## (e)Refilly

The Quinonez Killerz:
Evan Martinez, Nestor Ayala, Santiago Quinonez, and Wade Cookston


What Do They Do?

- Leading automotive parts retailer among D. I. Y. individuals \& leading auto parts distributor among commercial and professional customers
- Every store carries a diverse array of auto parts
- Distribution centers and hubs allow them to maximize space for less frequently needed parts
- Immediate access to the parts with the walk-in store



## Coreilly Company History

## 1883

- Michael has son named Charles Francis O'Reilly

1924

- Charles transferred to Springfield, Missouri

Dec. $2^{\text {nd }}, 1957$

- O'Reilly's formed
- 1 store, with 13 employees



## 1849

- Michael Byrne O'Reilly moved to America from Ireland


## 1913 \& 1914

- C. F. O'Reilly has a son named Charles Henry "Chub" O'Reilly
- C. F. O'Reilly goes to work for Fred
Campbell Auto
Supply


## 1932

- Charles became the manager of Link Auto Supply in Springfield


## 1993

1961

- $\$ 1.3$ million in sales
- Public offering of company stock at $\$ 17.50$



## 1958

- $\$ 700 \mathrm{k}$ in Sales


## 1975

- Sales volume reaches \$7 million
- Charles and Chub build a shared warehouse operation
- 9 stores in Southwest Missouri

1998

- Acquired $\mathrm{Hi} / \mathrm{LO}$ Auto Supply
- 182 stores in Texas and Lovisiana
- Made ORLY one of the top ten largest auto parts stores


## 2008

- Completed largest acquisition
- Acquired CSK Auto
- Added 1,273 stores in 12 states
- Made top 3 Auto Parts Store


## $m$ قas<AUTO

2001

- Purchased Mid-State Automotive Distributors
- $\quad+82$ stores across 7 states
- +2 distribution centers

2019

- Announced acquisition of Mayasa in August
- Finalized acquisition in November
- First international venture
- 5,400 stores across 47 states, and 20 in Mexico


Management


## David O'Reilly, 71

- Chairman of the Board(2005)


Larry O'Reilly, 74

- Vice Chairman of the Board(2005)

Greg Henslee, 60

- Vice Chairman of the Board(2017)
- Began as a part specialist
- 31 year tenure

- COO and Co-President
- Began as a parts manager in 1988


Tom McFall, 49

- CFO and Vice President(2006)


Greg Johnson, 54
-CEO and Co-
President(2018)

- 20 year tenure



## Rosalie O'Reilly Wootsen,

- Served as Vice President
- Director of Risk Management


## Management Focus

| Performance Metric | Weight\% | Threshold | Target | Actual | Achievement\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Comparable Store Sales | 30 | $2.5 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $4 \%$ | $29.6 \%$ |
| Operating Income | 30 | $\$ 1,885,000$ | $\$ 1,925,000$ | $\$ 1,920,726$ | $28.5 \%$ |
| Return on Invested Capital | 20 | $35,65 \%$ | $37,65 \%$ | $38.74 \%$ | $27.5 \%$ |
| Free Cash Flow | 20 | $\$ 858,000$ | $\$ 1,065,000$ | $\$ 1,020,649$ | $18.5 \%$ |

## The O'Reilly Culture

- O'Reilly philosophy to "Promote from Within" as shown through management
- Senior Managers average 21 years of service with the company
- Corporate Managers average 16 years of service within the company
- District Managers average $\mathbf{1 4}$ years of service within the company
- "Professional Parts People", go through automotive systems and product knowledge training and get certified after completing O'Reilly Certified Parts Pro Test
- Promotions and Compensation to incentivize performance for employees.


