### Notes

This is the EU CP. It argues that, instead of having the United States increase development or exploration of the Arctic, that the European Union should be the one to do so. This CP argues that the European Union is both 1. Capable of implementing all of the same arctic development/exploration programs that the aff argues for and 2. Is a better actor to do so because establishing a strong EU Arctic policy allows them to demonstrate to the world that they are capable leaders who can help fill in for US decline in global leadership. In doing so, the European Union can provide the world with a strong multilateral system.

**How to use this file if you are negative**

In the 1NC, all you have to do is read the arguments under the “EU CP—1NC vs XX” where “XX” is the aff you are debating against. So if they are reading Domain Awareness, you would read the “EU CP—1NC vs Domain Awareness” header.

In the 2NC or 1NR, any evidence you read will come from the “They Say” headers. Some arguments only apply to certain affirmatives- for example, you should only read “They Say: “US Key to Arms Control” (Russian LNG)” against the Russian LNG affirmative. Any header that is aff specific has included the aff in parenthesis. Anything without parentheses are applicable regardless of what aff they are reading. You should also make sure you are explaining how your 1nc evidence answers each 2ac argument.

**How to use this file if you are affirmative**

In the 2ac, you will want to read the arguments under the “2AC Answers to: European Union CP” header that is specific to your affirmative. You also want to include explanations of any 1ac evidence that explains why the United States federal government should be the one doing the plan.

In the 1ar, your primary job is explaining the arguments that you made in the 2ac. If you have time to read additional evidence, you can read evidence from the “extend” headers, but it is far more important to explain the 2ac arguments.

# European Union Counterplan

## 1NC

### EU CP—1NC vs Domain Awareness

#### The European Union should increase its deployment of domain awareness technology, including early warning radars, uncrewed aerial and underwater vehicles, and satellites, in the Arctic.

#### EU can expand its Arctic policy to achieve security and diplomatic goals – the region is key to establish its leadership

Ciolan 22, Research Fellow in the Europe in the World programme at the European Policy Centre. (Ionela Ciolan, 4-11-2022, “The EU’s geopolitical awakening in the Arctic,” https://www.epc.eu/publication/The-EUs-geopolitical-awakening-in-the-Arctic-47c318/)

The northern neighbourhood is one of the main testing grounds for the EU’s geopolitical awakening. Only through skilful use of diplomacy, deterrence, dialogue and defence will the EU successfully preserve the peace, sustainability and security of the Arctic.

Decades of exceptionalism, characterised by cooperation and peaceful dialogue, branded the Arctic a “pole of peace”. Today, it is fast transforming into a ‘pole of instability’ as geopolitics return to the High North and great power politics start to dominate this region. As the Arctic becomes a space for geopolitical competition, sharpened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the battles will be carried out in five areas: the chase for natural resources, the rivalry for supremacy, the contest for trading routes, the race for tourism opportunities, and the run for salvaging the environment of the Circumpolar North.

The EU’s voice in the Arctic

The EU’s engagement in the Arctic has been more ambitious in words than practice. Comprised of eight states – Canada, the US, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the Russian Federation –, the Arctic Council is the main framework of cooperation between the Arctic states and the North indigenous peoples on issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. For 21 years, the EU has been waiting for a seat in the room as an observer in the Council. As such, its work in the northern neighbourhood is dependent on the goodwill of the Arctic eight.

But things are changing. The 2021 Arctic Strategy gives Brussels a legitimate voice on Arctic issues and brakes its tiptoeing approach. By focusing the strategy on climate action and acknowledging the region as a strategic domain for European security in a growing geopolitical contest, the EU claims a rightful place within the Arctic discussions. In addition, the strategic relevance of the northern neighbourhood for the EU, along with the east and the south, was confirmed by the recently published Strategic Compass for European security and defence.

Beyond having a voice, the EU should now devise a better and more comprehensive strategy toward the Arctic. The “new normal” in the northern neighbourhood is characterised by multicrises that will require Brussels’ strategic engagement, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

More permafrost melting, less climate security

After the Amazon, the Arctic is the world’s second-biggest carbon sink, and the global “refrigerator” as it regulates global temperatures. In the High North, the effects of climate change are developing three times faster than anywhere on the globe, with implications for oceanic, atmospheric and geophysical developments.

As the Arctic heats up and more ice melts, cascading effects will further climate insecurity: extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, permafrost thawing with unimaginable consequences everywhere. Indeed, the melting of the permafrost could act as a climate bomb, releasing a billion tons of carbon gases into the atmosphere, awakening long-dormant bacteria and microbes, and changing polar landscapes that will disrupt local human activities and infrastructure.

The warming of the Circumpolar North also means competition for its vast untapped resources. The Arctic land and ocean hold 13% and 30% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves, respectively. The region is also rich in fish, natural minerals (e.g. nickel, platinum, palladium) and rare-earth elements vital to modern technology and cutting-edge innovations. Finally, it offers the possibility of shorter commercial routes, which implies profits of billions of dollars.

And with this comes geo-economic and geopolitical rivalry, too.

Rising geopolitics in the High North

Climate change acts as a conflict and risk multiplier. And nowhere on the globe are the geopolitical consequences of climate insecurity as visible as in the European Arctic. For example, Scandinavia is at the forefront of great power politics and growing competition between the West and Russia.

In the past decades, the Kremlin revitalised its Northern Fleet by constructing new Arctic military bases, complete with naval facilities, radar and testing sites, airfields and missile storage facilities, to phase “NATO out of Arctic”. Russia has returned to a version of its Cold War posture focused on securing its ballistic missile submarine fleet and operations in the North Atlantic Ocean.

To make the Arctic picture more challenging for Brussels, China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018 and is pursuing the creation of, in cooperation with Russia, a global transport corridor within the Northern Sea Route. It would be 40% faster than traditional cargo routes via the Suez Canal.

Beijing’s interests in the Arctic exceed pure economic, environmental and energy interests towards military implications. In the last few years, China has developed dual-use technology within its Arctic research facilities to gain influence and a strategic position in the High North. Increased military presence in the region reveals China’s ambition to become a “polar great power” by 2030.

Enter NATO

For years, NATO was adamant about creating an Arctic Strategy and let its five northern members – the US, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Denmark – take the lead. Russia’s aggressive actions since 2014 boosted NATO’s deterrence of its Northern Flank.

NATO’s 2022 Cold Response exercise was the largest military drill in the Arctic since the Cold War. Roughly 30,000 soldiers from 27 Allied countries trained for a simulated attack on land, air and sea in the Circumpolar North.

There is a growing security dilemma in the Arctic region, as both Russia and NATO have intensified their military exercises and presence in the area, heightening threat perceptions and lowering trust on both sides. This situation is worsened by the lack of a framework for dialogue between NATO and Russia on security and defence topics. The only two existing security cooperation mechanisms, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff meetings, were called off or held without Russia since the latter’s annexation of Crimea.

To make matters worse, Russia’s war on Ukraine and challenge to the European security architecture brings “a new normal [...] for Arctic security”, characterised by even more competition and enhanced defence and security risks for the Alliance. Now, even Sweden and Finland, non-NATO Arctic states, are facing the Russian threat and moving closer to NATO – which the latter would gladly welcome.

Russia’s war changes the Arctic

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a “watershed moment” that will define the future of European security, with cascading effects on the Arctic. Russia is threatening the international rules-based order, undermining Europe’s security architecture, and making the European Arctic the ‘hottest’ area in the High North.

In response to Russia’s aggression, the seven other Arctic states provisionally suspended their participation in the Arctic Council, isolating Russia. The pausing of its intergovernmental working groups was unprecedented, breaking with the tradition of keeping the Arctic out of conflicting politics.

Indeed, halting the Arctic Council affects Arctic security, governance and climate research directly. These effects will be felt across regional projects on climate change, biodiversity, oil spills, resource exploitations, search and rescue missions, and fishing. But, most importantly, the downward effect of the Kremlin’s breach of the international norms marks the return of geopolitics in the Arctic.

