

INTRO TO ETHICS

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APPENDIX 1

Types of Ethics

Most ethicists agree that there are three types of ethics or ethical inquiry: meta-ethics, descriptive ethics, and normative ethics.

Meta-ethics, as the name suggests, is interested in reflecting upon the nature of ethics itself. What is the proper nature or function of ethics, for example? What is the meaning or significance of ethical language? Is a rational approach to ethics possible? What we are doing right now in this first chapter, reflecting on the nature and practice of ethics, is a meta-ethical exercise.

Descriptive ethics is a form of empirical, usually experimental research into the moral values of groups of people, often undertaken by moral psychologists. In other words, this is the division of philosophical or general ethics that involves the observation of the moral decision-making process with the goal of describing the observed phenomena, such as the observed and replicable results of controlled experimentation. Those working on descriptive ethics research usually aim to uncover people's beliefs about such things as the values and principles they hold, or about which actions they think are right and wrong. Moral psychologists engaged in descriptive ethics might want to know which characteristics of moral agents are considered virtuous through empirical observation and analysis. Chapter 2 will look more closely at the realm of descriptive ethics in moral psychological research.

Normative ethics will be the primary focus of our concern in *Entrepreneurial Ethics*. Normative ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when we think about the question “how should I act, morally speaking?” Normative ethics is distinct from meta-ethics because it examines standards—norms—for the rightness and wrongness of actions, while meta-ethics studies the meaning of moral language and the metaphysics of moral ‘facts’. Normative ethics is also distinct from descriptive ethics, as the latter is an empirical investigation of people’s moral beliefs. To put it another way, descriptive ethics might be concerned with determining what proportion of people believe that killing is always wrong, while normative ethics is concerned with whether it is morally correct to hold such a belief. Hence, normative ethics is sometimes said to be *prescriptive*, rather than *descriptive*.

There are many different areas of human activities and interests where normative ethical principles are applied to particular moral questions, such as bioethics, medical ethics, legal ethics, environmental ethics, computer ethics, professional ethics, business ethics, etc. Normative ethical principles are derived from moral philosophical theories.

Moral Theories

When examining the sources of various normative moral theories and perspectives, a distinction is often made among deontological and teleological perspectives, Virtue Ethics, and Rights theory.

Deontological ... Deontology (from the Greek *deon*, meaning "duty") refers to an ethical theory or perspective based on duty or obligation. A deontological, or duty-based, theory is one in

which specific moral duties or obligations are seen as self-evident from a rational perspective, having intrinsic value in and of themselves and needing no further justification. To act from duty is to act from rational moral rules or laws or maxims that rational individuals determine and propose to themselves as the rational justifications for their actions. Moral actions are evaluated on the basis of inherent rightness or wrongness rather than consequences. This means doing what is right because it is the right thing to do. Any other motivation would not have moral merit. Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy is the classic example of duty ethics.

Teleological ... In contrast to both Virtue Ethics and Deontology, teleological moral theories (from the Greek *telos*, meaning "goal" or "end") describe an ethical perspective that argues that the rightness or wrongness of actions is based solely on the goodness or badness of their consequences. In a strict teleological interpretation, actions are morally neutral when considered apart from their consequences. Utilitarianism and Ethical Egoism are examples of teleological theories.

Virtue Ethics ... Virtue Ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the habitual, rational practice of virtuous actions. The goal of the practice of virtue is the development of the moral character of the practitioner, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes acting from a determination of duty or law (deontology), or the approach that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism) as the source of moral certitude.

Natural and Human Rights ... The rights approach to morality involves a broad range of theories and perspectives. Generally, it can be divided into two main categories:

- A. *Liberty*: right to something a right-holder cannot be prevented from holding, such as to speak freely or follow a particular belief, and
- B. *License*: right to do something which is otherwise illegal, such as to sell liquor or drive a powered vehicle.

Other, more specific, categories of rights include the following:

1. *Alienable*: rights that can be taken away or transferred, such as property rights.
2. *Inalienable*: rights that cannot be taken away or transferred, such as right to justice or privacy.
3. *Civil*: rights that accrue to all citizens of a country, such as rights to equality, good governance, and justice.
4. *Entitlement*: rights that specify what their holders would receive, such as an office holder's rights, or beneficiary's rights under a trust.
5. *Human*: rights that belong to every member of humanity, such as rights to education, equity, fair-play, free association.
6. *Natural*: rights that can neither be bestowed by a government nor abrogated by it, such as rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.
7. *Prima facie*: rights absolute in normal circumstances but which may be taken away in extraordinary situations, such as right to life annulled by a death penalty.

Rational moral theories such as those listed above are important because they produce moral principles which can be used to support the making of rational moral decisions in particular situations. For example, the teleological moral theory called "utilitarianism" arrives at its

fundamental moral principle which states that we should always act in such a way that our actions produce the greatest good for the greatest number of sentient beings. You could then use this principle to argue against the practice of, say, animal vivisection for research, for example, arguing that the pain and suffering of the animal outweigh all other consequences. Oddly enough, however, another person could use the same moral principle derived from the same moral theory to argue in favor of a contrary position, asserting that the positive consequences outweigh the negative. Both arguments could be rational and valid (no logical errors) in their evidence and reasoning for their position, but the two arguments may not be equally compelling in everyday practice to everyone universally. Animal Rights activists, using teleological arguments, seem to be winning the day. Morally based restrictions on live animal experimentation have increased in recent years.

Idealism

Idealism is a broad philosophical term that generally refers to the belief that experience is primarily a mind-dependent phenomenon. This position leads to the skeptical conclusion that it is not possible to know with certitude that our mental events (phenomena) have a material substrate independent of the appearance. Kant, for example, distinguished between two dimensions of things in his philosophy called Transcendental Idealism: *noumena* and *phenomena*. *Noumena* are things-in-themselves, how things are exactly. But *noumena* can never enter into our conscious perceptual experience, even if they somehow ‘give rise to’ that perception. *Phenomena* are things (like tables and cars) as they appear to you in your perceptual experience; appearances. All perceptual experiences are experiences of phenomena, never noumena. Thus, nobody can know the absolute truth (*noumena*) of any matter, but only their own perspective (*phenomenon*) of it. More about this in our consideration of phenomenology below.

Realism

Realism is another broad philosophical term that refers to the general belief that your inner experiences of the world are mental representations of actually existing macroscopic objects existing separate from your perception ‘out there’ in a three-dimensional world and which we experience through our senses. These macroscopic objects themselves are ontologically separate and distinct from your mental representations of them in your experience. They are believed to continue to exist even when you are not perceiving them.

Questions about the plausibility of realism, as with idealism, cuts across many disciplines, including ethics, aesthetics, science, mathematics, semantics, and the everyday world of macroscopic material objects and their properties. Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism or idealism across the board, it is more common for philosophers these days to be selectively realist or non-realist in regard to different topics. Thus, it would be perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral values which could be thought to be ideal. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that one can be more-or-less realist or idealist about any particular subject matter, which can complicate moral deliberation.

Rationalism

Rationalism, very generally, indicates a reliance on reason and cognition as the only reliable source of human knowledge. Rationalism offers a naturalistic alternative to appeals to religious accounts of human nature and moral conduct, although reason also has been thought of as a “divine spark” animating human corporeality, a kind of microchip off the old (divine) block. From this religious perspective, reason is a natural aspect of humans but also an aspect that connects us to divine reason which is absolute (God). Rationalism thus involves a kind of top-down model of knowing: first comes the rationally determined theory and then experience is constrained, understood and configured to fit in with the theoretical model, or, generally, something is thought to be wrong with the experience or judgment. Kant’s duty ethics exemplifies a moral rationalism.

In ordinary usage, the term rationalism is mostly intended to mean a basic sense of respect for reason or to refer to the idea that reason should play a large role in human life, especially in terms of moral deliberation and decision-making, and that we should be able to give reasons that explain and justify our actions, beliefs and ideas. Rationalism is often understood as being opposed to empiricism, especially as an approach to research in ethics.

Empiricism

Empiricism asserts that knowledge arises only through sense experience. It involves a set of philosophical positions that emphasizes the role of beliefs and behaviors that can be objectified, experimented with, and measured. Empiricism contrasts with rationalist philosophical positions that emphasize the role of innate ideas, a priori knowledge or speculation. Some philosophers sought to integrate empiricism with rationalism, conceiving that knowledge is constituted by the necessary working together of pre-existing rational concepts in the mind and intuited sensuous experience gained through the senses. By themselves, the senses would not know what they are sensing. And by itself, the mind would have nothing to give shape and form to knowing.

In the philosophy of science, empiricism refers to an emphasis on those aspects of scientific knowledge that are closely related to the objectification and scientific measurement of behavior, especially as formed through deliberate experimental arrangements. It is generally taken as a fundamental requirement of the scientific method that all hypotheses and theories must be tested against observations of the natural world, rather than relying on intuition or revelation. Hence, science is considered to be methodologically empirical in nature.

Empirical Method Versus Experimental Method

The empirical method is generally meant as the collecting of a large amount of data upon which to base a theory or derive a conclusion in science. It is part of the scientific method, but is often mistakenly assumed to be synonymous with the *experimental method*. Learning from the normal “trial and error” of everyday life is a good example of how the empirical method works, and illustrates how it is similar to but different than the experimental method in science.

The empirical method is not sharply defined and is often contrasted with the precision of the experimental method. In an experiment, the different “trials” are strictly manipulated so that an inference can be made as to causation of the observed change that results.

This contrasts with the empirical method of aggregating naturally occurring data seeking the emergence of sense from the data. The empirical method is a close cousin to the philosophical ‘method’ of research called phenomenology.

Exercise: Imagine you wanted to investigate Company X. Here are three possible approaches to doing that. One way would be to assess the company’s performance through an analysis of past financial reports. A second way might be to set up a competition with other companies and see how well the company performs. A third way might be to get a job at the company in order to experience the company first-hand. Match these three approaches to getting to know a company with the general research orientations of empiricism, rationalism and phenomenology.

