



# **SARI Global**

## Situational Report


### **Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh**

NOVEMBER 24, 2024





## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh



The above visualisation presents a collection of Israel Evacuation Orders and Israeli Armed Forces (IAF) attacks of the South & Nabatieh Governorates spanning from 1 October – 12 November 2024.

The map does not include individual building locations that have been issued evacuation orders by the IAF.

### Overview

The SARI Global report analyses the escalating conflict in southern Lebanon, focusing on patterns derived from data on evacuation orders and Israeli Armed Forces (IAF) attacks. The findings reveal a gradual expansion of conflict zones from early October to mid-November 2024, with evacuation orders broadening from localised areas near the southern border to encompass wider regions,

<sup>1</sup> Maalouf, N. – Map Template and October 1-18 Data derived from [Link](#)



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including Tyre, Nabatieh, Marjayoun, and Jezzine. This shift marks a significant transition from targeted threats to a more extensive impact zone.

The report delves into the escalation patterns, trends in IAF attacks, and the validity of evacuation orders covering large territories, with a detailed snapshot of the Tyre Subdistrict. Notably, the analysis highlights a substantial number of IAF airstrikes, over two thousand, across the South and Nabatieh Governorates between 1 October and 12 November 2024. These attacks also underscore a troubling increase in strikes on health workers and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) personnel, raising critical concerns about the conflict's broader humanitarian and security implications.

### Escalation Pattern

- Initial evacuation orders began in areas adjacent to the southern border and gradually expanded northeast toward more populated towns such as Nabatieh and Marjayoun.
- There is a concentration of airstrikes targeting Tyre, with noticeable strikes targeting the [city centre on 22 October](#).
- [On 12 November](#), highlighted in dark green the evacuation orders have expanded to include large swathes of territory, such as Aanqoun and Babliyah in Saida (Sidon) and Ansar in Nabatieh District.
- The map indicates a dense concentration of evacuation orders in the Southern border areas except for the Southwestern areas starting from Kfarkila in Marjayoun District, which has been an area of contestation from early stages since October 2023, along with other border towns such as Khiyam in Marjayoun District, Hibbariyeh and Kfarchouba in Hasbeiya District.

### Israel Armed Forces (IAF) Attacks

- Utilizing SARI Global's own data and in cross-reference with data from ACLED, there have been more than two thousand airstrikes in the South and Nabatieh Governorates recorded from 1 October – 12 November 2024.<sup>2</sup>
- Areas closer to the borders, such as Bint Jbeil and its surrounding villages, show a higher density of shelling and bombardments, likely targeting areas perceived as Hezbollah strongholds or strategic locations.

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
<sup>2</sup> Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com), derived on November 14 2024





## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh

Distribution Of Airstrikes By District



In the **South** and **Nabatieh Governorates**, Tyre District has been the most heavily targeted by IAF airstrikes, accounting for 33% of all strikes, followed by Bint Jbeil with 23%, Nabatieh with 19%, Marjayoun with 9%, Sidon (Saida) with 8%, and Jezzine with 3%. These districts remain the most affected compared to the rest of the country, with Tyre, Bint Jbeil, and Nabatieh consistently ranking as the top three.

The distribution of airstrikes **across the country** closely aligns with patterns of internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to data recorded by the [IOM on 18 November](#), 54% of IDPs originate from these southernmost districts, with 23% from Tyre, 18% from Nabatieh, and 13% from Bint Jbeil. The remaining 46% of IDPs are distributed across other districts, highlighting the disproportionate impact of airstrikes on these southern regions.

