Engaging the Titans: A Marcusean Critique of Habermas, Foucault, and Honneth

JAVISMINDA Journal

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Making sense of Marcuse today seems at first a bit odd. This is due to three main reasons. First, the Hegelian-Marxist leaning of the first generation of critical theorists, with which Marcuse identifies himself, has been abandoned by the proponents of the second generation, especially by its most illustrious representative Jurgen Habermas. Second, the third generation, with Axel Honneth as its leading figure, lacks concrete embodiment on the issue of technological domination, one of the central concepts in Marcuse's critical theory. Honneth's model of critical theory also has the strong tendency to depoliticize the agents of social transformation, thus undermining the political dimension of social movements peculiar to less developed countries like the Philippines. And third, the emergence of French poststructuralism which became influential during the second half of the 20th century has rendered Marcuse's brand of critique untenable. Foucault, one of the prominent figures in this intellectual movement, has analyzed the intricacies of power and domination in the light of archaeology and genealogy, a method of analysis and tactic of resistance quite different from Marcuse's. These conditions have led to the obfuscation of the promising project of emancipation Marcuse and other members of the first generation, let alone Adorno who became quite pessimistic about the project later in his life, have vigorously attempted to accomplish. No wonder, Marcuse's theory, especially on technological domination and emancipation, has declined significantly in the late 1970s. But owing to the fact that technological domination continues to haunt humanity today and that no social critical theorist at present has offered a kind of critique of modern societies as convincing as that of Marcuse, this paper assumes the Herculean task of situating Marcuse's brand of critical theory today through an ambitious displacement of the critical theories of Habermas, Foucault, and Honneth. This is not to say that Habermas, Foucault, and Honneth simply do not make sense. They are great theorists in their own right. However, they fail to engage the issue on technological domination, a big factor in the subjugation of the modern individual. They also defuse the explosive character of contemporary social movements necessary in the
attainment of a more humane and just society. Honneth sees these social movements promising, yet he depoliticizes them by keeping individual demands away from the political sphere. Habermas politicizes them by bringing their voice to the public sphere, yet his theory of linguistic intersubjectivity weakens the critical position of the agents of emancipation by making them vulnerable to the domineering disposition of the elites in the "too procedural" process of communication. Foucault, on the far side, has always been ambivalent, if not too pessimistic, about the project of emancipation. His theory of power, though puissant to some extent, especially after his shift from discursive power reminiscent of the early works such as The Order of Things, Archaeology of Knowledge, and Madness and Civilization to disciplinary power characteristic of the later works such as Discipline and Punish and the three volumes of the History of Sexuality, has failed to offer redemptive alternatives in the struggle for emancipation. Foucault simply says stoically that that's how life is; in a sense, he reduces the "ought" into an "is".¹

But Marcuse's theory can never be a panacea. He wrote from the early 1930s to the late 1970s, thus his theory seemed dated and its application to contemporary social realities may appear anachronistic. However, remnants of his seminal work One-Dimensional Man remain very applicable today, especially in the struggle for emancipation in the less developed countries, the wretched of the Earth, to use Frantz Fanon's terminology. Marcuse even doubts the possibility of emancipation in modern societies as the numbing effect of technological domination has rendered individuals impervious to the urgent call for "resistance". But towards the end of One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse sees light at the end of the tunnel. He realizes that resistance is still possible; especially in the so-called Third World countries where social and political movements are prevalent, and that emancipation is not a remote possibility. Marcuse views these movements as forces that stay outside the capitalist logic of production and consumption, movements that have the capacity to countervail domination. These are those forces, according to Marcuse, whose position is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not.²

Here, Marcuse argues that resistance is possible only if individuals step outside the capitalist logic of production and consumption and that "the truth and the freedom of 'negative thinking', of the Great Refusal, have their ground and reason",³ in those movements that oppose the established repressive society.

