THE CONCEPT OF MAN AND JACQUES MARITAIN’S INTEGRAL HUMANISM

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Introduction
What is man? What constitutes a human person? What is the difference between a human person and other beings in the world? Is man more important than any other living creatures on this earth? What makes him/her a human person? These are questions that have been bothering philosophers for many centuries until this postmodern time.

From the ancient to medieval period, philosophers have expounded their ideas on man. Humanists have expounded on the idea of the human person. Medieval philosophers have written that man, as a creature with body and soul and thus made in the image and likeness of God, is capable of engaging in search for truth. These philosophers affirmed, as Maritain claims, that

...man cannot save himself by himself alone, nor begin by himself alone the work of his salvation, nor prepare himself for it by himself alone and that by himself alone he can do only evil and error. However, man is free when he acts under the divine grace and freely posits good and meritorious acts. (Maritain, 1968:11)

In Medieval philosophy, specifically Scholastic philosophy, man is viewed as a creature wounded by original sin and without the aid of grace, man cannot attain the truth. However, this concept about man is lost when the age of enlightenment arose; this new period introduced a new mode of thought by the renaissance philosophers and reformists.

During this period, “errors and truth are closely intermingled and feed upon each other; truth which lie, and lies which speak the truth”
(Maritain 1968, x-xi). The truth brought by the renaissance is the distorted truth, a truth that offers man a special place in history, dependent to no one but to himself. The renaissance introduced the new but distorted truth about man. On the other hand, reformation brought the idea that he is a corrupted being because of the original sin and he “is no longer free for his free will has been killed by original sin” (Maritain 1973, 14). For this reason, man remained confused of his own being and was still striving to attain it.

Furthermore, a new society brought modernization and new waves of thought that seemingly answers man’s wandering thought. However, modern philosophy continually upheld and embraced the renaissance concept of man, that is, man “does not need grace, nor miracle, or revelation, and is made virtuous and just by his own good nature” (Maritain 1952, 185). Modern man believed that he could liberate himself alone and make himself master and possessor of all nature (Maritain, 1965, 156). For this reason, the more the modern society promises something new for man, the more man loses his own being.

Hence, modern society today focuses on the materialistic aspect of man. It offers man an opportunity, seemingly makes him attain the state of happiness, a paradise here on earth, where man enjoys his own being. However, what modern society offers is a mere illusion for it leads man to a more materialized being and worship material things as if they are gods, who appear to be only responsible for his happiness. In this case, man focuses only on his material aspect, for the more he indulges in material things the more he loses his own being; for he does not only degrade himself but he lets himself transformed into beast because he only use his instinct not his will and intellect. He became slave of his own instinct, he is not free anymore, for “freedom can only be attained by means of exercising our will and intellect by doing what is good for him” (Maritain, 1966; 133). For this reason, the true image of man is lost. It is distorted and alienated because of the vast secularization process, where man lost his “beingness” and man is fragmentized. Man forgets that he is a man, “a being composed of matter and spirit” (Maritain, 1965; 166). This is the image of man which our medieval thinkers protected and taught carefully.
Thus, it is in this context where this study comes in. It expounds, analyzes, and determines Maritain’s concept of integral humanism in order to give a critique whether this concept will help us restore the real image of man. It focuses on how Maritain’s concept of integral humanism restores the real image of the human person.

**The Concept of Man**

For Maritain, man is an individual and a person. Maritain emphasized the concept of “I”, the ego, and took as example Pascal’s idea that “the ego is hateful” (Maritain 1968, 283). He differentiated this Pascalian idea from St. Thomas’ idea by quoting the Bible, when he says, “the man who loves God must also love himself for God’s sake; he must love his soul and his body in the spirit of charity” (Maritain 1968, 284). He saw that Pascal’s idea contradicted the Thomistic idea and along with these contradictions, “the human being is held between two poles; a material pole, which in reality is not concerned with the authentic personality, but rather the material condition and the shadow of personality; and a spiritual pole, which concerns personality itself” (Maritain, 1968; 284). For Maritain, Pascal’s words aim at the material dimension and the individual becoming the center of all things. On the contrary, St. Thomas’ words are concerned with the spiritual dimension and the person who is the source of freedom and goodness (Maritain 1968, 285).

**Individuality**

Maritain distinguished personality and individuality. For him, citing the Thomistic view, “the individuality of inanimate and animate things is rooted in matter, as far as matter has uniquely distinct determinations with respect to location in space” (Maritain 1968, 286-287). This means that matter can still be determined by its location and space. The concept of matter is the materia prima, a pure potentiality, able neither to be nor to be thought by itself and from which all corporeal beings are made. For Maritain, prime matter or matter absolute is a kind of non-being, a simple power of receptivity and substantial mutability and avidity for being.

Moreover, in every material being, the prime matter bears the impress of a metaphysical energy which is called the “form” or
“soul.” The soul constitutes with matter a substantial unity and determines a being to be that which it is, and by this a being particularized to such and such being, a sharing with other beings equally immersed in space and the same specific nature (Maritain 1968, 286).

Furthermore, the human soul constitutes, with the matter, a unique substance, both spiritual and physical. The soul and matter are two substantial co-principles of one and the same being, a single and unique reality whose name is man. Soul animates a particular body which, for Maritain, “derives its matter from germinative cells from which it springs with all their load of heredity” (Maritain 1968, 287), because each soul is a substantial relation with a particular body. In addition, the soul has in its very substance individual characteristics, which differ from every other human soul. For man, as for all other corporeal beings, individuality has its primary ontological roots in matter. Man, insofar as he is a material individuality, has but an unstable unity, which wishes only to fall back to multiplicity for the reason that matter as such tends to decompose itself. Insofar as human beings are individuals, “each is a fragment of a species, a part of this universe, a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we obey” (Maritain 1968, 287). Man is subject to the determinism of the physical world.