How can the EU respond to the multicrises?

In this volatile and fragile environment, the EU’s goal of becoming a geopolitical player should be based on a 360°-security approach, and readiness and resilience to respond to permacrisis.

The EU will have to respond to all crises – climate insecurity, rising geopolitics, instability, territorial issues, human security – simultaneously and with equal strength and resolve. As such, it will need to skilfully use four D’s.

1. Defence: Build an EU Arctic Security Strategy. The time for tiptoeing and appeasing is over. Brussels must become a security provider for the Nordics in the realms of climate and hybrid security to face the expanding Russian militarisation.
2. Deterrence: Cooperate more strongly with NATO on Arctic security. In an era of permacrisis with a multitude of ‘burning areas’, only a deepened EU–NATO cooperation can preserve the security of the Euro-Atlantic space and deter the aggressive actions of other players.
3. Dialogue: Start an Arctic ‘seven + EU’ framework dialogue on climate change. The Arctic Council must resume, even without Russia, as the unfolding negative effects of climate change do not wait or stop for political consensus.
4. Diplomacy: Support the creation of a UN mechanism for the Arctic. As many non-Arctic countries direct their attention towards the region, a governance body for the High North will be needed to manage the ramifications of these newly found interests.

The new Arctic

After decades of peaceful cooperation, geopolitics is back in the Circumpolar North – and it is the European Arctic that feels the burn of rising instability and competition. From climate insecurity to increased militarisation and great power politics, this region will grow in importance, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  
The unfolding multicrises of the European Arctic will test the EU’s responsiveness, ambition and preparedness. It is time for the EU to go one step further and act on its newly founded geopolitical voice by employing the four D’s – defence, deterrence, dialogue and diplomacy – in its Arctic outlook.

#### Lack of U.S. commitment to Arctic motivates European states to develop strong independent security policies

Thorsson 25, Editor and Reporter for Arctic Today. (Elías Thorsson, 4-10-2025, “Can Europe defend the Arctic without the U.S.?” https://www.arctictoday.com/can-europe-defend-the-arctic-without-the-u-s/)

With shifting power dynamics, rising geopolitical tensions and the return of great-power competition in the High North, the question of whether Europe could defend its own Arctic territory without American support no longer feels hypothetical. As the United States flirts with isolationist rhetoric, threatens to take over allied territories and questions swirl around its long-term commitment to NATO, many European leaders and military experts are reevaluating their own readiness—particularly in the strategically vital Arctic.

Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, told Arctic Today that more than a question resources, the future of European defense was political.

“Of course Europe is capable [of defending itself], but it has to summon the political will,” he said. “Everybody knows Russia is a bad guy. And for years I’ve been hearing we need to step up without anybody stepping up.”

Hodges claimed that defending the European Arctic—especially countries like Norway, Sweden, and Finland—without the United States would be difficult, but not impossible.

“The military capabilities exist,” he said. “What lacks is not capability, but political will. Nations like Norway are wealthy enough to do much more, but have chosen not to. That’s not a resource problem—that’s a choice.”

He warned that the deterrent power of NATO, particularly Article 5, has traditionally relied not just on its legal structure but on the perception of unity and certainty. Hodges claims that the real danger lies in the erosion of NATO’s deterrent credibility.

“There never was a question about whether any country would live up to [Article 5]… Now there’s a question.”

That doubt has grown exponentially in recent months. On February 17, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, U.S. vice president JD Vance openly questioned the sustainability of America’s military role in Europe, casting it as a strategic overreach incompatible with U.S. domestic priorities. Vance’s remarks sent ripples through European defense circles, reinforcing a sense that bipartisan consensus in Washington on transatlantic security can no longer be taken for granted.

New threats and new alliances

In terms of the threats facing the region, Hodges’ concern isn’t only about Russia’s overt aggression but also about its hybrid tactics—sabotage, cyberattacks and pressure on undersea infrastructure. These tactics have already intensified in the Arctic and the Baltic regions and could escalate if Moscow senses a weakened or divided NATO.

Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde, Professor of War Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College, agrees that the Arctic could become a serious vulnerability for Europe if U.S. support fades. But he is more cautious in his assessment of Europe’s independent capabilities.

“Will European countries be able to defend Finland, Sweden and Norway without U.S. support? In my eyes yes, if the UK and Germany and others contribute, but with much more difficulty and greater losses,” Hilde said.

However, he cautioned that defending remote and symbolically important areas like Svalbard without American assistance would likely be beyond Europe’s current capacity.

Europe’s readiness gaps are not just theoretical. Hilde pointed to strategic airlift, long-range strike capability and intelligence assets as areas where Europe remains heavily reliant on U.S. support. Even in terms of basic infrastructure, he noted that road and rail connectivity across Scandinavia remains insufficient for a high-speed military response.

Nevertheless, Hodges believes the current geopolitical moment could be a turning point.

“It’s a shame that Europe needs the United States to remind it to live up to its treaty obligations,” he said, “but if this is what it takes to get countries to finally act, then maybe it’s for the better in the long term.”

Signs of this shift are beginning to appear. In early 2025, the United Kingdom and Norway announced plans for a new defense agreement focused on the High North, aimed at enhancing joint operations, intelligence-sharing, and protection of undersea infrastructure. For Hodges, the UK stands out as the European country most likely to step into a greater leadership role.

“There is more than enough combat power and potential in the region,” he said. “The problem has always been coordination and commitment.”

When it comes to nuclear deterrence, both men agreed that France and the UK are the only real options for Europe if the U.S. steps back, however, how that nuclear umbrella would be implemented remains up in the air.

“How far the UK is willing to go alone in offering what is called extended nuclear deterrence to the Northern European countries is not clear,” Hilde said. “France has talked about offering this to other European countries, but as far as I know, not been clear on details of what this will involve or how it would work. Few seem to be keen on taking up the French idea.”

Still, creating an effective European-led defense framework for the Arctic remains a tall order. Hilde doesn’t believe that existing regional alliances like Nordefco could evolve into a serious substitute for NATO, but he sees potential in a broader Northern European bloc.

“My bet would be on the Northern European countries coming together in some kind of ‘mini-NATO’ in the north… the Nordic countries, the Baltic, Poland, Germany, BeNeLux and the United Kingdom,” he said.

Ultimately, the central question isn’t whether Europe can defend the Arctic without the U.S.—it’s whether it will. For Hodges, the time to stop hoping for guarantees and start building credible alternatives is now.

“Deterrence requires capability and credibility,” he said. “The credibility part comes from showing that you’re serious.”

#### Ambitious EU Arctic policy spills over as a test case for EU supranationalism

Dr. Andreas Raspotnik, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the High North Center for Business and Governance, Nord University, Bodø, Norway “The Great Illusion Revisited: The Future of the European Union’s Arctic Engagement” https://www.kas.de/documents/272774/272823/The+Great+Illusion+Revisited+-+The+Future+of+EU+Arctic+Engagement.pdf/700a4ed7-1131-5ac8-6856-eac175f8d225?version=1.0&t=1603708374145 //DH

**EP = European Parliament, MEPs = Members of the European Parliament**

What role for the European Parliament?

Generally speaking, the EP’s Arctic voices tend to yield more controversies and are less coherent than policy statements issued by the Commission/EEAS and the Council. Especially in the early years of the EU’s Arctic policy process, considerations from the European Parliament and those of its Members have often raised eyebrows among Arctic stakeholders – be it the push for the infamous seal ban or discussions on an Arctic Treaty and moratoria on hydrocarbon exploitation. Yet, the EP has often pushed the EU’s Arctic policy to move forward and for example continuously called to develop a comprehensive Arctic ‘strategy’.

