



# Rethinking Police Demand

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## Foreword

**The pressures and demands facing modern policing are changing in ways which have profound implications for future policing policy, not least with respect to how the police are funded. There are two major reasons for this. Firstly, the fall in overall volume crime, as estimated by the Crime Survey for England and Wales, has masked important changes in the pattern of modern crime. There has been a growth in ‘high-harm’ offences, such as violence and sexual offences, and more crime has shifted from the public into the private sphere, including online. These offences tend to be more complex to investigate and thus costly to deal with. As a result, the police service have been unable to ‘cash the gains’ of falling volume crime.**

Secondly, the demands facing policing are broader. Our report provides clear evidence that ‘non-crime demand’ is sucking up more resources than was the case a decade ago; the police are increasingly being forced to pick up the pieces arising from various manifestations of social dysfunction, from mental illness to missing children. As the country’s 24-hour emergency service, policing has arguably also been a victim of its capacity and preparedness to respond to those demands, which has in turn stimulated public expectations in ways not previously envisaged.

There are two possible conclusions one can draw from these trends. The first is that policing has suffered from a form of ‘mission-creep’ – and that what is required is for policing to shed responsibility for things falling outside of its ‘core’ role of cutting crime. We categorically reject this idea. In our view, it is essential to recognise that cases involving public safety, welfare and the protection of the vulnerable represent a legitimate and worthy use of police time, rather than being viewed as a form of ‘mission-creep’. Indeed it can be argued that these categories of ‘non-crime’ demand are absolutely central to the policing mission, as the only 24-hour public service able to respond to emergencies, with the capacity to deploy coercive force. The public poll we have carried out for this report suggests the public agrees.

The second conclusion – the one we advocate – is that the police need to improve their ability to tackle the causes of demand (rather than managing the symptoms), which in turn requires the police to work more effectively as part of a wider system of public services. To tackle complex local problems, such as a growth in the numbers of missing children, the police need to work across organisational borders, collaborating with care homes, health professionals, social workers and community organisations. Many forces already do this – but it is not yet systematic. The current situation – with the police facing rising demand alongside shrinking budgets – risks creating a crisis of legitimacy for policing. For example, it is inevitable that Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners will need to make tough choices about how to allocate scarce resources. Some of these choices are bound to be controversial and unpopular. Yet currently, the basis for these choices remains unclear and under-discussed. All the public see is a service that appears to be shrinking. This urgently needs to be addressed, with the issues in this report exposed to public debate. Our report starts that process, setting out a series of practical policy options for enabling the police to manage demand in a more strategic way.

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## Executive Summary

**Major shifts in externally driven demand have left the police facing unprecedented pressures. However, they lack a good understanding of the nature and shape of that demand to help them plan and deploy their resources to best effect, and how to tackle an increasingly complex case load.**

In this report we have adopted a whole system view to assess the trends and volumes of both crime and non-crime demands. We have assembled the evidence from a variety of sources and have identified that the following key trends and changes are pushing up demand on the police – even at a time when the overall volume of crime is falling:

- 1) Since 2013 a significant increase in the volume of recorded crime (up by ~40% from 2013 to 2017), particularly from violence and sexual offences, which together represent the largest category of reported offences. These cases are, in general, more complex and take longer to resolve. The rise in reported violence and sexual crime is the single most important shift in demand that has occurred within policing over the last decade.
- 2) Reduced budgets have resulted in overall police workforce numbers falling by 25% since 2010. The ratio of crime cases to number of officers and staff initially remained constant during the period 2011 to 2013 but has, since then, grown very substantially by some 43%, reflecting the growth in more serious crime since 2013, and quantifying the scale of pressure felt by police.
- 3) New analysis undertaken for this report suggests that around a fifth (18%) of the incident volume tackled through command and control centres concerns what we have termed ‘vulnerability demand’ – cases that involve mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents or vulnerable persons. While this is lower than some previous estimates, our analysis suggests vulnerability demand uses up a disproportionately high quantity of police deployment resources.
- 4) The number and complexity of cases involving people who are vulnerable in some way, are growing, with a rise in Section 136 mental health detentions, missing children, domestic incidents/abuse, and drugs interventions, all of which require effective cross-agency arrangements or services, supported by service improvements, in mental health in particular. Importantly, these type of cases frequently have significant time demands on the officers dealing with them.
- 5) The volume of anti-social behaviour (which historically has made up the bulk of ‘non-crime demand’) has been falling over the past decade – down by 56% since 2011 and likely to continue. However, the ‘benefit’ from a reduction here is not enough to offset the pressure from rising crime (particularly violence) and vulnerability demand identified above.

These shifts in demand, alongside the shrinking of budgets, risk creating a crisis of legitimacy for policing. With more 'demand' than the police are capable of responding to, it is inevitable that Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners will need to make tough choices about how to allocate scarce resources. Inevitably some of these choices will be controversial and unpopular. Yet currently, the basis for these choices remains unclear and under-discussed. All the public see is a service that appears to be shrinking. This urgently needs to be addressed.

The pressures on public finances mean that extra resources for the police will not be easily won. In our view, the answer to the challenge posed by rising demand (particularly 'non-crime demand') is not to retrench to a narrow 'crime-only' view of the policing role. Not only are there practical problems to drawing such a boundary, we believe it is essential to recognise that cases involving safety, welfare and the protection of the vulnerable also represent a legitimate and worthy use of police time; they are not inferior in some way to crime-related demand. Indeed, it can be argued that these categories of non-crime demand are absolutely central to the police mission, a core tenet of which is the ability, indeed obligation, to respond to 'emergencies' at any time of the day or night, often necessitating the use of coercive force. New polling undertaken for this report illustrates that a narrowing of the police role is also not supported by the public.

Rather we think that the approach should be to maximise support and facilitate effective joint working practices that tackle those cases at source, recognising the responsibility and contribution that other local partners can bring. Our key recommendations are as follows:

**1. A high-level political statement, including also from the police leadership, affirming a scope and role of the police that extends beyond a pure 'crime' focus, to include public safety, welfare and the protection of the vulnerable.**

This should bring about needed certainty for the police and for local partner organisations, also spelling out what is expected from them.

**2. The evidence base for the external demand on the police needs to be improved with systematic cross-cutting studies being commissioned.**

A step towards understanding existing and future demands for the coming four years has commenced with forces completing Force Management Statements for submission to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS).. However, a better understanding of current and likely future demand is still required to facilitate better ways to deploy existing resources as well as strengthen the case for additional money or police. Such work can help drive more uniform classifications for data capture and analysis, leading progressively to more robust results.



**3. Encourage the police, local authorities, health and social services to establish multi-agency crisis teams to tackle complex cases that cut across service boundaries.**

This should be facilitated by pooled budgets and informed by the development of technological solutions which allow for much better analysis of data from statutory and non-statutory partners. Data can then be more effectively interrogated to understand both known demand but also ‘hidden’ demand from issues such as modern slavery, honour-based violence and grooming of vulnerable victims including children, that are not readily obvious to any one agency.

**4. PCCs should use their democratic authority and mandate to open up discussion with other agencies, to establish local service agreements.**

The forthcoming spending review should empower the police and local partners to find effective operating models, facilitating the creation of pooled budgets where such an approach would help.

**5. Better information for the public about accessing emergency services provided by other organisations as well as the police.**

The aim would be to inform and encourage the public to contact the right service rather than default to routing cases to the police.



# 1 What is 'demand' and why does it matter?

**At its most basic level, 'demand', in this report, refers to the range of incidents, events or other activities that require some form of police intervention.**

In this report we have sought to look at the problem of demand holistically, using published data when available to support such a perspective, and have also carried out analyses of local data from two police forces, to get a more detailed look than would be possible by relying entirely on published national statistics.

The public are not a neutral bystander in the framing of expectations about the role of the police and priorities. We have therefore carried out a public poll to help ascertain how the public see that role, helping to guide future thinking about police demand and workforce strategies.

The question of what makes up police demand is not merely a technocratic one. It goes to the heart of what makes a police service effective, efficient, and how it derives its legitimacy. Chief Constables need a rigorous understanding of the demands on their forces in order to be able to plan their services more effectively. (For example, some of our detailed comparative findings ought to trigger questions in a number of areas including how cases are handled, the role of health and other specialists, and the wide variation in investigation outcomes.)

Similarly, Police and Crime Commissioners need to understand the nature of demand so that they are able to prioritise scarce resources more effectively. Local authorities and health services, too, need to be better aware of significant demand overlaps, the impact of gaps in services and the imperative for coordinated local action working with the police. Meanwhile, a better understanding of demand is also in the public interest. Only when the public understand how the police spend their time can we hope for a more informed debate about the role of the police and how to join up services locally to the benefit of communities, bearing down on crime, promoting public safety and supporting better access to appropriate health and social services.

## 2 Police demand: opposing narratives

**It has long been recognised that police work is about much more than just fighting crime. Egon Bittner famously described the police officer as “Florence Nightingale in pursuit of [famous bank robber] Willie Sutton”<sup>1</sup> to illustrate the breadth of the police role. More recently, the 2010 Greater Manchester Twitter experiment colourfully captured the variety of incidents the public ask the police to assist with in a single day<sup>2</sup> – ranging from robberies and rape allegations to run away horses and teenagers throwing a snake.**

The Government’s use of falling crime rates to justify police funding cuts (based on Theresa May’s target-busting assertion that the police role is “to cut crime. No more, and no less”),<sup>3</sup> has exposed a gap in policing’s understanding of its broad and messy demand profile. In its 2014 Core Business inspection report HMIC<sup>4</sup> concluded that “few forces are carrying out the necessary detailed analysis of the nature of demand” and that “a disturbingly high proportion [of forces] did not understand the full range of demand they face including the workloads and activities undertaken by officers and staff”.<sup>5</sup> Subsequent efforts by the service to get a firmer grip on its demand profile have introduced a number of conceptual developments, often expressed as divisions or categories of demand, which can be traced through successive HMIC PEEL Efficiency inspection reports, a number of which are outlined below.

### Conceptual developments in understanding police demand

In 2015<sup>6</sup> HMIC concluded that while forces had a good understanding of current demand, they were much weaker at predicting future demand and that while there was a wealth of data on crime, forces did not routinely or consistently measure non-crime demand. Therefore, the widely held belief that non-crime demand was rising could not be tested. In addition, College of Policing analysis<sup>7</sup> identified that protective demand (for example resourcing MAPPA arrangements) was placing an increasing pull on police resource.

In 2016,<sup>8</sup> with a growing recognition that policing should seek out hidden harm as well as just responding to what was reported to them, HMIC’s Efficiency inspection identified greater attention being paid to proactive or latent demand as well as that which was reactive or patent. It recognised that some demand came from, or through, partners rather than the public and recommended that this needed to be managed proactively. It also

<sup>1</sup> Bittner, E. (1974) *Florence Nightingale in pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police*. New York: Sage.

<sup>2</sup> See: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/8065696/Twitter-experiment-by-police-a-success.html> and <https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/gmp-24-fahy-hails-twitter-1220834>

<sup>3</sup> See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/police-reform-theresa-mays-speech-to-the-national-policing-conference>

<sup>4</sup> Now HMICFRS.

<sup>5</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf> (p35)

<sup>6</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/publications/peel-police-efficiency-2015/>

<sup>7</sup> See: <http://www.college.police.uk/About/Pages/Demand-Analysis-Report.aspx>

<sup>8</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-efficiency-2016.pdf>

reported on initiatives to reduce internal demand (for example by reducing bureaucracy) and identify misplaced demand. In 2017<sup>9</sup> HMICFRS highlighted some success in forces' demand reduction work, but warned of possible demand suppression; when attempts to improve efficiency inadvertently lead to failures to address low priority cases.

HMICFRS has now introduced the concept of Force Management Statements, requiring each force to complete a comprehensive assessment of not only its current demand profile but how that is expected to change and develop over the next four years. The Statements require self-assessments of current and predicted demand in eleven key areas,<sup>10</sup> many of which cut across the crime/non-crime distinction.<sup>11</sup> Views differ within the service on the potential value of these statements though the need for greater consistency of thinking and measurement in relation to demand has been acknowledged.<sup>12</sup> The Force Management Statements also require forces to assess the condition, capacity, capability and serviceability of all of their assets including workforce and finance required to meet the predicted demands.

The above reflects a conceptual landscape that has rapidly become more sophisticated and in which crime/non-crime represents just one dimension. It has tended to generate two competing narratives.

On the one hand, it has been argued by some that policing has undergone 'mission creep' over a number of decades, away from its core crime and disorder functions, and that funding cuts, along with new crime challenges, increase the imperative to shed some of these non-crime/non-core drains on resource. Gibbs and Greenhalgh, for example, argued in 2014<sup>13</sup> that in order to release resource to prevent crime and disorder and tackle terrorism, the police should pull back from tasks like dealing with missing people enquiries, guarding suspects in hospitals, responding to online abuse, policing sporting and other public events, taking the lead in managing serious offenders, transporting mental health patients and supporting their partners in safeguarding work.

<sup>9</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/peel-police-efficiency-2017.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> i.e. responding to the public, prevention and deterrence, investigations, protecting vulnerable people, monitoring dangerous and repeat offenders, disrupting organised crime and responding to major events

<sup>11</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/force-management-statements-consultation-2017.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> See (p21): [http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/CCC\\_October\\_Minutes\\_Final\\_Open%20version.pdf](http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/CCC_October_Minutes_Final_Open%20version.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Available at: <http://www.reform.uk/publication/1171/>

An opposing standpoint is to view police demand within a wider eco-system, whereby public services generate ‘failure demand’<sup>14</sup> – that is, demand created by the failure of ‘the system’ to respond adequately when people present with needs that cut across organisational silos. Rather than demarcating territory and tightening remits, this approach advocates service integration and reconfiguration around the citizen,<sup>15</sup> based on a more holistic understanding of demand. For the police, reducing crime and non-crime demand (within this framework) depends on collaboration with other services to resolve issues early and appropriately, so that they do not re-emerge and intensify.

In recent years, these narratives – remit demarcation to concentrate on ‘core business’, and ‘embracing a wider set of concerns as part of a holistic, systems thinking’ – have existed in tension within police discourse and consciousness. The tension is apparent in the Policing Vision 2025;<sup>16</sup> which states:

*“Policing must address the sources of demand on its resources working with a range of partner agencies including health, education, social services, other emergency services, criminal justice and victims’ organisations...while being conscious of service-drift, as partner agencies capacity is reduced”.*

<sup>14</sup> Seddon, M. (2008) Systems Thinking in the Public Sector: the failure of the reform regime...and a manifesto for a better way

<sup>15</sup> See for example Greater Manchester’s vision for place based service integration and reform: [https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiS2bbx9obZAhWqLsAKHdXxA2EQFggsMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment\\_data%2Ffile%2F588237%2FIntegrated\\_place\\_based\\_services\\_Academy\\_seminar\\_slidepack\\_310117.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0eeiM7\\_EBZT\\_SRLGFclFON](https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwiS2bbx9obZAhWqLsAKHdXxA2EQFggsMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.uk%2Fgovernment%2Fuploads%2Fsystem%2Fuploads%2Fattachment_data%2Ffile%2F588237%2FIntegrated_place_based_services_Academy_seminar_slidepack_310117.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0eeiM7_EBZT_SRLGFclFON)

<sup>16</sup> Available at: <http://www.npcc.police.uk/NPCCBusinessAreas/ReformandTransformation/PolicingVision2025.aspx>

### 3 Quantifying police demand

In recent years, it has become common to hear senior policing leaders express concern about the police's inability to cope with rising demand. For example, in 2017, the Chair of the National Police Chiefs' Council, Sara Thornton, warned that the combination of funding cuts and rising demand was creating "additional pressure [that] is not sustainable".<sup>17</sup>

Of course, there is an obvious conundrum at the heart of this debate: how can it be possible for the police to be experiencing rising demand, given the large falls in volume crime that have occurred since 1995?<sup>18</sup> Finding an answer to that question depends on our ability to quantify the volume of 'demand' and assign relative weight to its different components.

Historically, quantitative estimates<sup>19</sup> of the volume of demand and of the balance between crime and other police work appear to have varied dramatically; the 1993 Government White Paper on Police Reform, for example, claimed that only 18% of calls to police were about crime, and that only 40% of police time was spent on it, using this to argue for a greater emphasis on 'catching criminals'.<sup>20</sup> In contrast, more recent studies have indicated that up to 80% of police demand relates to crime, or carries a 'risk' of crime, implying this should be considered core police business.<sup>21</sup> A good deal of this rests, of course, in what is, or should be, defined as 'calls', so that it leads to a meaningful analysis that can support planning and operational decisions. Our aim is to develop a demand map that can help clarify these issues.

Our analysis suggests three distinctive sets of phenomena:

- **a changing crime mix**, which has meant that the proportion of total crime that is 'high-harm' and therefore complex to investigate, has gone up. For example, a sustained increase in violence and sexual offending, which now make up a larger proportion of cases requiring investigation, helps explain the rising pressure on police workload.
- **a growth in non-crime demand**, such as the rise in mental health-related incidents, which has placed particular pressure on police response teams, effectively turning the police into a 'social service of last resort'.<sup>22</sup> However, 'non-crime demand' as a category, while it represents a large proportion of the incident volume and covers a multitude of things, needs breaking down, both to make sense of its impact and how to tackle it, in conjunction with other local organisations that exercise responsibility in these areas.

