

## BEING-FOR-ITSELF AS FREEDOM: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY ON SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN PERSON

**Asis Clo Abonado III**

University of the Immaculate Conception

**Abstract.** In this paper, the researcher, using the qualitative-descriptive method, exposes the principles behind Sartre's assertion of the human person as condemned by his own freedom and as a useless passion. At first, in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre talks about essence and appearances as two aspects of Being. Essence is just a chain in the series of appearances. Meanwhile, Sartre also affirms the permanent possibility of non-being, Nothingness, which is the limitation of one's inquiry on what exists. Nothingness is that which exists outside what is existent (i.e., Being), and conversely, 'Being is that which is outside of what is nothing. Indeed, Being and Nothingness as both existents imply the 'evident and 'non-evident'.

Another point is that man is enmeshed into existence his absurd world of muddling events. Since this world makes no sense, he finds no universal principles or moral standards in it. Upon his realization, he encounters his dreadful freedom because, as Sartre affirms, it is absolute and radical.

In conclusion, Sartre's effort of explaining the existence of human reality (*Being-for-itself*-human person) in some sense falls short, but is, in some respect, strong. It falls short primarily because Sartre provides the reader a definitive meaninglessness of his seemingly meaningful endeavors and toils in life. However, in Sartre's writings, freedom and responsibility are considered as constructive attributes of the human person. But going deeper into the central reasons of the formulation of such concepts using critical thinking would direct any reader to discover the definitive meaninglessness-human reality's Nothingness. Consequently, Sartre's phenomenological ontology does not successfully exhaust the explanations concerning the Human Person (of human reality, if one were to employ Sartre's *Being-For-Itself*). Nevertheless, if one tries to look at Sartre's philosophy in a critical way, one can clearly surmise that to be conscious of one's choices in life is essential.

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**Keywords.** Being-for-Itself, Freedom, Human Person

### **Introduction**

The divergence and convergence of the philosophical principles in life are extraneous unless a person understands the definitive justification of his existence. However, this understanding is applicable only if principles decided as its own set of priorities at one time will continue. If a principle, for example, that social harmony should take precedence over critical argumentation and open debates is once decided, then critical thinking practices would be odd because members of the culture would constantly agree that past decisions are not to be amended no matter what. But, it is surely a very unreasonable position to take. Cultures, like man, frequently make decisions which are later improved or revoked.

This phenomenon may show that critical thinking and philosophical thoughts are divergent. If Oriental cultures opt not to go along the path of objective critical thinking, then both do not seem to go with each other, for one may be correct when one argues that critical thinking is a part of Western culture only. If a culture prioritizes sets of values which contradict critical thinking and freely chooses those sets over those adopted by Westerns for whatever reasons, then its critical thinking would belong to Western culture only. Adopting it to Oriental cultures would be similar to importing foreign ideas and practices.

Classical philosophers investigated this preceding issue by relating it to the ultimate stuff of the cosmic humanity. In the long run, they fell short of completely discovering what they were looking for, since man could not entirely be equated with entities simply found in the cosmos.

In fact, throughout history, man himself has taken advantage of the concept of a supreme deity which turns out to be a valuable means for abuse, manipulation, and fraud by conflicting religious sects. Consequently, man has questioned the authority of social norms, values, moral standards and traditions. Various philosophical questions surface. These are: Is there really a god? Is this god not an obstruction to one's freedom as man? How does one come to know of this god? Again, these inquiries address the philosophical concerns

by putting man at the center. These are direct to the emergence of the contemporary philosophers whose philosophical attitude is characterized as Existentialism.

The peripheral cosmic world or any god-given nature which determines human being is no longer utilized as a point of undertaking of this new philosophical inquiry. What remains the same is the objectivity of sorting out the truth behind the reality of human existence. This philosophical attitude, which puts man as the standard of everything, leads to atheism or the disbelief of any deity. However, it does not mean a total abandonment of the possibility of a belief in a supreme transcendent being. For some existentialist philosophers, after having thoroughly studied man per se may still come up with the realization of the existence of a god.