Raising its Arctic voice is of key importance to the EP. On an individual level, the Arctic and related matters of combatting climate change or environmental and animal protection, is a relatively low-hanging fruit for some MEPs to gain votes within their electorate. Moreover, as knowledge on Arctic matters is rather limited, those MEPs are easily to be considered opinion makers, offering an often-unique chance to influence and define policy. On a broader level, the declaratory and political nature of EP resolutions allows for its representatives to take more ambitious, outspoken and at times controversial or confrontational stances, as compared to other EU institutions. Thus, the continuous engagement with Arctic issues is not only important for the European Parliament and some of its MEPs to continuously re-define its regional voice, it is also essential to acknowledge the Union’s normative and decisional supranationalism. This relates in particular to the Arctic, as its policy touches many aspects of both internal and external relevance/competence for the EU.

Accordingly, one wonders if the EP could not sow the seeds for a more ambitious geopolitical European Union, using the Arctic as case study and test ground to frame an EU-ropean narrative fit for tomorrow’s power politics? This would start with specific discussions on Chinese localisation tactics in Greenland to the EP asking the Commission/EEAS for a comprehensive security analysis of the Arctic and ends with a future- and goal-oriented, honest assessment of what the EU can and wants to achieve in the circumpolar North. There are good reasons for the rather timid coverage of the security angle in the last policy statements. Yet, a policy that aims to fully integrate all Arctic concerns should explicitly recognise the strategic importance of the Arctic, examine the new geopolitical realities and present clear and ambitious EU-ropean goals – despite this might giving rise to negative responses from Arctic states.

As such, the EU could also convincingly tackle matters of key importance, such as an Arctic-based selective engagement with Russia. Could the European Arctic be an area where the EU could seek talks with Russia based on its continuing northern cross-border bond and a potential willingness on the part of Russia? The peripheral Arctic might be the venue where the EU and Russia find common ground again, not only improving their relationship but also promoting Arctic stability. Using the Arctic as arena for renewed relations, or at least talks thereof, might have positive spillover effects on other areas of dispute. As such, the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians and the active engagement of the European Parliament might offer an opportunity to promote and actively engage in related, behind-the-door-talks? Given the current world situation and the EU’s Arctic history, this might be naïve, but a policy that separates regional from systemic components, sustainable development and environmental protection from questions of hard security, offers the opportunity to delineate clear and ambitious goals for the EU’s Arctic involvement. The European Parliament could complement the other institutions to adapt a more strategic mind-set and breaking down policy silos, starting with the Arctic region.

Arctic Geopolitics the EU-ropean Way

If the European Union aims to become a truly geopolitical Union it needs to learn the language of power by translating its economic and soft power into strategic leverage. In an Arctic context this means, among others, a concrete understanding of the security concerns (some) Member States have, the definition of strategic goals and an assessment on how the Union’s economic and soft power could address and tackle future security challenges. A security analysis of the Arctic might also reveal the potential for the EU to be at the forefront of developing new regional means of ‘geopolitical cooperation’. This could provide impetus to properly manage the growing global interest in Arctic matters and counteract emerging global geopolitical competition that also affects the Arctic. Over the last ten years, we have seen a European Union that has fulfilled its Arctic commitments, from funding research to fostering ocean governance, from supporting sustainable development to promoting international cooperation. A European Union that seems to be satisfied with its Arctic status quo. However, if change is indeed inherent in any system, we might also see a European Union that aims to leave its Arctic comfort zone based on a geopolitical strategy the EU-ropean way – if Arctic states like it or not.

#### That preserves global multilateralism and solves every existential threat

Ernesto Zedillo, 2024 –Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, former president of Mexico, former Commissioner on the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament “Reinforcing the multilateral system: Counting on Europe to keep us from the brink” 10/15, https://theelders.org/news/reinforcing-multilateral-system-counting-europe-keep-us-brink //DH

Let us think of the COVID-19 pandemic, the natural disasters caused by climate change, the evident deterioration of our planet’s natural capital, the financial crisis the financial crisis just two decades ago, the wars and other conflicts that have caused millions of people to die or be displaced, and the absurd existence of nuclear weapons, which, far from being reduced, has worsened in recent years, to cite just a few of the many examples.

Despite the existence and increase of global risks, some of which have already become existential for humanity and the planet, the multilateral system, far from being strengthened, seems to be very close to collapse.

The threats hanging over the multilateral system are overwhelming: blatant violation of the essential norms of international law by major powers; non-compliance and even repudiation of international agreements and treaties; paralysis in decision-making mechanisms to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, most notably within the UN Security Council; the multiplication of war fronts as has not occurred in many decades; systematic undermining—by omission or commission—of multilateral institutions to the point of paralysis, as is the case with the World Trade Organization; deliberate efforts by some members to erode the effectiveness and credibility of international institutions by some of their members; failure to adopt and implement strategies and policies—even those recently agreed upon—to address proven risks, such as pandemics; disregard for conventions and norms on human rights; the formation of regional blocs that exacerbate high-risk rivalries; fragmentation of the international trade system; and indifference in addressing emerging risks, such as cyber threats.

Historians debate whether today's geopolitics resembles that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading up to World War I, or that of the 1920s and 1930s, on the way to the Great Depression and World War II, or whether it is something like that experienced during the "Cold War." Others go as far back as the Peloponnesian War and apply Thucydides' classic analysis. My answer when I have been part of that discussion has been: “all of the above.”

Among the circumstances that occurred in the past and are now present again, we should count the following: multipolarity displacing unipolarity, military rivalries between the alliances that emerged from that multipolarity, open confrontations between the two greatest powers, exacerbated nationalisms - hand in hand with increasing armies, deepening economic disparities – both between nations and within them, isolationism and a resurgence of protectionism, ideological competition, ‘modernisation' of nuclear weapons instead of their abolition; technological and economic disruption, and repudiation or at least detachment from institutions and international law.

In the disastrous first half of the 20th century, they caused the two great world wars. They may cause the third in our very own time, with one major difference: it would be the last for humanity. Any use of nuclear weapons, however limited it may be at the beginning, would unleash a chain reaction, where the firing of just a fraction of the existing arsenals would lead to the extermination of our species. In a war with nuclear weapons, no one wins, we all lose everything.

What can prevent not only nuclear holocaust, but also open up paths to prosperity, justice, and peace in the world, and on that path successfully face the global challenges -- or as we economists say, provide the global public goods -- that concern this Forum?

To be frank, it is not anything different from what has been used in the past. I make the point, recalling that when my admired friend, Graham Allison of Harvard, populariser a few years ago of the Thucydides trap as a theory of the China-United States rivalry, launched the intellectual challenge of formulating proposals to free ourselves from the consequences of such a dilemma, I allowed myself to tell him that since the years of the great Greek historian, among other things, humans developed such basic and useful tools as politics, diplomacy, and international law, and shown that it is possible to apply them very successfully, whilst also experiencing the consequences of ignoring them. The real challenge is to make the powerful recognize that it is in their own national interest to resort to these means of civilization and avoid those of barbarism.

I insist, this is not about invoking ethical values, altruism, or justice. It is simply about acknowledging how high the cost has been of not using international institutions and rules to resolve disputes and address common or global problems.

One cannot resist the temptation to refer to at least a couple of calamitous examples from this century, so as not to look too far back in the past.

Consider the human, economic and geopolitical costs of the US invasion of Iraq that began in 2003, costs that would have been avoided if that power had adhered to the process that was already being followed at the UN Security Council to determine the dangerousness of Hussein's regime. Three and a half trillion dollars in direct costs plus that of the destruction caused in the invaded country, as well as more than half a million lives lost, deep regional destabilization, and a dramatic loss of US influence, marking the end of the brief period of unipolarity and benevolent hegemony - as that nation was seen during the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And what about the crime perpetrated by Russia invading Ukraine - without any justification for such brutal use of force and violation of international law - with the human losses and destruction that it has and will continue to cause. To calculate the direct cost of this war, one must also think of trillions of dollars, the human lives sacrificed nearing half a million, the immense value of the destruction caused, and whatever happens, a less secure Russia, converted into a criminal state completely outside international law and less respected than at any previous time in its history. The damage and pain caused to Ukrainians is already immense and simply irreparable. The cost incurred by other countries is also colossal. None of this atrocity was necessary. Beyond President Putin's fanciful imperial ambitions, any controversy, if it really existed at all, could have been resolved peacefully through the means of diplomacy and international law.

