



Assessment of Critical Infrastructure with No Grid Power

Healthcare Sector

Stephen Chill

Foundation for Infrastructure Resilience

Legal Disclaimer: The Foundation for Infrastructure Resilience makes no representations or warranties of any kind, whether express, implied, statutory or otherwise regarding the content of this document, third party content or references to services or information referenced or available through links herein, and further disclaims all warranties regarding any information contained herein, including any implied or express warranties of merchantability, satisfactory quality, fitness for a particular purpose, non-infringement, or quiet enjoyment, arising out of any course of dealing or usage of trade, that the third-party service will be uninterrupted, error free or free of harmful components.

**© 2024 Foundation for Infrastructure Resilience
All Rights Reserved**

Introduction

“There is a lack of understanding of the cascading, cross-sector interdependencies between infrastructure and what that means for prioritizing backup generation and other limited resources to maintain services and functions during a long-term, widespread outage.”- The President’s National Infrastructure Council

The purpose of this paper is to assess the Critical Infrastructure (CI) Sectors’ “timeframe to failure” in a Black Sky Event (BSE-nationwide or near nationwide grid power outage lasting 30 days) to assist in the understanding of cascading and cross-sector interdependencies in a BSE. This paper demonstrates the fundamental need for a resilient electric grid as none of the fifteen other critical infrastructures can continue to fully function without electricity from the grid. Most fail completely. A small number of CI elements (not the majority of any CI) may continue to function at an insufficient level using on-site natural gas generation, solar, wind, or other sources. This paper demonstrates that all CI rely on the grid.

This paper benefits leaders and planners involved with resilience and continuity of operations for each CI sector or CI element. The Energy Sector is not analyzed as this paper focuses on the impact to the other fifteen sectors by the loss of the grid. Elements of the Energy Sector not contained in the grid are addressed in specific CI (e.g. gas for automobiles is in the Transportation CI).

“Critical infrastructures are those infrastructure systems and assets that are so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, the economy, public health, public safety, or any combination thereof.” (DHS, CISA).

“CI in a BSE” has been poorly analyzed which contributes to current plans and organizations being “overmatched” by a BSE.¹ There are occasionally “bright spots” of planning and preparation in each CI; however, most plans are dated or insufficient.^{2 3}

The analysis of CI “time to failure” in a BSE has largely been ignored despite the key role time plays in a disaster. Every CI fails without power, the question addressed is “When?”. For example, most of the IT Sector likely fails immediately without electricity but the Dams Sector will likely continue to function.

¹ The Presidents National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Surviving a Catastrophic Power Outage; How to Strengthen the capabilities of the Nation, Dec 2018

² Ibid

³ DHS/CISA, Critical Infrastructure Sectors (plans are located in each sector), <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors>

The need for each CI is also based on time. For example, a healthy human can live for weeks without food, but only for days without water⁴ thereby making the Water/Wastewater Sector more BSE time-critical than the Food/Agriculture Sector. Every CI is needed, but an analysis focused on time is required to conduct resilience planning.

“Current planning frameworks focus on sector-by-sector preparedness and response, but in a catastrophic power outage, U.S. infrastructure and services will fail as a system. We need to take a systems approach—from the federal level down to the local level—to plan, design, and respond to these never-before-experienced events. This approach must move beyond existing planning and response frameworks and provide the guidance needed for an integrated cross-sector, cross-government strategy.”- The President’s National Infrastructure Council

Sector Analysis

In order to analyze CI timeframes, one must define the CI, deconstruct each CI into its elements (subsectors), and determine supporting infrastructures. This paper therefore defines/describes each CI with their sub and supporting elements. “Time to failure” is then portrayed and assessed. Understanding the timelines of CI failure in a BSE will assist in BSE (and other disaster) planning.

Failure means the majority of that sector or subsector is unable to perform the majority of its function. Consideration is given to the capability of sector specific backup power.


Subsectors are the main elements of the CI that, if failing, would cause the CI to fail. Assessed subsector timelines to failure are at the top of each timeline diagram (see below). Subsector elements assessed failure timelines may be used to plan sector resilience/continuity. If there is no plan to address CI subsectors, the sector will likely fail in a BSE.

Supporting CI (the bottom half of each diagram) shows the assessed failure times of supporting CI. Supporting CI are required for a given CI to function. The impact of the loss of supporting CI is not necessarily felt right away. For example, most water treatment systems have stocks of chemicals on-hand, so the immediate failure of the Chemical Sector will impact water treatment only when stored stocks are depleted and no more chemicals are coming from factories. If unaddressed, supporting CI will cause the given CI to fail anywhere from seconds to weeks (not depicted).