## Management <br> Capital Allocation

- Company has repurchased 77M for a total of $\$ 12.5 \mathrm{~B}$ for an average share price of $\$ 162.72$ since inception of repurchase program(2011) 74.6 M are outstanding
-3.9M were repurchased in 2019 for an average price of $\$ 369.55$
- O'Reilly does not pay a dividend
- Focus on opening new stores, strategic acquisitions, and growing distribution network. On average they open

Store Count
 around 200 stores.

Company Breakdown

## Dual Market Strategy

## Dual Market Strategy

Revenue by Customer


## Services and Programs

Battery，Alternator，and
Starter Diagnostic Testing

Wiper／Bulb Replacement

## シニニ Check Engine light

 とニ extractionCustom Hydraulic Hoses


Drum and rotor resurfacing

Loaner Tool Program

Professional Paint Shop Mixing

Used Oil，filter，battery recycling

O＇Reilly O＇Rewards Program

AutoParts


Maintanence

(e)Reilly.

Accessories


## Product Brands



## Private Label Products




MICROGARD.

## SUPER <br> BATTERIES

## (2)Reillyauto Pabis

Enank管
= CARTEKT

பLTIMA

## Supply Chain

Regional Distribution Centers

## 28 DC's

Access to 159,000 Products


Hub Stores
Hub


356 Total Stores
85 Super Hub / 271 Hub 68K Products/42K Products

## O'Reilly Stores

## 5,460 Total Stores

Stores Hold 22,000 Products
O'Reilly Stores
5,460 Total Stores
Stores Hold 22,000 Products


## Supply Chain

- 5 or less Greater than 5

©efily O'Reilly Auto Parts Locations in the USA Each grid point covers 10 -mile radius with at least one location


## Supply Chain




## Intangible Assets

## Scale and Cost Advantages

## Necessity

- Brand reputation
- Quality of service, convenience
- Proprietary brands
- Network of Distribution centers, Hub stores, and Traditional stores
- Quick, reliable service = More value
- Suppliers want to work with them
- Repair shops/commercial clients need to operate at a certain rate
- Parts are not a luxury item



## Oil Price Increases

When gas prices rise, people will not only drive less, but also have less money to spend on that repair or maintenance on their car that has been waiting for months.


## Lower number of miles driven.

The era of working from home saw less people commuting (in general) meaning less wear and tear on vehicles.


## Digital sellers (Amazon Effect)

Online sellers such as Amazon have a small footprint in the DIY market for parts, but do not offer the service, expertise, or ease

## amazon

 of experience that Auto Retailers like Orielly does.
## Electronification/Modernization of Vehicles

The ambiguous movement toward electric vehicles with less/more complex parts could pose risks to the DIY segment.


## Economic conditions favoring new car purchases.

Periods of rapid economic expansion may allow some consumers to purchase new vehicles which could affect DIY segment sales.

## Weather and its influence on DIY customers

While extreme weather conditions lead to more maintenance and failures, prolonged moderate conditions lead to less repairs needed.


Growth Opportunities

## Increase in Average Age of Recessionary Environments

As people defer new car purchases, the average age of cars that people are driving go up.

The prime DIY customer is not a 2020 Chevy Malibu, it's the 2008 Ford Explorer.

Older vehicles typically need frequent repair and this supports sales in DIY.

Average Age of Cars \& Light Trucks in Operation


## Oil Prices decreasing

Less money spent on gas for commuting means more discretionary income in the pockets of car owners that they can use to repair or maintain their vehicle.


## Same store sales growth

Orielly Auto Parts has been able to aggressively increase same store sales growth over the last 5 years.


## Expansion Into International Markets (Mayasa)

Their recent acquisition of Mayasa positions them well to insert themselves into Mexico.

Mayasa is an aftermarket parts retailer that currently has 6 distribution centers in Mexico and 21 stores. Their reach extends to 28 Mexican states.

