6 Pseudo Operations—A Double-Edged Sword of Counterinsurgency

Theodore L. Gatchel

In 1948, the government of the newly independent Republic of the Philippines was facing an insurgency led by communist holdovers from the *Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon,* or "Anti-Japanese Army," that was formed in 1942 by the merger of the Communist Party of the Philippines and various socialist organizations. Capitalizing on the dissatisfaction of many Filipinos with the policies of the government they elected after the war, the organization changed its name to the *Hukbong Magapalaya ng Bayan,* or "People's Liberation Army," and set out to overthrow the government. During the ensuing conflict, the organization was commonly referred to by the shortened form of its original name, *Hukbalahap*, and its members were called simply "Huks."[1]

Geographically, the insurgency centered on a region in central Luzon near Mount Arayat that became known as "Huklandia." Other more or less independent groups operated in southern Luzon, and one of those groups decided to join forces with the Huks in central Luzon after the death of its leader. In April 1948, the central group received reports of a skirmish between the southern Huk group and a company of the Philippine Constabulary that had caused casualties on both sides.

Several days later, the remnants of the southern Huk force arrived in Huklandia carrying with them two members suffering from gunshot wounds. Having no way of verifying the authenticity of the southern group, the northern command subjected the newly arrived insurgents to a detailed interrogation until they were certain that the group was what it claimed to be. For several days, the two groups fraternized and exchanged information. The northern group fed their new reinforcements and cared for their wounded.

Four days after their arrival, the members of the southern group detected a change in attitude among their northern comrades. Outnumbered three to one and afraid of what the larger group might be planning, the southern group suddenly opened fire on the northern Huks, killing 82 of them, including three commanders. What appeared to be an unfortunate friendly-fire incident was nothing of the kind. The southern Huk group was, in fact, a specially trained counterguerrilla organization from the Philippine Constabulary known as Force X. The Huks had fallen prey to a carefully executed pseudo operation.[2]

Theodore L. Gatchel is a professor of joint military operations at the Naval War College and a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel who commanded infantry units from the platoon to the battalion and served two combat tours in Vietnam during his 30-year career. He is the author of a book on amphibious warfare; numerous monographs, book chapters, and articles; and a monthy newspaper column on military affairs.

BACKGROUND

For purposes of this essay, pseudo operations are defined as actions in which specially trained and equipped counterinsurgency forces disguise themselves as insurgent bands in order to gain intelligence, carry out attacks against insurgent forces or facilities, capture or kill insurgent leaders, and conduct psychological operations against the insurgents.[3]

A pseudo operation is a ruse of war, a tactic that has been used throughout military history, and has been recognized as legitimate as long as certain constraints have been observed. Ruses are recognized by the Geneva Conventions as "acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed combat and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law."[4] The discussion of pseudo operations in this essay is limited strictly to their employment as a counterinsurgency tactic.

THE PHILIPPINES, KENYA, AND RHODESIA

Although a number of cases exist in which counterinsurgency forces have used or attempted to use pseudo operations, three stand out because of the systematic nature of their executions and because their principal architects have provided first-hand accounts of the operations.[5] The cases are

- Operations by the Philippine government against the Huk insurrection from the initial encounter between the Huks and the Philippine Military in May 1946 to the surrender of Huk leader Luis Taruc in May 1954, which effectively ended the insurrection
- Operations by the British against the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya from the declaration of a state of emergency in October 1952 to Kenyan independence in December 1963
- Operations by the Rhodesians against several black-nationalist insurgent groups from the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of Rhodesia from Great Britain by a white-ruled government in November 1965 to the reestablishment of British sovereignty in December 1979.