Skepticism

The practice of taking a skeptical attitude toward knowledge claims that are outside of our immediate, verifying experience, has been around for a long time. And for good reason.

Skepticism sometimes is considered to be a bad thing when the skeptic is viewed as being unsure, wishy-washy, out of the loop, or afraid to take a stand. But a little skepticism, understood as questioning what we do not know for sure about ourselves and our world, is a good thing developmentally, and a necessary thing phenomenologically. A little skepticism is necessary for generating wonder without falling into error. Skepticism is the probing tip of the source from which we investigate and question ourselves about what we are doing and question our knowledge about what we are believing to be true.

A certain level of skepticism is an important and necessary part of our approach to making good moral decisions. It also reveals the limitation of reason to achieve absolutely certain moral judgments. The recognition and practice of skepticism should therefore lead to a reduction in existential anxiety since the practicing skeptic can now let go of the pressure to be absolutely certain about everything he or she does, since skepticism is critical of such absolutes. Skepticism helps us to see and focus on what is within our power and to let go of what is not.

Pyrrho (c. 300 BCE) was one of the greatest skeptics who ever lived. He was an ancient Greek philosopher who was well-known for his arguments in favor of a thoroughgoing skepticism about all knowledge claims, including moral knowledge claims. Pyrrho held that nothing can be known with certitude about the hidden essence or true nature of things. He held this because he thought that every theory can be opposed by an equally sound contradictory theory. At a later date, this same idea would emerge in Immanuel Kant’s notion of the “Antinomies of Reason” where he shows the inability of reason to clearly demonstrate things like the existence of God or the reality of freedom because both the theories in support of such things and their contradictories are equally plausible. Reason cannot prove the existence of God, the reality of freedom, or the immortality of the soul. Neither can it prove these not to be true. Consequently, as the ancient Greek philosopher Pyrrho suggested, we must neither accept nor reject any theories as true, but, rather, we should skeptically *suspend judgment* (*epochē*) in all matters that are not indisputably clear and distinct—which is not much, if anything at all. Pyrrho thought there were existential benefits to doing this.

This suspension of judgment, called *epochē*, which meant “bracketing” or putting something out-of-play, was said by Pyrrho to lead to *ataraxia*—tranquility of spirit,

unperturbedness in challenging situations, being calm, cool, and collected when everyone else around you is freaking out. Practicing the “epochē” was also a key virtue for the Greek Stoic school of philosophy, as we will see in our investigation of Stoicism down the road. All in all, *ataraxia* is not a bad skill to possess generally, but especially in the high-pressure business world, don’t you think?

As you might expect from someone who was a master of *ataraxia*, Pyrrho’s fame was primarily a result of his exemplary *agoge* (way of living), though there are differences of opinion about what that way of life actually was. Here again, we can see how the practice of philosophy for the ancient Greeks was intimately and thoroughly connected to striving existentially to actually practice living the best possible life.

I don’t know what you think, but I agree with the skeptics that we cannot have absolute certitude about the truth or correctness of our moral judgments, and so we should reject absolute moral claims as unfounded. However, universal and absolute moral tenets such as “Do no harm,” or “The Golden Rule” (Do unto others as you would have done to yourself.) are commonly accepted as general moral rules from within the contextual framework of the situated, interrelated practices that constitute your everyday, existential world.

From a practical, situated point of view, we still must make moral judgments and we cannot always retreat into Pyrrho’s suspension of judgment because moral judgments often force themselves upon us and we simply cannot avoid making them. Refusing to make a moral judgment is itself a moral judgment. We must make moral judgments, but we should definitely be skeptical of claims to certain knowledge of ultimate moral foundations. So, even though we feel very strongly about our moral position regarding the death penalty, for example, we should also recognize that there is no rational way to prove either the position for or against the death penalty with absolute certitude.

While we should not expect absolute confirmation of the correctness of our moral judgments, we will see in coming chapters that we are nevertheless always working, however consciously, on our moral value orientation, challenging ourselves and adjusting our values and beliefs continuously as we enter into and are responsive to new relations, new situations, new ideas, new circumstances, new people, new points of view, new professional orientations, etc. – new experiences that are each original, unique, and unrepeatable. And, these experiences are uniquely your experiences and yours alone. How could one moral principle possibly encompass such diversity? Hence the need for a *pluralist* approach: employing as many moral theories and perspectives as makes sense in any given situation, in order to see that situation as clearly as possible and thus make the best possible moral judgment.

We will see in coming chapters that the rich web of our everyday, situated interpersonal experiences—more so, perhaps, than abstract moral theories and philosophical principles—is the primary way that we orient ourselves morally in the world, especially before we have fully taken over this job for ourselves. Yet, immersed in that situated web of daily practices influencing our moral value configuration, we nevertheless do not thereby escape the influence of the traditional moral theories. These ‘tried and true’ moral theories have, over the years and centuries, become integral to the cultural underpinnings of that rich web of our everyday experience, structuring it, and are thus indispensable for your rational moral deliberation and moral value configuration.

A similar positive and productive interpretation could be made for emotivism, insofar as it shows the limitations of a purely rational approach to moral reasoning and deliberation.

Emotivism and the Fact/Value Problem

Emotivism argues that all assertions of the form “One should do X” are basically just expressions of strong feeling because they cannot be determined to be true or false and are not objectively verifiable. From a strictly logical analysis of language, it is not hard to see that this is true. But it is only true within a field that is presumed to be thoroughly rational. But, as I am arguing in this text, the field of ethics is not bounded by a strict rationality, but rather by a much more fluid “bounded rationality” that is influenced by non-rational elements.

For emotivists, prescriptive or normative statements are understood to be merely descriptive statements of how one feels about something. And since there is no rational foundation for moral reasoning, there is also no way to determine the truth or falsity of any felt moral judgments. What follows from this has come to be known as the “fact/value” or “is/ought” problem in moral philosophy. It goes like this: from the fact of how things are it is impossible to determine how they *should or ought* to be. But, from the existential-phenomenological approach to ethics being developed in this text, the is/ought problem is only a problem within the strictest rational understanding of ethics.

Emotivism is based on linguistic analysis of impersonal moral language, not what real people think, mean, feel, hope for, etc. In actual practice, we do make moral judgments, certainly, and some moral judgments and the reasons for them are better (more persuasive, convincing, clearer, more coherent, etc.) than others; more reasonable = based on or justified by reasons. Feeling strongly is a reason, however reliable. Not all reasons have the same value. False beliefs, passion, or wrong-headed ideas can inhibit reasoning. Reason does not always function in a black and white or scientific manner, but often in shades of gray, gradations of meaning, or on a continuum of better and worse, especially where morality is concerned.

Feelings can be important evidence and can be used to “weigh” the choice of what to do in a kind of quasi-reasoning manner. We can imagine how it would feel to do something and then reflect on our experience and use it as evidence in rational deliberation. As I said, to be rational can be thought generally to mean to be able to give reasons based on evidence for what you are doing or have done, even though your reasons will never be reasons enough. Giving reasons is often a description of our motives. “I did X because I have always felt strongly that there was a need for X...” In this somewhat more organic and messy understanding of everyday morality from the bottom up, moral reflection, deliberation, and judgment are possible, even though this process is not entirely rational from a strictly logical perspective.

APPENDIX 2

Ways of knowing

Over the centuries many attempts have been made to classify knowledge, and different fields have focused on different dimensions of the knowledge phenomenon. This has resulted in numerous classifications and distinctions based in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science and sometimes reflected in religious belief.

Two types of knowledge are usually defined: explicit and tacit knowledge. The former refers to codified knowledge, such as that found in documents, while the latter refers to non-codified and more often personal/experience-based knowledge. In practice, all knowledge is likely a mixture of tacit and explicit elements rather than being one or the other. However, in order to understand knowledge, it is important to define these theoretical opposites.

Some researchers make a further distinction and talk about “embedded knowledge.” By distinguishing embedded knowledge, a clear distinction is drawn between knowledge embodied in people and knowledge embedded in processes, organizational cultures, routines, and other structured, habitual regularities, etc

Tacit Knowledge

Tacit knowledge was originally defined by chemist-turned-philosopher Michael Polanyi in a book entitled *The Tacit Dimension*.¹ Polanyi’s work has been influential ever since. Tacit knowledge is not easy to define. It is sometimes referred to as an automatic kind of ‘know-how’ and refers to intuitive, hard-to-define knowledge of what to do or how to resolve or manage a problem, etc. that is largely experience-based, organic, ‘felt’ in a particular situation rather than calculatingly worked out, but largely unconscious. Because of this, tacit knowledge is often context dependent and remains personal and necessarily ‘private’ in nature.

Tacit knowledge is lodged in the “can-do” of the body, the way the hands of the seasoned mechanic know just how much to tighten a bolt without need of a torque wrench or the way the body of a ballerina, after much practice, moves without conscious thought. It is hard to communicate our tacit moral knowledge because it functions at the intuitive and pre-conceptual level. You simply know what the right thing is to do but don’t know how you know it exactly. It is deeply rooted in embodied action, habitual and professional practices, and pre-conscious corporeal engagement. We will be exploring this pre-conceptual level of tacit ‘experience’ from a moral perspective throughout the chapters of *Entrepreneurial Ethics* since this level of knowing is where our practical moral wisdom abides but also where biases and prejudices lurk in the shadows.

Tacit knowledge is often regarded as being the most valuable source of knowledge, and the most likely to lead to breakthroughs and new visions within the business organization. Research has shown that the lack of focus on tacit knowledge in organizations leads directly to the reduced capability for innovation and sustained competitiveness. The same could be said about a lack of focus on tacit knowledge for individual persons

Here is how you can get a glimpse into how tacit knowledge works. Imagine trying to write an article that would accurately convey how you are able to instantly ‘read’ facial expressions. It should be quite apparent that it would be near impossible to convey your intuitive understanding gathered from years of experience and practice. Virtually all practitioners rely on this type of immediate, intuitive tacit knowledge. An IT specialist, for example, will often troubleshoot a problem based on her experience compressed into unconscious tacit knowledge and

¹ Polanyi, Michael. *The Tacit Dimension*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

intuition. But it would be very difficult for her to codify her knowledge into an explicit document that could convey her know-how effectively to a beginner with little hands-on experience. This is one reason why experience in a particular field is so highly regarded in the job market.