<sup>17</sup> The Police Chiefs' Blog, Sara Thornton, 2017 <https://www.npcc.police.uk/ThePoliceChiefsBlog/BlogCCSaraThorntonPolicefundingdowehavetheresource.aspx>

<sup>18</sup> The Crime Survey for England Wales suggests the number of crimes has fallen from c. 19 million to c. 11 million (if fraud and computer misuse are included)

<sup>19</sup> See Annex A for a short history of earlier work on mapping police demand

<sup>20</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/271972/2281.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271972/2281.pdf) see also Reiner (2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/28/admit-police-work-catching-criminals>

<sup>21</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/taking-time-for-crime.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> Independent Commission on Mental Health and Policing, 2013.

- **rising expectations**, which has seen demand for policing rise in proportion to its capacity and preparedness to meet these demands, which stimulates or depresses public expectations. Put crudely, the growing accessibility of the police to the public is likely to have been a factor in determining the level of demand.

Until recently, it has not been possible to assign relative weight to the different components of demand. For example, there are no published national estimates of the current average time the police spend dealing with specific crime types, although data on the overall timeliness by offence and outcome type have recently been made available. Similarly, until now, there have been little hard data about non-crime demand and how it has changed over time. (HMIC have previously found<sup>23</sup> that most police forces could not quantify non-crime demand and do not have data analysing the proportion of demand that is passed on from other agencies).<sup>24</sup>

The National Police Chiefs' Council frames the changing nature of demand as, in part, a product of "our revised approach to risk, threat, harm and vulnerability" (that is, as much driven by a change in mission as by external factors). It categorises demand into public, protective and internal and advocates a 'systems thinking' approach to prevention, through collaborative early intervention. It calls for a reassessment of the 'role and scope' of policing and for increased use of technologies, including 'big data' analytics and process mapping, to increase efficiency and improve prediction.<sup>25</sup>

Clearly, then, knowledge about the demand on the police is improving,<sup>26</sup> and our work with Police and Crime Commissioners suggests more police forces are investing time and effort to understand better the shape of their local workloads and priorities. Our analysis in this report aims to shed light on some of these issues, including the range of variability among police forces.

## A typology of demand

Demand on the police does not naturally fall into clear-cut categories. In particular, the distinction between 'crime' and 'non-crime' demand is often blurred and can sometimes be contrived. What might initially be reported to police as a non-crime matter, might on further investigation be found to be a significant crime issue, such as modern slavery.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. Evidence taken from HMIC in NAO, 2015, Financial Sustainability of Police Forces in England and Wales.

<sup>24</sup> The Greater Manchester Police Twitter experiment in 2010 provided an excellent snapshot of non-crime demand, showing up to a third of police time related to 'social work'.

<sup>25</sup> See: <http://www.npcc.police.uk/2017%20FOI/CO/078%2017%20CCC%20April%202017%2024%20Better%20Understanding%20Demand%20Policing%20the%20Future.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> See: <http://www.college.police.uk/About/Pages/Demand-Analysis-Report.aspx>

Moreover, we believe it is essential to recognise that cases involving safety, welfare and the protection of the vulnerable represent a legitimate and worthy use of police time; they are not inferior in some way to crime-related demand. Indeed, it can be argued that these categories of non-crime demand are absolutely central to the police mission, a core tenet of which is the ability, indeed obligation, to respond to ‘emergencies’ at any time of the day or night, often necessitating the use of coercive force. To quote Egon Bittner again, we can define the police’s purpose as simply as “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now!”.

The survey of the public we carried out in May 2018 – see Section 9 – strongly supports this view. Between 60 - 70% surveyed think that the police’s role is wider than solely dealing with crime and includes public safety and the protection of the vulnerable. Such cases are frequently complex and often require the support and contribution of other statutory agencies to find meaningful solutions.

For the purposes of this report, and to help shape our analysis, we have adopted a typology of demand that draws on a range of Crest’s project work and is aimed at helping to organise demand – characterising what the police do in ways that can support a strategic understanding and the decisions needed to shape the police’s response.

Chart 3.1 puts demand into three broad categories: (A), that which is externally derived over which the police have no or little control; (B), demand which is based on the police mission but its volume and delivery are for the most part plannable; and, (C), that which is linked to organisation maintenance and function, and is internally derived and driven. **In this report we have focused on external/reactive demand (A).**

Chart 3.1: Police activity grouped into three categories of demand

<b>A. External/Reactive demand</b>	+	<b>Police response and investigation</b>	→	<b>Externally driven, reactive workload</b>
B. Protective demand ongoing statutory responsibilities, public events, safeguarding	+	Prevention, Intelligence, Communications, Work with partners	→	Proactive/Partnership workload
C. Internal demand organisation function, Communications	+	HR & Hierarchy Management Finance HMIC & Political pressures	→	Internally generated workload



## 4 Methodology

Accessing relevant data was, and remains, the main challenge in seeking to estimate the volume and type of demands placed on the police. While the curation by government of crime related data is improving,<sup>27</sup> with a level of standardisation of reported statistics that allows, in some cases, both changes with time and geographic variation to be explored, broader questions about incidents that may also involve a health, welfare or a social dimension are harder to assess. In the main this is because police forces use different systems of data capture and categorisation - making it hard to compare broader demand categories across forces. Also, such systems generate so much data that extracting useful information to support decision making can stretch the analytical capacity of many Police and Crime Commissioners or police forces.

A further complication is introduced because incidents which are also associated with, for example, health, social and welfare factors, cut across conventional police categories. And data to try to make sense of how external drivers – such as service gaps – linked to other local services influence demand on police are harder to interpret since they are often structured along local authority or NHS lines.

It is also the case that data for certain types of crime, such as online fraud and child sex abuse offences, are not well captured. We discuss this in more detail in section 7.4. Furthermore, while volume of activity is recorded, there is very little information available about the time different activities take and thus how work-intensive they are. While this is a significant limitation, some inroad can be made by understanding the composition of the demand, and how difficult that is likely to be, in the context of broader categories.

Evidence has been gathered in a number of ways, with the overall intention of securing both in-depth operational insights and strategic perspectives on the volume and nature of incidents to which police respond. In particular, we have analysed data provided by two police forces: Platt Bridge, part of Greater Manchester, and Bedfordshire. These new results are discussed in Annex C and help to inform the discussion about non-crime demand and also serve to ‘cross check’ conclusions based on more general data sources but which lack the specific detail available from these two data sets.

<sup>27</sup> See for example the data set on recorded crime and anti-social behaviour at <https://data.police.uk/data/archive/>

In preparing our report we have drawn on the following:

- **Quantitative data analyses** – using published police data, health and other relevant data in particular focussing on ‘type A’ demand as characterised in Chart 3.1. This included 999 calls, incidents data and workforce data. We have analysed a dataset of crime and anti-social behaviour recorded at street level resolution over the period 2010 - 2018; where possible<sup>28</sup> we mapped to police areas health and other data reported for local authority or NHS geographies, to help assess local service demand or provision, and to help make cross police force comparisons.
- **National stakeholder consultation** – meetings and interviews were held with representatives from a number of organisations that hold a stake, at the national level, in guiding or influencing police and practice in relation to police demand, including the Home Office, National Police Chiefs’ Council, College of Policing and a number of Police and Crime Commissioners. A list of the organisations consulted is included in Appendix F.
- **Practitioner focus groups and interviews** – a number of focus group discussions and interviews were held with police officers in three police forces.
- **Public opinion survey** – Crest commissioned a survey of public opinion carried out by ComRes,<sup>29</sup> based on a sample of 2,002 adults in Great Britain.

<sup>28</sup> This was not always possible given how the published data were structured. Also, for the most part this was done for England - for example NHS data was not generally available in the same form for Wales.

<sup>29</sup> ComRes surveyed 2,002 GB adults online between 30th May 2018 and 31st May 2018. Data were weighted to be demographically representative of all British adults aged 18+.

## 5 The macro perspective: incidents, crime and non-crime

**In this report we embrace a whole system and systems thinking viewpoint. Our objective is to locate and characterise the complexity of demand so that it is seen in context, where possible quantifying the impact, and to recognise who and how other organisations need to be involved.**

The majority (~90%) of incidents are received either as 999 or 101 calls (see Annex B for more detail).<sup>30</sup> In building up a holistic view of externally driven demand it is also useful to present a model of how different types of incident translate into a workload for the police. The absence of activity-based cost information limits how far the analysis can be taken; however, an understanding of the composition of demand as that unfolds over time, from when an incident is reported to the time when police cease to work on the case, will be important to be able to shape a strategic response, and to analyse and interpret current and future data.

### THRIVE and MoRILE

Importantly, the police service is now utilising various methods to manage demand on its services most effectively. THRIVE is a structured risk assessment tool used to inform the most appropriate response needed to a call. It is based on the threat, harm, risk, investigative opportunities, the vulnerability of those involved as well as opportunities to engage.

In those cases where a criminal investigation develops, the service is now using the MoRILE (Management of Risk in Law Enforcement) approach. MoRILE uses a common language and structured methodology that assists decision makers to respond to threat, risk and harm, and is used both within the police service and by other law enforcement bodies such as the National Crime Agency.



Chart 5.1 provides a macro view of how police workload changes at each successive stage of the resolution of an incident until the case is 'closed'; and the broad categories. This picture has been 'pieced',<sup>31,32</sup> together to help navigate through the various elements of the externally driven demand. Such a meta-analysis faces a number of problems, not least, that the data on which it is based have, as a whole, neither been collected in a systematic fashion nor to a common format. Nonetheless, we think it is helpful to have such a map, albeit qualified in various ways, because it helps to convey scale, and the way the incident volume is reduced, as each stage of police action acts to 'filter out' those cases that are settled or can go no further. Sections 6, 7 and Annex C drill down in more detail, exploring trends as well as providing a more quantitative view. In particular we explore later in the report how crime and non-crime components of demand may be putting pressure on police resources.

<sup>30</sup> See Annex C - Chart C.1

<sup>31</sup> Essentially from, and limited by, the mosaic of information or analysis that is available

<sup>32</sup> This picture excludes cyber-crime and fraud - see Section 7.4

Chart 5.1: Incidents and activity grouped into categories





## 6 Mapping the volume - how much is non-crime?

Non-crime demand is estimated to make up about 75% of the total incident volume. The evidence shows that a substantial group of incidents – the vulnerable group – account for 18% of the volume and represent complex cases that need the full involvement of health and social services in particular. Gaps in health and social services appear to be a contributory factor both to the volume and complexity of this demand.

Table 6: Summary of the main components of 'non-crime' incidents demand on police

Type of incident <sup>33</sup>	Approx. percentage of total incident volume	Trend	Case complexity	Weight <sup>34</sup> relative to incident volume	Other non-CJS agency involvement
Anti-social behaviour <sup>35</sup>	13 - 16	Falling	Low	<1	Local authorities
Mental health	3.5	Rising	High	>1	Health services
Missing persons	3	Rising	Low	1	Social services/care homes
Drugs	2	Rising	High	>1	Health services
Alcohol	3.6	Rising	High	>1	Health services/Local authorities
Domestic incidents/abuse	6.2	Rising	High	>1	Health and social services
Children & young people	4	Flat overall, child protection plans rising	High	>1	Social services
Traffic	Up to 6	Flat	Low	1	Health, Highways agency
"Vulnerable group", aggregate of: mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents or vulnerable persons	18 - 19	Rising particularly for acute cases	High, coordination with other local services	>1	Health services, Social services
Administration	12 - 13	?	Low	<1	

<sup>33</sup> These categories are not entirely separate. There are some overlaps but in the main they are intended to represent coherent groups to help think about demand pressures on the police and which other organisations need to be or are involved.

<sup>34</sup> Based on the initial office deployments relative to the incident volume – see Annex C.

<sup>35</sup> Detailed discussion is in section 7.

## 6.1. The total volume of incidents

In this section we explore trends in and the composition of incident volumes in more detail, focussing in particular on those incidents that have a non-crime dimension. As already noted, police incidents arrive in a variety of ways such as 999 and 101 calls, radio by a police officer or police community support officers (PCSO), and some are reported online. They comprise a mix of crime and non-crime matters<sup>36</sup> such as public safety and welfare, crime, anti-social behaviour and transport. Incidents are classified in command and control rooms in various ways, including by type and the urgency of response deemed appropriate.

The national volume of incidents does not appear to be routinely monitored and so it is hard to establish how that has changed over the last decade, and its likely future direction. There are various figures:

- a. College of Policing reported that between 2011/12 and 2012/13, the total volume of police incidents fell by 3%, from more than 20 million to 19.6 million.<sup>37</sup>
- b. Data published by HMICFRS, Chart 6.1, show that incident levels continued to decrease to 16.2 million in 2015/16, but then increased somewhat by 160,000 (+1%) in 2016/17.
- c. Our own estimate, working back by combining the results of the analysis of Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge data (Annex C), together with national volume of recorded crime<sup>38</sup> gives an estimate of 19.2 million incidents for the calendar year 2017.


Taken together these estimates point to a range of between 16.2 – 19.2 million incidents for 2017.

<sup>36</sup> For an description of circumstances in which police incident record should be created see: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/our-work/crime-data-integrity/crime-recording-process/>

<sup>37</sup> Again, the source data for this does not appear to be currently publicly available and it is not possible to establish direct comparability with later figures.

<sup>38</sup> Explored in more detail in Section 7


Chart 6.1: Police incident volumes 2013/14 to 2016/17 (HMIC)



Looking at the urgency of the incidents, over the period 2013 to 2017 the number of incidents that received an emergency response grew steadily - see Chart 6.2. The number (and proportion) resolved without attendance also grew, but fewer incidents received a lower priority response or were dealt with through a scheduled appointment.

We need to be careful about how these figures are interpreted. This may indicate changes in the nature of demand, but it may also reflect developments to force triage processes, resulting in greater sensitivity to potential risk (and hence the provision of an emergency response), as well as opportunities to improve efficiency by resolving incidents without attendance. Either way, the data suggest the pressure on police response has increased in recent years.


Chart 6.2: Police incidents by response type 2013/14 to 2016/17





Also there are some data that categorise incidents according to ‘crime’, ‘anti-social behaviour’ and ‘other’,<sup>39</sup> see Chart 6.3. ‘Crime’ accounts for about 20% of incidents, anti-social behaviour around 10%, and ‘other’ incidents 70%. This pattern is consistent with the results of the Bedfordshire/Platt Bridge analysis – see Annex C – where incident composition is ~24% crime and ~14% antisocial behaviour. The ‘other’ category covers all other types of incidents including other non-crime. This is of course a two-year snapshot and the trends revealed by the analysis in section 7 show that, in absolute terms, crime has been on the increase while anti-social behaviour has been declining. This also points to shifts in the composition of incidents, which has implications for police workload, and is covered in more detail later in this section, and in section 7.

Chart 6.3: Police incidents by ‘type’ 2015/16 to 2016/17




## 6.2. ‘999’ and ‘101’ calls

The national trend in 999 calls broadly mirrors the upturn in police recorded crime with calls having increased since 2014/15 to around 9 million in 2015/16. A lack of data makes it harder to see how 101 calls have been changing. A one-off survey in 2014/15 indicates that there were 22.3 million 101 calls that year. However this estimate is likely to include general administrative calls (as much as 60%), not just those relating to incidents. This highlights weaknesses in the way the police capture their incident data, hampering future demand assessment. There is considerable geographical variation in the 999 trends and in 101 call rates.

Our analysis of the Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge data (Annex C) indicates around 90% of incident calls are received as either 999 or 101 calls. So it is useful to look at specific estimates relating to these types of call. Chart 6.4 shows the national trend in 999 calls broadly mirrors the upturn in police recorded crime - see section 7.1 - with calls having increased since 2014/15.

<sup>39</sup> These categories reflect the apparent nature of the incident based on the information available to the operator at the time.

Chart 6.4: Police 999 calls and police recorded crime 2010/11 to 2016/17<sup>40</sup>



In terms of geographical variation, 38 forces saw increases in 999 calls between 2015/16 and 2016/17, ranging between one and 21%, with the greatest increases in Cleveland, Gwent, Derbyshire and Suffolk.<sup>41</sup>

For 101 calls, data are very limited and only available as a one-off survey of police forces covering 2014/15. This gives an estimate of 22.3 million 101 calls.<sup>42</sup> The rate of incidents reported geographically – see Chart 6.5 – varied from 150 calls per 1,000 population, for Leicestershire, to around 675 calls per 1,000 population for Derbyshire, showing a factor of 4.5 between the lowest and highest. (The majority of force areas fell into a band between 300 and 500 calls per 1,000 population, a variation of 1.66). However, there are variations in how police forces manage 101 calls and collect data. For example, in some forces 101 calls are answered via their switchboards. Calls are then transferred to designated call handlers who deal with non-emergency issues. Some forces are unable to separate 101 calls from other non-emergency calls. It is therefore difficult to draw definitive conclusions about any trend (there is a single time point) or about the composition of the calls directly from this data set.

A 2017<sup>43,44</sup> survey carried out by Kent Police, sheds some light on the make-up of public calls – see Table 6.1 which sets out the results. It suggests that, taking the Kent management categories as generally representative, around 60% of calls (defined broadly, not just those that make it to the control room) relate to routine business – advice, appointments, etc. So, the large number of 101 calls reported in 2014/15 by forces is likely to be the result of varying handling practice and methods of counting.

<sup>40</sup> Source: HMIC / ONS.