Governorate	District	IDPs	Percentage of IDPs (Lebanon total)	Percentage of Airstrikes (Lebanon total)
South	Tyre	200,023	23%	26%
Nabatieh	Nabatieh	157,827	18%	15%
Nabatieh	Bint Jbeil	114,608	13%	18%
Baalbeck-Hermel	Baalbeck	81,350	9%	10%
Nabatieh	Marjayoun	72,570	8%	9%
South	Saida (Sidon)	62,835	7%	6%
Mount Lebanon	Baabda	112,392	12%	3%


Source: [IOM Mobility Snapshot 18 November 2024](#)



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
Since 13 November, the [IOM has recorded](#) 6,727 new displacements with 30% arriving from Tyre, 25% from Nabatieh and most notably, 10% from Saida (Sidon). SARI Global heat maps indicate the growing increase of IAF attacks spanning from south to north to target areas, such as Hasbeiya towards Saida (Sidon).

### IAF Airstrike distribution in early October



Compared to the early October heat map, the mid-November map reveals a broader distribution of IAF airstrikes, extending both northward and westward, with an intensification in central regions. Urban centres, such as Saida (Sidon) and Hasbeiya, have seen an increase in strike activity, elevating displacement risks for populations that had previously regarded these areas as relatively safe. This expanded trajectory has directly fuelled a surge in displacement, placing additional strain on already overstretched resources and destabilising affected communities.

### IAF Airstrike distribution in mid-November



The [Evacuation Orders Map](#) also illustrates a growing geographic spread of evacuation directives, yet these orders often fail to align with actual airstrike locations. [Blanket evacuation orders](#), which apply broadly to entire towns or villages without specific guidance.





## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh

- On 11 November at 13:00, the IAF issued evacuation orders to several villages to evacuate. At approximately 18:00 the IAF targeted an apartment block outside of the evacuation zones in Saksakieh, resulting in several fatalities. This attack marks the targeted assassinations that are outside the evacuation orders; in this case targeting a correspondent for Hezbollah's TV channel Al Manar.

### Targeted Assassinations

Israel has been carrying out targeted assassinations against Hezbollah's leadership over the past year. The first high-profile target was Hezbollah's military adviser Fouad Shukr, who was killed in an airstrike on the southern suburbs of Beirut on 30 July. Israel then conducted a series of assassinations throughout September, which included the pager attacks that killed or wounded Hezbollah's first and second-tier commanders and airstrikes that killed the Radwan Brigade's leadership and Hezbollah's long-time Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah.

Since then, Israel has pursued Hezbollah officials and commanders, who play both combat and non-combat roles, throughout Lebanese territory. For example:

- On 3 October, an IAF airstrike killed Hashem Safieddine, the successor of Hezbollah's deceased Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, in an underground bunker in Beirut's southern suburbs. Hezbollah later confirmed Safieddine's death on 23 October.
- On 10 October, IAF airstrikes killed the Hezbollah commander in Houla, Ahmad Mustafa al-Hajj Ali and the commander of anti-armour forces in Meiss Ej-Jabal, Mohamad Ali Hamdan.
- On 14 October, an IAF airstrike targeted a house in Aitou, Zgharta and killed Ahmad Fakih, a Hezbollah official responsible for distributing money and aid to displaced persons. The airstrike targeted Fakih while he was visiting a house inhabited by displaced persons in the town, killing more than 18 civilians who were inside the house.
- On 19 October, an IAF airstrike targeted the vehicle of Rida Abbas Awada, a commander in Hezbollah's Intelligence Apparatus, killing him and his wife while they were driving on the highway in Jounieh city.
- On 10 November, an IAF airstrike targeted a house in Aalmat, Jbeil and killed Ahmad Amhaz, a Hezbollah member of unknown rank who was healing from combat wounds. More than 24 civilians residing in the house were killed along with Amhaz.
- On 17 November, an IAF airstrike targeted the headquarters of the Lebanese Baath Party in Beirut and killed Mohamad Afif, Hezbollah's Media Relations Manager who was present in the building.



## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh

### Timeline of IAF Targeted Assassinations October-November

17 Nov	17 Nov: IAF airstrike in Beirut killed Mohamad Afif at the Baath Party HQ.
10 Nov	10 Nov: IAF airstrike in Aalmat killed Ahmad Amhaz and 24 civilians.
19 Oct	19 Oct: IAF airstrike killed Rida Abbas Awada and his wife in Jounieh.
14 Oct	14 Oct: IAF airstrike in Aitou killed Ahmad Fakih and 18 civilians.
10 Oct	10 Oct: IAF airstrikes killed Ahmad Mustafa al-Hajj Ali and Mohamad Ali Hamdan.
3 Oct	3 Oct: IAF airstrike killed Hashem Safieddine in Beirut.

These incidents signify Israel's goal of killing Hezbollah's leadership with the intent of disrupting Hezbollah's command and control capabilities in the hopes of causing chaos in the organization's ranks. However, it is important to note that these operations carry a high risk for collateral damage signified by a large number of civilian casualties, as these individuals are targeted either in residential areas or on the road among civilian vehicles.

These assassinations have led to significant loss of life on several occasions where these individuals were deliberately targeted when they were in the company of civilians. It is also worth noting that Israel assassinated commanders of other organizations allied with Hezbollah. Israel has assassinated the commanders of Hamas and Fatah's Lebanon branch who have played a supporting or an active role in operations against the IAF in southern Lebanon, the Gaza envelope and the West Bank. For example:

- On 30 September, an IAF airstrike in Beirut's Cola neighbourhood targeted PLFP leaders Imad Audi, Mohammad Abdel Aal, and Abdel Rahmad Abdel Aal, and an unidentified fourth victim.
- On 30 September, an IAF airstrike on the al-Bass Palestinian refugee camp in Tyre killed Hamas commander, Sharif Abu al-Amin along with his wife and two children.
- On 1 October, an IAF airstrike targeted the house of Fatah leader Munir Makdah in Ein el-Hilweh Camp.





## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh

### Targeting of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

The Lebanese Army spokesperson told AP news on 20 November, that a total of 41 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) personnel have been killed by the Israeli Armed Forces (IAF) airstrikes since October 2023. The following provides examples of incidents that occurred in the South and Nabatieh Governorates:

- On 11 October, the IAF carried out an airstrike targeting a building near a LAF checkpoint in Kafra, Bint Jbeil, killing two military personnel.
- On 7 November, the IAF carried out an airstrike targeting a vehicle passing through a LAF checkpoint in Saida (Sidon). Three LAF soldiers operating the checkpoint and six UNIFIL personnel passing through at the same time were wounded.
- On 19 November, the IAF carried out an airstrike targeting an LAF military post in Sarafand, Saida (Sidon), killing three military personnel.

The incidents signify the targeting of key services associated with emergency response. It significantly increases the risks of passing through checkpoints due to the heightened likelihood that the IAF will strike a target during its slower speed through a checkpoint. These actions severely compromise road safety, amplifying the hazards for civilians, humanitarian workers, and neutral actors travelling through conflict zones.

Motives behind such attacks may be attributed to the aim of causing injuries to LAF personnel and damaging LAF infrastructure to exert pressure on the Lebanese Armed Forces, potentially undermining its operational capacity, morale, and ability to remain deployed across southern Lebanon to maintain security.

### Targeting of Health Workers

According to OCHA between 11 and 14 November, up to 67 health workers were killed by IAF attacks, marking a significant escalation in targeting health workers in November. On 15 November, Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health announced that at least 208 health sector workers have been killed and 311 have been injured by IAF airstrikes since the start of the conflict, such as in the following incidents:

- On 13 October, the IAF carried out an airstrike targeting a Red Cross relief vehicle in Sarbin, Bint Jbeil District, injuring four health workers.
- On 31 October, the IAF carried out an airstrike targeting an Islamic Health Society vehicle in Deir al-Zahrani, Nabatieh District, killing a health worker and injuring two others.
- On 15 November, the IAF carried out an airstrike targeting an Islamic Health Society facility in Arabsalim, Nabatieh District, killing six health workers.





## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh

Airstrikes targeting the Red Cross illustrate the IAF are not only targeting the Hezbollah-affiliated Islamic Health Society but other health workers who have no known ties to groups considered adversaries of Israel.

The targeting of healthcare vehicles and centres highlights the acute risks faced by humanitarian workers operating in the South, even when operating under the protections afforded by international humanitarian law (IHL).

Vehicles marked for humanitarian purposes are vulnerable to misidentification or perceived affiliations with armed groups, or deliberate targeting. These actions severely compromise road safety, amplifying the hazards for civilians, humanitarian workers, and neutral actors travelling through conflict zones. The cumulative effect is a breakdown of mobility and access to essential services, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

### A Closer Look: Evacuation Orders

The time between the issuance of [evacuation orders](#) and [the impact of IAF airstrikes](#) ranges broadly from [30 minutes to 2 hours](#). Unlike the targeted attacks in Tyre, where specific building evacuation orders are issued and widely reported, evacuation orders in the South and Nabatieh Governorates have usually been broader and less detailed. This lack of specificity has limited media coverage, as journalists are less able to document strikes in proximity to clearly identified targets, such as those with a 500-meter evacuation radius.

For instance, on [12 November at 15:03](#), the IAF issued evacuation orders for several villages, including Shakra and Mahbib, both located in Bint Jbeil District; Houla, Majdal Silm, Taloussa, Mais al-Jabal, Sawana, Qabrikha, and Blida in Marjayoun District; and Yahmour, Arnoun, Barashi, Fron, and Ghandouriyeh in Nabatieh District. The timing of impacts varied significantly, with airstrikes on Ghandouriyeh and Fron occurring around [19:00](#), while Shakra was targeted earlier at [14:46 - 15 minutes prior](#) the evacuation order was issued. This inconsistency highlights the challenges faced by civilians in responding effectively to evacuation directives.

Issuing [evacuation instructions for entire towns and villages](#) in southern Lebanon reflects a broad and imprecise approach to risk communication, raising concerns about its effectiveness in safeguarding civilian safety. Such blanket warnings risk being perceived as a tactic to induce mass displacement, potentially destabilising local communities and overburdening humanitarian response systems. Notably, many of these evacuation orders in southern Lebanon have been repeated and often fail to align with actual airstrike locations, further undermining their credibility and practical utility. Anecdotal evidence from primary sources indicates inaccuracies in the




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warnings provided, as several warned buildings are often left untouched, while nearby buildings, which may not have received warnings, are targeted instead.

### In Focus: Tyre

SARI Global calculated time lapses between evacuation orders and airstrikes, and mapped geospatial coordinates to identify strike concentrations, and categorising incidents by subdistrict.




Our findings from strikes on **16 November** reveal a pattern where the Israeli Armed Forces (IAF) conducted airstrikes approximately **2 to 3 hours** after issuing evacuation orders in the Tyre region, affecting subdistricts like **Aabbassiyet Sour**, **Sour (Tyre)**, **Borj Ech-Chemali**, and **Aain Baal**.





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This consistent time-lapse suggests that while the IAF is providing a window for civilians to evacuate, the **2–3-hour timeframe may not be sufficient** for effective evacuation, especially considering communication delays and logistical challenges. The concentration of strikes in densely populated urban areas raises significant **humanitarian concerns**, including the risk of civilian casualties and the strain on evacuation routes and resources.

### Implications of Misleading Evacuation Orders

In cases where the evacuation range is only a few minutes, civilians often lack the time to gather belongings, secure family members, or reach a safe location. This can lead to **overcrowded roads and panic**, increasing the risk of accidents and exposure to secondary threats, such as strikes targeting vehicles or escape routes.