You will come to see that much of your moral functioning takes place at the tacit level, even after you have made the effort to make it conscious. The moral value configuration that you have absorbed into the immediacy of your lived mind/body in a structured hierarchy of moral values is something that you have been ‘working’ on tacitly since you were a child, mostly without realizing it. You are so familiar with your moral value schema by now, it is so close to who you are, that you are rarely aware of consciously ‘accessing’ it in order to make a moral decision in a particular situation. It just happens, as if to you, not by you. You make the decisions you must make and “feel” with some level of confidence or another that your decision is correct. But you may likely have a much more difficult time trying to say explicitly how you were able to make that decision, what moral principles you used to justify it, etc. That is how tacit moral knowledge works. Once realizing this, you can begin to mine the wisdom of your extensive tacit moral knowledge in the form of in-sights and understandings that are the signs of expansion and broadening of those consciousness horizons, the moral enlightenment that we were talking about earlier and that you can expect to occur as you work through this text. You should keep a journal of your insights as you do so; a journal of self-discovery. It will enhance the process

Although it is worth knowing something about explicit and embedded knowledge, I am most interested in the way tacit knowledge comes into play in moral decision-making. Nevertheless, here is a brief overview of these other two knowledge forms.

Explicit Knowledge

Explicit knowledge is formalized and codified, and is sometimes referred to as “know-what.” It is, therefore, fairly easy to identify, store, and retrieve. This is the type of knowledge that is most easily handled by knowledge management systems, which are very effective at facilitating the storage, retrieval, and modification of documents and texts. From a managerial perspective, the greatest challenge with explicit knowledge is similar to information. It involves ensuring that people have access to what they need; that important knowledge is stored; and that the knowledge is reviewed, updated, or discarded.

Many theoreticians regard explicit knowledge as being less important than tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is considered simpler in nature and does not contain the rich experience base of “know-how” that can generate lasting competitive advantage. Although this is changing to some limited degree with big data mining, quantum computing and deep neural learning algorithms, knowledge management initiatives driven by technology have often had the flaw of focusing almost exclusively on explicit knowledge. In fields such as IT, for example, there is often a lack of a more sophisticated definition of what constitutes knowledge. Explicit knowledge is found in: databases, memos, notes, documents, etc.

Making your tacit moral value configurations conscious or explicit is one of the goals of our ethical investigations and a good practice to develop overall in your life.

Embedded Knowledge

Embedded knowledge refers to the knowledge that is locked in processes, products, culture, routines, artifacts, or structures. Knowledge is embedded either formally, such as through a management initiative to formalize a certain beneficial routine, or informally as the organization uses and applies the other two knowledge types.

The challenges in managing embedded knowledge vary considerably and will often differ from embodied tacit knowledge. Culture and routines can be both difficult to understand and hard to change. Formalized routines on the other hand may be easier to implement and management can actively try to embed the fruits of lessons learned directly into procedures, routines, and products.

Due to the difficulty in effectively managing embedded knowledge, firms that succeed may enjoy a significant competitive advantage. Embedded knowledge is found in: rules, processes, manuals, organizational culture, codes of conduct, ethics, products, etc. It is important to note, that while embedded knowledge can exist in explicit sources (i.e. a rule can be written in a manual), the knowledge itself is not explicit, i.e. it is not immediately apparent why doing something this way is beneficial to the organization.

APPENDIX 3

Emotion and Ethical Thinking

So far, we have seen that an almost exclusive focus on rational thinking in the history of moral philosophy resulted in an overvaluation of pure reasoning in ethics and a de-valuation of non-rational factors. Modern social psychology has corrected that overvaluation to some degree by demonstrating how non-rational aspects of human subjectivity come into play and are important in moral deliberation, judgment, and action. Our best moral judgments reflect the existential inseparability of the rational and non-rational aspects of human beings, especially in concrete, situated, everyday life engagements. The ancient philosophical debate about whether ethics is primarily a matter of reason or emotion has spilled over into psychology where there is much current discussion about the nature of ethical thinking. Bottom line: moral judgments, like all our judgments, always involve both rational, non-rational, emotional, and situational/contextual aspects, since we are whole, situated beings and not made up of parts. All moral responsiveness is holistic.

How can you do the right thing? People are sometimes told: “Be rational, not emotional!” Such advice seems to presume as true the widespread assumption that reason and emotion are opposites. This opposition is particularly acute in ethics, where philosophers and psychologists have long debated the relative roles in moral thinking of abstract, theoretical inference and emotional intuitions. This debate concerns both the descriptive question about how people actually do think when they are making moral judgments and the normative question of how they should think, especially for psychologists like Piff who blend description with prescription.

Adjudicating this debate requires an evidence-based theory of emotions that mediates between two traditional theories: the cognitive appraisal view that takes emotions to be judgments about the accomplishment of one's goals, and the physiological perception view that takes emotions to be reactions to changes in one's body. Phenomenological analysis is in a position to do this since it shares in both the cognitive appraisal view and the physiological view by focusing on subjective experience, the locus of both. The cognitive appraisal view is compatible with the potential rationality of emotion, because the truth or falsity of judgments can be evaluated emotionally. On the other hand, the physiological perception view puts emotions on the non-rational side, since bodily reactions are not susceptible to reason, in the typical sense of being able to give reasons for their occurrence. But these need not be in opposition

The brain is capable of simultaneously performing both cognitive appraisal and bodily felt perception; emotional consciousness results from this combination. If the integrated view is correct, we can see how emotions can be both rational (helping to evaluate and assess) and visceral, providing non-rational evidence and motivations to act. Some emotions are beautifully rational, such as love for people who add great value to our lives, whereas other emotions can be more motivated by non-rational energies, such as attachment to abusive partners.

Ethical judgments are often highly emotional, when people express their strong approval or disapproval of various acts. Whether they are also rational depends on whether the cognitive appraisal that is part of the emotional judgment is done well or badly, a skill which can be cultivated through emotional intelligence training, as we saw. Emotional judgments can be flawed by many factors, such as ignorance about the actual consequences of actions and neglect of relevant goals, such as taking into account the needs and interests of all people affected. Adam Smith, the father of modern, free market capitalism, is sometimes taken as preaching a gospel of strict self-interest, but his work on moral sentiments emphasized the need for ethics to be based on beneficent sympathy for other people, as we will see in more detail below. Hence, the emotions involved in ethical thinking can be rational when they are based on careful consideration of a full range of appropriate goals, including altruistic ones. Ideally, this consideration should mesh with a visceral reaction that provides a motivation to act well and correct injustices.

It seems clear that successfully navigating difficult moral situations requires both thinking and feeling. This ambiguous straddling of the rational and non-rational can be viewed from an evolutionary perspective where certain emotions are thought to have been naturally selected for their rational contributions to the creation and maintenance of social reality.

The Four Moral Emotions

When viewed from an evolutionary perspective, emotions can be distinguished by those that serve the future interests of the individual and those that serve the future interests of the group or society. This also brings into relief the connection between emotion and action. One reason emotions are useful is that they get us to react quickly in response to danger. Although our rational (as opposed to emotional) minds do a lot to keep us at the top of the food chain, rational thinking is sometimes too slow for handling a threat (e.g. fighting a tiger). Sometimes, we need to react more quickly--and our basic emotions, like fear and surprise, help us do that.

But, of course, supplying speedy reactions to tigers is not the only use of emotion. Some recent research on emotion has focused not just on issues of an individual's self-defense, but on the larger social value of emotions. Emotions evolved--the thinking goes--not just to protect people, but to bind communities. After all, we all have a better chance at survival if the species works as a team, rather than battling it out to mutual extinction. In turn, emotions are useful because they seal a Social Contract, a system of ethics that protects the species--not just individuals--into the future, which will be investigated in a later chapter.

Of course, our 'hottest' or most animalistic emotions are usually more self-serving than communal. These 'hot', animalistic emotions, often called the "basic" emotions, are the emotions that Paul Ekman famously first labeled in the 1960's, in his work with tribes in Papua New Guinea. These are the emotions that show on faces across all cultures, and they are thought to be biologically determined. We share most of these basic emotions with animals. They are often listed as the following six: *anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise*.

These basic emotions help individuals more directly than they help groups. Take surprise, for example. Surprise, from an evolutionary vantage point, is a basic emotion that allows us to avoid what's unexpected and dangerous. If I turn the corner and bump into a tiger (or my unpaid landlord or my boss when I'm skipping work), my heartbeat increases and my muscles tense. I move quickly to avoid the danger. Surprise triggers a fight or flight response--which is more self-serving than group-serving. Similar analogies can be made for most of the basic emotions.

But recent research on emotion has shifted the traditional focus away from the 'basic' emotions to another set of emotions which are thought to be more distinctly human. Focus has turned to the 'self-conscious' emotions, which are sometimes also referred to as *moral, social or higher-order emotions*. Moral emotions are the emotions that an organism can only feel if it has a highly developed sense of self-reflection. Usually, the 'self-conscious' emotions are listed as these four: *guilt, shame, embarrassment, and pride*.

Researchers tend to cite two requirements for being able to experience these higher emotions. One: The person needs to be capable of subjective "position-taking," of knowing how her behaviors would affect or be perceived by others. Two: She needs the ability to imagine how the reception of her behavior would reflect back on her character. For example, the fear you can feel in an interview (heart beating fast, voice constricting, palms sweating) is a basic emotion. But the shame that might set in as you leave ("Why do I interview so poorly?!") is a self-conscious, higher emotion. *The self-conscious emotion is the one that arises from understanding how others see us*. It influences future behavior. If you are ashamed after an interview, you might take a class in public speaking or ask for input from your friends ("What kind of person do I seem like to you?"). The self-conscious and other-oriented emotion binds us back to others--to their expectations, ideas, potential evaluations of us, etc.