In what follows, I will present succinctly the critical theories of Habermas, Foucault and Honneth and explain further the reasons for appropriating Marcuse's theory today. My aim here is not to brush aside the theories of Habermas, Foucault, and Honneth. Instead, I will just argue that Marcuse's theory is much more appropriate than that of Habermas, Foucault, and
Honneth inasmuch as technological domination continues to preponderate in the entire image of modern societies.

Habermas’s Linguistic Intersubjectivity

Habermas transformed the revolutionary thoughts of the first generation of critical theorists and sidetracked the whole direction of critical theory by formulating a kind of theory that does not consider the Hegelian and Marxist tradition, but emphasizes the primacy of mutual understanding between subjects capable of speech and action. He believes that Hegel’s dialectic which became the principle of Marx’s “historical class struggle” is no longer tenable since the emergence of state-regulated capitalism in modern societies suspends the very idea of class conflict. While it is true that Habermas accedes that class antagonism has not been abolished but becomes latent, he argues that conflict in modern societies is a remote possibility since the system of advanced capitalism has successfully secured the loyalty of the wage-earning masses through social rewards. Consequently, the workers no longer view themselves as being exploited since they receive their fair share by proving themselves in the market. Still, the loyalty of the wage-earning masses to the market and to the state as a whole does not guarantee freedom and equality. Like the rest of the critical theorists, Habermas is convinced that advanced capitalist societies produce social inequalities and injustices despite the fact that material prosperity is achieved to some considerable degree. For Habermas, these inequalities and injustices ensue from the invasion and colonization of the “lifeworld” by instrumental reason. Here, autonomy and power of self-legislation are stripped off the individual, which allows the systems and subsystems to do the thinking and acting for him. Thus, Habermas offers the “theory of communicative action” to rejuvenate the Enlightenment’s project of liberty and justice, that is, emancipation viewed from the perspective of critical theory, through ordinary language and communication. This dynamics of linguistic intersubjectivity becomes the raison d’être of his “theory of communicative action.”

The basic idea of communicative action is that all self-consciousness is grounded on intersubjectivity; thus, there is no self-consciousness apart from the awareness of the existence of others. One only sees oneself as a conscious self if one enters into communion with another self. This domain of communication is governed by consensual norms of objectified ordinary language. More importantly, Habermas believes that understanding and, eventually, agreement are inherent in any form of intersubjectivity, and that such communication must come up with a real consensus if freedom is said to be not illusory. Because individuals self-consciously enter into a dialogue with each other, they are said to be autonomous and self-legislating. As a result, a
democratic decision-making process free from domination is put to work in the public sphere.

The public sphere for Habermas is where self-conscious individuals converge to form a public opinion guided by the principle of equality, reciprocity, and justice. The opinions being agreed upon are geared toward the general interest which then influences the affairs of the state. But Habermas warns that those who are in authority should not take part in the dialogue. The role that the whole state plays is threefold: 1) the protection of the public sphere; 2) the promotion of their interests and, most importantly; 3) the implementation the public opinion being arrived at and agreed upon universally. This is what Habermas calls “ideal speech situation,” where all the participants have equal opportunities to take part in the dialogue. Habermas believes that once this situation is attained, a just and humane society necessarily follows.

The Foucauldian Archaeological and Genealogical Critique

Almost at the same time when Habermas was busy formulating his own version of critical theory, another intellectual movement was gaining enormous momentum: the French post-structuralism or otherwise known as postmodernism. Contrary to Habermas’s too procedural style of critique, the postmodernist thinkers have employed unsystematic ways of diagnosing society. Foucault, though most consider Derrida as the forerunner of this movement and probably the most influential, is said to be the keenest of the postmodernists in diagnosing modern societies by emphasizing how language and discourse, which Habermas considers to be the effective means in attaining understanding and consensus, have become the means of control and domination. It must be noted that while many intellectuals label Foucault as a postmodernist, the philosopher always refuses to be called as such.

