

Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland

Safety and Security Plan

Iraq Country Office

2019

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1. INTRODUCTION

These Regulations are applicable to all ASB staff, volunteers, and visitors. By signing their copy of the Regulations, each signatory gives a formal acknowledgement that they have understood them, and commits to abide by them.

The Country Representative, Randala Noureddine has the ultimate responsibility for security in the agency.

2. PURPOSE

This plan has a definitive purpose to decrease ASB vulnerabilities and increase capacities of the staff so that we are able to face and reduce threats and risks. This plan is designed to be a roadmap with specific parameters and measures that helps ASB Iraq staff to have an effective and timely response without jeopardizing our vision, security of staff and beneficiaries.

3. APPLICATION

These Regulations are applicable to all staff, local staff during work hours, volunteers, consultants and any personnel operating under the ASB-Iraq umbrella in the operational governorates (KRI- Baghdad-Anbar). ASB Personnel hosting visitors are responsible for ensuring any visitors to the operational area abide by these Regulations. This security plan does not repeat generic Security Policy and its relevant SOPs.

Every member of the team has a responsibility to promote security, and is required to follow all measures and procedures contained in this security plan. Failure to do so could endanger life, and is a disciplinary offence.

The person overall in charge of security is the Country Representative (CR). Other staff with security-related responsibilities are ASBs MENA Desk Officer.

By signing their copy of these regulations, each signatory gives a formal acknowledgement that they have understood them, and commits to abide by them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have received ASB Security Plan which I have read and understood,

NAME: _____

SIGNED: _____

DATE: _____

4. KEY SECURITY AND EMERGENCY CONTACTS

4.1. Primary Contact in case of medical emergency: Country Representative (CR)

Name: Nouredine, Randala
 E-mail: countryrep@asb-me.org
 Mobile: [+964](tel:+964) (0) 750 862 13 75
 Skype: rindala46

4.2. Secondary contact in case of emergency: Acting Country Representative (ACR)

Secondary contact in case of emergency:
 Name: Mehner, Marko
 Position: Admin/Financial Manager
 E-mail: manageradminfinance@asb-me.org
 Mobile: +964 (0) 7502175874
 Skype: markomehner2305

4.3. Secondary contact in case of emergency and for evacuation: MENA Desk Officer

Name: Rosi Gallinger
 E-mail: r.gallinger@asb.de
 Mobile: +49 (0) 1722866533
 Skype: [rosi.asb@outlook.de](skype:rosi.asb@outlook.de)

4.4. Security Focal point in case of Emergency: (SFP)

Name: Sameer M. Sadeeq
 E-mail: officeradminfinance@asb-me.org
 Mobile: +964 (0) 752 762 5907
 Skype: live:officeradminfinance

5. OTHER IMPORTANT CONTACTS

Contact	Phone
Security of Erbil	222 5183 - 222 0230
Emergency Police	104 - 124 - 134 - 144
The General Traffic Police Directorate	223 0292
Fire Station	066115 – 125115 -- 115
Ambulance	122
Red Crescent	Tracing Dept : 009647706740086

6. NEAREST HOSPITAL(S)

Governorate	Town/ city	Name	address	Phone	GPS
Erbil	Erbil	Rojhalat Emergency Hospital	Eastern (Rojhalat) Road 100M	+964(0)662273883	36.192041, 44.040153
Duhok	Duhok	Private Shilan Hospital Specialty	KRO- Qazi Mohammed Street	+964(0)7504577788	36.866603, 42.980742
Duhok	Zakho	General Hospital Public	Kebat Quarter Zakho	+964(0)6627331707	37.145602, 42.646817
Nineveh	Mosul	Mosul General Hospital	Hay wadi hajjar	+964(0)7701743523	36.323047, 43.123662
Nineveh	Sinjar	General Hospital Sinjar	Sinjar center	+964(0)7701667071	36.322577, 41.852492
Nineveh	Talafar	Telafer General Hospital	Near governmental registration Building		36.362410, 42.403897
Baghdad	Baghdad	Baghdad teaching hospital	Bab Al moutham Baghdad Medical City		33.345142, 44.378446
Salaheddine	Tikrit	Salaheddine general Hospital	Qadisia street	+964(0)7709504478	34.651220, 43.671675
Anbar	Heet	Heet General Hospital	Near Siddiqi Mosque		33.636614, 42.838976
Anbar	Haditha	Haditha General Hospital	Near AlRachid bank		34.138237, 42.371338
Anbar	Al Rutba	Al Rutba General Hospital	Rutba road		33.047717, 40.270173

7. EMERGENCY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (ESMC)

ASB's, an Emergency and Security Management Committee whose central team is in the Duhok office and represented by personnel in the different field offices. The Team is permanently in contact and meets once a month. It also has members specialized in the areas of security and health.

The Security and Safety Committee(ESMC) will provide the means of support in order to ensure that the field personnel have the systems, logistics, resources and appropriate information relating to security and safety. The team managing the practical crisis response in the country programme affected. This team will activate networks on the ground and undertake logistical coordination while ensuring the projects are not adversely affected by the crisis. During crisis the team has to:

Maintain contact and sharing of information with all the personnel members assigned to the Project

Keep a file where significant emergency events are recorded and the actions that were taken to counter them.

Continual updating of the information required for responding to emergency events: emergency centers gathering, evacuation routes that can be used in the event of emergencies, available conventional and non-conventional communication means.