**Personality**

Although man is subject to the determinism of the physical world, each man is also a person. Insofar as man is a person, “he is not subject to the beginning of things and atoms, for he subsists entirely with the very subsistence of his spiritual soul, and the soul is in him a principle of creative unity, of independence and of freedom” (Maritain 1968, 288).

The best way, according to Maritain, to understand personality is to consider the relation between personality and love. Maritain disagrees with Pascal’s statement, “On n’aime jamais personne, mais seulement des qualités” (we never love the person but only his qualities) (Maritain 1968, 288), for love is not concerned with qualities. Qualities are not the object of love but rather the person; for the person is deepest, most substantial and hidden, and the
existing reality of the beloved being. This person is capable of bestowing and giving itself. In the same manner, to bestow oneself, one must exist, i.e., a thing subsists and exercises existence itself. This thing exists eminently, in self-possession, holding itself at hand, master of itself. In short, it must be endowed with spiritual existence, capable of super-existing by way of knowledge and love and this is the person. For Maritain, a person is a reality which subsists spiritually, constitutes a universe unto itself, a relatively independent whole within the great whole of the universe, and faces a transcendent whole, which is God. God is the sovereign personality whose existence itself consists in a pure and absolute super-existence by way of intellection and love (Maritain 1968, 288). Thus, the personality does not refer to matter but to the highest and deepest dimension of being. Personality is rooted in spirit insofar as the spirit stands by itself in existence and super abounds in it.

Furthermore, Maritain took the idea “personality as subsistence” from the Thomistic School. Subsistence is the ultimate achievement by which the creative influx seals, within itself, a nature face to face with the whole order of existence so that it receives is its own existence and its own perfection (Maritain 1965, 21). Personality therefore is the subsistence of the spiritual soul communicated to the human composite because it is an imprint or seal that enables one to possess one’s existence, to perfect and give oneself freely. It bears witness to the generosity or expansiveness of being, which in an incarnate spirit derives from the spirit and which constitutes a source of dynamic unity and unification from within. Personality is the “subjectivity of the person” for the reason that the spirit in man makes him cross the beginning of independence and of interiority to himself (Maritain 1968, 289). Maritain compares this subjectivity of the human person to the isolated unity of the Leibnizian monad (Maritain 1965, 22). For Maritain, “its spiritual fatherland is the whole order of goods having an absolute value, and which serves as an introduction to the absolute Whole, which transcends the world” (Maritain 1968, 289).

Finally, the human person not only bears to God the common resemblance borne by other creatures, “it resembles Him in peculiar fashion, and it is the image of God” (Maritain 1965, 22). For God is
spirit, and the person proceeds from Him, having as its principle of life a spiritual soul. A spiritual soul “capable of loving and of being uplifted by grace to participation in the very life of God so that, in the end it may know and love Him as He know and loves Himself” (Ibid.).

Subjectivity and the Human Person

Maritain upholds St. Thomas’ notion of subsistence since it is the key concept that will lead to the reality of the subject. The existential subject has something in common with the act of existing; they both transcend the concept or the idea considered as the terminus of the first operation of the mind or simple apprehension (Maritain 1966, 164). The act of existing is grasped by the intellect for it is the first of ideas and the intelligible that is proper to judgment and not the first apprehension (Maritain 1966, 164).

Furthermore, man, the supremely concrete reality, is an existent subject or suppositum, which subsists in the individual nature, constitutes him and receives from the creative influx his nature as well as his subsistence, his existence, and his activity (Maritain 1966, 164). Every human being possesses an essence and reveals it in his action. In addition, every human being by the virtue of individual existing reality is an exhaustible well of knowability (Maritain 1966, 166).

Moreover, there are only subjects and supposita and that which derives from them into being. We can know these subjects but we can never know their deepest part. We know them not as subjects but as objects by means of objectivising, which is the means of achieving objective insights of them (Maritain 1966, 166). For this reason, “the object is nothing other than something of the subject transferred into the state of immaterial existence of intellect in act” (Ibid.). We know subjects not as subjects but as objects and hence only in the intelligible aspects and perspectives that will render them present to the mind. We shall never get to them in themselves as subjects.

Maritain’s notion of subject leads us to the concentration and integration of the concept of individuality, whose action manifests a more and more perfect spontaneity, from the mere transitive activity of inanimate bodies to the concealed immanent of vegetable life, the
definitely immanent activity of sentient life, and the perfectly immanent activity of the life of the intellect. In man, the suppositum becomes persona, that is, “a whole which subsists and exists in virtue of the very subsistence and existence of its spiritual soul, and acts by setting itself its own ends. He is a universe in itself, a microcosm that though its existence at the heart of the material universe is ceaselessly threatened nevertheless he possesses a higher ontological density than the whole universe” (Maritain 1966, 166). In view of freedom, only the person is free, which means that in the full sense he possesses inwardsness and subjectivity.

In addition, Maritain did not disregard the idea of intersubjectivity of a person, which means interiority of self. He equated it to the subjectivity of the human person which has nothing in common to the unity without doors and windows of the Leibnizian monad. In view of this, the way they communicate with each other is in the order of knowledge and love. Although such communication is rarely possible, it can be made possible “if the persons has a direct relation with the absolute” (Maritain 1965, 22) for only in the absolute can a person can find his fulfillment.