- **Monitoring On Social Media:** Due to the unpredictability and short intervals of evacuation orders, civilians have developed ad-hoc methods to warn others of imminent airstrikes: Young men in affected areas closely monitor Avichay Adraee's [X account](#), a key source of real-time updates on IAF activity.
- **Community Alerts:** In the absence of formal warning systems, residents **fire weapons into the air** to alert their communities of incoming strikes, particularly during early morning hours when warnings, such as those at **02:00 on 13 November**, are most challenging to disseminate. This method poses an increased risk to civilians due to the increased exposure to stray bullets.

There are no designated safe assembly points provided in the evacuation orders, and it is up to individuals who read them to determine a safe location. A report by [Amnesty International](#) indicates that the timeframe for evacuation is inaccurate, provides little time and illustrates maps smaller than the indicated 500-metre radius.



## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh

### Implications To Humanitarian Access & Day-To-Day Operations

#### Mobility Restrictions and Infrastructure Damage

- **Bottlenecks in Aid Delivery:** Restrictions on vehicle movement and damaged infrastructure have created significant bottlenecks in delivering essential supplies to conflict-affected areas. Roads and bridges have been compromised due to ongoing airstrikes and shelling, hindering the timely transportation of goods and personnel.
- **Operational Difficulties:** The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) [had reported](#) difficulties in organising transport supply trucks and obtaining movement approvals. Security processes that limit mobility contribute to delays and complications in reaching those in need.

#### Operational Challenges for Shelters and Mobile Clinics

- **Overcapacity of Shelters:** Organizations continue to [operate shelters](#) in the South and mobile clinics across the country to support the humanitarian crisis. Shelters, such as those managed by UNRWA and largely located in schools, have reached [maximum capacity](#). Overcrowding leads to strained resources and decreased quality of assistance.
- **Logistical and Security Issues:** Operating shelters and mobile clinics in regions with ongoing airstrikes and instability poses significant logistical and security challenges. Humanitarian organisations face concerns over staff safety, consistent access to affected areas, and supply chain disruptions, all of which impede effective service delivery.

#### Risks to Aid Workers and Service Provision

- **Navigating Dangerous Environments:** Aid workers are forced to navigate increasingly dangerous environments due to the escalation of conflict. The threat of being targeted or caught in crossfire elevates the personal risk for humanitarian personnel.
- **Suspension of Aid Deliveries:** The fear of being targeted reduces the willingness of humanitarian personnel to operate in high-risk areas. This hesitancy can lead to the suspension of critical aid deliveries, resulting in gaps in essential services such as medical care, food distribution, and shelter assistance.

#### Proximity to Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Installations

- **Increased Risks Near LAF Positions:** Humanitarian operations near Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) installations face increased risks of collateral damage due to the frequent targeting of these areas by the Israeli Armed Forces (IAF). These locations are often perceived as strategic military zones.





## Israel Evacuation Orders & Airstrikes on the South and Nabatieh

- **Exposure to Unpredictable Attacks:** Aid workers operating near LAF positions are exposed to unpredictable attacks, significantly heightening the danger, especially in regions where LAF installations are integral to the local security framework. This proximity complicates humanitarian missions and poses severe safety concerns.

### Recommendations

#### Travel Security

- **Secure Transport Corridors:** Pre-position supplies in safer areas, such as vetted locations to mitigate logistical disruptions.
- **Real-Time Monitoring:** Use satellite imagery, or local intelligence to monitor roads and conflict zones, ensuring transport safety.
- **Avoid High-Risk Areas:** Exercise caution near LAF positions and infrastructure due to the likelihood of IAF targeting.

#### Evacuation Protocols

- **Clear Communication:** Establish actionable evacuation protocols with marked assembly points and extended evacuation windows to reduce uncoordinated responses.
- **Diverse Communication Channels:** Utilize SMS alerts, loudspeakers, local radio stations, and community networks to disseminate evacuation orders to all demographics, including those without internet access.
- **Traffic Management:** Coordinate with local authorities to manage road traffic and designate clear evacuation routes, minimising delays and risks associated with congested travel corridors.



## SARI Global

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