Diagram Example: The Chemical Sector Diagram is depicted below. The Chemical Sector subsectors are chemical plants and chemical stocks (located on the top with arrows depicting assessed BSE failure timelines). The Chemical Sector supporting CI are located on the bottom

⁴ FEMA, FEMA NATIONAL US&R RESPONSE SYSTEM STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE TECHNICIAN ,
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/usr/appen_b.pdf

with their own assessed failure timelines (note that supporting CI will not necessarily cause the Chemical CI to fail in the same “failure time”).



Communications, Energy, Financial Services, and IT are required for the administration of most CI. This includes (and is not limited to) financial transactions for supplies/raw materials, pay for employees, supply chain efforts, and the ability to effectively coordinate and execute operations. These CI are important for CI survival while other CI (e.g., Water) are more important for human survival. As humans are a required element of each CI, food and water become Supporting CI for all other CI.

Sectors are identified as local, regional, or national to assist in assigning planning responsibility. For example, if a CI is national, national planning should occur as well as regional and local planning. If it is local, then local planning is required. For example, wastewater treatment plants require local planning as there is no national wastewater system while the Finance CI requires a national plan.

A brief impact statement for the failure of each CI is included as is a brief recommendation for each CI based on the failure timeline.

Additional Considerations

In addition, the following entities are important in analyzing the impact timelines of BSE in the US (these are not official Critical Infrastructures):

- **People:** People are an element of all CI, and their survival needs to be considered within each CI. For example, a water treatment plant may want to have its personnel and families live at the treatment plant in a BSE (some have planned for this). Much of

“power out” planning focuses on human survival vs CI survival. Humans can generally survive for 3 days without water or 3 weeks without food.⁵ As people are an element of each CI, there is a first order need for food and water in each CI. Family concerns and widespread societal panic that could lead to desperate behavior, to include looting, rioting and violence, may keep people away from their CI posts (exacerbating CI failure). CI personnel may have old, sick (to include medicated), and very young dependents that have more pressing needs earlier in a BSE. Shelter may be a necessity. Many books and recommendations for family preparedness have been published (to include by FEMA⁶) but it is improbable that preparedness of CI individuals and families can be accurately determined (until an actual emergency occurs). In addition, it is unclear how many CI workers will show up to work without some form of compensation (finance).

- Fuel: Fuel is not a CI, but elements of the fuel system are included in several CI. Transportation includes rail, barge/ship, and truck transportation for fuels. Many CI and individuals have backup generation, but the lack of fuel will restrict their usage. If gas stations and bulk fuel distributors are not functioning, then all CI that depends on backup generation will not have (or run out of) the fuel required to function (Commercial facilities, communications (for credit cards) and finance generally are required for the normal function of gas stations.⁷). Previous power outages have shown that gas for automobiles/trucks and generators is generally unavailable.⁸ This problem remains.⁹ Superstorm Sandy demonstrated the need for backup power, especially for the fuel industry.
- Backup generation: Many CI have elements that have backup generation. If CI have backup generation, then their “time to failure” is extended. If CI have fuel storage for their backup generation, then their “time to failure” is further extended. There are no CI that have full backup generation for all elements. Some CI have sufficient backup power to last hours and days, but no CI has sufficient backup power to last weeks (due to lack of on hand fuel). A CI plan that relies on continuous fuel resupply for backup generation is assessed as unlikely (due to the failure of CI that are required for continuous

⁵ FEMA, FEMA NATIONAL US&R RESPONSE SYSTEM STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE TECHNICIAN , https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/usr/appen_b.pdf

⁶ FEMA, Build a Kit, <https://www.ready.gov/kit>

⁷ FEMA, Power Outage, Keep Vehicles Fueled, <https://community.fema.gov/ProtectiveActions/s/article/Power-Outage-Keep-Vehicles-Fueled#:~:text=%E2%80%9CKeep%20your%20car%20fuel%20tank,Several%20Minutes%20or%20Several%20Days>

⁸ FEMA, Power Outage, <https://community.fema.gov/ProtectiveActions/s/article/Power-Outage-Keep-Vehicles-Fueled>

⁹ The Presidents National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Surviving a Catastrophic Power Outage; How to Strengthen the capabilities of the Nation, Dec 2018, page 30 https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIAC%2520Catastrophic%2520Power%2520Outage%2520Study_FINAL.pdf

resupply). In addition, Superstorm Sandy showed that backup generators require significant maintenance when in constant use.¹⁰

- **Military:** The Military role in a BSE is governed by the same processes and procedures that apply to hurricanes and other natural disasters.¹¹ In sum, the US Military relies on other local/state/federal organizations for the welfare of its personnel and families that live off-installation (approximately 70 percent¹² of its force). In modern times, the military has not responded to community needs until a DSCA (Defense Support of Civilian Authorities) request is approved.¹³ Certain commanders do have the ability to respond to emergencies without DSCA approvals.¹⁴ There is currently no published military plan that addresses a BSE despite the severe impact it would have on military personnel and the infrastructure required to support military bases.
- **Governance:** As with the Military, continuity plans that address governance are inadequate for a BSE. Some agencies will have a skeletal capability to function, but the ability to support the population with required governance in a BSE is deficient.^{15 16}

Recommendations

Plan for a BSE. Subsector elements and supporting CI may be used to organize planning for sector resilience (see Food/Ag Sector for example). If there is no plan to address subsector elements or supporting CI, the sector will fail in a BSE.

