

**A Race to the Top?:
The Aid Transparency Index and the Social Power of Global Performance Assessments**

Dan Honig and Catherine Weaver¹

May 22, 2017

Recent studies on global performance assessments (GPAs) reveal the distinct power that can be accrued and exercised by non-state actors in world politics. How and when does this happen? Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine the impact of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI), an annual rating and rankings index produced by the small UK-based NGO Publish What You Fund. The ATI seeks to shape development aid donors' behavior with respect to their transparency – the quality and kind of information they publicly disclose. To investigate the ATI's effect, we construct an original panel dataset of donor transparency performance before and after ATI inclusion (2006-2013) to test whether, and which, donors alter their behavior in response to inclusion in the ATI. To further probe the causal mechanisms that explain variations in donor behavior we use extensive qualitative research, including over 150 key informant interviews conducted between 2010-2016. Our analysis uncovers the conditions under which the ATI exercises influence over powerful aid donors. Moreover, our mixed methods evidence reveals *how* this happens. Consistent with Kelley & Simmons' central argument that GPAs exercise influence via social pressure, we find that the ATI shapes donor behavior primarily via direct effects on elites: the diffusion of professional norms, organizational learning, and peer pressure.

Word count (excluding this title page and appendices intended for online placement): 11,163

¹ Many thanks to Rucheta Singh, Grace Chao, Susannah Horton, and particularly Yunhui Lin for research assistance. We are also thankful to Publish What You Fund for their time and clarification; AidData, and particularly Brooke Russell and Brad Parks, for assistance in generating critical additional data; Dennis Vega and Jessica Klein of the US Department of State's Office of US Foreign Assistance Resources; Sally Paxton at Friends of Publish What You Fund; and numerous officials from aid agencies, parliaments, think tanks and NGOs that graciously agreed to interviews. Many thanks to Sam Asher, Jim Bisbee, Laura Henry, George Ingram, Judith Kelley, Eddy Malesky, John Marshall, and participants in the May 2016 and September 2016 APSA Assessment Power in World Politics conferences for valuable comments and guidance.

1 Introduction

One of the more striking examples of the power and influence seemingly exercised by global performance assessments in world politics is the case of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI) – an annual international rating and ranking of international development assistance donor agencies by Publish What You Fund (PWYF). PWYF was established as a non-governmental organization in 2008 to monitor the progress of international donors in publicly disclosing where they spend their aid funds, on whom and for what. PWYF is quite small; it has less than 10 staff members and a 2016 budget of less than £700,000. Housed in a modest one-room office above an Italian restaurant on London’s South Bank, PWYF has no direct material power with which to coerce change in the behavior of these large multilateral and bilateral donors. It must instead use the soft power of its GPA, and that GPA’s attempt to define best practices for aid transparency and strategically name and shame in ways that incite status concerns and peer competition amongst donors.

There is abundant circumstantial evidence that aid donors are sensitive to the ATI’s social power. Over the past several years numerous important actors in the international aid system have made explicit note of the ATI. Helen Clark, former New Zealand Prime Minister and Administrator of the UN Development Programme, declared at the launch of the 2016 ATI, “Publish What You Fund’s annual assessment is a very powerful driver for improving reporting on transparency... you [Publish What You Fund] really motivated us to work very hard... we’ve seen [the ATI] as a huge incentive to work to excel.”² On a similar note, Nancy Lee, deputy CEO of the US Millennium Challenge Corporation, stated “[the ATI] is a big deal for us. We care about this a lot. This is part of our culture... it’s part of our DNA.”³ The ATI has also appeared prominently in US Congressional conversations regarding aid allocations and foreign aid legislation.⁴ The US Senate has also prominently referenced the index, with good performance on the ATI explicitly mentioned as one of the reasons justifying continued support of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI).

In the simplest terms, PWYF, like other small non-state actors in the GPA business, seeks to use the ATI to shape the behavior of powerful actors in their policy space by exploiting the politics of numbers.⁵ We pose two key questions to investigate the ATI’s effects. First, close observation of the ATI over time reveals that the index does not always have the same effect upon all donors, prompting us to ask *when does the ATI have more or less influence upon aid agencies?* Second, for those aid agencies that do display sensitivity to the ATI’s effect, what can we say about how the ATI accrues social power? *How does the ATI exercise its influence?*

² Speech at Launch of 2016 ATI, Center for Global Development, April 13 2016. Speech online at <http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/live-2016-aid-transparency-index-launch/>; quote at approximately 3:45.

³ Speech at Launch of 2016 ATI, Center for Global Development, April 13 2016. Speech online at <http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/live-2016-aid-transparency-index-launch/>; quote at approximately 26:10.

⁴ *Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2015 - HR 3766* 2015. Congressman Poe refers to “a recent Publish What You Fund study”, which is clearly the ATI. HR 2766 ultimately became law on July 15, 2016 (Public Law #114-191). The ATI is also referenced in US Senate funding of GAVI; Senate Resolution 578 of 2014.

⁵ Andreas and Greenhill 2010.

Using statistical analysis and extensive interview-based qualitative research, we find that the ATI does indeed have substantial impact on major aid donors' transparency. We find that donor agencies that have aid distribution as their primary operational mandate (e.g. USAID) are much more likely to be influenced by the ATI than donors for whom the provision of official development assistance is secondary to their core mandate (e.g. U.S. Department of Defense). We find that agencies' responses to the ATI are shaped strongly by the ATI's social power to define, categorize and rank donor behavior amongst their peers; in this sense, the ATI operates in a manner similar to the Ease of Doing Business indicators examined in this volume.⁶

The ATI has a discernible influence on *elite actors and staff within donor agencies*. The ATI engages reputation, much like other GPAs studies in this volume.⁷ Critically, as Kelley and Simmons and Brisbee et al (this volume) argue, we also find that elites may be concerned with their performance on the ATI even in the absence of material payoffs. Moreover, the very process of being monitored closely, and regularly interacting with the PWYF team during the ATI's annual review, produces inter- and intra-organizational learning, norm diffusion and professionalization of aid staff and management around the specific standards of transparency that the ATI promotes. Secondly, the ATI plays a role in enhancing *domestic political pressure* by equipping transparency reform proponents (particularly those with some material power over aid agencies) with critical information and clear standards to guide policy change.

We unpack our analysis through a mixed methods approach. In our quantitative analysis, presented in section 4, we seek to understand variation in donor performance on, and donor response to, the ATI. This inquiry enables us to specify the conditions under which donor agencies are sensitive to the ATI, and thus provide a more precise answer to the question of which targeted actors will be influenced by the ATI's assessments. To do so, we employ regression analysis using a panel dataset of the ATI with the unit of observation the agency-year.⁸ In addition to each agency's overall and indicator-by-indicator score from 2011-2016, our dataset includes independent data on aid agency disclosure and transparency practices from 2006-2013 compiled by AidData at our request.⁹ The AidData data allow us to model the presence of the ATI as a treatment, examining whether (and which) agencies respond to the presence of the ATI.

⁶ Kelley, Simmons, and Doshi. This volume.

⁷ Lipsey & Kijima; Lall; Morse. All this volume.

⁸ There are five full waves of the ATI – 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2016, with a 2015 'mid-term review' covering only EU and US agencies. The 2011 data was called a "pilot index"; there was also a 2010 assessment, but at a country level and based on perceptions surveys.

⁹ AidData is a "stand-alone development research and innovation lab at the College of William and Mary"

(<http://aiddata.org/our-story>). For a given country-year AidData uses the best, most complete data source available. Over the period in question (2006-2013) the primary source is agencies' official reporting to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Creditor Reporting System, but the source is sometimes agencies' annual reports and public websites. AidData source choice represents a determination by arguably the organization most concerned with finding high quality historic aid data of what source provides the best available data for a given country-year. The source of data is never the IATI data on which the ATI most directly contracts; this does not mean that e.g. the data reported to OECD and that reported to IATI in a given year are independent, of course. This is not a concern, inasmuch as the focus here (and what the alternative scale drawn from AidData's data measures) is changes in the quality of the best data disclosed irrespective of the forum where that disclosure occurs, whether it is via the IATI or not.

To further examine mechanisms in section 5 we use extensive qualitative evidence, foremost semi-structured key informant interviews with over 150 subject matter experts between 2010-2016.¹⁰ These interviews were conducted with the staff and management of donor organizations' headquarters and mission (recipient country) offices, national parliamentary and U.S. Congressional staff, relevant think tanks, civil society groups and international non-governmental organizations, including multiple interviews at Publish What You Fund's office in London and with PWYF's staff in Washington, DC. In addition to this interview evidence, we analyzed a wide array primary and secondary materials, including donor organization press releases, policy documents, parliamentary and congressional hearings and legislation, and the research and advocacy materials of NGOs, CSOs and think tanks.

The next section, section 2, provides more background on the ATI itself and how it operates. Section 3 then develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 provides quantitative tests to assess whether the ATI is in fact changing donor behavior, and presents suggestive data as to mechanisms. Section 5's qualitative analysis then provides substantially more detail on how the ATI achieves its results by honing in on the nature of ATI's influence and the channels through which it influences donor behavior. Section 6 concludes.

2. Background: The Rise of the ATI

One of the most significant changes in international development over the past decade has been the rise of a concerted international movement to increase the transparency of the multibillion dollar global aid industry. Achieving aid transparency is not an easy task. Donor agencies have enjoyed relative opacity for most of their existence. For years, efforts to enact fundamental changes in national freedom of information acts and organizations information disclosure policies have been met with agencies' resistance and persistent delays.¹¹ Numerous published analyses and interviews repeatedly point out pervasive problems of organizational inertia, staff's cultural fears surrounding transparency, and a myriad of technological and economic barriers to change.¹² Yet over the past ten years, this landscape has shifted dramatically.¹³

Since the first high level forum on aid effectiveness in Paris in 2003, there has been a proliferation of declarations, initiatives, commitments, laws and startup networks and organizations dedicated to prying open the spigot of information on donor agencies' own projects and programs. The presumed benefits of such open aid data include the centralization of

¹⁰ Specifically, as part of a broader project on aid transparency between 2010-2016, Weaver personally interviewed or sent trained graduate research assistants to conduct interviews in eight countries, with a concentrated focus on members of the development community based in the US (DC and New York), the United Kingdom, Uganda, Malawi, and Nepal. These interviews are listed in the online appendices.

¹¹ Nelson 2001; Florini 2007; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; and Ingraham 2015.

¹² Bent 2015.