Similarly, existentialism does not endanger the philosophical learning gained through the cosmological observations by the early thinkers. This is through the realization that man is not alone in this world; he is not the standard of everything. Accordingly, a philosophical attitude driven by the principle of pure objectivity, stating that everything external to a thinking subject is considered as mere objects, has to be untenable and, to the excess, not viable. Philosophers who maintain this philosophical approach are branded solipsists, viewing that nothing exists except one's own self and contents of his consciousness. As a result, solipsism generally leads to such ideas as isolation, egocentricity, indifference, and other self-centered outlook in life. Also, it will effect to a discontented way of living characterized by regrets - an expression of insufficiency over an erroneous understanding of human existence.

#### **Different conceptions of man and critiques of freedom**

Existentialism emphasizes *individual existence, freedom, and choice*. The diversity of positions with emphasis on *concrete individual existence* and consequently on *subjectivity, individual freedom, and choice* makes existentialism impossible to define (Aronson, May 2006).

This divergence in perspectives on existentialism is supported by some of the leading existential scholars. In fact, Walter Kaufmann (Krapiec, 1985) says that existentialism is not a school of thought or

reducible to any set of tenets. Some of the difficulties in defining existentialism result from the characteristics of the philosophy itself.

For example, most existentialists, according to Raymond, (as cited by Krapiec 1985) deny that reality can be neatly summarized into a system. This does not mean that existentialists are unsystematic. They tend to emphasize the richness of human experience rather than construct a tidy framework. Thus, having a precise definition is impossible. It, however, suggests one major theme: a stress on individual existence and the subsequent development of personal essence.

Moreover, the humanistic studies whose subject is man himself and his cultural creations cannot be outmoded. Man himself is an interesting and significant subject matter (Krapiec, 1985). The Platonic concept of man exemplifies the structure of the entire cosmos. Man, as a union of body and soul, is a reflection of this cosmic dualism. The essential element differentiating man from all living things is his intellectual soul. The essential function of the soul is to animate the body. Plato's theory of man must therefore be described as dualism which is expressed in both ontological and epistemological positions.

The Aristotelian concept of man posits that the agent's intellect separates from the body, without sensation, simply an act from its own being. This intellect participates in the life of god. Hence, there must be another power of the soul, while the agent intellect is something divine and immortal. But, man is not immortal and human soul is essentially joined to the body. The soul is not a substance, but only the function and act of the body. Thus, it shares the destiny of the body.

The Thomistic notion of man holds that he is actualized in the experience of 'beatific vision'. This vision is a way that man contemplates on the very essence of god. So, when it happens, he is spontaneously immersed in an experience filled with never ending happiness and contentment (Pavo, 2010).

Meanwhile, Descartes' concept of man is closely connected with his new philosophical starting-point. Beginning with universal doubt, Descartes finds in it a foundation for certitude. If one doubts, he is thinking. Thought exists even though one is dreaming or led into

error by an evil demon. Even though what one thinks may be a dream or a delusion, the fact that one does think cannot be doubted. The foundation of knowledge should be sought for not in the object but in the subject and in the conscious spirit (Pavo, 2010).

From contemporary nihilism, Sartre appropriates Heidegger's *Dasein* and renames it *Being-for-itself* or consciousness which creates itself through its choices. Likewise, he acknowledges the dichotomy represented by being and nothing and translates it into celebrated opposition between *Being-in-itself* and *Being-for-itself* (Webbs, 1952).

Accordingly, the human person is characterized as *Being-for-itself*, which is consciousness. All other entities that lack human consciousness belong to the antithetical class of beings, namely, *Being-in-itself*. In the examination of the human person, i.e., *Being-for-itself*, one should consider first the *Being-for-itself* as consciousness. It is essentially consciousness, as always a consciousness of something. In *Being and nothingness*, Sartre describes the fundamental relation between consciousness (*Being-for-itself*) and object (*Being-in-itself*). Consciousness always presupposes an object of which it is conscious. The examination of Sartre's particular brand of existentialism is developed under the aspect of *Being-for-itself*, while maintaining that the first two modes of being (*Being-for-itself* and *Being-in-itself*) divide all reality (Warnock, 1970).