<sup>41</sup> Dorset (-10.1%) and Humberside (-1.2%) saw decreases while Hampshire reported no change. West Mercia returned no data for 2015/16 and City of London police does not handle 999 calls.

<sup>42</sup> Assuming that 999 calls and 101 calls represent different streams of incidents coming in to police forces, the combined total of 999 and 101 calls would represent around 30.3 million calls in 2014/15, an estimate that is much higher than those commonly cited by HMIC. We think such an estimate would be unreliable because of the varied nature of the way data were collected, mixing general administrative calls with incidents.

<sup>43</sup> Reported in the National Police Chiefs Council Report, 2017 - Better understanding demand: Policing the future: <http://www.npcc.police.uk/2017%20FOI/CO/078%2017%20CCC%20April%202017%2024%20Better%20Understanding%20Demand%20Policing%20the%20Future.pdf>

<sup>44</sup> Not actually recorded in the reported statistics but we take them to relate to 2017, the year the report was published.

Chart 6.5: 101 call rate per 1,000 population




Table 6.1: Kent Police Analysis

Demand management	Number	Percentage
Advice	434,000	52
Appointments	54,000	7
Immediate calls	110,000	13
'High calls'	190,000	23
Report a crime	39,000	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>827,000</b>	<b>100</b>

### 6.3. 'Public Safety and Welfare' demand

We estimate that incidents that have one or more factors involving mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents or vulnerable persons make about 18% of the incident volume, equivalent to 3 – 3.5 million incidents in 2016/17. This group of incidents has a differential impact and is more likely to call for a greater initial deployment of police officers (22%), than the proportion of the incident volume would suggest. Around a third of these deployments (7%) would relate to cases that have a crime dimension. Certain parts of this type demand (acute cases in particular) have been growing. Overall, 18% represents a substantial proportion of police incident demand which requires a cross-cutting joint approach with health and social services among others.

Police force workload (and performance) will be affected by overlapping areas of demand. The police are tackling incidents that form a spectrum ranging from mainstream criminal activity to cases that may involve mental health, drug addiction, alcohol-related problems, or vulnerable adults/children. However, it is important not to draw too sharp a distinction. Morbidity linked to mental health, drug and alcohol-related abuse among offenders is very high;<sup>45</sup> and so these issues will be likely to feature in many cases where an offence has been committed, at least as a co-occurring factor, and in some cases will have been a contributing factor.

The term ‘Public Safety and Welfare’ is used in various data sets to characterise a broad range of incidents including those that include mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents, policing of protests and demonstrations, etc.<sup>46</sup> In many ways such a category is too broad and a more granular analysis is needed. We explore this in the next subsections, along with a range of other non-police data sets, structuring the results on police geography, to provide context as well as estimated volumes of incidents which involve non-crime factors.

Our analysis (Annex C) shows that an aggregate category comprising mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents, and vulnerable persons, together make up 18% of the incident volume. This on its own, of course, does not make up the whole of the non-crime demand – anti-social behaviour and ‘administration’ are the next largest categories – but it focuses on those incidents where other local agencies, health, local authorities, social services and education, will have a direct role to play, and for some incidents should arguably have been ‘in the lead’. Assuming<sup>47</sup> that these proportions are representative of the national picture, it would suggest that around 3.0 - 3.5 million incidents a year have such a health, social or welfare dimension. It is also interesting to note that approximately 4% of the total incident volume involves cases that relate to mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents, and vulnerable persons and also have a crime dimension.

Further, using the initial deployment of police officers to assess the differential impact on resources, these cases take up a larger fraction of the total deployment than their incident volume would suggest. So, mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents, and vulnerable persons, together took 22% of deployments in the Bedfordshire incident data.

Type	Percentage of total incident volume	Percentage of initial officer deployment
<b>All incidents with mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents, and vulnerable persons flags</b>	18	22
<b>incidents with mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents, and vulnerable persons flags <u>and</u> crime dimension</b>	4	7

<sup>45</sup> See, for example: <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Mental-health-in-prisons.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> The 2015 College of Policing analysis identified that demand generated by incidents relating to concerns for ‘public safety and welfare’ appeared to be increasing. However, this assessment was based on internal force datasets not available and cannot be revisited nor updated.

<sup>47</sup> The similar proportions in the data from Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge give encouragement that such an assumption is reasonable, notwithstanding geographical variations in incident volumes.

## 6.4. Mental Health

**There is compelling evidence that the pattern for mental health related incidents that involve the police is changing. Overall 3.5% of all incidents handled through command and control rooms have a mental health dimension, around 560,000 – 670,000 in 2017. The volume and complexity of acute or urgent cases is increasing, as indicated for example by the rising number of Section 136 detentions. It is clear that there are gaps in local health arrangements, particularly in the provision of accessible support for those whose mental health is significantly deteriorating and in respect of acute 24-hour mental health emergency response including access to beds. Underinvestment in mental health services means that NHS capacity issues are impacting on the police and hindering efforts to shift from a police to a health-based response. Such cases are placing a disproportionate weight on police deployment resources, as already indicated in section 6.3.**

There is a substantial body of evidence showing that the mental health needs of offenders are significantly greater than those of the general population. Levels of mental illness and personality disorder are very much higher<sup>48</sup> and this inevitably is reflected on the demands placed on services at all stages of the criminal justice system. However, as noted above, the police, in their role as a first responder, deal with cases where the crime elements, if any, may be minor and the focus would be on safety and welfare, ensuring that the person involved has appropriate access to assessment and treatment. The question then arises whether, or to what extent, the police are picking up demand resulting from service gaps or under-provision in mental health services.

The Department of Health routinely publishes statistics on the demand and service provision of mental health services.<sup>49</sup> In broad terms the level of mental health need ranges from GP led primary care, hospital outpatient services, the community-based Care Programme Approach (CPA), and admission to a mental health hospital which may include detention under the Mental Health Act (1983). The Mental Health Act (MHA), under Section 136, also provides a power to the police to remove a person from a public place, when they appear to be suffering from a mental disorder, to a place of safety. This power is now generally exercised in coordination with local mental health services.

The number of people in contact with NHS secondary mental health, autism and learning disability services in the UK has more than doubled since 2010/11 and stood at 2.6 million in 2016/17.<sup>50</sup> The proportion of these admitted to hospital halved in the same period<sup>51</sup> (which means more were being treated in the community). Chart 6.6 shows the number of persons, by police area, in contact with mental health services per 1,000 population. It also shows the number of missed care appointments (again per 1,000 population) by police area for 2017, which we interpret as an indicator of the quality of relationship between services and the patients they serve.

<sup>48</sup> *ibid*


<sup>49</sup> Mental Health Services Monthly Statistics: Final Dec 2017, provisional Jan 2018  
[https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mental-health-services-monthly-statistics-final-dec-2017-provisional-jan-2018\(\\*\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mental-health-services-monthly-statistics-final-dec-2017-provisional-jan-2018(*)) mid 2016 estimate

<sup>50</sup> See: [https://digital.nhs.uk/media/34279/Mental-Health-Bulletin-2016-17-Reference-Tables/default/MHB\\_-\\_1617-\\_Reference\\_Tables](https://digital.nhs.uk/media/34279/Mental-Health-Bulletin-2016-17-Reference-Tables/default/MHB_-_1617-_Reference_Tables)

<sup>51</sup> Police Foundation, unpublished document

While there are some obvious outliers – Warwickshire and Lancashire for example in terms of rates of contact and Northamptonshire in terms of missed care appointments – across the majority of police areas, the level of service appears to be broadly similar, allowing for some natural variation in the need for access and the way mental health services are organised and delivered.

Chart 6.6: Contact with mental health services by police area, 2017



However, ‘broadly similar’ does not mean sufficient to meet their population’s needs; 40% of trusts saw reduced income between 2013/14 and 2014/15 and there is widespread evidence of poor quality care – only 14% of patients said they received appropriate care in crisis. A lack of inpatient beds has led to increased strain on community mental health services and more out-of-area placements. The wholesale transformation of mental health services to reduce costs has been described as a ‘leap in the dark’ and has led to substantial reductions in the number of experienced nursing staff.<sup>52</sup>

The total number of NHS hospital beds available for patients suffering mental illness in England stood at just under 19,000 – down from 28,000 a decade earlier (and from more than 65,000 in the mid-1980s following the introduction of community care in the early ‘90s).<sup>53</sup>

It is also informative to consider the services of Crisis Resolution Teams (CRTs). CRTs are multidisciplinary, specialist mental health services intended to provide short intensive interventions at home to people experiencing a mental health crisis. The aim is to avert a hospital admission wherever possible.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>52</sup> See: [https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/field\\_publication\\_file/mental-health-under-pressure-nov15\\_0.pdf](https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/field/field_publication_file/mental-health-under-pressure-nov15_0.pdf)

<sup>53</sup> See: <https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/projects/nhs-in-a-nutshell/hospital-beds>

<sup>54</sup> Johnson S, Thornicroft G. The development of crisis resolution and home treatment teams. In *Crisis Resolution and Home Treatment in Mental Health* (eds S Johnson, J Needle, J Bindman, G Thornicroft): 9–22. Cambridge University Press, 2008.

CRTs for working-age adults have been implemented nationally in England since the National Health Service (NHS) Plan of 2000. There exists a mature model of the service, however its implementation nationally has been highly variable. A recent national survey in England by UCL<sup>55</sup> concluded:

*“Few CRTs adhered fully to national policy guidelines. CRT implementation and local acute care system contexts varied substantially. Access to CRTs for working-age adults appears to have improved, compared with a similar survey in 2012, despite no evidence of higher staffing levels. Specialist CRTs for children and for older adults with dementia have been implemented in some areas but are uncommon.”*

Table 6.2: Variation in the acute care systems within which CRTs operate<sup>56</sup>

Acute care characteristic	CRTs operating within this type of acute care system n/N (%)		
	Adult CRTs	Children and young people's CRTs	Older adult/dementia CRTs
<b>A separate, 24hr crisis line is provided</b>	106/184 (58%)	3/13 (23%)	10/29 (34%)
<b>A separate crisis assessment/ triage service is provided</b>	59/184 (32%)	2/13 (15%)	6/29 (21%)
<b>The CRT has access to residential crisis beds (non-hospital)</b>	85/185 (46%)	1/13 (8%)	3/29 (10%)
<b>The CRT can access an acute day hospital</b>	40/185 (22%)	1/13 (8%)	5/29 (17%)
<b>A separate sanctuary/crisis drop-in service is provided</b>	28/185 (15%)	1/13 (8%)	3/29 (10%)

Table 6.2 shows the coverage of those elements of the CRT model that would help prevent mental health incidents ‘spilling over’ to the police to handle. It is clear from this that over 40% of CRTs do not have a separate 24hr crisis line, and generally less than half of the CRTs are able to intervene by accessing local acute services. This state of affairs would strongly suggest that emergency cases are spilling over from NHS crisis care arrangements to the police to handle in the first instance, and the increase in the volume of Mental Health section 136 cases is in line with such a conclusion – see Table 6.3, discussed in the next section.

<sup>55</sup> Lloyd-Evans, B., Lamb, D., Barnby, J., Eskinazi, M., Turner, A., & Johnson, S. (2018). Mental health crisis resolution teams and crisis care systems in England: A national survey. *BJPsych Bulletin*, 1-6. doi:10.1192/bjb.2018.19

<sup>56</sup> Adapted from Table 3 of Lloyd-Evans, B., Lamb, D., Barnby, J., Eskinazi, M., Turner, A., & Johnson, S. (2018), *ibid*

Looking at cases where police are called to respond to people with mental health problems as a whole, national data are not collected as matter of routine. Freedom of Information requests have suggested national figures of 240,000<sup>57</sup> and 300,000<sup>58</sup> incidents per year. The Metropolitan Police Service alone reportedly recorded 115,000 mental health-related calls in 2016/17 – an increase of one third since 2012/13, although better recording might exaggerate this change.<sup>59</sup> Our analysis in Annex C suggests that approximately 3.5% of incidents will have a mental health dimension. If this proportion was replicated nationally, it would mean between 560,000 – 670,000 incidents.

### **Section 136 detentions**

Section 136 of The Mental Health Act (MHA) is used by the police to remove a person who appears to be suffering from a mental disorder, from a place to which the police have public access, to a place of safety for assessment. The number of Section 136 detentions in England increased by 54% between 2011/12 and 2015/16. There were almost 23,000 Section 136 detentions in 2015/16. Police data show that use of Section 136 levelled off in 2017/18 with 22,891 detentions in England.<sup>60</sup> When Wales is included, the figure rises to 26,328.

Section 135 of the MHA allows a warrant to be granted by a magistrate to search for and remove a mentally disordered person from a non-public location to a place of safety (normally a hospital). A police officer attends to gain access and must be accompanied by an approved mental health professional; it is used less frequently than Section 136 but has also seen substantial increases over recent years, including a 76% increase between 2014/15 and 2015/16.

Chart 6.7 shows the number of cases (per 1,000 population) in 2017 of Section 136 detentions alongside treatments under the MHA. The rates are broadly comparable suggesting that treatment under the MHA and Section 136 cases carry a similarly high threshold. While it might be tempting to try to draw some direct relationship between the two, statistical analysis does not support that. The variation across police areas is too wide to support a straightforward correlation between the volume of MHA treatments and the need to invoke a Section 136 detention. However, this does not rule out some third factor, such as the availability of acute beds, or new, previously undiagnosed cases, playing a role.

<sup>57</sup> L See: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-nottinghamshire-38857306>


<sup>58</sup> See: <http://www.itv.com/news/2017-02-03/shocking-numbers-of-police-incidents-involved-mental-health/>

<sup>59</sup> See: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/aug/28/police-phone-calls-mental-health-nhs>

<sup>60</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/654469/detentions-mental-health-act-police-powers-procedures-mar17-hosb2017-tables.ods](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/654469/detentions-mental-health-act-police-powers-procedures-mar17-hosb2017-tables.ods)



Chart 6.7: Persons receiving mental health services by police force area, 2017, ranked by Section 136 MHA police involvement



The total number of detentions under The MHA (1983) in England increased by 30% between 2011/12 and 2015/16 and by 20% in the last two years of that period (this includes detentions within hospital settings which do not generally involve the police as well as those in the community which may do). There were almost 66,000 MHA detentions in 2015/16 (just under 1 per 1,000 of the population). Such incidents are often time consuming for police officers due in part to delays in getting the required Approved Mental Health Practitioner and approved doctor together to undertake the assessment.

The proportion of all MHA detentions which involve the police is also showing an increase – see Table 6.3. Section 136 and Section 135 detentions accounted for 37% of all detentions in 2015/16 compared to 28% in 2012/13.

Table 6.3 Section 135 and 136 detentions in England 2011/12 to 2015/16

	Section 136 detentions	% change from previous year	Section 135 detentions	% change on previous year	S. 135 & S.136 as proportion of all detentions under MHA Act.
2011/12	14,902		338		31.3
2012/13	14,053	- 5.7	243	-28.1	28.4
2013/14	17,008	21.0	307	26.3	32.6
2014/15	19,403	14.1	315	2.6	33.8
2015/16	22,965	18.4	556	76.5	37.0

It is also useful to compare the number of Section 136 detentions to the broader estimate of incidents that have a mental health dimension and involve the police. Therefore, using the estimates cited in the first paragraph of this section along with those in Table 6.3 suggests that Section 136 cases have grown to be around 5% of the estimated number of mental health related incidents in 2017, and which directly involve the police in complex and resource intensive cases.

The police have dramatically reduced the use of police cells to detain those held under the MHA (a 70% reduction between 2013/14 and 2015/16), instead using health-based facilities.<sup>61</sup> In 2016/17 a police station was used as the place of safety following a Section 136 detention on 1,029 occasions (4% of all Section 136 detentions). On almost half of these occasions this was because there was no capacity in a health-based facility. An assessed risk of violence or substantive offending accounted for use of police cells on only 15% of occasions when one was used.<sup>62</sup> A change in legislation brought about by the Police and Crime Act 2017 further limits when police cells can be used as a place of safety, meaning on one under the age of 18 can be detained in a police cell and all other detentions now require the prior authority of an Inspector.

A police vehicle was used to convey a detainee to a place of safety following 41% of Section 136 detentions in 2016/17 (almost 11,000 occasions), an ambulance (or other health vehicle) was used on 36% of occasions. On 34% of occasions where a police vehicle was used this was because an ambulance was not available within 30 minutes (almost 3,500 occasions).

Nationally, only around 30 % of those detained under Section 136 are further detained for treatment under the MHA after initial assessment. Of the rest, just under 15% are discharged for follow up from specialist community based psychiatric teams. This suggests that there is a real lack of support and services for those suffering from failing mental health, which creates a greater crisis, often requiring emergency intervention. In his 'State of Policing' report of June 2018, Sir Tom Winsor, Chief Inspector of Constabulary acknowledges that forces have invested significant time and resources in supporting those with mental health problems and that health professionals spoken to were overwhelmingly positive about the care that front line officers give to those suffering mental health problems.<sup>63</sup> Some forces are taking a more proactive approach to this issue by deploying mental health nurses in custody suites and working with mental health professionals out in the community. In Bedfordshire, there is a mental health street triage team made of up police officers and paramedics, who respond to mental health related calls.