## ORe O- <br> Competitor Analysis

## Total Sales (Thousands)



## Store Count

■ O'reilly ■ AutoZone ■ Advanced Auto Parts



## Sales Per Store (Thousands)



# Comparable Store Sales Growth (\%) 

■ O'reilly ■ AutoZone - Advanced Auto Parts



## Total Number of Employees

\author{

- O'reilly ■ AutoZone - Advanced Auto Parts
}

120000


## Sales Per Employee (Thousands)

■O'reilly ■ AutoZone ■ Advanced Auto Parts



## Inventory Turnover (x)




## REVENUE




FREE CASH FLOW


## SHARES OUTSTANDING



## LONG-TERM DEBT



## RETAINED EARNINGS



## SHAREHOLDER'S EQUITY



## RETURN ON EQUITY



## RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL



## RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED



## MANAGEMENT CALCULATED ROIC



## GROSS PROFIT MARGIN

```
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
    0%
        2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
                            —GPM —Threshold
```


## OPERATING MARGIN

25\%


5\%

0\%

$$
\begin{array}{lllllllllllll}
2009 & 2010 & 2011 & 2012 & 2013 & 2014 & 2015 & 2016 & 2017 & 2018 & 2019 & 2020 \\
& & & & & & 2020
\end{array}
$$

## NET PROFIT MARGIN



## FREE CASH FLOW MARGIN



## SG\&A EXPENSES TO GROSS PROFIT



AUTO PARTS

## DD\&A EXPENSES TO GROSS PROFIT



## INTEREST EXPENSE TO OP. INCOME



## OBLIGATION RATIO

| LONG-TERM DEBT | $\$ 4,122$ (Millions) |
| :---: | :---: |
| SHORT-TERM DEBT | $\$ 0$ |
| LEASES*7 | $\$ 2,213$ |
| PENSION SHORTFALL | $\$ 0$ |
| PREFERRED STOCK | $\$ 0$ |
| CASH ASSETS | $-\$ 466$ |
| NET INCOME | $\$ 1,752$ |
| OBLIGATION RATIO | 3.35 Years |

## DEBT MATURITIES SCHEDULE

| Contractual Obligations | Payments Due By Period |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Total | Before <br> 1 Year | Years <br> 1 and 2 | Years <br> 3 and 4 | Years 5 and Over |
| Long-term debt principal and interest payments ${ }^{(1)}$ | \$4,779,438 | \$157,958 | \$ 1,624,882 | \$477,935 | \$2,518,663 |
| Future minimum lease payments under operating leases ${ }^{(2)}$ | 2,437,219 | 316,050 | 574,102 | 456,857 | 1,090,210 |
| Self-insurance reserves ${ }^{(3)}$ | 168,279 | 79,079 | 54,148 | 21,772 | 13,280 |
| Construction commitments | 100,086 | 100,086 | - | - | - |
| Capital contributions to certain tax credit equity investments ${ }^{(4)}$ | 95,000 | 95,000 | - | - | - |
| Total contractual cash obligations | \$7,580,022 | \$748,173 | \$2,253,132 | \$ 956,564 | \$3,622,153 |



## PRICE TO SALES



2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021

## PRICE TO OWNER'S EARNINGS



## PRICE TO EARNINGS LESS CASH



15

## PRICE TO EARNINGS



## PRICE TO CASH FLOW



## PRICE TO FREE CASH FLOW



## ENTERPRISE VALE TO REVENUE



## ENTERPRISE VALUE TO EBITDA



## ENTERPRISE VALUE TO EBIT




Intraportfolio Analysis

## RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL




## PRICE TO SALES



PRICE TO FREE CASH FLOW


## EV TO EBIT



## EV TO EBITDA




Discounted Cash Flow Analysis

## DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW - EPS

| Bear Case |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| EPS | $\mathbf{\$ 2 3 . 5 3}$ |
| Growth Rate | $8 \%$ |
| Years | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |
| Terminal Rate | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ |
| Discount Rate | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| Current Price | $\mathbf{\$ 4 3 4 . 0 0}$ |
| Fair Value | $\mathbf{\$ 3 9 1 . 0 0}$ |
| Margin of Safety | $-\mathbf{- 1 0 . 7 4 \%}$ |