Organize and assist with the organization of emergency simulations.

It will ensure that the location of all project members is known and where they can be contacted if required.

Emergency and Security Management Committee

Member: Omar Rashid Person in-charge of Health	E-mail: asb7.iraq@gmail.com Mobile : +96407701625821 Skype :Omar Alali
Team Coordinator: Randala Nouredine	E-mail: countryrep@asb-me.org Mobile: +964 (0) 750 862 13 75 Skype: rindala46
Member responsible program Karina Pavlova	E-mail: agriculturepm@asb-me.org Mobile: +964 (0) 772 961 58878 Skype: Karina Pavlova Meyer
Member responsible for Financial Markos Mehner	E-mail: manageradminfinance@asb-me.org Mobile: +964 (0) 7502175874 Skype: markomehner2305
Security Focal Point Sameer M. Sadeeq	E-mail: officeradminfinance@asb-me.org Mobile: +964 (0) 752 762 5907 Skype: live:officeradminfinance
Member responsible for linkage with local offices: Ali, Raaied Hussein	E-mail: raaidaliasb@gmail.com Mobile: +964 (0) 771 619115 Skype: live:61ff3f8f2f9dcacf

8. IRAQ Context 2018- 2019

The ongoing violence in Iraq – including bombings, targeted killings, kidnappings, crime related violence and clashes between Iraqi Security Forces and armed militants, in addition to continues–protests that erupted in Baghdad and spread to other parts of Iraq and the escalation into violence left over hundred protestors dead and hundreds of people injured endangers NGOs operating in the country. Landmines, closed roads, Checkpoints, curfews, and other “heightened security measures” can significantly impede service delivery.

The presence of IS in Iraq poses another risk to both civilians and humanitarian actors in the country. With many areas turned into sleeping cell zones, the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be dangerous or downright impossible. Addressing humanitarian needs in areas of conflicts remains difficult.

The long-standing tensions between Kurds and Arabs, and the lack of social cohesion, can jeopardize humanitarian access and the ability to deliver aid in a neutral and impartial manner.

While many of the active battlefronts between Iraqi forces and the Islamic State (ISIS) had quieted by 2018, military operations continued against sleeper cells and rural ISIS holdouts. ISIS continued to capture and extra judicially kill civilians and Iraqi armed forces throughout the year. Under the guise of fighting terror, Iraqi forces arbitrarily detained, ill-treated and tortured, and disappeared mostly Sunni men from areas where ISIS was active and failed to respect their due process and fair trial rights.

Iraqi military and security forces have forcibly disappeared predominately Sunni Arab males in the context of counterterrorism operations, as well as in other cases. A range of military and security actors are responsible for the enforced disappearances, many of which took place at checkpoints or the homes of suspects.

The lack of military presence throughout large unpatrolled and ungoverned space in Iraq, as well as the security vacuum left behind following the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from the disputed areas after October 2017, has given ISIL room to continue to operate freely in remote areas such as south of Kirkuk and north of Tikrit, mostly conducting sporadic hit-and-run attacks, kidnappings, targeted assassinations, and planting IEDs

The Hamreen Mountains, bordering to the governorates of Diyala, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk, are probably ISIL’s most strategic remaining strongholds in the country today. The rugged terrain of the mountain range is a historically known insurgent stronghold, earlier harboring other extremist groups. The vast desert terrain that makes up most part of the governorate of Anbar is another central hub for ISIL sleeper cells to regroup and plan new attacks. The remote mountain ranges, valleys and caves serve as ideal hideouts for the organization.

Turkey increased its operations in northern Iraq against the armed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The PKK, has long maintained a presence in northern Iraq near the Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian borders. Turkish forces have conducted operations against the PKK in Iraq at various times for over two decades. Turkish forces are extending their presence into northern Iraq by at least 30 kilometers, establishing multiple outposts, including in rural areas of Dohuk and Erbil governorates.

In KRI opposition parties' rejection of the vote results could lead to further political, social and economic turmoil, which could fuel up public anger.

Although the KRI was relatively insulated from ISIL activity, ISIL also maintains a support zone in the Halabja Mountains close to the Iranian borders. This area, where groups such as Ansar Al-Islam pledged allegiance to ISIL, is known to have provided ISIL with Kurdish fighters.

ISIL is currently expanding its influence beyond the Halabja Mountains, notably through these local groups. Kurdish forces have allegedly arrested many ISIL cells within Sulaymaniyah governorate.

9. AREAS OF OPERATIONS and ROUTES

All routes and project locations are verified as being either clean or cleaned by Mine Advisory Group (MAG) and local police authorities and JCMC.

The GPS of all locations and routes of travel are pinpointed on the relevant Iraq Map, security clearance is updated each morning from (INSO) updates.

For movements, the vehicle must leave between 06:00 and 17:00 (depending on seasons and sunset times). No movements are allowed within the governorate between cities after or before these hours during night time unless approved by ASB CR.

All travel between cities must be validated by the Country Representative. All travel are planned in advance and are registered in the movements tracking board at the ASB office in Duhok and Baghdad.

The leaving vehicle must communicate through sms the Country Representative or SFP of the departure hour and the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA). As soon as the vehicle reaches the destination, the leaving base (if existing) should be advised also through sms.