<sup>61</sup> See: <http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/S136%20Data%202015%2016.pdf>

<sup>62</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/654469/detentions-mental-health-act-police-powers-procedures-mar17-hosb2017-tables.ods](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/654469/detentions-mental-health-act-police-powers-procedures-mar17-hosb2017-tables.ods)

<sup>63</sup> See: <https://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/2Submission%202018%20080218.pdf>

### Bedfordshire Mental Health Street Triage

The Mental Health Street Team (MHST) deals with people in urgent crisis. According to the current MHST data, the partnership's intervention saved the ambulance services from intervening in c.45% of the calls dealt with and saved the police services from intervening in c.38% of the calls dealt with.

Most callers are first time callers, white and male. Callers are mostly in their late teens, mid-twenties, or mid-to-late forties. Furthermore, repeat callers tend to call over a short period of time (within 3 weeks). The largest proportion of calls which have flags are signalled as overdose. However, the reasons for which the MHST are called range from the very physically dangerous to the individual and the public, to the very distressing. According to manual dip sampling, attendance tends to focus on incidents where mental health is the primary issue, and giving phone advice where mental health is the secondary issue.

Whilst there is often a difficulty in getting accurate data from NHS Trusts, the information about those who are vulnerable and who require significant longer term health interventions is frequently available to both police and NHS leaders. The introduction of new integrated care services (ICS) in some areas across England provides an opportunity for agencies to work together to both identify and assess the current need for improved services and also trial new ways of working that lessen the demands on all agencies and crucially, provide better services much earlier on for those suffering from poor mental health.

## 6.5. Missing persons

**The data point to an upward trend in missing persons which represent, as a category of their own, around 3% of the incident volume. These cases are resolved relatively quickly with around 80% being found within 24 hours and only 2% remain missing for a week or more. Also, data show that a high proportion of those involving children are individuals who repeatedly go missing. These cases indicate a much higher level of complexity and risk, with children missing from care being vulnerable to exploitation and abuse via the phenomenon known as 'county lines'. This suggests that more could be done by local authorities to tackle the issue at source, potentially reducing the impact on the police.**

The Missing Persons Unit (hosted by the National Crime Agency) collates information on missing and absent people from UK police forces. The available data<sup>64</sup> is subject to caveats about consistency and comparability across forces and over time.

<sup>64</sup> See: <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/876-missing-persons-data-report-2015-2016-1/file>

In 2015/16, police forces in England, Wales and Scotland received 377,710 calls<sup>65</sup> relating to missing and absent persons (337,640 in England and Wales and 40,070 in Scotland). In relation to those in England and Wales, police forces created 242,317 missing incidents<sup>66</sup> relating to 134,757 missing individuals; an average of 368 per day.

In 2015/16, 77% of missing persons cases were classified as medium risk (up from 72% in 2014/15), 12% were deemed high risk (up from 11%) and 10% were low risk. A medium risk missing person's case has been estimated to require an average of 18 hours of police time, 12 tasks to be completed by the police (some repeated multiple times) and to cost between £1,325 and £2,415.<sup>67</sup> This would put the national annual cost to the police of dealing with medium risk missing persons at between £244 and £445 million.

Changes in recording practices mean annual figures are not directly comparable and should be treated with caution; however, these tentatively suggest an upward trend in the number of missing persons related calls since 2012/13<sup>68</sup> – see Table 6.4.

Table 6.4: Missing person calls to English, Welsh and Scottish Police per year<sup>69,70</sup>

	<b>Calls relating to missing persons</b>	<b>% change on previous year</b>
<b>2010/11</b>	326,764	
<b>2011/12</b>	313,019	- 4.2
<b>2012/13</b>	306,118	- 2.2
<b>2013/14</b>	307,172	0.3
<b>2014/15</b>	231,992	4.8
<b>2015/16</b>	377,710	17.3

Our analysis in Annex C indicates around 3% of the incident volume is associated with missing persons, i.e. around 480,000 to 580,000 for England and Wales, or from 45% to 75% higher<sup>71</sup> for 2015/16, assuming the figure in Table 6.4 is representative of the current position. The Bedfordshire data also suggest that vulnerable, repeatedly missing looked after children (LAC) drive a disproportionately high proportion of total demand (despite only making up 21% of missing persons, LAC repeat missing children are responsible for 58% of missing reports on average).

<sup>65</sup> These calls may relate to new or pre-existing cases and to either one or a group of missing people.

<sup>66</sup> The 'absent' category has recently been introduced and should only be applied to cases with no apparent risk and will not generally require an active police response.

<sup>67</sup> Shalev-Greene, K. and Pakes, F. (2012) Establishing the Cost of Missing Person Investigations. <http://www.port.ac.uk/media/contacts-and-departments/icjs/csm/Establishing-the-Cost-of-Missing-Persons-Investigations.pdf>


<sup>68</sup> A series of system changes within Police Scotland mean that their data are not directly comparable from year to year. 2015/16 figures include the new 'absent' category; it is not clear whether some or all of these would previously have been counted as 'missing'. Dorset police provided no data for 2015/16.

<sup>69</sup> See: <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/696-missing-persons-data-report-2014-2015/file>

<sup>70</sup> See: <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/876-missing-persons-data-report-2015-2016-1/file>

<sup>71</sup> This makes a correction for the contribution from Scotland to the data in the Table

Chart 6.8: Missing children in Bedfordshire



The investigation of children missing from care is often an area of high risk and complexity for the police service. It is also, rightly, time consuming and demanding. Children in care frequently come from troubled backgrounds and have complex needs which can include mental health, drug and alcohol problems. The shocking cases of grooming of young girls who were then subjected to offences of rape and sexual assault in places such as Rotherham, Rochdale and Newcastle demonstrated the need to do more than simply record and trace children who are missing from care. Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables are thus increasingly (and rightly) keen that the police spend time attempting to understand the reasons and circumstances of their being missing.

Missing Persons Unit data suggest that those reported missing are being located more quickly. In 2015/16 four out of five missing people returned, or were found, within 24 hours (79%, compared to 74% in the previous two years), while only 2% remain missing for a week or longer (compared to 5% in 2014/15). This might suggest that cases where the likely whereabouts of the individual is suspected (and which might not previously have been formally recorded as missing) are now being counted within the total. It should be noted however that the risk profile of the cohort is increasing; suggesting the vulnerability of these cases is increasingly being recognised by the police.

## 6.6. Drugs

There is evidence that the health and social impact of problematic drug abuse or dependency has been increasing. The number of deaths from drug-related poisoning and drug misuse increased by 43% between 2005 and 2016. The number of hospital admissions with a primary diagnosis of drug-related mental health and behavioural disorders was 73,000 in 2014/15, having increased 10% compared to the previous year. In addition, there were approximately 14,000 admissions directly associated with illicit drug use in 2014/2015, which was a similar figure to the previous year. However, there is substantial geographical variation, with the higher rates apparently associated with areas of high deprivation. The proportion of incidents with a drugs flag in the Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge data sets were 2.2% and

**0.5% respectively, which would suggest that up to 420,000 incidents a year might be related to drug abuse (although only a fraction of these would be expected to result in a hospital admission). We expect that the rising levels of hospital admissions are also indicative of the pressure on police demand from drug related incidents.**

**A relatively new and worrying trend has been on the rise in the use of psychoactive substances, such as Spice, which creates significant demands on both the police and ambulance services. Equally concerning is the rise in ‘county lines’, which involves criminal networks based in urban areas expanding their drug dealing into county towns and rural areas, often exploiting young and vulnerable people to do so.**

Drugs impact on police work in two main respects: tackling criminal activity linked to the trade in drugs which, at the most serious end, will involve organised criminal gangs operating across borders; and the social and health impact of drug abuse or dependency, which, in its own terms, can also drive theft, burglary or robbery to help fund addiction.

The 2015/2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales shows a downward trend in general drug use, with 21% fewer 16 to 59-year-olds reporting any drug use in the previous year, compared to a decade earlier.<sup>72</sup> This trend is in line with the declining number of drugs related offences – see Chart 7.4. However, there is evidence of an increase in problematic drug use and drug related health emergencies, particularly those linked to mental health and behavioural disorders. NHS data show a steady increase in the number of hospital admissions with a primary diagnosis of drug related mental health and behavioural disorders (11% higher in 2015/16 compared to 2005/6, and 52% up on 2008/9),<sup>73</sup> as well as in admissions with a primary diagnosis of poisoning by illicit drugs (51% increase since 2005/6).<sup>74,75</sup>

In 2015 there were 2,479 registered deaths in England and Wales related to drug misuse,<sup>76</sup> equating to 0.5% of all deaths. This is an increase of 10% on 2014 and 48% higher than 2005. Deaths related to drug misuse are at their highest level since comparable records began in 1993.<sup>77</sup> The number of deaths from drug related poisoning and drug misuse more than doubled between 1993 and 2016<sup>78</sup> (111% increase from 3,009 to 6,337) and increased by 43% between 2005 and 2016.

<sup>72</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/448081/drug-misuse-1415-tabs.ods](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448081/drug-misuse-1415-tabs.ods)

<sup>73</sup> The lowest number in the decade leading up to 2015/16.

<sup>74</sup> See: <http://digital.nhs.uk/catalogue/PUB23442>


<sup>75</sup> See: <http://digital.nhs.uk/media/30575/Statistics-on-Drug-Misuse-England-2017-Tables-/Any/drug-misu-eng-2017-tab>

<sup>76</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/669620/Trends\\_in\\_drug\\_misuse\\_deaths\\_in\\_England\\_from\\_1999\\_to\\_2014.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/669620/Trends_in_drug_misuse_deaths_in_England_from_1999_to_2014.pdf)

<sup>77</sup> See: <http://digital.nhs.uk/media/30572/Statistics-on-Drug-Misuse-England-2017-Report-/Any/drug-misu-eng-2017-rep>

<sup>78</sup> See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/drug-misuse-findings-from-the-2015-to-2016-csew>

Chart 6.9: Deaths from drug related poisoning and drug misuse in England and Wales – 1993 – 2016




The link between mental health issues, drug misuse and vulnerabilities often associated with homelessness is very evident in the rise in the use of psychoactive substances such as Spice. Previously known as ‘legal highs’, psychoactive substances were banned by the Government in May 2016. These substances mimic the effect of cannabis but affect the brain differently and can have severely debilitating effects on users. These substances are highly addictive and often relatively cheap in comparison to other drugs such as crack cocaine and heroin. Areas such as Manchester, Birmingham, parts of London and Newcastle are facing significant challenges in dealing with the impact of use of these drugs, particularly amongst homeless communities. The professionals within drug treatment services spoken to as part of this research told us that such substances are creating a ‘mental health time bomb’ for the next 5 – 10 years. Use of these substances is rife within the prison population creating significant problems for the Prison Service. The development of new types of psychoactive substances also creates fast time changing demands on both emergency and health care services. In August 2018, the police and the ambulance service in Staffordshire raised concern about the increasing use of ‘Monkey Dust,’ the street name for a class B drug which makes addicts both paranoid and violent, often making them believe they have superhuman strengths. Police are receiving on average 10 calls a day from users of the drug and the ambulance service has responded to 170 calls for assistance to users since April. The drug costs as little as £2 and is often sold to those who are homeless and vulnerable. Chart 6.10 shows the rates in England of drug related hospital admission episodes (a) associated directly with the use of illicit drugs – e.g. overdoses – and (b) mental health and behavioural disorders brought about through persistent drug abuse.<sup>79</sup> In 2014/15 there were approximately 73,000 hospital admissions for drug induced mental health behavioural disorders, up 10% on the previous year; and approximately 14,000 admissions associated with direct illicit drug use in 2014/15, similar to that in the previous year.

<sup>79</sup> Analysis based in: Statistics on Drugs Misuse: England, 2016. <https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statistical/statistics-on-drug-misuse/statistics-on-drugs-misuse-england-2016>

There is a wide variation (factor of 4) between the lowest (Surrey) and the highest (Merseyside). It is also useful to look at Chart 6.10 in the context of the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD).<sup>80</sup> We have calculated the police area ranking – see Annex D – which lays out police areas in England in an order from the least deprived (Surrey) to the most deprived (Merseyside). Here the pattern of variation seems to follow broadly that of the IMD ranking. In fact, the top seven police force areas in Chart 6.10 are also the top seven in the IMD ranking, suggesting that police areas with very high levels of deprivation are likely to see more drug related admissions. It is noteworthy that mental health and behavioural disorders associated with drugs represent the largest category, though it is not possible from these data to establish how far the police may have been involved.

Chart 6.10: Drug related admissions per 1000 population, 2014-15



<sup>80</sup> The index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) is a standardised way of ranking small areas along a number social and economic dimensions, combined to values that allows areas in England to be compared in relation to levels of deprivation. See - <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015>





### County lines

Another relatively new aspect of the data on drug misuse is the emergence of ‘county lines’, a term used to describe how existing, generally urban based criminals expand their drug dealing activities into smaller towns and urban areas, often exploiting young or otherwise vulnerable people to do so. Typically, dealers will use a single mobile phone line to facilitate the supply of Class A drugs, usually heroin and crack cocaine. The phone line becomes a recognised and valuable brand and is often protected by the use of violence and intimidation. Established dealers then recruit children, young people or those who are otherwise vulnerable to undertake the actual supply to customers, and movement of the drugs and cash back to the established dealer. The homes of vulnerable people are often taken over and controlled as part of the drug supply operation, known as cuckooing. An assessment by the National Crime Agency (NCA) in 2017 based on data from every police force in England and Wales, Police Scotland, and British Transport Police, showed that there are at least 720 county lines in England and Wales although the actual figure may be higher. Of those, at least 283 originated in London with other urban hubs continuing to emerge.

## 6.7. Alcohol

While there has been a reduction of overall consumption of alcohol, that which relates to problematic drinking and is thus more likely to require police involvement, appears to be increasing. There is also substantial geographical variation as indicated by the provision of primary care led treatments, with those police areas at the higher end being associated with high levels of deprivation. Looking across all incident categories, those with an alcohol flag in the Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge data sets accounted for 3.6 – 3.7%, which if replicated nationally would mean around 580,000 – 710,000 alcohol related incidents. Alcohol is strongly associated with anti-social behaviour, public order offences and criminal damage, and the rising levels of problematic alcohol use will impact on police workloads.

A similar picture to that of drugs emerges in relation to alcohol. The proportion of adults that disclosed drinking any alcohol (in the week before responding the Opinions and Lifestyle Survey) fell from 64% in 2005 to 57% in 2016;<sup>81</sup> the lowest level in a decade.<sup>82</sup> Twenty-one per cent reported never drinking, suggesting a downward trend in alcohol consumption since 2005/6,<sup>83</sup> however problematic drinking appears to be increasing.

In 2015/16, there were approximately 339,000 hospital admissions related to alcohol consumption,<sup>84</sup> a 22% increase since 2005/6.<sup>85</sup> The broader measure of alcohol-related admissions also hit record levels in 2015/16, with 1.1 million admissions in England, a significant increase over the last decade<sup>86</sup> (101% higher than the 554,000 recorded in 2005/6).<sup>87</sup> Hospital admissions for patients with mental and behavioural disorders associated with alcohol has increased by 94% compared to 2005/6.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>81</sup> See: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/drugusealcoholandsmoking/datasets/adultdrinkinghabits>

<sup>82</sup> See: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/drugusealcoholandsmoking/bulletins/opinionsandlifestylesurveyadultdrinkinghabitsingreatbritain/2005to2016#adult-drinking-habits-in-great-britain-2005-to-2016>

<sup>83</sup> See: <http://digital.nhs.uk/media/30886/Statistics-on-Alcohol-England-2017-Report/Any/alc-eng-2017-rep>

<sup>84</sup> See: <http://www.portmangroup.org.uk/docs/default-source/trends-in-alcohol/2017alcohol-trends-compendium.pdf?sfvrsn=2>


<sup>85</sup> See: <http://www.ias.org.uk/News/2017/03-May-2017-Alcohol-related-admissions-to-English-hospitals-continue-to-rise.aspx>

<sup>86</sup> Comparison should be made with caution due to changes in recording practices over time.

<sup>87</sup> See: [http://fingertips.phe.org.uk/documents/LAPE\\_Statistical\\_tables\\_for\\_England\\_270416.xlsx](http://fingertips.phe.org.uk/documents/LAPE_Statistical_tables_for_England_270416.xlsx)

<sup>88</sup> See: <https://www.alcoholconcern.org.uk/alcohol-statistics>

Chart 6.11:<sup>89</sup> Alcohol related hospital admissions – primary and secondary diagnoses (broad measure)



In 2015, there were 8,758 alcohol related deaths in the UK, of which 6,813 were alcohol-specific (representing 1.4% of all deaths)<sup>90</sup>, a 10% increase since 2005.<sup>91</sup> The age-standardised rate of 14 alcohol-related deaths per 100,000 people is slightly below than 2008 peak rate (16 deaths per 100,000), but significantly higher than the level in 1994 (9 deaths per 100,000 people).<sup>92</sup>

While the demand this places on the police can only be indirectly inferred, there is clear evidence of an increase in people experiencing health crises due to problematic drug and alcohol use, which is also likely to manifest as safety or welfare related demand for the police.

Chart 6.12 shows the number of treatments provided in England<sup>93</sup> for alcohol dependence.<sup>94</sup> Alcohol dependence is a high threshold. Very often problematic and/or binge drinking would be likely to present a greater problem for the local communities and the police, with alcohol abuse often linked to public order offences, criminal damage and anti-social behaviour. Nevertheless, these data reflect a measure of both the demand for alcohol treatment services and the response of the local health services in the geographical police areas. Misuse of alcohol also creates safeguarding and welfare issues for families with children and is often a factor in cases of domestic violence and abuse.