¹³ For reviews of transparency and accountability initiatives in global development, including campaigns and initiatives focused on aid transparency, see Darby 2010; Martin 2010; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; McGee and Gaventa 2013; and Weaver 2016.

information for better donor coordination, better development planning and management, and the empowerment of aid stakeholders to push for greater voice and feedback.¹⁴

At the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in November 2011, most major donor countries and agencies – including many from the global south – committed themselves to reporting their aid information to a common standard that combined three complementary systems: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS++)¹⁵, the OECD DAC Forward Spending Survey (FSS)¹⁶ and the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).¹⁷ Over this time period the international regime complex for aid effectiveness, transparency and accountability has grown by leaps and bounds, constituted by a rich set of supranational initiatives (such as the EU Aid Transparency Guarantee and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation), national level policies and open data systems, and international non-governmental organizations and networks devoted specifically to the advocacy and production of transparent and open aid data.¹⁸ The ATI is part of this broader movement.

The ATI works explicitly through active and sustained engagement with donors and independent experts to collate annual data. Publish What You Fund publishes the evaluation criteria for a given year's index and engages in a three-month dialogue with every aid agency prior to the release of the index. There have been annual releases of the ATI from 2011-present.¹⁹ While the method of calculating the ATI has been modified slightly over time, the ATI has always focused on publishing specific data regarding aid flows at the activity level – meaning the details regarding particular interventions and projects. While the ATI is primarily disseminated to the public via hierarchical rankings of agencies into categories (“good”, “fair”, “poor”, etc.), these rankings draw from a continuous scale drawn from a series of indicators; there were 39 such indicators in 2016. Evaluated indicators include information such as project title, description, budget, and objectives of interventions. Table 1 provides greater detail.

TABLE 1: 2016 ATI Indicators and Weights

ATI Total Score out of 100%

1. Commitment to Aid Transparency (10%)

- Quality of FOIA Legislation (3.33%)
- Implementation Schedule (for IATI Common Standard) (3.33%)
- Accessibility of Aid Information through donor portals, databases, etc. (3.33%)

¹⁴ Florini 2002 and 2007; Collin, Zubairi, Nielson and Barder 2009; Publish What You Fund 2009; Mulley 2010; Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Herrling 2015; Barder 2016.

¹⁵ <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1>

¹⁶ <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FSS>

¹⁷ <http://www.aidtransparency.net/>

¹⁸ See, e.g., AidData, Aidwatch, aidinfo, Development Gateway, DevInfo, Development Initiatives, Data2X, Interaction, Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, Open Aid Partnership, Oxfam International, and many others.

¹⁹ The 2011 data was called a “pilot index”; there was also a 2010 assessment, but at a country level and based on perceptions surveys. The 2015 annual survey was a ‘mid-term review’ covering only EU and US agencies. We include all data from 2011-2016 in our analysis in section 4.

2. Organizational Level Publications (25%)

- Planning: Strategy Documents (2.5%)
- Planning: Annual Report (2.5%)
- Planning: Allocation Policy by Themes or Countries (2.5%)
- Planning: Procurement Policy (2.5%)
- Planning: Strategy Documents – Country Level (2.5%)
- Financial: Total Organization Budget (three year forward spending) (4.17%)
- Financial: Disaggregated Budget (4.17%)
- Financial: Audits (4.17%)

3. Activity Level Publications (65%)

- Basic Activity Information: Implementer (1.63%)
- Basic Activity Information: Unique ID (1.63%)
- Basic Activity Information: Title (1.63%)
- Basic Activity Information: Description of Activity (1.63%)
- Basic Activity Information: Planned Dates (1.63%)
- Basic Activity Information: Actual Dates (1.63%)
- Basic Activity Information: Current Status (1.63%)
- Basic Activity Information: Contact Details (1.63%)
- Classifications: Collaboration Types (1.86%)
- Classifications: Flow Type (1.86%)
- Classifications: Aid Type (1.86%)
- Classifications: Finance Type (1.86%)
- Classifications: Sectors (1.86%)
- Classifications: Sub-National Location (1.86%)
- Classifications: Tied Aid Status (1.86%)
- Related Documents: Memorandum of Understanding (2.17%)
- Related Documents: Evaluations (2.17%)
- Related Documents: Objectives (2.17%)
- Related Documents: Budget Documents – Activity Level (2.17%)
- Related Documents: Contracts (2.17%)
- Related Documents: Tenders (2.17%)
- Financial: Budget – annual/quarterly; total activity commitments (3.25%)
- Financial: Commitments (3.25%)
- Financial: Disbursements & Expenditures (3.25%)
- Financial: Budget ID (3.25%)
- Performance: Results (4.33%)
- Performance: Impact Appraisals (4.33%)
- Performance: Conditions (4.33%)

Source: Publish What You Fund. 2016a. 2016 Aid Transparency Index.

The comprehensive index largely evaluates national government agencies and international organizations, as well as a few foundations (e.g. Hewlett and Gates). The primary focus is bilateral aid agencies (e.g. the US Agency for International Development and UK Department for International Development) and major multilateral aid-focused organizations (e.g. the UN Development Program, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional development banks). Notably, the index also includes agencies that disburse significant amounts of foreign aid, even though development assistance is not their primary mandate. For example, the 2016 index includes six separate US Government agencies that provide official development assistance (ODA), only three of whom have ODA as a primary mandate: the US Agency for

International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).²⁰ Appendix Table A1 provides a complete listing of all covered agencies and their inclusion in the various waves of the ATI.

3. Hypotheses: When and How Does the ATI Influence Aid Donors?

In a recent survey of staff within U.S. development agencies revealed that over 75% of respondents thought the ATI had a “very positive impact” on their own agency’s transparency efforts.²¹ But does all of this attention, and self-reported satisfaction with the ATI, actually alter what aid donors do? If yes, are all donors affected? Fully understanding the effects of GPAs such as the ATI requires more than anecdotal evidence. In this section, we explore who we believe is likely to be responsive to the ATI, and why – the channels via which this influence operates.

Drawing from interviews with key informants and our examination of agency level documents, it appears that not all donors are equally concerned about, or responsive to, the ATI’s assessment of their agencies’ performance. In line with this evidence, we first propose one key mediating factor which shapes agencies’ reaction to the ATI: whether their primary mandate is to provide official development assistance. We hypothesize that when aid is the “primary mandate” (versus a secondary mandate or goal) of an agency, the agency will be more sensitive to the (de)legitimizing effect of poor ATI scores.

Kelley and Simmons propose three channels of influence for GPAs.²² In the case of the ATI, our interviews indicate that two of these channels are at play. First, the ATI influences donors by inciting domestic political pressure, particularly through the provision of critical information to key principals and stakeholders in aid that may then use the ATI’s scores to monitor, sanction and reward aid agencies. Second, the ATI plays a direct role in shaping the interests and behavior of elites within aid organization.

In this first instance of domestic political pressure, we hypothesize that the ATI affects donors’ behavior by altering the interests and behavior of donors’ political principals (via legislative or executive board oversight and control). This expectation is rooted in principal-agent and sociological resource dependency theories, which both hypothesize that donor agencies’ response to the ATI may be connected to the legitimacy and resource needs of these organizations in their task and authorizing environments.²³ The ATI resolves information asymmetries and defines clear standards and benchmarks for success, allowing principals to better understand the transparency performance of their agencies. In response, agencies to act in order to improve performance as perceived by their principals.

²⁰ The other three US agencies are the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. While the US has the greatest number of evaluated agencies in 2016 (and 2014, the year with the broadest coverage), it is not alone in having multiple units evaluated. E.g. in 2014, 5 UK, 3 German, and 3 French agencies were evaluated. Amongst multilaterals, 4 EC and 3 UN agencies were evaluated.

²¹ Friends of Publish What You Fund 2016, 10.

²² Kelley and Simmons, this volume.

²³ On PA models, see Hawkins et al 2006. For a discussion of these broader issues of IO resource dependencies, see Weaver 2008 and Moschella and Weaver 2014.

In the second instance of more directly shaping the interests and behavior of elites, the ATI still operates through reducing information asymmetry and the construction of meaning. However, this channel focuses on aid professionals' logic of appropriateness rather than the more traditional payoffs that might accrue to organizational reputational changes, such as greater funding, access to markets, private investment. Donor organizations are often framed by scholars, in our view correctly, as part of an "aid industry."²⁴ Professionals in that industry see themselves as part of a broader community of peers. By influencing the meaning of what it is to be a "good" aid agency and thus "good" aid professional, the ATI influences the actions of aid professionals.

We hypothesize both channels – domestic political pressure and direct elite response - are operative, but began our research unsure which of these two channels was the more influential. We thus constructed a quantitative test that would provide suggestive evidence as to which of these was the more influential mechanism. We believe agency independence is a way of getting purchase on which of these channels is the dominant means via which the ATI influences agencies.

We hypothesize that the domestic political pressure and direct elite response have conflicting implications as to whether more or less independent agency will be more responsive. If it is domestic political pressure primarily influencing donor agency behavior, we should expect less politically and financially independent agencies to appear more responsive to the ATI, as measured via their yearly net change on the ATI ratings and rankings. This is because the ATI may enable the materially weak PWYF and its key allies in the aid transparency movement to capture principals' "power of the purse" and executive or legislative authority over donor agencies. Consequently, if principals are indeed paying attention to the ATI and taking subsequent action based upon the ATI's information, we would expect aid agencies with higher degrees of dependence on principals' financial contributions to be especially sensitive to the ATI effects.

However, if it is elites who are directly responding to the ATI's social power that is the dominant channel of influence, agencies that have more relative independence may exhibit greater responsiveness. This is because more independent donors can use their scope for autonomous action to react more quickly to emerging standards around transparency policies and practices and to the ATI's professional norm diffusion and socialization effects. Less independent organizations may hold limited capacity to enact wide-sweeping operational reforms around transparency and data reporting without the consent and resources of their political authorizers.

To restate our argument: We hypothesize that the ATI does indeed influence donor agencies, prompting them to alter their information disclosure practices. We believe the ATI achieves this both via reducing information asymmetries for political principals (*domestic political pressure*) and by constructing meaning and inducing competition not tied to direct payoffs for the professionals who staff donor agencies (*direct elite effects*). In the sections below we test whether indeed the introduction of the ATI is correlated with changes in donors' practices. We

²⁴ See e.g. Hanlon, Barrientos, and Hulme 2010; Gulrajani 2011; Engel 2014.

also examine whether either or both of these mechanisms are present, and which seems to be the primary channel of influence.

The next section, section 4, presents evidence as to whether the ATI has systematically affected donor practices, and for which donors this is the case. It includes agency independence in regression models, thus providing suggestive evidence as to which channel of influence is dominant. The qualitative evidence on mechanisms in section 5 then further explores whether one or both of the channels hypothesized – domestic political pressure and direct elite influence, respectively – are present, and if so which is the primary driver of response to the ATI.