The Concept of Freedom

Freedom is one of the important factors of man’s life, which he sometimes sacrifice in order to be free. Despite its plurality of meanings, freedom, in Maritain’s philosophy, is summed up into two: the freedom of choice or free will and the freedom of spontaneity. These two principal lines are “the freedom of choice or free will defined as the freedom as an absence of constraint, and the freedom of spontaneity defined as an absence of necessity or of necessitation” (Maritain 1966, 132). These two definitions are, for Maritain, the primordial meanings of freedom which the thinkers of the 17th century did not distinguish clearly.

Freedom of Choice or Free will

Placing his perspective on the Thomistic philosophy, Maritain calls the freedom of choice as the first freedom or human free will. For Maritain, “the will is an appetite; a power of desire and of inclination, creating in the soul spiritual weights which attract the
whole and its primordial act is love (Maritain 1966, 133). All appetite, specifically sensitive appetite, is rooted in knowing or awareness. The sensitive appetite is common to men and animals and is rooted in the knowledge of the senses. In case of the will, which a Thomistic philosopher defines as the power of spiritual appetition, it is rooted in the intellect, which possesses the notion of what is good. For this reason, there must exist, in every intelligent nature, a power of desire and of love essentially distinct from the sensitive appetite. This power of desire and love is the rational appetite or will. Thus, “the will is grounded in nature and is itself a kind of nature and for this reason it must have a necessary determination” (Maritain 1966, 134). It must have an operation, which is produced in a natural way and as such necessarily determined. There must be something that it must desire by virtue of what it is, something which it desires necessarily. This desire is “the good which satisfies every desire and which suits all human aspirations; in short, the beatitude, which is equal to happiness” (Ibid.). Necessarily and naturally, one desires absolute happiness. “Absolute happiness by virtue of a desire which is conditional and transnatural, tending toward something superior to our natural limitations and concerning the constitution of which consequently, nature cannot possess the idea” (Ibid., 134-135). The nature of human will is necessarily to desire and the one who necessarily determines it is the Absolute and the complete good. However, one cannot find absolute happiness here on earth, for what one can find here on earth are particular and concrete goods. What man can experience here on earth are the apparent and real goods that one should abandon in order to attain God. For this reason, the way man can possess the absolute happiness here on earth is “when the human intelligence shall behold God, through reason and faith, it will see Him and possess Him as He actually in Himself: it will behold Him as actually satisfying, up to repletion and super-repletion, all the possibilities of desire of the human person, leaving him nothing, not even the shadow of a shadow, to be desired apart from Him” (Ibid., 136).

For Maritain, man can make first decision concerning his last end at the time when the life of reason and personality matures when he was a child. This act can be accomplished in complete silence in the
very depths but it is in itself an extremely great event. In addition to that, “each time that man takes himself in hand in order to deliberate over his ultimate end and to choose his destiny, he recovers in this act something of the absolute beginnings of his childhood” (Ibid.). Now, according to Maritain, when man who deliberates chooses to love which is good in itself, he moves toward God, whether consciously or unconsciously.

Because God is the Absolute Good, “He is our real last end... every creature naturally loves God and this is God longed for” (Ibid.). Without God, one cannot attain the freedom of choice “for without Him we can do nothing” without God man cannot choose toward what is good. Man can only do evil (Maritain 1966, 142).

**Freedom of Spontaneity**

The freedom of spontaneity, as the absences of constraint, is composed of four degrees.

The first degree of freedom of spontaneity, which Maritain called the lowest degree, is “that of a stone that falls freely when nothing hinders it from obeying the law of gravitation” (Ibid.). The second degree of spontaneity is “represented by organic bodies having vegetative life” (Ibid.). The third degree is “by organism having sensitive life” (Ibid., 143). In the third degree of spontaneity, the animal is free with respect to the constituted structures that it has received from nature, in the sense that its activity in space depends on forms or patterns of movement, which are perceptions. The fourth degree of freedom of spontaneity is of “intellective life” (Ibid.). By this, the human being acts not only according to forms or patterns of activity but also in accordance with one’s cognitive activity. Man is “able to exceed from his realm of sense, able to know being and intelligible natures, he knows both what he does and the ends of his activity, as such” (Maritain 1966, 243). By means of the intellectual operations, man can look at the ends of his activity.

From the fourth degree of freedom of spontaneity, man “enters the world of the world of spiritual things, which forms the supreme level of creation” (Ibid.). At this point, the freedom of spontaneity becomes freedom of independence, “for the concern is with persons endowed with free will, and masters of their actions, and the persons
each of whom is as a whole or as a universe” (Ibid., 143).

Through the intellect and the will, the person enters the soul becoming present while existing according to intentional being and, in an immaterial manner, the form and the person, which is the interiority of the actions that the soul will freely carry out. Furthermore, every external reality interiorizes itself in the activity it aspires. As Maritain expounded, “Let all my activity spring from myself as from its source, and be regulated by me; let me be sufficient unto myself in order to live” (Maritain 1966, 144).

From this, man becomes independent because he appears in creation as an intelligent substance (and) endowed with liberty of choice. Man, insofar as he has the aspirations as a person, wishes an ever-higher degree of freedom of spontaneity and independence, which Maritain called the fifth degree. The fifth degree of the freedom of spontaneity is the divine degree, which is “absolutely perfect” (Ibid., 144). For Maritain, this degree “does not destroy man’s being but it goes beyond human condition” (Ibid.). This desire in man does not come from man’s own physical nature but a transcendental element. As of the fifth degree, the perfection of freedom and personality attains only when these are in pure act. This can be made to realize in God.