It is clear that there is a wide variation – a factor of 9 between the lowest and the highest – although a large ‘middle group’ has rates between 2 and 4 treatments per 1,000 population. With the exception of Gloucestershire, all of the eight police areas with alcohol treatment rates above 5 per 1,000 population are also in the top end of the spectrum of IMD scores. However, this relationship is not straightforward since the reverse is not true: some areas with high IMD scores are low in treatment rates – Cleveland for example.

<sup>89</sup> Figure taken from: <https://www.drinkaware.co.uk/research/data/consequences/>

<sup>90</sup> See: <https://www.alcoholconcern.org.uk/alcohol-statistics>


<sup>91</sup> See: <http://digital.nhs.uk/media/30886/Statistics-on-Alcohol-England-2017-Report/Any/alc-eng-2017-rep>

<sup>92</sup> See: <https://www.drinkaware.co.uk/research/data/consequences/>

<sup>93</sup> Analysis based on: Statistics on Alcohol - England 2017; <http://digital.nhs.uk/pubs/alcohol17>

<sup>94</sup> As measured by the number of prescription items per 1000 population, for the treatment of alcohol dependence, prescribed in primary care and dispensed in the community. For example Acamprosate, a medication used along with counselling to treat alcohol dependence.

Chart 6.12: Primary care alcohol treatments/1,000 population



## 6.8. Children and young people

The number of referrals, and proportion of referrals made by police to children’s social services has increased. This is in line with the results of the analysis of referrals by police to Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACS) and suggests the police are increasingly coming into contact with children in need and that they are more often the first agency to do so. This highlights the importance of tackling service gaps and coordinated work between the police and social services. The commentary above relating to missing children and county lines outlines how many cases involving children and young people are increasingly complex and high risk. Children are also increasingly vulnerable to online crime types such as cyber bullying, sexual exploitation or are at increased risk of being drawn into gang culture and violence through the use of the internet.

We estimate that around 4% of police incidents (see Annex C) are youth related. This would equate to between 640,000 to 760,000 incidents a year.

Looking at data concerning the total number of referrals to children’s social care, this has remained relatively stable between 2014 and 2017 (at between 621,000 and 658,000)<sup>95</sup> however the number made by the police increased by 13% over the period to 177,470 in 2016/17. The proportion of all referrals made by the police (rather than another agency) has increased from 24 to 28%.<sup>96</sup> This suggests the police are increasingly coming into contact with children in need and that they are more often the first agency to do so. It may also indicate greater sensitivity to potential need when the police do come into contact with children.

<sup>95</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/656395/SFR61-2017\\_Main\\_text.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/656395/SFR61-2017_Main_text.pdf)

<sup>96</sup> See annual figures in table C5 of each annual data release: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-children-in-need>

The number of child protection plans and initial child protection case conferences put in place each year is increasing, which might indicate greater protective demand.<sup>97</sup> On assessment, abuse or neglect is identified as the primary need in more than half of all cases. This is discussed further in Section 6.11 on domestic abuse, which looks at the data concerning MARACS and shows that the police are the agency generally making the most referrals.

While the implications for policing are not explicit it may also be relevant to note that:

- Between 2012/13 and 2015/16 permanent exclusions from schools rose by 44% and fixed-term exclusion from schools rose by 28%,<sup>98</sup> although the number of persistent absentees has reduced since 2012/13.<sup>99</sup>
- £387 million was cut from spending on youth services between 2010/11 and 2016/17, and between 2012 and 2016 603 youth centres were closed across the country.<sup>100</sup>

In its recently revised National Strategy for Policing of Children and Young People, the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) recognises that the police service needs to continue to work on effective and constructive relationships with children and young people if it is to continue to keep them safe from harm. The strategy acknowledges that young people are not ‘mini adults’ and that the service, together with other agencies, needs to understand and address the cause of vulnerability which leads to young people committing crime as well as becoming victims of crime. This is particularly relevant for looked after children who are 2 – 3 times more likely to offend than those who have had a stable family life. Such an approach, often in partnership with other agencies, is both complex and resource intensive and undoubtedly adds to the demands on police officer time.

Children and young people increasingly use online platforms and social media in their everyday lives. Whilst this brings many positive benefits, it also brings a significant number of risks for young people that can add to the complexity and demand on policing. Peer pressure to be active on social media makes it very difficult for some young people to escape online bullying, making the lives of those affected miserable, in some cases leading to self-harm and even suicide. Pressure by the NSPCC in their ‘Wild West Web’ campaign has resulted in the Government committing to creating new online safety laws to tackle both cyberbullying and online child sexual exploitation.

<sup>97</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/656395/SFR61-2017\\_Main\\_text.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/656395/SFR61-2017_Main_text.pdf)

<sup>98</sup> See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-exclusions>

<sup>99</sup> See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/pupil-absence-in-schools-in-england-2015-to-2016>

<sup>100</sup> See: <https://www.unison.org.uk/content/uploads/2016/08/23996.pdf>

### New crimes, new demands: 'sexting'

Sexting – where people are pressured into taking sexual images of themselves which are then sent to another person, is also an area where children and young people are vulnerable to exploitation. Victims are then blackmailed into sending further images with the threat that those images will be shared with family or friends through social media or other web-based sites. The extreme embarrassment and distress caused by such offences makes it extremely difficult for victims to seek police help. Another aspect of this problem is that young people themselves are increasingly seeking and sharing sexual images of themselves or others. Although technically they are committing a criminal offence, the police, Crown Prosecution Service, education service and other statutory authorities, recognise that charging young people with a criminal offence in such circumstances is counterproductive and unnecessary. Forces now risk assess every case they deal with and utilise Outcome 21, a new judicial disposal in the Home Office Crime Recording Rules, where appropriate. Outcome 21 may be then considered as an appropriate resolution for those cases of youth generated sexual imagery cases where there is no evidence of exploitation, grooming, profit motive, malicious intent or persistent behaviour. These type of offences, therefore, need careful investigation in order to achieve the right outcomes for young people and the recorded number of offences have been steadily rising from 2,700 in 2014/15 to 4681 in 2015/16 and then 6,238 in 2016/17. These figures undoubtedly only show a proportion of offences committed each year.

Internet based crime also impacts on children and young people in other ways, notably online sexual abuse. Again, such cases are often difficult and time consuming to investigate, with the internet enabling global contact between offenders and victims. The National Crime Agency takes the lead for organised crime offences involving online exploitation through the Child Exploitation Online Protection Centre (CEOP) but forces across the UK will often be left to deal with lower level, locally based offences including those where perpetrators are living in their force areas.

## 6.9. Health emergencies

**Ambulance response times are deteriorating, with fewer trusts achieving their targets. There has been a steady decline in the number of ‘Category A’ calls attended within the target of eight minutes. Nationally, none of the time targets have been met since May 2015. There is little data with which to form a view about the impact on the police. The Bedfordshire data analysis points to around 0.2% of incidents being associated with ambulance services. Also, police involvement in ambulance calls in London suggests that the frequency with which police transported casualties to hospital due to ambulance delays reduced between 2014 and 2016. Both of these suggest that demand on the police from health emergencies is likely to be low.**

When ambulance services are delayed in attending calls to health emergencies, police may be called on to provide initial assistance. There are no data on the frequency with which this occurs however there is a clear picture of increasing strain on ambulance services.

The number of ambulance calls (and NHS 111) transfers in England increased by over a third, from 7.9 million in 2009/10 to 10.7 million in 2015/16. Emergency responses to the most urgent calls increased by 33%.

There has been an increase in the proportion of calls resolved over the telephone (10% in 2015/16 compared with 5% in 2011/12) due to which the number of incidents attended by ambulances rose by only 9% since 2011/12.<sup>101</sup> The proportion of incidents that were attended but did not require hospital transport for resolution also increased slightly, from 34% in 2011/12 to 38% in 2015/16.<sup>102</sup>

Despite some increases to funding and staffing, ambulance response times are deteriorating, with fewer trusts achieving their targets. There has been a steady decline in the number of ‘Category A’ calls<sup>103</sup> attended within the target of eight minutes. The national target of reaching 75% of Category A calls within that time frame was not met for 32 consecutive months prior to August 2016.<sup>104</sup> Nationally, none of the time targets have been met since May 2015.<sup>105</sup>

In 2015-16, only 58% of hospital transfers met the 15-minute turn around expectation (compared to 80% in 2011/12) and only 65% of ambulance crews were then ready for another call within 15 minutes.<sup>106</sup> These delays were the equivalent of 113 12-hour shifts lost per day.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>101</sup> See: <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/NHS-Ambulance-Services.pdf>

<sup>102</sup> See: <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/NHS-Ambulance-Services.pdf>

<sup>103</sup> Category A (Red 1 and Red 2) ambulance calls are those classed as life threatening.

<sup>104</sup> See: <http://www.qualitywatch.org.uk/indicator/ambulance-response-times>

<sup>105</sup> See: <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/NHS-Ambulance-Services.pdf>

<sup>106</sup> The national target is 30 minutes for patient transfer care to A&E, including getting the vehicle ready for the next call.

<sup>107</sup> See: <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/NHS-Ambulance-Services.pdf>

Without data it is only possible to hypothesise potential demand displacement to the police. The Bedfordshire data analysis points to around 0.2% of incidents being associated with ambulance services – see Annex C. The other available indicator of police involvement in ambulance calls suggests that the frequency with which police transported casualties to hospital due to ambulance delays in London reduced between 2014 and 2016.<sup>108</sup>

## 6.10. Domestic abuse

**The picture is complex: domestic abuse generates ‘crime’ and ‘non-crime’ cases for the police which together made over one million incidents in 2016/17. Around half of domestic abuse incidents are classified as offences. There is wide geographical variation in the rates (per 1,000 population) of domestic abuse offences and this needs to be better understood. It is clear that recorded volumes of crime linked to domestic abuse are increasing markedly, in line with the growth of violent and sexual offences overall (see section 7.1). Case complexity also appears to be increasing with police taking longer to complete investigations. Police are the main referral agency for MARACS cases and are the main route into the multi-agency risk management for domestic violence. Domestic abuse incidents have a high impact on police resources, both in terms of case complexity and in navigating through multi-agency arrangements.**

Police demand relating to domestic abuse has been described as “unrelenting and increasing”.<sup>109</sup> Often reports of domestic abuse result in a crime being recorded; on other occasions (where no allegations are made and where there is no evidence of an offence) these reports are logged as an incident. Domestic abuse, therefore, generates ‘crime’ and ‘non-crime’ demands on the police; however (as discussed below) such reports are increasingly being treated as the former.

Although its reliability on the subject has been challenged,<sup>110</sup> the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) estimates that 1.9 million people (1.2 million women and 713,000 men) experienced domestic abuse in the year to March 2017. It also suggests that there has been a small (but statistically significant) reduction in prevalence over the last five years, with 5.9% of the population reporting victimisation in the year to March 2017, compared to 7% to March 2012.<sup>111</sup>

There is some debate as to whether incidence (the number of violent assaults linked to domestic abuse, rather than the number of victims) has increased during the last decade. It has been argued that innovative methods for analysing CSEW data reveal an increase in the number of assaults experienced by the most chronically abused women since 2008.<sup>112</sup>

<sup>108</sup> See: [https://www.met.police.uk/globalassets/foi-media/disclosure\\_2016/july\\_2016/information-rights-unit---number-of-times-police-officers-in-the-mps-have-taken-members-of-the-public-to-hospital-due-to-ambulances-being-unavailable](https://www.met.police.uk/globalassets/foi-media/disclosure_2016/july_2016/information-rights-unit---number-of-times-police-officers-in-the-mps-have-taken-members-of-the-public-to-hospital-due-to-ambulances-being-unavailable)

<sup>109</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/progress-report-on-the-police-response-to-domestic-abuse.pdf>

<sup>110</sup> See: <https://www.womensaid.org.uk/information-support/what-is-domestic-abuse/how-common-is-domestic-abuse/>

<sup>111</sup> See: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/domesticabuseinenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2017>

<sup>112</sup> See: Walby et al. (2016) <https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/56/6/1203/2415172>




Due to changes in reporting, recording and response provided, changes in prevalence and incidence have little (or no) bearing on the level of demand that domestic abuse places on the police.

A total of 488,000 cases of domestic abuse were recorded<sup>113</sup> for the year ending March 2017, up from 421,000 the year ending March 2016 – a 16% increase. There are no comparable data for previous years, however HMICFRS reported a 23% increase between 2014/15 and 2015/16 (for years ending June).<sup>114</sup> It is clear that recorded volumes of crime linked to domestic abuse are increasing markedly: 11% of all recorded offences, 32% of violent offences and 13% of sexual offences were flagged as domestic abuse (in 2016/17). Thirty-one per cent of all homicides (with adult victims) were domestic homicides.

In addition to domestic abuse offences the police also recorded 580,000 domestic abuse incidents (that were not subsequently classified as crimes) in the year to March 2017; this is a 5% reduction on the 610,000 in the previous year.<sup>115</sup> The total number of domestic abuse crimes and incidents (that were not subsequently classified as crimes) combined, increased by 3.6% in the year to March 2017 compared with the previous year.

Chart 6.13: Police recorded domestic abuse offences and incidents in England and Wales, 2015/16 and 2016/17



Between 2015/16 and 2016/17 the proportion of domestic abuse offences that resulted in a suspect being charged reduced from 25 to 18%, and the proportion where no charge was made because the victim did not support action, increased from 35 to 42%.


The time taken to carry out investigations has increased. In 2016/17 only 28% of cases reached an outcome within five days, compared to 42% in the previous year. This might suggest an increase in the complexity or amount of work being carried out (per offence) before a case is closed/completed. It is not clear whether the amount of ‘work’ carried out in relation to domestic abuse (non-crime) ‘incidents’ has also increased (for example in triaging, recording, reviewing, making referrals etc.). However, the police are, generally speaking, making most of the referrals to MARAC and appear to be taking a leading role in delivering a joined-up response.

<sup>113</sup> Data tables are published alongside the bulletin: Domestic Abuse in England and Wales, year ending March 2017 - Appendix tables, published by ONS. Covers 2015/16 and 2016/17 only.

<sup>114</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/progress-report-on-the-police-response-to-domestic-abuse.pdf>

<sup>115</sup> See: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/domesticabuseinenglandandwalesappendixtables>

Chart 6.14: Domestic abuse offences 2016-17, per 1,000 population




There is a factor of 3 in the geographic variation of the number of domestic abuse offences per 1,000 population. Given the impact of domestic related incidents on police resources it is important to try to understand this wide variation. For example, are the differences due to social and economic demographics (not much the police can do) or due to a different configuration of health and social services, victim support, etc, that lead to lower rates of police involvement?

### Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs)

For high risk cases of domestic violence, MARACs are a key part of the machinery to co-ordinate community responses. They include representatives from different agencies to respond to cases of abuse likely to result in serious harm or homicide. In 2016/17 there were ~83,000 cases considered by MARACs with 104,000 children in relevant households.

Chart 6.15 shows that the police generally make the largest number of referrals to MARACs and three quarters of all forces make more than 50% of the referrals, underlining the police leadership role in this respect.

Chart 6.15: Proportion of cases referred to MARACs by police



Also, looking at charts 6.14 to 6.15 together poses some interesting questions about how the police become involved in complex cross-agency cases and the levels of engagement from other local services. For example, Essex make the highest proportion of referrals to MARACs (88%), but are in the middle of the range for the number of domestic abuse referrals overall. A better understanding of the incident and referral dynamics of domestic abuse – and other non-crime incidents, this is a general point – would help articulate the business case and shape of cross-agency collaboration.

### The Serious Crime Act 2015

The introduction of new legislation in the Serious Crime Act 2015 means that domestic violence now includes other forms of emotional abuse such as coercive or controlling behaviour between intimate partners, former partners, or family members. The new offence seeks to protect victims who have been subjected to sustained patterns of abuse where the perpetrator repeatedly seeks to control the victim's behaviour in some way. Acts that are repeatedly designed to intimidate, frighten or coerce a victim can now be regarded as an offence. Many victims do not always recognise the action of their partners as being controlling for many months or years and such offences need careful investigation to gather evidence and present a case for prosecution. New powers introduced by the Domestic Violence Act 2018 also enhance a number of protective options available for victims of domestic abuse and offer greater options for investigating officers. Additional and much needed powers however, also increase the demands on investigators.

Offences of forced marriage, honour-based violence and female genital mutilation (FGM) are also crimes which occur within a family or partnership setting and this brings added complexity and risk management issues for investigating officers. As with the offences outlined above, the number of offences reported often masks the time and complexity of the investigation that follows to secure evidence and provide the necessary reassurance and protection for victims to secure a prosecution (if practical) as well the safety of the victim and other family members. Importantly, forces are now working with other partners to look at intelligence and data held by each of them to try to identify 'hidden' demand and possible offences.




## 6.11. Traffic management and road casualties

Despite rising motor traffic levels, deaths and injuries from traffic accidents have not increased and the number of road deaths in the UK has remained relatively constant since 2012. Comparing similar police geographies identifies a significant variation in the way forces respond to traffic incidents, which, at the higher end, might be around 6% of incident volume.