THE PHILIPPINES

The background of the Huk insurrection and an example of one successful use of pseudo operations against the Huks were described earlier. The use of Force X had been initiated by Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, commander of a special Philippine Constabulary unit at the time, but after its initial successful use, pseudo operations gradually gave way to more conventional counterinsurgency tactics. Under the direction of Philippine secretary of national defense Ramon Magsaysay, a veteran of guerrilla operations against the Japanese in World War II, the concept of pseudo operations was revitalized in 1951.[6]

Initially the Philippine Army employed companies posing as Huk squadrons in operations that were called "large unit infiltrations." As those operations gained success, however, the Huks became increasingly wary of large units. In response, the army began using smaller teams in their pseudo operations. The smaller sizes of these units required better training, which, in turn, required increased reliance on captured Huks to provide the information needed to keep the pseudo units current with respect to Huk operating procedures. By the time the insurrection was winding down in 1954, pseudo operations were employed routinely by a specially trained unit called A-H for à la Huk.[7]

KENYA

In 1948, about the same time that the Huk insurrection was beginning to take hold in the Philippines, British officials in the east African colony of Kenya began receiving reports of a shadowy organization that the British called the Mau Mau.[8] A militant movement that advocated terrorism to achieve its anticolonial goals, the Mau Mau parlayed a relatively minor land dispute between the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest ethnic group, and the government into a grievance by all black Kenyans against the white colonial authorities.[9] Formed into small groups that the British referred to as gangs, the Mau Mau conducted small-scale attacks on British farms, killing the farmers, their families, and their black employees in the most vicious ways imaginable in an effort to create terror.

The British initially treated the matter as a law enforcement problem and tried to deal with it by using the Kenya Police, the Kenya Police Reserve, and, later, a locally recruited Kikuyu Guard. As these police efforts proved inadequate, the British turned to military methods, including the dispatch of a British Army battalion to Kenya in October 1952. Initially the army tended to rely on conventional tactics such as cordon and search operations to isolate the gangs and massive sweeps to hunt them down.

In March 1954, Frank Kitson, a young British officer serving as a field intelligence assistant (FIA), stumbled on the idea of using pseudo operations against the Mau Mau. The inspiration for Kitson's concept was an incident in which a Mau Mau member whom he had captured agreed to lead him to the rest of his gang.[10] Kitson accepted the offer, which eventually resulted in the capture or killing of the remaining members of the turned insurgent's gang. This small success set in motion a chain of events in which Kitson established a training center for pseudo operations and formed "countergangs" composed of loyal Kikuyu and former Mau Mau insurgents that were led by selected white police and military personnel.

RHODESIA

As with the previous two cases, pseudo operations started in Rhodesia in a more or less ad hoc way. In January 1973, the special branch of the police in Salisbury, the capital of Rhodesia, formed an all-African pseudo unit to impersonate insurgents from the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA).[11] This unit never engaged ZANLA forces in combat, but did collect some useful information. Encouraged by the results, the Rhodesian Army assigned Major Ron Reid Daly in 1973 the task of creating the Selous Scouts, an organization designed specifically to conduct pseudo operations.[12] Named for Frederick Courteney Selous, a famous big game hunter who was killed during World War I, the Selous Scouts were officered by white Rhodesians but manned by a mix of white and black soldiers that included a large percentage of turned insurgents. After initially giving priority to locating insurgents, who would then be attacked by "fire forces" from units such as the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Scouts became increasingly involved with mobile, flying columns used to attack insurgent training camps and supporting infrastructure in neighboring countries. In addition to typical pseudo operations, they also provided trackers, long-range reconnaissance, and even spies.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYING PSEUDO OPERATIONS

Four broad issues run through all three of the cases described that must be considered when planning pseudo operations. These involve the organization, training, and control of forces used to conduct pseudo operations and what types of missions they should be assigned. Two additional issues of importance are the overall evaluation of the effectiveness of pseudo operations and the legal implications of conducting them.

In all three cases, the pseudo forces employed a mix of individuals loyal to the government and former insurgents who agreed to change sides after being captured. In Kenya and Rhodesia, the situation was further complicated by the inclusion of white personnel in units designed to impersonate insurgent forces that were exclusively black. This seemingly impossible feat was accomplished, in part, by effective use of camouflage and disguise and by operating at night whenever possible. A more important factor in the success of these units was the employment of former insurgents.

Given the nature of the Huks, the Mau Mau, and the various nationalist insurgent groups in Rhodesia, the probability of significant numbers of captured personnel agreeing to fight against their former comrades would seem unlikely. Former insurgents nevertheless became an invaluable part of pseudo operations in all three cases. Individuals charged with creating the pseudo forces understandably had concerns about the ultimate loyalty of turned insurgents, but their concerns proved to be largely unwarranted. With only a minor number of exceptions, the former insurgents proved their loyalties in combat, and many gave their lives in the services of their newly adopted causes.