*Being-for-itself* is consciousness. Consciousness necessitates something, for without an object, there can be no consciousness. Sartre speaks of *Being-for-itself* as nothingness since consciousness cannot possess any essence or content of its own. Human reality is a kind of nothingness of the present which is situated between the past accomplishments and the future projects (Blackham, 1952).

Jean-Paul Sartre maintains the non-stability of human nature. According to him, man is not what he is, inasmuch as he is a being who is not now, or what his past has been. At the same time, man is what he is not, for he is not yet the undetermined future. He will stand as a kind of nothingness of pure existence between his accomplishments, which are now history, and his future projects which are still undetermined. The present becomes meaningful only in the light of what has already been achieved, and that remains to be accomplished (Blackham, 1952).

The *Being-for-itself* is neither a person nor a substance, nor a thing. It is a revelation of nothingness which has no fixed essence (Schaldenbrand, 1960). Barsoum (1991), Blackham (1952) and Copleston (1994) express the importance of authentic individuals not just a simple human story. Barsoum (1991) writes: "Man has to fend himself to an alien world. His past is covered with difficulty and uncertainty; his responsibility is so great that he becomes anxious (angst) with no room for complacency."

These authors described the condition of *Being-for-itself* that recognizes the perpetual pure separation and denial embodied in historical existence in the world. But this condition should not be identified with existence as a property as its totality because it perpetually re-constitutes itself with a virtual totality of its own. Hence, they observed that Sartre tries to avoid the difficulty of human condition instead of human nature. Copleston (1994) said, "man whatever he is called Dasein or *Being-for-itself* needs to be something, and he is differentiated from a stone, tree, or fish."

Lafarge (1970) writes that man's existence does not precede essence, and his view opposes Sartre's view that existence activates nothing that pre-exists it. It means that one would exist but he would be nothing; he would not have human nature.

In the same manner, "man is a being through whom nothingness comes into the world. He is the being who is what he is not, and who is not what he is. He is *freedom*, but *freedom* is a lack of being. He is lack of being so that Being may be there. He must set himself apart from the totality of being to assign significance to the particular Being, which he confronts, and which he establishes with it" (Schaldenbrand, 1960).

Pojman (1998) emphasizes the absolute *freedom* in Sartre's philosophy. He expounds Sartre's notion of human person condemned to *freedom* by way of putting it into a concrete example. To illustrate, man imagines the most magnificent house in the world, and in his imagination, he hires a builder who constructs the house according to that plans. Now, he has an existing house to serve his purpose. This means that the essence (idea) precedes the existence of the house. On the contrary, he further elaborates and takes away god. For an atheist like Sartre, there is no ideal mind that defines

one's being. One is not like the house that has been designed for a purpose with a definite nature. He is just born and determines his nature. In other words, he creates his essence.

Schaldenbrand (1960) speaks that *freedom* is always considered as the specific quality of being human. Man has a choice: to be or not to be, to do or not to do. Other living beings merely follow a path pre-set by their nature, but human beings do not have a plan to follow or if they have one, they can, by means of *freedom*, choose to subvert that plan. Some thinkers find difficulty accepting the existence of human *freedom*, especially when this *freedom* could be used to subvert god's will. She cited Sartre who asked why god endowed man with *freedom* to only thwart His plans. In *The flies*, which she cited, Sartre presumed that god might commit a mistake by endowing man with *freedom* because by means of *freedom*, man can disobey Him. In the end, she said, to use one's *freedom* correctly means salvation; to use it wrongly is one's damnation.

Greene (April 2006) states that man cannot have a stable and permanent human nature. Instead of having common human nature or human condition, "Man can never be spoken as having a completed or permanent being. There is a constancy of futurity and negativity."

Streller (1960) presents Sartre's conception of *freedom* not as conditions eternal to man which allow him to choose among alternatives but a state of being of the *Being-in-itself* to which the *Being-for-itself* is condemned. One is a *freedom*, for he has a choice, and that is he does not choose to be free. Indeed, he is condemned to *freedom*.