The number of road policing officers, police budgets for roads policing and proactive activity such as breath tests have reduced in recent years.<sup>116</sup> However, despite rising motor traffic levels (up by 1.4% in year to June 2017), deaths and injuries from traffic accidents have not increased. The number of road deaths in the UK has remained relatively constant at between 1,700 and 1,800 per year since 2012. Police data indicate a (statistically significant) 5% reduction in the number of casualties (suffering injuries of any severity) in the year ending June 2017 compared with the previous year. However, it has been suggested that this might be the result of reduced police attendance at accidents involving only minor injury.<sup>117</sup>

The Bedfordshire data (see Annex C) point to road traffic related incidents forming around 6% of incident volume. Chart 6.16, which gives the rate of traffic accidents per 1,000 population, covers a subset of police forces. This puts Bedfordshire third from the top at 2.3 accidents per 1,000 and so is unlikely to be representative of police forces as a whole. Comparing Kent and Bedfordshire there is a factor of seven difference (for what are both semi-rural counties) indicating very different approaches to traffic related incidents.

Chart 6.16: Road traffic accidents per 1,000 population, 2016



<sup>116</sup> See: <http://www.ias.org.uk/uploads/pdf/IAS%20reports/rp28122017.pdf>

<sup>117</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/654962/quarterly-estimates-april-to-june-2017.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/654962/quarterly-estimates-april-to-june-2017.pdf)

More generally, the police manage traffic by enforcing a number of endorsable and non-endorsable motoring offences, which are commonly dealt with through Fixed Penalty Notices (FPN) including for speeding and parking offences. From a peak of 3.4 million in 2005, FPNs for motoring offences reduced to just over 1 million in 2015.<sup>118</sup> The proportion of these detected by a camera has increased.

Parking restrictions are enforced by a combination of Civil Enforcement Officers (employed by local authorities) and Traffic Wardens, who (as well as police officers) enforce criminal offences. Traffic Wardens are 'appointed' by the police but responsibility for employing these has, for some time, been almost entirely transferred to local authorities (or, in London, Transport for London).<sup>119</sup> In 2017 police forces in England and Wales employed only 143 traffic wardens (with only the Metropolitan Police, Manchester and Lancashire retaining any at all); in 2012 there were only 63.<sup>120</sup>



<sup>118</sup> See: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/561976/fixed-penalty-notices-police-powers-procedures-hosb1516-tables.ods](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/561976/fixed-penalty-notices-police-powers-procedures-hosb1516-tables.ods)

<sup>119</sup> See: <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN02104>

<sup>120</sup> See: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2017>

## 7 Mapping the volume - criminal offences and anti-social behaviour

**From 2013 the overall volume of crime being dealt with by the police has been increasing. However, the long-term trend in reducing anti-social behaviour incidents is continuing. Although anti-social behaviour is not classified as crime it represents around 25% (in 2017) of incidents to which the police respond and it is useful to compare it against the level of crime-related demand, since in many cases it will not be clear, initially, whether an incident is a crime or a form of anti-social behaviour.**

In considering the macro view of crime levels there remains an ambiguity concerning how well police recorded crime represents what is actually happening to the level of real criminal activity, and, somewhat more narrowly, to the demand 'felt' by the police in the form of incidents that require a response and investigation.<sup>121</sup> The annual Crime Survey in England and Wales (CSEW) provides an alternative view (to police recorded crime) that helps to triangulate what may be the real changes in crime levels and trends. We look to the CSEW to inform section 7.4 on cyber and fraud related crime, which is currently poorly covered by police recorded crime.

In recent years there has been criticism of police recording practices by HMICFRS<sup>122</sup> with an estimated 19% under recording, and that the problem was particularly acute for victims of violence against the person and sexual offences, where the under recording rates were 33% and 26% respectively. As a result, there is a question about how much of the changing demand profile relates to an improvement in recording practices. Where possible, we take this into account when looking at the results of our analysis of police recorded crime data; however, for the most part we treat the police data as providing a sufficiently accurate representation of what is taking place for the purposes of assessing the demand on police forces – particularly when using the latest data for 2017.

### 7.1. Changes over time

**Looking at systematically recorded data on crime and anti-social behaviour shows a reversal in the earlier reducing crime trend. The picture is now more complex with significant and sustained increases, from about 2013, for some types of crime. The numbers of recorded crimes for violence and sexual offences; public order offences; criminal damage and arson; and vehicle crime are going up. For others such as burglary, other theft and drugs, the trend is now flat following reductions prior to 2013. While this assessment needs to be qualified by potential effects of changes in police recording practices, the divergences are, we think, pointing firmly to an altering mix of police cases, with a larger volume of complex violence or sexual offences, and one that is more likely to impact on police resources and investigative capacity. It is also clear that the shifts in the demand profile are being felt by all police forces pointing to broader underlying causes.**


<sup>121</sup> Statistical bulletin: Crime in England and Wales: year ending December 2017 at <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingdecember2017>

<sup>122</sup> Crime-recording: making the victim count. The final report of an inspection of crime data integrity in police forces in England and Wales, November 2014

On the other hand, there has been a continuing fall in the number of anti-social behaviour (ASB) incidents; however, the impact of this in releasing resources is not expected to compensate from the added demands from crime.

Chart 7.1 records the total number of incidents recorded in published data at monthly intervals and a street level geographic resolution.<sup>123</sup>

Chart 7.1: All nationally recorded incidents including anti-social behaviour (ASB), England and Wales, 2011-2018



A number of trends are immediately apparent:

- 1) Recorded crime has been increasing since the second half of 2013,<sup>124</sup> from ~295,000 to 430,000 per month by July 2017, a 42% increase. This is more than double the rate of under recording identified by HMICFRS and so it is improbable that the whole of the increase can be attributed to improved recording practice.
- 2) On the other hand, ASB, beneath a seasonal imprint with summer peaks, has a more or less linear downward trend, falling from ~280,000 cases per month in 2011 to ~155,000 by July 2017, a fall of 56%. Again, the HMICFRS report suggests that the rate of mis-recording crimes as anti-social behaviour is around 3%<sup>125</sup> so the drop in anti-social behaviour is not simply an artefact of recording practice or reallocation of incidents. The number of ASB incidents reported to police halved between 2007/08 and 2014/15 from 3.8 to 1.9

<sup>123</sup> The dataset as published includes Northern Ireland. These entries were removed to create an England and Wales only dataset. This includes some 45,000,000 entries and gives a robust picture, at least in so far as data limitations apply, including changes to recording and reporting practices by police forces who submit the data. The data set can be found at the [Data.police.uk](https://data.police.uk/data/archive/) website

<sup>124</sup> We are taking peak to peak measurements

<sup>125</sup> This is based on a 2012 survey.




million<sup>126</sup> and that downward trend has continued so that in 2017 the annual rate of ASB incidents was 1.65 million.

- 3) The overall effect on the total (crime plus ASB) is that of an increasing trend from a minimum in 2013 of ~517,000 to ~587,000 by July 2017, an increase of 15%.

CSEW data also indicate a reduction in anti-social behaviour with the number of respondents perceiving a high level of ASB in their area falling from around 20% in 2002/03 to less than 10% in 2016/17. With the exception of litter and noisy neighbours all categories of ASB reduced over the period – see Chart 7.2.

Chart 7.2: Percentage of people who say there is a fairly/very big problem in their area with different types of anti-social behaviour (2001/02 to 2016/17)



Clearly, crime incidents will be more resource demanding in policing terms (for example, calling for investigation, prosecution etc.), and so the increase in crime is more significant as a driver of demand than the reduction in ASB. For example, our analysis of the Bedfordshire data (Annex C), which includes information about initial police officer deployments, shows a rate of 1.45 officer deployments per crime compared to 0.75 officer deployments per ASB incident.<sup>127</sup>

<sup>126</sup> See: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/adhocs/004910antisocialbehaviourincidents-bypoliceforceareainenglishregionsandwalesyearendingmarch2008toyearendingmarch2015>

<sup>127</sup> Calculated from Table C.1 and the number incidents and deployments

It is also useful to look at the breakdown of crime data by offence type. Charts 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 show the results of this analysis. It is evident that over the past 7 years changes have not been uniform:

1. Bicycle and thefts from a person have remained broadly stable, in a band ranging from 6,500 – 10,000 per month. Bicycle theft is also showing seasonality peaks in September and October.<sup>128</sup>
2. Shoplifting is showing a rising trend from a low of 25,000 per month in 2011 to a high of ~33,000 per month in early 2018, a rise of 32%.
3. The category of other theft has shown a rapid decline to 2014, followed by a stable phase at ~40,000 offences per month; this group of offences is also shows a marked seasonal behaviour with summer peaks and winter troughs, with a gap of ~10,000 offences per month.
4. The pattern for burglary has shown a small reduction from a high of over 2011/12 and then a period of stability, ~35,000 offences per month, with a somewhat less pronounced seasonal variation of winter highs and summer troughs.
5. Weapons possession and robbery have remained broadly constant or have small rising trends.
6. Violence and sexual offences have, however, shown a very rapid rise since 2013 when the data started to be collected within the data set. Over the period of 5 years the rate has climbed from a low of ~50,000 to ~139,000 offences per month, an increase by a factor of 2.8. A proportion of this rapid rise could be the result of more systematic recording practices by the police responding to criticism about inaccurate records, in particular for violence offences. However, this is not the only crime type which is showing an increase, with a similar picture for public order offences, for example - see point (7) below.
7. With the exception of drugs, the offences covered by Chart 7.5 are all showing increases. Criminal damage and arson, vehicle crime and public order offences are showing upward trends, with public order offences showing a pronounced rise from a low base of ~10,000 in 2014 to ~34,000 offences per month in 2017/18, an increase of over 350%!

<sup>128</sup> It is not obvious why this should peak as an autumnal cycle, though the approach of winter may make cycling less attractive

Chart 7.3: Monthly rate of theft offences, England and Wales, 2011 – 2018




Chart 7.4: Monthly rate of violence and related offences, England and Wales, 2011 – 2018





Chart 7.5: Monthly rate of “other” offences, England and Wales, 2011 – 2018




Plainly this presents a mixed picture of how crime incident volume is changing, albeit qualified by some uncertainty about the accuracy of police recording practice and how representative it is of the ‘real’ level of reported crime.

Chart 7.6 shows a comparison of the crime rate and ASB incidents by police force geography. Data covering four years are included, 2014 to 2017; and the rates are normalised per 1,000 population. The chart is presented by ranking the position of police forces using the 2017 rate. It is clear from this that rates across police forces differ by a factor of about 2 between the lowest, 80 per 1,000 population in Thames Valley, and the highest, 170 per 1,000 population in Cleveland.

The chart also shows that the increase in rates in the last four years, shown in charts 7.3 to 7.5, is being felt by almost all forces; and, in consequence, 2017 data generally overlie the previous years. It is also useful to note that the variation, in part and at the high end, appears to be strongly associated with high levels of deprivation as measured by the index of multiple deprivation (IMD): almost all the police areas in England that appear in the top 25% of the crime rate per 1,000 population are also in the top 25% of the IMD. This is not of course the complete picture since the lower half of the scale is more scrambled.<sup>129</sup> Again, as discussed earlier, it would be important to understand fully the reasons for such variations.

<sup>129</sup> We have not carried out a cluster analysis. However, on the basis of these data it would seem a worthwhile exercise.

Chart 7.6: Crimes and ASB per 1,000 population, per police area (ranked by 2017 rate)



## 7.2. Composition of reported crime and anti-social behaviour

The largest two categories of recorded incidents reported centrally are violence and sexual offences and ASB. Together they account for around half the police recorded incidents. There is a substantial variation among police forces in the proportion of these two groups, and in the other crime types, which needs to be better understood including how the changing mix of offences faced by individual forces is impacting on the use of police resources.


Chart 7.7 shows the composition of reported incidents by police force area and a breakdown by crime type. The data cover the three months December 2017 to February 2018.<sup>130</sup> A number of immediate points emerge:

1. The two largest categories are ASB and violence and sexual offences which account for around half the recorded incidents.
2. ASB represents a variable proportion of the total, from 10% to 40%. The national average from chart 7.1, for the period covered by the data (December 2017 to February 2018), is 28%.

<sup>130</sup> City of London and British Transport Police are atypical police forces and are not usually included in charts comparing geographical variation.

3. Visually at least, most of the geographical variation appears to be concentrated on ASB and violence/sexual offences. The range of other offences together comprise around 50% to 60% of the middle band.

Chart 7.7: Composition by police force area of nationally recorded crime and anti-social behaviour - Dec 2017 to Feb 2018



### 7.3. What are the police outcomes? And how do they relate to workload?


The proportion of crimes where the police either were not able to identify a suspect or there was insufficient evidence to take it further varied across police forces from 50% to 80%, 73% overall. This means that a majority of cases do not proceed beyond the first investigative stage. The proportion of cases charged for prosecution ranged from 9% to 20% depending on the police force, 11.5% overall. There is a number of possible factors that may be contributing to such a wide variation. Along with police efficiency and the broader geographic and socio-economic character of a police force, we expect case mix also to be important. However, more work would be needed to understand this better.

Chart 7.8 shows the breakdown of crime outcomes in terms of four categories, where:

1. The police were not able to identify a suspect
2. There was insufficient evidence to prosecute
3. The suspect was charged and the case would proceed to court
4. Other ways in which the offence was sanctioned, e.g. cautions

This chart also shows the variation of the breakdown across police forces. It is clear that (1) and (2), together representing an early end to police investigation, account for between 50% (Norfolk) and 80% (Lancashire) of recorded crime in their respective police areas. This, of course, raises issues of comparative performance across police forces and it would be very useful to understand the reasons for the differences. However, from the perspective of planning, it is clear that, depending on the police force, between 50% and 80% of cases will not move beyond the initial investigative stage.

Chart 7.8: Main police outcomes, 2017



## 7.4. Cyber-crime and fraud

The pattern of offending has been changing over the past two decades, with the wide availability of the internet offering new ways for committing conventional offences such as fraud, as well as new offences relating to internet services. Cyber-crime and fraud are growing. Estimates indicate 4.7 million incidents of fraud and computer misuse were experienced by adults aged 16 and over in England and Wales for the survey year ending September 2017, showing a 15% decrease from the previous survey year. Reporting and investigation arrangements are now centralised, reflecting both the specialist and technical dimension of these offences and also that they transcend normal police areas, and that often they have an international character. However, over time, we would expect a possibly increasing proportion of these cases to be handled by individual police forces.

A review by ONS<sup>131</sup> provides an up to date survey of the various data sources that shed light on the changing trends and volumes for cyber-crime and fraud. New centralised arrangements for reporting and investigating fraud and cyber-crime have been introduced. Action Fraud<sup>132</sup> is the UK's national fraud reporting service. Fraud offences can be reported online – such as forwarding scam emails for investigation – or by telephone. The National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU),<sup>133</sup> part of the National Crime Agency, leads the UK's response to cyber-crime coordinating the response to the most serious threats. The NCCU works with partners with specialist capabilities, and with Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCU). The latest figures for the year ending September 2017 indicate that the volume of frauds recorded by Action Fraud is the highest it has ever been at 272,980 offences. Some incidents of fraud are passed to police forces to deal with.

Until recently fraud was not covered in the headline estimates from the Crime Survey England and Wales (CSEW), but this gap has now been covered from October 2015 by extending the main victimisation module in the CSEW with new questions on both fraud and computer misuse. The new questions cover a wide range of frauds involving both traditional and more modern methods (for example, those committed in person, by mail, over the phone and online), as well as offences falling under the Computer Misuse Act.

Estimates indicate 4.7 million incidents of fraud and computer misuse were experienced by adults aged 16 and over in England and Wales for the survey year ending September 2017, showing a 15% decrease from the previous survey year. Fraud, which accounted for over two-thirds of the estimated fraud and computer misuse total, fell by 10% from the previous year to 3.2 million offences. 'Bank and credit account fraud', which makes up the majority of total fraud offences, remained at a similar level to the previous survey year.

<sup>131</sup> Overview of fraud and computer misuse statistics for England and Wales. Summary of the various sources of data for fraud and computer misuse and what these tell us about victims, circumstances and long term trends, January 2018. <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/articles/overviewoffraudandcomputermisusestatisticsforenglandandwales/2018-01-25>

<sup>132</sup> <https://www.actionfraud.police.uk/>

<sup>133</sup> [www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/national-cyber-crime-unit](http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do/national-cyber-crime-unit)



The technically complex and international dimension to some of these offences restricts opportunities to bring offenders to justice when perpetrators are found to be in other countries that do not co-operate with UK police and law enforcement agencies. The National Crime Agency predicts that the use of technologies such as the dark web, encryption, virtual private networks (VPN) and virtual currencies amongst both criminals and the public will continue to increase. This presents significant challenges for police forces, some of which are already struggling to recruit a sufficient number of detectives. The complexity of cyber-crime often demands investigators with enhanced skills and experience to both investigate online offences and present cases to the Crown Prosecution Service. It is not unusual for investigating officers to seize computers and hard drives with terabytes of data that needs to be interrogated. This in itself, produces a significant demand for investigating officers and for those who supervise their work. The internet is regularly used for child sexual exploitation (as discussed in section 6:9 above). It is also used by modern slavery and human trafficking offenders who frequently recruit victims of trafficking online. In the latest assessment of cyber-crime, the National Crime Agency predicts that these methods are likely to increase in the next three years.


The ability of criminals anywhere in the world to commit offences such as fraud, blackmail, online abuse and hacking of IT systems against those in the UK, is creating a significant and growing demand on policing which will not be tackled by the service alone.