The Problems of Humanism
Middle Age and Its Concept of Humanism

Problem of Man

For the medieval perspective, man is not only a rational being but also a human nature that goes beyond being rational, contesting Aristotle’s idea that man is a rational animal (Maritain 1968, 9). Man is also a being made of spirit, which is the principal part of man. For this reason, it shows that “man has superhuman aspirations but, since it is the spirit of animal, it also shows that it is the weakest of the spirit” (Ibid., 9).

Moreover, man is also a person, that is, “a universe of spiritual nature endowed with freedom of choice and constituting to this extent a whole which is independent in the face of the world” (Maritain 1968, 9). For Maritain, God is, in medieval thought, the one
who acts within, which shows the value God sets on man. However, God respects the freedom of man, “at the heart of which God nevertheless lives; He implores it, He never forces it” (Ibid.). On the other hand, medieval philosophy, according to Maritain, viewed man as a dislocated being, who is wounded by the devil and bears the heritage of original sin. Man is substantially corrupted and divested of the gifts of grace. For this reason, man viewed himself as a creature who could not do anything except sinning. However, man is “made for supernatural end, traversed by the solicitations of actual grace and bears within the properly divine life of sanctifying grace and its gifts” (Ibid., 10).

Furthermore, according to Maritain, the problem of man in this period was the “sort of fear or metaphysical modesty, and also a predominant concern to see things and to contemplate being, and to take the measures of the world that kept the gaze of medieval man turned away from himself” (Ibid.). This problem turned man away from himself, in order to nurture his relationship with God by means of allowing God to choose his own destiny. And by this, man forgot that he is a creature endowed with free will by God.

Problem of Grace and Freedom

Although problem of grace and freedom is not regarded absolutely as an anthropological but a theological problem, it is necessary to understand the idea of freedom and grace in the medieval period for, “the thought of the medieval period is the Christian thought” (Maritain, 1968; 10). Medieval thought is purely and simply Catholic and Christian thought, which was influenced mainly by St. Augustine.

According to Maritain, the Augustinian conception of man is that,

Man cannot save himself by himself alone, nor begin by himself alone the work of his salvation, nor prepare himself for it by himself alone, and that nevertheless he is free when he acts under divine grace; and that he is alone responsible for the evil that he does; and that his freedom speaks about him in the world a role and initiatives of an unimaginable importance; and that God is the one who
created him, and without him he cannot be saved” (Maritain 1968, 11).

The problem in this concept was that medieval thought explored only things that pertain to the mystery of grace and freedom. Furthermore, for Maritain, “the vast region of shadow remained unexplored which concerned the creative and human depths of this mystery, in particular this shadows are all that which relates to the divine permission of the evil act and to the engendering of evil by the creature and also to the meaning and proper value of the temporal and profane activity of the human being” (Ibid., 12).

Additionally, medieval philosophy portrayed that man’s prise de conscience is not accomplished implicitly in the very movement of metaphysical or theological thought toward being and toward God, for the reason that the sense of nature of the medieval ages is to lived in it rather than to be aware about it” (Ibid., 13). From this sense, medieval philosophy identified only human creature in terms of soteriological problems, the divine needs with regard to man, and the objective laws of morality required of man. However, medieval philosophy did not deal with the subjective resources of man’s grandeur or the subjective resources of man’s miseries (Ibid., 14).

Hence, the inexperienced and unreflecting simplicity of man’s movement of response to God’s movement of effusion characterized medieval thought. Because of this “all human was thus under the sign of the sacred, ordered to the sacred and protected by the sacred,” and the problem that arose here is that “the divine work was being accomplished by the baptized soul and forgot itself for God” (Maritain 1968, 14).

Renaissance and Reformation Period

Because of the theocentric conception of man in the medieval period, “man felt being despised and held as nothing before God” (Ibid., 15). Man felt the misery of being nothing. For this reason, the radiating dissolution of the medieval age and its sacral forms gives birth to the age of secular civilization. “This is the time dominated by the protestant reformist and humanist renaissance, whose aim was to proceed to an anthropocentric rehabilitation of man” (Ibid.).
The Concept of Man and Maritain’s Integral Humanism

The Problem of Man and of Grace and Freedom (Protestant Discovery)

For Maritain, the so-called protestant discovery, which appeared to solve man’s despair, is a mockery in disguise. In this period, the thought of Luther, Calvin, and Jansenius were influential. The problem that occurred in this period was the reformists’ idea that man is a corrupted being, a being corrupted by the original sin. Accordingly, the reformists’ idea, “that human nature is essentially spoiled by original sin and it will remain spoiled under grace, which is no longer a life but a mantle” (Maritain 1968, 16), is a principle that eventually led to the concept of pure pessimism. That the protestant discovery is pure pessimism lies in its concept that illustrates man’s declaration of being held nothing in front of his Creator and is pleading to bring back his own nature. To accept God as the personal savior without the human action is the result of reformists’ pessimistic approach. And on these grounds, the reformists’ problem of grace and freedom arose. According to this doctrine,

Man is bound down, annihilated under despotic decrees. However, the predestined one is sure of his salvation. Thus, he is ready to confront anything here below and to conduct himself as the elect of God on earth; his imperialist demands. His imperialist demands will be limitless and material prosperity will seem to him a duty of his state. (Maritain 1968, 17).

The problem of freedom and grace in the reformation was due to the pessimistic concept about man. Accordingly, “there is no longer free will for it has been killed by original sin” (Maritain, 1968; 17). In this view, it became, for Maritain, the doctrine of predestination and reprobation.