Correspondingly, Sartre maintains his affirmation that *existence precedes essence* is not at all a denial of consciousness as constitutive. He strongly protests the Husserlian equation of man's consciousness with a transcendental ego. Sartre argues that the empirical ego is created by consciousness, but he goes far beyond the phenomenological data when he ascribes its creation to an absolute (Schaldenbrand, 1960).

On the contrary, Desan (1954) opposes Sartre's position on existence that precedes essence. According to him, Sartre maintains that *Being-for-Itself* is equated with consciousness or human

condition is free from stability and fullness of the *Being-in-itself*. With this, Desan argues that Sartre refuses to consider human reality as an essence because *Being-for-itself* is Absolute and indefinable freedom.

Massley (June 2005) argues that one can combine several interpretations in order to arrive at the best understanding of Sartre's treatment of consciousness. She states that such an understanding treats consciousness as the state of affairs, i.e., its facticity transcends itself towards its correlative objects. In the end, one must utilize certain aspects of Husserl's description of consciousness, a description that Sartre actually rejects.

As a result, the consciousness consistently appears as personal, and the self persuades practically all men that it is a genuine spontaneity. Massley's first point is that the essential function of the self is masking spontaneity and not the mirroring an ideal unity of psychic states. The consciousness would avoid the anguishing revelation of its absolute freedom. Thus, its total responsibility constitutes the self as its false representative (Schaldenbrand, 1960).

Tillich (2006), in *Existentialism and Psychotherapy*, observes Sartre's rejection of a human essence and emphasizes the absolute dependence of existentialism on an existentialist's doctrine. He writes that there are, however, only rare moments in this vast development in which an almost pure existentialism has reached. An example is Sartre's doctrine of man stating that man is what he acts to be.

Roberts (2006), in *Existentialism and Religious Belief*, accuses Sartre of outright dishonesty. He argues that Sartre deceives when he refuses to talk about essential human nature. Sartre discusses on universal human condition in connection with the fact that all men have to exist in the world of mortals along with other people. Roubiczek (2006) likewise criticizes Sartre's rejection of the notion of essence in preference to existence. Citing Sartre, man is not merely developing his personalities by understanding different aspects of one's human nature, but creating himself entirely.

Foulquie (2006) criticizes Sartre's claim that man makes or chooses his own essence. He points out Sartre's failure to distinguish between the universal essence and the individual essence (p. 19). Macann (1993), however, discusses that man is never an individual but a universal singular, metalized and universalized by his



epoch. According to him, Sartre's process is the opposite of the classical meaning of universalizing.

Collins (1952), on the other hand, expresses that the exemplar notion is not a type wherein it accords with which finite individuals are immobilized. It represents the entire being of the creature in its unique existential act and individual traits, as well as in its essential nature. In such a case, the real individual essence and the act of existence coexist simultaneously. Collins points out that Sartre's basic existentialist thesis implies a logical difficulty, for it is impossible to be without being something.

Desan (1965) and Levy (2002) point out that as an abstract notion, human essence is a group of abstract characters which is found in each of the existentialistic situations. Brown (2005) argues that for Sartre and Foucault the issue of *freedom* occurs at different stages in their totality. By proceeding with a critical intention in mind, Brown elucidates three important similarities between Sartre and Foucault. In short, the implications of their refusal to introduce an idea of the good into the social field show that both reduce the status of *freedom* to a negative concept.

Stumpf (1994) and Quito (2002) explain that man must always be responsible for himself and everyone else, and this presupposes that he is overcome with anxiety and deep anguish. Moreover, they want to put that existentialism is a type of philosophy rooted in lived experience, concerned with human *freedom* and purpose in the midst of apparent absurdity.