ASB vehicles MUST always be equipped with communication means and emergency equipment

AREAS OF OPERATION AND ROUTES

Cities	Distance	Duration	Routes (security cleared)
Erbil-Duhok	ca.179km	2h40min-3h	Erbil-Kalak-Bardarash-Rovia-Xazir-Ba'adra-Dohuk
Duhok-Zakho	ca. 56km	1h	Duhok-Sumel-Zakho
Duhok-Ibrahim Khalil (Turkey border)	ca. 71 km	1h15min	Duhok-Sumel-Zakho-Ibrahim Khalil Border Crossing
Erbil-Sulaimaniya	ca. 202km	2h45min-3h	Erbil-Koysinjak-Dokan-Tasluja-Sylaimaniya
Dohuk-Sulaimaniya	ca. 350km	4h30min-6h	Duhok-Akre-Shaqlawa-Koysinjak- Tasluja-Sylaimaniya
Erbil-Duhok	ca. 179km	2h40min-3h	Erbil-Kalak-Bardarash-Rovia-Xazir-Ba'adra-Dohuk
Erbil - Kirkuk	ca. 100km	1h34min	Erbil – Baba Kurkor - Kirkuk
Kirkuk - baghdad	ca. 266km	3h35min	Kirkul – Amarli – Housanii- Bagouba- Baghdad
Duhok-Zakho	ca. 56km	1h	Duhok-Sumel-Zakho
Duhok-Ibrahim Khalil	ca. 71 km	1h15min	Duhok-Sumel-Zakho-Ibrahim Khalil Border
Duhok - Mosul	ca. 86km	1h30min	Duhok - Hatrah - Mosul
Erbil - Mosul	ca. 83km	1h10min	Erbil - Kawrban - Kalk - Bartella - Mosul
Mosul - Sinjar	ca. 125km	2h	Mosul – Talafar - Sinjar
Mosul - Tikrit	ca. 229km	2h50min	Mosul – Baji - Tikrit
Mosul - Baghdad	ca. 402km	4h50min	Mosul – Biji – Sameraa - Baghdad
Mosul - Zummar	ca. 77km	1h25min	Mosul - Al ashq - Zummar
Mosul - Talafar	ca. 77km	1h23min	Mosul - Badoush - Al ashq -
Baghdad - Ramadi	ca. 120	1hr30min	Baghdad- alskour- Ramadi
Baghdad - Heet	ca. 180	2hr7min	Baghdad- Ramadi – Abu tabyan - Heet

Baghdad - Haditha	ca. 266	3hr30min	Baghdad- Ramadi – Abu tabyan – Heet - Haditha
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10. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

General communication In Emergency

- CR gets in touch with ASB HQ Desk Officer 1 time per day via sms informing briefly about the status, Until 10pm (CET)
- ASB HQ Desk Officer confirms each sms via sms.
- If no messages have been received by the agreed time, ASB HQ Desk Officer sends a reminder sms to CR.
- In the event that there is still no feedback from CR, ASB HQ Desk Officer tries to reach CR directly by phone or skype

Should there also be no feedback, ASB HQ Desk Officer tries to contact SFP/ACR.

11. COMMUNICATION DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT

Every staff has two sim card (Korak and Asiacell) to ensure complete coverage all over Iraq.

Staff travelling in the field has two internet link hardware (Fastlink and Zain) to ensure complete coverage all over Iraq.

In all times all the communication devices and hardware are fully charged with credits.

Radio devices are not needed at this state.

12. RISK Analysis and Mitigation

Security levels	Indicators	Measures	Staff Responsibility
Level 1 (Normal)	<p>Secure situation within the country/Baghdad-Salaheddine- Nineveh- Anbar.</p> <p>No outward signs of significant social disruption or instability.</p> <p>Crime is within normal limits and a functioning system of justice is in place.</p> <p>No observable threat to \ staff.</p>	<p>Ensure a full security and safety briefing is provided to all staff and visitors, upon arrival, or as part of their local recruitment.</p> <p>Apply standard operating procedures for staff travel and movement, communications, facility access.</p> <p>Develop and maintain strong relations with individuals, community leaders, authorities and local government.</p> <p>Maintain liaison with other agencies and UN.</p> <p>Free and unrestricted movement of staff at all times.</p> <p>Programme activities continuing as normal.</p> <p>Maintain emergency personnel files for all staff</p>	<p>Each individual staff member is responsible for their own security, safety and health.</p> <p>All staff should proactively monitor the security situation and report any incidents or concerns to their line manager.</p> <p>All staff must carry ASB photo ID card, where appropriate, and emergency contact information.</p>
Level 2 (Tense)	<p>Significant political, economic and social unrest is present.</p> <p>High crime, ineffective police or justice systems.</p> <p>Local animosity or hostility towards UN and NGOs, but not directed at ASB staff.</p>	<p>As Level 1</p> <p>Notify to all staff of increased security level.</p> <p>Establish daily staff security meetings.</p> <p>Ensure all staff movements are monitored, and all field travel is limited to daylight hours. Some restrictions on movement of staff on specific roads and locations as per daily updates (movement permission is required).</p> <p>Review and reinforce security measures and procedures. Establish guards at ASB offices and residences.</p> <p>Establish and test emergency communications tree.</p> <p>Day to day evaluation of the area of operation security situation.</p>	<p>As level 1</p> <p>All staff should follow the travel SOP and avoid travelling alone, especially at night.</p> <p>All staff should routinely communicate their movement plans, or any changes, to colleagues.</p> <p>Follow movement SOP.</p>