4 Quantitative Results: Does the ATI Alter Donor Behavior?

This section explores whether donor practices indeed shifted in response to the introduction of the ATI, and if so for which donors this was the case. To investigate who responds to the ATI we build a panel at the agency-year of ATI scores (and thus ATI coverage), complementing this with historic data on agency transparency practices drawn from AidData’s database. We also include a calculation of agency independence and a dummy for whether the aid agency’s primary purpose is the giving of foreign aid (e.g. USAID) or not (e.g. the US Department of Defense). These agencies are hereafter referred to as “aid” versus “non-aid” agencies to signal their primary mandate. Table 2 provides summary statistics of the key variables.

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ATI Score	333	40.448	24.009	0	93.3
Net Change in ATI Score Over Coverage Period	77	10.15	18.772	-39.3	75.7
Agency Independence (using Gilardi scheme)	84	.435	.154	0	1
Aidagency Status Dummy	84	.536	.502	0	1

The calculation of agency independence we use builds from Gilardi’s work on Western European regulatory agencies.²⁵ Gilardi develops a scale of 21 indicators, unique in its attempt to compare the independence of a variety of agencies focusing on different issue areas from a range of countries. In collaboration with research assistants, we applied Gilardi’s scheme to all ATI covered agencies using those indicators we were able to consistently code. This data is a mere echo of the full Gilardi measure, thus adding to the suggestive nature of the independence analysis. We were able to find consistent information for just four of Gilardi’s 21 indicators of agency independence – term of office of agency head, source of budget, whether independence is formally stated, and whether the head of the agency is of cabinet rank.²⁶

²⁵ Gilardi 2002.

²⁶ While the results presented here apply this scale to multilaterals and foundations – i.e. organizations without cabinet rank by definition, and for whom the scale was not intended by Gilardi – the results are robust to restricting the sample to bilateral (that is, state) organizations.

Independence is coded as a time-invariant measure based on the best available data. While this opens up possible measurement error regarding changes in independence within organization over time, we expect this measurement error should be orthogonal to the primary analysis and thus add noise (reducing power) rather than leading to spurious inferences. The measure constructed using the Gilardi method is broad, incorporating both aid and non-aid agencies.

A visual examination of ATI scores and changes over time underscores the heterogeneity of agency response to the ATI. The wide differences in donors' behavior is demonstrated in Figure 2, which shows the variation in realized scores, and Figure 3, which compares each agency's score in its last year of ATI coverage to its score in its first year.





Figure 4 illustrates the broad coverage of the ATI, alleviating concerns regarding the ATI's 'sample' within the aid universe.²⁷ The ATI does not assess two significant non-OECD bilateral donors, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, although the index does include China (which scores at the bottom largely because China does not report to the IATI or participate in ATI annual process). While this alleviates concerns regarding ATI selection criteria and how they might lead to spurious inferences about the effect of this GPA, it also unfortunately precludes plausible matching strategies that might provide additional analytic leverage.

²⁷ This is the proportion of Official Development Assistance (ODA) reported to the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) at www.stats.oecd.org represented by those agencies included in both the ATI and the CRS. This necessarily underestimates the actual aid provided by agencies included in the ATI, inasmuch as some agencies (e.g. Chinese development aid, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Hewlett Foundation, the European Investment Bank) are covered by the ATI but do not report to CRS. This calculation uses the year of reporting and net disbursements when possible; e.g. the 2011 statistic is the proportion of 2011 net disbursements accounted for by agencies covered by the 2011 ATI. The 2016 calculation is done with 2014 data due to a lack of DAC data availability, and 2015 is omitted due to its interim review status.



While by no means determinative, Table 3 below uses the ATI overall score data to examine differential performance on the ATI with and without country, year, and country*year fixed effects, allowing us to examine intra-country differences in ATI performance. The results are quite stable with and without fixed effects. As we hypothesized, agencies whose primary purpose is the giving of foreign aid perform better in the ATI ratings than those for whom foreign aid is a secondary task. This is true looking both across all agencies and within a given country’s set of covered agencies.

Table 3 suggests that for non-aid agencies, greater independence has no association with higher ATI scores. For aid organizations, however, the picture is quite different. More independent aid organizations score better on the ATI than less independent aid organizations. The greater the degree of a dedicated aid agencies’ independence, the greater the agency’s degree of outperformance of other organizations in their country; the least independent aid agencies perform no better, or on some specifications even worse, than non-aid agencies from their country.

Table 3: Performance on the ATI: Dedicated Aid Agencies & Independence

DV: Overall ATI Score	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Aid Agency Dummy	17.74*** (4.095)	12.86** (5.111)	20.36*** (6.567)	-17.65 (12.98)	-15.31 (24.21)	-122.6** (57.47)
Independence (Gilardi)				-32.64 (20.46)	12.78 (38.63)	-164.4 (110.4)
Ind*Aid Agency				82.98*** (27.66)	93.95* (55.88)	343.2*** (126.0)
Constant	21.96*** (3.297)	30.77*** (11.45)	5.645 (19.23)	38.21*** (10.62)	25.82 (22.35)	94.96* (55.46)
Year FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Country FEs	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Country*Year FEs	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
R^2 -Within	.255	.256	.766	.255	.256	.766
R^2 -Between	.225	.834	.862	.300	.864	.911
Observations	333	333	333	333	333	333

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Of course, differential performance on the ATI itself does not mean that it is the ATI that has affected the disclosure and transparency practices of aid agencies. Aid agencies, particularly those with more independence, may simply be more apt to disclose information regarding flows, irrespective of the ATI's influence. To examine whether it is the ATI itself that is systematically shaping aid agency behavior, Table 4 shifts to modeling inclusion in the ATI as a treatment variable, examining whether inclusion changes within-agency transparency practices.

For the dependent variable, we draw on disclosure quality measures from AidData's historic aid flow reporting data described above, which AidData generously provided to us on request. This data commences five years prior to the ATI's first year of coverage and two years prior to the launch of PWYF. It runs through 2013, thus capturing only the first three years of the ATI; Table 4 thus cannot speak to how the ATI has come to influence donors in the past few years if the pattern of influence has changed. We use a subset of the AidData historic data that is quite similar in thrust to the ATI's "Activity Level" component – that is, which focuses on the completeness of individual aid activity reporting, such as the name, country, sector, and size of individual development projects. We call this subset of the AidData information the *AidData Activity Scale*, and it serves as the dependent variable in Table 4. The AidData Activity Scale is a distinct measure of items on which the ATI focuses, begins before the ATI, and allows for use of the ATI as a treatment variable and thus organization fixed effects. We can thus examine whether inclusion on the ATI is in fact associated with a change in a covered agencies' disclosure behavior.

Table 4: ATI as Treatment²⁸

DV: AidData Activity Scale Sample:	(1) All Agencies	(2) All Agencies	(3) Non-Aid Agencies	(4) Non-Aid Agencies	(5) Aid Agencies	(6) Aid Agencies
Covered by ATI (Treatment)	5.960*** (2.213)	0.429 (3.128)	-1.830 (6.458)	-7.462 (6.996)	-7.321 (6.233)	-10.86 (7.528)
Treatment*Aid Agency	4.514* (2.724)	4.695* (2.695)				
Treatment*Independence			16.85 (13.30)	17.12 (13.33)	43.22*** (14.59)	42.08*** (14.30)
Constant	88.15*** (0.676)	94.82*** (2.779)	91.56*** (0.929)	97.21*** (3.462)	85.67*** (0.929)	91.35*** (4.867)
Organization FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FEs	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
R ² -Within	0.141	0.203	0.079	0.139	0.211	0.277
R ² -Between	0.008	0.013	0.015	0.002	0.012	0.001
Observations	367	367	152	152	215	215


Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4 strongly suggests that inclusion in the ATI changes aid agencies' behavior. The quality of covered agencies' reporting at the "activity level" – the level of individual projects and interventions – improves when agencies are covered by the ATI. This is only robust in the case for dedicated aid agencies, however. When year fixed effects are included, *the disclosure practices of aid agencies are indeed influenced by the ATI's existence but those of non-aid agencies are not.*

Models 3 through 6 of Table 4 examine the role of agency independence for the sub-sample of agencies whose primary business is aid (e.g. USAID) and those for which it is not (e.g. the US Department of Defense) respectively. While there is no relationship between independence and response for non-aid agencies, *the greater the independence of an aid agency, the greater the improvement on the AidData scale associated with coverage by the ATI, ceteris paribus.* Indeed, for the median aid agency on the independence scale (independence=.375), there is no statistically significant effect of ATI inclusion. For a firm at the 75th percentile, however (independence=.5), there is a ten-point treatment effect statistically differentiable from zero. This ten point effect would raise the median aid agency (score=89) to a nearly perfect 99. The clear ceiling effect problem with these data suggests this effect size may be an underestimate of the true influence on donor disclosure practices of ATI coverage. Figures 5 and 6 graphically represent the role of independence for aid and non-aid agencies respectively (Table 4, Models 4 and 6), demonstrating the importance of agency independence for aid but not non-aid agencies.

²⁸ Specifications 3-6 have interaction terms but no 'base' term for independence (calculated using the Gilardi scale) as independence does not vary within organizations and is thus absorbed into organization fixed effects. This is also why specifications 1-2 do not have a 'base' term for aid agency dummy.



We find that *more independent aid agencies are more responsive to coverage by the ATI*. Indeed, only aid agencies above the mean in independence have an improvement in transparency practices in response to the introduction of the ATI that is statistically differentiable from zero. This finding on aid agency independence, as articulated in section 3, is suggestive of direct elite influence as the primary channel via which the ATI alters the behavior of the agencies it evaluates. This does not mean that it is the only channel of influence, however; these findings are perfectly consistent with the presence of multiple mechanisms. To further explore how the ATI drives donors to change we turn in section 5 to a closer examination of the nature of the ATI's power and its key mechanisms of influence over donor agencies.

5: How Does the ATI Affect Donors? Qualitative Evidence on Mechanisms and Channels of Influence

To further probe how the ATI shapes donor behavior, we use extensive qualitative interviews and primary and secondary text analysis to investigate the nature of the ATI's power and its key channels of influence;. We find the presence of both domestic political pressure and direct elite response channels, with direct elite response the primary channel of influence. This section explores each of the two channels in turn, beginning with direct elite influence and then turning to domestic political pressure.