## 8 Workforce comparisons

Overall police workforce numbers have fallen by 25% since their peak in 2010. Our analysis in the earlier sections has pointed to a change in the complexity and composition of police work as reflected in the types and volumes of incidents managed through control rooms. Some of this complexity arises because of the cross-cutting nature of incidents which often need the involvement of other local agencies in order to successfully to resolve them. One measure of the tension between the availability of resources and the case load is the ratio of cases to number of personnel. This ratio was broadly constant for the period 2011 to 2014 but since then has grown very substantially by some 43%, reflecting the growth in crime since 2013. This excludes fraud and cyber-crime which are largely managed centrally. It also does not make allowance for any distortion due to changes or improvements in police recording practice, which we think may account for some of the growth in crime but not all.

Chart 8.1 shows the changes in overall police workforce numbers<sup>134</sup> in England and Wales, over the eleven-year period 2007 to 2017 inclusive. A peak in 2010 of approximately 250,000 fell to just over 200,000 in 2017 – a 25% reduction overall. As is well known, the pressures on public finances and in consequence on police budgets has been the principal driver behind these changes.

Chart 8.1: Changes in the police workforce, 2007-2017



<sup>134</sup> Police workforce, England and Wales, as at 31 March 2007 to 31 March 2017, source: Home Office

It is, however, also useful to see these funding changes against the background of externally driven demand. Given that data are not available in a consistent manner across time or incident type, the most robust and direct comparison that could be made is with the monthly crime and anti-social behaviour statistics that were analysed in section 7 (see Chart 7.1) which cover the same period. Chart 8.2 puts these two sources together.

As already discussed the evidence is that, from about 2013, recorded crime has been on the increase. And crime, as a component of the externally driven demand, takes a larger share of the available resources that the proportion of incident volume would imply. It is clear therefore that crime demand and available resources – as measured by the staff employed by police – have diverging trends.

Chart 8.2: Changing staff numbers and crime/ ASB incident volume





Chart 8.3 quantifies this difference, showing the proportion of crimes per staff member (c/sm). From 2014 this has started to grow from 16.4 c/sm to 23.5 c/sm (an increase of 43%) reflecting the added pressure on police resources starting from 2013.

Chart 8.3: No of crimes/ member of staff



The police service can only respond to the demands placed upon it by having the right mix of police officers and staff, uniform and detective personnel. In 2017, a national shortage of investigators was highlighted by HMICFRS. A lack of more than 5,000 investigators was described by HMIC Zoe Billingham as a ‘national crisis’. In a more recent assessment in March 2018, HMICFRS noted that progress to fill these posts has been stubbornly slow and that one in five investigator posts remain vacant.

Some forces are also reporting difficulties in filling other specialist posts such as firearms officers and custody roles. In their evidence to the Police Pay and Remuneration Body in 2018, the National Police Chief Council (NPCC)<sup>135</sup> cited loss of allowances, shift patterns and increasing accountability as some of the reasons for difficulties in filling these roles. Another key aspect of effective policing is having adequate supervision at both Sergeant and Inspector ranks. In the Police Remuneration Review Body 4th Report on Police Pay for 2018,<sup>136</sup> the Board heard evidence that 17 forces were finding it difficult to attract officers to both Sergeant and Inspector roles.

Both the Police Federation of England and Wales and the Police Superintendent’s Association highlight the fact that their members find it increasingly difficult to maintain a reasonable work-life balance. The level of demand they were managing, the increased risk to their safety, sometimes exacerbated by low numbers of available officers, was influencing their career choices and decision about how long to continue in the service.

NPCC are also undertaking a significant programme of work to modernise workforce practices with the aim of making policing more responsive to the changing demands and increasing skills, capability and flexibility of the workforce. There is a recognition that police officers will require additional skills, formal recognition and accreditation. This will be particularly relevant for those investigating some of the more complex crimes such as child sexual abuse and cyber-crime. The ability of the service to continue to manage increased and more complex demand, will depend in part, on realising the benefits of the workforce modernisation programme.

<sup>135</sup> See: <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/state-of-policing-2017-2.pdf>

<sup>136</sup> See: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/728354/Final\\_PRRB\\_EW\\_2018\\_Report\\_-\\_web\\_accessible.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/728354/Final_PRRB_EW_2018_Report_-_web_accessible.pdf)

## 9 What the public think

The results of a survey carried out in May 2018 show that the public (60-70%) consider the police's role to be wider than solely dealing with crime. The public consider the police's wide role to include public safety and protection of the vulnerable, mental health, missing children, anti-social behaviour, rowdy neighbours and alcohol-related disorder. However, the results also suggest that more should be done by the police and local partners to explain how to access services directly in emergencies and in more routine cases.

In order to better understand the views of the public on the role and priorities of the police, Crest Advisory commissioned a national survey of 2,002 adults.<sup>137</sup> The sample comprised geographic and socioeconomic dimensions: nation/region, gender, age, social grade<sup>138</sup> and employment sector.<sup>139</sup> In addition, as part of the background, we looked at the extent to which those in the sample had previous contact with the police. Approximately two thirds of the sample had had contact with the police at some point.

### 9.1. The questions

We sought to test public views through a series of questions focussing on:

- 1) the purpose of policing
- 2) the situations or circumstances in which police could be contacted
- 3) the issues with which the police should be involved, covering non-crime factors
- 4) the extent that the public would be confident that social services, health services, local authorities or charities would provide an adequate response
- 5) knowledge about how to contact local services
- 6) police priorities

More detail about the questions can be found in Annex E.

<sup>137</sup> On behalf of Crest Advisory, ComRes surveyed 2,002 GB adults online between 30th May 2018 and 31st May 2018. Data were weighted to be demographically representative of all British adults aged 18+.

<sup>138</sup> AB, C1, C2 and DE

<sup>139</sup> private or public

## 9.1. The questions

The survey results show that the public have quite a firm view about the role of the police and the police relationship with other local services and organisations. In addition, the pattern of responses shows strong congruence across both regional and socio-economic characteristics of the survey group. A selection of results is presented here to illustrate the key emerging messages.

Chart 9.1 shows the range of views in relation to the scope of the police role, giving a regional perspective. It is clear that the police role is seen to extend well beyond dealing with crime alone. Between 60 – 70% of those surveyed think that the police's role is wider than solely dealing with crime and includes public safety and the protection of the vulnerable.

Chart 9.1: What should be the purpose of policing?




Chart 9.2 identifies the top six situations that the police would be contacted, looking across the spectrum of socio-economic groups in the sample. Views are consistent across these groups and the focus is on both personal and neighbourhood safety.

Chart 9.2: In which of the following situations would you call the police? (Top six categories)





Chart 9.3 shows the public's view in relation to a range of social problems which pose a challenge within communities. In very many cases such incidents will likely give rise to public safety concerns, the need for social or health intervention, as well as the possibility that offences may have been committed. With the exception of homelessness, there is a strong expectation (70% - 92%) that the police should have a role where there are concerns around mental health, missing children, anti-social behaviour, rowdy neighbours and alcohol-related disorder.

Chart 9.3: Do you think that the police should be dealing with any of the following issues?



The case of homelessness, however, is different. Here, 28% think that this calls for a police role compared to the other types which score 70% or more.

In Chart 9.4 and 9.5 we have probed the public's understanding about the role that other local organisations could play in relation to mental health, missing children, anti-social behaviour, alcohol-related disorder, rowdy neighbours or homelessness. It is clear that where single agencies had, or should have, a predominant role, this was picked out, for example health services for mental illness or social services for regularly missing children. It is interesting to note that in relation to alcohol-related disorder and homelessness views were more evenly divided. However, the responses in relation to being able to readily access such organisations, suggest that more could be done particularly in relation to local charities, mental health and social services.



Chart 9.4: For the following issues, who else would you call that you would be confident would provide an adequate response?





Chart 9.5: To help with any of the scenarios in the previous question, would you know how to contact the following in your area?



## 10 Conclusions

In this report we have looked at externally driven police demand taking a whole system view. Publicly available data do not provide a complete picture and are often subject to numerous caveats about recording and classification changes, which can make trends difficult to interpret and volumes approximate. However, we were able to piece together an overview of the major categories, and their approximate relative weight, using published data and also some recent analysis carried out by Crest on command and control room data from Bedfordshire and Greater Manchester Police.

Cyber-crime and fraud are a separate category, tackled in part through centralised arrangements. We expect these offences to continue to grow in volume as more and more of our lives are lived through the internet. This trend is likely to continue to shape the pattern of offending in the future as well as add to the complexity of cases.

We estimate that for 2016/17 there were approximately 16.2 to 19.2 million incidents handled through police command and control rooms. Around 90% were either 999 or 101 calls.

Trends on the whole are harder to discern. The volumes of some types of incident are falling while others are increasing. In particular, anti-social behaviour is continuing to fall, whilst at the same time, violence and sexual offences have shown substantial and sustained growth. Increases in these types of crimes have significant implications for police demand and resource. The composition and likely trend for major (>10%) groups of incidents are summarised in Table 10.1.

Table 10.1: Summary of the main components of incident demand on police command and control rooms

Type of incident	Approx. percentage of total	Trend	Case complexity	Weight <sup>140</sup> relative to incident volume	Other non-CJS agency involvement
<b>Crime</b>	23-24	Increasing substantially	High, particularly for violence and sexual offences	>1	
<b>Anti-social behaviour</b>	13-16	Falling	Low	<1	Local authority
<b>Mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents or vulnerable persons</b>	18 -19	Increasing particularly for acute cases	High, coordination with other local services	>1	Health services, Social services
<b>Administration</b>	12 - 13	?	Low	<<1	

<sup>140</sup> Based on the initial office deployments relative to the incident volume – see Annex C

While Table 10.1 presents a national overview, it is clear from our analysis in sections 6 and 7 that there is substantial variation among police force areas. This is the case at least for the rates of incident reporting; pressures from health, social or welfare related incidents (and the underlying service provision from health services); crime composition; and, police outcomes. The reasons for this variation are not well understood. From the perspective of getting to grips with demand, and in terms of judging police performance and identifying areas for improvement or good practice that can be shared, a more detailed and cross cutting study is needed, one that has the necessary involvement and buy in from police forces and other local services.

There is a current debate about the role of the police, whether framed widely or focussed exclusively on crime, as a way of reducing demand pressures on the police. However, our analysis suggests that a narrow crime focussed role is not supported by the evidence:

1. Non-crime demand will involve a range of incidents, e.g. hoax or administrative calls, covering activities needed to deal with the incoming stream of incidents. This seems unavoidable, although no doubt steps to mitigate its resource impact should be taken.
2. At the point of entry, it will not in general be clear whether an incident is a crime or not a crime. Anti-social behaviour and cases involving mental health, drugs, alcohol, domestic incidents or vulnerable persons are examples of non-crime incidents. Some 4% of vulnerable persons incidents will be both. This means that the police will inevitably be drawn into such incidents, making any narrowly prescribed police role difficult to maintain.
3. Pressure on police resources does not derive exclusively from non-crime incidents. Our analysis points both to a major (and probably continuing) increase in the volume of complex crime as well as to complex cross-cutting cases such as those that involve acute mental health or vulnerable children. The police are often the first service to see complex cross cutting cases, illustrated by their predominant role in making referrals to local multi-agency case management arrangements.
4. A public survey of adults in Great Britain, commissioned by Crest and carried out in May 2018, reveals that, across all age, socioeconomic and geographic groups, 60 – 70% expect the police to also have a role in cases that involve public safety and the protection of the vulnerable. A narrowing of the police's role would be against public expectations.

While it has not been specifically covered in this report, there is wide ranging statistical and other evidence to show that a proportion of those in contact with services (prolific offenders, drugs, alcohol, mental health services users) present a high level of repeat demand both to the police and other local services. This is a significant factor that should be taken into account in the planning of the deployment of resources and in the design of local multi-agency crises teams, which we recommend in section 11.

Our conclusion is that the mix and complexity of the police case load will continue to develop and that the police will continue to need to deliver and be challenged to do so, on their own, and in combination with other health, social, economic and education agencies. However, it remains the case that local cross agency working is often poorly structured, insufficiently accountable, and underrepresented in commissioning and development plans. This has been a longstanding problem, one that locally owned driven models are more likely to help solve.

## 11 Recommendations

We think that there are a number of things that will be needed to tackle the issues identified in this report:

**1. A high-level political statement, including contributions from police leadership, affirming a scope and role for the police that includes safety, welfare and the protection of the vulnerable.** This should bring about needed certainty for the police and for local partner organisations, also spelling out what is expected from them.

**2. The evidence base for the external demand on the police needs to be improved by commissioning systematic cross-cutting studies.** A step towards understanding existing and future demands for the coming four years has commenced with forces completing Force Management Statements for submission to HMICFRS. However, a better understanding of current and likely future demand is still required to facilitate better ways to deploy existing resources as well as strengthen the case for additional money or police staff. Such work can help drive more uniform classifications for data capture and analysis, leading progressively to more robust results.

**3. Encourage the police, local authorities, health and social services to establish multi-agency crisis teams in order to tackle complex cases that cut across service boundaries.** This should be informed by the development of technological solutions which allow for much better analysis of data from statutory and non-statutory partners. Data can then be more effectively interrogated to better understand both known demand but also 'hidden' demand from issues such as modern slavery, honour-based violence and grooming of vulnerable victims including children, that are not readily obvious to any one agency. Local examples of the use of ICT applications to uncover such crimes are already showing real benefits. Such teams already exist in a number of locations.

**4. Police and Crime Commissioners should use their democratic authority and mandate to open up discussion with other agencies, to establish local agreements.** The forthcoming spending review should empower the police and local partners to find effective operating models, facilitating the creation of joint budgets where such an approach would help.

**5. Better information for the public about accessing emergency services provided by other organisations as well as the police.** The aim would be to inform and encourage the public to contact the right service rather than default to routing cases to the police.



# Annexes

## Annex A - Previous attempts to map demand: a short history

**The desire to establish a more sophisticated map of police demand is not new – indeed attempts stretch back well over two decades (see below) – with various arms of government having repeatedly tried to come up with a common standard for measuring demand. A list of some of the most notable attempts is set out below.**

### **July 2015: Public Accounts Committee: Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales<sup>141</sup>**

The Committee drew heavily on evidence from the NAO and HMIC, both of whom were critical of the police's inability to understand demand: "Of the 9 police forces the NAO visited for its report, 8 believed that funding pressures in other sectors, such as mental health, local authority-funded community safety and ambulance services, had had an impact on police services. However, none had data analysing demand for police services passed on from other agencies, nor was there any national data".

The Committee were also critical of previous work by the College of Policing to map demand: "in our view, the College's recent report on demand provides a limited picture across the service".

### **January 2015: College of Policing: Estimating demand on the police service<sup>142</sup>**

The College attempted to map police demand, drawing on available national data (CSEW, police recorded data and some police incident data), though their analysis was subsequently criticised as too generic to be operationally useful (see above). In the body of the report, the College acknowledged "there is a limited amount of information on the amount of time the police spend undertaking problem solving ... [on activities that allow] police to drive down crime".

### **September 2014: HMIC: Core Business: an inspection into crime prevention, police attendance and the use of police time<sup>143</sup>**

HMIC considered that only ten of the 43 forces had a sophisticated understanding of the demand for police services.

### **2011: HMIC: Demanding times: the front line and police visibility<sup>144</sup>**

In order to illustrate the demands on the police, HMIC conducted case studies in three forces over a 24-hour period. These largely focused on mapping incoming calls from the public against the deployment of police resources in response to those calls.

<sup>141</sup> The Committee sat in July 2015, with the official report published in September 2015, [www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2015/16/cmselect/cmpubacc/288/288.pdf](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2015/16/cmselect/cmpubacc/288/288.pdf), evidence based on NAO report (2015) Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales, <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Financial-sustainability-of-police-forces.pdf>

<sup>142</sup> HMIC, 2014, link to report: [www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf](http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/wp-content/uploads/core-business.pdf)

<sup>143</sup> College of Policing, 2015, link: [www.college.police.uk/Documents/Demand\\_Report\\_21\\_1\\_15.pdf](http://www.college.police.uk/Documents/Demand_Report_21_1_15.pdf)

<sup>144</sup> HMIC, 2011, link to report: [www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/media/demanding-times-062011.pdf](http://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmic/media/demanding-times-062011.pdf)



### **October 2010: Greater Manchester Police: #GMP24 twitter demand experiment**

First in 2010, and then four years later in 2014, GMP conducted an experiment using twitter to log every incident the force had to deal with in a 24-hour period. It was designed to give the public a better idea of demand on the force and encapsulate “an average day”. Subsequent analysis suggested that 32% of the issues dealt with in the 2010 experiment were related to ‘social work’, with the rest being ‘crime related’.<sup>145</sup>

### **2003/4 - 2007/8: Home Office Police Standards Unit: Activity Based Costing**

In 2004, the Home Office required all forces to adopt Activity Based Costing (ABC) to improve the understanding of the cost of services and to guide more effective decision-making at force level. Four years later the practice was dropped following a decision by the then Permanent Secretary, who deemed the practice disproportionately burdensome and ineffective (in terms of capturing meaningful data).

### **April 2005: Home Office Police Standards Unit: National Call Handling Standards<sup>146</sup>**

Demand Management was identified by the Home Office as key to ensuring that the public’s expectations were met and that they were satisfied with the service they had received. The publication of this guidance was intended to provide a framework to help forces improve the way they managed demand, from call handling to despatch and response.