Using archaeology as method and genealogy as tactic of critique, Foucault exposes par excellence not only how the administrators of the society creates and re-creates, forms and transforms the subject as the object of power and domination through language and discourse, but also how and in what forms the subject partakes in the process. This critique, still, is geared toward a fuller understanding of how control and domination has taken new forms in modern societies. Thus in Discipline and Punish and in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, where the major themes of the previous works from Madness and Civilization down to The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things and Archaeology of Knowledge converge, Foucault enunciates how individuals in modern societies have become the object of totalizing control and domination by making the prisons, schools, hospitals, and other correctional institutions as models. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault conscientiously inquires how during
the early seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries the “body” (of the convict) was discovered and became the target and at the same time the symbol of social control through a brutal display of torture and execution. In the opening paragraph of this work, Foucault dramatically narrates:

In March 1757 the regicide was condemned ‘to make the amende honorable’...he was taken and conveyed in a car, wearing nothing but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds, to the Place de Greve, where on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with the redhot pincers, his right hand, holding up the knife with which he had committed the parricide, burnt with sulfur, and on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burnt with sulfur, burning resin, wax and sulfur melted together, and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes thrown to the winds.

This brutal form of punishment, Foucault argues, was intended to repress the whole populace as it induced fear among them. As a consequence, individuals avert crimes and other illegalities for fear of being ruthlessly punished in the scaffold.

From this monarchical type of punishment, Foucault’s narrative switches to the “disciplinary” one and informs his readers how this shift took place in just a short period of time, that is, in just 80 years. Here, Foucault argues that the old technologies of punishment, though unsuccessful in solving crimes and other illegalities, have developed into more subtle and more effective form of social control. A new technology of power has taken place: disciplinary power. A more humane form of punishment has replaced the old brutal one, but Foucault wittingly argues that this new technology of power only intensifies social control and domination. He uses Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon to illustrate how this power works as a system of domination in modern societies.

In Bentham’s Panopticon as a design for prisons, a tower is strategically situated at the center so that a single guard can watch over many inmates while the former remains unseen. More interestingly, even if there is no guard staying in the tower, the inmates think as if somebody is watching them all the time. As a result, the inmates behave accordingly. This is how Foucault views the modern society. With the disciplinary power of correctional institutions, it seems everyone is a prisoner in the modern society—the rules inside these correctional institutions, especially the prison, have extended and permeated
the entire society. Hence, "the new disciplinary system ‘celebrated’ the child, the deviant, the mad, and the criminal" because the subjugation of their souls feeds the social order and propels the functioning of the entire system of domination.

Foucault, however, suggests that power becomes domination only if individuals fail to see the destructive aspect of power, or if they have seen it, allow themselves to be subjugated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that whenever there is power there is domination, for in the broader sense, power can be positive and productive. Foucault’s typical example for this is “the pedagogical relation of student and teacher.” The teacher exercises “power over” the student “that is not necessarily domination (although it often is).”

From here, though Foucault never offers a concrete practicable solution to the issue of domination, he seems to suggest that this problem can be addressed by exposing the insidious effects of power (Foucault equates power with knowledge and discourse) through “genealogical critique.” And it is “only the critical capacity of the genealogical account will make resistance possible by making the insidious features of these technologies of power evident.”

Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition

Axel Honneth, the leading figure of the third generation of critical theorists, and the incumbent director of the Frankfurt School, is famous for his theory on the “struggle for recognition.” This theory results, but not accidentally, from his attempt to reconcile the contrasting social theories of Habermas and Foucault in particular, and the contemporary French and German thoughts in general, while juxtaposing a radical reconstruction of Hegel’s notion of recognition. In fact, Honneth’s first major work the Critique of Power dealt intensively with the philosophies of Habermas, Foucault, and Adorno. But more specifically, Honneth’s project attempts to provide a normative critique of modern society based on the logic of social conflict, which hopes to attain emancipation. Emmanuel Renault and Jean-Philippe Deranty define it more clearly: “Honneth’s project is to devise a normative theory of society that will rejuvenate the original project of critical theory: to secure a sound normative base, on which social critique can identify contemporary pathologies and point to the direction of emancipation.”