For another example, let's consider anger again. The anger you might feel at having your wallet snatched is a basic emotion. But if you write a letter to the editor or your representative arguing for new laws addressing local crime, that's pride, a self-conscious emotion. Then you are striving to establish your morals in relation to the thief and the community. Self-conscious

emotions are emotions in which you imagine, perhaps pre-reflectively, your conformity or nonconformity to society's norms.

All our emotions work with amazing coordination really--like a symphony. One emotion can trigger another, to keep us in balance with the group. For instance, a heavy tendency for joy, anger, and pride might tilt a woman toward a career in business. She might feel strongest when finding investment deals and making money, closing deals. In this, she scores big points for individual preservation. She gets rich. But, in time—especially if she's screwed over some clients, for example--the feelings of guilt and shame might also set in. That would be a good thing for the social contract. Influenced by her guilt about how others might judge her, she might shift her behavior--giving to charity, mentoring some kid, working to protect society, changing her ways. Some might say she's acting altruistically "for the wrong reasons," but guilt is undoubtedly "right" when we think of the social contract it serves. In this way, our emotions serve both to propel the individual and to protect the larger group that affords every individual safety. Emotions are our rubber bands for propelling individual (and group) gain while protecting the society in which gain happens.

The evolutionary perspective accepts the view that emotions are hard-wired into our corporeal being from birth, socially reinforced and thus, to some extent, susceptible to alteration, grooming, and change. Moral sentiment theory, developed by numerous theorists during the same time that Darwin's evolutionary ideas were being widely discussed, takes a similar position with more of a theoretical, philosophical point-of-view. Yet, the two perspectives are compatible and tend to bring ethics and morality away from abstract and theoretical discussions to more of a focus on the moral corporeality.

Can Ethics be Taught?

There is a ton of research that demonstrates that college-age students are particularly interested in learning about and upgrading their personal morality, and that they undergo significant development toward principled moral reasoning during their collegiate experience. A recent report on how the college experience affects students put it this way:

The reasons why postsecondary education may facilitate growth in principled moral reasoning are not completely clear. However, numerous researchers suggest that part of the explanation may be that college provides a relatively challenging and stimulating environment that leads students to overhaul and rethink the fundamental ways in which they form moral judgments. College may do this in large measure because it encourages students to think about the larger social context of history, institutions, and broad intellectual and cultural trends—many of which involve moral and ethical issues. Consistent with such an explanation is evidence reported from one study which shows that academic perspective-taking (that is, exposure to broad perspectives concerning intellectual

or social issues) is a strong predictor of advanced levels of moral reasoning among college students.²

Clearly, morality can develop and educative interventions can cultivate this development to some degree. Unfortunately, however, you wouldn't know about such research if your reading was limited to newspaper reports and opinions about the effectiveness of ethics education. For example, in a recent editorial "Does an 'A' in Ethics Have any Value?" (WSJ 2/6/2013), the *Wall Street Journal* announced that college ethics courses are more or less useless because ethics cannot be taught. Few academic scholars would turn to the *Wall Street Journal* as a learned expert on the teaching of ethics. We have already seen in previous chapters that broad generalizations about ethics generally come with a lot of unclarified presumptions that are merely glossed over by armchair philosophers to appeal to conventional sensitivities and interests, or maybe to sell newspapers. Nevertheless, the issue raised by the *Wall Street Journal* is worthy of some reflection: Can ethics be taught?

The issue is an old one. Almost 2500 years ago, the philosopher Socrates—as described by his student, Plato—debated this important question which was central to the practice of philosophy. What good is the practice of philosophy if we are unable to develop as moral persons? Plato rendered Socrates' position very clear: Ethics consists of knowing what we ought to do, and such knowledge can be taught; to know the good is to do the good, Plato taught. But, we have already seen that some care should be taken in what we mean, exactly, when we use that elusive verb "to know." Plato had a special way of understanding that term since the kind of knowing he is talking about has mystical overtones where the knower becomes one with the 'known', a kind of cognitive/spiritual inter-penetration or exchange by which you are naturally transformed by the enlightening knowledge experience. Therefore, by knowing the good in this ecstatic and somewhat mystical sense, you will be automatically transformed by that experience such that you naturally do the moral good that you have come to know like you know yourself.

Most psychologists today, with different reasons in mind no doubt, would agree with Socrates that morality is learned to some degree, and therefore can be taught, cultivated, and developed. But simply knowing the good, in the normal sense of this term, is not the same as actually doing the good. Nevertheless, psychologists generally agree that moral consciousness and action develops over time and therefore can be taught, practiced, and learned. Contemporary research in the field of moral development during the last half century supports this position fairly consistently, even though it does not make clear how this should be brought about.

Dramatic changes in value orientation and configuration often occur in young adults in their 20s and 30s in terms of the basic problem-solving strategies they use to deal with moral issues in their everyday lives. These changes are linked to fundamental changes in how a person perceives themselves, society, and his or her role in society. The extent to which change occurs has been associated with the number of years of formal education (college or professional school). Deliberate educational attempts (formal curriculum) to influence awareness of moral problems and to influence the reasoning or judgment process have been demonstrated to be effective in some cases, but not in others. Numerous studies indicate that a person's behavior is influenced by his or

² Pascarella, Ernest T. and Terenzini, Parrick T. *How College Affects Students*. San Francisco: Josey-Bass, 2005, vol. 2/349.

her moral perception and moral judgments, forming a large body of research in support of the idea that morality develops and can be positively influenced by education

APPENDIX 4

Pragmatism: social self-development

The formulation of classical American pragmatism occurred from around 1850 to 1950 when the perspectives of its major proponents took shape, but it represents a spirit and vitality that is in an ongoing process of expanding application today. The attempt to get at the significance of pragmatic philosophy has been long, complex, and inconclusive. Because of initial confusion about the meaning and import of pragmatism, interest in it began to wane in philosophical circles. That is changing.

In recent years, interest in pragmatism has been growing rapidly from two interrelated directions. *First*, it is becoming recognized that pragmatism, though coming along prior to what is considered mainstream philosophy today, anticipated many of its problems and dilemmas, and offers a framework for moving beyond some of the impasses that these problems pose. *Second*, it is becoming evident that pragmatism has a unique relevance for engaging and understanding the everyday life of the existential individual, including social and cultural issues, moral values and the processes and goals that guide our actions. This is particularly true in regard to the formation of the moral self in the social relation between the individual and the community.

The Individual and the Community

Sometimes, the terms that we use quite frequently are so much taken for granted that we never stop to consider what they really mean. The terms *individual*, or *self*, or *person* are examples of this phenomenon. However, the view of the self that you hold has serious implications for many issues relating to ethics, as we have seen. Consequently, pragmatism is also concerned with the question concerning whether the self is a separate, “atomic,” discrete entity, or, by its very nature, a part of a social process.

The view that entirely separate or atomic individuals exist and have moral claims apart from any associations except those they choose to form for their own purpose was the philosophical basis for the French and American revolutions. Many contemporary views of the social contract are rooted in the atomistic presuppositions of Locke and other social contract theorists of the Enlightenment rationalist tradition. This is what I refer to as the modernist view of the self or modernist subjectivity. These presuppositions are also the basis for understanding the nature of the corporation as a voluntary association of individuals and are at the heart of the neoliberal view of capitalism, which will be taken up in a later chapter of the text.

The pragmatic view of the self as an integral aspect of an ongoing social process is a radically different way of understanding the self from the liberal, atomistic view. According to the pragmatic, integrated view, in the adjustments and co-ordinations needed for cooperative action in a social context, *human organisms take the perspective or the attitude of others in the development of their moral conduct*. In this way there develops the common normative content that provides a community of moral meaning, such that communication can take place because there is now a socially or situationally determined basis of understanding. Without this shared

meaning, people in a society have no way of understanding each other; in fact, it could be said that no society exists unless there is some common content. Yet there could be no individuals without the social order.

The moral self, from a pragmatic or process perspective, comes about through responsive awareness of one's role in a social context. It involves the ability to be aware of oneself as an acting agent within the context of other acting agents. Not only can selves exist only in relationship to other selves, but no absolute line can be drawn between our own self and the selves of others, since our own self develops only insofar as others enter into our experience. The origins and foundation of the self are social or intersubjective; the self is not a given that constitutes the basic building block of society as in atomic individualism. This pragmatic view is close to Levinas' view, described below, except for one important difference that makes all the difference. The pragmatic view seems to begin with a mysterious collection of isolated individuals (who are not yet selves) who just appear on the pragmatic scene and then become selves through social interaction (which is somehow already an interaction of selves that haven't been produced yet—a little strange), but does not account for exactly what the 'self' is that is interacting socially prior to the emergence of the self formed from that interaction. Levinas's existential-phenomenological approach will resolve this empirical conundrum.

For pragmatism, a person consists of a creative, ongoing interplay between the individual and social domains, and in this way freedom of the self lies in the proper relation between these two domains. Freedom does not lie in opposition to the restrictions of norms and authority but in a self-direction, which requires the proper dynamic interaction of these two dimensions within the self. Thus, freedom does not lie in being unaffected by others and by one's past but in the way one uses one's incorporation of "the other" in novel decisions and actions. While a self or a person is not an isolatable individual apart from a social process, a self or person does have its own unique individuality, which is in an ongoing process of development.

The moral growth and development of our self incorporates an ever more encompassing, sympathetic understanding of varied and diverse social interests, pragmatists claim, thus leading to social tolerance not as an infringement on one's self, but as an expansion of self. To enrich and expand the community is at once to enrich and expand the individuals involved in ongoing community interactions.

A true community, by its very nature incorporating ongoing practices, processes and a pluralism of perspectives requiring ongoing growth or integrative expansion, is far from immune to hazardous pitfalls and wrenching clashes, but these provide the material for such ongoing development. What needs to be cultivated in a society is the motivation, sensitivity, and imaginative vision needed to change irreconcilable factionalism into a growing pluralistic community. The deepening required for this growth does not negate the use of intelligent inquiry, but rather opens it up, frees it from the products of its past, from rigidities and abstractions, and focuses it on the dynamics of concrete human existence.