### **2004: Home Office: Building Communities, Beating Crime<sup>147</sup>**

The 2004 White Paper called on the police to improve their understanding of demand: “the Government believes that police forces will need to put in place the techniques that have developed in other sectors, such as an evidence-based understanding of demand patterns and the needs of users and wider public – knowing not to make assumptions”.

Alongside the White Paper, a study of rostering and deployment of the response teams in 7 police forces was published. The findings suggested that there were real benefits to be had from better management of shift patterns: “A variable shift arrangement built around accurate demand profiling can provide almost 70% more officers on duty at peak times than a shift pattern with a flat supply”.

<sup>145</sup> Greater Manchester Police ran the first experiment from the 14 -15 October 2010 , and the second in 14 -15 October 2014 [www.gmp.police.uk/content/WebsitePages/653E722\\_EAFEFB92780257D7300365D6\\_0\\_OpenDocument](http://www.gmp.police.uk/content/WebsitePages/653E722_EAFEFB92780257D7300365D6_0_OpenDocument)

<sup>146</sup> Published by ACPO, 2005, the guide was compiled by the Police Standards Unit.

<sup>147</sup> Home Office, 2004, link to report: [www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/251058/6360.pdf](http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/251058/6360.pdf)

## **2002: HMIC: Narrowing the gap: Police visibility and public reassurance - managing public expectation and demand<sup>148</sup>**

This HMIC study explored use of a software system called CARM (Computer Assisted Resource Management) in Scotland to understand demand arising from the requirement to attend court and adjust shift patterns appropriately. The report concluded that despite implementation difficulties, 'CARN' was worthy of consideration by other forces and recommended that modelling court attendance as part of police time should be a "key part of a force's resource management strategy".

## **1998: Kent Police: Force intelligence review team; Kent Policing Model<sup>149</sup>**

The Force Intelligence Review Team aimed to create a model that was based upon 'cyclical and analytical approaches' that might manage demand upon the forces' services and would enable the force to switch more effort into planned operations and away from response deployment. This included the implementation of a new Crime Management Model (CMM), to enable proper screening of incoming calls from the public.

## **Research**

## **1996: 'Reacting to crime: the management of police resources', Irving, Faulkner, Frostdick and Topping (Home Office Series)<sup>150</sup>**

The research sought to identify the personnel who make decisions on deployment, what drives those decisions, the resources which are routinely involved, and what the deployment process entails. It found that Control Rooms allocated resources to 60% of incidents - in the remainder of cases, officers deployed themselves.

## **1994: 'Managing demand on the police: an evaluation of a crime line', Jolowicz and Read (Police Research Series Paper No 8)<sup>151</sup>**

This research evaluated Norfolk Police's crime reporting system, concluding that although it only dealt with minor crime and requests for advice, the crime line diverted just under ten thousand calls annually from members of the public away from the control room and the time taken to process each minor crime reported was halved on average.

<sup>148</sup> HMIC 2002 , looking at Police in Scotland, link to report: <http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/46932/0025212.pdf> Kent police, unpublished, link to report: [http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/221/1/James\\_The\\_influence\\_of\\_intelligence-led\\_policing\\_models\\_on\\_investigative\\_policy\\_and\\_practice\\_in\\_mainstream\\_policing\\_1993-2007.pdf](http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/221/1/James_The_influence_of_intelligence-led_policing_models_on_investigative_policy_and_practice_in_mainstream_policing_1993-2007.pdf)

<sup>149</sup> Home Office Police Research Group, 1996 , link to report: [tna.europarchive.org/20071206133532/homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/brf196.pdf](http://tna.europarchive.org/20071206133532/homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/brf196.pdf)

<sup>150</sup> Home Office Police Research Group, 1994 , link to report: [webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prg8bf.pdf](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110218135832/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/prg8bf.pdf)

<sup>151</sup> Jane Morgan in Crime UK 1986: An Economic, Social and Policy Audit, Harrison, A., and J. Gretton (eds) Policy Journals, pp.41-9 .

**1986: 'Getting better use of police resources', Harrison and Gretton (Crime UK)<sup>152</sup>**

This research attempted a breakdown of how and where police spent their time, concluding that shifts in population, new roads etc., led to new patterns of demand on police services.

**1975: 'Social and democratic factors in prediction of demand for the police service', Superintendent Alan Dyer, Nottinghamshire Constabulary (Police Journal)<sup>153</sup>**


This research evaluated the formula used to determine levels of police manpower, concluding that simply using the variables of population, road mileage, acreage and crime figures to determine these levels gave an inaccurate measure of police demand. It recommended that a wider range of variables should be used to take into account the range of police demand.

<sup>152</sup> Jane Morgan in Crime UK 1986: An Economic, Social and Policy Audit, Harrison, A., and J. Gretton (eds) Policy Journals, pp.41-9 .

<sup>153</sup> A. Dyer 4 9 Police J. 4 2 (1976) Social and Demographic Factors in Prediction of Demand for the Police Service 1 9 NAO (2015) Financial sustainability of police forces in England and Wales, <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Financial-sustainability-of-police-forces.pdf>

## Annex B - Flow of incidents

### External/Reactive demand process



## Annex C - Bedfordshire Police and Platt Bridge, Greater Manchester

**The composition of incidents handled through the Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge control rooms shows a very similar pattern. The largest categories are crime (23.5%-24.6%), concern for safety (18.2% - 19%) an anti-social behaviour (13.0% - 16.8%).**

**Non-crime factors such as mental health, alcohol, drugs, domestic incidents, vulnerable or missing persons, etc., were present in both crime and other types of non-crime incidents. The relationship was complex with multiple overlapping flags. In aggregate, we estimate these cases to comprise 18% of the volume in Bedfordshire and 19% in Platt Bridge.**

**Incident volume will not in general be a reliable guide to the deployment requirements: more serious incidents are given higher weight. The resource impact of non-crime factors, as measured by the initial deployment of officers, is proportionately larger than the incident volume. In Bedfordshire these incidents accounted for 22% of total deployments, with a little under half (10%) comprised of tackling incidents of public safety or welfare without a crime dimension.**

This Annex provides an analysis of incident data provided by Bedfordshire police for the period March 2017 to February 2018, and Platt Bridge, an area within Greater Manchester Police, covering the period August 2013 to July 2016.

The anonymised data sets recorded a range of details, including incident type, priority, flags for various health, drugs, alcohol, social, and welfare factors pertaining to incidents. Incidents relating to domestic violence or abuse were also covered. The Bedfordshire dataset contained 166,291 entries, and also had information about police deployments to various incident types. The Platt Bridge dataset was much smaller, with 6,325 incident entries.

### C.1. Overview

In broad terms the results of the analysis of the Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge data are summarised in Charts C.1, C.2 and C.3. These cover how incidents were received, the role of the caller and the type of incident involved. It will be clear from these three charts that the emerging pattern is quite similar for these two datasets. In particular:


- 1) Around half of incidents were received by telephone and around 35% were 999. The balance came from a variety of sources, including ambulance, e-mail and web chat for example.
- 2) Most reports came from witnesses, 22 - 34%, and victims, 26 - 36%

Chart C.3 corrals incidents according to the descriptions given in the datasets<sup>154</sup> aiming to explore rather more directly questions about the nature of the incidents that the police were having to deal with, and, to the extent that a distinction would be meaningful, whether the incident was crime or non-crime.

That the pattern of proportions in Chart C.3 is quite similar gives reassurance that the main categories are likely to be widely recognised and shared by police forces. However, this characterisation is to a degree ambiguous and framed by the descriptions in the data. For example, the largest group, designated as crimes or in some way directly related to offenders or offending,<sup>155</sup> represents around a quarter of the incident volume. However many incidents, such as domestic incidents/abuse, for example, will generally be multifactorial, reflecting elements of safety, vulnerable adults or children, alcohol or mental health, as well as possible offending. So while these are counted separately, there is very likely some spill over to other categories.

The same issue also applies to the ‘concern for safety’ category which could include domestic incidents, missing persons, abandoned or hoax calls, for example. However, in this report we have kept them separate because it is more informative to do so, and because their management would be likely to rely on different relationships between the police and their local partners. The cross-cutting health, social and welfare aspects are explored in more detail below.

Chart C.1: How incidents were received



<sup>154</sup> Since the datasets were collected independently without the structure of an experimental design there are inevitable ambiguities and differences. Where possible we have used groups that helped to reduce such issues but also that helped to elucidate the broader questions covered in sections on the issue of non-crime demand.

<sup>155</sup> For example, breaches of bail conditions

Chart C.2: Caller role in reporting incidents





Chart C.3: Percentage composition of incidents



## C.2. Deployment of resources

The Bedfordshire data set includes information about the deployment of resources as part of incident handling. Over the period covered by the data (March 2017 to Feb 2018) a total of 187,438 officer deployments took place. These were recorded as ‘unique collars’, that is to say counts of individual officers attending an incident. However, the data do not provide a measure of the time each officer expended.

Approximately 30% of incidents were resolved without police deployment; and 56% of calls were classified as emergency. Table C.1 lists the relationship between incident volume and the proportions of resources that were deployed. It is clear that the vast proportion of deployments were linked to the urgency status of the incident. Also, it should be noted that incident volume will not in general be a reliable guide to the deployment requirements: more serious categories of incidents are given higher weight, for example mental health/vulnerability issues result in a substantially higher proportion of deployment than the incident volume alone would suggest, viz. 6.8% incident and 10% deployment. The reverse is true for some other categories, administration or anti-social behaviour, for example.

The analysis cannot be extended to look at the total deployment of resource to the point where an incident has reached a natural end, whether resolved early on, or following investigation leading to a charge and conviction. Nevertheless, it points firmly to the need to take a whole system view, including follow-up action, so even if systematic collection of data in this respect is unfeasible as a matter of routine, consideration should be given to appropriate sampling to help inform local police planning and discussion with partners.

Table C.1: Officer deployment in response to incidents in Bedfordshire (year ending February 2018)

Call classification or flag	% of incidents	% of total officer deployment
<b>Emergency</b>	56	90
<b>Administrative</b>	12	3.5
<b>Crime</b>	23.5	30.3
<b>Anti-social behaviour</b>	13	8
<b>Alcohol</b>	3.5	6
<b>Mental health/ vulnerable</b>	6.8	10
<b>Drugs</b>	2.5	3
<b>Domestic abuse<sup>156</sup></b>	6.2	11.6
<b>Traffic</b>	5.8	5.7

<sup>153</sup> Includes domestic incidents plus other incidents with a domestic



### C.3. Health, social, domestic, alcohol or drugs incidents

Both data sets support taking cross sectional views of various factors that characterise the incident volume. These reflect health, social, domestic, alcohol or drugs, among others, and an analysis could help inform the question about volume of work that is potentially linked to the role and work of other local agencies and the extent to which such incidents that have a health, social or welfare dimension also overlap with crime or have an offending dimension.

Table C.2 provides information about the proportion of incidents that have a health, social, domestic, alcohol or drugs dimension,<sup>157</sup> comparing Bedfordshire and Platt Bridge. As with Chart C.3 it is clear that the proportions show a high degree of congruence, providing confidence about the proportions that make up incidents with a cross-cutting dimension.

Table C.2: Proportion of incidents that have a health, social, domestic, alcohol or drugs dimension

Call classification or flag	% of incidents Bedfordshire	% of incidents Platt Bridge (GMP)
Anti-social behaviour	12	16.7
Alcohol	3.5	3.7
Mental health/vulnerable	6.8 (3.5 mental health only)	3.7
Drugs	2.5	0.5 <sup>158</sup> /0.9 <sup>159</sup>
Domestic abuse	6.2	7.6

In aggregate,<sup>160</sup> cases involving health, social, domestic, alcohol or drugs incidents comprised 18% of the volume in Bedfordshire and 19% in Platt Bridge.

In the case of Bedfordshire these incidents accounted for 22% of deployments. It is also useful to see how much of this demand also involved offences or other types of incidents. Chart C.4 shows how this group is made up by incident type: 47% (of the 22%) of deployments in this group involved a public safety or welfare concern as the main incident category; 36% were, however, deployments that were also linked to offences, violence, drugs, criminal damage, sexual offences, theft and robbery, for example.

Pulling this together, an estimated 10% of total deployments were concerned with issues of public safety or welfare concerns, without a crime dimension.

<sup>157</sup> There are some differences in the terminology between the two data sets which we have retained as the incidents may not cover precisely the same ground

<sup>158</sup> Drugs flag only

<sup>159</sup> Drugs flag plus drug related crime

<sup>160</sup> It should be noted that incidents may have had multiple flags, so the aggregate proportion will be less than the sum of the constituent components

Chart C.4: Deployments composition of incidents in Bedfordshire involving 'health, social and welfare' factors




Table C.3: Proportion of incidents for other incident categories

Call classification or flag	% of incidents Bedfordshire	% of incidents Platt Bridge (GMP)
Hoax or abandoned	6.3	6.5
Youth related	3.9	3.7
Missing persons	3.3	2.7
Other organisations involved	4.0	3.3

## Annex D - Police force areas in England ranked by the index of multiple deprivation

IMD RANKING	
Police Force Area	Average score for the area
Surrey	9.37
Hertfordshire	12.14
Thames Valley	12.21
North Yorkshire	14.13
Wiltshire	14.86
Warwickshire	14.99
Gloucestershire	15.16
Hampshire and Isle of Wight	16.22
Dorset	16.22
Cambridgeshire	16.55
Sussex	17.14
Essex	18.25
Avon and Somerset	18.30
Suffolk	18.61
Bedfordshire	18.64
Cheshire	18.64
West Mercia	18.84
Leicestershire	18.87
Northamptonshire	19.11
Kent	19.33
Derbyshire	20.52
Staffordshire	20.60
Lincolnshire	20.65
Norfolk	21.02
Devon and Cornwall	21.72
Cumbria	21.76
Metropolitan Police	23.59
Nottinghamshire	24.00
Lancashire	25.68
Northumbria	25.74
Durham	25.94
Humberside	26.80
West Yorkshire	27.27
Greater Manchester	28.14
South Yorkshire	28.27
Cleveland	30.56
West Midlands	31.29
Merseyside	33.35

## Annex E - Survey questions

This annex provides more detail about the survey questions used to gauge public views about the role of the police. We sought to test public views through a series of questions focussing on:

- 1) The purpose of policing
  - The police are there to deal with crime
  - The police's role extends beyond dealing with crime to the maintenance of order and public safety
  - The police's role extends beyond dealing with crime to the maintenance of order, public safety and protecting of the vulnerable
- 2) The situations or circumstances in which police would be contacted
  - If I felt unsafe
  - If someone else felt unsafe
  - If I was worried about a neighbour missing/being dead
  - If I was worried about the safety/treatment of a child
  - If I saw people using drugs in the street
  - If I witnessed young people being rowdy and loud
  - If I was worried about the behaviour of drunk people
  - If someone was acting strangely in the street
  - None of the above
- 3) The issues with which the police should be involved, covering
  - People in mental health crises posing a threat to themselves or others
  - Children who go missing regularly
  - Anti-social behaviour that causes upset in the community
  - Alcohol-related disorder
  - Rowdy neighbours
  - People who are homeless on the street
- 4) The extent that the public would be confident that social services, health services, local authority or charities would provide an adequate response to the issues at (3) above

- 5) Knowledge about how to contact local services, i.e.
  - Social services
  - Ambulance services
  - Mental health services
  - Local authority
  - A local charity
  
- 6) With fewer resources, where should the police reduce effort?
  - Cases they have low chances of solving
  - Historical cases (occurring over 10 years ago)
  - Cases that do not pose high risk of threat, harm or risk (like bike theft)
  - None of the above/other
  
- 7) If there were fewer resources available to the police, which of the following should they decrease their focus on?
  - People in mental health crises, where someone poses a threat to themselves or others
  - Children who go missing regularly
  - Anti-social behaviour that causes upset in the community
  - Alcohol-related disorder
  - People who are homeless on the street
  - Rowdy neighbours
  - Non-violent crime
  - None of the above/other
  
- 8) With the police spending time responding to emergencies arising from problems with other public services, how the public would see a resolution of the tension between resources and demand:
  - The police should stop filling gaps left by other public services and other services should step up
  - We should increase funding for the police so they can deal with all the different kinds of demands that come their way
  - We should increase funding for other public services, so the police can focus on crime
  - The police should work in combined teams, for example made up of mental health nurses, police officers, and social workers who could respond more effectively to emergencies

## Annex F - Individuals and Organisations contacted

- Rachel Tuffin, Director of Research, College of Policing
- David Lamberti, Director of Policing policy, Home Office
- Andy Feist, Crime and Policing Analyst, Home Office
- Sara Thornton, Chair, National Police Chiefs' Council
- Sophie Linden, Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, London
- Caroline Murdoch, Director of Strategy, National Crime Agency
- Dame Vera Baird, Police and Crime Commissioner, Northumbria
- Sue Mountstevens, Police and Crime Commissioner, Avon and Somerset
- Kathryn Holloway, Police and Crime Commissioner, Bedfordshire
- Jon Boucher, Chief Constable, Bedfordshire Police
- Rob Potts, Assistant Chief Constable, Greater Manchester Police
- Peter Langmead-Jones, HMIC
- Dame Louise Casey
- Professor Eddie Kane, Nottingham University
- Dr Rick Muir, Police Foundation
- Andy Higgins, Police Foundation
- Jessica Asato, Safer Lives
- Paul Farmer, Mind