Methods for converting captured insurgents varied somewhat. As a result of his experience in a number of counterinsurgency efforts, Kitson came to the conclusion that there is a more or less universal formula for success.

> Briefly it is that three separate factors have to be brought into play in order to make a man change his allegiance. First, he must be given an incentive that is strong enough to make him want to do so. This is the carrot. Then he must be made to realize that failure will result in something very unpleasant happening to him. This is the stick. Third, he must be given a reasonable opportunity of proving both to himself and to his friends that there is nothing fundamentally dishonorable about his action.[13]

Accounts about the Philippine case are largely silent on the subject. In Kenya the British used a three-stage approach, initially treating a captured insurgent "harshly" and then gradually relaxing the pressure.[14] The Rhodesians generally used a more subtle approach from the start, particularly with respect to wounded insurgents, who were given a high priority for medical evacuation and treatment.[15] In Daly's words, "The turning itself comprised no magic formula . . . no one was ever beaten up by his Special Branch interrogators . . . in fact, quite the reverse was the interrogational technique, as it was vital a trusting relationship be quickly established between the prisoner and the questioner."[16] In both cases, emphasis was placed on convincing the turned insurgents that they were completely trusted members of their new teams. In the case of Kenya, Kitson explains:

> From the beginning of stage three it was essential that the man should feel that he was trusted. Once he had joined us there were no reservations. He could sleep with the others, carry arms, do sentry duty or go out by himself. Frequently on one of his first patrols Eric

or I would give him our pistol and carry only a simi [a Kenyan knife] to make him realize that he was absolutely one of the team.[17]

For use in turning captured insurgents, counterinsurgency forces in both Kenya and Rhodesia had a similar "stick" in the form of emergency laws that imposed severe penalties for such violations as possessing firearms and belonging to subversive organizations. Captured insurgents who refused to cooperate would be turned over to the police, where they faced the possibility of long prison sentences or even hanging.

As incredible as the idea of insurgents swapping sides might seem, the pattern fits Eric Hoffer's evaluation of the psychology of individuals who become members of mass movements. In his view, membership in a revolutionary or nationalistic movement fills a certain need, and members of one movement have frequently converted to a diametrically opposed one, apparently without reservations. Hoffer points out, for example, that Ernst Röhm, leader of the Nazi SA, the infamous brownshirt storm troopers, boasted that he could convert the most die-hard communist into a Nazi in four weeks.[18] Regarding candidates for conversion, Kitson expressed a somewhat different view. With the systematic approach that typified his view of counterinsurgency, Kitson classified captured Mau Mau members into three categories with respect to the likelihood of being able to turn them into pseudo insurgents. The least likely converts were individuals who joined the Mau Mau because of a fanatic devotion to the cause. A larger group that was easier to convert consisted of men who had joined because their friends had done so. The easiest individuals to convert were those who joined primarily out of a spirit of adventure.[19]

In addition to serving with other members of the counterinsurgency forces in pseudo units, former insurgents play a vital role in training. The success of a pseudo operation and the safety of the individuals conducting it depend on their being able to pass themselves off as genuine insurgents. In all three cases, the insurgents became exceptionally suspicious of alleged insurgent units and subjected them to intensive interrogation before accepting them. A wrong phrase or lack of knowledge about the camp where they had received training or even the latest insurgent songs could lead to sudden death. The members of the Philippine Force X learned after their initial operation that the Huks had become suspicious of them because they had too much bright new ammunition for a genuine insurgent unit.[20] Only a former insurgent could provide the information needed to prevent such missteps, and newly captured insurgents were essential to keep the necessary information up to date.[21]

Because pseudo forces tended to develop in an ad hoc way, so did formal training. Force X in the Philippines underwent its month-long training in a field site that was created for that specific purpose. When the use of pseudo operations was restarted by the 7th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) under the command of Colonel Valeriano, the unit created a secret training base in the Sierra Madre and instituted a rigorous eight-week course to prepare its men to operate as Huks.[22] In Kenya, Kitson was forced to use his own resources and captured Mau Mau to build a training center for his countergangs. The Rhodesians were the most advanced in this respect, eventually building a base where the Selous Scouts could train in secrecy and where members could bring their families to live in comparative comfort and safety.