		Programme activities carrying on as normal but with a need for extra care and diligence.	
Level 3 (Insecure)	<p>Substantial deterioration in the security situation.</p> <p>General lawlessness, incidents of rioting or looting reported.</p> <p>Emergency or martial law declared.</p> <p>Organized anti-government or terrorist groups threatening government stability.</p> <p>Assassinations of prominent leaders/politicians.</p> <p>Terrorist activities or other violence indicates foreigners are being targeted.</p> <p>Localized incidents of fighting between specific groups, or as a result of military activity.</p>	<p>As Level 2</p> <p>Inform RC and HQ of increased security level.</p> <p>Ensure staff are briefed on security developments and incidents on a routine basis (daily).</p> <p>Ensure all staff movements are strictly monitored, including time of departure, estimated time of arrival and persons travelling.</p> <p>Ensure all travel to field is authorized by the Country Director.</p> <p>Maintain emergency communications and coordinate with other agencies.</p> <p>Test emergency communications tree daily.</p> <p>Review and update evacuation/relocation plans and prepare for possible closure of offices and activities.</p> <p>Prepare provisions for possible hibernation and store in designated hibernation location.</p> <p>Ensure regular backup of computer files and store in a secure location.</p> <p>Day to day evaluation of the area of operation security situation. (INSO updates and Local authorities)</p> <p>Programme activities restricted</p>	<p>All staff should maintain regular contact with base.</p> <p>All staff should clearly understand the evacuation/relocation plans and procedures, and prepare an essential grab bag.</p> <p>All staff should ensure that ASB residencies have adequate supplies (water, food, first aid kit)</p> <p>All staff should ensure that ASB residencies have working emergency communication equipment.</p>
Level 4 (dangerous)	<p>Widespread civil unrest and indiscriminate violence.</p> <p>Security deteriorated to such an extent that it is considered unsafe, or impossible, to relocate/evacuate from the area/country.</p> <p>Fighting or military actions close to area of operations.</p>	<p>As Level 3</p> <p>Maintain constant contact with RC and HQ, diplomatic mission(s), UN and other agencies until evacuation/relocation can be implemented.</p> <p>Ensure staff are updated on security situation (daily).</p> <p>Relocate/evacuate non-essential staff and prohibit visitors.</p> <p>Nominate and prepare national management team.</p>	<p>All staff should return to base/safe area and await further instruction.</p> <p>All travel and movements must be authorized by CD.</p> <p>No movement out of base/safe area, at any time, except to relocate/evacuate.</p> <p>All staff should have a pre-packed bag of essential items ready and with them at all times.</p>

		<p>Back up data, and identify sensitive documents and data that must be removed or destroyed.</p> <p>Staff relocated from particular areas, and possible further relocation of staff.</p> <p>Local staff are requested to stay at safe places.</p> <p>All staff movements restricted.</p> <p>Programme activities suspended.</p> <p>Staff waiting for an opportunity to relocate/evacuate.</p> <p>No movement of staff at any time unless as part relocation/evacuation.</p> <p>Initiate relocation/evacuation plan.</p> <p>National staff relocated to place of origin/safe haven.</p>	
Level 5 (untenable)	<p>Credible threat against NGOs or towards ASB staff.</p> <p>Fighting or military actions in the immediate vicinity of ASB offices and residences.</p>	<p>All international staff restricted to designated safe areas and be prepared for immediate evacuation.</p> <p>HIBERNATE if it is not safe to evacuate or relocation</p> <p>Suspend all programme activities and close office.</p>	<p>No Movement</p> <p>Staff has to stay in Safe place (hibernate).</p> <p>Ensure prompt communication with CR and SFP</p>

13. RISK LEVELS

	1	2	3	4	5
General Risk Level	LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME	UNTENABLE
	Negligible	Tension	Alert	Danger	Unacceptable
Erbil	X				
Duhok	X				
Zakho	X				
Kirkuk		X			
Zummar	X				
Mosul		X			
Qayarra		X			
Sinjar			X		
Talafar		X			
Baghdad		X			
Salaheddine			X		
Anbar- east		X			
Anbar- west		X			

14. LIST OF MOST LIKELY THREATS AND CONTROL MEASURES

INHERENT (RAW) RISK		KEY CONTROL MEASURES BY ASB RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN	KEY ACTIONS BY STAFF
DESCRIPTION	RATING	DESCRIPTION	DESCRIPTION
<p>Threat: Armed Conflict: Shooting, Shelling and Bombing</p> <p>Vulnerability: ASB staff are caught in conflict zones or in highly volatile areas, (routes in Anbar, Sinjar and Salaheddine) it is possible to be caught in a combat situation.</p> <p>Risk: Casualties, Death, Stress</p>		<p>Monitoring last updates of conflict areas, including updates from the UNHCR, INSO. Context analysis.</p> <p>Staff instructed to avoid conflict roads, villages and cities.</p> <p>Staff message alert tree in place to distribute rapid messages.</p> <p>Staff are not allowed to drive alone.</p> <p>Robust movement controls and strict communications set-up and follow-up</p> <p>Staff are well trained to follow best practice security instructions.</p> <p>Pre knowledge of alternative routes and maps of area crossed by ASB team.</p>	<p>Drive away if the road is clear.</p> <p>Do not wait to see if they are aiming at you.</p> <p>Passengers should get as low as possible.</p> <p>If the shots are fired in front of you, turn around to indicate a non-threatening manoeuvre.</p> <p>Be cautious, the sides of the road may be mined.</p> <p>Keep in mind that a moving target is difficult to hit.</p> <p>Speeding while driving off is not necessarily going to provide protection. It's more important to drive with care when leaving, to avoid wrecking the vehicle.</p> <p>If surrounded by shooting, turn off the engine.</p> <p>Seek cover or concealment.</p> <p>Remember ditches may be mined.</p> <p>Concealment hides you, but does not protect you from bullets.</p> <p>Cover hides you and protects you.</p>
<p>Threat: Mines, military supplies and booby traps.</p> <p>Vulnerability: ASB staff are daily in the field to monitor and follow up the projects, regular meetings with</p>		<p>(ESMC) will endeavor, within their possibilities, to inform and keep notified personnel about areas that have been declared as "mined". ASB mandate to work only in areas, building and routes cleaned from mines (JCMC, MAG information on</p>	<p>Never travel in high risk areas</p> <p>Report to your office the planned dates, times and routes of you work schedule. Use approved routes and if possible do not deviate from these routes</p> <p>Always when possible travel on the roads that are in the best condition, even though this may mean that the trip is longer</p> <p>Avoid travelling at night</p>