Direct Elite Response to the ATI's Social Power

Donors clearly care about their reputation and perceived legitimacy even when such status is not tangibly linked to materials rewards or sanctions. Donors often point to their ATI ratings and rankings to draw positive attention to themselves (brag or self-promote), direct negative attention to others (distract or finger point), or signal their own good intentions and commitments. As we've seen repeatedly in press releases and statements by aid agency elites, landing in the "very good" category grants bragging rights with large legitimacy gains -- something that organizations value independently from any direct link to financial sanctions or rewards.²⁹ Likewise, scoring poorly on the ATI is used as an opportunity to signal renewed commitment to redressing gaps in

²⁹ See, for example, many organizations make direct references to ATI scores to show evidence of success. See Clare, Verhust and Young 2016, 4 (Sweden's SIDA); George 2012 (World Bank IDA); Greening 2-12 (UK DFID).

transparency policies. As Kelley and Simmons (this issue) note, the very act of the ATI's regularized monitoring triggers reactivity, meaning that target actors change their behavior (if not their underlying interests) in reaction to being evaluated, observed and measured.³⁰

The ATI's ability to incite status and reputational concerns has two effects on organizations. The ATI's peer rankings both serve to motivate poorly performing donor organization to communicate their renewed commitments and refocus organizational resources on transparency reforms. At the same time, the ATI peer rankings and release of annual reports provide opportunities for well-performing organizations to send signals to their external constituents that they have made good on their transparency promises and, in some instances, achieved compliance with international commitments, national law and open data standards. According to numerous interviews, there is a fair amount of institutional rivalry that reify organizations' desire for status and positive reputations. This appears to especially resonate in countries where there are multiple aid agencies who are vying for favorable positions in the eyes of common principals.³¹ This is clearest in the case of the U.S., with a palpable rivalry between the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the US Agency for International Development, both of whom have mandates that solely focus on official development assistance.

The peer pressure invoked by the ATI plays a central role in motivating key reforms in US agencies who have performed poorly in past ATI rankings, particularly at USAID and the U.S. State Department. In the first months after then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US would become a signatory to IATI in November 2011, these agencies (especially State) argued vigorously through back channels against an aggressive timeline and benchmarks for implementation.³² They argued this was because of the anticipated high costs of required changes in underlying data technology systems and the need to build capacity and buy-in from staff to report to new standards and dashboards, including the newly established U.S. Foreign Assistance Dashboard. Subsequent key informant interviews with actors within US aid agencies and US Congress reveal that much of the rationale behind this argument fell by the wayside when the Millennium Challenge Corporation quickly enacted an ambitious transparency agenda and vaulted into the top spot of the ATI in 2013. While few interview subjects would state on the record that this was an official reason for the significant shift in USAID's approach to a more aggressive IATI implementation plan shortly thereafter, several remarked that this competition had a lot to do with getting the attention of top USAID management and putting data transparency reforms "on the front burner."

Our interviews also strongly suggest that policy and behavior change in response to the ATI need not emerge solely from the gain or loss of professional status. As Kelley & Simmons note, assessment processes can alter identity and professional norms.³³ An agency's performance on

³⁰ Espeland and Saunder 2007.

³¹ Interview with senior staff and management at MCC, USAID, U.S. State Department, DFID, UNDP, and UNICEF. In addition to the US, three other countries have at least two agencies assessed by the ATI, including France (MINEFI and MAEDI), Japan (JICA and MOFA), and Germany (BMZ-GIZ and BMZ-KfW). Four multilateral groups also have multiple agencies in the ATI: United Nations (UN DP, UNICEF, UN OCHA), the World Bank (IFC and IDA) and the European Communities (EBRD, EIB, DG-NEAR, DG-DEVCO, DG ECHO and DG Enlargement).

³² Interviews with senior staff at the U.S. Department of State and USAID.

³³ Kelley and Simmons 2017, this volume.

the ATI, especially a significant improvement in a rating or categorical ranking from one year to the next, can be used by elites to signal to both external and internal audience how much an organization values transparency.³⁴ Moreover, the ATI shapes how the concept of aid transparency is collectively understood and acted upon.³⁵ Circulation of elite staff between organizations and the sharing of “best practices” spurred by the ATI fosters inter-organizational learning and diffusion of new policies.³⁶ Constantly reiterating the value of transparency and sharing best practices leads to the diffusion and internalization of norms amongst management and staff.

Similarly, the process of constructing the annual ATI itself is critical to understanding the ATI’s social power and influence over elites within donor agencies. First, the inclusive nature of the ATI review process, which includes opportunities for target organizations to participate in the collection of data and validation of results, lends considerable legitimacy, credibility, and authority to Publish What You Fund and the ATI itself. Because donors are directly involved in the reporting to the index, and have opportunities to contest the data before the index is finalized, the results are rarely openly contested. Second, interviews with the staff of PWYF and aid agencies across the board reveal that the process of collating the ATI results every year, a process that takes several months and repeated interaction between PWYF staff and the targeted donor groups, provides further opportunities again for *organizational learning, diffusion of transparency policy norms and policy change*. During the busiest months of the review process, organizations are compelled to reflect on their progress towards transparency and regroup on their strategies for reform, especially since the ATI gives some points for organizational commitments and implementation plans even in the absence of actual policy changes in reporting.³⁷ The costs of inattention to this process is a bad score – or even a stagnant score - with a lingering sense of “what have you done lately?” This period of personal exchange enhances the reactivity effects of the ATI’s monitoring. Amongst staff, this also reifies the sense that the annual review is in fact deep and rigorous, with layers of independent analysis from subject matter experts to serve as a check against agencies’ self-assessments. This prompts organizations to steer away from loose coupling or rhetorical commitments that might otherwise be used to “game” the assessment process to tight coupling around meaningful policy and operational change on transparency.³⁸

According to numerous interviews, primary and secondary source documents, the ATI also empowers elites to mobilize support for reforms by clearly defining what transparency looks like and setting specific benchmarks for success. References to the results of ATI rankings and ratings help “reform champions” to persuade reticent staff of the merits of changes to operational policy. Specifically, the ATI’s detailed set of indicators reduces uncertainty on the part of the organizational leaders in terms of identifying precisely what policies and practices need to change to meet basic expectations set in international commitments and national law. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (ranked first in the 2014 ATI), attributes its

³⁴ Larson and Callahan 1990; interviews with senior staff at USAID and MCC.

³⁵ Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury 2015; interview with Sally Paxton from Friends of Publish What You Fund.

³⁶ Tvedt 2006.

³⁷ Clare, Verhust and Young 2016, 9; Hansen and Marschner 2015; UK DFID 2015.

³⁸ Saunder and Espeland 2009.

success to this: “...through the Aid Transparency Index process, Publish What You Fund and other advocacy groups have made specific recommendations to MCC in the interest of moving the field of aid transparency forward, particularly regarding how to prioritize improvements to IATI data.”³⁹ The ATI, in essence, becomes the “blueprint for reform.” This shows up repeatedly in interviews and in internal and published organizational strategies papers and operational policies. Notably, this happens even when there continues to be some disagreement within organizations on the importance or fit of those ideals and standards within the overall transparency agenda and core values of the organization.⁴⁰

Consider for a moment a key shift in USAID’s transparency agenda. In July 2015, after struggling in prior years in the ATI rankings, USAID published a strategy paper on open data, depicted as the agency’s “roadmap” to transparency.⁴¹ The strategy paper, also known as the IATI Implementation Cost-Management Plan (CMP – Phase 2), explicitly states that one of the four central goals of the strategy was to increase USAID’s ATI score.⁴² A month later, Alex Their, then Assistant to the USAID Administrator for the Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning, stated “...after we implemented Phase One of the CMP, our Publish What You Fund Aid Transparency Index...increased more than 20 points and moved USAID from ‘Fair’ to ‘Good’. This was an exciting, tangible way to demonstrate our progress, and this success raised awareness around the Agency on these important efforts.”⁴³

Pointedly, the CMP provides unambiguous evidence that USAID is now measuring progress in policy change – and aligning goals – directly around the ATI (see Table 5). The snapshot below of the IATI Cost Management plan shows how the evaluation metrics for the CMP include outcomes explicitly stated in terms of anticipated scores on all of the ATI indicators.

Table 5: Snapshot of the 2015 USAID IATI Cost Management Plan

Indicator Name	Field Contents	Points to Gain in PWYF’s ATI
Allocation Policy	Web links to Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ)	1.25
Annual Report	Web links to Agency Performance Report and Agency Annual Letter	1.25
Audit	Web link to Agency Financial Report	2.09
Country Strategy	Web links to Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS)	2.50
Disaggregated	Due to two errors in the XML output, USAID is not receiving full	1.5

³⁹ Hansen and Marschner 2015. For similar statements by the Canadian International Aid Agency, see Bhusan and Bond 2013.

⁴⁰ Interviews with staff and management at USAID and World Bank. See also Koeberle 2016.

⁴¹ Hamilton 2015; see also Thier and Crumbly 2015.

⁴² USAID 2015.

⁴³ Quoted in Hamilton 2015.

Budget by Recipient Country, Future year 1	credit for the information currently reported. Once corrected, USAID expects to receive 1/3 of the total possible points due to only having one of three years of forward-looking budget data.	
Organization Strategy	Web links to Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the FY 2014-2017 USAID and Department of State Strategic Plan, Agency Performance Plan, and Agency Priority Goals	1.25
Procurement	Web link to USAID’s Automated Directive System (ADS) and Agency Acquisition and Assistance (A&A) Planning Functional Series, Chapter 300	1.25
Total Organization Budget, Future year 1	Due to an error in the XML output, USAID is not receiving full credit for the information currently reported. Once corrected, USAID expects to receive 1/3 of the total possible points due to only having one of three years of forward looking data	1.5

Source: United States Agency for International Development. 2015a.

Finally, we find considerable evidence from our qualitative research that indicates that the ATI facilitates not only internal change, but also inter-organizational learning. The ATI is accompanied annually by donor-level narrative reviews and open discussion forums, which provide critical information on the experiences of peer institutions in building organizational cultures around transparency reforms, overcoming technological barriers, and building staff capacity in needed areas. This is an effect quite synergistic, but distinct, from that of peer naming and shaming. In the words of Brookings scholar George Ingram, such inter-organizational learning spurred from discussions surrounding the ATI helps organizations learn to “stop hugging data”, to release more of the information they gather.⁴⁴ Agencies performing well on the ATI are able to demonstrate to other organizations that implementing seeming “costly” or “risky” transparency reforms are, contrary to expectations, neither costly nor risky.⁴⁵

The ATI’s Power via Domestic Political Pressure

We also find that the ATI does indeed reduce information asymmetries and induce principal attention on their agents, donor organizations. Via the lobbying and advocacy campaigns of PWYF and likeminded members of the epistemic community, the ATI creates awareness among political principals for aid transparency. This channel of influence provides the ATI with a form of indirect material power, defined here as the exercise of financial or legislative authority to get actors to do what they would otherwise not want to do. More precisely, this works through the ATI’s role as a monitor of donor agencies. The ATI is an essential tool for resolving the information asymmetries that hinder principal oversight and control.⁴⁶ In providing detailed,

⁴⁴ Interview with George Ingram, Brookings Institution.