In some of the management literature today, there is growing interest in what is called "pragmatic irrationality" in management decisions. This is based on the emerging understanding that moral decisions are not based on the weighing of abstract, "objective," instrumentally calculative alternatives, that the process of reasoning in concrete situations is not understandable merely as the application of abstractly grasped principles, nor can it be subjected to step-by-step analysis. What is imperative instead in management decision-making, it is held, is something akin

to the ‘irrationality’ of emotional intelligence and tacit knowledge and practical wisdom that cannot be examined or understood by traditional rational methods of examination. Which is where the practice of phenomenology comes into the picture, as we will see

The pragmatic view of self-formation and development offers more evidence for the view that a broader understanding of rationality is needed to reconfigure modernist rationality into a more fluid and relational rationality. The process view of self-formation presented here, like phenomenology and existentialism, does not disregard or destroy reason but brings it down to earth. What has been ‘destroyed’ is only the belief in the exclusive role of reason to provide access to truth and value. Reason, brought down to earth, is concrete, imaginative, and deepened to operate within ‘messy’, everyday possibilities that have been liberated from the confines and rigidities of abstract rules and procedural steps for reaching a moral decision about something. Yet, there remains an important place for calculative, rational thinking in ethical deliberations of the moral subject, which we will take up in the next chapter.

Because pragmatism starts at the empirical level with the empirical self already in some social relation to the community that will, ambiguously, produce it, the empirical self seems to just appear upon the social scene in some state of potentiality or readiness to be completed by social interaction, without any account for how this occurs. This is due to the naïve realist orientation of pragmatism connected to a realm of ‘given’ empirical objects which themselves are unaccounted for, an epistemological problem which is resolved elegantly by the phenomenological approach.

Notes On The Practice Of Phenomenology

Husserl articulated three cognitive/perceptual movements or re-orientations that would be necessary in order for you to take up the perceptual ‘position’ of the ‘phenomenological attitude’, three cognitive self-orientations or phases of the process that Husserl called ‘reductions’ which a person would assume or undergo in order to put the ideas of phenomenology into actual practice.

The first step out of the naïve, natural attitude (“natural attitude” = the everyday consciousness of commonplace realism) and into the phenomenological attitude is through the narrow door of the *epochē*, as Husserl referred to it, the bracketing or suspension of belief in and judgment about whatever is beyond your clear and distinct knowledge, understanding, and experience—a move Husserl borrowed from the Greek skeptics we met in chapter one. To believe in something as if it were in our experience when in fact it is not actually a part of our experience would be a “prejudice” (a *pre-judgment* or decision made in advance of the experiential evidence and thinking that is supposed to lead to the decision) barring the way to true understanding and successful practice.

The suspension of judgment about what we do not know clearly and distinctly is the “skeptical” or purifying moment of phenomenology. It is not a denial of the possibility of knowledge but an unwillingness to make knowledge claims when there is insufficient evidence for the claim. In keeping with this, we should practice speaking carefully in accord with this restricted but truthful perspective. For example, someone might say to a child: “You are a bad boy!” But, actually, there are no ‘bad boys’, only boys doing things that some people consider bad. Therefore, you should not say to your child “Bobby, you are bad boy for doing that!” since, first of all, the term “bad” is essentially unclear but also because the claim intends to say something about Bobby’s fundamental nature or essence which is not part of the parent’s experience of “Bobby.” Psychologists call this a “fundamental attribution error,” attributing the cause of Bobby’s behavior to unverifiable inner mechanisms rather than verifiable, external, situational factors. A more

phenomenological way of referring to what is happening, while staying strictly within my experience would be to say: “Bobby, what I perceive you doing is unacceptable to me and I am feeling upset about it.”

The most fundamental and widespread of the perceptual prejudices, according to Husserl, is the belief in a three-dimensional, independently existing, material world apart from consciousness. In fact, this belief, though widely and commonly held as certain knowledge, is unjustifiable experientially, as the whole history of skepticism has made clear. Yet, despite the abundant evidence putting into doubt any certain knowledge of a three-dimensional, material world existing apart from and independent of consciousness, people continue to go on talking about “reality” and “the real world” as if it *is* immediately clear to everyone that there *is* a real, independent, material world existing apart from consciousness that is immediately available to us through our perception and mental representations, just as we continue to say the sun “rises” when we know this is not true. Suspending my judgment about the real existence of a material world apart from my consciousness does not change my sentient experience of the world at all, and I still have complete access to that experience of a sensual, external, three-dimensional world to investigate. Instead of saying incorrectly that the sun is setting, I could say the earth is turning toward night. Sometimes, just adding the words “appears to be” to a description can make all the difference. All you have done is to bracket a prejudicial belief from your thinking. Nothing else changes.

Prejudices, biases, and delusions are numerous and often well-camouflaged in everyday perceptual consciousness, as we saw in Chapter 2. The practice of overcoming perceptual prejudices takes a lifetime of phenomenological engagement such that this practice would become a *way of life*—a key dimension of the “ethical” moment of phenomenology since the practice of overcoming prejudices is also the practice of developing virtue. It is easier to talk about overcoming perceptual prejudices than it is to actually overcome them. Why? These prejudices support values, beliefs, interpretations, and other practices that a person desires more than they desire to see the truth. Some people seem to have a vested interest in the delusional belief that some boys or girls are just born bad, for example, and will not give up this prejudice easily because it perhaps has some kind of (dysfunctional) payoff for them.

In the final analysis, what you are left with after you perform the first phenomenological ‘reduction’ of your belief in a material world apart from your perception, is your pure subjective experience without an added belief of there being an objective correlate to that experience, which doesn’t change your experience at all but focuses you in on your experience itself (which is immediately available to you) rather than on a supposed objective correlate to your experience (which is not available to you). Your subjective experience alone is the deep, rich, and ever-changing source of all your personal moral value configurations.

The second strategic movement of Husserl’s phenomenological practice is another ‘reduction’ or re-framing of your experiences to be understood now as *phenomena*. This is to understand that what we perceive is not an objective, three-dimensional reality apart from us (although it feels that way), but phenomena, appearances, how things look and appear *to us* in our experience of them, in all their sensual fullness. The way things appear to me is the *phenomenon*. I see a chair, but I don’t actually experience the chair in itself. I experience the chair as it appears to me. Upon reflection I know this appearance to be a phenomenon. We can describe these perceptual phenomena and inspect them insofar as we experience them, in great detail, in fact, without ever ascribing to them any absolute reality beyond our perception, which doesn’t mean

they are not connected to any reality at all. But the only evidence we have is our intuited experience. So, if your description stays true to your intuited experience, what you assert, Husserl believed, will be true or at least without falseness. For example, I can tell you with complete certitude that this is the way I interpret Husserl about this. No doubt about it.

The third movement out of naïve realism and into the phenomenological attitude is the somewhat controversial reduction of phenomena to essences; the refinement of our perceptual experience through reflection, articulation, and more description until the common element of similar experiences is discovered; what-it-is that makes that phenomenon the kind of thing it is; the definition of the thing sought in description; determining what a thing is; the ‘whatness’ of a thing; like trying to distill the essential element from various experiences of joy or sadness in order to determine or approximate what joy or sadness *is* in itself for me, even though this “in-itself-ness” cannot enter into my experience with any fullness. Think of trying to adequately describe in words the most awe-inspiring experience you ever had, or the face of the one you love. What description would do it justice? Some things leave us ultimately speechless, or overflowing with endless speech!

People often take for granted that they know *what* is happening and go straightaway to trying to determine *why* it is happening. “Why/because” always takes you down the rational, analytic road. But phenomenological consciousness focuses more on seeing what is happening clearly, fully and without prejudice; and, where many disagree, to see what is essentially true among the various disagreements. Determining the essences of things (what a thing is or what is happening) requires an infinite task of questioning and articulation, a task which approaches its goal without ever getting there, so that the seeking of truth itself becomes a way of life and lifelong practice. This is certainly true with ethics and is one reason phenomenology is especially appropriate for ethical investigation.

The overall commitment to seeing clearly what is happening is how I understand phenomenology to be a practical way of life, and not merely an impersonal method that can be applied to reality at arms’ length in a supposedly objective, detached manner. Rather, the practicing phenomenologist is both the investigator and the ‘thing’ investigated; and the thing investigated is changed by the investigation, energizing a new perspective on the life situation. It is this recursive learning spiral toward ever deeper enlightenment that is the “way” in the idea of phenomenology being a way of life.

One problem for phenomenology is accounting for inter-subjectivity. If what we have available to us is only our own experiences, it becomes problematic to account for inter-subjectivity and how we are able to relate to others in a ‘common’ world. How phenomenology might avoid solipsism and the absolute separateness of subjective consciousness is a question Husserl struggled with to the end but was unable to resolve. This would also be a problem for Sartre’s free, existential subjectivity whose primary connection with others is viewed as a contest for dominance and control. But Emmanuel Levinas, a student of Husserl’s and friend of Sartre’s—whom I had the pleasure of meeting in person for a delightful interview on Easter Sunday afternoon, 1989, in Paris—offers a solution to his mentor’s solipsistic problem: *subjectivity understood as responsive inter-subjectivity*. A connection with the otherness of Others before we know it.

Duty ethics

Questions about the sameness and difference at play between rationalism and empiricism from a moral perspective that we touched on earlier in the text, come to the fore in a comparison of the deontological, duty approach to ethics and the teleological, utilitarian approach to ethical reasoning. As we have seen, empiricism holds to the belief that knowledge arises only from verifiable observation, as is illustrated by the work of psychologists Kohlberg and Piaget, for example, deriving their psychological moral knowledge from actual observations of persons' actions and behavior. Like those empirical psychologists, Mill is also an empirical philosopher who believed that utilitarian theory is derived from observations of how persons use a sort of cost-benefit analysis of the consequences of moral situations when making moral judgments in practice every day in the real world.