The essential question is: where do we start to avoid the disaster looming over the planet’s geopolitics?

One possibility is to pay attention to the Pact for the Future, approved at the UN Summit just last September 22 by all member countries - except seven led by Russia.

The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, stated that the Summit was to move multilateralism away from the edge of the precipice where it now seems to be. The agreed Pact contains at least an agenda - ambitious under the current circumstances - to first preserve what remains of the system and then strengthen it. It contains critical commitments for many aspects of international cooperation, but those related to international peace and security, as well as the revitalisation of the multilateral system, are particularly important, addressing fundamental issues such as the reform of the Security Council and nuclear disarmament.

Delivering is not the same as promising. It would be serious if the Pact were to join the long list of commitments made by governments at important summits, only to be forgotten as soon as they are over. A special effort is needed to organise the provision of global public goods solemnly agreed on September 22.

The challenge is that, given the absence of a global government with the authority and capacity to regulate, enforce, and impose taxes to finance them, action to initiate the provision of global public goods must be voluntary. But given the resistance of nation states to share their sovereignty and the temptation to let others pay, the voluntarism to unleash that provision does not happen spontaneously. Historically, it has been necessary for a nation or a small group of nations, with an enlightened vision and a clear sense of responsibility, to unleash the processes leading to the solution of the problems that affect all humanity.

Who can play that role in our time?

In the past, the United States has done so, exercising the leadership it built up both through the military and economic might it had after World War II and its feverish activity in promoting the creation of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the GATT and many others during the 1940s and 1950s.

In the past two decades, the United States certainly seems interested in preserving its preeminent power but equally engaged in weakening the multilateral system --that it largely built. Its behaviour fits into a view that purports that during the period in which the hegemon's supremacy is not threatened, it will be in its interest to support the rules-based system, largely of its own construction, in order to preserve and enhance its dominant position. But when this position is threatened by the emergence of a new power—in this case China—the hegemon may turn against the rules-based system and revert to one that is based purely on power, to delay or even prevent the emerging power from taking over the dominant position. This is a short-sighted view because it is actually in the long-term interest of both the hegemon, the United States, and the emerging power, China, to operate within a system with rules that serve to contain the effect, intended or not, of the actions of the adversary country, if that is a valid term. Be that as it may, neither of them seems genuinely interested in effectively leading the defence of the multilateral system in the immediate future; rather, they are concerned with the opposite, most notably the United States.

To put it bluntly, the European Union is the only benign power on the geostrategic horizon up to the task, and one around which a coalition of middle powers could be formed that would join the endeavour --for their own national interest-- such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and at some point some developing countries with the possibility of becoming an emerging powers. For the moment, I rule out India.

The EU seems like a suitable candidate to fill the void left by the United States for many reasons. Its economic power should be highlighted --although this obviously needs to be strengthened; its proven normative capacity, starting with its attachment to democratic values, respect for human rights and the rule of law; its solid --by any comparison-- institutional structure that has materialised into an admirable supranational entity that could well be imitated in some of its features to reinforce multilateral governance; and its proven commitment to agreements and policies to address global challenges.

Of course, to assume this role, the EU must overcome multiple challenges, the most important of which is perhaps to achieve a new balance in its relationship with the United States. It could start by not imitating the latter’s trade neo-protectionism and helping to fix the damage done to the World Trade Organization by the United States since the previous American administration and which has not been repaired in any way by the current one; likewise, Europe should not imitate the acute Sinophobia that afflicts the United States, which will prove very costly for all involved. And, of course, it must take the essential components of the Pact for the Future - in whose content it had a great influence - and promote concrete initiatives for the implementation of those components.

### EU CP—1NC vs Science Diplomacy

#### The European Union should increase its scientific exploration of permafrost in the Russian Arctic under the auspices of the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation.

#### EU can expand its Arctic policy to achieve security and diplomatic goals – the region is key to establish its leadership

Ciolan 22, Research Fellow in the Europe in the World programme at the European Policy Centre. (Ionela Ciolan, 4-11-2022, “The EU’s geopolitical awakening in the Arctic,” https://www.epc.eu/publication/The-EUs-geopolitical-awakening-in-the-Arctic-47c318/)

The northern neighbourhood is one of the main testing grounds for the EU’s geopolitical awakening. Only through skilful use of diplomacy, deterrence, dialogue and defence will the EU successfully preserve the peace, sustainability and security of the Arctic.

Decades of exceptionalism, characterised by cooperation and peaceful dialogue, branded the Arctic a “pole of peace”. Today, it is fast transforming into a ‘pole of instability’ as geopolitics return to the High North and great power politics start to dominate this region. As the Arctic becomes a space for geopolitical competition, sharpened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the battles will be carried out in five areas: the chase for natural resources, the rivalry for supremacy, the contest for trading routes, the race for tourism opportunities, and the run for salvaging the environment of the Circumpolar North.

The EU’s voice in the Arctic

The EU’s engagement in the Arctic has been more ambitious in words than practice. Comprised of eight states – Canada, the US, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the Russian Federation –, the Arctic Council is the main framework of cooperation between the Arctic states and the North indigenous peoples on issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. For 21 years, the EU has been waiting for a seat in the room as an observer in the Council. As such, its work in the northern neighbourhood is dependent on the goodwill of the Arctic eight.

But things are changing. The 2021 Arctic Strategy gives Brussels a legitimate voice on Arctic issues and brakes its tiptoeing approach. By focusing the strategy on climate action and acknowledging the region as a strategic domain for European security in a growing geopolitical contest, the EU claims a rightful place within the Arctic discussions. In addition, the strategic relevance of the northern neighbourhood for the EU, along with the east and the south, was confirmed by the recently published Strategic Compass for European security and defence.

Beyond having a voice, the EU should now devise a better and more comprehensive strategy toward the Arctic. The “new normal” in the northern neighbourhood is characterised by multicrises that will require Brussels’ strategic engagement, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

More permafrost melting, less climate security

After the Amazon, the Arctic is the world’s second-biggest carbon sink, and the global “refrigerator” as it regulates global temperatures. In the High North, the effects of climate change are developing three times faster than anywhere on the globe, with implications for oceanic, atmospheric and geophysical developments.

As the Arctic heats up and more ice melts, cascading effects will further climate insecurity: extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, permafrost thawing with unimaginable consequences everywhere. Indeed, the melting of the permafrost could act as a climate bomb, releasing a billion tons of carbon gases into the atmosphere, awakening long-dormant bacteria and microbes, and changing polar landscapes that will disrupt local human activities and infrastructure.

The warming of the Circumpolar North also means competition for its vast untapped resources. The Arctic land and ocean hold 13% and 30% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves, respectively. The region is also rich in fish, natural minerals (e.g. nickel, platinum, palladium) and rare-earth elements vital to modern technology and cutting-edge innovations. Finally, it offers the possibility of shorter commercial routes, which implies profits of billions of dollars.

And with this comes geo-economic and geopolitical rivalry, too.

Rising geopolitics in the High North

Climate change acts as a conflict and risk multiplier. And nowhere on the globe are the geopolitical consequences of climate insecurity as visible as in the European Arctic. For example, Scandinavia is at the forefront of great power politics and growing competition between the West and Russia.

In the past decades, the Kremlin revitalised its Northern Fleet by constructing new Arctic military bases, complete with naval facilities, radar and testing sites, airfields and missile storage facilities, to phase “NATO out of Arctic”. Russia has returned to a version of its Cold War posture focused on securing its ballistic missile submarine fleet and operations in the North Atlantic Ocean.

To make the Arctic picture more challenging for Brussels, China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018 and is pursuing the creation of, in cooperation with Russia, a global transport corridor within the Northern Sea Route. It would be 40% faster than traditional cargo routes via the Suez Canal.

Beijing’s interests in the Arctic exceed pure economic, environmental and energy interests towards military implications. In the last few years, China has developed dual-use technology within its Arctic research facilities to gain influence and a strategic position in the High North. Increased military presence in the region reveals China’s ambition to become a “polar great power” by 2030.