<p>stakeholders, work journeys in 4 governorates.</p> <p>Risks: Injury, death, Medical Evacuation, team in shock</p>		<p>maps on cleared areas and routes.</p> <p>ASB training all staff on types of mines, precautions, and prevention of casualties.</p>	<p>Report to your office if you deviate from the chosen route.</p> <p>When possible, travel with somebody, preferably with someone who knows the route.</p> <p>Take a map marked with the best possible information of the known routes that are free of mines. Update this information continuously with the local people.</p> <p>Always be more careful when travelling during or after heavy rains. The mines move or come to the surface as a result of the rains.</p> <p>Never leave your route. Never drive through or around abandoned military camps.</p> <p>Never drive over plastic bags, pieces of cloth, a piece of wood, as they could contain mines.</p> <p>Always ask the local people about the situation of land mines and pay attention to their warnings.</p> <p>Never walk over areas with obstacles. Use the sidewalk and paths that are in continual use.</p> <p>Do not enter abandoned building.</p>
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<p><u>Threat:</u> Kinetic Attack (VIED/IED/Suicide attack) from IS militants or other militias in main cities and on the roads mostly against Police and Security forces premises.</p> <p><u>Vulnerability:</u> ASB staff are daily in the field to monitor and follow up the projects, regular meetings with stakeholders, work journeys in 4 governorates.</p> <p><u>Risks:</u> Injury, death, Medical Evacuation, team in shock</p>	LOW	<p>Monitoring last updates of conflict areas, including updates from the UNHCR, INSO. Context analysis.</p> <p>Staff instructed to avoid possible targets on the roads, villages and cities.</p> <p>Staff message alert tree in place to distribute rapid messages.</p> <p>All targeted governorates will be considered NO GO areas for ASB staff.</p> <p>The operation will be run via remote management.</p> <p>ASB team trained on first aid and First aid kit carried with the team at all time</p> <p>Medical support system in place (SOS, emergency facilities, medical evacuation)</p>	<p>In a high-risk environment it is important, at all times, to be dressed appropriately and carry items you may need in the event of an abduction, such as medication and emergency contact details.</p> <p>Never travel in high risk areas</p> <p>Report to your office the planned dates, times and routes of you work schedule.</p> <p>Use approved routes and if possible do not deviate from these routes</p> <p>Always when possible travel on the roads that are in the best condition, even though this may mean that the trip is longer</p> <p>Avoid travelling at night</p> <p>Report to your office if you deviate from the chosen route.</p>
<p><u>Threat:</u> IS and other militia perform Kidnappings as a source of funding their activities.</p> <p><u>Vulnerability:</u> ASB staff members may get detained or abducted for a variety of reasons. Detentions may be the result of an alleged crime committed or because of the</p>	LOW	<p>Precautions while travelling and generally avoid routine.</p> <p>Limit to strict minimum taking taxis at night or for travelling.</p> <p>Maintain good contextual awareness and follow-up of security incidents in Iraq (OCHA, INSO, etc.)</p> <p>Robust movement controls and strict communications set-up and follow-up</p> <p>Maintain a low profile. Consider removing agency logos from vehicles and property, travelling in unmarked local vehicles, and even withdrawing those staff</p>	<p>Avoid routine, kidnapping in particular requires planning, and so perpetrators will study their target's activities and movements for some time before attempting the abduction.</p> <p>Scan the roads you are using while travelling for any suspicious action.</p> <p>Avoid travelling alone, especially at night, Perpetrators may be less likely to attempt to abduct people travelling in groups, as this requires more planning and resources.</p> <p>Have an updated situation while crossing official checkpoints.</p> <p><u>In case you are abducted</u></p>

