





psychological changes. As a response, a distinction between *idem-identity* and *ipse-identity* has been set in place which inexplicably relates the self to that of the other. With a face-to-face encounter of the self with the other, an ethics in the philosophy of Ricoeur becomes inescapable.

The common thread that binds the authors in the first part of the book is the theory of narrativity. Narrative identity bridges *idem* and *ipse* identities. Though the emphasis of Langsdorf and Van den Hengel is that of Husserl's intentionality and action theory respectively, still, they relate them to the general theory of the narrative, how myopic it might be. In other words, they both recognize the very important role that the narrative plays in their analyses. Reagan, Rasmussen and Ihde, on the other hand, are specifically bound by narrative identity.

The narrative plays a pivotal role in their analysis because, as what Ricoeur narrates in *Oneself as Another*, "the narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character" (147-8). In relation to this, inasmuch as Ricoeur defines character as "the set of distinctive marks which permit the reidentification of a human individual as being the same" (119), it as well "designates the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized" (121). Moreover, "the notion of 'a narrative identity' allows one to think through the question of 'personal identity' in a new way, taking into full account the temporal dimension (the temporality) of a being who, by existing with others in the horizon of a common world, is led to transform himself in the course of a life history, that is, who is what he or she is only in the course of becoming himself or herself", explains Villela-Petit. This position may explain why Ricoeur did not right away pursue the third volume of *The Philosophy of Will* project. After publishing the first volume on 1950 entitled *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and Involuntary* and the two-part second volume on 1960 entitled *Finitude and Guilt* with *The Fallible* and *The Symbolism of Evil* as part titles respectively, he put in abeyance the publication of the third volume supposedly to be titled *The Poetics of the Will*.

The first volume explains Ricoeur's attempt "to unfold the basic structures of the will at the level of 'essential possibility'... What is revealed at this level is that the structures of the will are characterised by a fundamental reciprocity of the voluntary and the involuntary" (2), narrates Thompson. Furthermore, "Ricoeur argues that the voluntary and involuntary dimensions of human existence are complementary. There is, to be sure, no seamless harmony between these two dimensions. Each person has to struggle with the conflict between them. But this conflict is what ultimately makes my freedom genuinely mine, what gives me my distinctive identity", explains Dauenhauer. The first



volume recognizes the fact of man as an incarnate subjectivity, which makes him prone to fall.

The first part of the second volume, *The Fallible Man*, implies "that the *possibility* of moral evil is inherent in man's constitution... If the capacity to fail consists in the fragility of the mediation that man effects in the object... the question arises concerning the sense in which this fragility is a capacity to fail" (133, 141), explains Ricoeur. The self's immediate and direct understanding of the ultimate cause of human fallibility, however, is not possible. Ricoeur (1991) explains that "there is no self-understanding that is not *mediated* by signs, symbols, and texts; in the last resort understanding coincides with the interpretation given to these mediating terms." (15). Thus, though *The Symbolism of Evil* explores initially an historico-phenomenological analysis of great symbols and myths, Ricoeur's symbolism of evil is gearing towards an understanding of the degree of subjectivity. In fact, Paul Ricoeur's notion of interpretation is rooted in his quest to understand symbol. He observes that there is something in the symbolic that tells more about it. The symbolic trilogy of defilement-sin-guilt mirrors the gradation of the subject's going into itself.

As a symbolism of evil, guilt portrays the subject's recognizing the nature of its activity. It is not a product of the subject's self-consciousness. The guilt symbolism is the subjectivization of the experience of evil. The subject feels guilty only when it understands that its deeds are contrary to the laws that the society establishes and follows. Objectively, there is no guilt feeling based on the collective experience of the people. Guilt is the product of the subject's distanciation from its participation and at the same time the product of its own reflection. Nevertheless, the reflection of the subject is not totally based on itself. It is rooted first on the reality in which the subject lives. It realizes that it is guilty only by intensely reflecting that there is something morally wrong with its deeds. The wrong committed is not limited only to the self. It has the recognition of its effect to others. The development, however, of the subject's consciousness to include the other takes a long time. In other words, the development of the character takes a lot of mindful and conscious dialogue with experience.