Enter NATO

For years, NATO was adamant about creating an Arctic Strategy and let its five northern members – the US, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Denmark – take the lead. Russia’s aggressive actions since 2014 boosted NATO’s deterrence of its Northern Flank.

NATO’s 2022 Cold Response exercise was the largest military drill in the Arctic since the Cold War. Roughly 30,000 soldiers from 27 Allied countries trained for a simulated attack on land, air and sea in the Circumpolar North.

There is a growing security dilemma in the Arctic region, as both Russia and NATO have intensified their military exercises and presence in the area, heightening threat perceptions and lowering trust on both sides. This situation is worsened by the lack of a framework for dialogue between NATO and Russia on security and defence topics. The only two existing security cooperation mechanisms, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff meetings, were called off or held without Russia since the latter’s annexation of Crimea.

To make matters worse, Russia’s war on Ukraine and challenge to the European security architecture brings “a new normal [...] for Arctic security”, characterised by even more competition and enhanced defence and security risks for the Alliance. Now, even Sweden and Finland, non-NATO Arctic states, are facing the Russian threat and moving closer to NATO – which the latter would gladly welcome.

Russia’s war changes the Arctic

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a “watershed moment” that will define the future of European security, with cascading effects on the Arctic. Russia is threatening the international rules-based order, undermining Europe’s security architecture, and making the European Arctic the ‘hottest’ area in the High North.

In response to Russia’s aggression, the seven other Arctic states provisionally suspended their participation in the Arctic Council, isolating Russia. The pausing of its intergovernmental working groups was unprecedented, breaking with the tradition of keeping the Arctic out of conflicting politics.

Indeed, halting the Arctic Council affects Arctic security, governance and climate research directly. These effects will be felt across regional projects on climate change, biodiversity, oil spills, resource exploitations, search and rescue missions, and fishing. But, most importantly, the downward effect of the Kremlin’s breach of the international norms marks the return of geopolitics in the Arctic.

How can the EU respond to the multicrises?

In this volatile and fragile environment, the EU’s goal of becoming a geopolitical player should be based on a 360°-security approach, and readiness and resilience to respond to permacrisis.

The EU will have to respond to all crises – climate insecurity, rising geopolitics, instability, territorial issues, human security – simultaneously and with equal strength and resolve. As such, it will need to skilfully use four D’s.

1. Defence: Build an EU Arctic Security Strategy. The time for tiptoeing and appeasing is over. Brussels must become a security provider for the Nordics in the realms of climate and hybrid security to face the expanding Russian militarisation.
2. Deterrence: Cooperate more strongly with NATO on Arctic security. In an era of permacrisis with a multitude of ‘burning areas’, only a deepened EU–NATO cooperation can preserve the security of the Euro-Atlantic space and deter the aggressive actions of other players.
3. Dialogue: Start an Arctic ‘seven + EU’ framework dialogue on climate change. The Arctic Council must resume, even without Russia, as the unfolding negative effects of climate change do not wait or stop for political consensus.
4. Diplomacy: Support the creation of a UN mechanism for the Arctic. As many non-Arctic countries direct their attention towards the region, a governance body for the High North will be needed to manage the ramifications of these newly found interests.

The new Arctic

After decades of peaceful cooperation, geopolitics is back in the Circumpolar North – and it is the European Arctic that feels the burn of rising instability and competition. From climate insecurity to increased militarisation and great power politics, this region will grow in importance, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  
The unfolding multicrises of the European Arctic will test the EU’s responsiveness, ambition and preparedness. It is time for the EU to go one step further and act on its newly founded geopolitical voice by employing the four D’s – defence, deterrence, dialogue and diplomacy – in its Arctic outlook.

#### Lack of U.S. commitment to Arctic motivates European states to develop strong independent security policies

Thorsson 25, Editor and Reporter for Arctic Today. (Elías Thorsson, 4-10-2025, “Can Europe defend the Arctic without the U.S.?” https://www.arctictoday.com/can-europe-defend-the-arctic-without-the-u-s/)

With shifting power dynamics, rising geopolitical tensions and the return of great-power competition in the High North, the question of whether Europe could defend its own Arctic territory without American support no longer feels hypothetical. As the United States flirts with isolationist rhetoric, threatens to take over allied territories and questions swirl around its long-term commitment to NATO, many European leaders and military experts are reevaluating their own readiness—particularly in the strategically vital Arctic.

Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, told Arctic Today that more than a question resources, the future of European defense was political.

“Of course Europe is capable [of defending itself], but it has to summon the political will,” he said. “Everybody knows Russia is a bad guy. And for years I’ve been hearing we need to step up without anybody stepping up.”

Hodges claimed that defending the European Arctic—especially countries like Norway, Sweden, and Finland—without the United States would be difficult, but not impossible.

“The military capabilities exist,” he said. “What lacks is not capability, but political will. Nations like Norway are wealthy enough to do much more, but have chosen not to. That’s not a resource problem—that’s a choice.”

He warned that the deterrent power of NATO, particularly Article 5, has traditionally relied not just on its legal structure but on the perception of unity and certainty. Hodges claims that the real danger lies in the erosion of NATO’s deterrent credibility.

“There never was a question about whether any country would live up to [Article 5]… Now there’s a question.”

That doubt has grown exponentially in recent months. On February 17, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, U.S. vice president JD Vance openly questioned the sustainability of America’s military role in Europe, casting it as a strategic overreach incompatible with U.S. domestic priorities. Vance’s remarks sent ripples through European defense circles, reinforcing a sense that bipartisan consensus in Washington on transatlantic security can no longer be taken for granted.

New threats and new alliances

In terms of the threats facing the region, Hodges’ concern isn’t only about Russia’s overt aggression but also about its hybrid tactics—sabotage, cyberattacks and pressure on undersea infrastructure. These tactics have already intensified in the Arctic and the Baltic regions and could escalate if Moscow senses a weakened or divided NATO.

Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde, Professor of War Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College, agrees that the Arctic could become a serious vulnerability for Europe if U.S. support fades. But he is more cautious in his assessment of Europe’s independent capabilities.

“Will European countries be able to defend Finland, Sweden and Norway without U.S. support? In my eyes yes, if the UK and Germany and others contribute, but with much more difficulty and greater losses,” Hilde said.

However, he cautioned that defending remote and symbolically important areas like Svalbard without American assistance would likely be beyond Europe’s current capacity.

Europe’s readiness gaps are not just theoretical. Hilde pointed to strategic airlift, long-range strike capability and intelligence assets as areas where Europe remains heavily reliant on U.S. support. Even in terms of basic infrastructure, he noted that road and rail connectivity across Scandinavia remains insufficient for a high-speed military response.

Nevertheless, Hodges believes the current geopolitical moment could be a turning point.

“It’s a shame that Europe needs the United States to remind it to live up to its treaty obligations,” he said, “but if this is what it takes to get countries to finally act, then maybe it’s for the better in the long term.”

Signs of this shift are beginning to appear. In early 2025, the United Kingdom and Norway announced plans for a new defense agreement focused on the High North, aimed at enhancing joint operations, intelligence-sharing, and protection of undersea infrastructure. For Hodges, the UK stands out as the European country most likely to step into a greater leadership role.

“There is more than enough combat power and potential in the region,” he said. “The problem has always been coordination and commitment.”

When it comes to nuclear deterrence, both men agreed that France and the UK are the only real options for Europe if the U.S. steps back, however, how that nuclear umbrella would be implemented remains up in the air.

“How far the UK is willing to go alone in offering what is called extended nuclear deterrence to the Northern European countries is not clear,” Hilde said. “France has talked about offering this to other European countries, but as far as I know, not been clear on details of what this will involve or how it would work. Few seem to be keen on taking up the French idea.”

Still, creating an effective European-led defense framework for the Arctic remains a tall order. Hilde doesn’t believe that existing regional alliances like Nordefco could evolve into a serious substitute for NATO, but he sees potential in a broader Northern European bloc.