| Base Case |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| EPS | $\mathbf{\$ 2 3 . 5 3}$ |
| Growth Rate | $11 \%$ |
| Years | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |
| Terminal Rate | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ |
| Discount Rate | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| Current Price | $\mathbf{\$ 4 3 4 . 0 0}$ |
| Fair Value | $\$ 480.37$ |
| Margin of Safety | $\mathbf{9 . 8 6 \%}$ |


| Bull Case |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| EPS | $\$ 23.53$ |
| Growth Rate | $14 \%$ |
| Years | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |
| Terminal Rate | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ |
| Discount Rate | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| Current Price | $\mathbf{\$ 4 3 4 . 0 0}$ |
| Fair Value | $\$ 590.83$ |
| Margin of Safety | $26.71 \%$ |



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BEAR CASE SCENARIOS



## BASE CASE SCENARIOS



## BASE CASE SCENARIOS



## BASE CASE SCENARIOS



## BULL CASE SCENARIOS



## BULL CASE SCENARIOS



## BULL CASE SCENARIOS



## SENSATIVITY ANALYSIS

| Sensitivity Analysis: <br> Total RoR Range |  |  |  | Exp |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Est. EPS growth rate |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 8\% | 11\% | 14\% |
|  | 15.0x | 3.3\% | 6.2\% | 9.0\% |
|  | 23.0x | 12.5\% | 15.6\% | 18.8\% |
|  | 30.0x | 18.6\% | 21.9\% | 25.2\% |

## Why O'Reilly Instead of More Autozone?

- O'Reilly and Autozone trade at similar valuation multiples and are both leaders in the industry.
- However, they dominate different markets. O'Reilly dominates the professional services market which is growing faster, while Autozone dominates the DIY and international markets.


IIIIIINTOZOne

- We want to make sure we can capture the growth of both of these markets by owning both companies.


## Conclusion

- We believe that O'Reilly is a business that is predictable, consistent, and understandable.
- It has consistently improved and is currently trading at a discount relative to historical valuation.
- We believe it fits all of our investment criteria and is a long-term compounder



## Recommendation

- We want to make ORLY $2 \%$ of our portfolio since Autozone is $3 \%$.
- Our recommendation is to buy 40 shares of ORLY at a limit of $\$ 445$




## 5-YEAR P/E

## - O'Reilly Automotive Inc PE Ratio



## Morningstar Estimates

Fair Value and Profit Drivers | by Zain Akbari Updated Nov 17, 2020
We are raising our valuation of 0'Reilly to $\$ 410$ per share from $\$ 378$, reflecting stellar thirdquarter sales results (17\% comparable growth) that led us to lift our 2020 marks (to 11\% comparable growth from 7\%). Our estimate implies forward fiscal 2021 enterprise value/adjusted EBITDA of 13 times and adjusted forward P/E of 17 .

Fourth quarter comparable growth should moderate from recent levels as ebbing stimulus effects and renewed restrictions as COVID-19 case counts rise slow expansion that should nevertheless be brisk relative to historical levels. Management indicates O'Reilly saw a low-double-digit comparable growth rate in October, and our 11\% full-year target is also in line with O'Reilly's year-to-date mark. We expect a return to trend after strong 2020 sales are lapped in 2021, with 5\% average annual revenue growth from 2022-29, fueled by industry consolidation and the firm's Mexican expansion.