The Problem of Man (Humanist Discovery)

The renaissance period promised to rehabilitate man and bring back human nature. For Maritain, however, it brought out again another problem which man should consider. According to Maritain, the best way to understand the humanist problem is to distinguish the view of mitigated humanist theology and the absolute humanist theology.

In Maritain’s illustration, mitigated humanist theology is “a
theology of Christian naturalism, which regards grace as a simple ornament capping nature (a nature which has needed only itself to be perfect in its order). And so, grace renders meritorious for heaven and colors with a supernatural varnish those acts whose perfect rectitude the reason of the upright man suffices to assure” (Maritain 1968, 21). The Averroism of the middle ages and the Cartesian rationalism of the 17th century claimed in this manner. These famous thinkers aimed to furnish the world with a perfect natural wisdom that man, existentially considered, would be capable of knowing, despite that man “keeps himself in isolation and separation from the things of faith and of revelation, in this climate apart, differed from that of Christian wisdom” (Maritain, 1968; 21).

Here we see the division in man. Man as such, as medieval period conceived was split into two: on the one hand, a man of pure nature, who needed only reason to be perfect, wise and good, and to gain the earth (Maritain, 1968; 22) and on the other hand, “a man who has a celestial envelope, a believing double, assiduous at worship and praying to the God of the Christians, who surrounds and pads with fluffs of grace and renders him capable of gaining heaven” (Ibid., 22). Even though, for Maritain, man was pictured that way nevertheless man remained the man of pure nature.

Furthermore, the doctrine of absolute humanist theology, which Maritain called the theology of natural goodness, differed from the view of mitigated humanist theology. This doctrine is pioneered by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Auguste Comte, and G.W.F. Hegel. According to Maritain,

The man of Rousseau is not only free of original sin and of the wounds of nature; he possesses by essence the pure goodness which renders him a participant in the divine life and which was manifest in him in the state of innocence. Thus, grace has been reabsorbed in nature. The true meaning of Rousseau’s theory is that man is naturally holy. He is holy if he establishes himself in divine union with the spirit of Nature, which will render good and right all his primary movements. (Maritain 1968, 23)

For Rousseau evil comes from the constraints of education and of civilization, of reflection and of deception. Hence, the
manifestation of the man of Rousseau, according to Maritain, “is a man by which the nature will let open itself and pure goodness of man will appear” (Ibid.).

Another great thinker that Maritain cited in view of this doctrine is Auguste Comte, who showed that “man is purely naturalistic” (Maritain, 1968; 23). From this concept God-humanity, Comte that the human race is in its natural and terrestrial reality.

The third thinker who adheres to this doctrine is Hegel. Hegel “reabsorb[ed] all the content of religion into the supreme metaphysical enunciations of pure reason” (Maritain, 1968; 23). Moreover, Hegel introduced the very movement of the redemption into the dialectic of history and made the State the mystical body through which man attains freedom as the son of God.

Consequently, whether one turns to Rousseau, Comte, or Hegel, one would notice that with regard to the existential condition, man is purely natural being, “whom one represents to himself as detached from any connection with supernatural order connoting original sin and grace” (Maritain 1968, 24).

The Problem of Grace and Freedom

Concerning the problem of grace and freedom in this period, we should illustrate also the distinction between mitigated humanist theology and absolute humanist theology.

In this case, Maritain owed this concept, mitigated humanist theology, to Molinism, formulated by a Spanish theologian Luis de Molina. In Molinism, “human nature shares only the first initiative of good and salvation. Man has only the second initiative and God has the first initiative” (Ibid., 19).

According to this view, man has indeed the second initiative and the free initiative of good acts in their entirety since God alone having the first initiative is the source of man’s good acts. For Molinists, there is a relation between human freedom and divine freedom. God does not only give man life but also enlightens constantly the created life and its activity.

The absolute humanist theology, on the other hand, views the problem of grace and freedom as it “seeks to save human freedom at the expense of divine causality” (Ibid., 20). For man, freedom is a
claim and a privilege which he realizes and causes to triumph selfishly.

**Modernity and Anthropocentric Humanism**

The misfortunes of the renaissance and reformation period gave rise to anthropocentric humanism. There was contrasting thought among these periods. For instance the reformation period was “the cry of distress on man’s misery” (Maritain 1968, 26) and the renaissance period was the “cry of man’s grandeur and of its beauty that man makes mount toward heaven.” And from these contrasting views, a new era emerged, that is, modernity. The problem of modern period is that it has been dominated by anthropocentric thought.

**The Problem of Man**

The problem of man in this period was the product of the concept brought by Descartes, Rousseau, and Kant. According to Maritain, these three prominent thinkers paved the way to the problem of man. For Maritain, these three thinkers brought the idea of rationalism to the period and “rationalism had risen up a proud and splendid image of the personality of man” (Maritain 1968, 28). From this conception man was viewed as inviolable, jealous of self-immanence, autonomous, and good in essence. Also from man’s rights and autonomy, these rationalists condemned any physical and spiritual interventions in man. These interventions, according to Maritain, were “revelation and grace, from a tradition of human wisdom, from the authority of divine law, from the Sovereign Good which solicits his will, and from an objective reality, which would measure and rule his intelligence” (Maritain, 1968; 28).

However, this anthropocentric personality failed and gave rise to the significant moment of biology through the Darwinian ideas on man. Charles Darwin, famous for his theory of evolution, regarded man not only as coming from a long evolution of animal species but also “without anything absolutely new appearing in the series, namely, the spiritual subsistence, the soul” (Ibid., 29).