There is a lack of redundancy throughout CI (e.g., each household taps into one water system and if that system fails to produce, there is no alternate system). Increasing sector redundancy while eliminating single points of failure will increase CI resilience.

¹⁰P CISA, Resilient Power Best Practices

for Critical Facilities and Sites with Guidelines, Analysis, Background Material, and References 61,
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/CISA_Resilient_Power_Best_Practices_for_Critical_Facilities_and_Sites_508c.pdf

¹¹ Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Defense Support of Civil Authorities,
<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11324#:~:text=Courts%20have%20generally%20construed%20this,and%20criteria%20for%20handling%20requests>.

¹² US Dept of Housing and Urban Development, Community Housing Impacts of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, p 1, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/insight_3.pdf

¹³ DODD 3025.18, Defense Support to Civil Authorities,
<https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/302518p.pdf>

¹⁴ Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Defense Support of Civil Authorities,
<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11324#:~:text=Courts%20have%20generally%20construed%20this,and%20criteria%20for%20handling%20requests>.

¹⁵ The Presidents National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Surviving a Catastrophic Power Outage; How to Strengthen the capabilities of the Nation, Dec 2018, page 10
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIAC%2520Catastrophic%2520Power%2520Outage%2520Study_FINAL.pdf

¹⁶ DHS/CISA, Critical Infrastructure Sectors (plans are located in each sector), <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors>

CI are most often considered individually instead of as “strands” of mutually supporting CI. National, state, and local planning should prepare using a “mutually supporting CI” approach.

Explore increasing natural gas generation and solar generation that does not rely on the grid or grid power (based on CI requirements).

Summary Table

The following table summarizes the assessed general failure times for each CI without power. The United States Government published an Energy Sector Specific Plan (SSP) that includes wording stating that each sector is reliant on energy/electricity.¹⁷ While the reliance on electricity was clearly stated, the timeline to failure was not. This table summarizes the assessed “times to failure” based on the more detailed CI analysis contained herein. These failure summaries are assessed for the majority of the CI (every sector will have some well-prepared entities).

Critical Infrastructure (CI)	Failure Within Seconds	Failure Within Minutes/hours	Failure Within Days	Limited Failure
Chemical				
Commercial Facilities				
Communications				
Critical Manufacturing				
Dams				
Defense Industrial Base				
Emergency Services				
Energy				
Financial Services				
Food and Agriculture				
Government Facilities				
Healthcare				
Information Technology				
Nuclear				
Transportation				
Water and Wastewater				

¹⁷ FEMA, DHS, Energy Sector Specific Plan, p 19, <https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-energy-2015-508.pdf>

Notes:

“The NIPP [National Infrastructure Protection Plan] 2013 identifies lifeline functions— water, transportation systems, communications, and energy—as services and resources that are essential to the operations of most critical infrastructure partners and communities.”¹⁸

Most Sector Strategic Plans contain a section describing sector dependencies. These provide the bulk of the sector interdependencies discussed in this paper.


The Financial Services Sector is normally ignored in most Sectors. This paper includes Financial Services in each CI as a “Supporting CI” (except Emergency Services). All CI include personnel who require paychecks (Assumption: Most ES personnel will report for duty without pay...for a period of time). All CI require the ability to pay bills, invoices and conduct other purchase/sell transactions. Required payments don’t become free in a power outage.

No backup effort is considered effective unless it has been planned for and at least partially rehearsed. For example, a food warehouse that relies on IT to receive invoices is not considered functional by simply stating that warehouses can use paper invoices and manual accounting; they have to plan and rehearse this option for it to be viable.