<p>programs being presented in-country.</p> <p>Risks: Kidnapping, abduction, death, closure of programs in KR-I, teams under shock</p>		<p>members considered to be at highest risk.</p>	<p>Stay calm. If their capture is inevitable, accept and follow orders. Acknowledge the fact that you are the captive and mentally accept the change in circumstances. Report any medical treatment that you are receiving. Accept and eat what you are given, even if the food is not nice. Prepare mentally for a long wait, it could be some months, before you are freed. Adopt a discreet skeptical realistic attitude regarding the information that you are given by the kidnappers. Occupy your mind, systematically, with constructive and positive thoughts. Plan a daily activity program, including exercises, and carry it out. Try to keep the time precisely. Take advantage of any comfort or privileges offered by the captors, like books, newspapers or radio access. If they are not offered, politely request them. Keep as clean as possible. Request that the captors give a place where you can wash and use the bathroom</p>
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<p><u>Threat:</u> bad routes, poor road status and maintenance, chaotic driving attitudes from drivers.</p> <p><u>Vulnerabilities:</u> ASB staff travel frequently and daily from Duhok to Erbil and Zakho, to Baghdad, and Anbar and Salaheddine.</p> <p><u>Risks:</u> Injuries, death, MEDEVAC, damaged vehicle</p>	Medium	<p>Driving only during daylight hours</p> <p>Hiring and using qualified drivers</p> <p>Vehicles are maintained on monthly bases, Vehicle usage SOP. Vehicle insurance.</p> <p>Transport SOP and speed limits.</p> <p>Robust movement controls and on-travel communications procedures</p> <p>First Aid training.</p> <p>First aid kits/trauma bags carried with the team at all time</p> <p>Medical support system in place (SOS, emergency facilities, etc.)</p>	<p>Drive during working hours.</p> <p>The driving speed is maintained to 80KM in the highway and 60KM in the towns and urban roads.</p> <p>Using mobiles in forbidden while driving.</p> <p>Seat belts are to be used all times during driving.</p> <p>Abide to vehicle use SOP.</p> <p>Plan your journey to use most safe roads.</p> <p>NO Alcohol policy should be abided.</p>
<p><u>Threat:</u> militia perform checkpoints or car jacking as a source of funding their activities.</p> <p><u>Vulnerabilities:</u> ASB staff travel frequently and daily from Duhok to Erbil and Zakho, to Baghdad, and Anbar and Salaheddine.</p> <p><u>Risks:</u> Injuries, stress, theft, loss of money and assets</p>		<p>Low profile strategy in terms of visibility of valuables</p> <p>Evaluate and monitor INSO and JCMC updates</p> <p>Communication with NGOs to evaluate past events.</p> <p>Transport Policy and SOP.</p>	<p>While on duty minimize the amount of cash and valuables you hold.</p> <p>Remain calm and do not be aggressive, Armed assailants are most likely to shoot when they feel their own safety is threatened.</p> <p>Do not attempt to intervene, you will put yourself and your colleagues at risk.</p> <p>Comply with demands, no material possessions are worth risking your life for, when faced with demands for a vehicle, equipment or money, do not resist.</p> <p>Do not make any sudden movements.</p> <p>Keep your hands visible and inform the armed assailants what you are going to do before you do it.</p> <p>If you are held in a group, do not talk among yourselves unless necessary – particularly in a</p>

			<p>language not understood by your assailants.</p> <p>If necessary, one person should talk on behalf of everyone.</p> <p>Once the assailants have left and you feel it's safe to do so, inform the local authorities.</p>
<p><u>Threat:</u> The influx of IDPs increased more criminality rates especially in main cities.</p> <p><u>Vulnerability:</u> ASB staff walks at night, usually they move with computers, cash and valuables on them.</p> <p><u>Risk:</u> Theft, Robbery, sexual harassment.</p>	Medium	<p>Low profile strategy in terms of visibility of valuables and tech equipment on buildings and vehicles</p> <p>SOP for Location and offices</p> <p>Security and safety are in place and valid.</p>	<p>When moving in IDP camps and/or host communities' areas, all valuables are left locked inside the vehicle with the driver in standby in it.</p> <p>Restriction of movements on foot at night but in groups.</p> <p>Maintain good situational awareness.</p> <p>Follow local dress code and respect their culture.</p>

<p>Threat: Violent attack/aggressions from demonstrators or IDPs in camps</p> <p>Vulnerability: working in areas with high needs and different understanding of project scopes and vulnerability between the beneficiaries and ASB staff and partners. ASB not being able to meet their most essential needs.</p> <p>Risks: Threats, aggressions, violence, loss of goods, looting of items</p>	<p>LOW</p>	<p>Lobbying and advocacy on ASB projects and implementation policies with local authorities and local leaders, Focus groups among the beneficiaries</p> <p>Proper assessment of beneficiary's internal power policies</p> <p>No false promises during the needs assessment</p> <p>Implementation of close coordination with authorities</p>	<p>Be clam</p> <p>Try to have rapid communication with line manager.</p> <p>Communicate with local leaders.</p>
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<p><u>Threat:</u> Turkish forces are performing air strikes against YPG positions in KR-G controlled areas in Nineveh Governorate.</p> <p><u>Vulnerability:</u> ASB staff performs an assessment mission in that area with possible programs implementation to the IDP and host communities.</p> <p><u>Risk:</u> Serious injury, death, loss of goods</p>	LOW	<p>Monitoring last updates of conflict areas, including updates from the UN agencies on the ground</p> <p>Proper SOPs and contingency plans before assessment mission</p> <p>Strong liaison with central and local security forces (Peshmerga forces)</p> <p>Medical support system in place (emergency facilities, MEDEVAC)</p>	<p>Limit any field visit</p> <p>Follow instructions from CR</p> <p>Reread Security Plan</p> <p>Consider staying in safe place.</p> <p>Wait for further instructions.</p>
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<p><u>Threat:</u> Sexual Harassment for female national and international staff.</p> <p><u>Vulnerability:</u> ASB staff performs walk in street alone in evening and late hours,</p> <p><u>Risk:</u> Serious injury, loss of goods, and emotional discomfort.</p>	Medium	<p>Be aware of potential threats by researching the types of incidents that have occurred in the past, who has been targeted and who the perpetrators were.</p> <p>Review security measures and procedures, making sure that staff are not exposed through movement procedures, accommodation arrangements, or their working environment.</p> <p>In high-risk situations ASB shall consider the need to relocate or withdraw those staff at highest risk.</p> <p>Monitoring last updates, including updates from the UN agencies on the ground</p>	<p>Walking in accompanied.</p> <p>Use a verified rented car (Admin-finance contracted).</p> <p>Respect the culture and dress code.</p> <p>Don't use dark isolated roads.</p> <p>Inform one colleague on your destination and time out.</p> <p>Keep low profile.</p> <p>Keep your mobile accessible.</p> <p>Don't stand with or talk to strangers at night and when you are alone.</p> <p>Check any suspicious movement of people around you.</p>
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		<p>Strong liaison with central and local security forces</p> <p>Medical 2 support system in place (emergency facilities, MEDEVAC)</p>	
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15. MEASURE IN DEVELOPING EMERGENCY