Honneth was initially convinced that Habermas’s communicative action is the right method in diagnosing modern societies. He sees that the idea of democratic participation in the public sphere would facilitate the fruition of his theory of recognition. However, he realizes that it does not provide an adequate perspective on actual interaction. Honneth reckons that Habermas’s theory lacks concrete embodiment on the most crucial elements of social interaction like respect, disrespect, shame, and conflict. Thus Honneth retains
Foucault’s “definition of power as the fragile and open-ended outcome of conflicts between social agents” and integrates it into his own theoretical paradigm, which, according to Renault and Deranty, is the key feature of the theory of recognition.\(^\text{13}\) But Honneth sees to it that social agents are given primordial role in the theory of recognition, rather than reducing them to mere examples or case studies as what Foucault did in his archaeological and genealogical critique.\(^\text{34}\)

The main contention of the theory of recognition is that the denial of the individuals’ demand for recognition is the main cause of social sufferings and the experiences of injustice. And Honneth believes that these types of social pathologies are institutional by nature, that is, they are primarily caused by the society’s indifference to and violation of the deep-seated claims and expectations of its constituents, a kind of social negligence which results to the disappointment of the individuals. These experiences of injustice, feelings of discontent, and social sufferings, according to Honneth, concretely manifest that the modern “society is doing something unjust, something unjustifiable.”\(^\text{15}\) Thus, Honneth insists for a general recognition of the individuals’ deep-seated claims and expectations as the most practicable way of attaining emancipation, which he terms as the “good life”.

Honneth introduces three spheres of recognition that would somehow provide the basis for an expanded kind of recognition, namely: 1) love or the sphere of intimate relations; 2) modern law or legal relations, and; 3) achievement or the sphere of social esteem. Renault and Deranty contend that the purpose of these is not only “to describe injustice, but also to emphasize that justice is a matter of conflict.”\(^\text{16}\) Honneth states that

In intimate relationships this internal conflict typically takes the form of bringing forth newly developed or previously unconsidered needs by appeal to the mutually attested love in order to demand a different or expanded kind of care. In the recognition sphere of modern law, in contrast, it normally takes the form of showing how previously excluded groups deserve legal recognition or previously neglected facts require differentiation of legal principles by appeal to the basic idea of equality. And in the third recognition sphere, individuals or social groups generally bring forth hitherto neglected or underappreciated activities and capacities by appeal to the achievement principle in order to demand greater social esteem and at the same time a redistribution of (material) resources.\(^\text{17}\)
What Honneth wants to convey at this juncture, in addition to what Renault and Deranty claim that the three spheres are intended both to describe injustice and emphasize that justice is a matter of conflict, is that the forms of recognition are multi-faceted and that the modern lifeworld comes with these kinds of demands, and that the denial of the demands set by each sphere of recognition would lead to social injustice. Thus, Honneth insists that individuals or groups who are demanding mutual recognition must be accorded due attention if the whole society wants justice to reign. In the event these demands do not receive due consideration, Honneth suggests that a struggle must be persistently staged until recognition is won. But in doing so, the victims of injustice must create a force by coming together so that they can effectively assert their demands. As Honneth puts it, the “ubiquitous conflicts only become a ‘struggle’ in a more exacting political sense when sufficiently large number of those affected come together to convince the broader public of the general, exemplary significance of their cause, thereby calling into question the prevailing status order as a whole.”

In conclusion, the struggle for recognition based on the experiences of injustice is precisely the demand for social justice, indeed the demand for the highest form of human freedom. Once due recognition is accorded to this demand, the “good life” is surely attained.