“My bet would be on the Northern European countries coming together in some kind of ‘mini-NATO’ in the north… the Nordic countries, the Baltic, Poland, Germany, BeNeLux and the United Kingdom,” he said.

Ultimately, the central question isn’t whether Europe can defend the Arctic without the U.S.—it’s whether it will. For Hodges, the time to stop hoping for guarantees and start building credible alternatives is now.

“Deterrence requires capability and credibility,” he said. “The credibility part comes from showing that you’re serious.”

#### Ambitious EU Arctic policy spills over as a test case for EU supranationalism

Dr. Andreas Raspotnik, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the High North Center for Business and Governance, Nord University, Bodø, Norway “The Great Illusion Revisited: The Future of the European Union’s Arctic Engagement” https://www.kas.de/documents/272774/272823/The+Great+Illusion+Revisited+-+The+Future+of+EU+Arctic+Engagement.pdf/700a4ed7-1131-5ac8-6856-eac175f8d225?version=1.0&t=1603708374145 //DH

**EP = European Parliament, MEPs = Members of the European Parliament**

What role for the European Parliament?

Generally speaking, the EP’s Arctic voices tend to yield more controversies and are less coherent than policy statements issued by the Commission/EEAS and the Council. Especially in the early years of the EU’s Arctic policy process, considerations from the European Parliament and those of its Members have often raised eyebrows among Arctic stakeholders – be it the push for the infamous seal ban or discussions on an Arctic Treaty and moratoria on hydrocarbon exploitation. Yet, the EP has often pushed the EU’s Arctic policy to move forward and for example continuously called to develop a comprehensive Arctic ‘strategy’.

Raising its Arctic voice is of key importance to the EP. On an individual level, the Arctic and related matters of combatting climate change or environmental and animal protection, is a relatively low-hanging fruit for some MEPs to gain votes within their electorate. Moreover, as knowledge on Arctic matters is rather limited, those MEPs are easily to be considered opinion makers, offering an often-unique chance to influence and define policy. On a broader level, the declaratory and political nature of EP resolutions allows for its representatives to take more ambitious, outspoken and at times controversial or confrontational stances, as compared to other EU institutions. Thus, the continuous engagement with Arctic issues is not only important for the European Parliament and some of its MEPs to continuously re-define its regional voice, it is also essential to acknowledge the Union’s normative and decisional supranationalism. This relates in particular to the Arctic, as its policy touches many aspects of both internal and external relevance/competence for the EU.

Accordingly, one wonders if the EP could not sow the seeds for a more ambitious geopolitical European Union, using the Arctic as case study and test ground to frame an EU-ropean narrative fit for tomorrow’s power politics? This would start with specific discussions on Chinese localisation tactics in Greenland to the EP asking the Commission/EEAS for a comprehensive security analysis of the Arctic and ends with a future- and goal-oriented, honest assessment of what the EU can and wants to achieve in the circumpolar North. There are good reasons for the rather timid coverage of the security angle in the last policy statements. Yet, a policy that aims to fully integrate all Arctic concerns should explicitly recognise the strategic importance of the Arctic, examine the new geopolitical realities and present clear and ambitious EU-ropean goals – despite this might giving rise to negative responses from Arctic states.

As such, the EU could also convincingly tackle matters of key importance, such as an Arctic-based selective engagement with Russia. Could the European Arctic be an area where the EU could seek talks with Russia based on its continuing northern cross-border bond and a potential willingness on the part of Russia? The peripheral Arctic might be the venue where the EU and Russia find common ground again, not only improving their relationship but also promoting Arctic stability. Using the Arctic as arena for renewed relations, or at least talks thereof, might have positive spillover effects on other areas of dispute. As such, the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians and the active engagement of the European Parliament might offer an opportunity to promote and actively engage in related, behind-the-door-talks? Given the current world situation and the EU’s Arctic history, this might be naïve, but a policy that separates regional from systemic components, sustainable development and environmental protection from questions of hard security, offers the opportunity to delineate clear and ambitious goals for the EU’s Arctic involvement. The European Parliament could complement the other institutions to adapt a more strategic mind-set and breaking down policy silos, starting with the Arctic region.

Arctic Geopolitics the EU-ropean Way

If the European Union aims to become a truly geopolitical Union it needs to learn the language of power by translating its economic and soft power into strategic leverage. In an Arctic context this means, among others, a concrete understanding of the security concerns (some) Member States have, the definition of strategic goals and an assessment on how the Union’s economic and soft power could address and tackle future security challenges. A security analysis of the Arctic might also reveal the potential for the EU to be at the forefront of developing new regional means of ‘geopolitical cooperation’. This could provide impetus to properly manage the growing global interest in Arctic matters and counteract emerging global geopolitical competition that also affects the Arctic. Over the last ten years, we have seen a European Union that has fulfilled its Arctic commitments, from funding research to fostering ocean governance, from supporting sustainable development to promoting international cooperation. A European Union that seems to be satisfied with its Arctic status quo. However, if change is indeed inherent in any system, we might also see a European Union that aims to leave its Arctic comfort zone based on a geopolitical strategy the EU-ropean way – if Arctic states like it or not.

#### That preserves global multilateralism and solves every existential threat

Ernesto Zedillo, 2024 –Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, former president of Mexico, former Commissioner on the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament “Reinforcing the multilateral system: Counting on Europe to keep us from the brink” 10/15, https://theelders.org/news/reinforcing-multilateral-system-counting-europe-keep-us-brink //DH

Let us think of the COVID-19 pandemic, the natural disasters caused by climate change, the evident deterioration of our planet’s natural capital, the financial crisis the financial crisis just two decades ago, the wars and other conflicts that have caused millions of people to die or be displaced, and the absurd existence of nuclear weapons, which, far from being reduced, has worsened in recent years, to cite just a few of the many examples.

Despite the existence and increase of global risks, some of which have already become existential for humanity and the planet, the multilateral system, far from being strengthened, seems to be very close to collapse.

The threats hanging over the multilateral system are overwhelming: blatant violation of the essential norms of international law by major powers; non-compliance and even repudiation of international agreements and treaties; paralysis in decision-making mechanisms to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, most notably within the UN Security Council; the multiplication of war fronts as has not occurred in many decades; systematic undermining—by omission or commission—of multilateral institutions to the point of paralysis, as is the case with the World Trade Organization; deliberate efforts by some members to erode the effectiveness and credibility of international institutions by some of their members; failure to adopt and implement strategies and policies—even those recently agreed upon—to address proven risks, such as pandemics; disregard for conventions and norms on human rights; the formation of regional blocs that exacerbate high-risk rivalries; fragmentation of the international trade system; and indifference in addressing emerging risks, such as cyber threats.

Historians debate whether today's geopolitics resembles that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading up to World War I, or that of the 1920s and 1930s, on the way to the Great Depression and World War II, or whether it is something like that experienced during the "Cold War." Others go as far back as the Peloponnesian War and apply Thucydides' classic analysis. My answer when I have been part of that discussion has been: “all of the above.”

Among the circumstances that occurred in the past and are now present again, we should count the following: multipolarity displacing unipolarity, military rivalries between the alliances that emerged from that multipolarity, open confrontations between the two greatest powers, exacerbated nationalisms - hand in hand with increasing armies, deepening economic disparities – both between nations and within them, isolationism and a resurgence of protectionism, ideological competition, ‘modernisation' of nuclear weapons instead of their abolition; technological and economic disruption, and repudiation or at least detachment from institutions and international law.

In the disastrous first half of the 20th century, they caused the two great world wars. They may cause the third in our very own time, with one major difference: it would be the last for humanity. Any use of nuclear weapons, however limited it may be at the beginning, would unleash a chain reaction, where the firing of just a fraction of the existing arsenals would lead to the extermination of our species. In a war with nuclear weapons, no one wins, we all lose everything.

What can prevent not only nuclear holocaust, but also open up paths to prosperity, justice, and peace in the world, and on that path successfully face the global challenges -- or as we economists say, provide the global public goods -- that concern this Forum?

