Institutional Effects of Nonviolent and Violent Revolutions

Joshua Ammons[1]

October 10, 2023

Abstract

This paper conducts a systematic review and comparative analysis of the institutional impacts of nonviolent versus violent revolutions. It examines sixty-five quantitative studies across disciplines on how revolutionary tactics affect post-conflict institutions. The analysis categorizes institutional outcome variables into five groups: democracy, military/police/courts, foreign relations, ethnicity/culture, and well-being. The comparative analysis finds a preponderance of evidence that nonviolent movements have more positive institutional effects than violent ones. Civil resistance is associated with democratization, reduced repression, loyalty shifts, human rights protections, inclusion of marginalized groups, and greater well-being compared to violent campaigns. The comparative analysis contributes strong cross-disciplinary evidence on the differential institutional impacts of revolutionary tactics.

[1] Joshua Ammons
JAmmons3@GMU.Edu
Department of Economics, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, MSN 3G4,
Fairfax, VA 22030, USA
ORC-ID: 0000-0002-8118-6059

1.   Introduction

A sizeable economic literature discusses the importance of institutions for a variety of outcomes (Davis et al. 1971; Greif 1993; Haber et al. 2008; Musgrave 1988; North 1974; 1990; 2010; North et al. 2013; North and Thomas 1973; North et al. 2009; Rodrik et al. 2004). However, this literature does not discuss how revolutionary methods determine a country's informal and formal institutions in the long run. When economists think about institutions, they may reference literature on legal origins (Porta et al. 2008) or colonialism (Acemoglu et al. 2001). Instead, this paper prioritizes the institutional effects of revolutionary mechanisms and suggests that the differences are meaningful.

Regime change efforts may be categorized into two types. Nonviolent action (often called civil resistance) involves protests, resistance, and intervention absent violence (Sharp 2012; 1973). Methods of nonviolent action include protests and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. Nonviolent action is contrasted by violent action, which may include methods like coups, terrorism, civil war, and insurgency. While violent and nonviolent action may be used for various ends, this paper focuses on regime change efforts or a totalizing restructuring of formal institutions.

The theory and historical cataloging of civil resistance was outlined by Gene Sharp (1973) many decades ago, this literature has grown significantly in the past two decades with the introduction of empirical examinations of the success of nonviolent action (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Chenoweth et al. 2019; Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Chenoweth et al. 2018; Day et al. 2014; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). This literature faces criticism (Anisin 2021; 2020), but most researchers agree that the empirical results favor civil resistance's success in regime change over violent methods (Chenoweth 2023; Onken et al. 2021). However, radical violent flanks within a movement complicate the clean categorization of movements as violent or nonviolent (Chenoweth and Schock 2015; Muñoz and Anduiza 2019). Despite the profound economic implications of this research, few economists have researched nonviolent action, and this paper seeks to bridge that gap in the literature.

Despite the success of civil resistance, violent methods are still used. A growing literature explores why violent or nonviolent methods are selected. Edwards (2021) summarizes this scholarship, showing that many dominant theories have empirical validity and overlap. Both existing political institutions and social movement resources play a key role in the rational allocation of resistance resources. Institutions allowing movements to integrate into the political process are less likely to turn to violence. Strong social movement organizational structures, resources, and skills favor nonviolent methods. Education, globalization, and gender equity also tend toward nonviolent methods. However, if these conditions are removed, groups often turn to violence.

Therefore, the literature suggests that nonviolent methods are like luxury goods while violent methods are inferior goods utilized under non-ideal conditions. This paper examines the institutional effects of both nonviolent and violent regime change to question if violent methods are goods at all. More specifically, this paper seeks to understand if the long-term effects of these

revolutions generate desirable results for the individuals living under the political and economic systems formed through these methods. It is possible that instead of generating goods, these methods generate public bads that hamper human flourishing and political, economic, and social development.

Given the established role of formal institutions in explaining cross-country income differences, this analysis provides vital insights into economic development. Moreover, major powers frequently fund or otherwise assist violent revolutions abroad at the behest of their citizens, despite limited empirical evidence on the long-run impacts for the aided populations. A deeper understanding of revolution's legacy effects could reshape public policy and empower citizens seeking to construct rights-respecting, prosperous societies. At a minimum, such knowledge may prevent the infliction of further human suffering through ill-conceived foreign interventions.

This paper conducts a comparative institutional analysis following nonviolent and violent revolutions in several broad subsets of institutions. I describe the methods used in the analysis before turning to five key effects of revolutions. First, I examine thirty papers on the effects of transitions from autocratic to democratic government, voting behavior and electoral outcomes, democratic quality, and revolution's effects on democracy more generally. Second, the paper analyzes twelve studies on the long-term effects on the military, police, and legal systems. Third, it explores six articles on the impact of foreign influence and ongoing foreign relations. Fourth, I examine nine studies on ethnicity and culture. Fifth, we examine eight papers on the impacts of revolutions on various measures of well-being, such as wealth, inequality, life expectancy, subjective well-being, psychology, civil liberties, and human rights. After presenting these findings, the paper closes with sections on discussion and implications and a conclusion.

2.   Methods

This paper conducts a comprehensive comparative analysis and comparative institutional analysis to examine the effects of violent versus nonviolent revolutions across several important institutional domains. The analysis relies on a systematic review of sixty-five scholarly articles with empirical evidence on post-revolutionary institutional impacts. Inclusion criteria were applied to filter studies for relevance. To be included, studies had to: (1) contain empirical analysis of revolutionary effects rather than just theory or description; (2) research nonviolent or violent revolutionary paths; and (3) examine institutional impacts on one of the following domains - democracy, security forces, courts, foreign relations, ethnicity or culture, or various contributions to well-being.

Google Scholar was used to identify articles for inclusion. Special attention was paid to articles citing known datasets on civil resistance or important articles in the field. Additionally, articles cited in literature reviews on protests were given special attention. Less attention was paid to articles strictly investigating the effects of violent revolution without an explicit comparison between violent revolution and nonviolent revolution. Keyword searches with Boolean logic were also conducted using various terms that signaled empirical analysis and revolutions.

Methodologically, the analysis is overwhelmingly cross-national, with over 50 studies looking at global samples or a large subset of countries worldwide. This facilitates generalizable

conclusions about phenomena like nonviolent movements, regime change, and democratization drawn from around the globe. Time periods examined also tend toward comprehensive coverage, commonly spanning several decades or the entire 20th century, though some concentrate on specific periods.

While broad cross-national perspectives dominate, several studies provide intensive analysis of one or a few countries through in-depth case studies. These complement the breadth of statistical findings by investigating causal mechanisms in context. Quantitatively, regression analysis is most common for hypothesis testing on large datasets. Advanced statistical techniques help address issues like endogeneity and selection bias. Surveys and interviews in a handful of studies generate original data, though pre-existing datasets are more typical.

The most commonly used data in over thirty papers analyzed comes from the NAVCO dataset, which is a series of purpose-built datasets tracking nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns (Chenoweth 2019; Chenoweth and Shay 2019; 2020a; 2020b; Chenoweth and Lewis 2019; Chenoweth et al. 2019). While these datasets differ, they all primarily contain information on large violent and nonviolent movements across time and space.

There is also substantial use of existing data on political institutions and regimes, such as Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and Polity IV, to situate resistance campaigns within broader political contexts. Democracy and autocracy data help analyze how regime type relates to the emergence and success of nonviolent movements. Beyond tracking protest campaigns and political systems, these researchers use data on specific components like mass mobilization events, security force defections, participatory values, and human rights protections. This facilitates analyzing which factors within campaigns and regimes shape various institutional outcomes.

Data sources are global in scope, with campaigns, political conditions, and other variables coded across most regions. Specialized datasets exist for particular countries or issues, like Middle East, minorities, or health impacts. The breadth focuses on generalizable findings, while customized data extracts local insights.

The most common independent variable in the papers selected for examination is the tactics or nature of resistance campaigns, especially contrasting nonviolent versus violent approaches. Researchers want to test how protest methods influence various outcomes. Other independent variables relate to the composition and features of resistance campaigns, like size, duration, number of participating groups, connections between them, and protest locations. Underlying country conditions are also tested as drivers of protest emergence and success. These include economic factors like inequality and growth, and political conditions like regime type, institutions, and exclusion, plus cultural values.

The dependent variables span a range of protest outcomes, with success, concessions, and achievement of stated goals being common. Transitions to democracy and survival are also essential outcomes studied. Beyond protest outcomes, dependent variables include government responses to dissent like repression, loyalty shifts, and concessions. Post-campaign conditions like democracy, human rights protections, life expectancy, and economic performance are also examined.

The review overlooks a significant body of non-quantitative research based on in-depth fieldwork and theory development. This literature is important and offers insights into the rich mechanisms individuals and groups use to achieve their ends. It is also a very large literature covering most revolutions occurring throughout human history. However, the volume of well-researched non-quantitative papers in the literature would make a comparative analysis unwieldy and difficult to summarize.

Additionally, the review is thin on articles examining violent revolution's effects on institutional quality. Additional research could be done to provide a similarly comprehensive analysis on coups, civil wars, insurgencies, foreign-led regime change wars, and other episodes of violent overthrow of the government. One challenge with including a comprehensive overview of this literature is that it, like the non-quantitative literature on nonviolent action, is quite expansive and would consume more space than a brief article allows. Despite this, some articles exclusively examining violent revolutions are included in the analysis. Davenport et al. (2019) do an excellent job reviewing this literature.

The institutional outcome variables examined are classified into five main categories: (1) democratic measures including autocratic to democratic transitions, voting behavior and electoral outcomes, democratic quality, and democracy generally (2) military, police, and the law; (3) foreign relations and influence; (4) ethnicity and culture; and (5) well-being measures including wealth, inequality, health, psychology, civil liberties, and human rights. A comparative analysis summarizes the differential impacts of violent versus nonviolent revolutions on these institutional domains based on the patterns documented across the sample of studies.

3.   Review Findings
3.1   Democracy
The effects of nonviolent and violent revolutions are examined in four primary categories: the effects of revolution against autocracy or authoritarian governments, voting and electoral outcomes, qualities of democracy using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, and a general category for papers related to democracy. Because much of the empirical research on civil resistance movements is conducted by political scientists, it should be no surprise that democratic institutions have primacy within the literature. The empirical evidence generally supports nonviolent action, as opposed to violent revolution. However, a few papers challenge this notion.

Violent and nonviolent revolutions occur in response to authoritarian, autocratic, or anti-liberal governments across the globe. Table 1 reviews the findings on the impacts of revolutions on these anti-democratic regimes. Two of the eight papers describe the positive effects of civil resistance. However, Kadivar and Ketchley (2018) find positive effects of unarmed violence (riots/property destruction) on political liberalization. Likewise, Turner (2023) finds that the costs of civil resistance born by individuals are more often than not greater than the gross societal benefits. Among analyses reviewed in this paper, Turner's approach is unique in accounting using an individualist cost/benefit model with opportunity costs. Unfortunately, this paper does not compare the direct costs of violent revolution. The other papers in this group show worse outcomes for violent revolution than nonviolent revolution, so we might infer that the costs of violent revolution outweigh the benefits, but this has never been similarly analyzed. This paper is critical

for our understanding of the nature of nonviolent action because not only do actors face a collective action problem, meaning that there are gains for the group, but their individual contribution is difficult to induce, in fact, civil resistance may not produce gains that outweigh the costs borne by individuals.