## Model for Revenue Growth

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 2 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 2 5}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Revenue (2\% then 5\%) | 11,604 | 11,836 | 12,428 | 13,049 | 13,702 | $\mathbf{1 4 , 3 8 7}$ |
| Net Income (14\% margin) | 1,752 | 1,775 | 1,864 | 1,957 | 2,055 | 2,158 |
| Shares Outstanding (6\% Decrease) | 74 | 70 | 65 | 61 | 58 | 54 |
| EPS | 23.68 | 25.52 | 28.51 | 31.85 | 35.57 | 39.74 |

## Value Line Estimates

| ANNUAL RATES | Past | Past | Est'd '17.'19 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| of change (per sh) | 10 Yrs. | 5 Yrs. | to '23.'25 |
| Sales | $16.0 \%$ | $15.0 \%$ | $11.5 \%$ |
| "Cash Flow" | $22.0 \%$ | $20.0 \%$ | $13.0 \%$ |
| Earnings | $23.5 \%$ | $21.0 \%$ | $14.0 \%$ |
| Dividends | $-10.0 \%$ | $-20.5 \%$ | $25.0 \%$ |
| Book Value | $-10.0 \%$ | $-20 \%$ | 2 |



## S\&P Global Estimates



## DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW - FCF

| Bear Case |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| FCF | $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 . 4 2}$ |
| Growth Rate | $4 \%$ |
| Years | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |
| Terminal Rate | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ |
| Discount Rate | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| Current Price | $\mathbf{\$ 4 5 4 . 4 0}$ |
| Fair Value | $\$ 385.36$ |
| Margin of Safety | $-\mathbf{- 1 4 . 8 3 \%}$ |


| Base Case |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| FCF | $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 . 4 2}$ |
| Growth Rate | $6 \%$ |
| Years | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |
| Terminal Rate | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ |
| Discount Rate | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| Current Price | $\mathbf{\$ 4 5 4 . 4 0}$ |
| Fair Value | $\mathbf{\$ 4 4 1 . 1 2}$ |
| Margin of Safety | $-\mathbf{0 . 3 1 \%}$ |


| Bull Case |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| FCF | $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 . 4 2}$ |
| Growth Rate | $8 \%$ |
| Years | $\mathbf{1 0}$ |
| Terminal Rate | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ |
| Discount Rate | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| Current Price | $\mathbf{\$ 4 5 4 . 4 0}$ |
| Fair Value | $\$ 505.41$ |
| Margin of Safety | $\mathbf{1 2 . 4 6 \%}$ |

## PRICE TO BOOK



## PRICE TO BOOK



Our Team's commitment to excellent customer service and expense control also resulted in our generation of $\$ 1.0$ billion in free cash in 2019, after reinvesting $\$ 628$ million in capital projects at our stores, DCs and offices. During 2019, we returned excess capital of $\$ 1.4$ billion to you, our shareholders, through our share repurchase program. Since we began this program in 2011, we have returned $\$ 12.5$ billion through the repurchase of 77 million shares, at an average price of $\$ 162.72$ per share. We continue to view the disciplined execution of our share repurchase program as an effective means of returning capital after we have exhausted all opportunities to profitably grow the business and drive a high rate of return for our shareholders. We remain committed to a balanced capital structure that supports our investment grade credit ratings and provides the flexibility to take advantage of future growth opportunities while also providing outstanding returns for our shareholders.

## Future Buybacks

Today, the Company also announced that its Board of Directors (the "Board") approved a resolution to increase the authorization amount under its share repurchase program by an additional $\$ 1.0$ billion, raising the aggregate authorization under the program to $\$ 15.75$ billion. The additional $\$ 1.0$ billion authorization is effective for a three-year period, beginning on February 10, 2021. Stock repurchases under the program may be made from time to time, as the Company deems appropriate, solely through open market repurchases effected through a broker dealer at prevailing market prices, based on a variety of factors such as price, corporate requirements and overall market conditions. There can be no assurance as to the number of shares the Company will purchase, if any. The share repurchase program may be increased or otherwise modified, renewed, suspended or terminated by the Company at any time, without prior notice. As of the date of this release, the Company had approximately $\$ 1.18$ billion remaining under its current share repurchase authorization


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