A Marcusian Response

Now, Habermas’s theory of communicative action is to some extent showing the likelihood of accomplishing the Enlightenment’s project of emancipation. Like the rest of the members of the first generation of critical theorists, his theory addresses the plight of the individuals in modern societies by empowering them through their participation in the dialogue that would take place in the public sphere. In this sense, the individuals are given the chance to voice out their sentiments and express what they really want. Surely, the ideal of the theory of communicative action is what the adherents of genuine democracy, including Marcuse himself, aspire to achieve. But as regards the practicability of his theory, Habermas is really faced with a huge difficulty. It seems that he is too much engrossed with the practicability of discourse among free individuals aimed at achieving understanding to the point that he fails to address seriously the *conditio sine qua non* of such democratic discourse—that is, the existence of a firmly established democracy or a “favorable circumstance for communication” to use Habermas’s words. Habermas is actually aware of this precondition, but he just takes it loosely and instead insists on the persistence of such discourse. In “A Philosophico-Political Profile,” one finds Habermas affirming this point but never attempted to engage with it seriously. He writes: “...nothing makes me more nervous than
the imputation that because the theory of communicative action focuses attention on the social facticity of recognized validity-claims, it proposes or at least suggests a rationalistic utopian society.²⁹

In *Toward a Rational Society*, this difficulty becomes clearer when Habermas explicitly admits that his theory presupposes the existence of a firmly established democracy so that a democratic decision-making process free from domination can be put to work. The point therefore is that the most pressing issue is the practicability not of the theory of communicative action but of a firmly established democracy which logically entails the removal of social control and domination. Nonetheless, Habermas offers a solution but a shaky one. He said that “if a particular democracy is not yet firmly established, the only thing that works is the mechanism of self-defense, based on solidarity, undertaken by the whole institution under attack.”³⁰ This sounds plausible at first glance but a serious perusal of the dynamics of power and domination in advanced capitalist societies proves that its opposite is true. Habermas’s idea of “self-defense” is a total capitulation to the bourgeois society with its system of control and domination unless it is viewed as a “Great Refusal”, a term Marcuse uses to describe a kind of resistance that counteracts domination, to effect total social change. Hence, Habermas needs to grapple first with the system of control and domination exacted by the technological society if he really wants a decision-making process that is truly free from domination.

Habermas also admits that today his theory of communicative action is a remote possibility since it is blocked by some forces, namely, the bureaucratic encapsulation that arises from the organization of the modern research process and by the regulation of military secrecy.²¹ This only shows that the administrators of modern societies obstruct the free flow of information needed in communicative action, and that Habermas’s assumption that there is enough space for the public sphere where consensus is easily attained is a blind conceit. If this is the case, then, again, Habermas’s theory of communicative action is doomed to fail if it does not presuppose Marcuse’s notion of the Great Refusal which has the promise of bringing to fruition a moment of emancipation.²² It is at this juncture then that Marcuse, who would have us believe that any form of domination and oppression must be countered with equal force, comes in.

Foucault’s genealogy, on the other hand, is a more forceful and convincing critique of modern societies. It is one which seriously engages the dynamics of power and domination by exposing how individuals get programmed by the social institutions in which they are in and the reason why they accept being programmed. Foucault’s genealogical critique therefore is concerned with the effects of the centralizing power of discourse—that is, social control and domination. Thus, it is a mistake to take Foucault’s view of
social relation as power relation only without juxtaposing the idea of control and domination; social relation for Foucault is precisely one of control and domination made explicit by power relations inherent in discourse and later in the modern technologies of power like prisons, schools, factories, hospitals, etc. Yet, it can also be argued that Foucault’s notion of power relation cannot be exclusively viewed as relation of control and domination. Foucault admits that power can also be productive. As stated previously, the relation between the teacher and the student is not necessarily domination; even disciplinary power is not at all bad; self-discipline proves that disciplinary power is advantageous to some degree. But this is not the primary concern of Foucault. What worries him very much is the seemingly unconditional compliance of the individuals to the system of domination. Hence, Foucault offers his “genealogical critique” to arm those who oppose the devastating effect of power and domination. In fact, Foucault argues that “the genealogy should enable historical knowledges to oppose and struggle against the coercion of theoretical, unitary, formal, and scientific discourse.” Indeed, Foucault is tempted to address social pathologies, but in the end he avoids the issue. Although he views “critique” as the art of not being governed so much, Foucault remains pessimistic about the project of emancipation, arguing instead that domination is simply part of history.