Five fundamental mechanisms are driving the results shown in Table 1. 1.) Civil resistance increases the potential for elite defection and concessions. When large numbers of people mobilize nonviolently, security forces face increased costs for following orders to crack down violently. Unarmed campaigns also generate coalitions with elites that enable compromises or stepping down. 2.) Nonviolent campaigns disperse power more widely. Their decentralized nature and diverse participation mean no one group dominates. This makes power-sharing arrangements like democracy more appealing after transitions. 3.) They help cultivate social and human capital that complements democracy. The organizational infrastructure needed to sustain peaceful mobilization fosters cooperation, compromise, and civic engagement. Veterans of nonviolent movements can bring these skills into new democratic governments. 4.) Nonviolent direct action avoids the polarization and centralization of power caused by armed conflicts. This reduces the risk of new autocratic regimes emerging from violent power struggles after transitions. 5.) Regional democratic diffusion effects are stronger with nonviolent campaigns. Bloodless transitions in one country send stronger signals to autocratic neighbors to democratize than regime change driven by armed forces. Therefore, nonviolent action enhances participation, curbs repression, promotes concessions, and boosts democratization through various mechanisms.

The articles utilize diverse quantitative methods to empirically analyze the relationship between protest tactics, regime types, and transitions. Methods include survival analysis (Bayer et al. 2016; Kadivar 2018), regression models (Dahl & Gleditsch 2023; Celestino & Gleditsch 2013; Kim & Kroeger 2019; Marino et al. 2020), matching techniques (Bayer et al. 2016), scaling analysis (Turner 2023), and qualitative case studies (Kadivar & Ketchley 2018). A key strength across many studies is the use of protest event dataset NAVCO to incorporate nonviolent and violent protest variables. Most leverage global sample sizes for enhanced generalizability. However, the reliance on observational data makes causal claims more tenuous. Experimental or quasi-experimental approaches could better isolate causal effects. The mixed-methods articles (Kadivar & Ketchley 2018; Turner 2023) provide richer contextual analysis to complement the quantitative findings. However, small qualitative sample sizes limit generalizability. Overall, the diversity of empirical techniques provides multifaceted insights, but the studies would benefit from more integration of quantitative causal identification strategies with in-depth qualitative investigation.

Table 1: Effects on Democracy, Authoritarian, or Autocratic Governments

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Bayer et al. (2016)	Democratic regimes with nonviolent resistance in their autocratic-to-democratic shift last significantly longer than those without such campaigns.	Presence of nonviolent resistance during democratic shift (binary: NVR).	Duration of democracy until its breakdown	Democratic regimes that originated	Cox proportional hazards models; Propensity score matching	Ulfelder (2012); NAVCO from Chenoweth & Lewis (2013); GDP, population, etc. from other sources	1955 - 2006
Celestino & Gleditsch (2013)	In autocracies, nonviolent campaigns, especially with democratic neighbors, boost democratic transitions. Violent campaigns often lead to new autocracies.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Transitions to democracy and transitions to autocracy	Autocracies	Multinomial Logistic regression	NAVCO; Polity data on regime transitions	1900 - 2004

Dahl & Gleditsch (2023)	Coups accompanied by popular mobilization lead to more democratic change, while coups without mobilization lead to more autocratic change.	Coups; Popular mobilization	Outcomes of democratization following coups	Global analysis	OLS regression with country fixed effects	Powell and Thyne; NAVCO 1.3; Polity IV	1950 - 2019
Kadivar & Ketchley (2018)	Unarmed violence like riots promotes political liberalization without notably affecting deliberalization in autocratic settings.	Different forms of unarmed protest, including riots, property destruction, demonstrations, etc.	Liberalization: Polity IV score rise; Deliberalization: score drop; Key democratic shifts	103 nondemocratic countries	Quantitative survival analysis; Qualitative case studies and process tracing	World Handbook of Political Indicators IV; regime, economic & demographic data; qualitative analysis on democratic shifts & protest news	1990 - 2004; 1980 - 2010
Kadivar (2018)	More extended periods of unarmed mass mobilization against authoritarian regimes are associated with increased likelihood of democratic survival in the post-transition period.	Duration of unarmed mobilization/protest prior to democratic transition	Survival (vs breakdown) of new democracy after transition	112 new democratic regimes in 80 countries	Cox proportional hazard models	Original data on unarmed mobilization durations in democratic transitions; Geddes et al.	1960 - 2010
Kim & Kroeger (2019)	Nonviolent protests heighten chances of authoritarian collapse and democratic shifts, either by directly toppling regimes or by pressuring them into concessions.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Authoritarian regime breakdown; transitions to democracy; transitions to autocracy	Authoritarian regimes	Logistic regression with fixed effects; Heckman selection models	NAVCO data on protests; GWF data on authoritarian regimes	1950 - 2007
Marino et al. (2020)	Peaceful protests support all democratic phases; violent ones help early but may obstruct stability. Hidden factors affecting democratization warrant analysis.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Democracy index with 4 phases (autocracy, closed anocracy, open anocracy, democracy)	171 countries	Multivariate finite mixture model, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity	National Accounts Main Aggregates; UN Stats; Polity IV; Banks Cross National Time Series	1971 - 2010
Turner (2023)	Protests in autocracies gain but bear societal costs. A scale considering gains/costs indicates that most protests yield overall negative success scores.	Costs and benefits of protests	Protest success scores	34 nonviolent movements in authoritarian states	Mokken scale analysis	NAVCO data on nonviolent movements	2002 - 2013

Development economists show that effective restraints on corruption and poor governance stimulate economic growth and innovation (Rivera-Batiz 2002). While economists largely agree that functional institutions are beneficial, fewer economics papers examine how citizens can promote stable and accountable political systems. Table 2 illustrates, many points of agreement exist within the literature on violent and nonviolent revolutions and electoral outcomes. Compared with violent campaigns or no campaigns, civil resistance is generally more effective at achieving democratic reforms, political inclusion of marginalized groups, and stable transitions. Multiple studies (Ives 2021; Kim 2016; Wittels 2017) found evidence supporting this. Election violence by incumbent regimes can help them win elections but also risks post-election instability. Hafner-Burton et al. (2016) and Condra et al. (2018) found links between pre-election violence and incumbent electoral success. Mass mobilization through protests, lobbying, and petitions can influence policy changes and reforms. Aidt and Franck (2019) and El-Mallakh (2020) highlighted these effects.

However, Table 2 also shows several important nuances emerge on factors like protest radicalization, election violence risks, and campaign duration. El-Mallakh (2020) found that localized protest disruption pushed Egyptian voters toward ex-regime candidates, a conservative backlash, while Ives (2021) and Kim (2016) associate protests with democratization. Hafner-Burton et al. (2016) emphasize election violence's risk of post-vote protests and concessions, qualifying its benefits for incumbent regimes. Wittels (2017) argues that longer nonviolent campaigns yield more democracy than brief ones, while Ives (2021) found that even short nonviolent resistance (NVR) boosts inclusion. Aidt and Franck (2019) emphasize political expedience's key role along with protests in the passage of the Reform Act.

Condra et al. (2018) are particularly well suited to make causal claims because they use an instrumental variable approach to examine election violence in Afghanistan. They find that violence and threats of violence raise the costs of voting, depressing turnout. Depressing turnout for particular candidates (e.g. Pashtun candidate Ghani) can undermine winners the insurgents

oppose. Insurgents try to deter voters while avoiding backlash from harming civilians. Insurgents calibrate the timing and location of attacks to limit harm to civilians and avoid a backlash. Increasing attacks during campaigns and on election days show that the insurgents can still disrupt the state. Attacking elections demonstrates the government's inability to provide security and casts doubt on the winner's mandate. Violence erodes public confidence and satisfaction with electoral institutions, further delegitimizing the state. This aggression creates uncertainty about security, magnifying deterrence effects when information on violence is limited. Therefore, the paper demonstrates the positive effects of strategic violence for rebel groups, but it also shows how violence erodes confidence in a core feature of democratic governance, the electoral process.

Another study using a difference-in-differences model with fixed effects by El-Mallakh (2020) finds that Egyptian protests associated with theft, property destruction, and economic disruption saw increased votes for pro-regime candidates driven by greater calls for order and stability. The number of fatalities in a particular region is positively associated with the share of votes for the former regime candidates. Additionally, in regions with high levels of violence some secular social segments who supported the revolution chose to abstain or spoil their votes. Interestingly, the paper suggests that higher pro-regime support associated with violence is not driven by the fear from elites of economic distribution. This paper more definitively demonstrates that violence is counter-productive for revolutionary aims and supports the theory that violence entrenches the status quo.

The effects of civil resistance on electoral outcomes and voting can be explained through five mechanisms. 1.) Disruption and social instability: Areas with more intense protests often experience more disruption to daily life, economic activity, and perceptions of security and stability. This can make residents weary of further unrest and more inclined to support candidates promising order and the status quo, even if they were formerly associated with the prior regime. 2.) Calls for security over rights: Relatedly, more protest-exposed areas tend to exhibit a greater willingness to trade off human rights and democracy for security and stability. The protests reveal the downsides of instability, leading people to prioritize order. 3.) Anti-revolution backlash: Highly disruptive protests can sometimes trigger a conservative recoil amongst segments of the population as the costs and violence of unrest become apparent. This prompts counter-revolutionary sentiments and pro-status quo voting. 4.) Strategic considerations: In areas with high protest intensity, some voters make strategic calculations to support more conservative or pro-status quo candidates as a bulwark against instability or out of opposition to protestors' demands. 5.) Religiosity: More religious individuals tend to reject unrest and support pro-status quo candidates. However, they also support Islamist parties ideologically, creating cross-cutting effects. Therefore, violent protests can shift preferences toward stability, influenced by their social and economic disruption, favoring status quo candidates.

This collection of studies leverages an array of quantitative techniques including regression analysis, difference-in-differences models, instrumental variables, and descriptive statistics. A predominant strength is integrating election, protest, and regime data, facilitating multivariate examination of protest tactics, regimes, and electoral dynamics. For instance, Condra et al. (2018) skillfully utilize instrumental variables to mitigate endogeneity concerns regarding insurgent

violence and voter turnout. El-Mallakh's (2020) difference-in-differences design controls for time-invariant district factors to isolate the protest exposure effect. While the quantitative techniques isolate key relationships, most studies would benefit from mixed methods incorporating qualitative case analyses to unpack protest-election mechanisms. The diversity of data sources, cross-national data, and statistical models provide multifaceted insight into the protest-election nexus, albeit with limitations regarding causal claims.