Moreover, the Catholic Church condemned the idea of Darwin because it opposed the Christian idea of the human person. Also, a new concept developed and this was in psychology. Sigmund Freud “affirmed that man is only the place of intersection and conflict for
radically sexual libido and an instinct for death” (Ibid., 29).

The result of the opposition between the tenets of the Catholic Church and the sciences was that “man became an enigma despondent over the complications of death” (Maritain, 1968; 29). Man became confused on whether what and who was on the right track.

**Marxist and Racist Delusion**

Marxism and Racism reacted against the secularized Christian world. These movements opposed the beliefs of Christianity especially on the presence and action of Christ at the core of human history. Through these movements, anthropocentric humanism was strengthened and developed.

To understand better these movements, Marxism and Racism needs to be distinguished. Maritain professed that Marxist principle is “purely and exclusively temporal because Marx believed that salvation is done by man without the help of God” (Maritain 1966, 221). In Marxism, alienation and enslavement in terms of salvation means “giving up of personality and the organization of collective man into one single body whose supreme destiny is to give dominion over matter and human history” (Ibid., 221). In this regard, Maritain pointed out, man was no longer the creature created by God and created according to the image of God. Marxism removed the Christian idea of man which is “a personality which implies free will and is responsible for an eternal destiny, and a being which possesses rights and is called to the conquest of freedom and to a self-achievement consisting of love and clarity” (Maritain 1965, 160). In Marxist doctrine, “man is a particle of the social whole and lives on the collective consciousness of the whole, and man’s happiness and liberty lie in serving the work of the whole” (Ibid., 161). The whole itself was an economic and industrial whole. Maritain illustrated this idea as a “thirst for communion, which is sought in economic activity or in pure productivity” (Maritain, 1965; 160).

One can see in Marxism the dehumanizing image of man, giving up himself for the whole and lost track of his soul, which led man to despair; there is a sort of irrationality, of hatred of intelligence, and of the awakening of a tragic opposition between life and spirit. So, “a
new hope was offered to man in order to overcome this despair, and this hope is the advent of the superman, the will to power, the death of truth, and worse of all, the death of God” (Ibid., 161).

This hope is the idea of Racism, which is grounded in the operation of instinct and life that ends in the hatred of reason. In racism, “the purpose of intelligence is to use it in order to develop techniques of destruction and pervert the function of language. It also perverts the very nature of God, making God Himself an idol and makes Him as a spirit protector attached to the glory of a people or a state, or even as a demon of the race” (Ibid., 162).

In this movement, man was no longer the creature and image of God. Man “became the particle of the collective whole and lives by the Volksgeist” (Maritain, 1965; 162). For this reason, there was no longer any enticement of happiness and liberty in this teaching, as well as universal emancipation for what reigned was only power and self-realization through violence.

Hence, Racism on its irrational and biological basis rejected all universalism and broke even the natural unity of the human race to impose “the hegemony of a so called higher racial essence” (Maritain, 1965; 162). For Maritain, these two systems eventually led to communism, the final state of anthropocentric rationalism and striving to substitute their earthly universalism to the universalism of Christianity (Ibid., 163).

After all these, dissociations and dualisms in the age of anthropocentric humanism, the separation and opposition of nature and grace, of faith and reason, and of love and knowledge, man witnessed the dispersion, a final disintegration.

The Distorted Image of Man

After an extensive process of secularization, human reason lost its grasp on “Being”. Modern man “knew so many truths, the truth which are relative and unstable truth of sciences, without the Truth, which for Maritain, the divine truth given by God” (Maritain 1966, 218). Modern man also claimed human rights and dignity without God, “for his ideology grounded human rights and human dignity in a godlike, infinite autonomy of human will, which any rule or measurement received from another would offend and destroy”
Moreover, modern man trusted peace and fraternity without Christ; “he was to save himself by himself alone, and his love for mankind did not need to be founded in divine charity” (Maritain, 1966; 218). He constantly progressed toward good and toward the possession of the earth without evil on earth, “for he did not believe in the existence of evil, for him, evil was only an imperfect stage in evolution” (Ibid.). He also enjoyed and worshipped human life as having an infinite value without the soul or gift of oneself, “for he believed that the soul or the gift of oneself is unscientific concept, inherited from dreams of primitive men” (Ibid.) and enjoyed a common life without a common good, “for he believed that the aim of common life consisted only of preserving everyone’s freedom to enjoy private ownership, acquire wealth and seek his own pleasure” (Ibid.).

Modern man believed in liberty without self-mastery or moral responsibility, “for he believed that free will is incompatible with scientific determinism” (Maritain, 1966; 218). He believed in equality without justice, “for justice for him is just a metaphysical idea that lost any rational foundation and lacked of any criterion in the modern biological and sociological outlook” (Ibid.). He placed hope in machinism, technique, and mechanical or industrial civilization without wisdom to dominate them at the service of human good and freedom, “for man expected freedom from the development of external techniques themselves, not from any ascetic effort toward the internal possession of self” (Ibid., 219). Modern man looked for happiness without end to aim at, or any rational pattern to adhere, “for the most natural concept and motive power, that of happiness was thus warped by the loss of the concept and the sense of finality is one with desirability and desirability is one with happiness” (Ibid.).