On the other hand, Santoni (1987) argues against the Sartrean, claiming that bad faith is not skeptical. According to him, Sartre argues that bad faith, as lying to oneself and distinguished from lying in general, introduces the possibility of concealing the truth from the one whom one is trying to deceive-oneself. He thus concludes that consciousness in bad faith cannot be skeptical. For him, Sartre is guilty of focusing on the single unified consciousness of bad faith (lying to oneself) while at the same time unintentionally allowing the duality of consciousness to become a necessary condition for both lying and skepticism. For Santoni, Sartre fails to acknowledge the skeptical aspects of the kind of lying that goes with bad faith. In conclusion, Santoni argues that if his analysis is resonance, Sartre's

bad faith may be said to be skeptical. That is, the project and structure of bad faith bear most of the elements of cynical consciousness.

Ally (November 2001) investigates the relationship between morality and history and provides significant resources for a novel Sartrean argument for human freedom and careful examination of the paradoxical nature of morality. He argues that a vision yields on the *concrete, situated, historical freedom* that surely counts among the varieties of free will which is worth wanting.

Borrajo (1968), after discussing the implications of Sartrean ethics, concludes that the root of the failure of Sartre's moral perspectives is ultimately his unrelenting atheism. The denial of god and the separation of man from divine dependence ultimately condemn him to desperate and incurable contradiction of his being.

Natanson (1951) explains that Sartre's work is closely connected to perennial philosophy, and the questions he raises concerning man's *being, freedom, anguish* and responsibility are crucial problems which philosophy must attempt to clarify and answer. He claimed that Sartre prepares in advance the way beyond quasi-phenomenological ontology. Whether or not this advance making use of Husserl's method will succeed, the author leaves an open question. Sartre's greatest achievement is to have returned to one—the link of philosophic problems concerning the ultimate similarity between human subjectivity and human reality.

In sum, man is the only known being that defines itself simply through the act of living. In other words, first one exists, and then the individual emerges as life decisions are made.

Freedom of choice, through which each human being makes his own nature, is one of the essential themes. As a result, individuals are free to choose their own path. They must allow the risk and responsibility of their actions. Those who follow this believe they are in a world that does not always make sense, a world that is filled with uncertainty where well-intended actions can become obscure and disorganized. In basic existentialist beliefs, "man is the only animal defining itself through life. Without life, there is no meaning. Existentialists believe in life and fighting for it" (Wyatt, 2011).

Existentialism upholds that life is a series of choices. Some decisions are devoid of pessimistic results. Some things are irrational or absurd, without explanation. If one makes a decision, he or she must follow through. Also, that of anxiety, or the sense of anguish, a generalized uneasiness, and a fear or dread is not directed to any specific object. Anguish is the dread of the emptiness of human existence. Moreover, that of absurdity, an existentialist would say 'I am my own existence, but this existence is absurd'. To exist as a human being is unfathomable and absurd. Everyone is simply here, thrown into time and place. Thus, one's existence has no reason, without necessary connection. One's life is an absurd fact.

*Being-for-itself* is consciousness. Consciousness is necessarily of something, for without an object, there can be no consciousness. Like a mirror, its content is only of the reflected objects. There is also a fundamental separation between consciousness and its object. Sartre speaks of *Being-For-Itself* as nothingness, since consciousness cannot have any essence or content of its own. Human reality is a kind of nothingness of the present situation between the past of accomplishments upon. Hence, man possesses no fixed or permanent nature. He is in the constant process of creating it (Barnes, 1959).

In view of this, the researcher attempts to deeply scrutinize Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy of human person with emphasis on *Being-for-itself* as freedom.

### **Sartre's human person: Being-for-itself as freedom**

Man is a *Being-for-itself*, which Sartre identifies with consciousness. *Being-For-itself* is consciousness. All consciousness is consciousness of something. Consciousness is necessarily of something, for without an object, there can be no consciousness. Like a mirror, its content is only of the reflected objects. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness. That is, consciousness is born, supported by a being, which is not itself. To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as revealed—as revelation of a being which is not and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it.

Consciousness can be compared to a mirror. A mirror has content only when objects are reflected on it. Of itself, it is empty. In like manner, consciousness has no content except the objects, which it reflects. These objects are always other than consciousness itself.