Foucault and Marcuse, for sure, share the same view about the prevalence of power and domination in modern societies, although they view it from two different vantage points: one from the advancement of language and discourse, and the other from the advancement of technology. They also differ in the way they approach the problem. While Foucault seems to offer reforms through genealogical critique, Marcuse on the other hand offers social transformation, that is, total social change through the Great Refusal. But inasmuch as it is technological domination that is the recurring form of control and domination today where the political, social, psychological, and economic forms of coercion converge, and inasmuch as a total social change is what the modern society needs rather than reforms which only feeds the system of control and domination, Marcuse’s brand of critical theory is more appropriate than that of Foucault’s; Marcuse directly engages the issue of technological control and domination and not Foucault. While it can be said that Marcuse reduces social transformation through political means only, I contend that Marcuse’s Great Refusal as a political protest, as a saying no to the system of inequalities and injustices, is informed by the norms of the social, the economic, and the psychological. Marcuse is only politicizing the theories arrived at in other disciplines and, finally, Marcuse believes that only through a “collective political resistance” to the system of control and domination can a total social change be achieved.
Meanwhile, Honneth’s call for social justice through a struggle for recognition receives favorable attention from those theorists who advocate moderate forms of social reforms. But his emphasis on “expectations” articulated by the new social movements as the bases of the theory of recognition is quite questionable unless these movements step outside the capitalist system. There are two obvious reasons. Firstly, it is not clear whether these expectations which demand for appropriate consideration are created freely by the individuals themselves. For Marcuse, they might be “false expectations” in the sense that they might be produced by the technological society where the individuals are in. The question must be raised therefore: Are these expectations conceived freely? The answer is surely inconclusive, but the closest to the truth is the negative. In a society where technological rationality is predominant, individuals seldom create their own expectations but rather internalize what the society offers. Secondly, Honneth’s social movements as the key players in his theory of recognition cannot create a decisive force that would contribute to the realization of a total social change unless they come together as a political force. It must be noted here that for Honneth, the struggle for recognition is social by nature and the political has almost nothing to do with it. Honneth is precisely correct in claiming that today Marx’s proletariat is no longer the sole agent of social transformation, but depoliticizing the feminists, students, ethnic minorities, gay and lesbian, and other social movements would weaken the struggle for recognition. This is not to undermine the role of these social movements in the struggle for emancipation. In fact, for Marcuse, these movements have the capacity to countervail domination. However, to depoliticize these movements will only strengthen the functioning of the system of control and domination. In the final analysis, there is no other subject today that can counter domination with equal force than the subject who carries the spirit of the Great Refusal.

Bibliography


Endnotes

3. Ibid., 222. Emphasis mine.
5. Ibid., 108.
8. Ibid., 3.
11 Ibid., 81.
13 Ibid.
14 Renault and Deranty, “Politicizing Honneth’s,” 92-111.
16 Renault and Deranty, “Politicizing Honneth’s,” 92-111.
17 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition*, 144-145. Renault and Deranty developed these three spheres of recognition. The first sphere has something to do with the respect of the person’s body and affectivity. The fulfillment of this demand leads to self-confidence. The second sphere is about the juridical recognition of the equal dignity of persons. The fulfillment of this demand leads to self-respect. Finally, the third sphere, which articulates the recognition of the individual’s contribution to the social division of labor, when fulfilled leads to self-esteem. Getting some hints from Honneth, Renault and Deranty argue that “when individuals and groups fight against social contempt, they just don’t fight against individuals or groups denying them recognition, they are also more or less explicitly driven by a normative dynamic aiming at a social order which would provide self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem.” See Renault and Deranty, “Politicizing Honneth’s,” 92-111.
18 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition*, 155.
20 Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, 11.
21 Ibid., 76.
22 “A moment of emancipation” only because according to Marcuse, there can never be an ultimate form of emancipation like the Absolute of Hegel. According to Marcuse, once one form of domination is addressed another one will arise and this goes on and on. See Richard Kearney, *Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers, The Phenomenological Tradition* (London: Manchester University Press, 1984), 76.