Lastly, the modern man looked for democracy without any task of justice to be performed and without brotherly love from which to get aspiration for the reason that, “democracy tended to become an embodiment of the sovereign will of the people in the machinery of a bureaucratic state more and more irresponsible and more and more asleep” (Ibid.).
The Notion of New Christendom and Integral Humanism

Throughout these different problems, man thirsted for, in the depths of his being, the integration of himself, a desire for unity and happiness. For this reason, Maritain proposed, “the only way of regeneration for the human community is the rediscovery of the true image of man and a definite attempt toward a new Christian civilization, a new Christendom” (Maritain, 1965; 163). Modern period offered man many good things but in a wrong way. The things to do now are to seek these good things along the right way and save the human values and achievements aimed at by our ancestors, which were endangered by false philosophy of the past century, and to have for that purpose the courage and fearlessness of proposing to ourselves the biggest task of renewal, of internal and external transformation.

A new civilization must be organized, a world of genuine humanism and Christian inspiration. Maritain’s idea of new Christendom is different from medieval civilization, even though in both cases Christianity is at their root. The difference of this new Christian civilization to the medieval Christian civilization, for Maritain, can be viewed in two ways; first, “the historical climate of the middle ages, of which all the temporal things such as philosophical and scientific disciplines were subservient instrument of spiritual things, of religious faith, and of the Church. On the other hand, in modern times temporal things gained a position of autonomy, and considered only as a normal process” (Maritain, 1966; 225).

Second, “the medieval man felt he was being oppressed and crushed by the controversy of the pure theocentric humanist thought while on the modern times longed for a rehabilitation of human nature without the help of God” (Maritain, 1966; 226).

In view of this, the idea of new Christian civilization is a response of rehabilitating human nature with the help of God. It is also the only way to rehabilitate man for it brought the idea of integral humanism. A humanism who “considers man in all his natural grandeur and weakness, in the full reality of nature, sin and sainthood” (Maritain, 1965; 164). This integral humanism would “recognize all that is irrational in order to tame it to reason and all that is supra-rational in order to have reason vivified by it and to open man to the descent of
the divine in him” (Maritain, 1965; 165).

Hence, this integral humanism, for Maritain, will work for the sanctification of the temporal order, which is the problem of the modern world.

The True Image of Man

Man in integral humanism is a “being made of matter and spirit, whose body may emerge from the historical evolution of animal forms, but whose immortal soul directly proceeds from divine creation” (Maritain 1966, 227). This man is made of truth and is capable of knowing God as the first cause of Being by the use of reason and capable of knowing God in his innermost life. He is an image of a wounded man. “Wounded by sin and death from the sin of the first race whose burden weighs upon the entire humanity and caused by Christ to become of the race and family of God, living a divine life, and called upon to enter by suffering and love into Christ’s very work of redemption” (Ibid., 228).

In integral humanism, man’s nature is destined to unfold historically the internal potentialities “by achieving constantly reason’s domination over his own animality and material universe” (Ibid.). He has the awareness that the progress obtained “is not automatic or natural but accomplished in step with freedom and with the inner help of God” (Ibid.). Even though “he was thwarted by the power of evil who injected nothingness into his being he remained firmed and raised up his history by the greater forces of love and reason” (Ibid.).

This integral man has already a fragile idea of natural love of God, so, by the help of charity, which man receives from God as a participation in his own life, “it makes him efficaciously love God above everything and each human person in God” (Ibid.).

Also, man is a being who has self-bestowal. “He bestows his own being willingly to all kinds of danger” (Maritain 1965, 167), for the reason that man is aware that “the more he gives himself, the more it makes him a god by participation and makes this life intense within him” (Maritain 1966, 229).
The Internal Dynamism of Human Life

The internal dynamism of human life is classified into two types of movement. For Maritain, the man of Christian humanism has an ultimate end that is God, who, “must be seen and possessed in order for him to tend towards self-protection” (Maritain 1966, 230). For this reason, man’s life has meaning and direction. Man is able to grow up on the way, without turning or wavering or remaining a child spiritually. This perfection to which man tends is what Maritain called “the perfection of love, the love toward another which man has, more than himself and who craves above all to join and love even more, even though, in the process man carries imperfections and weakness” (Ibid.). From this perfection lies perfect freedom, which is to be conquered by continuous effort and be finally given by God, “the one who is loved and the first to love us” (Ibid.). This movement is what Maritain called the vertical movement, which tends toward self-perfection.

Furthermore, the second type of movement is the horizontal movement, which concerns on the evolution of humanity and progressively reveals the substance and the creative forces of man in history. “The horizontal movements of civilization when directed toward its authentic temporal aim help the vertical movement of souls” (Ibid.). Without the vertical movement, the horizontal movement will lose the charge of spiritual, human pressure and creative radiance that animates it towards its temporal accomplishments. For the man of integral humanism, history has a meaning and direction, for the reason that “the progressive integration of humanity is also the progressive emancipation form the human servitude and misery as well as from the constraints of material nature” (Ibid.).

Consequently, this is for Maritain the supreme ideal for which the humanity must worked upon so that the existential state of human life and the structures of civilization will draw nearer to man’s perfection and to the standard of justice and friendship. For “this supreme ideal is the very one of a genuine democracy, of the new democracy we are expecting of which men can be asked to work, fight and die” (Ibid., 226).
Analysis

This study analyzes the solution of the problem of man according to the four divisions of the topic, namely, Maritain's concepts of the true image of man, personality, subjectivity, and inter-subjectivity, and individuality.

According to Maritain, man’s true image is that of a being made of matter and spirit, whose body may have emerged from the historical evolution of animal forms, but whose immortal soul directly proceeds from divine creation (Maritain, 1966; 227). Here, Maritain’s image of man is dualistic, however, substantially united. One cannot separate the body from the human soul. Here, Maritain’s concept of man is likely similar to the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of man. For St. Thomas, the nature of man is composed of body and soul. St. Thomas said, “For just as it belongs to the nature of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones, so it belongs to the nature of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones” (Aquinas 1970, 19). Furthermore, Maritain expounded conveniently the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of man in order to make it suitable in addressing the problem of the modern times.