Rationalists, on the other hand, are people who think that the mind alone can generate ideas and knowledge. Do we really need any empirical experiments to figure out that a square peg won't fit into a round hole, or is a reflection on the idea sufficient? But, the empiricists insist, where did those ideas of "round," "square," and "peg" come from if not from intuited empirical experiences that were then configured into meaningful reflective understanding by application of rational categories of understanding to the raw sensible intuitions? The rationalist responds: But certain basic ideas may simply be innate, the basic categories of understanding, for example, since these surely could not have arisen *out of* sensible experience when they were needed to be in place already in order to recognize sense experience *as* sense experiences. And so the debate has raged on between the rationalists and the empiricists about how we know what we think we know.

Kant attempted to set the record straight on the matter once and for all with a kind of compromise: we need *some* sensible intuitions or 'raw' sensible experience in order to generate rational knowledge, but intuited sense experience alone is unknowable without rational cognitive appraisal or understanding. To paraphrase Kant: reason without sensation is lifeless; sensation without reason is blind. ("Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.")

Pure sensible intuition is the way the world is given to your senses pre-consciously before you have any conscious, reflective knowledge of what any 'thing' is, since, prior to the operation of our linguistically structured understanding (concepts) on our sensible intuitions, there is nothing. Since our categories of understanding are linguistically structured, nothing can exist outside of language. This is why it is impossible for us linguistically saturated human beings to know what a dog's pre-linguistic sensible intuitions or 'experiences' of the 'world' are like, just as it is impossible for us to reflectively know our own pre-linguistic sensible intuitions before understanding has conceptualized them within a linguistic framework, basically like trying to remember how you experienced the world when you were three months old, which we can't do since our world at that time was not linguistically structured. It was ... well, I don't know. Nothing exists outside of language. We cannot think what is prior to the very possibility of being thought.

The Runaway Trolley

Some theorists assert that our moral judgments and actions concerning other human beings *personally*, like putting your hands on the large person and pushing them physically off the bridge, are different, more constrained and careful, than moral judgments regarding non-human actions

like pulling a lever. In practice, in the scenario situation, we experience this constraint emotionally as a reluctance to push the large person off the bridge.

In other words, emotion seems to play a large part in supposedly rational moral decision-making. Your different emotional experience with the two trolley scenarios represents inculcated or culturally conditioned theoretical moral value perspectives and principles that are accessed intuitively and used to make a judgment.

If you pay close attention, you can *feel* the difference in your motive and perception of consequences when it changes as you imaginatively switch between the challenge of the lever situation and the somewhat different challenge of the footbridge situation. Feels okay to most people to pull the lever. Doesn't feel okay to most people to push the person off the bridge. That tells you all you need to know right there; but it doesn't tell you everything.

It is as if our emotions have been educated about moral theories, so that our immediate emotional moral responses serve to enact or express the orientations of those theories without our having to think about it or know how we did it, or even that we did it. Emotional willingness to pull the lever is as immediate as the emotional unwillingness to push the person. This is how our emotions 'think'. But they couldn't think unless they had been inculcated with the framework of the moral theories they reflect. The question of whether the emotions merely transmit moral judgments or are the moral judgments themselves, is still an open question.

Thus, the runaway trolley scenario provides a salient experience of how emotions comport with rational moral judgments. In fact, the runaway trolley is both a thought experiment and an "emotions experiment." Look at how you felt about pulling the lever, for example. Of course, in existential actuality, the whole situation would be feeling suddenly highly emotional. A runaway trolley! Lives at stake! My adrenalin would suddenly be surging! I'm pretty sure I would pull the lever but I would also be feeling terrible about the poor worker who gets killed right in front of me by the speeding train. Splat! OMG! Not a pretty sight. I can just feel how I would be freaking out emotionally, shocked that all this was suddenly happening rather than feeling pleased with myself for saving four lives by pulling a lever that resulted in one death.

And then on the bridge, again the sudden freak-out when I realize the racing trolley is driverless and on a doomsday trip. It suddenly and spontaneously flashes through my mind that I could push the big person over the side to stop it ... an idea I instantly reject, not because I coolly apply Kant's idea of the categorical imperative or Mill's hedonic calculus of consequences, but because it instantly *feels* so repugnant, disgusting, and deplorable to do such a thing that I feel and know instantly in my whole body that I will not push the person off, no matter how many lives it would save.

This reflection on the runaway trolley indicates to me that my moral emotions must be 'thinking' intuitively from a deontological or consequentialist moral perspective that must have been inculcated pre-reflectively into my moral value orientation by conditioned strategies from childhood and reinforced culturally for it to function so automatically now. Much conventional emotional moral reasoning must, ultimately, be grounded in deontological or teleological moral principles of one kind or another since these have become so fused with the value structure of Western culture and societies.

In the final analysis, you can see from your own experience that, if you, like most people, responded differently to the two moral situations involved in the runaway trolley thought experiment, it is probably because you immediately felt differently about the two situations and, whether you realized it or not, your emotional response would in all likelihood have tracked the two rational moral theories presented in this chapter. This suggests how acting rationally can be productively integrated into our emotional responsiveness. We coolly and reflectively configure our moral values, yet, once configured, they are deployed in a hot intuitive flash of feeling.

But, what is the difference between the two situations in the runaway trolley scenario that gives rise to the two different moral responses expressed emotionally, since the two trolley scenarios have a similar basic structure and outcome. Why do most people respond differently? Why are we not consistent utilitarians across the two runaway trolley situations? Some recent neuroscientific and cross-cultural research using the runaway trolley scenario as a probe has attempted to answer that question.

APPENDIX 5

No character or personality

Gilbert Harman³

As a recent introductory textbook in social psychology remarks, there is surprisingly little consistency in people's friendliness, honesty, or any other personality trait from one situation to other, different situations.

. . . [W]e often fail to realize this, and tend to assume that behavior is far more consistent and predictable than it really is. As a result, when we observe people's behavior, we jump to conclusions about their underlying personality far too readily and have much more confidence than we should in our ability to predict their behavior in other settings.

These conclusions are uncontroversial and a similar account can be found in almost any recent textbook in social psychology. Such conclusions are supported by a very large amount of disparate evidence.

These conclusions and the evidence for them have significant implications for business ethics. In an extremely interesting and useful account Robert Solomon notes that one implication

³ Harman, Gilbert. "No Character or Personality." *Business Ethics Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 87-94.

is that “We need less moralizing [about character] and more beneficent social engineering.” But, while praising an important new book that elaborates the philosophical implications of the results of social psychology, written by the philosopher John Doris, Solomon defends a version of business Virtue Ethics and criticizes what I call the “fragmentation of character.”

In this note, I want to suggest that Solomon underestimates the force of the threat to his version of business Virtue Ethics and I want to say a bit more about how the evidence from social psychology implies such “fragmentation.”

Psychology and Folk Psychology

It is uncontroversial that there is usually a difference between the study of ordinary conceptions of a given phenomenon and the study of the phenomenon itself... We distinguish between the study of how people conceive of God from the study of theology itself. We distinguish between the study of doctors’ views about good medical treatment and an investigation into what sorts of treatment are actually effective.... In the same way, there is a clear conceptual difference between what people generally think about character and personality and what is actually the case; the study of what people think about character and personality is part of the study of folk psychology and is not the same as a study of character and personality....

Furthermore, whether or not there is a matter of fact about what is right or wrong, it is obvious that many moral judgments presuppose matters of fact. To belabor the point, if I say you were wrong to hit Bob in the nose, I presuppose that in fact you hit Bob in the nose and, if you did not, I am mistaken. Similarly, if I say that you have a certain virtuous character, I presuppose that you have a character. Perhaps, as Solomon believes, it is not a matter of fact whether such a character is virtuous. But it is a matter of fact whether you have that character, and whether there are character traits at all....

What Is the Fundamental Attribution Error?

The librarian carried the old woman’s groceries across the street. The receptionist stepped in front of the old man in line. The plumber slipped an extra \$50 into his wife’s purse. Although you were not asked to make any inferences about any of these characters, chances are that you inferred that the librarian is helpful, the receptionist rude, and the plumber generous. Perhaps because we do not realize the extent to which behavior is shaped by situations, we tend to spontaneously infer such traits from behavior.

Psychologists refer to this tendency as “correspondence bias” or “the fundamental attribution error.” It is a bias toward explanations in terms of corresponding personality traits, the error of ignoring situational factors.

Having once attributed a trait to a given person, an observer has a strong tendency to continue to attribute that trait to the person even in the face of considerable disconfirming evidence, a tendency psychologists sometimes call “confirmation bias,” a bias toward noting evidence that is in accord with one’s hypothesis and toward disregarding evidence against it.

Even in a world with no individual differences in character traits or personality traits, people would still strongly believe that there were such differences, as long as they were subject to the fundamental attribution error and to confirmation bias. True, it is “obvious” that, some people have different character and personality traits than others. But our finding this fact so obvious is predicted by our tendency to the fundamental attribution error whether or not there are such differences.

Subtle Situational Effects

Minor and seemingly irrelevant differences in the perceived situation sometimes make significant differences to what people do.

Imagine a person making a call in a suburban shopping plaza. As the caller leaves the phone booth, along comes Alice, who drops a folder full of papers that scatter in the caller’s path. Will the caller stop and help before the only copy of Alice’s magnum opus is trampled? In an experiment, the paper-dropper was an experimental assistant or “confederate.” For one group of callers, a dime was planted in the phone’s coin return slot; for the other, the slot was empty. The results are that, of 16 callers who found a dime, 14 helped and 2 did not; of 25 who did not find a dime, 1 helped and 24 did not. Finding a bit of change is something one would hardly bother to remark on in describing one’s day, yet it makes the difference between helping and not.

Whether or not a theology student stops to help someone who seems to be having a heart attack may depend on how much of a hurry the student is to accomplish a comparatively trivial goal, as reported in the “Good Samaritan” study by Darley and Batson, in 1973. Whether someone in a waiting room will go to the aid of another person who seems to have fallen off a ladder in the next room may depend on whether there is another person in the waiting room who seems unconcerned with the apparent fall or not.

In the Milgram (1974) obedience experiment, subjects were led by gradual steps to do something they would never have done straight away, namely to administer very severe electrical shocks to another person. The gradualness of the process with no obvious place to stop seems an important part of the explanation why they obeyed a command to shock the other person in that experiment although they would not have done so if directly ordered to give the severe shock at the very beginning.