Table 2: Effects on Democracy, Electoral Outcomes and Voting

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Aidt & Franck (2019)	Peaceful lobbying, more than violent unrest, influenced the UK's 1832 Great Reform Act approval in the House of Commons. Political convenience was also a factor.	Violent unrest; Peaceful reform agitation; Political expedience	Support for reform among MPs OR MPs' votes on the Reform Act	Constituency level votes from MPs	Probit regression analysis; OLS	Historical data on votes, public protests, political constituencies etc. around the 1832 Reform Act	1828-1831
Condra et al. (2018)	Insurgent violence during elections in Afghanistan was precisely targeted to maximize disruption while minimizing harm to civilians. Violence decreased voter turnout.	Insurgent violence during election period	Voter turnout	Afghanistan	Instrumental variables regression	Military records of insurgent attacks; election data; survey data	2003-2015
El-Mallakh (2020)	Egypt 2012: areas with major protests favored ex-regime candidates more than in 2011. High-protest zones faced a conservative recoil.	Protest intensity exposure: protester deaths per 1000 district residents	Vote shift between 2011 referendum and 2012 elections for all candidates	351 districts across 27 governorates in Egypt	Difference-in-differences fixed effects model; OLS regressions	Egypt's election commission; Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution; 2006 Egyptian census	2011-2012
Hafner-Burton et al. (2016)	Incumbent pre-election violence raises their win chances but also ups post-vote protest risks and power concessions.	Pre-election violence by the incumbent government (binary indicator)	Incumbent victory, post-election protests, and incumbent concessions: all binary	National legislative and presidential elections globally	Logistic regression models; Mediation analysis	NELDA dataset; control from Polity IV & CIRI Human Rights	1981-2004
Ives (2021)	Nonviolent resistance (NVR) boosts political inclusion for excluded ethnic groups more than no NVR or violent campaigns, consistent even among democratization subgroups.	Presence of a nonviolent national resistance (NVR) campaign (dichotomous, measured yearly)	Yearly political inclusion rise for excluded ethnic groups (binary)	Excluded ethnic groups globally	Logistic regression models; Mediation analysis; Case study (Mali)	NAVCO 2.0 for resistance campaigns; GROWup for ethnic group inclusion; Covariates from Polity IV & others	1946-2008
Kim (2016)	Anti-regime uprisings often lead to electoral authoritarianism. Nonviolent ones are more likely than violent ones to result in such transitions.	Anti-regime mass uprisings, measured as the number of anti-regime campaigns in the previous 3 years	Transition from closed authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism	Closed authoritarian regimes	Logistic regression models	NAVCO dataset; regime data from Boix et al. and Geddes et al.	1961-2006
O'Reilly (2020)	This paper finds heterogeneous effects of civil war on institutional quality using synthetic control for 25 cases. Civil war leads to deterioration in institutional quality in about 1/4 of cases, with only 1 case showing improvement.	Civil war	Institutional quality in liberal components index, equality before law and individual liberty, log GDP per capita, log population, and V-Dem Polyarchy	25 cases of civil war since 1960.	Synthetic control	Liberal components index; V-Dem; University of Uppsala Armed Conflict Database; Property rights data from Gwartney et al. (2018); Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015)	1960-2020
Wittels (2017)	Longer nonviolent campaigns associated with more positive outcomes like democracy and stability compared to shorter nonviolent campaigns.	Duration of nonviolent campaigns	Post-campaign democracy, electoral manipulation, coup attempts, violent conflict	109 successful nonviolent and violent campaigns globally	Large-N statistical analysis using flexible modeling and sensitivity analysis	NAVCO data on 109 nonviolent and violent campaigns globally	1945-2006

The quality of democracy is positively associated with higher levels of education and income but many economics papers suggest that only rich countries can afford good institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). Instead, this paper argues that discrete choices between nonviolent and violent revolutionary methods substantially influence the quality of democracy in a country. The studies in Table 3 find substantial evidence that nonviolent resistance campaigns, mass mobilization, and protest diversity positively impact democracy levels and quality. Multiple analyses using V-Dem data (Bethke and Pinckney 2019; Fetrati 2022; Pinckney 2020; Sato and Wahman 2019) concur that transitions and campaigns involving civil resistance led to meaningful improvements across dimensions like electoral democracy, liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, and civil liberties compared to transitions without resistance. Furthermore, Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022), Dahlum (2023), and Pinckney (2020) emphasize how mass mobilization and

inclusive, cross-cutting protest movements boost democracy measures and the likelihood of democratic transitions. While some nuances emerge around the mechanisms and components of democracy most affected, the studies broadly agree that nonviolent campaigns and mobilization are pivotal forces for enhancing democracy's quality and vibrancy. However, Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022) find that pro-autocratic mobilization reduces democracy, qualifying the positive effects. Nonviolent resistance facilitates democracy, but mobilization's impacts depend on the protesters' goals. Context and country factors mediate effects, so further case analyses are needed to understand causality fully.

Bethke and Pinckney (2019) utilize a differences-in-differences strategy with kernel matching to explore democratic quality after transition relative to transitions without nonviolent direct action. The effects of nonviolent action are most potent on freedom of expression and associational autonomy. However, they find inconsistent results when comparing the link between civil resistance and the promotion of free and fair elections. Therefore, the most important benefits of nonviolent resistance are to civil society and informal institutions rather than formal institutions. However, these results are only measured up to five years after the revolution.

Fetrati (2023) examines the effects of nonviolent revolution on democratic quality up to ten years after a revolution with a differences-in-differences approach. This paper finds significant improvements in electoral democracy, liberal democracy, participatory democracy, deliberative democracy, and egalitarian democracy. It argues that strong civil society organization formed during the civil resistance movement creates stable liberal institutions and prevents democratic backsliding. The longer timeline in Fetrati's research explains the variation in results with Bethke and Pinckney's analysis and signals the importance of civil society for young democracies.

Another sophisticated paper by O'Reilly (2020) studies the effect of civil war on institutional quality using the synthetic control method for 25 cases of civil war between 1960-2010. It constructs a synthetic counterfactual for each country using a weighted combination of similar countries that did not experience civil war. The results show heterogeneous effects - in most cases, civil war does not significantly affect institutional quality, but for 5-8 cases out of 25 there is evidence of a deterioration in institutional quality measures related to the rule of law and constraints on the executive. The paper finds that the negative effect on institutions is statistically significant in about a quarter of cases, with only one case improving. Overall, the results indicate that civil war can deteriorate institutional quality in some contexts, adding to theories and evidence that war can influence institutions and development paths. The synthetic control method provides a useful way to construct counterfactuals and estimate treatment effects in a setting where traditional regression methods may not fully capture heterogeneity.

The findings outlined in Table 3 can be understood with the following mechanisms. 1.) Organizational culture and networks forged during peaceful campaigns persist into the new regime. The cooperative norms, participatory decision-making, and bridging of different social groups that develop within nonviolent movements establish civil society networks and practices conducive to participatory, inclusive governance. This organizational legacy shapes the emerging political institutions. The civil society forged through nonviolent organizing provides ongoing monitoring of government, channels for participation, and buttressing of democratic practices. 2.)

Nonviolent resistance movements build broad social coalitions that enhance legitimacy and inclusion. Next to violent conflicts and elite pacts, nonviolent campaigns tend to involve a wider diversity of social groups with divergent interests. This forces compromise and bargaining, leading to more inclusive democratic institutions. 3.) Civil resistance avoids the trauma and social divisions produced by violent conflict. Violence often drives polarization between social groups that carry over into the new regime, undermining democratic values and trust. Nonviolent movements mitigate these issues. These mechanisms indicate that nonviolent movements foster a democratic foundation in citizens, leading to more vibrant, egalitarian democracies post-transition.

These papers showcase the advanced utilization of quantitative techniques to analyze protest dynamics and democracy using the extensive V-Dem dataset. Techniques include difference-in-differences (Bethke and Pinckney 2019; Fetrati 2022), synthetic controls (O'Reilly 2020), propensity score matching (Pinckney 2020), regression analysis (Dahlum 2023; Hellmeier and Bernhard 2022; 2023; Sato and Wahman 2019), and survival models (Hellmeier and Bernhard 2023). The studies leverage these methods to isolate protest effects on democracy while controlling for confounders. A key strength is the disaggregation of democracy into multiple dimensions like civil liberties, deliberation, and electoral components. This enables a nuanced examination of protest impacts on specific aspects of democracy. Overall, the quantitative techniques combined with the granular V-Dem data offer a valuable multifaceted analysis of protest tactics and impacts on democracy.

Table 3: Effects on Democracy using the V-Dem Dataset

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Bethke & Pinckney (2019)	Nonviolent resistance during democratic transition improves quality of post-transition democracy.	Nonviolent resistance campaign during democratic transition	Democracy quality (V-Dem Polyarchy index)	Democratic transitions	Difference-in-differences with kernel matching	NAVCO campaigns data, V-Dem democracy data	1945-2006
Dahlum (2023)	Socially diverse protest movements are positively associated with democratization both in the short term and long term.	Number of social groups participating in protest campaigns	Level of democracy (continuous measure from V-Dem dataset)	Global analysis of protest campaigns	Linear regression models; controls for various confounders; sensitivity analysis	Original dataset mapping social groups in protest campaigns listed in NAVCO dataset	1900-2013
Fetrati (2022)	Democracies born from nonviolent campaigns show deeper democracy across procedural, substantive, and civil liberty aspects than those from elite-led or violent shifts.	Transition to democracy via nonviolent resistance campaign (vs. elite-led or violent transition)	Democracy metrics: V-Dem's electoral, liberal, participatory, and deliberative scores	Democratic transitions	Difference-in-differences with kernel matching	Combined data from V-Dem; NAVCO; Boix et al. democracy dataset	1900-2020
Hellmeier & Bernhard (2022)	Mobilization for democracy boosts it and the odds of democratic transition. In contrast, autocratic mobilization reduces both democracy and its transition likelihood.	Mass mobilization for democracy and autocracy	Electoral Democracy Index; Democratic Breakdown; Democratic Transition	170 countries	Linear regression; logistic regression; panel data analysis	Expert survey data on mass mobilization; events from V-Dem	1900-2020
Hellmeier & Bernhard (2023)	Pro-democratic mobilization increases democracy levels and likelihood of democratic transition. Pro-autocratic mobilization decreases democracy.	Pro-democratic mobilization, pro-autocratic mobilization	Democracy level, democratic transition, autocratic transition	179 countries	Cox proportional hazards models; Pooled OLS, with fixed effects	New dataset from the Varieties of Democracy project	1900-2021
O'Reilly (2020)	This paper finds heterogeneous effects of civil war on institutional quality using synthetic control for 25 cases. Civil war leads to deterioration in institutional quality in about 1/4 of cases, with only 1 case showing improvement.	Civil war	Institutional quality in liberal components index, equality before law and individual liberty, log GDP per capita, log population, and V-Dem Polyarchy	25 cases of civil war since 1960.	Synthetic control	Liberal components index; V-Dem; University of Uppsala Armed Conflict Database; Property rights data from Gwartney et al. (2018); Penn World Table (Feenstra et al., 2015)	1960-2020
Pinckney (2020)	Greater mobilization and less maximalism during civil resistance predict enhanced democracy post-transition, nudging countries towards a democratic ideal.	Mobilization via society activity, talks, protests; Maximalism by election actions, anti-system moves	Democracy level post-transition via V-Dem's polyarchy score	78 civil resistance transitions in 64 countries	Linear regression; Logistic regression; Propensity score matching; Dose-response models	V-Dem; Phoenix Historical Event Data; Geddes et al.; Other datasets for controls	1945-2011
Sato & Wahman (2019)	The combination of opposition coordination and popular	Opposition coordination	Change in democracy score (V-	Authoritarian elections	OLS with fixed effects	Resistance campaigns from NAVCO dataset; democracy measures from V-Dem	1991-2014

mobilization has a robust positive effect on democratic change.	(binary); Number of protest events	Dem electoral democracy index)

There is a strong link between authoritarian repression, poverty, and early death (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Citizens and policymakers seeking to redress this problem would benefit from examining revolutionary methods. Table 4 demonstrates broad consensus across the research that civil resistance campaigns, when set against violent campaigns, positively influence democratization processes and outcomes. Multiple studies (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008; 2011; Bethke 2017; Gleditsch et al. 2022) find nonviolent movements are more likely to succeed than violent ones and facilitate loyalist shifts and defections that enable democratic change. Bethke (2017), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and Gleditsch et al. (2022) highlight how nonviolent campaigns attract more diverse participation, fostering inclusion. Several works (Davenport and Appel 2022; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) also agree that nonviolent movements elicit international sanctions and pressure more readily than armed groups. However, findings diverge on consolidation effects. While Bethke (2017) shows that nonviolent direct action aids later democratic turnover, Gleditsch and Rivera (2015) find limited global diffusion of nonviolent campaigns. Griffiths and Wasser (2018) also counter assumptions that violent secessionist movements necessarily fail more than nonviolent ones. Research concurs that nonviolent resistance advances democratization, but gaps remain on secondary effects like consolidation.