To be frank, it is not anything different from what has been used in the past. I make the point, recalling that when my admired friend, Graham Allison of Harvard, populariser a few years ago of the Thucydides trap as a theory of the China-United States rivalry, launched the intellectual challenge of formulating proposals to free ourselves from the consequences of such a dilemma, I allowed myself to tell him that since the years of the great Greek historian, among other things, humans developed such basic and useful tools as politics, diplomacy, and international law, and shown that it is possible to apply them very successfully, whilst also experiencing the consequences of ignoring them. The real challenge is to make the powerful recognize that it is in their own national interest to resort to these means of civilization and avoid those of barbarism.

I insist, this is not about invoking ethical values, altruism, or justice. It is simply about acknowledging how high the cost has been of not using international institutions and rules to resolve disputes and address common or global problems.

One cannot resist the temptation to refer to at least a couple of calamitous examples from this century, so as not to look too far back in the past.

Consider the human, economic and geopolitical costs of the US invasion of Iraq that began in 2003, costs that would have been avoided if that power had adhered to the process that was already being followed at the UN Security Council to determine the dangerousness of Hussein's regime. Three and a half trillion dollars in direct costs plus that of the destruction caused in the invaded country, as well as more than half a million lives lost, deep regional destabilization, and a dramatic loss of US influence, marking the end of the brief period of unipolarity and benevolent hegemony - as that nation was seen during the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And what about the crime perpetrated by Russia invading Ukraine - without any justification for such brutal use of force and violation of international law - with the human losses and destruction that it has and will continue to cause. To calculate the direct cost of this war, one must also think of trillions of dollars, the human lives sacrificed nearing half a million, the immense value of the destruction caused, and whatever happens, a less secure Russia, converted into a criminal state completely outside international law and less respected than at any previous time in its history. The damage and pain caused to Ukrainians is already immense and simply irreparable. The cost incurred by other countries is also colossal. None of this atrocity was necessary. Beyond President Putin's fanciful imperial ambitions, any controversy, if it really existed at all, could have been resolved peacefully through the means of diplomacy and international law.

The essential question is: where do we start to avoid the disaster looming over the planet’s geopolitics?

One possibility is to pay attention to the Pact for the Future, approved at the UN Summit just last September 22 by all member countries - except seven led by Russia.

The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, stated that the Summit was to move multilateralism away from the edge of the precipice where it now seems to be. The agreed Pact contains at least an agenda - ambitious under the current circumstances - to first preserve what remains of the system and then strengthen it. It contains critical commitments for many aspects of international cooperation, but those related to international peace and security, as well as the revitalisation of the multilateral system, are particularly important, addressing fundamental issues such as the reform of the Security Council and nuclear disarmament.

Delivering is not the same as promising. It would be serious if the Pact were to join the long list of commitments made by governments at important summits, only to be forgotten as soon as they are over. A special effort is needed to organise the provision of global public goods solemnly agreed on September 22.

The challenge is that, given the absence of a global government with the authority and capacity to regulate, enforce, and impose taxes to finance them, action to initiate the provision of global public goods must be voluntary. But given the resistance of nation states to share their sovereignty and the temptation to let others pay, the voluntarism to unleash that provision does not happen spontaneously. Historically, it has been necessary for a nation or a small group of nations, with an enlightened vision and a clear sense of responsibility, to unleash the processes leading to the solution of the problems that affect all humanity.

Who can play that role in our time?

In the past, the United States has done so, exercising the leadership it built up both through the military and economic might it had after World War II and its feverish activity in promoting the creation of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the GATT and many others during the 1940s and 1950s.

In the past two decades, the United States certainly seems interested in preserving its preeminent power but equally engaged in weakening the multilateral system --that it largely built. Its behaviour fits into a view that purports that during the period in which the hegemon's supremacy is not threatened, it will be in its interest to support the rules-based system, largely of its own construction, in order to preserve and enhance its dominant position. But when this position is threatened by the emergence of a new power—in this case China—the hegemon may turn against the rules-based system and revert to one that is based purely on power, to delay or even prevent the emerging power from taking over the dominant position. This is a short-sighted view because it is actually in the long-term interest of both the hegemon, the United States, and the emerging power, China, to operate within a system with rules that serve to contain the effect, intended or not, of the actions of the adversary country, if that is a valid term. Be that as it may, neither of them seems genuinely interested in effectively leading the defence of the multilateral system in the immediate future; rather, they are concerned with the opposite, most notably the United States.

To put it bluntly, the European Union is the only benign power on the geostrategic horizon up to the task, and one around which a coalition of middle powers could be formed that would join the endeavour --for their own national interest-- such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and at some point some developing countries with the possibility of becoming an emerging powers. For the moment, I rule out India.

The EU seems like a suitable candidate to fill the void left by the United States for many reasons. Its economic power should be highlighted --although this obviously needs to be strengthened; its proven normative capacity, starting with its attachment to democratic values, respect for human rights and the rule of law; its solid --by any comparison-- institutional structure that has materialised into an admirable supranational entity that could well be imitated in some of its features to reinforce multilateral governance; and its proven commitment to agreements and policies to address global challenges.

Of course, to assume this role, the EU must overcome multiple challenges, the most important of which is perhaps to achieve a new balance in its relationship with the United States. It could start by not imitating the latter’s trade neo-protectionism and helping to fix the damage done to the World Trade Organization by the United States since the previous American administration and which has not been repaired in any way by the current one; likewise, Europe should not imitate the acute Sinophobia that afflicts the United States, which will prove very costly for all involved. And, of course, it must take the essential components of the Pact for the Future - in whose content it had a great influence - and promote concrete initiatives for the implementation of those components.

### EU CP—1NC vs Russian LNG

#### The European Union should increase its development of the Russian Arctic by offering to invest in the natural gas projects, including offering technology for sub-zero drilling and joint ventures for liquid natural gas production.

#### EU can expand its Arctic policy to achieve security and diplomatic goals – the region is key to establish its leadership

Ciolan 22, Research Fellow in the Europe in the World programme at the European Policy Centre. (Ionela Ciolan, 4-11-2022, “The EU’s geopolitical awakening in the Arctic,” https://www.epc.eu/publication/The-EUs-geopolitical-awakening-in-the-Arctic-47c318/)

The northern neighbourhood is one of the main testing grounds for the EU’s geopolitical awakening. Only through skilful use of diplomacy, deterrence, dialogue and defence will the EU successfully preserve the peace, sustainability and security of the Arctic.

Decades of exceptionalism, characterised by cooperation and peaceful dialogue, branded the Arctic a “pole of peace”. Today, it is fast transforming into a ‘pole of instability’ as geopolitics return to the High North and great power politics start to dominate this region. As the Arctic becomes a space for geopolitical competition, sharpened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the battles will be carried out in five areas: the chase for natural resources, the rivalry for supremacy, the contest for trading routes, the race for tourism opportunities, and the run for salvaging the environment of the Circumpolar North.

The EU’s voice in the Arctic

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But things are changing. The 2021 Arctic Strategy gives Brussels a legitimate voice on Arctic issues and brakes its tiptoeing approach. By focusing the strategy on climate action and acknowledging the region as a strategic domain for European security in a growing geopolitical contest, the EU claims a rightful place within the Arctic discussions. In addition, the strategic relevance of the northern neighbourhood for the EU, along with the east and the south, was confirmed by the recently published Strategic Compass for European security and defence.

Beyond having a voice, the EU should now devise a better and more comprehensive strategy toward the Arctic. The “new normal” in the northern neighbourhood is characterised by multicrises that will require Brussels’ strategic engagement, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

More permafrost melting, less climate security

After the Amazon, the Arctic is the world’s second-biggest carbon sink, and the global “refrigerator” as it regulates global temperatures. In the High North, the effects of climate change are developing three times faster than anywhere on the globe, with implications for oceanic, atmospheric and geophysical developments.