The first issue regarding command and control of pseudo operations that needs to be resolved involves determining what part of a nation's security apparatus will control them. Most experts agree that a successful counterinsurgency requires close cooperation among a nation's police, military, and intelligence agencies. The leaders of those communities usually agree on that principle, but they frequently disagree as to which group should have overall control. In all three cases, the insurgency was initially treated as a law enforcement problem to be handled by the police. Only after police methods proved inadequate did military forces become involved.

In the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary was initially responsible for counterinsurgency, including the first use of pseudo operations. When Ramon Magsaysay became secretary of national defense in 1950, he orchestrated a reorganization under which the constabulary was placed under military control for the duration of the campaign against the Huks.[23] As was the case in the Philippines, the authorities in Kenya initially tried to handle the Mau Mau problem as a law enforcement issue and resisted advice that the military should be involved. In 1953, as the situation continued to deteriorate, General Sir George Erskine was ordered to Kenya as commander in chief with command of military forces and operational control over the police and its auxiliaries. When he was appointed, General Erskine asked for overall command of both military and civilian authorities, along the lines that had been used in Malaya during the emergency there. That request was denied, but he was given the authority to declare martial law should that become necessary.[24] Below the national level, provincial and district commissioners chaired emergency committees that had army and police representatives. These committees controlled the activities of the security forces, including pseudo gangs, in their areas. This system remained in force until 1955 when the responsibility for pseudo operations was centralized in a special forces command.[25] In Rhodesia, command and control of pseudo operations was particularly complicated because of the wide range of missions assigned to the Selous Scouts and their responsibility for operations both inside and outside of Rhodesia. Initially the Scouts received instructions from a variety of military, police, and intelligence organizations.[26] To reduce the inevitable problems caused by a split command system, a Combined Operations Headquarters was created in 1977 to direct the war, including control of the Selous Scouts.[27]

Another command and control issue involves the measures needed to prevent blue-on-blue or fratricide incidents resulting from counterinsurgency forces' mistaking pseudo insurgents for real ones. All three cases provide examples of such incidents. The principal method used by the Selous Scouts to reduce the possibility of such incidents was to declare an area in which one of their units was operating as "frozen." Once frozen, no other security force units were allowed to operate in that area. In spite of that precaution, mistakes were inevitable. In June 1978, for example, a Selous Scouts operations officer failed to correctly designate a frozen area, which resulted in a police anti-terrorist unit engaging, and killing four Selous Scouts acting as insurgents. Because of the secrecy of their operations, the Selous Scouts could not even inform the police of the mistake.[28]

The three cases also illustrate different approaches regarding the types of missions that should be assigned to pseudo forces. Regarding the Philippine case, for example,

Valeriano and Bohannan expressed their view that the top three missions in order of importance are

- Killing enemy leaders or "outstanding fanatics"
- Destroying enemy elite units
- Penetrating and destroying effective enemy support units.[29]

Although Kitson does not delineate missions for his countergangs in the same way, a rough idea can be drawn from the examples he provides. In general, the countergangs operated in very small groups in an effort to make contact with real insurgents. When contact occurred, the reaction depended on the situation. When possible, the countergang tried to withdraw and notify police or military units that were staged nearby to kill or capture the insurgents. Unlike Valeriano and Bohannan, Kitson placed priority on capturing insurgents whenever possible.[30] Kitson also discusses the trade-off between using pseudo forces for offensive operations and for intelligence collection. In his words, "Despite the strong temptation to use the information for offensive purposes at once, we decided that we would not do so unless there was some exceptional prize to be gained, such as the elimination of an important gangster."[31]

When they were created, the overall purpose of the Selous Scouts was "the clandestine elimination of terrorism and terrorists both within and outside the country."[32] After operating in a manner not unlike that of the Philippine Army's Force X, Ron Daly, commander of the Selous Scouts, decided that a change in tactics was warranted. In his words, the new role of the Scouts would be "to infiltrate the tribal population and the terrorist networks, pinpoint the terrorist camps and bases and then direct conventional forces in to carry out the actual attacks."[33]

In all three cases, pseudo operations proved to be successful at the tactical level. In the case of Rhodesia, for example, 68 percent of the insurgents killed died as a result of direct or indirect action by the Selous Scouts.[34]