Similarly, if you are trying not to give into temptation to drink alcohol, to smoke, or to eat caloric food, the best advice is not to try to develop “willpower” or “self-control.” Instead, it is

best to follow the situationist slogan, “People! Places! Things!” Don’t go to places where people drink! Do not carry cigarettes or a lighter and avoid people who smoke! Stay out of the kitchen!

When you learn that a certain seminary student walked right past someone who seemed to be having a heart attack, actually stepping right over the person, you tend to think of the student as incredibly callous and not that he was simply being influenced by the fact that he was in a hurry to accomplish a goal....

No one supposes that these two experiments, taken by themselves, show that there are no character traits. What they show is that aspects of a particular situation can be important to how a person acts in ways that ordinary people do not normally appreciate, leading them to attribute certain distinctive actions to an agent’s distinctive character rather than to subtle aspects of the situation....

Free Will and Responsibility

Solomon worries that in the rejection of the sort of character and personality traits that are accepted in ordinary moral thinking and in his version of Virtue Ethics, something extremely important can get lost.... It is the idea that one can and should resist certain pressures, even at considerable cost to oneself, depending on the severity of the situation and circumstances. That is the very basis on which Virtue Ethics has proven to be so appealing to people in business.

This is clearly a different issue. Of course, people can and should resist such pressures and we should encourage them to do so. But the point has nothing to do with whether people have character traits. As Solomon would certainly agree, even a person without relevant character traits can and should resist.

Solomon worries about the philosophical consequences of denying the existence of character, because that would be to go “over to causal and statistical explanations of behavior instead of a continuing emphasis on character, agency, and responsibility.” But people do not need character traits in order to have agency and responsibility.

Conclusion

Aristotelian style Virtue Ethics shares with folk psychology a commitment to broad-based character traits of a sort that people simply do not have. This does not threaten free will and moral responsibility, but it does mean that it is a mistake to base business ethics on that sort of Virtue Ethics.

Victims of circumstance? A defense of Virtue Ethics in business

Robert C. Solomon⁴

Business ethics is a child of ethics, and business ethics, like its parents, is vulnerable to the same threats and challenges visited on its elders. For many years, one such threat (or rather, a family of threats) has challenged moral philosophy, and it is time it was brought out in the open in business ethics as well. It is a threat that is sometimes identified by way of the philosophical term, “determinism,” and though its status in the philosophy of science and theory of knowledge is by no means settled, it has nevertheless wreaked havoc on ethics. If there is determinism, so the argument goes, there can be no agency, properly speaking, and thus no moral responsibility. But determinism admits of at least two interpretations in ethics. The first is determination by “external” circumstances, including pressure or coercion by other people. The second is determination within the person, in particular, by his or her character. In the former case, but arguably not in the latter, there is thought to be a problem ascribing moral responsibility.

The argument can be readily extended to business ethics. Versions of the argument have been put forward with regard to corporations, for instance, in the now perennial arguments whether corporations can be or cannot be held responsible. One familiar line of argument holds that only individuals, not corporations, can be held responsible for their actions. But then corporate executives like to excuse their actions by reference to “market forces” that render them helpless, mere victims of economic circumstances, and everyone who works in the corporation similarly excuses their bad behavior by reference to those who set their agenda and policies. They are mere “victims of circumstances.” They thus betray their utter lack of leadership. Moreover, it doesn’t take a whole lot of research to show that people in corporations tend to behave in conformity with the people and expectations that surround them, even when what they are told to do violates their “personal morality.” What (outside of the corporation) might count as “character” tends to be more of an obstacle than a boon to corporate success for many people. What seems to count as “character” in the corporation is a disposition to please others, obey superiors, follow others, and avoid personal responsibility.

...David Hume and John Stuart Mill suggested that an act is free (and an agent responsible) if it “flows from the person’s character,”³ where “character” stood for a reasonably stable set of established character traits that were both morally significant and served as the antecedent causal conditions demanded by determinism. Adam Smith, Hume’s best friend and the father of not only modern economics but of business ethics too, agreed with this thesis. It was a good solution. It saved the notions of agency and responsibility, was very much in line with our ordinary intuitions about people’s behavior, and it did not try to challenge the scientific establishment. So, too, a major movement in business ethics, of which I consider myself a card-carrying member, is “Virtue Ethics,” which takes the concept of character (and with it the related notions of virtue and integrity) to be central to the idea of being a good person in business. Among the many virtues of Virtue Ethics in business, one might think, is that, as in Hume and Mill, it would seem to keep at bay the threat of situational (“external”) determinism.

...But I have mixed feelings about the empiricist solution. On the one hand, it seems to me too weak. It does not account (or try to account) for actions “out of character,” heroic or

⁴ Solomon, Robert C. “Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business.” *Business Ethics Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Jan., 2003), pp. 43-62.

saintly or vicious and shockingly greedy behavior, which could not have been predicted of (or even by) the subject. And it does not (as Aristotle does) rigorously hold a person responsible for the formation of his or her character. Aristotle makes it quite clear that a wicked person is responsible for his or her character not because he or she could now alter it but because he or she could have and should have acted differently early on and established very different habits and states of character. The corporate bully, the greedy entrepreneur, and the office snitch all would seem to be responsible for not only what they do but who they are, according to Aristotle's tough criterion.

Character consists of such traits as honesty and trustworthiness that are more or less resistant to social or interpersonal pressures. But character is never fully formed and settled. It is always vulnerable to circumstances and trauma. People change, and they are malleable. They respond in interesting and sometimes immediate ways to their environment, their peers and pressures from above. Put into an unusual, pressured, or troubled environment, many people will act "out of character," sometimes in heroic but more often in disappointing and sometimes shocking ways. In the corporate setting, in particular, people joke about "leaving their integrity at the office door" and act with sometimes shocking obedience to orders and policies that they personally find unethical and even downright revolting.

These worries can be taken care of with an adequate retooling of the notion of character and its place in ethics, and this is what I will try to do here. But my real worry is that in the effort to correct the excesses of the empiricist emphasis on character, the baby is being thrown out with the bath toys. Both Harman and Doris argue at considerable length that a great deal of what we take as "character" is in fact due to specific social settings that reinforce virtuous conduct. To mention two often-used examples, clergy act like clergy not because of character but because they surround themselves with other clergy who expect them to act like clergy. So, too, criminals act like criminals not because of character but because they hang out with other criminals who expect them to act like criminals....

So, too, in business ethics, there is a good reason to be suspicious of a notion of character that is supposed to stand up to overwhelming pressures without peer or institutional support. I would take Harman's arguments as a good reason to insist on sound ethical policies and rigorous ethical enforcement in corporations and in the business community more generally, thus maximizing the likelihood that people will conform to the right kinds of corporate expectations. Nevertheless, something extremely important can get lost in the face of that otherwise quite reasonable and desirable demand. It is the idea that a person can, and should, resist those pressures, even at considerable cost to oneself, depending on the severity of the situation and circumstances. That is the very basis on which Virtue Ethics has proven to be so appealing to people in business. It is the hope that they can, and sometimes will, resist or even rise up against pressures and policies that they find to be unethical.

So, whatever my worries, I find myself a staunch defender of character and the indispensability of talk about character in both ethics and business ethics.

Some of my concern with this issue is personal. Like most conscientious people, I worry about my integrity and character, what sorts of temptations and threats I could and would withstand. I feel ashamed (or worse) when I give into those temptations and humiliated when I succumb to (at least some of) those threats. I am occasionally even proud about those temptations and threats I have withstood. Philosophically ("existentially"), I worry about how we view

ourselves when the balance of accounts is shifted over to causal and statistical [empirical] explanations of behavior instead of a continuing emphasis on character, agency, and responsibility. Will that give almost everyone an excuse for almost everything?

And, professionally, I have made something of a reputation for myself as a “virtue ethicist” in business ethics, in the twisted tradition of Aristotle and Nietzsche, and Virtue Ethics requires a solid notion of character. But not a fixed and permanent notion of character. To be sure, many writers about the virtues, perhaps betraying their own insecurity, tend to describe good character and integrity in terms of rock and stone metaphors, suggesting that the truly virtuous person is capable of standing up against anything.

But I for one never said that Virtue Ethics requires a strong sense of autonomy, the ability to cut oneself off from all influences and pressures from other people and institutions and ignore one’s personal “inclinations” and make a decision on the basis of one’s “practical reason” alone. On the contrary, I have argued that one’s inclinations (one’s emotions, in particular) form the essential core of the virtues. And one’s emotions are largely reactive, responsive to other people and the social situations in which one finds oneself. Virtue Ethics need not, and should not, deny any of this.

The “New Empiricism ” Virtue Ethics and Empirical Science

...I have long been an advocate of cooperation between moral philosophy and the social sciences in business ethics. I think that the more we know about how people actually behave in corporations, the richer and more informed our moral judgments and, more important, our decisions will be. In particular, it is very instructive to learn how people will behave in extraordinary circumstances, those in which our ordinary moral intuitions do not give us a clue. All of us have asked, say, with regard to the Nazi disease in Germany in the Thirties, how we would have behaved; or how we would behave, think, and feel if we worked for a tobacco company. But even in an ordinary corporation (which is not the same as a university in which there is at least the illusion of individual autonomy and “academic freedom”), the question of “obedience to authority” comes front and center.

Thus, an experiment like the Milgram experiment is shocking precisely because it does not seem to presuppose any extraordinary context. Milgram’s experiment, which would certainly be prohibited today, has to do with subjects inflicting potentially lethal shocks to victim-learners (in fact the experimenter’s accomplices). Even when the victim-learners pleaded for them to stop, the majority of subjects continued to apply the shocks when ordered to do so by the authorities (the experimenters). One could easily imagine this “experiment” being confirmed in any corporation.

...It seems to me that what the Milgram experiment shows—and what subsequent events in Vietnam made all too painfully obvious—was that despite our high moral opinions of ourselves and our conformist chorus singing about what independent individuals we all are, Americans, like Germans before them, are capable of beastly behavior in circumstances where their practiced virtues are forced to confront an unusual situation in which unpracticed efforts are required. In the Milgram experiment as in Vietnam, American subjects and soldiers were compelled by their own practiced dispositions to follow orders even in the face of consequences that were intolerable. Obedience may not always be a virtue....