Three discrete mechanisms drive the results found when examining the impacts of revolutions on democracy. 1.) International legitimacy: Nonviolent movements are often seen as having greater moral legitimacy, which increases their ability to attract international condemnation and sanctions against repressive regimes. This external pressure raises the costs of sustaining repression and refusing democratic reforms. 2.) Disruption and elite threats: Nonviolent dissent, especially with mass participation and economic boycotts, poses a major disruption and direct threat to political elites in power. The governance costs and risks of defection become greater than cracking down, prompting democratic openings. 3.) Democratic norms and culture: Nonviolent resistance helps instill norms and habits of compromise, civic participation, and accountable governance, facilitating longer-term democratic consolidation if transitions occur. Movements modeling democratic ideals can aid new regimes and oppositions. These studies also identify mechanisms like those previously identified in the paper.

This assemblage utilizes various quantitative methods, including regression analysis, survival models, statistical tests, and qualitative case studies. A predominant asset is the global scope of analysis, enhancing generalizability. Most studies leverage the expansive NAVCO dataset on nonviolent campaigns, enabling multivariate examination of protest tactics and impacts. Chenoweth and Stephan's (2008; 2011) combination of large-N statistical analysis with qualitative case studies provides a robust mixed-methods approach. Since our basis is observational data, drawing firm causal links is challenging. A pivot to RCTs or natural experiment designs would reinforce these links. On another note, the paucity of qualitative samples can hamper a full-blown contextual inquiry. Yet, when considering everything, the diverse techniques provide valuable multifaceted insight into the relationships between dissent tactics and democracy.

Table 4: Effects on Democracy Generally

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Bethke (2017)	Nonviolent resistance movements positively influence the likelihood of a second democratic turnover of power, but not the first turnover.	Whether democratic transition was achieved through a nonviolent resistance movement	Democratic consolidation, measured by achievement of two peaceful turnovers of power	Global analysis of democratic transitions	Logistic regression analysis	NAVCO dataset combined with data on political regimes and leadership turnover	1955 - 2010
Chenoweth & Stephan (2008)	Nonviolent movements garner legitimacy, support, and loyalty shifts, unlike armed ones, which face counterattacks and fewer loyalty shifts.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Campaign outcome (success vs failure in achieving stated objectives)	Major nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns	Multinomial logistic regression; Qualitative case studies in the Philippines, Burma, and East Timor	Dataset from literature & expert review on nonviolent campaigns. Outcomes coded by objectives & 2-year post-campaign changes	1900 - 2006
Chenoweth & Stephan (2011)	Nonviolent campaigns, especially against regimes or occupations, succeed more than violent ones and draw significantly more participants.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Campaign success in meeting goals like regime change, ending occupation	323 campaigns; Case studies - Iran, Palestine, Philippines, and Burma	Multivariate regression analysis controlling for structural factors; Qualitative case studies	NAVCO for 259 campaigns; data on force defections, sanctions; 4 country case studies	1900 - 2006
Davenport & Appel (2022)	Democratization is the main factor associated with stopping ongoing large-scale state repression. Other factors like economic sanctions have little effect.	Civil resistance campaigns; Democratization; Economic sanctions; Other cost-raising factors	Termination of repression spells	Global	Cox proportional hazard models	New dataset of 239 high-repression spells	1976 - 2006
Gleditsch & Rivera (2015)	Nonviolent campaigns spread regionally, boosting similar movements in neighbors. Limited signs of a global spread effect.	Neighbor has ongoing nonviolent action; Global tally of campaigns minus home country	Onset of a new nonviolent campaign in a country-year	Nonviolent campaigns	Logistic regression models	NAVCO, Polity IV, GDP, population, conflict & Cshapes geographic data	1946 - 2006
Gleditsch et al. (2022)	Due to governance costs and elite defection risks, nonviolent dissent endangers political leaders more than violent dissent. More participants amplify this threat.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent), level of participation	Leader exit from office	Dissent campaigns and leader tenure	Cox proportional hazard models	Archigos data on leaders; NAVCO data on campaigns	1945 - 2006
Griffiths & Wasser (2018)	Violent secessionist movements are not more successful than nonviolent movements. Institutional methods appear essential for secessionist success.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Success or establishment of secessionist movements or territorial independence	Secessionist movements	Logistic regressions; Cross-tabulations; Chi-squared tests for differences	Original data set on secessionist movements and their methods	1946 - 2011

3.2 Military, Police, and Courts

A large literature demonstrates the importance of security, order, and the administration of justice as key components of economic development, although few scholars agree on how to create this security in developing countries despite trillions of dollars being spent on this effort (Haggard et al. 2008). As Table 5 indicates, the studies converge in showing that complex dissent environments with more mobilized groups create challenges for states and regimes. Several works find that prolonged dissent campaigns (Belgioioso 2018), more diverse or numerous anti-government groups (Braithwaite and Butcher 2023), and major protest mobilization (Johnson and Thyne 2016) can each increase the likelihood of security breakdowns like terrorism, ceasefire failures, or coups against autocrats. However, studies diverge on the democratizing effects of such breakdowns. While Croissant et al. (2018) find that military shifts due to protests can enable democratization shifts, Curtice and Arnon (2019) and Rasler et al. (2022) caution that coups and military involvement tend to damage rights and democracy over time, even if initially supportive. There are also mixed results on protest locations and tactics, with Johnson and Thyne (2016) showing urban capital protests spur coups, but Lewis (2023) found African rural rebels less protest-linked than urban ones. The studies agree that complex dissent boosts instability risks but reach different conclusions on democratization from security force shifts, suggesting context shapes outcomes.

The factors behind these outcomes can be divided into six categories. 1.) Defections: Nonviolent movements are more likely to spur loyalty shifts and defections within security forces

away from regimes. This undermines regimes without necessitating violence. 2.) Disruption: Mass nonviolent mobilization signals the depth of grievances and potential for escalation, convincing security forces and regimes to make concessions. 4.) Radicalization: Even limited protester violence can divide nonviolent movements and validate state repression, entrenching conflict dynamics. 5.) Personalization: When autocratic regimes excessively personalize security forces, it deters mass mobilization, fuels repression during protests, and hurts democratization prospects if regimes fall. The literature indicates that nonviolent resistance positively transforms security force loyalty and public opinion while reducing retaliation risks compared to violent uprisings. However, contexts like exclusion from political processes can incentivize minority armed mobilization. Overall, the nonviolent discipline appears crucial for security actors and institutions to democratize.

Through adept use of quantitative approaches, these studies delve into the effects on security forces using statistical methods like regression analysis, survival models, and qualitative case studies to examine protest-security force dynamics. Key strengths include leveraging global data on protests, coups, ceasefires, and dissident campaigns to enable multivariate examination. Belgioioso (2018), Braithwaite & Butcher (2023), and Lewis (2023) skillfully utilize survival models to analyze time dynamics of terrorism onset, ceasefire breakdowns, and rebel group emergence. Curtice & Arnon's (2019) fixed effects regression isolates the coup effect on rights protections. Relying solely on non-experimental data casts doubt on our causal determinations. Experimental data or exogenous shocks would be apt for a more conclusive stance on causality. Furthermore, small qualitative samples limit contextual analysis, though Croissant et al.'s (2018) inclusion of case studies provides richer insight. Overall, the diverse techniques offer valuable multifaceted analysis, but integrating quantitative causal identification with extensive qualitative investigation could further enrich the empirical understanding.

Table 5: Effects on Security Forces

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Belgioioso (2018)	Extended and fragmented mass dissident campaigns increase terrorism likelihood, applicable to both violent and nonviolent movements.	Years of dissident campaign; Annual increase of dissident groups from it.	Terrorist campaign onset: Year dissident action includes 3+ attacks.	189 mass dissident campaigns	Logistic regression analysis	NAVCO 2.0; Global Terrorism Database	1948-2006
Braithwaite & Butcher (2023)	Complex environments of anti-government dissent, with more mobilized dissident organizations, contribute to faster breakdown of ceasefires in civil wars.	Composition of anti-government dissent (number of groups, connections, ideology)	Time until ceasefire failure/breakdown	Ceasefires in African civil wars	Cox proportional hazards models	Original dataset on mobilized dissident organizations in Africa; new ceasefire dataset	1990-2015
Chin et al. (2022)	Security force personalization decreases the likelihood of mass uprising onset, increases repression during protests, and reduces the chance of democratic transition.	Security force personalization in dictatorships	Mass uprising onset; Repression during protests; Democratic transition	Dictatorships	Regression analysis	Survey on security force personalization; uprising & democracy data from V-Dem & more	1946-2010
Croissant et al. (2018)	Military shifts due to nonviolent protests favor democratic transitions, coups do not.. Greater social gap between protesters and military raises repression chances.	Military reaction to nonviolent protests (repression, loyalty shift, coup)	Leader exit, Democratic transition	Global study of anti-government protests: cases & large-N analysis	Statistical analysis; Process tracing case studies	Dataset of protests (1946-2014) with 40 "dictator endgame" cases, using sources like NAVCO	1946-2014
Curtice & Arnon (2019)	After coups, prior uncertainty curtails physical rights due to regime repression and revenge. Failed coups see extended retaliation because of information voids.	Coups (failed and successful)	Respect for physical integrity rights (latent human rights protection score)	172 countries	OLS regression with fixed effects	Powell and Thyne dataset; Physical integrity rights - Latent human rights protection score	1980-2015
Johnson & Thyne (2016)	Anti-government protests, especially those near the capital and nonviolent, increase the likelihood of coup attempts against autocratic leaders.	Anti-government protests; Protest location; Protest violence	Coup attempts	Global sample	Logistic regression analysis	SPEED data on protest events; Powell & Thyne data on coups	1951-2005
Lewis (2023)	Rebel groups in rural Africa are less likely to emerge from recent nearby protest mobilization than urban rebel groups.	Rural vs. urban location of rebel group formation	Rebel group formation	Rebel group formation in 47 African states	Linear probability models;	Original dataset of 152 rebel groups formed in Africa 1997-2015	1997-2015

					Descriptive statistics		
Rasler et al. (2022)	Nonviolent revolts yield short-term democratic boosts, but long-term results hinge on military involvement. Greater involvement weakens democratization prospects.	Extent of military defection/involvement ; Size of protests	Democracy levels 5 and 10 years after nonviolent revolts	36 cases of successful nonviolent revolts globally	OLS regression models; Bivariate correlations	Polity IV (democracy data); estimates of protest size and military involvement for each case	1958-2005
Svensson et al. (2022)	Civilian protests against jihadists had higher success with multi-town actions, clear non-extreme demands, and repression that, counterintuitively, boosted mobilization.	Tactics and geographical scope of protests, types of demands made, past repression	Success of civil resistance events (protesters achieving stated demands)	Syrian war anti-jihadist protests using Census Data	Logistic regression models; Case studies	Original dataset of 624 anti-jihadist protest events in Syria 2011-2018	2014

The World Bank and other international organizations have spent millions of dollars on campaigns to improve judicial performance, seeing a well-run judiciary as fundamental for economic performance. (Messick 1999). Table 6 outlines the three studies that converge in showing how opposition tactics and dissent dynamics influence public opinion or post-conflict institutions. Lupu and Wallace (2019) and Braithwaite et al. (2022) both find that nonviolent action has more positive impacts than violent actions, whether in boosting post-conflict judicial independence (Braithwaite et al. 2022) or reducing public support for state repression (Lupu and Wallace 2019). Bennett et al. (2021) find that successful and failed coups were associated with a substantial reduction in judicial constraints in the year after the coup. However, Lupu and Wallace (2019) also uncover divergent conclusions, as knowledge of rights law decreased public approval for repression in India but increased it in Israel, suggesting complex contextual effects. While the studies agree that dissent tactics shape public views and institutions, the review indicates inconsistent results across contexts regarding nonviolent mobilization, pointing to the need for further research.