¹⁸ DHS, Chemical Sector Specific Plan, 2015, p 5, <https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-chemical-2015-508.pdf>

Healthcare (sometimes referred to as Healthcare and Public Health (HPH))

Define/Describe CI: “The HPH Sector provides goods and services integral to maintaining local, national, and global health security.”¹⁹ “The HPH Sector is large, diverse, and open, spanning both the public and private sectors. It includes publicly accessible healthcare facilities, research centers, suppliers, manufacturers, and other physical assets and vast, complex public-private information technology systems required for care delivery and to support the rapid, secure transmission and storage of large amounts of HPH data. Access to healthcare is critical in maintaining national health security...”²⁰ The HPH SSP is one of the few that discusses EMP impact: “In particular, the Nation’s power grid is at risk of being damaged or rendered ineffective by the effects of an EMP—a sudden burst of electromagnetic radiation (pulse) resulting from a natural or manmade event...Depending on the impact area, an EMP event could be catastrophic for healthcare facilities, causing long-term power outages that may overwhelm the Sector’s backup power sources.”²¹



Failure timeline: (subsectors sourced from HPH SSP) Many aspects of the HPH sector will fail in seconds in a BSE. Other aspects of HPH will have a robust capability for hours as services are gradually curtailed.²² Facilities will remain, but without power they will become less useful. Doctors and nurses can perform their duties “manually”, but without modern facilities and equipment, their capability will be vastly reduced (if they continue to work at all). It is unclear

¹⁹ DHS/CISA, Healthcare SSP, 2016, p 3, <https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-healthcare-public-health-2015-508.pdf>

²⁰ Ibid, p 4

²¹ Ibid, p 10

²² DHS/CISA, Healthcare SSP, 2016, p 12, <https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-healthcare-public-health-2015-508.pdf>

how many hospitals have planned to function for 30 days or more without electricity. Many standards reference a need for up to 96 hours of backup power.²³ Pharmaceuticals will run out over time as supply chains are disrupted (adding more patients).²⁴ A lack of clean drinking water for the entire population will cause mass casualties, adding to healthcare burdens.

Describe CI Interdependencies (first order interdependencies that, if failing, will cause (at varying times) the HPH sector to fail). HPH facilities often reside in Commercial Facilities. HPH, as a whole, have better procedures for power outages than most CI.

- Communications, Energy, Financial Services, and IT are required for the administration of all CI. This includes (and is not limited to) financial transactions for supplies/raw materials, pay for employees, supply chain efforts, and the ability to effectively coordinate and execute operations. Electronic patient records may be unavailable. Food/Ag and Water are required to maintain the human element of each CI.
- Emergency Services: ES is a personnel heavy infrastructure. Without pay (financial services) personnel will have to work voluntarily. Voluntary ES (similar to voluntary HPH) personnel may maintain some ES functionality.
- Transportation: Transportation is required to move personnel to and from HPH.
- Water and Wastewater (WW): Fresh water and wastewater support is required at HPH facilities as well as for the entire population. Bad drinking water will cause mass casualties, overwhelming an already taxed BSE HPH sector.

Sort into local or regional or National entities Most of the HPH sector is local. Access to supplies (e.g., medications, medical supplies) may be regionally or nationally sourced.

Impact of this CI with no power (to CI and to society) “About 60% of adults aged 18 and over reported taking at least one prescription medication in 2021, with 36% reporting taking three or more.”²⁵ Without a functioning HPH sector, these medications will run out (some faster than others). “Every year in the United States, there are about 36 million hospital stays.”²⁶ This equates to approximately ten percent of the US population. The lack of medications and hospital care will cause mass deaths, even without considering disease, lack of clean water, food, and violence (all of which will tax the HPH Sector in a BSE).

Conclusion

- **Summary:** Assessment: The HPH sector has a robust short-term capability in a BSE (hours) but as time passes, generator fuel and other support will run out. The healthcare sector is massive and impacts much of the US society on a regular basis. Voluntary healthcare efforts may succeed in the short term, but mass casualties should be

²³ Mackey, P, Hospital Emergency Power Supply Systems, 2022 <https://www.csemag.com/articles/hospital-emergency-power-supply-systems/>

²⁴ DHS/CISA, Healthcare SSP, 2016, p 9, <https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nipp-ssp-healthcare-public-health-2015-508.pdf>

²⁵ Mykyta and Cohen, NCHS, Characteristics of Adults Aged 18–64 Who Did Not Take Medication as Prescribed to Reduce Costs: United States, 2021, June 2023, <https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db470.pdf>

²⁶ OASH, HHS, Hospital and Emergency Services, <https://health.gov/healthypeople/objectives-and-data/browse-objectives/hospital-and-emergency-services#:~:text=Every%20year%20in%20the%20United,about%2036%20million%20hospital%20stays.>

anticipated after weeks in a BSE. The HPH sector will not be able to adequately support a BSE.

- **Point towards broad solutions:** The HPH sector has accomplished some level of BSE planning as power outages have been a threat to HPH for decades. The plans are simply not robust enough to deal with a BSE. HPH should increase capability to a BSE level. The Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense produced an analysis of CI response to a biological attack that can be useful in HPH planning for BSE.²⁷

²⁷ Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense. (2021). Insidious Scourge: Critical Infrastructure at Biological Risk, <https://biodefensecommission.org/reports/insidious-scurge-critical-infrastructure-at-biological-risk/>