As a result, consciousness always presupposes an object of which it is conscious. In addition, the object is an absolute necessity, since there is no consciousness without it. Sartre spends no time in demonstrating the existence of the object. The *Being-for-itself* is absolute and indefinable freedom, because he is in reality, a lack of being and it is seeking after being; it is total and absolute freedom.

Furthermore, Sartre asserts that man does not possess freedom. He is not an agent who possesses a nature and who can experience his will in freedom. For Sartre, man himself is freedom. He asserts that *Being-for-itself* is a being who learns his freedom through his actions, but he is also a being whose particular and distinctive existence temporalizes itself as freedom. He is essentially consciousness of freedom since nothing exists in consciousness. Hence, his freedom is continually in question of his being. It is the substance of his being and it is essentially possess a comprehension of freedom.

Freedom has various descriptions, but it cannot be defined, for it creates itself incessantly. In Sartre's freedom, existence precedes and commands essence. There is no essence of freedom just as there is no essence of consciousness. Sartre's *Being-for-itself* is a continual escape towards its possibility; it is always in the making. Consequently, freedom means negation of all boundaries, and there is only one limit to freedom, and that is freedom itself. *Being-for-itself* is free because it is not what it is, because it is not massive *Being-in-itself*. The *Being-For-Itself* manages to have the world that it wants. Man is the future of man. This means that there is no weight of the past on him, and that man with no support is condemned at every moment to invent man.

Hence, the human person is free because it stays out of being, escapes from being. If the *Being-For-Itself* were surrounded in the massive and full density of the *Being-In-Itself*, man would no longer be free.

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**Validation of Sartre's human person, Being-for-itself as freedom**

Sartre argues that there is no God and, hence man has no constant nature. Human person is equated to *Being-For-Itself*, which is consciousness. Sartre describes the human person as a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not. Man is not what he is, inasmuch as he is not now, what his past has been. Moreover, *Being-for-itself* as consciousness and nothingness is also *freedom*. Man does not possess or exercise *freedom*. He is *freedom*. The *freedom* to which man is condemned makes him the creator of all human values. There is absolutely no thing, person nor norm to which man can turn for guidance in the choices he must make.

Hence, there is a fundamental separation between consciousness and its object. Sartre speaks of *Being-for-itself* as nothingness, because consciousness cannot have any essence or content of its own. Human reality is a kind of nothingness of the present, situated between the past of accomplishments and the future of the projects to be embarked upon. Hence, man possesses no fixed or permanent nature. He is in the constant process of creating it; this process is always rendered incomplete by the intervention of physical and moral essence. Therefore, Sartre asserts that although it is impossible to find in each man a universal essence that can be called human nature, nevertheless, a human universality of condition. Man possesses no fixed or permanent nature. He is in a constant process of creating it.

Furthermore, Sartre insists that man does not have freedom. Man is not an agent who possesses a nature and who can experience his will in freedom. Man is freedom. Sartre validates his argument of *Being-for-itself* in terms of freedom in the following manner: mainly, man is an existent who learns his freedom through his acts, but he is an existent whose individual and unique existence temporalizes itself as freedom. As such, he is necessarily consciousness (of) freedom since nothing exists in consciousness except as the non-thetic consciousness of existing. Thus, man's freedom is perpetually in question in his being; it is not a quality or property added on his nature. It is exactly the stuff of his being; and, as in his being, his being is in question, he must necessarily possess a certain comprehension of freedom.

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For that reason, man is thrown into the world and is free to act as soon as he becomes conscious of himself. Man must invent his values, since there are no rules of conduct or morality as guidelines for his actions. There is absolutely no one can condemn or justify him. He is the supreme maker and inventor of values.

Hence, man is free in every respect—free to act and choose the cause for his particular actions. As unqualified and ungrounded freedom, man must carry the entire responsibility of the world by himself. He is abandoned in the world, but his abandonment does not involve passivity on his part.

