**On-line Appendix for “Taking the Fight to Them: Neighborhood Human Rights Organizations and Domestic Protest**

The model presented below estimates the same model as Table 1 in the manuscript, but instead uses a dependent variable of violent protest. This variable is also generated from the same events data. The results on the interaction terms below demonstrate that the conditional effect that we find between domestic and neighboring HROs in Table 1 of the manuscript do not hold up when examining violent protest. This is not inconsistent with our argument, because we do not expect that these organizations are likely to push for violent forms of protest as these might be met with greater repression from the government.

**Table A1: The Impact of Neighborhood HROs on Violent Protest, Negative Binomial Model with Robust Standard Errors**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | **Coefficient** |
| **VARIABLES** | **(Standard Error)** |
|  |  |
| HRO Secretariat t-1 | 0.0540\*\* |
|  | (0.026) |
| Neighborhood HRO Secretariat t-1 | 0.0129\*\*\* |
|  | (0.004) |
| HRO Member (ln)  t-1 | 0.2982 |
|  | (0.195) |
| Neighborhood HRO Member (ln) t-1 | -0.1118 |
|  | (0.269) |
| HRO Member (ln) X Neighborhood HRO Member (ln) t-1 | -0.0553 |
|  | (0.069) |
| HRO Secretariat (ln) X Neighborhood HRO Member (ln) t-1 | -0.0101 |
|  | (0.007) |
| Violent Protest t-1 | 0.0117\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) |
| Non-Violent Protest t-1 | -0.0023 |
|  | (0.002) |
| Neighborhood Violent Protest t-1 | 0.0009 |
|  | (0.001) |
| Neighborhood Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI) t-1 | 0.0289 |
|  | (0.025) |
| Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI) t-1 | -0.2287\*\*\* |
|  | (0.022) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | 0.0853\*\* |
|  | (0.043) |
| GDP per Capita (ln)  t-1 | -0.0302 |
|  | (0.040) |
| War (Interstate or Intrastate) t-1 | 0.2909\*\*\* |
|  | (0.113) |
| Polity Score (-10 to 10) t-1 | 0.0122\* |
|  | (0.007) |
| IDEA Coverage (ln) t-1 | 0.3290\*\*\* |
|  | (0.051) |
| Constant | -0.7049 |
|  | (1.093) |
| Ln alpha | -0.1942\*\*\* |
|  | (0.065) |
|  |  |
| Observations | 1,546 |

Table 2 below presents the list of events that are counted in the non-violent events dependent variable.

**Table A2: Nonviolent Protest Activities in the IDEA Dataset**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ACTIVITY | IDEA CODE | DEFINITION |
| Break relations | <BREL> | Formal severance of ties. |
| Defy norms | <DEFY> | Open defiance of laws and norms, civil disobedience. |
| Demonstrate | <DEMO> | Demonstrations not otherwise specified. |
| Formally complain | <FCOM> | Written and institutionalized protests and appeals, and all petition drives and recalls. |
| Informally complain | <ICOM> | Verbal protests and rebukes, and all other informal complaints. |
| Protest altruism | <PALT> | Protest demonstrations that place the source (protestor) at risk for the sake of unity with the target. |
| Protest demonstrations | <PDEM> | All protest demonstrations not otherwise specified. |
| Protest procession | <PMAR> | Picketing and other parading protests. |
| Protest obstruction | <POBS> | Sit-ins and other non-military occupation protests. |
| Protest defacement | <PPRO> | Damage, sabotage and the use of graffiti to desecrate property and symbols. |
| Reduce routine activity | <REDR> | Reduction of routine and planned activities. |
| Rally support | <SRAL> | Gatherings to express or demonstrate support, celebrations and all other public displays of confidence; includes protest vigils and commemorations. |
| Strikes and boycotts | <STRI> | Labor and professional sanctions reported as strikes, general strikes, walkouts, withholding of goods or services and lockouts. |
| Threaten to boycott or embargo | <TBOE> | Threaten to boycott or impose embargoes, restrict normal interactions presented explicitly as a protest or retaliatory measure. |
| Threaten to reduce or break relations | <TRBR> | Threaten to reduce or formally sever ties. |
| Sanctions threat | <TSAN> | Threats of non-military, non-physical force social, economic and political sanctions. |
| Give ultimatum | <ULTI> | Threats conveyed explicitly as an ultimatum. |