Mechanisms driving these results can be categorized into three unique categories. 1.) Threat perception: Governments and publics tend to perceive nonviolent campaigns as less threatening compared to violent campaigns. This makes them more willing to make concessions to nonviolent campaigns. The papers argue that this threat perception mechanism helps explain why governments grant more judicial independence after nonviolent campaigns. 2.) Information and credibility: Nonviolent tactics signal to governments that dissidents are willing to resolve grievances through institutional channels like the judiciary. This provides an incentive for governments to empower independent courts as an "information generating" institution and peaceful means of dispute resolution. 3.) Rents: Military coup leaders in particular have incentives to reduce judicial constraints quickly before losing power. Their shorter time horizons lead them to behave more like "roving bandits" who maximize short-run rents. Many of the mechanisms previously identified in this analysis also contribute to the effects on the legal system.

Identified studies on courts leverage various techniques including difference-in-difference, difference-of-means testing, survey experiments, regression analysis, and qualitative case studies. Bennett et al. (2021) have the most empirically sound methods in this group, employing a mix of difference-in-difference methods, fixed effects regression analysis, and a variety of robustness checks. Lupu & Wallace (2019) skillfully utilize randomized treatment assignments in survey experiments to isolate individual-level reactions to dissent tactics and rights violations. Braithwaite et al. (2022) apply regression analysis to quantify the impact of protest tactics on post-conflict judicial independence. The studies draw from diverse data sources spanning surveys, inequality metrics, judicial independence scores, and conflict data. Overall, the multifaceted techniques

provide valuable insights, but integrating quantitative causal identification with extensive qualitative investigation could further enrich the empirical understanding.

Table 6: Effects on Courts and Law

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Bennett et al. (2021)	Successful coups, especially by the military, reduce judicial independence. Civilian coups against military regimes increased judicial constraints.	Coups	Corruption, judicial constraints, and regime type	537 successful and failed coup attempts	Difference-in-differences; Fixed effects regression analysis	Bjørnskov and Rode (2020); V-Dem; Cheibub et al. (2010), Penn World Tables, The Maddison Project	1950-2018
Braithwaite et al. (2022)	Nonviolent resistance campaigns are associated with higher levels of post-conflict judicial independence than violent campaigns.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Level of judicial independence in the post-conflict period	Global	OLS regression	Latent judicial independence scores; campaign data from NAVCO dataset	1949-2012
Lupu & Wallace (2019)	Violent tactics boost public support for government repression. Knowledge of human rights law lessens approval in India but amplifies it in Israel.	Opposition and government tactics (violent/nonviolent); International law breach	Public approval of government repression	Survey experiments in India, Israel, Argentina	Randomized treatment assignments; Difference-of-means tests; OLS; Ordered probit	Original survey data collected by authors	2015

3.3 Foreign Influence

Foreign governments often promote violent regime change abroad, and studies show that many of these interventions reduce income and levels of democracy in the receiving country (Absher et al. 2023). But what about nonviolent revolutions? Table 7 shows broad agreement across the studies that civil resistance campaigns and tactics positively correlate with increased international treaty commitments, concessions, and peacekeeper support from abroad. Multiple analyses (Ryckman 2016; Cunningham 2023; Belgioioso et al. 2020) found nonviolent movements are associated with more human rights treaty ratifications, self-determination concessions, and post-conflict peacekeeper deployments compared to violent groups or no campaigns. This highlights the ability of principled nonviolence to mobilize external pressure and intervention. However, divergent conclusions emerge around major power relations. While Kalin et al. (2022) find that proximity to major powers assists nonviolent campaigns, they also show that economic and military ties to major powers reduce campaign success chances, as these powerful states often support friendly autocratic regimes. Furthermore, Asal et al. (2014) underscore that violent organizations receive more foreign state support than nonviolent groups. While nonviolence garners support from peacekeepers, democratic states, and some major powers, violent groups still attract backing from specific states, especially during the Cold War. The nuanced interplay between nonviolent mobilization and varied external actors is a crucial area needing further explication.

Five primary mechanisms emerge from the analysis of foreign influence. 1.) Deterrence: Major powers with military or economic ties with autocratic regimes are reluctant to support nonviolent movements against their state allies. 2.) State interests: Violent groups are still supported by foreign powers seeking influence, despite moral issues with violence. Realpolitik considerations persist. 3.) Legitimacy: Nonviolent discipline maintains moral authority with international audiences. Protester violence alienates potential foreign allies. 4.) Peacekeeping: Countries with robust civil societies and rule of law export norms via peacekeeping after conflicts, assisting nonviolent mobilization. 5.) Treaty commitments: Ongoing nonviolent movements increase government willingness to sign human rights treaties to satisfy foreign critics. Therefore, foreign governments often pose real challenges to civil resistance groups, though foreign civil

society groups can assist in lending credibility to the movement and promote human rights and legal protections abroad.

This literature explores the international dynamics surrounding dissent and human rights with refined quantitative methodologies, like regression analysis. Key strengths include using logistic regression and rare events logistic regression to model rare outcome variables like transnational activity (Asal et al. 2014) and organization strategy choices. Belgioioso et al. (2020) skillfully employ negative binomial models to analyze count variables like protests. Cunningham (2023) leverages global data on self-determination movements for enhanced generalizability. While non-experimental data offers insights, it does not firmly anchor causal conclusions. Methods that are systematically allocated treatments or differences-in-differences could enhance our understanding of causality. The confined scale of our qualitative samples, however, can constrict detailed contextual evaluation. The diverse regression techniques combined with expansive datasets provide valuable multifaceted insight into international factors shaping dissent outcomes and human rights commitments.

Table 7: Effects on Foreign Influence

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Asal et al. (2014)	Foreign and diaspora support, plus electoral exclusion, raise chances of ethnic groups partaking in transnational politics, notably violence.	Foreign state support, diaspora support, electoral participation, etc.	Transnational political activities - solicitation, protest, violence	Study of 104 ethnopolitical groups in Middle East/North Africa	Logistic regression analysis	Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset	1980-2004
Asal et al. (2019)	In both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, ethnopolitical organizations using violence are more likely to obtain foreign state support than nonviolent organizations.	Organization's use of violence, popularity, kinship ties, capability	Foreign State Support	Ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East	Logistic regression analysis	Middle East Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset with modifications	1980-2004
Belgioioso et al. (2020)	Nations with UN peacekeeping missions experience more nonviolent protests, especially if police personnel come from countries with active civil societies.	UN peacekeeping mission details; Count of nonviolent protests post-civil war	UN peace mission traits; Nonviolent protests in post-war nations	Post-war years: with vs. without peacekeeping missions	Negative binomial regression with country fixed effects	Original peacekeeping data; Phoenix Historical Event Dataset; V-Dem	1990-2011
Cunningham (2023)	Nonviolent tactics, even outside mass campaigns, effectively secure state concessions for self-determination. Nonviolence outperforms violence in gaining concessions.	Nonviolent, violent, and political tactics by self-determination groups	Concessions made to self-determination movements by the state	Self-determination disputes globally	Logistic regression analysis	Original data on yearly tactics of 1100+ groups in self-determination disputes	1960-2005
Kalin et al. (2022)	Nonviolent movements struggle against states backed by major powers. However, such power support can cause security defections, enhancing success prospects.	Trade, defense ties, and proximity to major powers; Major power backing for regime or campaign	Success of nonviolent resistance campaign	Nonviolent resistance campaigns	Logistic regression analysis	NAVCO data on campaigns; Correlates of War data on trade & alliances	1980-2013
Ryckman (2016)	Ongoing nonviolent, pro-democracy movements make a country more likely to sign/ratify human rights treaties.	Presence of nonviolent, pro-democracy movement	Country's yearly signing/ratifying of core UN human rights treaties	UN rights treaties & global nonviolent movements	Cox proportional hazards models; Logistic regression	NAVCO data on nonviolent movements; data on commitments to nine UN human rights treaties	1965-2006

3.4   Ethnicity and Culture

Minority rights are an essential and often overlooked component of economic development (Easterly 2013). This section explores how marginalized groups fare after violent and nonviolent bottom-up resistance movements. Table 8 highlights a broad consensus across these studies that nonviolent direct action is more effective than violence for marginalized identity groups to achieve goals like autonomy, inclusion, and peace talks. Multiple analyses (Shaykhutdinov 2010; Koos 2014; Nilsson and Svensson 2023) found nonviolent protests and rebellions enhanced territorial autonomy, political power sharing, and negotiation representation relative to violent uprisings. This highlights principled nonviolence's ability to garner moral authority and compel inclusion. However, Acosta (2022) underscores a nuance - in democracies, marginalized groups often turn to violence out of frustration when shut out from access. Furthermore, Pischedda (2022) finds that campaigns defined by ethnic differences from the ruling group are disadvantaged. So, while

nonviolence outperforms violence overall, identity factors create complex dynamics. Donni et al. (2021) and Pinckney et al. (2022) emphasize how emancipative values and civil society's strength promote nonviolent mobilization. Cultural elements shape protest tactics and outcomes. However, directions of influence remain unclear - Do values drive protests, or do protests transform values? Further unpacking this reciprocal relationship is critical.

Four mechanisms stand out when examining the relationship between ethnic groups, culture, and revolutions. 1.) Exclusion: Groups excluded from political access sometimes turn to violence out of frustration when nonviolent options seem ineffective. 2.) Values: Cultural norms emphasizing emancipation and autonomy facilitate participation in principled nonviolent action. 3.) Terrain: Rural areas with dense social ties can mobilize sizeable civil resistance campaigns, overcoming assumptions that urbanization aids mobilization. 4.) Transitions: Nonviolent campaigns increase the likelihood that transitions meaningfully include and empower marginalized identity groups in the new system. Overall, the literature suggests that principled nonviolent resistance provides a strategic advantage for mobilizing identity groups and advancing their agendas compared to armed struggle. However, complex dynamics around exclusion, values, and radical flanks mediate outcomes. Further research should unpack these relationships.

This body of work applies precise quantitative techniques, like regression analysis, literature reviews, latent class models, and survival models, to examine identity and cultural factors surrounding dissent. Key strengths include using logistic regression to model discrete choices like violence adoption (Acosta 2022) and overcoming deprivation (Koos 2014). Nilsson and Svensson (2023) employ logit models to analyze the likelihood of inclusive peace talks. Donni et al.'s (2021) latent class analysis provides nuanced cultural profiling based on protest propensities. However, the predominant reliance on non-experimental data makes causal claims tentative. Purposeful randomization or studies exploiting external changes could better establish causality. Also, small qualitative samples limit contextual analysis, though case studies help illustrate mechanisms. Overall, the diverse techniques provide valuable multifaceted insights, but integrating quantitative causal identification with extensive qualitative investigation could further enrich the empirical understanding of cultural and identity factors.