⁴⁵ See also Clare, Verhust and Young 2016, 10; see also Hansen and Marchner 2015.

⁴⁶ Interviews with staff in the US House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, senior staff at the UK Department for International Development, and think tanks scholars both in the U.S. and U.K.

regularized data on agencies' transparency performance, the ATI essentially acts as a policeman, or third party watchdog, on the behalf of powerful principals who may have neither the capacity or willingness to closely monitor their agent's behavior.⁴⁷

Consistent with the hypotheses in section 3, where domestic political pressure appears to play a stronger role with respect to less independent aid agencies. Staff at agencies without relative autonomy from its principal (e.g. USAID) fear that the ATI's score may influence the way its political masters decide to appropriate funds. This hypothesis is supported by numerous interviews at aid agencies, wherein staff and management frequently mention that the perceived possibility of greater oversight and control by key principals (such as Congress or the Executive Branch in the United States) is a motivation for introducing changes in transparency policies at the agency level.⁴⁸

Likewise, our qualitative research indicates that the ATI's detailed information on where donors are lagging in transparency performance is used by principals (namely national parliaments) to inform specific policies within national legislation and open data standards. Several national "aid transparency guarantees", such as in the UK and Sweden, and even the 2016 US Foreign Aid Transparency Act makes specific recommendations that align with the indicators and goals of the ATI.

Interestingly, our interviews also reveal that aid agency staff do not always wait for clear threats or actual principal exercise of oversight and control. Instead, they can act *in anticipation* of possible greater oversight and control by parliaments, executive branches, and member states - exhibiting a desire to "get ahead of the game" by taking proactive steps to implement data reporting standards that would be fully compliant with IATI and aligned to the metrics in the ATI.⁴⁹

In other instances, it is most apparent that the ATI is empowering other actors who then apply domestic political pressure to promote transparency reforms. In the US, for example, there is a thriving epistemic community of think tanks, academic and NGOs around aid reform that pays close attention to the ATI. The rankings and ratings inform their analytical reports, lobbying and activism.⁵⁰ Interviews with senior congressional staff in the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee and the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee reveal that a great deal of their information on the transparency performance of US aid agencies comes from this epistemic community, with frequent reference to the ATI as a primary source of evidence.

Qualitative Evidence in Sum

Donor agencies that see themselves as part of the broader aid community (i.e. those whose primary mission is the disbursement of official development assistance) genuinely think about,

⁴⁷ This is similar to the role played by NGOs in Thompson 2006.

⁴⁸ Interviews with staff in the U.S. Congressional Research Service, U.S. General Accounting Office, and USAID.

⁴⁹ Interviews with staff at the U.S. General Accounting Office, Congressional Research Service, and USAID. See also Marks 2012.

⁵⁰ For example, key groups based in Washington, DC include the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network, Center for Global Development, the Brookings Institution, the Lugar Center, Open Data Watch, Development Gateway, and Oxfam International.

and respond to, the ATI. These donors struggle to compile past and current data in ATI specified formats on detailed budgets, activities, procurement and even results data. They do so fearing that failure to do so will result in another year of lingering in the ATI's shameful categories of "fair", "poor" or "very poor."⁵¹

While domestic political actors clearly play an important role in prompting agencies to respond to the ATI, what comes out even more strongly in our qualitative research is the ATI's direct influence over management and staff within organizations. This is consistent with what Kelley and Simmons (this volume) refer to as direct elite responses to the ATI's social power, in which the ATI constructs meaning and shape the identity, interests and behavior of actors around emerging norms or logics of "appropriateness" in regards to transparency.⁵² Like other GPAs, the ATI uses its ratings and rankings of donor agencies to define key goals and expectations for "good" behavior, as well as name and shame target actors in ways that trigger peer competition over relative status and other reputational concerns that do not always appear connected to competition over scarce resources or other material pressures. The qualitative evidence supports our hypothesis that both channels are operative. It also is consistent with the results of section 4 above, with direct elite response seemingly the more influential channel.

6 Conclusion: Critical Reflections on the ATI's Social Power and Influence

As Kelley and Simmons argue, GPAs can enable weak actors to exercise considerable influence upon powerful actors in world politics. The ATI is a remarkable case in point. Created nearly ten years ago by a small NGO with no direct material power, the ATI has assumed a major role in defining what best practices in aid transparency look like. The ATI has exercised influence via domestic political pressure and, particularly, elite channels. While some donors remain relatively immune to the ATI's influence, we find strong evidence that agencies with aid as their primary mandate and mission are especially responsive to the ATI's assessments, particularly when those agencies are relatively independent and thus more able to act in response to a change in aid professionals' priorities and understandings. Direct response by elites to professional social pressure drives donor agencies to alter their reporting practices in response to coverage by the ATI. The ATI case demonstrates that a GPA creator (in this case, Publish What You Fund) can strategically use normative channels to substantially alter behavior it considers important within a relatively tightly knit professional community.

Thinking in real world terms about the potential power of GPAs, our case of the ATI suggests that there may be strong advantages to focusing on elite channels and construction of meaning in professional communities. By creating common understandings in the absence of material rewards, the ATI arguably lessens the degree of concern that donors will "teach to the test", as Le & Malesky find to be problematic in their context.⁵³ By reducing the material benefits or structuring the review process in a way that makes it more difficult to game the index, the ATI

⁵¹ Interviews (2012-2016) with PWYF U.S. representative; PWYF London staff; senior staff members, United Kingdom Department for International Development; senior resident scholar, Brookings Institution; senior scholars, Center for Global Development; senior aides, U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee and U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. See also Paxton 2014.

⁵² Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.

⁵³ Le & Malesky, this volume.

may reduce the likelihood that those evaluated will focus on their scores to the expense of the broader purpose those scores are meant to serve; i.e., genuine behavioral change in donor policies and practices.

At the same time, we learn from this case that a GPA that operates via social pressure will be unlikely to influence those who reject the importance of the goal or are not part of the community in which social pressure is operative (such as China, in this instance of the ATI). This is true especially of ODA providers that do not have official development assistance as their primary mandate. For example, the ATI's efforts to affect change in these agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Defense, may be of limited usefulness in terms of exacting change in the DoD's transparency policies and practices. Bluntly speaking, this is likely because the DoD's status and reputation and that of the professionals who staff the DoD does not depend upon perceived transparency in providing aid.

Consistent with Kelley and Simmons' discussion of the social power of GPAs, the ATI has assumed a significant role in drawing critical attention to the aid transparency commitments and performance of donors, facilitating widespread discussion on best and worst practices, and inciting peer learning and competition that has produced pivotal impacts on donor efforts to improve transparency policies and practices. The ATI by many accounts is now an industry leader in assessing aid transparency and setting accountability standards for donors. The ATI alters what transparency means in practice even as it encourages greater disclosure; the ATI is more than a mere assessor of transparency practices, it is an active constructor of what it in fact means to be "transparent."

That said, the ATI is not always seen as a singularly positive influence, which suggests that even in this case we can perceive some unintended or negative effects of the index. For example, when asked if the ATI presented any concerns or risks, key informant interviewees were quick to point out that the pressures induced by the ATI to signal commitments to and compliance with the IATI common reporting standards meant that organizations often had to adopt data collection and reporting systems that did not always represent the quickest or most efficient route to full transparency. It is thus interesting that conformity around the ATI's norms of transparency, has taken hold despite conflicting ideas and sentiments about the appropriateness of these standards. Critically, this qualitative finding may portend a varying effect of social power over time as the ATI ages. This contestation over the operationalization of 'transparency' may lead in the future to some discrediting or distancing from the ATI, pressures for adapting the index to be more inclusive of other indicators and weights, or perhaps even the rise of new GPA competitors that reflect changing norms regarding the structure and goals of aid transparency.⁵⁴

At the same time, a more existential question revolves around the ATI's core norms, with respect to defining what the end goal of aid transparency looks like and, more critically, the focus on

⁵⁴ At the fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in November 2011, the Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation was created and mandated to monitor donor progress towards the Busan agreement, including commitments to transparency. The first Global Monitoring Report 2014 was released just prior to the 2015 Fifth High Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Mexico. The monitoring framework thus far appears to depend upon voluntary reporting by participating countries and organizations and a vague methodology and set of indicators; as such, it does not appear to be emerging yet as a viable competitor to the ATI. However, the clear overlap in the indices' purposive goals may indicate some movement in the competitive landscape, with yet unknown consequences for its power and influence of the ATI.

monitoring the supply, as opposed to actual use, of aid data. The lack of demonstrable evidence that vested stakeholders are actually using the data produced through transparency initiatives detracts from the case for transparency at a key time when reaching the movement's goal demands renewed investments in open data standards.⁵⁵ PWYF's CEO noted this in a recent blog post, saying "The impact of our work has been less than we hoped, however, because of limited use of our data. Much of our early work assumed that techies would build tools to visualize aid data, and developing country citizens would find ways to use these tools. The experience of the past five years suggests that isn't enough."⁵⁶ It is thus an open question: while the ATI has proven effective in moving the needle on donor transparency, will the ATI have substantive impact on the planning, execution, and assessment of development projects either by the agencies that fund them or in the countries where the coalface of project implementation takes place?

The ATI is an important exemplar of how power can be and is being wielded by outside (and traditionally weak) actors to shape the behavior of government agencies and international organizations involved in the distribution of foreign aid. The ATI instantiates that NGO "Davids" can sometimes substantially influence the behavior of state actor "Goliaths", with GPAs a potentially important stone in the slingshot.

⁵⁵ Fung et al 2008; Gaventa and McGee 2013; McGee 2013; Davies, Fernando and Alonso 2013; Carter 2014; Rank and Steele 2014; Davies 2014; USAID 2015b; Simons 2016; Weaver 2016.

⁵⁶ Simons 2016.