In spite of the physical damage done to insurgents by pseudo operations, the more important effect is probably psychological. The very nature of insurgency tends to cause its practitioners to become extremely security conscious, if not outright paranoid. Knowing that pseudo forces are operating in a region reinforces that feeling of paranoia. The resulting suspicion of any armed groups increases the chances of insurgents inadvertently engaging other insurgents. One ZANLA insurgent captured in Rhodesia told his interrogator that he had been involved in 10 firefights since infiltrating into Rhodesia. On checking the records, the interrogator determined that only 2 of the firefights had been with Rhodesian security forces. The remaining 8 had been with other ZANLA forces.[35]

Insurgents in Rhodesia were especially vulnerable to pseudo operations because of the natures of the two insurgent groups that were competing for control of the insurgency, and ultimately of an independent Zimbabwe. The two groups, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), represented political groups that reflected different revolutionary ideologies, were supported by different parts of the communist world, operated from bases in different foreign countries, and recruited their members largely from different ethnic groups.[36] These differences were exploited by the Selous Scouts, who impersonated

forces from one group while operating in areas controlled by the other, thereby precipitating engagements that caused the insurgents to believe they had been attacked by their rivals.

Although perhaps not as spectacular, similar results in Kenya caused Kitson to note, "There can be little doubt that the most effective means of getting information and killing Mau Mau gangsters was the pseudo gang technique."[37] Equivalent assessments have been made regarding the use of pseudo operations against the Huks in the Philippines. In a study of insurgencies in the Philippines from 1899 to 1955, for example, the Special Operations Research Office of the American University listed as one of its essential lessons learned, "Operations in which friendly forces were disguised as the enemy were often most productive."[38]

Any consideration of pseudo operations must also take into account the applicable laws of armed conflict. Unfortunately the relevant issues are complicated ones that are largely beyond the scope of this essay. Several points need to be made nevertheless. As was pointed out earlier, ruses are acceptable under the laws of armed conflict as long as certain conditions are met. One of those conditions involves the use of enemy uniforms and symbols.

Historically, the general view regarding the use of enemy uniforms in land warfare was that such use constituted a lawful ruse as long as the enemy uniforms were discarded before actual combat took place. The 1907 Hague Convention IV on land warfare prohibits the "improper" use of an enemy's national flag, military insignia, or uniform, but fails to define improper use.[39] By the time the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions were being drafted in the 1970s, a body of opinion had developed that the use of enemy uniforms was unlawful at any time. Although proposals were made in the relevant committees to make such restrictions explicit, the final results were left deliberately vague. In the words of Article 39 of Additional Protocol I, "It is prohibited to make use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of adverse Parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, protect or impede military operations."[40] It is also worth noting that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court classifies the "improper" use of an enemy's flag, military insignia, or uniform as a serious violation of the "laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict."[41]

Additional Protocol I further complicated the issue by applying its provisions not just to international armed conflicts but to "conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination."[42] Because pseudo insurgents often operate in civilian clothes to disguise themselves as actual insurgents, justifying that practice under international law requires answering what one source calls the "problematic question" of "how to distinguish permitted cases of operating in civilian clothes (guerrilla fighters in occupied territories and in wars of national liberation) from cases of legally forbidden perfidy."[43]

The argument that a nation's armed forces, including special forces that would presumably include pseudo units, are never permitted to operate in civilian clothes runs along the following general lines:

- Armed forces on both sides have an absolute obligation to distinguish themselves from civilians.

- Because of the conditions under which they are forced to fight the rules regarding distinction are relaxed for insurgents fighting against colonial domination and racist regimes.
- The use of civilian clothes in combat is therefore lawful on the part of the insurgents but perfidious on the part of pseudo forces trying to disguise themselves as insurgents.

This line of reasoning represents only one side of this contentious issue, but any nation planning to conduct pseudo operations should expect to have their legality challenged and must be prepared to justify them in terms of international law.[44]

Some of these questions may be more academic than practical ones, however, because of the nature of enemies against whom pseudo operations are most useful. In the three cases described in this essay, the insurgent forces displayed little regard for the niceties of international law except in those circumstances in which they were able to use them against the counterinsurgency forces for propaganda purposes. That use of propaganda is precisely what makes pseudo operations a double-edged sword of counterinsurgency.

THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

In the three cases discussed here, the insurgents waged a particularly vicious form of warfare. In the cases of Kenya and Rhodesia, the insurgents deliberately murdered civilians in savage ways in hopes of inspiring terror. Given that form of combat, it would be naive not to expect the security forces to exact revenge on occasion. In the two African cases, the likelihood of abuses was increased by the racist attitudes of many of the white citizens, both civilian and military. In his book, *Mau Mau: An African Crucible,* Robert Edgerton devotes a chapter to various forms of brutality perpetrated by the British in Kenya involving the police, the military, the Kikuyu Guard, and white settlers.[45] None of the abuses described are attributed to British pseudo gangs. That is not the case with Rhodesia, however, where the Selous Scouts were routinely accused of crimes ranging from murdering prisoners to poisoning wells and waging biological warfare with anthrax.[46]

The problem is to sort out the real cases of abuse from the false accusations and punish the wrongdoers appropriately. The inherent nature of pseudo operations complicates this task because pseudo forces are nearly perfect targets for insurgent propaganda and disinformation campaigns. Any abuse on the part of insurgents can readily be blamed on their impersonators. The victims themselves may not even know who their tormentors were, but, in Kenya and Rhodesia, revulsion over colonial and racist policies on the part of the governments caused many people with no firsthand knowledge of the situation to believe any accusations made against the security forces.

The insurgents were quick to exploit such sympathies. Kitson captures the situation succinctly:

> When, however, certain sections of the press expressed indignation at one or two apparent lapses on the part of authority, the Mau Mau, advised by their legal friends, were quick to realize that they had a powerful weapon within their grasp. By cashing in on the atmosphere which the newspapers had built up they could spread completely false stories about certain people who were particularly effective at frustrating their plans. Thus, if the officer in charge of a certain police station was exceptionally efficient, you could be sure that he would soon find himself the subject of an investigation: he would learn how he had brutally murdered some harmless African whom he claimed to have killed in a fair fight. If the

> F.I.A. [field intelligence assistant] was learning too much about the Mau Mau organization in his area, you could be sure he would soon be charged with ill-treating a prisoner whom he had once interrogated. No one was immune from this highly organized form of attack.[47]

This "highly organized form of attack" has been used so extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan today that it has been given a name: lawfare.

CONCLUSIONS

In the final analysis, the pseudo operation has proved to be a valuable technique when used wisely and selectively by military and police forces to counter insurgency. It is only one of many useful techniques, however, and it must be used in coordination with others to be truly effective. Furthermore, no military or police technique will be decisive if it is not used in support of a larger political strategy designed to deal with the causes of the insurgency. In spite of the inherent liabilities associated with pseudo operations, they should be an integral part of any counterinsurgency force's repertoire from the start and not something that comes about inadvertently as has been the case too often in the past.

NOTES

1. For an account of the background of the Huk movement, see Lawrence M. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946–1955* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987) 1–56.

2. The description of this operation was taken from Napoleon D. Valeriano and T. R. Bohannan, *Counter-guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) 145–46; and Napoleon D. Valeriano, "Military Operations," in *Counter-guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, 1946–1953: A Seminar on the Huk Campaign Held at Ft. Bragg, N.C., 15 June 1961*, 33–38.

3. For a slightly different definition see the seminal monograph by Lawrence E. Cline, *Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Other Countries* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 1. This monograph is an excellent starting point for research on pseudo operations.

4. "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts" [Additional Protocol I], art. 37(2), available at www.icrc.org/IHL .nsf.

5. Although no single individual was entirely responsible for pseudo operations in the selected cases, the three principal sources referred to are Valeriano and Bohannan, *Counter-guerrilla Operations* for the Philippines; Frank Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960) for Kenya; and Ron Reid Daly and Peter Stiff, *Selous Scouts: Top Secret War* (London: Galago, 1982) for Rhodesia.

6. For background regarding pseudo operations against the Huks, see Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection,* 71–74, 117–28; Valeriano and Bohannan, *Counter-guerrilla Operations*, 142–56; and Paul Melshen, "The JUSMAG in the Philippines, 1947–55: Lessons Learned from a Successful Counterinsurgency Campaign," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement* 6 (Summer 1997), 77–89.