Table 8: Effects on Ethnicity and Culture

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Acosta (2022)	In democracies, marginalized identity groups resort to violence. In autocracies, large sidelined groups favor nonviolent demonstrations.	Exclusionary politics (exclusion of identity group from political system)	Use of violent vs nonviolent resistance by organizations	Over 500 resistance organizations worldwide	Logistic regression analysis; Case study of Lebanon	Revolutionary and Militant Organizations Dataset (author's original dataset)	1940-2014
Besley & Persson (2019)	Democratic values and institutions evolve jointly and interdependently. Values are slow-moving which creates institutional inertia without assumed commitment ability.	Share of citizens with democratic values	Democratic institutions (autocracy versus democracy)	50 countries	Linear probability models; Theoretical model	Polity IV (institutions); World Values Survey (values)	1800-2011
Donni et al. (2021)	Country-level emancipative values correlate with frequent nonviolent protests but not violent ones. Cultural values play a key role in nonviolent mobilization.	Annual country data on prevalence of values stressing autonomy, equality, and choice	Annual counts of nonviolent and violent protest events at the country level	105 countries worldwide	Dynamic negative binomial hidden Markov latent class model	Emancipative values scores from Brunkert (2019); protest data from Cross-National Time-Series Archive.	1971-2010
Hillesund & Østby (2022)	Ethnic inequalities heighten civil war risks with ambiguous ties to nonviolent conflicts. Historical inequalities impact varies on context for both conflict types.	Horizontal inequalities (political, economic) between ethnic groups	Violent conflict; Nonviolent conflict	Cross-national; Subnational; Individual level	Literature review; Logistic regressions; Heckman selection model; Differences-in-differences	Variety of datasets on conflict, inequality, ethnicity, etc. (UCDP, EPR, MAR, DHS surveys, etc.)	1900-2022

Koos (2014)	Ethnic rebellion increases the likelihood of deprived ethnic groups overcoming political deprivation.	Ethnic rebellion	Overcoming political deprivation (binary)	Politically deprived ethnic groups	Logistic regression with fixed effects	ETH Ethnic Power Relations dataset, ethnic conflict data	1946-2008
Nilsson & Svensson (2023)	Civil society protests enhance their role in peace talks. Yet, their dialogues do not achieve similar inclusive outcomes.	Protests: recent peace actions; Dialogue: 6-month talks with combatants	Inclusion: non-combatants in peace talks; Substantive: full roles in talks	Monthly gov-rebel dyads in Africa & Americas	Logistic regression models	NoWA dataset on peacemaking; UCDP data on conflict	1989-2018
Pinckney et al. (2022)	Greater participation of "quotidian" civil society organizations (e.g. unions, religious groups) in protest campaigns positively associated with democratization.	Civil Society Organizations; Nature of Resistance (Violent or Nonviolent)	Level of democracy 2-3 years after protest campaign	Analysis of protests & democracy in African nations.	Regression analysis	Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns (ARC) dataset	1990-2015
Pischedda (2020)	Nonviolent protest movements dominated by an ethnic group different than the state's dominant ethnic group are significantly less likely to succeed.	If the nonviolent protest ethnically distinct from the state's main group	Success of nonviolent protest movement	Global analysis of nonviolent protest movements	Logistic regression; competing risks models, with controls	NAVCO dataset with additional coding of "ethnic conflict" variable	1946-2006
Shaykhutdinov (2010)	Ethnic groups that rely on peaceful protest tactics like demonstrations are more likely to achieve territorial autonomy than groups using violence.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Creation of autonomy for regional ethnic communities	168 ethnic minority groups across 87 countries	Weibull and Cox regressions; SUR	Dataset from Minorities at Risk, enhanced with other sources. Territorial autonomy & protest tactics coded	1945-2000

3.5 Well-being

An emerging literature advocates for rigorously tested and evidence-based strategies to improve well-being in developing countries. However, researchers often assume that institutions cannot improve without external support and that the individuals in these countries do not act rationally (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). This demands a response that is both evidence-based and demonstrates the creativity and ingenuity of the people in poor countries, and their ability to generate solutions endogenously. Table 9 indicates that the studies largely agree that nonviolent resistance positively impacts well-being more than violent resistance. Stoddard (2013), Shay (2023), and Biglaiser et al. (2023) all find evidence that nonviolent tactics are associated with better health, life expectancy, and economic outcomes as opposed to violent tactics. Kent and Phan (2019) also show that adverse productivity shocks help explain economic declines during unrest periods. However, some divergences emerge in the relationship between dissent and government concessions. While Witte et al. (2020) find that life dissatisfaction fuels nonviolent but not violent dissent, Butcher and Pinckney (2022) uncover a counterintuitive negative relationship between protest size, mortality, and policy compromises in Muslim countries. Moyer (2023) also forecasts rising poverty due to continued conflict. Overall, the studies converge in suggesting nonviolent resistance improves well-being more than violent tactics, but mixed findings emerge on dissent-concession links and forecasted conflict impacts.

"Blessed are the peacemakers: The future burden of intrastate conflict on poverty" by Jonathan Moyer (2023) delves into the relationship between intrastate conflict and its implications for human development, particularly the impact on global poverty across various income thresholds. The study's main objective is to understand how many individuals will live in poverty due to intrastate civil conflict in 2030, 2050, and 2070. For this purpose, the author utilizes the International Futures model and shared socioeconomic pathways to forecast 12 scenarios across 179 countries.

The baseline conflict scenario predicts that an additional 148.2 million people (ranging from 50.7 million to 186.0 million) will live in extreme poverty (less than $1.90 per day) due to conflict by 2030. This is compared to a hypothetical scenario in which conflict is eliminated starting in 2022. This suggests that intrastate conflict has a meaningful and escalating impact on

global poverty levels, emphasizing the importance of peace initiatives for global development goals.

Shay (2023) examines the relationship between resistance methods (violent vs. nonviolent) and human rights abuse after resistance campaigns end. The author tests several hypotheses using data on resistance campaigns between 1945 and 2013. The key empirical findings are as follows. First, nonviolent campaigns are associated with greater disdain for political killings in the 5 years after the campaign ends versus violent campaigns, even when controlling for democratization. This holds in both linear regression and survival models, showing that nonviolence reduces the time until substantial human rights improvements occur. Second, mediation analyses suggest democratization only accounts for a minority of the effect of nonviolence on post-campaign repression. Most of the effect is direct, not mediated by democratization or subsequent outbreaks of violence. Overall, the results support the argument that violent resistance primes security forces to be more repressive in the future, while nonviolence helps countries avoid this 'repression trap'.

When assessing well-being and revolution, five distinct mechanisms are prominent 1.) Productivity shocks: Increased negative skewness of productivity shocks during periods of unrest explains a significant portion of declines in economic growth and investment. This suggests that unrest impacts well-being partly by disrupting productivity and output. 2.) Military spending: High continued military spending after violent campaigns hinders social investments, private spending, and well-being. Resistance shapes fiscal policies. 3.) Data loss: Conflicts can degrade data collection capabilities, complicating health evaluations. Revolutions disrupt information systems. 4.) Poverty traps: Violent conflict increases poverty, suggesting unrest disrupts development and causes lasting harm to well-being. 5.) Institutional change: Nonviolent campaigns improve human rights, even accounting for democratization, but democratization partially mediates. Resistance can spur positive institutional reforms. This list does not provide a comprehensive overview of the costs of violent conflict and the mechanisms that diminish well-being. Instead, it provides many reasons why revolutionaries should be cautious in selecting violent methods.

Sophisticated statistical methods like regression analysis, survival models, forecasting, and case-control studies are used to examine the well-being impacts of dissent. Key strengths include Shay's (2023) use of survival models to analyze time until human rights improvements and Moyer's (2023) leveraging a forecasting model to project future conflict burdens. Kent and Phan (2019) skillfully calibrate a business cycle model to match empirical moments during unrest. Witte et al.'s (2020) use an instrumental variable to causally show that suffering leads to civil resistance. Despite the specifics, the diverse techniques generally provide valuable multifaceted insights into dissent's impacts on health, economics, and human rights, despite limitations regarding causal claims and contextual analysis.

Table 9: Effects on Well-being

Citation	Findings	Independent Variable	Dependent Variable	Scope	Empirical Methods	Data	Year
Biglaiser et al. (2023)	Countries experiencing violent political unrest are more likely to receive sovereign bond downgrades compared to countries with non-violent unrest or no unrest.	Violent political unrest (vs non-violent unrest or no unrest)	Sovereign bond ratings from Moody's and S&P	Up to 60 developing countries	Linear regression with Driscoll-Kraay SE; Heckman selection; Mediation analysis	Moody's & S&P bond ratings; NAVCO; economic & political variables from World Bank, IMF, Polity	1996-2018
Butcher & Pinckney (2022)	Due to bandwagoning effects, larger protests do not always lead to more government concessions, especially on predictable days.	Size of protests	Likelihood of government concessions in	Protests in Muslim countries using	Two-stage instrumental variable; Two-stage least squares	NAVCO 3.0, MMAD, and Integrated Crisis Early Warning System	1990-2015

			response to protests	NAVCO & MMAD datasets			
Kent & Phan (2019)	Increases in negative skewness of productivity shocks during periods of unrest can explain a significant portion of declines in economic growth and investment.	Post-unrest shifts in productivity shock volatility and skewness.	Economic growth, investment	Calibration based on 84 unrest episodes in 154 countries	Real business cycle model, calibrated to match moments of data during unrest	NAVCO dataset; Economic data from World Bank World Development Indicators	1960-2006
Moyer (2023)	Conflict may push 148.2M into extreme poverty by 2030 and 164.9M by 2050. Without conflict, 6.9% will still be extremely poor in 2030, exceeding the 3% SDG target.	Intrastate conflict probability and scenarios, either continuing at baseline levels or eliminated	People in poverty at thresholds: <$1.90, <$3.20, <$5.50 per day	179 countries	Forecasting International Futures (IFs) model; Differences-in-means; OLS	IFs model forecasts with SSP scenarios; PovcalNet-initiated poverty data	2022-2070
Shay (2023)	Post-campaign (5-10 years), nonviolent resistances correlate with fewer political killings than violent ones, even accounting for democratization.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent)	Post-campaign (5-10 years) freedom from political killings via V-Dem	Campaigns in shifting autocracies to democracies	Cox proportional hazards models; Causal mediation analysis; Hierarchical linear models	NAVCO data on resistance; V-Dem data on political killings & regime type	1945-2013
Stoddard (2013)	Nonviolent campaigns lead to higher life expectancy growth than violent campaigns and world averages. Violent campaigns have a negative impact on life expectancy.	Tactics of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent); Success of Campaign	Predicted life expectancy at birth	NAVCO campaigns less than 2 years in duration	Linear regression; OLS	NAVCO data on campaigns; World Bank data on life expectancy	1975 to 2006
Waller (2020)	No significant correlation found between prevalence of various health conditions (independent variables) and the onset of conflict in a country (dependent variable).	254 health conditions rated by DALYs in the Global Disease Study	Conflict onset in a nation based on NAVCO database data	14 conflict onset countries; 42 matched peaceful nations	Matched case-control study using nonparametric Mann-Whitney statistical tests	Global Burden of Disease data on 254 health conditions; NAVCO data on conflict onset	1990-2000
Witte et al. (2020)	Life discontent spurs nonviolent, not violent, uprisings in any regime or development context. Rooted in unhappiness with living conditions and life's meaning.	Well-being metrics: % of people labeled "suffering" or "struggling" from life evaluation scores	Count of nonviolent uprisings: anti-government demonstrations and strikes	118 countries	Instrumental variable models; Panel data regressions, including fixed effects models	Subjective well-being data from Gallup; CNTS & MEC; controls from World Bank, Polity	2006-2014

4.   Discussion and Implications

This comparative analysis reveals that nonviolent revolutions tend to yield more positive institutional outcomes than violent revolutions across several domains. The evidence indicates that nonviolent campaigns are more likely to facilitate transitions from autocracy to democracy and improve qualities of democracy, such as civil liberties. Nonviolent movements also have better prospects for transforming security forces and judicial systems in rights-respecting, accountable directions than violent campaigns. In terms of well-being, nonviolent resistance is associated with higher life expectancy, while violence is associated with poverty and economic instability. However, complex relationships exist between protest tactics, foreign influence, identity exclusion, cultural values, and institutional impacts. While nonviolent resistance campaigns show consistent advantages, factors like access to political processes and major power relations mediate outcomes. Further parsing of contextual relationships is critical. Overall, this comparative analysis finds data showing that nonviolent revolutions transform institutions in more constructive directions than violent revolutions. However, gaps remain in understanding nuanced dynamics between dissent tactics, identities, and political contexts globally.