Crump's attention to reflexive philosophy is very timely. As he said, "the reflexive method is the movement from the comprehension of the situation to the self-understanding of reason as being-situated" (175). As what Ricoeur expresses in *On Interpretation*, "reflexion is that act of turning back upon itself by which a subject grasps, in a moment of intellectual clarity and moral responsibility, the unifying principle of the operations among which it is dispersed and forgets itself as subject" (12). This being the case, it can be approximated that man's intention to act morally, like that of Kant, is not due to the belief that God exists but due to his understanding of his nature in context. Thus, Pellauer's going back



to Ricoeur's discussion on fallibility is an adequate addition to this volume. Tracing Ricoeur's work from *Freedom and Nature*, to *The Fallible Man* then to *The Symbolism of Evil* until *Oneself as Another*, it can be surmised that man becomes moral or ethical only after he understands the very nature of himself. The constancy of his character cannot materialize if in the first place he will deny his being fallible. Realizing his being fallible, he will then act with vigilance not to be overpowered by this fallibility. Citing Nietzsche at the same breadth in the process is very striking. Taking the cue from Nietzsche's the three metamorphoses of the spirit--to which Hollingdale remarks that this discourse is "a parable illustrating the spiritual development of the forerunner of the Superman, the philosopher - who is... 'the creator of new values'" (28); it is very remarkable when after overcoming the dragon, the lion turns into a child. What is remarkable here is the lion's recognition of the need to become a child. The child's innocence leading to its sacred yea-saying propels him to create a new set of values separated from the values that the world cares. From the value of self-confinement, the subject is now slowly able to recognize the face of the other. Being able to recognize the other presupposes the overcoming of oneself.

This further makes the other authors of the second part distinctly relate Ricoeur to philosophers with whom the latter mirrored his ethical theory. From the seventh to the ninth study, Ricoeur expounded his ethical theory. At the outset, it seems that Ricoeur and Levinas took the opposing ends of the spectrum. Bourgeois narrates that the opposition of Ricoeur on Levinas is anchored on the latter's "powerful message of responsibility elicited within the face to face epiphany of the other" (110), whereby the self or the *I* shoulders the burden of responsibility. Furthermore, Ricoeur "sees Levinas's entire philosophy as resting 'on the initiative of the other,' but this initiative establishes no relation" (110) at all. Ricoeur contests this idea because it "interprets the role of the self before the encounter with the other face to face as 'a stubbornly closed, locked up, separate ego'" (111). Ricoeur's choice of Aristotle and Kant as exemplars of his ethical theory is instructive in itself. Ricoeur, in a way, persuades us that to be ethical or moral is not just to respond to the appeal initiated by the other. On the contrary, it is to respond to the understanding of the subject of the need to be ethical and moral.

On the other hand, Cohen's unwavering defense of Levinas from the onslaught of Ricoeur is understandable. Because, if Ricoeur argues that Levinas's self is "too closed in, incapable of receiving and unable to discriminate" (xi), then Levinas's self is gullible. The gullibility of the Levinasian self, however, may not necessarily be disadvantageous. It may be surmised as not a loss for the self but a manifestation of its genuine concern for the other. This illustrates the non-reciprocal relation



of responsibility. The Levinasian self is simply there ready to help as there is no need for the other to call for help. But if Cohen will insist that the Levinasian self "is not so separate as to be inviolate, closed, out of relation, simply passive as Ricoeur claims, but is more passive than any passivity, because it arises in pure subjection to the other" (xi), there lies the crux of the matter. Ricoeur's self is nothing but active and decisive; it is "the result of a reflexive structure, better defined by its power of reconsidering preexisting objectifications than by an initial separation" (140). The readiness to help the other is not immediately born out of the situation. Instead, it is consciously developed overtime by the self through his dynamic and reflective inter-relation with others. Cohen, however, ably defended Levinas from the criticisms of Ricoeur and pointed out that the latter instead committed a straw man fallacy for the reason that Levinas' self's capacity of receiving the other is created rather than caused contrary to the accusation of Ricoeur.

On the other hand, Rawls's theory of justice presupposes that the subject has already transcended his basic needs to be able to recognize the need of securing as well the needs of others. The two principles that Rawls mentioned, the liberty principle and the difference principle, presupposes an institution that is willing to distribute rights and duties to all concern. This assumes as well that the one who is in charge of the institution has a well-developed self-esteem. As Reagan describes self-esteem, it is "not founded on accomplishment, but on capacity; the ability to judge (to esteem) is based on the ability to act (*le pouvoir-faire*)" (17). Thus Ricoeur's giving priority of the ethical over the moral is not surprising. Aristotle's concern is the pursuit of happiness in accordance to excellence which is living according to the nature of man, that is, to live in accordance with reason or at least not without reason. As what Reagan explained, "the ethical concern of Aristotle [is] in the *teleological* interest in the 'good life'" (16). When man is already living a good life, the happiest life of all which is the life of contemplation, then man must have understood already what is happiness and is bathing with it. It is only at this moment whereby he will feel that he is bound by duty towards other people. Hence, Kantian morality as good will, which is doing one's duty, becomes imminent only because the person is a self-assured. As it is understood, for Kant, to be moral is does not necessarily result to happiness. The person who realized one's blessedness wills to extend such blessedness to others.

Consequently, the ethical life emerges only from a sincere recognition of the significance of one's own stake in the greater good of the whole.