References

- Andreas. Peter and Kelly M. Greenhill. 2011. *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict*. Cornell University Press.
- Clare, Ali, Stefaan Verhulst and Andrew Young. 2016. *OpenAid in Sweden: Enhanced Transparency and Accountability in Development Cooperation*. Report for the GovLab, in collaboration with the Omidyar Network. Available at <http://odimpact.org/case-openaid-in-sweden.html>. Accessed 9 February 2016
- Council of the European Union. 2011. *EU Common Position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness*. Available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126060.pdf
- Darby, Sefton. 2010. *Natural Resource Governance: New Frontiers in Transparency and Accountability*. London: Transparency & Accountability Initiative, Open Society Foundation.
- Davies, Timothy, Perini Fernando and Jose Alonso. 2013. *Researching the Emerging Impacts of Open Data – ODDC Conceptual Framework*. Boston: World Wide Web Foundation.
- Bent, Rodney. 2015. “A Sad State of Affairs: Is Transparency a Solution?” *Publish What You Fund Blog*, 23 September 2015. Available at <http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/by-country/us/state-transparency-solution/>
- Bhushan, Aniket and Rebekka Bond. 2013. *Open Data, Transparency and International Development, Summary Report for the North-South Institute*, November 2013. Available at <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/2013-Open-Data-Summary-Report.pdf>
- Broome, André and Joel Quirk. 2015. “Governing the World at a Distance: The Practice of Global Benchmarking,” *Review of International Studies*, 41(5): 819–41.
- Carothers, Thomas and Saskia Brechenmacher. 2014. *Accountability, Transparency, Participation and Inclusion: A New Development Consensus?* Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/new_development_consensus.pdf. Accessed 1 September 2015.
- Carter, Becky. 2014. *Transparency and Accountability*. GPSA Knowledge Platform, 28 January 2014. Available at <http://gpsaknowledge.org/knowledge-repository/transparency-and-accountability/#.V0tHy5MrJBI>. Accessed 28 May 2016.
- Clare, Ali, Stefaan Verhulst and Andrew Young. 2016. *OpenAid in Sweden: Enhanced Transparency and Accountability in Development Cooperation*. Report for the GovLab, in collaboration with the Omidyar Network. Available at <http://odimpact.org/case-openaid-in-sweden.html>. Accessed 9 February 2016.

Cooley, Alex and Jack Snyder, eds. 2015. *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

David, Kevin E., Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry, eds. 2012. *Governance by Indicators: Global Power Through Classification and Rankings*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Davies, Tim. 2014. *Open Data in Developing Countries: Emerging Insights from Phase I*. Berlin, Germany: World Wide Web Foundation. Available at <http://www.opendataresearch.org/content/2014/704/open-data-developing-countries-emerging-insights-phase-i>.

Davies, Timothy, Perini Fernando and Jose Alonso. 2013. *Researching the Emerging Impacts of Open Data – ODDC Conceptual Framework*. Boston: World Wide Web Foundation.

De Tray, Dennis. Speech presented at the Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, February 2006.

Dobbins, Frank, Beth A. Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett. 2007. "The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?" *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33: 449-72.

Engel, Susan. 2014. The not-so-great aid debate. *Third World Quarterly* 35 (8). Routledge: 1374–1389.

Espeland, Wendy Nelson and Michael Sauder. 2007. "Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds," *American Journal of Sociology*, 113(1): 1-40.

Espeland, Wendy Nelson and Michael Sauders. 2014. *Fear of Falling: How Media Rankings Changed Legal Education in America*. Russell Sage Foundation, forthcoming.

Friends of Publish What You Fund. 2016. *How Can Data Revolutionize Development? Putting Data at the Center of U.S. Global Development – An Assessment of U.S. Foreign Aid Transparency*. 21 October 2016. Available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/9a0ffd_2ce18150803b48989905acabf9bb91d6.pdf

Gaventa, John and Rosemary McGee. 2013. *The Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives*. *Development Policy Review*, 31:s3–s28.

George, Hannah. 2012. "Raising the Bar on Transparency, Accountability and Openness." Blog entry on World Bank's "Inside the Web", 16 February 2012.

Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. 2014. *2014 Progress Report: Making Development Cooperation More Effective*. Paris and New York: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Development Program. Available at

<http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/4314021e.pdf>. Accessed 14 August 2016.

Greening, Justine. 2012. Speech by the Secretary of State for International Development, Justine Greening, MP, at an event hosted by PWYF, BOND, and UK Aid Network.

Gulrajani, Nilima. 2011. Transcending the Great Foreign Aid Debate: managerialism, radicalism and the search for aid effectiveness. *Third World Quarterly* 32 (2): 199–216.

Gutman, Jeffrey and Claire Horton. 2015. “Accessibility and Effectiveness of Donor Disclosure Policies: When Disclosure Clouds Transparency,” Global Economy & Development Working Paper 85, May 2015. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Hamilton, Joni. 2015. “USAID’s Strategic Approach to Improving IATI Compliance.” 13 August 2015. Available at <http://www.aidtransparency.net/news/usaid-strategic-approach-to-improving-iati-compliance>. Accessed 9 February 2016.

Hanlon, Joseph, Armando Barrientos, and David Hulme. 2010. *Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South*. Kumarian Press.

Hansen, Heather and Catherine Marschner. 2015. Millennium Challenge Corporation: Principles into Practice. Washington, DC: Millennium Challenge Corporation. Available at <https://assets.mcc.gov/reports/paper-2015001163301-principles-transparency.pdf>

Hawkins, Darren, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. 2006. *Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations and Principal-Agent Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Herrling, Sheila. 2015. “The Business Proposition of Open Aid Data: Why Every U.S. Agency Should Default to Transparency,” Publish What You Fund Blog, 30 June 2015. Available at <http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/by-country/us/business-proposition-open-aid-data-why-every-u-s-agency-should-default-transparency/>

Hudson, Alan. 2014. “Opening Government: What Does the Data Say?” Global Integrity Blog, May 9, 2014. Available at <http://www.globalintegrity.org/posts/opening-government-what-does-the-data-say>

Ingraham, George. 2015. “Making Aid Transparency a Reality,” Blogpost based upon a Brookings institution and MFAN event.

International Aid Transparency Initiative. 2015. IATI Annual Report 2015. Available at <http://www.aidtransparency.net/about/why-iati>

Jorgens, Helge. 2004. Governance by Diffusion - Implementing Global Norms Through Cross-National Imitation and Learning. In *Governance for Sustainable Development. The Challenge of Adapting Form to Function.*, edited by William M. Lafferty, 246–283. Edward Elgar Publishing.

- Kalafut, Jen. 2006. Assessing World Bank Openness: A Transparency Scorecard. Global Transparency Initiative and Bank Information Center. Available at <<http://www.bicusa.org/proxy/Document.9555.aspx>>. Access 15 March 2012.
- Kelley, Judith G. and Beth A. Simmons. 2014. Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations. *American Journal of Political Science*, 59(1): 55-70.
- Kelley, Judith G., and Beth A. Simmons. 2017. *Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Assessment*.
- Kharas, Homi and Anirban Ghosh. 2012. *The Money Trail: Ranking Donor Transparency in Foreign Aid*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- Koerberle, Stefan. 2016. "The World Bank is Again in the Top 10 of the Aid Transparency Index." *The World Bank DataBlog*, 3 March 2016. Available at <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/world-bank-again-top0-aid-transparency-index>
- Larson, James R., and Christine Callahan. 1990. Performance monitoring: How it Affects Productivity. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 75: 530–538.
- Lucas, Sarah. 2014. "A Race to the Top: The 2014 Aid Transparency Index and Why It Matters." *Hewlett Foundation Blog*. 16 October 2014.
- Marks, Joseph. 2012. "USAID Plans to Map all Its Spending Data in Some Countries," 19 January 2012. Available at <http://www.nextgov.com/technology-news/2012/01/usaaid-plans-to-map-all-its-spending-data-in-some-countries/50481/>
- Martins, Luis L. 2005. A Model of the Effects of Reputational Rankings on Organizational Change. *Organization Science* 16 (6): 701–720.
- Merry, Sally, Kevin Davis, and Benedict Kingsbury. 2015. *The Quiet Power of Indicators: Measuring Governance, Corruption, and Rule of Law*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mulley, Sarah. 2010. "Donor Aid: New Frontiers in Transparency and Accountability," Transparency & Accountability Initiative. Available at http://www.transparency-initiative.org/wp-content/.../donor_aid_final.pdf
- Nelson, Paul J. 2001. Transparency Mechanisms at the Multilateral Development Banks. *World Development*, 29(11): 1835-1847
- Obama, Barack. 2009. Transparency and open government. Memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment.

Orszag, Peter. 2009. Open government directive. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/open/documents/open-government-directive>

Paxton, Sally. 2014. "What We Want to See in the U.S. Ranking vs. What We Expect to See," Publish What You Fund Blog, 26 September 2014. Available at <http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/by-country/us/what-we-want-see-u-s-ranking-vs-what-we-expect-see/>.

Publish What You Fund. 2009. Briefing Paper 1: Why Aid Transparency Matters, and the Global Movement for Aid Transparency. London: Publish What You Fund.

Publish What You Fund. (2011-2016). Aid Transparency Indices: 2011-2016. Available at <http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/>

Publish What You Fund. 2015. 2015 EU Aid Transparency Review. London: Publish What You Fund.

Publish What You Fund. 2015. 2015 U.S. Aid Transparency Review. London: Publish What You Fund.

Publish What You Fund. Annual Reports of the Aid Transparency Index, 2011-2016. London: Publish What You Fund.

Rank, Rachel and Liz Steele. 2014. Progress Since Busan: Transparency and Accountability. Report for the Global Partnership for Effective Development and Cooperation. 9 April 2014. Available at http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Transparency_and_accountability_discussion_paper_FINAL.pdf

Saunders, Michael and Wendy Nelson Espeland. 2009. The Discipline of Rankings: Tight Coupling and Organizational Change. *American Sociological Review*, 74:63-82.

Schueth, Sam. 2015. "Winning the Rankings Game: The Republic of Georgia, USAID, and the Doing Business Project," in Cooley, Alex and Jack Snyder, eds. 2015. *Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp.151-176.

Simons, Rupert. 2016. "Where is Transparency in the Hype Cycle?" Publish What You Fund Blog, 11 February 2016. Available at <http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/where-transparency-hype-cycle/>.

Simons, Rupert. 2016. "A New Strategy for a New Development Landscape." (blog post). Available from <http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/blog/new-strategy-new-development-landscape/>.

Simons, Rupert. 2016. A New Strategy for a New Development Landscape (blog post).

Available from <<http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/updates/blog/new-strategy-new-development-landscape/>>.

Thier, Alex and Angelique Crumbly. 2015. "It's Clear: Transparency Works," USAID Blogs, 2 July 2015. Available at <https://blog.usaid.gov/2015/07/its-clear-transparency-works/>

Thompson, Alexander. 2006. Screening Power: International Organizations as Informative Agents. In *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, 229–254. Cambridge University Press.