Turner (2023) is critical for understanding civil resistance about collective action problems. Through an empirical analysis of protests in authoritarian states from 2002-2013, the paper shows that many movements resulted in adverse overall outcomes when considering both gains and societal costs. This challenges assumptions that nonviolent struggle will inevitably lead to positive change. Notably, the prevalence of negative scores in the analysis indicates that civil resistance frequently comes with trade-offs and costs, even for seemingly successful movements. This has meaningful implications for economists studying the linkages between protest tactics, government responses, and economic development. The nuanced analysis of success, unintended consequences, and societal costs reveals critical dynamics economists must carefully consider when evaluating civil resistance and collective action problems. After finding positive impacts on

institutions, economists must account for the costs borne by individuals to create those impacts, weighing one against the other. This is essential for modeling the dynamic, uncertain, and complex game actors play when selecting resistance methods.

Only five studies out of sixty-five in our analysis showed positive institutional effects of violence, and those studies showed limited positive effects. Acosta (2022) finds that marginalized groups in democracies often turn to violence due to frustration over political exclusion, contrasting with repressed groups under autocracy that build large nonviolent movements. Kadivar and Ketchley (2018) use survival analysis to find that unarmed violence like riots and property destruction can promote political liberalization in autocracies without impacting democratization. Griffiths and Wasser (2018) argue that violent secessionist movements are not necessarily less successful than nonviolent ones in achieving territorial independence. Institutional tactics appear most important. Asal et al. (2014, 2019) show that violent ethnic groups and organizations receive more foreign state support than nonviolent ones, especially during the Cold War era. However, the overwhelming evidence presented in this paper suggests that violence is counterproductive. Additionally, most of these studies use simple logistic regression to demonstrate that violence is effective, and I highlight four papers (Condra et al. 2018; El-Mallakh 2020; Bethke and Pinckney 2019; Fetrati 2022) showing adverse effects of violence or positive effects of civil resistance using superior empirical strategies.

Nearly half of the studies in this comparative analysis rely on NAVCO data. Anisin's (2020) critique argues that widely used data on civil resistance campaigns is flawed, with improper conceptualization and cherry-picking that exaggerates nonviolent success. He proposes better-differentiating campaign methods and finds much lower success for strictly nonviolent campaigns compared to those using some unarmed violence. Responses (Onken et al. 2021) acknowledge partial validity in noting coding limitations but dispute Anisin's (2021) consistency and rationale in recoding data. They also challenge claims that minor protester violence aids success, citing mixed evidence. While acknowledging gaps, especially concerning unarmed violence, Chenoweth (2021) maintains that pragmatic nonviolent discipline is pivotal for leverage, defections, and campaign success. However, this debate raises serious challenges, especially concerning the beneficial use of unarmed violence and property destruction.

There are several additional avenues for research in this field. First, there is a need for more mixed methods studies on bottom-up resistance, emphasizing the economic benefits and costs of civil resistance. For example, no studies used rigorous empirical methods or time series data to compare civil resistance and violent methods and economic growth or GDP per capita. No papers have used the Economic Freedom of the World Index and NAVCO. There are no studies examining nonviolent versus violent resistance and property rights. Finally, the economics profession has given pride of place to causal inference through difference-in-differences studies, instrumental variable research, natural experiments, or controlled treatment studies. Few papers in civil resistance literature utilize these methods, although most have been reviewed in this comparative analysis.

The data indicates that nonviolent campaigns garner greater participation and boost post-transition democracy quality, suggesting that governments aiming to advance democracy abroad

have compelling reasons to assist disciplined nonviolent movements while refraining from providing aid to armed groups. However, findings examined say foreign state support is more likely given to violent groups despite their civilian harm and negative institutional results. This highlights realpolitik hurdles in aligning foreign policy with research insights and the desire to benefit the countries receiving support. By demonstrating nonviolence's strategic power, research can shape public discourse to pressure policymakers toward consistent democratic values in foreign affairs.

5.   Conclusion

This comparative analysis provides a comprehensive, empirical assessment of how violent versus nonviolent revolutions shape institutional outcomes across key domains, including democracy, security forces, foreign relations, ethnicity, culture, and well-being. The synthesis of sixty-five quantitative studies, overwhelmingly using global samples and advanced statistical techniques, reveals a predominant pattern - principled nonviolent resistance movements have more positive impacts on post-revolution institutions when juxtaposed with violent revolutions in the papers analyzed.

Across nearly all institutional outcome measures, from democratic quality to judicial independence, life expectancy, and human rights protections, nonviolent campaigns demonstrate decisive advantages relative to armed struggles in laying foundations for rights-respecting, accountable governance. Nonviolent action attracts broader participation, maintains moral authority domestically and internationally, reduces retaliation risks, and prevents the destruction inherent in armed conflict, facilitating democracy, rule of law, and development.

However, complex contextual relationships mediate these effects. Identity exclusion, cultural values, access to political processes, and major power alliances all intersect with dissent tactics in shaping institutional trajectories. Nonviolence is not a panacea oblivious to grievances, identities, or geopolitics. Nevertheless, its superiority emerges from avoiding violence's destruction while channeling cooperation.

This comparative analysis provides a rigorous, empirical confirmation of disciplined nonviolent action's strategic power for enabling social and political change. However, gaps remain, with qualitative field studies needed to capture resistance processes and impacts in context. Civil resistance research is far behind mainstream economics in using experiments to determine causality. Theorists must grapple with how ordinary citizens innovatively navigate collective action dilemmas using nonviolent means. Economists should leverage data to demonstrate nonviolence's economic advantages.

While highlighting strengths, one must avoid absolutist claims about universally optimal resistance strategies. This is particularly true when considering the benefits of violent tactics for minority groups whose ideas could not garner mainstream support and the strategic support of violence abroad to advance the interests of major powers. Nonviolent change relies on situated grassroots cooperation; not ideal solutions externally imposed. Citizens retain agency to tackle challenges creatively, informed by local knowledge. While vindicating nonviolent discipline's empirical edge, this synthesis should inspire further study of how people drive change through

values, ingenuity, and cooperation. The complex alchemy of nonviolent mobilization remains unfinished.

References

Absher, Samuel, Robin Grier, and Kevin Grier. 2023. "The Consequences of CIA-Sponsored Regime Change in Latin America." *European Journal of Political Economy*, September, 102452. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2023.102452.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91 (5): 1369–1401. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1369.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson, eds. 2005. "What Do We Know about Democracy?" In *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 48–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510809.004.

———. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*. New York: Crown.

Acosta, Benjamin. 2022. "Exclusionary Politics and Organized Resistance." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 34 (2): 341–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1701445.

Aidt, Toke S., and Raphaël Franck. 2019. "What Motivates an Oligarchic Elite to Democratize? Evidence from the Roll Call Vote on the Great Reform Act of 1832." *The Journal of Economic History* 79 (3): 773–825. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050719000342.

Anisin, Alexei. 2020. "Debunking the Myths Behind Nonviolent Civil Resistance." *Critical Sociology* 46 (7–8): 1121–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920520913982.

———. 2021. "Reinforcing Criticisms of Civil Resistance: A Response to Onken, Shemia-Goeke, and Martin." *Critical Sociology* 47 (7–8): 1205–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205211028279.

Asal, Victor, R. William Ayres, and Yuichi Kubota. 2019. "Friends in High Places: State Support for Violent and Non-Violent Ethnopolitical Organizations." *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 12 (3): 208–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1622027.

Asal, Victor, Justin Conrad, and Peter White. 2014. "Going Abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations." *International Organization* 68 (4): 945–78. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000228.

Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. 2011. *Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*. 1st ed. New York: PublicAffairs.

Bayer, Markus, Felix S. Bethke, and Daniel Lambach. 2016. "The Democratic Dividend of Nonviolent Resistance." *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (6): 758–71. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316658090.

Belgioioso, Margherita. 2018. "Going Underground: Resort to Terrorism in Mass Mobilization Dissident Campaigns." *Journal of Peace Research* 55 (5): 641–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318764795.

Belgioioso, Margherita, Jessica Di Salvatore, and Jonathan Pinckney. 2021. "Tangled up in Blue: The Effect of UN Peacekeeping on Nonviolent Protests in Post–Civil War Countries." *International Studies Quarterly* 65 (1): 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa015.

Bennett, Daniel L., Christian Bjørnskov, and Stephan F. Gohmann. 2021. "Coups, Regime Transitions, and Institutional Consequences." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 49 (2): 627–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2020.05.008.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2019. "Democratic Values and Institutions." *American Economic Review: Insights* 1 (1): 59–76. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20180248.

Bethke, Felix S. 2017. "Nonviolent Resistance and Peaceful Turnover of Power." *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy* 23 (4). https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2017-0022.

Bethke, Felix S, and Jonathan Pinckney. 2021. "Non-Violent Resistance and the Quality of Democracy." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38 (5): 503–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219855918.

Biglaiser, Glen, Hoon Lee, and Ronald J. McGauvran. 2023. "Domestic Political Unrest and Sovereign Bond Ratings in the Developing World." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, August, 00220027231195383. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231195383.

Braithwaite, Jessica Maves, and Charles Butcher. 2023. "Muddying the Waters: The Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns and the Failure of Ceasefires in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 67 (7–8): 1376–1404. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231159828.

Braithwaite, Jessica Maves, Joseph M. Cox, and Margaret Farry. 2022. "Tactics of Resistance and Post-Conflict Judicial Independence." *Journal of Peace Research* 59 (6): 779–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221076880.

Butcher, Charles, and Jonathan Pinckney. 2022. "Friday on My Mind: Re-Assessing the Impact of Protest Size on Government Concessions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66 (7–8): 1320–55. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221099887.

Celestino, Mauricio Rivera, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2013. "Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3): 385–400. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312469979.

Chenoweth, Erica. 2019. "NAVCO 1.1 Dataset." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/YLLHEE.

———. 2023. "The Role of Violence in Nonviolent Resistance." *Annual Review of Political Science* 26 (1): 55–77. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051421-124128.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham. 2013. "Understanding Nonviolent Resistance: An Introduction." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3): 271–76. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313480381.

Chenoweth, Erica, Cullen S. Hendrix, and Kyleanne Hunter. 2019. "Introducing the Nonviolent Action in Violent Contexts (NVAVC) Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (2): 295–305. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318804855.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Orion A. Lewis. 2013. "Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3): 415–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312471551.

———. 2019. "NAVCO 2.0 Dataset." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PLXAFY.