...But one third of the subjects in the Milgram experiment did quit. And those who did not were indeed confused. Is there no room for character in a complete explanation?

The other often-used case for “lack of character” is the case of the “good Samaritan,” designed by Darley and Batson. Seminary students, on their way to give an assigned lecture (on “the good Samaritan”) were forced to confront a person (an accomplice of the experimenter) on their way. Few of them stopped to help. It is no doubt true that the difference between subjects and their willingness to help the (supposed) victim can be partially explained on the basis of such transient variables as the fact that they were “in a hurry.” And it is probably true as well that people who were religious or who were about to talk on a religious topic of direct relevance to the experience did not act so differently as they would have supposed. But does it follow that character played no role? I would say that all sorts of character traits, from one’s ability to think about time and priorities to one’s feelings of anxiety and competence when faced with a (seemingly) suffering human being all come into play. Plus, of course, the sense of responsibility and obligation to arrive at an appointment on time, which once again slips into the background of the interpretation of the experiment and so blinds us to the obvious.

As in the Milgram experiment, how much is the most plausible explanation of the case precisely one that the experimenters simply assume but ignore, namely the character trait or virtue of promptness, the desire to arrive at the designated place on time? It is not lack of character. It is a conflict of character traits, one practiced and well-cultivated, the other more often spoken of than put in practice. Theology students have no special claims on compassion. They just tend to talk about it a lot. And as students they have had little opportunity to test and practice their compassion in ways that are not routine.

Conclusion: In Defense of Business Virtue Ethics

Virtue Ethics has a long pedigree, going back to Plato and Aristotle, Confucius in China, and many other cultures as well as encompassing much of Medieval and modern ethics—including, especially, the ethics of Hume, Adam Smith, and the other “Moral Sentiment Theorists.” But we would do well to remind ourselves just why virtue and character have become such large concerns in the world today—in business ethics and in politics in particular. The impetus comes from such disparate sources as the Nuremberg trials and American atrocities in Vietnam, teenage drug use and peer pressure, and the frequently heard rationalization in business and politics that “everyone is doing it.” The renewed emphasis on character is an attempt to build a personal bulwark (call it “integrity”) against such pressures and rationalizations and to cultivate virtues other than those virtues of unquestioning obedience that proved to be so dominant in the Milgram experiments and in Vietnam atrocities such as My Lai.

Nevertheless, I share with Harman a concern that Virtue Ethics and talk about character is being overused and abused. Too often preachers of the virtues praise (in effect) their own sterling personalities without bothering to note how little there has been in their lives to challenge their high opinion of themselves. Too often, people are blamed for behaving in ways in which, given the situation and their personal backgrounds, it is hard to see how they could have acted or chosen to act otherwise. In contemporary politics, in particular, the renewed emphasis on character is prone to bullying and even cruelty, for example, as way of condemning the victims of poverty and racial oppression for their behavior and insisting that such people “boot-strap” their way to respectability.

Then again there are those who consider it a virtue to say, “virtue is necessary”; but at bottom they believe only that the police are necessary....

If we are to combat intolerance, encourage mutual forgiveness, and facilitate human flourishing in contexts plagued by ethnic hatred, for instance, there is no denying the need for mediating institutions that will create the circumstances in which the virtues can be cultivated. Closer to home, the cultivation of the virtues in much-touted moral education also requires the serious redesign of our educational institutions. And much of the crime and commercial dishonesty in the United States and in the world today is due, no doubt, to the absence of such designs and character-building contexts....

APPENDIX 6

The Everyday Ethics of Workplace Lies⁵

David Shulma

In the aftermath of savage human actions, we often ask, "Who could do such a thing?" We agonize over people's capacity to do evil to others and we hope we can uncover and control whatever forces can turn people into monsters. Our culture usually explains wrongdoing by segregating responsibility—we hold "bad" individual actors culpable and fault to a lesser extent the larger society from whence wrongdoers come. This separation of individual and group flatters society by allowing us to displace blame to individuals while disregarding ways in which social groups bear some responsibility.

The capacity to do wrong is a collective act. It takes more than one person to produce harmful acts ranging from the ultimate crime of genocide to white-collar, occupational safety, and environmental crimes, even if one or two individuals at the top are the initiators. When we spotlight only the most egregious individual offenders, we risk neglecting social contexts that make committing offenses possible. Understanding these obscured contextual forces is critical for answering a general question that the sociologist Everett Hughes (1984) posed, which, to paraphrase, is: How can people do wrong and still view themselves as ‘good’ people?

There is an important difference between the organizational underlife explored in this book an organization's potential criminal underworld. But the aspects of the workplace that encourage and tolerate deception as an everyday mechanism of social interaction at work may represent important micro-sociological features of workplaces that help in carrying out and rationalizing more serious deviant activities. Are the mechanics of rationalizing everyday deception useful in understanding criminal wrong-doing in the workplace?

In chapter 3 I explored how workplaces enable people to justify lying for work-related purposes without viewing themselves as being immoral. Examining a similar process in

⁵ Shulman, David. *From Hire to Liar: The Role of Deception in the Workplace*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 144-147.

informal deceptions is useful for learning about lying and criminal behavior. Organizational culture does influence misconduct. Exactly how does it do so? In this chapter I examine a range of rationalizations in the workplace for informal deception--the sources of an everyday ethics that favors workplace lying--and suggest some connections between the source of those rationalizations and their potential role in perpetrating misconduct.

That people use a range of preemptive and post-hoc excuses and justifications to avoid or to repair a spoiled identity is well established. However, what must be elaborated further is the organization's contribution to those accounts. The distinction here is between an individual's motive and the opportunities and encouragement that an organization provides to pursue that motive

Consider three managers who are caught embezzling. One might embezzle to fund a gambling addiction, another to seek revenge against the employer, a third because of greed . The individual motives vary. What is analytically relevant, however, is that all three had the problem of having to subvert some set of social controls to commit the act. They had to feign trustworthiness so that co-workers did not notice anything out of the ordinary, and written records had to be vulnerable to fraud.

I suggest that organizations inevitably have structural and cultural blind spots in their social control, in part because casual deceptions are so important in an organization's dramaturgical infrastructure. This infrastructure allows productive deceptions and possibly permits people to act on and rationalize much more serious offenses and opportunities to subvert social controls.

In the introduction I introduced the term "ethical disengagement" to describe a process through which people neutralize ethical mores _so that they can engage in deceptive actions. This category references the moral reasoning that surrounds workplace deception. Routine organizational operations permit an everyday ethics that both encourages and mitigates deception. What is crucial about this ethical disengagement is that it reflects an underlying social organization of irresponsibility. By blaming only individual bad actors, ethical disengagement is often perceived as being the product of faulty moral decision-making by individuals, while the underlying social organization of irresponsibility is overlooked.

There are many sound reasons for this attribution. First, individuals do decide to carry out wrongdoing and are culpable for doing so. Second, responsibility is often viewed in individual terms. We prefer to reduce social complexity in criminal offenses to single actors, which is what our system is set up to adjudicate. Neo-Marxist theorists, on the other hand, view the amoral individual model as promoting a false idea of who the real economic criminals are--exploitative capitalists and the capitalist system. By focusing on frequently apprehended individual offenders, systematic economic pillaging by rich elites receives less attention. We should try to reveal an underlying system whereby workplace cultures can subtly encourage the rationalization of misconduct.

To that end, I suggest analyzing ethical disengagement as a process that is sponsored by informal organizational culture and norms. Individual excuses and justifications are a symptom of an underlying set of organizational mechanisms that allow both individuals and organizations to detach themselves from adverse moral assessments

of deception. These mechanisms of ethical disengagement exist to preserve individual workers and the organization's "identities" as ethical. I believe that these systems of ethical disengagement are often mundane and apply mostly to slightly questionable behaviors. However, these stable systems of ethical disengagement may escalate into propping up an organizational culture of misconduct that is an important and understated accomplice in explaining workplace crime.

Jackall (1980, 59) argues that bureaucratic administration influences moral consciousness by "making the moral classification of right and wrong irrelevant and replacing it with the technical classifications of correct and incorrect, logical and illogical, efficacious and non-efficacious." Bureaucratic organizations stress pursuing rational goals and administration, which may produce a tunnel vision that substitutes an imperative of productivity for a responsibility to the general "good." The danger here is that workers, on their own initiative, will fastidiously follow unethical or illegal means of accumulating profits while remaining concertedly blind and callous to the possible negative consequences of those means.

The tendency to emphasize rational efficiency can diffuse responsibility further by allowing people to make "efficiency" culpable for any questionable activities that are required on the job. The use of "legality" as a default account by private detectives is an illustration. Jackall (1980, 58) concludes that bureaucracies invite deceit because "managers and officials come to internalize the bureaucratic morality, based on the rational/technical ethos and on the compartmentalization of actions from their consequences."

As the bureaucratic ethos makes clear, ethical implications are also not immediately apparent when they are subordinated to technical ends. Gioia (1992, 137) notes about the Pinto, "The person who decides to let the assembly line use substandard cord in the fabrication of radial tires is not thinking of the accidents that the decision could cause, but simply keeping the assembly line moving." Further, keeping one's job is a strong incentive. As Vandiver (1982, 138) recalled, in his experience of faked AD7 airbrake tests, workers' livelihoods depended on following orders. As he succinctly notes, "Your conscience doesn't pay your salary."

At the extreme end of a nightmarish spectrum for the bureaucratic ethos lies Kelman and Hamilton's analysis (1989) of the three dimensions of organizational culture that contributed to the My Lai massacre, which can be applied to the workplace: *authorization*, which imposes a structure of authority on workers and a dictum in which obedience requires not asking questions of authority; *routinization*, in which tasks are compartmentalized and actors focus on a job's details rather than its meaning; and *dehumanization*, in which organizational influences lead workers to see an organization's targets as less than human and deserving of little consideration.