Sartre has always insisted that his stance demands the priority of existence over essence. He has categorically denied the existence of God. Firstly, essence can be understood on the metaphysical plane, as referring to the nature of the being. Secondly, essence can be understood in a moral plane. It deals with the free development of the moral character of a person. In a way, it is true that man fashions his nature in the sense that the existential choices, which he makes throughout his life, will determine the kind of a person he will be. However, to substitute moral essence for metaphysical essence is untenable. Sartre claims that man chooses his own essence. Sartre says that man first is-only afterwards is he this or that; man must create for himself his own essence. Sartre tries to substitute human condition for human essence. Although, it is impossible to find in each and every man a universal essence that can be called human nature nevertheless, there is a universality of human condition. By this condition, one understands with more or less clarity, all the limitations which a priori define man's fundamental situation in the world.

### **Implications Sartre's notion**

There are three implications of Sartre's human person. The first is epistemological implication. First, truth in relation to man and his freedom is not something absolute and permanent. Second, truth is subjective in the sense that it is the individual by free choice determines what is true. Third, meaning is not fixed; it is continually created and recreated by the individual. Fourth, meaning in life is not found in things; the individual creates and recreates it. Fifth, one

cannot impose universal or absolute truth. Sixth, truth cannot be attained by an absolute method. Seventh, meaning and truth is continually defined and redefined.

The second is metaphysical implication. There are six points under this implication. First, man as the *Being-for-itself* should not be considered as an object. Second, man cannot be measured and calculated, because he is nothingness. He cannot be defined, and one can never judge a person. Third, man's life is a constant change. As a result, in *relationship*, one should anticipate changes. Fourth, one attribute towards persons should be phenomenological, that is, to let the person show himself, just as he shows himself to himself. Fifth, man has no stable nature and possesses no stable tendencies. Sixth, man being the *Being-for-itself* should not be placed into fixed idea.

The last is ethical implication. It presents seven points. First, values or ethical standards are never imposed upon a human person. They are created and recreated by the person himself. Second, it implies that one has to eradicate God and deify oneself. Third, though man is free, Sartre reminds everybody to be responsible for one's actions. Fourth, man is not bound by his past actions because he changes from time to time. Fifth, the meaning of one's choice exists only by virtue of its choice. Sixth, there are no changeless norms, to which man can look for guidance on his conduct. Seventh, man is a deity and creates values not only for particular self, but also for others.

### Conclusions

After an exposition and evaluation of Sartre's key concepts, the researcher concludes that Sartre's effort of explaining the existence of human reality (*Being-for-itself—Human person*) falls short [, and, in some respect, strength]. It falls short because Sartre, as exposed in his writings, provides a reader the *definitive meaninglessness* of his *seemingly meaningful* endeavors and toils in life. However, along the course of Sartre's writings, certain concepts are constructive attributes of the human person; concepts such as freedom and responsibility. Nonetheless, the attempt of going deeper into the central reasons of such concepts using critical thinking would direct

any reader to discover the definitive meaninglessness—human reality's *Nothingness*—implicitly advocated in Sartre's writings.

Sartre's phenomenological ontology does not successfully exhaust the entire possible explanations concerning the human person. He is not able to validate man's abandonment from the weight behind man's natural tendency to inquire for an ultimate reason, which is commonly gained through the inquiry *why?* Sartre's apathy towards metaphysics is the central reason why the concepts in his philosophical writings accordingly become negated and empty in meaning. Nevertheless, if one tries to look at Sartre's philosophy in a critical way, one can clearly surmise that it is essential for man to be conscious of all the choices he makes in life. To consider the act of implicating external forces for the outcome of one's endeavors in life must, at all cost, be a taboo.

Meanwhile, it is not viable for a human person (*Being-for-itself*) to attain an identical and substantial unity with the foundation of his being (*Being-in-itself*). As Sartre asserts, his effort of doing so should not make him a mere useless-passion. Likewise, *Being-in-itself*, which Sartre claims to be free from any description, is not at all negated of any meaning. On the contrary, it might be the *being* that contains the fullness of meaning. It might be what man usually calls as God who provides him the capability to reason (conscious) and love. It might be the definitive end that gives human person a meaning why he must be responsible for all his actions. Also, it might be the basis of illumination for the humanity to realize that his freedom can only be exercised properly not in doing what one subjectively likes, rather, by doing what one ought to do.

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