Tvedt, Terje. 2006. The International Aid System and the Non-Governmental Organizations: A New Research Agenda. *Journal of International Development* 18: 677–690.

United Kingdom Department for International Development. 2015. "Key Topics in Transparency." Memo of the International Development Sector Transparency Panel, 5 March 2015. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/441699/Key_topics_in_transparency_-_Paper_5_March_2015.pdf

United States Agency for International Development. 2015a. International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) Cost Management Plan. Washington, DC: USAID, June 2015. Available at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/IATI%20Cost%20Management%20Plan_u_14July2015.pdf. Accessed 9 February 2016.

United States Agency for International Development. 2015b. Aid Transparency Country Pilot Assessment. Washington, DC: USAID.

United States General Accountability Office. 2016. Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Quality of Data on ForeignAssistance.gov. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, August 2016. Available at <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-768>

United States Government. 2015. The Open Government Partnership: Third Open Government National Action Plan for the United States of America, 27 October 2015.

United States Congress. 2015. *Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2015 --- HR 3766*.

United States Senate. 2014. *Senate Resolution 578 of 2014*.

Online Appendix

Interviews

Note: Interviewee's titles and institutional affiliations listed below reflect positions held at the time of the interviews. Overall, between 2010-2016, approximately 400 interview were conducted, approximately 150 of which touched upon issues related to the ATI and its effects. The interviewees relevant to our ATI case study are listed below. Interviews who requested partial anonymity are listed according to institutional affiliation. Interview subjects who requested full anonymity, or were exempt from attribution in our IRB protocols, are not indicated in this list.

Malawi

Twaib Ali, Assistant Director, Debt & Aid Coordination Unit, Ministry of Finance
Mr. Archanjel, US Agency for International Development
Agnes Lumphezi Banda, Humanitarian Response Officer, Danish Church Aid
Aaron Batten, Oversees Development Institute Economist, Malawi Ministry of Finance,
Oversees Development Institute Economist
Uta Borges, Country Director, GTZ
Patrick Brenny, Country Coordinator, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
Chancy Chilimbila, Title unknown, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD)
Augustin Chilkuni, Programme Officer, Royal Norwegian Embassy
George Chimseu, MVAC Technical Advisor, Malawi Vulnerability Assessment Committee
(MVAC), Ministry of Development, Planning and Cooperation
Vitumbiko Chinoko, Programme Officer, Christian Aid
Martin Dawson, Deputy Head of Office, UK Department for International Development
Adrian Fitzgerald, Head of Development, IrishAid
Demetrio Kachingwe, Senior Budget Control Assistant, United Nation's Children's Fund
Ms. Kadewere, UNAIDS
Sam Kakhobwe, Coordinator and Point of Contact, Millennium Challenge Account- Malawi
Vera Kamtumkule, Title unknown, IrishAid
Chrissie Kamwendo, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank
Godfrey Kapalamula, Senior Program Office, Japanese International Cooperation Agency
Prince Kapondamgaga, Officer in Farmers Union Malawi
Titus Kavalo, United Nations Development Program
Walusungu Kayira, Chief Economist, Ministry of Local Government
Niall Keleher, Country Director, Innovations for Poverty Action
Mr. Nathan Khuthe, Flemish International Cooperation Agency (FICA)
Karolyn Kuo, Democracy and Governance Officer, USAID – Malawi
Eric Leventhal, Program Manager, Health Financing, Clinton Health Access Initiative
Madalitso Lowole, Programme Budget Officer, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Charles Machinjili, Commissioner of Statistics, National Statistics Office of Malawi
Chrispin Magombo, Program Director for Food Security/Economic Development, Director of
Food Security, Regional Program Coordinator, CARE
Paul Makwinja, Operations Manager, United Nations Population Fund

Michael Malewezi, Program Officer, Assistant Resident Representative, Japanese International Cooperation Agency
Ken Matekenya, Program Officer, ActionAid
Ernest Misomali, Assistant Resident Representative for Capacity Development, United Nations Development Program
Michael Mkoko, ICT Division, Ministry of Finance
Chisimphika Mphande, Communications Officer, CEPA
Sampson Msungama, United Nations Development Program (with four staff members)
Mr. Lawrence Munthali, Monitoring & Evaluation Advisor, IrishAid
Stephen Raphael Mwale, Governance Program Management Specialist, USAID – Malawi
John Mussa, Director of Land Resources Conservation, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Land Resources Conservation
Mary Ng'ambi, Development Outreach and Communications Specialist, Project Management Specialist, USAID – Malawi
Delight Ngwira, African Development Bank
Alick Nkhoma, Assistant Representative, United Nations Food & Agricultural Organization
Tamani Nkhono Mvula, National Coordinator for Civil Society Agriculture Network
Lamulo Nsanja, Country Economist, KfW
Agnes L. Nyirenda, Humanitarian Officer, Danish Church Aid
Jacob Nyirongo, Norwegian Church Aid
Mr. Oghale Oddo, US Agency for International Development
Mr. Kenji Ohara, JOCV Coordinator, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Vincent O'Neil, Head of Development Coordination, Irish Aid
Patrick Pollard, Overseas Development Institute Fellow, Ministry of Health
Koorosh Raffli, Chief of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Jan Rijpma, Assistant Resident Representation, Environment, Energy & Climate Change, United Nations Development Program –
Lauren Shear, Program Manager, Global Health Fund, Clinton Health Access Initiative
Marita Sorheim-Rensvik, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
Howard Standen, Climate Change Advisor, UK Department for International Development
Alexander Stevens, Department for International Development
Jane Swira, Programme Manager, National Climate Change Programme, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MEPD)
Chimvano Thawani, Debt & Aid Coordination Unit, Ministry of Finance

Kampala, Uganda

(16-23 March 2015, interviews conducted in collaboration with Kelly Steffen, Steven Damiano, Tanlyn Roelofs, and Jacqueline Homann)

Richard Okello, Aid Coordinator & GIS Specialization, USAID Uganda
Phillip Greene, Mission Economist, USAID Uganda
Asger Hallberg Borg, Country Officer, World Bank
Franklin Mutahakana, AMP Focal Point, World Bank
Sybille Schmidt, Operations Advisor, Delegation of the European Union

Theo Hoorntje, First Counsellor- Head of Cooperation, Delegation of the European Union
Cate Jaijuma, Senior Program Advisor, DANIDA
Charlotte Rosen, Financial Manager, DANIDA
Pontian Muhwezi, Country Program Officer, IFAD
Ann Turinayo, Knowledge Management & Communications Consultant, IFAD
Josephat Byaruhanga, Senior Policy Officer, Agriculture & Agribusiness, MINBUZA
Peter Michael Oumo, Economic Adviser, Irish Aid
Virginie Leroy, Agency of French Development
Mr. Weber, Head of Development Cooperation, German Embassy
Birgitta Grosskinsky, Desk Officer for Development, German Embassy
Yasumichi Araki, Senior Representative, JICA
Agnes Ndamata, UNDP
Christine Mugoyo, UNDP
Ronald Kansere Bwanika, UNDP
Alexis Rwabizambuga, Chief Country Economist, African Development Bank
Cary McCormick, UNICEF
Diego Angemi, UNICEF
Nakayima Esther, Uganda National NGO Forum
Peter Wandera, Transparency International Uganda
George Bogere, Research Fellow, ACODE
Winnie Nabiddo, Research Fellow, ACODE
Alex Talwangire, Research Fellow, ACODE
Harry Kiragga, Research Officer, ACODE
Daphne Kobugabe, Research Intern, ACODE
Bernard Sabiti, Development, Research & Training
Sophie Nampewo, Analyst, Development Initiatives
Ellen Hoxha, Chief of Party, Strengthening Decentralization for Sustainability (SDS)
Juliet Akello, Program Officer, Governance & Rights, Uganda Debt Network
Gilbert Musinguzi, Quality Assurance Manager, Uganda Debt Network

Nairobi, Kenya (December 2009, names omitted due to IRB protocol)

Washington, DC*

(Meetings conducted February 2011; June 2013; September 2014 February 2015, October 2015, January-February 2016, September 2016, February 2017)

Augusta Abrahamse, US Global Development Lab, U.S. Agency for International Development
Gregory Adams, Director, Aid Effectiveness, Oxfam America
Carolyn Anstey, Managing Director, World Bank
Joan Atherton, Senior Policy Advisor for Aid Effectiveness, USAID/Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau, Office of Donor Engagement
Shaida Badiee, Open Data Watch
Owen Barder, Center for Global Development / AidInfo
David Beckman, President, Bread for the World

Brian Bingham, AAAS Fellow, USAID, HESN Program
Danila Boneva, UNDP and IATI
Jeremiah Carew, Deputy Director, Strategic and Program Planning Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning, U.S. Agency for International Development
Tom Carothers, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment
Jeff Chelsky, World Bank
Nancy Choi, Senior Director of Operations, Development Gateway and co-Executive Director, AidData
Samantha Custer, Director of Policy and Communications, AidData
Steve Davenport, Director of Citizen Engagement, World Bank
Taryn Davis, Development Gateway
Porter Delaney, Kyle House Group
Chad Dobson, Bank Information Center
Elizabeth Dodds, World Bank Institute Open Aid Partnership
Eduardo Estrada, Program Officer, Open Budgets Partnership, World Bank
Elizabeth Fox, Director, Global Health Bureau, USAID
Jeffrey Gutman, former Vice President, Operational Policy and Country Services, World Bank
Sarah Hennessey, Feedback Labs
Dustin Homer, Development Gateway
George Ingram, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Stephen Jarrett, US Global Development Lab, U.S. Agency for International Development
Bruce Jenkins, Bank Information Center
Tariq Khokar, Open Data Evangelist, World Bank
Johannes Kiess, World Bank Institute Open Aid Partnership
Marion Lawson, Specialist in Foreign Assistance Policy, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service
Ben Leo, Senior Fellow & Director of Rethinking U.S. Development Policy, Center for Global Development
Catherine Marschner, Data Program Manager, Millennium Challenge Corporation
Massimo Mastruzzi, Senior Economist and Director, Open Budgets Partnership, World Bank
Daniel McGlinchy (Barney Frank's office)
Tom Melito, United States General Accounting Office
Alexander Moseson, AAAS Fellow, USAID, HESN Program
Luke Murry, Staff Director, Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Trade Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs
Pernilla Näsfors, Development Data Specialist, Open Aid Partnership, Innovations Lab, World Bank Institute
Sally Paxton, U.S. Representative, Publish What You Fund
Chrisian Peratsakis, Program Manager, Socrata
Josh Powell, Director of Innovation, Development Gateway
Vijaya Ramachandran, Center for Global Development
Lori Groves Rowley, Director, Global Food Security & Aid Effectiveness Program, Lugar Center
Nilmini Gunaratne Rubin, Senior Advisor, U.S. House of Representatives
Jean-Louis Sarbib, CEO, Development Gateway
David Saldivar, Oxfam America