7. Melshen, "The JUSMAG in the Philippines, 1947–55," 82–83.

8. The insurgents did not refer to themselves as Mau Mau. For an explanation of the possible origins of the term, see Donald L. Barnett and Karari Njama, *Mau Mau from Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant Revolt* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966), 51–55. For a different explanation of the term, see Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, *'Mau Mau' Detainee: The Account by a Kenya African of His Experiences in Detention Camps 1953– 1960* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 23–24.

9. For a concise account of the origins of Mau Mau and its operations against the British, see Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, vol. 2 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1975), 862–86.

10. Frank Kitson, "Counterinsurrection in Kenya," in *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 163–65.

11. ZANLA, the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), was one of two major insurgent groups that competed for control of the insurgency, and ultimately for control of an independent Zimbabwe. The other group was the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

12. For background on the formation of the Selous Scouts, see Daly and Stiff, *Selous Scouts,* 44–83.

13. Kitson, "Counterinsurrection in Kenya," 171–72.

14. Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs,* 126.

15. Daly and Stiff, *Selous Scouts,* 103–104.

16. Ibid., 104.

17. Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs,* 127.

18. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), 17.

19. Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs,* 126.

20. Valeriano, "Military Operations," 39.

21. Valeriano and Bohannan, *Counter-guerrilla Operations,* 147–48.

22. Charles Bohannan, "Unconventional Operations," in *Counter-guerrilla Operations in the Philippines, 1946–1953: A Seminar on the Huk Campaign Held at Ft. Bragg, N.C., 15 June 1961,* 65–66.

23. Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection,* 88–89.

24. For details of the command arrangements, see Anthony Clayton, *Counter-insurgency in Kenya: A Study of Military Operations against the Mau Mau* (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1984), 3–12.

25. Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs*, 11–12, 185–88.

26. Daly and Stiff, *Selous Scouts,* 47.

27. Ibid., 264.

28. Ibid., 308.

29. Valeriano and Bohannan, *Counter-guerrilla Operations,* 147.

30. Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs,* 95.

31. Ibid., 76–77.

32. Daly and Stiff, *Selous Scouts,* 47.

33. Ibid., 76.

34. Ibid., 330.

35. Ibid., 125.

36. ZANLA was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) that was eventually led by Robert Mugabe. The majority of its combatants were Shona. It espoused a Mao-like form of rural insurgency and was supported by the People's Republic of China. Its main bases were in Mozambique. ZIPRA was the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) that was led by Mugabe's rival Joshua Nkomo. Its combatants were largely Ndebele who were recruited in Botswana and trained in Zambia and Angola by advisers from the Soviet Union. Unlike ZANLA, whose forces operated as guerrillas, ZIPRA also trained its members to be conventional forces. ZIPRA appears to have held some of its forces in reserve for an anticipated battle with ZANLA after the defeat of Rhodesia. For details, see Steven C. Rubert and R. Kent Rasmussen, *Historical Dictionary of Zimbabwe*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2001), 357–70.

37. Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs,* 170.

38. Andrew D. Sens, comp., *A Summary of the U.S. Role in Insurgency Situations in the Philippine Islands 1899–1955* (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1964), 24.

39. "Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" [Hague Convention IV], 1907, "Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land," art. 23(f), available at www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf.

40. Additional Protocol I, art. 39(2). For some of the efforts to clarify the language, see Howard S. Levie, *Protection of War Victims: Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions*, vol. 2 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1980), 319–28.

41. "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," 1998, art. 8(b)(vii), available at www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.

42. Additional Protocol I, art. 1(4).

43. Dieter Fleck, ed., *The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 201.

44. For a detailed discussion of this issue and an extensive list of operations in which military forces wore civilian clothes or enemy uniforms, see Hays Parks, "Special Forces' Wear of Non-standard Uniforms," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 4 (Fall 2003).

45. Robert B. Edgerton, *Mau Mau: An African Crucible* (New York: Free Press, 1989), 142–72.

46. See, for example, Ian Martinez, "Rhodesian Anthrax: The Use of Bacteriological & Chemical Agents during the Liberation War of 1965–80," *Indiana International & Comparative Law Review* 13 (2003). Available online through LexisNexis Academic.

47. Kitson, *Gangs and Counter-gangs,* 46.