In the event of a developing emergency the employees of a determined project or administrative personnel, are indispensable for notifying the Emergency Security Management Committee at the Head Office, in order to analyze the situation and for issue of the necessary instructions.

This phase is characterized by sending messages to all the personnel that work in the project zone so that they remain alert and, depending on the emergency, congregate in the project buildings/offices. These messages will be transmitted, if possible, by normal communication means.

In the event of an emergency, all the members of ASB assigned to the Project must report to the Programme manager in order to determine their current status and if they need any type of assistance. If they are working in the field and an emergency event occurs that could harm their physical/psychological wellbeing it is recommended they remain alert, leave the danger area and go to the building/office allocated for the ASB personnel in order to await instruction from the person in-charge of the office.

The person in-charge of the office will be the only person responsible for determining the type of emergency that has occurred and the only person responsible for issuing information of the current status of the affected project members.

The person in charge of the office, depending on the seriousness of the situation, must get in contact with the Head Office's the Emergency Security Management Committee by any possible means in order to inform them of the situation in the area and the physical/psychological state of the employees which they are in charge of.

The information that the person reporting must include:

- ☐ Current state of each of the employees working on the Project.
- ☐ Names of the affected employees.
- ☐ A summary of the current situation of the project office.
- ☐ The location from which the message is being transmitted
- ☐ A status report of the sector.
- ☐ Actions that have been taken to protect all the personnel
- ☐ Request for assistance of actions to be taken

The Security Focal Point at the Head Office must issue information and instructions in order to respond to and combat the emergency.

Annex 1

MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC)

Medical evacuation refers to the timely and efficient movement and care provided by medical personnel to wounded being evacuated from a battlefield, to injured patients being evacuated from the scene of an accident to receiving medical facilities, or to patients at a rural hospital requiring urgent care at a better-equipped facility using medically equipped ground vehicles or aircraft. This permits the rapid transport of seriously injured persons, particularly trauma patients, from the scene of the accident to the nearest good quality medical facilities.

If a staff member is injured or falls ill and local medical facilities cannot provide sufficient treatment, medical evacuation (Medevac) by aircraft may be needed. This normally happens only when a doctor advises that it is necessary.

ASB provides a collective health insurance by Hallesche/Union for all international staff members which automatically include Medevac. (See "SOPs Salary and contract procedures"). If the staff member chooses another health insurance, he/she must provide a copy of the health insurance certificate to ASB. The consultant must ensure that the chosen health insurance include Medevac. Otherwise he/she has to take out a special Medevac insurance and inform the responsible Desk Officer in Cologne about the procedure for calling in the medical evacuation company, including up to date phone and fax numbers, and certificate numbers if necessary. The consultant has to provide a record that the chosen insurance bear any expenses in case of a medical evacuation.

If a person is sick but the situation is not an emergency and the manager in the field is not sure whether to evacuate or not, he or she should consult with the CR and the ASB HQ Desk Officer in HQ.

In case of severe illness or injury, the staff member should be admitted as soon as possible to a reputable hospital (See "[Nearest hospital\(s\) and its location](#)" page 6)

If the illness or injury takes place in the field, inform the CR or SFP immediately. If the condition of the delegate is severe and does not allow for road transport, the CR can request evacuation.

It is the responsibility of the CR to inform the ASB HQ Desk Officer in Cologne, which will then contact the relatives and the insurance company.

The insurance company will directly contact the treating physician and agree on the modality of evacuation (by commercial flight with or without an escort or air ambulance).

The CR or his/her deputy will be the point of contact for any update on the staff member's health status and evacuation.

Despite the urgency of the situation, insurance company requires prior approval to reimburse payment. Once ASB received approval from the insurance provider, make sure to have the following details ready:

- the place the patient is to be evacuated from and the place they are to be evacuated to (capital city, neighboring country, third country)
- name, age, sex and nationality of the patient
- Reasons for evacuation request (e.g., severe illness, accident, etc.)
- details of the patient's condition
- the physician's name and contact number, if the patient is already in hospital

HEALTH

Healthy staff tends to be more efficient, alert and safe. It is vital that ASB staff take good care of their health, and is rigorous about hygiene and other preventive measures. Staff should be aware that in many cases health issues pose the most serious risk to life, and should take precautions accordingly.