Meanwhile, by highlighting that matter or body emerged from the historical evolution of animal forms, one should notice the difference between historical evolution and biological evolution. The historical evolution means man progressed from primitivism to civilization to which Maritain adhered, while the biological evolution pioneered by Darwin teaches that man evolved from simple organisms and passed through stages of natural selection and adaptation to become what he is. Maritain criticizes this concept. He emphasizes that Darwin’s biological evolution implies that in each generation of the human being the soul is not created by God but evolves naturally with the body. Eventually taking the idea of Maritain, the researcher can say that man is composed of body and soul.

The second point is Maritain’s concept of individuality and personality. According to Maritain, “the individuality of inanimate and animate things is rooted in matter, as far as matter has uniquely distinct determinations with respect to location in space” (Maritain, 1968; 286). Matter is “the materia prima, a pure potentiality, able
neither to be nor to be thought by itself, and from which all corporeal beings are made” (Maritain, 1966; 286). From this, the researcher claims that the matter of Maritain is the same with the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept. The Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of prime matter is that “prime matter is mere potency, a capacity to become something or to be made something” (Hernandez 1968, 16), which is similar to the matter of Maritain which is pure potentiality and able neither to be nor thought by itself.

Maritain asserts that man’s individuality is rooted in matter. However, it does not end there for man is also a person. This personality is rooted in the spiritual pole of man. Maritain’s distinction is unlikely new for it is the fundamental distinction of the philosophy of St. Thomas.

In reference to man, the notion of individuality is closely related to the personality. In Marthaler’s (2003, 456) point of view, Maritain’s concept of individuality is different from that of Boethius because for the latter man is composed of parts or plurality of forms. For Maritain, the person is incommunicable; he is whole within himself by the reason of his individuality. Moreover the notion of individuality is related to the order of society. As long as man is individual, he is related to society and the person is a ‘whole’, is an object of dignity and must be treated as an end and has a transcendent destiny. In both the material and the spiritual order, however, human beings participate in a common good. Moreover, for Marthaler, this makes moral predication respective of personality and individuality for society is at the service of the person, although considered as an individual, this same person is at the service of temporal society (Ibid., 423). Furthermore this claims that the individual, according to his moral definition, has only human values of the same order as those that belong to society, and that his values should be ordered to society as parts to a whole, while the person, according also to moral definitions, by reason of his values, transcends all (properly to the) sociological values.

The third point is Maritain’s concept of personality that leads to the concept of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. According to Maritain, the best way to understand personality is to consider its relation to love for love is not concerned with qualities. They are not
the objects of our love. Man loves the deepest most substantial and hidden, the most existing reality of the beloved being. This is a metaphysical center deeper than all the qualities and essences, which can find and enumerate in the beloved (Maritain 1968, 288). The idea here is clear that man loves not the qualities but the most existing reality of the beloved. One should remember that Maritain distinguishes individuality from personality. Moreover, one of Maritain’s work speaks of the person as “a center of liberty,” and, personality as “a metaphysical and substantial perfection” (Maritain, 1968; 284). From this vantage, it is a big mistake to suppose that man loves the persons’ qualities rather than the person. This is also the mistake of Pascal’s idea, the idea that “we never love the person but only his qualities” (Ibid., 288).

For Maritain, man cannot love others unless the one who loves and the one loved enjoy self-possession of their person and in turn may able to be the ground of self-donation. To support the contention the researcher would like to quote the idea that the “the deeper meeting here in love happens when two persons or more who are free to be themselves choose to share themselves. It presupposes an ‘I- thou communication’, a communication of selves” (Dy 2003, 221). Every person is enjoying self-possession within himself or herself and is able to go beyond himself. Moreover, everything is individual, for everything is “what it is and another thing” (Maritain 1968, 286). However, mere individuality cannot transcend its own existence in self-bestowal. In sharp contrast, Maritain sees personality as “the ultimate achievement by which the creative influx seals, within itself, a nature face to face with the whole order of existence so that the existence which it receives is its own existence and its own perfection” (Ibid., 288). Without this personality, love is impossible for love is the distinguishing act of the person. As Dy asserted, love is “an act of possessing or being possessed by another person” (Dy 2003, 219). The problem that arises here is the questions whether man can love the person and at the same time (can he also) love the qualities? For Maritain, love does not concern with qualities. How about those beautiful qualities that we’re eventually attracted to? Dy objected, “but once these qualities cease to be attractive, love also ceases” (Dy 2003, 221). Man experiences that love pertains not only
to the person but also to the qualities. The other person is more than his qualities, more than what man can conceptualize him (Ibid.); love is the experience of this depth and mystery of the other and the firm will to be for him. Dy emphasizes that “the appeal of other is himself. The other in his ownness is himself the requested experience. The appeal to the other is the call to participate in his subjectivity, to be with and for him” (Ibid.). Hence, in Maritain’s view, the person cannot communicate with others unless by means of knowledge and love. However, this communication can only be possible if these persons relate themselves to the absolute.

Conclusion

Maritain’s integral humanism is the man of Christian humanism. It is a guide, a pathway, that leads to the restoration of the real image of man distorted by the medieval, renaissance and reformation period, and modern times. This is not only a magnificent work of a Christian philosopher but also a reflection of the real essence of man. Hence, Maritain’s integral humanism is the renewing our modern and fragmented society today.

REFERENCES