Chenoweth, Erica, Jonathan Pinckney, and Orion Lewis. 2018. "Days of Rage: Introducing the NAVCO 3.0 Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 55 (4): 524–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318759411.

———. 2019. "NAVCO 3.0 Dataset." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/INNYEO.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Kurt Schock. 2015. "Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns?*." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 20 (4): 427–51. https://doi.org/10.17813/1086-671X-20-4-427.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Christopher Wiley Shay. 2019a. "NAVCO 1.2 Dataset." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/0UZOTX.

———. 2019b. "NAVCO 2.1 Dataset." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MHOXDV.

———. 2020. "List of Campaigns in NAVCO 1.3." Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ON9XND.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chin, John, Wonjun Song, and Joseph Wright. 2023. "Personalization of Power and Mass Uprisings in Dictatorships." *British Journal of Political Science* 53 (1): 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000114.

Condra, Luke N., James D. Long, Andrew C. Shaver, and Austin L. Wright. 2018. "The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence." *American Economic Review* 108 (11): 3199–3231. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170416.

Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, and Tanja Eschenauer. 2018. "Mass Protests and the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 29 (3): 141–55. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0051.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2023. "Choosing Tactics: The Efficacy of Violence and Nonviolence in Self-Determination Disputes." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (1): 124–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221145961.

Curtice, Travis B., and Daniel Arnon. 2020. "Deterring Threats and Settling Scores: How Coups Influence Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37 (6): 655–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219843240.

Dahl, Marianne, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2023. "Clouds with Silver Linings: How Mobilization Shapes the Impact of Coups on Democratization." *European Journal of International Relations*, January, 135406612211432. https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661221143213.

Dahlum, Sirianne. 2023. "Joining Forces: Social Coalitions and Democratic Revolutions." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (1): 42–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221138614.

Davenport, Christian, and Benjamin J. Appel. 2022. "Stopping State Repression: An Examination of Spells." *Journal of Peace Research* 59 (5): 633–47. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221078181.

Davenport, Christian, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Hanne Fjelde, and David Armstrong. 2019. "The Consequences of Contention: Understanding the Aftereffects of Political Conflict and

Violence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22 (1): 361–77.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-064057.

Davis, L. E., Douglass C. North, and Calla Smorodin. 1971. *Institutional Change and American Economic Growth*. CUP Archive.

Day, Joel, Jonathan Pinckney, and Erica Chenoweth. 2015. "Collecting Data on Nonviolent Action: Lessons Learned and Ways Forward." *Journal of Peace Research* 52 (1): 129–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314533985.

Easterly, William. 2013. *The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor*. New York: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Book Group.

Edwards, Pearce. 2021. "The Politics of Nonviolent Mobilization: Campaigns, Competition, and Social Movement Resources." *Journal of Peace Research* 58 (5): 945–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320958456.

El-Mallakh, Nelly. 2020. "How Do Protests Affect Electoral Choices? Evidence from Egypt." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 179 (November): 299–322. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.005.

Fetrati, Jalal. 2023. "Non-Violent Resistance Movements and Substantive Democracy." *Democratization* 30 (3): 378–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2022.2148159.

Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Mauricio Rivera. 2017. "The Diffusion of Nonviolent Campaigns." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (5): 1120–45. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715603101.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Roman-Gabriel Olar, and Marius Radean. 2023. "Going, Going, Gone? Varieties of Dissent and Leader Exit." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (5): 729–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221092813.

Greif, Avner. 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition." *The American Economic Review* 83 (3): 525–48.

Griffiths, Ryan D., and Louis M. Wasser. 2019. "Does Violent Secessionism Work?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (5): 1310–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718783032.

Haber, Stephen H., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 2008. *Political Institutions and Financial Development*. Stanford University Press.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski. 2018. "Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions." *British Journal of Political Science* 48 (2): 459–88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712341600020X.

Haggard, Stephan, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede. 2008. "The Rule of Law and Economic Development." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 205–34. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.081205.100244.

Hellmeier, Sebastian, and Michael Bernhard. 2022. "Mass Mobilization and Regime Change. Evidence From a New Measure of Mobilization for Democracy and Autocracy From 1900 to 2020." *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4019439.

———. 2023. "Regime Transformation From Below: Mobilization for Democracy and Autocracy From 1900 to 2021." *Comparative Political Studies* 56 (12): 1858–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231152793.

Hillesund, Solveig, and Gudrun Østby. 2022. "Horizontal Inequalities, Political Violence, and Nonviolent Conflict Mobilization: A Review of the Literature." *Journal of Economic Surveys*, November, joes.12539. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12539.

Ives, Brandon. 2022. "Trickledown Politics: Do Excluded Ethnic Groups Benefit from Non-Violent National Resistance Campaigns?" *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39 (6): 661–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211045936.

Johnson, Jaclyn, and Clayton L. Thyne. 2018. "Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty: How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1951–2005." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (3): 597–625. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716654742.

Kadivar, Mohammad Ali. 2018. "Mass Mobilization and the Durability of New Democracies." *American Sociological Review* 83 (2): 390–417. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122418759546.

Kadivar, Mohammad Ali, and Neil Ketchley. 2018. "Sticks, Stones, and Molotov Cocktails: Unarmed Collective Violence and Democratization." *Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World* 4 (January): 237802311877361. https://doi.org/10.1177/2378023118773614.

Kalin, Ilker, Marie Olson Lounsbery, and Frederic Pearson. 2022. "Major Power Politics and Non-Violent Resistance Movements." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39 (3): 241–65. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211062495.

Kent, Lance, and Toan Phan. 2013. "Business Cycles with Revolutions." *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2347318.

Kim, Nam Kyu. 2017. "Anti-Regime Uprisings and the Emergence of Electoral Authoritarianism." *Political Research Quarterly* 70 (1): 111–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916675739.

Kim, Nam Kyu, and Alex M. Kroeger. 2019. "Conquering and Coercing: Nonviolent Anti-Regime Protests and the Pathways to Democracy." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (5): 650–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319830267.

Koos, Carlo. 2016. "Does Violence Pay? The Effect of Ethnic Rebellion on Overcoming Political Deprivation." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33 (1): 3–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214559670.

Lewis, Janet I. 2023. "Rebel Group Formation in Africa: Evidence from a New Dataset." *World Development* 170 (October): 106207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106207.

Li Donni, Paolo, Maria Marino, and Christian Welzel. 2021. "How Important Is Culture to Understand Political Protest?" *World Development* 148 (December): 105661. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105661.

Lupu, Yonatan, and Geoffrey P. R. Wallace. 2019. "Violence, Nonviolence, and the Effects of International Human Rights Law." *American Journal of Political Science* 63 (2): 411–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12416.

Marino, Maria, Paolo Li Donni, Sebastiano Bavetta, and Marco Cellini. 2020. "The Democratization Process: An Empirical Appraisal of the Role of Political Protest." *European Journal of Political Economy* 63 (June): 101881. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101881.

Messick, Richard E. 1999. "Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues." *The World Bank Research Observer* 14 (1): 117–36. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/14.1.117.

Moyer, Jonathan D. 2023. "Blessed Are the Peacemakers: The Future Burden of Intrastate Conflict on Poverty." *World Development* 165 (May): 106188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106188.

Muñoz, Jordi, and Eva Anduiza. 2019. "'If a Fight Starts, Watch the Crowd': The Effect of Violence on Popular Support for Social Movements." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (4): 485–98. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318820575.

Nilsson, Desirée, and Isak Svensson. 2023. "Pushing the Doors Open: Nonviolent Action and Inclusion in Peace Negotiations." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (1): 58–72. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221141468.

North, Douglass C. 1974. "Beyond the New Economic History." *The Journal of Economic History* 34 (1): 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700079596.

———. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.

———. 2005. *Understanding the Process of Economic Change:* Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829484.

———. 2009. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge ; Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C., and Robert Paul Thomas. 1973. *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*. Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, Steven Benjamin Webb, and Barry R. Weingast. 2013. *In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problem of Development*. Cambridge: University Press.

Onken, Monika, Dalilah Shemia-Goeke, and Brian Martin. 2021. "Learning from Criticisms of Civil Resistance." *Critical Sociology* 47 (7–8): 1191–1203. https://doi.org/10.1177/08969205211025819.

O'Reilly, Colin. 2021. "Violent Conflict and Institutional Change." *Economics of Transition and Institutional Change* 29 (2): 257–317. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12269.

Pinckney, Jonathan, Charles Butcher, and Jessica Maves Braithwaite. 2022. "Organizations, Resistance, and Democracy: How Civil Society Organizations Impact Democratization." *International Studies Quarterly* 66 (1): sqab094. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab094.

Pinckney, Jonathan C. 2020. *From Dissent to Democracy: The Promise and Perils of Civil Resistance Transitions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pischedda, Costantino. 2020. "Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Nonviolent Resistance." *Security Studies* 29 (2): 362–91. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1722854.

Porta, Rafael La, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins." *Journal of Economic Literature* 46 (2): 285–332. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.46.2.285.

Rasler, Karen, William R. Thompson, and Hicham Bou Nassif. 2022. "The Extent of Military Involvement in Nonviolent, Civilian Revolts and Their Aftermath." In *Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century*, 739–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86468-2_29.

Rivera-Batiz, Francisco L. 2002. "Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence." *Review of Development Economics* 6 (2): 225–47. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9361.00151.

Ryckman, Kirssa Cline. 2016. "Ratification as Accommodation? Domestic Dissent and Human Rights Treaties." *Journal of Peace Research* 53 (4): 582–96. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316630038.

Sato, Yuko, and Michael Wahman. 2019. "Elite Coordination and Popular Protest: The Joint Effect on Democratic Change." *Democratization* 26 (8): 1419–38. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1645127.

Sharp, Gene. 1973. *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. Extending Horizons Books. Boston: Sargent.

———. 2012. *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shay, Christopher Wiley. 2023. "Swords into Ploughshares? Why Human Rights Abuses Persist after Resistance Campaigns." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (1): 141–56. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221140432.

Shaykhutdinov, Renat. 2010. "Give Peace a Chance: Nonviolent Protest and the Creation of Territorial Autonomy Arrangements." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (2): 179–91. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309353109.

Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. 2008. "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict." *International Security* 33 (1): 7–44. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.7.

Stoddard, Judith. 2013 "How Do Major, Violent and Nonviolent Opposition Campaigns, Impact Predicted Life Expectancy at Birth?" *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 2 (2): 37. https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bx.

Svensson, Isak, Daniel Finnbogason, Dino Krause, Luís Martínez Lorenzo, and Nanar Hawach. 2022. "Civil Resistance Against Jihadists: Why Is It Successful?" In *Confronting the Caliphate*, by Isak Svensson, Daniel Finnbogason, Dino Krause, Luís Martínez Lorenzo, and Nanar Hawach, 1st ed., 150-C6.P94. Oxford University PressNew York. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197605608.003.0006.

Turner, Kimberly. 2023. "A Win or a Flop? Measuring Mass Protest Successfulness in Authoritarian Settings." *Journal of Peace Research* 60 (1): 107–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221140434.

Waller, Stephen G. 2020. "Do Health Programs Reduce Conflict and Violence? A Case-Control Study." Preprint. In Review. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-28184/v1.

Witte, Caroline T., Martijn J. Burger, and Elena Ianchovichina. 2020. "Subjective Well-Being and Peaceful Uprisings." *Kyklos* 73 (1): 120–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12219.

Wittels, Stephen. 2017. "The Virtues of Nonviolent Struggle." *SSRN Electronic Journal*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2981936.