Merrick Shaefer, US Global Development Lab, U.S. Agency for International Development
Kim Smith, USAID/Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau, Office of Donor Engagement
Michelle Strucke, Policy & Advocacy Advisor, Aid Effectiveness, Oxfam America
Didier Trinh, Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network
Katherine (Kat) Townshend, Senior Assistant for Engagement, USAID/Policy, Planning and Learning Bureau
Aleem Walji, Director, World Bank Innovations, World Bank
David Wheeler, Center for Global Development
Martin Weiss, Congressional Research Service
Dennis Whittle, Feedback Labs
Qiyang Xu, World Bank Institute Open Aid Partnership, World Bank
Tom Zearley, AAAS Fellow, USAID

London, UK

Mark Brough, Aid Information Officer, Publish What You Fund
Catalina Reyes, Advocacy Officer, Publish What You Fund
David Hall-Matthews, Executive Director, Publish What You Fund
Bill Anderson, Development Initiatives
Tony German, Development Initiatives
Wendy Rogers, Development Initiatives
John Adams, UK Department for International Development
Joe Powell, UK Department of Treasury
Simon Parrish, Senior Advisor, Transparency & Open Data, Development Initiatives
Simon Gill, Overseas Development Institute
Ngairé Woods, Oxford University

Kathmandu, Nepal

(Meetings conducted on 8-17 December 2014; 16-20 March 2015. December interview conducted in collaboration with Brian O'Donnell, Shelby Carvalho, and Zehra Akbar. March 2015 interviews conducted by Krista Rasmussen, Robbie Paras, Nadia Sabat-Pererya, and Erin Cusack)

Shreejana Rajbhandari, AMP Focal Point, Asian Development Bank
Arun S. Rana, Program Officer, Social Protection, Asian Development Bank
Kenichi Yokoyama, Country Director, Asian Development Bank
Indra Sharan, GIS Specialist, USAID/Nepal
Kishore K.C., AMP Focal Person, USAID/Nepal
Andrew Nelson, Economist, Program & Project Development Office, USAID/Nepal
Kristin Ray, Deputy Program Director, USAID/Nepal
Bigyan Pradhan, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank
Aayushma K.C., AMP Focal Person and Operations Officer, World Bank
Surya Rana, AMP Focal Person and Program Staff, UK DFID
Kavindra Subba, AMP Focal Person, UK DFID
Andy Murray, Statistics Advisor & Results Lead, UK DFID

Nita Pacchai, Program Officer, UK DFID
Pramila Shrestha, Finance & Control Officer, Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation (SDC)
Aman Johnche, Program Management Specialist & Team Leader, Swiss Agency for Development & Cooperation (SDC)
Milan Shrestha, Finance and Administration Officer, International Labor Organization
Nita Neupane, Program Officer, International Labor Organization
Govinda Poudyal, Program Finance Assistance, United Nations Development Program
Dirk Steffes-enn, First Secretary, Development Cooperation, Germany Embassy
Shanker Pandey, Local Representative and Head of Office, KfW Development Bank
Ilryoung Lee, Deputy Representative, Korean International Cooperation Agency
Shristi Chitrakar, Assistant Officer, Korean International Cooperation Agency
Jitendra Bohara, Program Coordinator, International Office on Migration
Ariani Soejoeti, Public Relations Officer, International Office on Migration
Ram Prasad Bhandari, Assistance Program Manager – Aid Coordination, Disaster Management, Private Sector, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Ram Krishna Dahal, Finance Associate, UNFPA
Shyam Thapa, Program Associate, UNFPA
Sarina KC, Communications/ AMP Focal Point, UNICEF
Ashok Vaidya, Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist, UNICEF
Kamakshi Rai Yakthumba, Program Manager, Cross Program, DFAT
Uttam Das Shresthra, Chief Accountant, DANIDA
Andreas Roettger, Head of Cooperation, European Union
Mario Lontro, Program Officer, European Union
Nama R. Budhathoki, Executive Director, Kathmandu Living Labs
Bibhusa Bista, Young Innovations
Joshua Leslie, Development Initiatives

In addition to formal interviews, this research was informed by informal discussion with participants in the Aid Management Platform Workshop, 10-12 December 2014, Kathmandu, Nepal. These participants included individuals from Development Gateway and numerous country delegations, including:

Kastriot Halili, Kosovo Delegation
Florim Canolli, Kosovo Delegation
Mahamat Mamadou Addy, Chad Delegation
Abdel-Hosky Nassour, Chad Delegation
Bihindi Khatib, Tanzania Delegation
Oman Mkima, Tanzania Delegation
Thani Kassim, Tanzania Delegation
Mussa Anwar, Malawi Delegation
Moses Chiwoni, Malawi Delegation
Ferdinand Tumwebaze, Uganda Delegation
Collins Ishimwe, Uganda Delegation
Azizah Nabitalo, Uganda Delegation

James Herrera, Timor-Leste Delegation
Soares Gaudencio, Timor-Leste Delegation
Elson Martinho da Costa, Timor-Leste Delegation
Seydou Yayé, Niger Delegation
Moustapha Issa Mountari, Niger Delegation
Alica Viviana Dodo, Côte d'Ivoire Delegation
Kouakou Mida Théophile Koffy, Côte d'Ivoire Delegation
Bandama Jean March Koffi, Côte d'Ivoire Delegation
Suman Prasad Sharma, Nepal Delegation
Tilakman Bhandari, Nepal Delegation
Karki Bhuban, Nepal Delegation
Marasini Madhu, Nepal Delegation
Gairhe Thakur, Nepal Delegation
Khatrī LB, Nepal Delegation
Mohan Sigh Basnet, Nepal Delegation
Chandika Dhakal, Nepal Delegation
Asor Henry Nkang, Nigeria Delegation
Rekiya Ibrahima Atta, Nigeria Delegation
Indra Sharan, USAID Nepal
Kristina Kempkey, USAID (Washington, DC)
Brian Bingham, USAID (Washington, DC)
Bubhusan Bista, Young Innovations/Open Nepal
Wendy Rogers, Development Initiatives
Jean-Louis Sarbib, Development Gateway
Taryn Davis, Development Gateway
Fabrice Musoni, Development Gateway
Denise Butcher, Development Gateway
Vanessa Goas, Development Gateway
Dustin Homer, Development Gateway
Josh Powell, Development Gateway
Dina Abdel-Fattah, Development Gateway
Dan Runfola, AidData
Ashley Napier, AidData

Remote Correspondence (email & skype)

Tim Davies, World Web Foundation
Didier Trinh, Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network
Alena Stern, AidData
Lauren Harrison, AidData
Marc Maxson, Global Giving Innovation Partner
Danila Boneva, UNDP/IATI
Martin Tinse, Omidyar Network
Patrick Meier, Ushahidi
Tony German, Development Initiatives
Senior official, ONE Campaign (Brussels)
Senior officials, European Commission (Brussels)

Table A1: Agencies in the ATI

Organization	Country	Covered by ATI						Aid Agency
		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Australian Agency for International Development	Australia	•	•	•				Yes
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade	Australia				•		•	No
Austrian Development Agency	Austria	•	•	•	•			Yes
Belgian Development Agency	Belgium	•	•					Yes
Directorate General for Cooperation and Development	Belgium			•	•	•	•	Yes
Brazilian Cooperation Agency	Brazil		•	•	•			Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Bulgaria	•	•	•	•			No
Canadian International Development Agency	Canada	•	•	•				Yes
Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development	Canada				•		•	No
Ministry of Commerce	China	•	•	•	•		•	No
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs	Croatia				•			No
CyprusAid	Cyprus			•	•			Yes
Planning Bureau	Cyprus	•	•					No
Czech Development Agency	Czech	•	•	•	•			Yes
Danida	Denmark	•	•					Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Denmark			•	•	•	•	No
DG Development and Cooperation	EC	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission	EC	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
DG Enlargement	EC	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Foreign Policy Instruments Service	EC		•	•	•	•		No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Estonia	•	•	•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Finland	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
French Agency for Development	France	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes

Ministry of Economy and Finance	France		•	•	•		•	No
Foreign Office	Germany			•	•			No
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)-GIZ	Germany	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)-KfW	Germany	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
HellenicAid	Greece	•	•	•	•			Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Hungary	•	•	•	•			No
Irish Aid	Ireland	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Italy	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Japan International Cooperation Agency	Japan	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Japan		•	•	•		•	No
Economic Cooperation Development Fund	Korea	•	•					Yes
Korean International Cooperation Agency	Korea	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Latvia	•	•	•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Lithuania	•	•	•	•			No
Lux-Development	Luxembourg	•	•					Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Luxembourg			•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Malta	•	•	•	•			No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Netherlands	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
New Zealand Aid Programme -	New Zealand	•	•	•	•			No
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation - Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Norway	•	•	•	•		•	No
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Poland	•	•	•	•			No
Portuguese Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua	Portugal		•	•	•			No
Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance	Portugal	•						Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Romania	•	•	•	•			No
Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation	Slovakia	•	•	•	•			Yes
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Slovenia	•	•	•	•			No

Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation -	Spain	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	Sweden	•	•	•				Yes
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency - Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Sweden				•	•	•	No
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation	Switzerland	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Department of finance	UAE						•	No
Department of Defense	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Millennium Challenge Corporation	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Department of State	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Department of the Treasury	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	No
United States Agency for International Development	U.S.	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
CDC Group	UK	•	•					Yes
Department of Energy and Climate Change	UK		•					No
Department for International Development	UK	•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
Foreign and Commonwealth Office	UK		•	•	•			No
Ministry of Defence	UK		•	•	•			No
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs	UN		•	•	•		•	Yes
United Nations Development Programme	UN	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
United Nations Children's Fund	UN		•	•	•		•	Yes
International Development Association - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	WB	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
International Finance Corporation	WB	•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Adaptation Fund			•					Yes
African Development Bank		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Asian Development Bank		•	•	•	•		•	Yes

Clean Technology Fund			•					Yes
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development		•	•	•	•	•	•	Yes
European Investment Bank		•	•	•	•	•	•	No
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation			•	•	•		•	Yes
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Global Environment Facility			•					Yes
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
Inter-American Development Bank		•	•	•	•		•	Yes
International Monetary Fund				•	•		•	No
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation		•	•					Yes