ASB recommends vaccination according to WHO standards for all staff. In specific epidemic situations, where ASB is operating, the provision of preventive measures, vaccinations and /or other prophylaxis measures should be considered.

All international and national staff needs to have a health and accident insurance. (See "SOPs Salary and contract procedures"). Daily laborers and short term contractors should be provided with insurance coverage during their contract, if possible.

First aid kits should be available in each building and vehicle, and may need to be carried by staff, depending on the circumstances. It is important that first aid kits are appropriate to the situation and kept up-to-date.

Annex 2

EVACUATION PLAN FOR SECURITY REASONS

1. Circumstances where relocation or evacuation of staff becomes necessary may include:
2. Staff are exposed to unreasonable risk.
3. Humanitarian agencies are being targeted.
4. There is an immediate threat – eg, fighting in the vicinity.
5. Security concerns make it impossible to meet programme outputs and the needs of beneficiaries.
6. Controlling forces/authorities recommend departure.
7. Embassies/UN officials advise foreign nationals to leave.

Modes

This plan refers to the practical arrangements for all staff in case of relocation and/or evacuation of personnel of ASB from Duhok city in KR-I. This plan reflects three modes of evacuation by road.

1. Up to Erbil Airport.
2. Up to Zakho city and then to the “Ibrahim Khalil” crossing point into neighbor Turkey and up to Mardin or Silopi Airport.
3. Up to Baghdad Airport (if the staff location is in Baghdad or Anbar or Salaheddine or the first and second above routes are difficult to access)

Guidelines

According to the relevant safety and security instructions when the evacuation plan must be implemented, the EC will give the necessary instructions for all personnel. It is important to note that the precise analysis on-site will determine what specific actions to take. The evacuation may be, and should be possible but ASB must be aware that sometimes staying put and confine the staff in a safe haven is a safer measure. It is important that the means of telecommunication remain available, functional and that all personnel are trained and know how to use them.

Due to the current context in Duhok and in case of the scenarios described below that would trigger an evacuation plan is important to take into consideration that the best option and the most efficient set-up is to closely collaborate with other INGOs present in the area. Any of the scenarios described below will probably trigger the procedure too for the rest of international agencies and therefore, the evacuation should be performed together with them.

General Information

Who has access to this document:		CR, ASB HQ Desk Officer
Updated	30.1.2019	
Next update due	30.04.2020	
Person responsible for security decisions in the field	Randala Nouredine E-mail: countryrep@asb-me.org Mobile: +964 (0) 750 862 13 75 Skype: rindala46	
Contact responsible for international staff	Name: Rosi Gallinger E-mail: r.gallinger@asb.de Mobile: +49 (0) 1722866533 Landline: +49 (0) 221 476 05 265 Skype: rosi.asb@outlook.de	
Direct reporting concerning security issues to	ASB HQ Desk Officer	
Contact responsible for authorizing evacuation, hibernation or relocation	CR, ASB HQ Desk Officer	
Possible assembly points:		
assembly point 1	ASB KR-I office Duhok	
assembly point 2	Zada hotel- Duhok (Lobby)	
assembly point 3	Bagdad Office- Mansour	
Possible destinations:		
destination 1	Erbil Airport (Route A)	
destination 2	Turkish Border Ebrahim Khalil (Route B)	
destination 3	Bagdad Airport (Route C)	
Office address - Duhok	Ghazi Mohamad street - #44	
Office address - Baghdad	Mansour district - 14 Tishreen street - #74	
Mobile	+964 750 862 13 75	

EXPATRIATES LIST AND CONTACTS

Staff member	Passport No.	Telephone	Nationality
Randala Noureddine	LR1320849	+964 750 862 13 75	Lebanese
Marko Mehner	C74NTN3W5	+964 751 251 01 52	German
Karina Pavolva	FG514283	+96477296158878	Ukrainian

EVACUATION SUPPLIES

	Stockpile Essentials	luggage	Admin, HR and Financial procedures	Communication Required	Transportation Required
STANDARDS	Food and water for 15 days for each person. Extra fuel for generators, lamps and vehicles	Go Bags- no more than 10 kg each plus 5 kg food and water	Back up essential files, delete sensitive files, shred sensitive documents Prepare handover of authority.	Include equipment, backup power, contact procedures	Include vehicle for all persons to be evacuated, luggage and equipment. Extra fuel. Drivers who are knowledgeable and not at risk.

EVACUATION ESSENTIAL ITEMS

	Visa	Phones	Security Cash	Behavior
PRÉPARATIONS	Turkey: Citizens of most Western nations are able to obtain a three-month, multiple-entry tourist visa upon arrival at Turkish airports or land border crossings. They can apply as well online to get their visas at https://www.evisa.gov.tr/en/	Phone cards with at least \$100 of credit either already on the phone, or in the form of prepaid cards. Phones should be fully	If more than one international on the spot, security envelope cash advance should be considered.	Whether travelling by land or air, but especially overland, staff should keep a low profile at all times and avoid any

	<p>However, policies specifically related to the Ibrahim Khalil/Habur Border Crossing are subject to change without notice.</p> <p>Baghdad; all ASB expatriates have valid visa to Government of Iraq.</p> <p>Beirut: Citizens of most Western nations are able to obtain a three-month, multiple-entry tourist visa upon arrival at Rafic Al Harriri Airport</p>	charged prior to travel.		behavior that draws attention.
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EVACUATION FLOWCHART