Table 3 presents two alternate weighting schemes for the HRO membership variable. Instead of relying on just neighborhood weighting, we use a trade-based weight and a former colony based weight. The trade-based variable provides an indicator of the number of HRO members in a state’s trading partners. The colony-based measure is the number of members in the states that were colonial holders of the territory. Neither of these measures produces statistically significant coefficients.

**Table A3: Trade & Colony Weighted HRO Memberships & Non-Violent Protest, Negative Binomial Model with Robust Standard Errors, 1991-2004**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| VARIABLES | Trade | Colony |
|  |  |  |
| HRO Secretariat t-1 | 0.049\*\* | 0.054\*\* |
|  | (0.024) | (0.024) |
| Neighborhood HRO Secretariat t-1 | 0.023\*\*\* | 0.021\*\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| HRO Member (ln)  t-1 | 0.761\*\*\* | 0.742\*\*\* |
|  | (0.293) | (0.199) |
| Neighborhood HRO Member (ln) t-1 | 0.696\*\*\* | 0.686\*\*\* |
|  | (0.233) | (0.215) |
| HRO Member (ln) X Neighborhood HRO Member (ln) t-1 | -0.231\*\*\* | -0.237\*\*\* |
|  | (0.067) | (0.059) |
| HRO Secretariat (ln) X Neighborhood HRO Member (ln) t-1 | -0.012\* | -0.013\*\* |
|  | (0.006) | (0.006) |
| Trade-Weighted HRO Member (ln) t-1 | -0.291 |  |
|  | (0.246) |  |
| HRO Member (ln) X Trade-Weighted HRO Member (ln) t-1 | -0.001 |  |
|  | (0.085) |  |
| Colonial-linkage HRO Member (ln) t-1 |  | 0.056 |
|  |  | (0.071) |
| HRO Secretariat (ln) X Colonial-linkage HRO Member (ln) t-1 |  | -0.018 |
|  |  | (0.019) |
| Violent Protest t-1 | 0.002\*\* | 0.002\*\* |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Non-Violent Protest t-1 | 0.005\*\*\* | 0.005\*\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Neighborhood Non-Violent Protest t-1 | -0.004\*\*\* | -0.004\*\* |
|  | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Neighborhood Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI) t-1 | 0.020 | 0.014 |
|  | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Physical Integrity Rights Index (CIRI) t-1 | -0.062\*\*\* | -0.058\*\*\* |
|  | (0.017) | (0.017) |
| Population (ln) t-1 | 0.224\*\*\* | 0.235\*\*\* |
|  | (0.030) | (0.032) |
| GDP per Capita (ln)  t-1 | 0.033 | 0.025 |
|  | (0.028) | (0.029) |
| War (Interstate or Intrastate) t-1 | -0.232\*\* | -0.203\* |
|  | (0.103) | (0.110) |
| Polity Score (-10 to 10) t-1 | 0.013\*\*\* | 0.014\*\*\* |
|  | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| IDEA Coverage (ln) t-1 | 0.475\*\*\* | 0.482\*\*\* |
|  | (0.034) | (0.034) |
| Constant | -6.769\*\*\* | -7.936\*\*\* |
|  | (1.055) | (0.889) |
| Ln alpha | -0.914\*\*\* | -0.905\*\*\* |
|  | (0.078) | (0.078) |
|  |  |  |
| Observations | 1,546 | 1,532 |

This figure presents the extent to which the effect of neighborhood HRO member presence is conditioned by the presence of a domestic secretariat. While the figures show that the effect of neighboring HROs declines as the number of local HRO secretariats is increased (the slightly downward sloping line in each figure), the three plots demonstrate, that local HRO membership has a much stronger conditioning effect than local HRO secretariats.

**Figure A1: Neighborhood HRO Members Conditioned by Domestic Secretariat**

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