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The warming of the Circumpolar North also means competition for its vast untapped resources. The Arctic land and ocean hold 13% and 30% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves, respectively. The region is also rich in fish, natural minerals (e.g. nickel, platinum, palladium) and rare-earth elements vital to modern technology and cutting-edge innovations. Finally, it offers the possibility of shorter commercial routes, which implies profits of billions of dollars.

And with this comes geo-economic and geopolitical rivalry, too.

Rising geopolitics in the High North

Climate change acts as a conflict and risk multiplier. And nowhere on the globe are the geopolitical consequences of climate insecurity as visible as in the European Arctic. For example, Scandinavia is at the forefront of great power politics and growing competition between the West and Russia.

In the past decades, the Kremlin revitalised its Northern Fleet by constructing new Arctic military bases, complete with naval facilities, radar and testing sites, airfields and missile storage facilities, to phase “NATO out of Arctic”. Russia has returned to a version of its Cold War posture focused on securing its ballistic missile submarine fleet and operations in the North Atlantic Ocean.

To make the Arctic picture more challenging for Brussels, China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018 and is pursuing the creation of, in cooperation with Russia, a global transport corridor within the Northern Sea Route. It would be 40% faster than traditional cargo routes via the Suez Canal.

Beijing’s interests in the Arctic exceed pure economic, environmental and energy interests towards military implications. In the last few years, China has developed dual-use technology within its Arctic research facilities to gain influence and a strategic position in the High North. Increased military presence in the region reveals China’s ambition to become a “polar great power” by 2030.

Enter NATO

For years, NATO was adamant about creating an Arctic Strategy and let its five northern members – the US, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Denmark – take the lead. Russia’s aggressive actions since 2014 boosted NATO’s deterrence of its Northern Flank.

NATO’s 2022 Cold Response exercise was the largest military drill in the Arctic since the Cold War. Roughly 30,000 soldiers from 27 Allied countries trained for a simulated attack on land, air and sea in the Circumpolar North.

There is a growing security dilemma in the Arctic region, as both Russia and NATO have intensified their military exercises and presence in the area, heightening threat perceptions and lowering trust on both sides. This situation is worsened by the lack of a framework for dialogue between NATO and Russia on security and defence topics. The only two existing security cooperation mechanisms, the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the Arctic Chiefs of Defence Staff meetings, were called off or held without Russia since the latter’s annexation of Crimea.

To make matters worse, Russia’s war on Ukraine and challenge to the European security architecture brings “a new normal [...] for Arctic security”, characterised by even more competition and enhanced defence and security risks for the Alliance. Now, even Sweden and Finland, non-NATO Arctic states, are facing the Russian threat and moving closer to NATO – which the latter would gladly welcome.

Russia’s war changes the Arctic

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a “watershed moment” that will define the future of European security, with cascading effects on the Arctic. Russia is threatening the international rules-based order, undermining Europe’s security architecture, and making the European Arctic the ‘hottest’ area in the High North.

In response to Russia’s aggression, the seven other Arctic states provisionally suspended their participation in the Arctic Council, isolating Russia. The pausing of its intergovernmental working groups was unprecedented, breaking with the tradition of keeping the Arctic out of conflicting politics.

Indeed, halting the Arctic Council affects Arctic security, governance and climate research directly. These effects will be felt across regional projects on climate change, biodiversity, oil spills, resource exploitations, search and rescue missions, and fishing. But, most importantly, the downward effect of the Kremlin’s breach of the international norms marks the return of geopolitics in the Arctic.

How can the EU respond to the multicrises?

In this volatile and fragile environment, the EU’s goal of becoming a geopolitical player should be based on a 360°-security approach, and readiness and resilience to respond to permacrisis.

The EU will have to respond to all crises – climate insecurity, rising geopolitics, instability, territorial issues, human security – simultaneously and with equal strength and resolve. As such, it will need to skilfully use four D’s.

1. Defence: Build an EU Arctic Security Strategy. The time for tiptoeing and appeasing is over. Brussels must become a security provider for the Nordics in the realms of climate and hybrid security to face the expanding Russian militarisation.
2. Deterrence: Cooperate more strongly with NATO on Arctic security. In an era of permacrisis with a multitude of ‘burning areas’, only a deepened EU–NATO cooperation can preserve the security of the Euro-Atlantic space and deter the aggressive actions of other players.
3. Dialogue: Start an Arctic ‘seven + EU’ framework dialogue on climate change. The Arctic Council must resume, even without Russia, as the unfolding negative effects of climate change do not wait or stop for political consensus.
4. Diplomacy: Support the creation of a UN mechanism for the Arctic. As many non-Arctic countries direct their attention towards the region, a governance body for the High North will be needed to manage the ramifications of these newly found interests.

The new Arctic

After decades of peaceful cooperation, geopolitics is back in the Circumpolar North – and it is the European Arctic that feels the burn of rising instability and competition. From climate insecurity to increased militarisation and great power politics, this region will grow in importance, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  
The unfolding multicrises of the European Arctic will test the EU’s responsiveness, ambition and preparedness. It is time for the EU to go one step further and act on its newly founded geopolitical voice by employing the four D’s – defence, deterrence, dialogue and diplomacy – in its Arctic outlook.

#### Lack of U.S. commitment to Arctic motivates European states to develop strong independent security policies

Thorsson 25, Editor and Reporter for Arctic Today. (Elías Thorsson, 4-10-2025, “Can Europe defend the Arctic without the U.S.?” https://www.arctictoday.com/can-europe-defend-the-arctic-without-the-u-s/)

With shifting power dynamics, rising geopolitical tensions and the return of great-power competition in the High North, the question of whether Europe could defend its own Arctic territory without American support no longer feels hypothetical. As the United States flirts with isolationist rhetoric, threatens to take over allied territories and questions swirl around its long-term commitment to NATO, many European leaders and military experts are reevaluating their own readiness—particularly in the strategically vital Arctic.

Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, told Arctic Today that more than a question resources, the future of European defense was political.

“Of course Europe is capable [of defending itself], but it has to summon the political will,” he said. “Everybody knows Russia is a bad guy. And for years I’ve been hearing we need to step up without anybody stepping up.”

Hodges claimed that defending the European Arctic—especially countries like Norway, Sweden, and Finland—without the United States would be difficult, but not impossible.

“The military capabilities exist,” he said. “What lacks is not capability, but political will. Nations like Norway are wealthy enough to do much more, but have chosen not to. That’s not a resource problem—that’s a choice.”

He warned that the deterrent power of NATO, particularly Article 5, has traditionally relied not just on its legal structure but on the perception of unity and certainty. Hodges claims that the real danger lies in the erosion of NATO’s deterrent credibility.

“There never was a question about whether any country would live up to [Article 5]… Now there’s a question.”

That doubt has grown exponentially in recent months. On February 17, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, U.S. vice president JD Vance openly questioned the sustainability of America’s military role in Europe, casting it as a strategic overreach incompatible with U.S. domestic priorities. Vance’s remarks sent ripples through European defense circles, reinforcing a sense that bipartisan consensus in Washington on transatlantic security can no longer be taken for granted.

New threats and new alliances

In terms of the threats facing the region, Hodges’ concern isn’t only about Russia’s overt aggression but also about its hybrid tactics—sabotage, cyberattacks and pressure on undersea infrastructure. These tactics have already intensified in the Arctic and the Baltic regions and could escalate if Moscow senses a weakened or divided NATO.

Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde, Professor of War Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College, agrees that the Arctic could become a serious vulnerability for Europe if U.S. support fades. But he is more cautious in his assessment of Europe’s independent capabilities.

“Will European countries be able to defend Finland, Sweden and Norway without U.S. support? In my eyes yes, if the UK and Germany and others contribute, but with much more difficulty and greater losses,” Hilde said.

However, he cautioned that defending remote and symbolically important areas like Svalbard without American assistance would likely be beyond Europe’s current capacity.

Europe’s readiness gaps are not just theoretical. Hilde pointed to strategic airlift, long-range strike capability and intelligence assets as areas where Europe remains heavily reliant on U.S. support. Even in terms of basic infrastructure, he noted that road and rail connectivity across Scandinavia remains insufficient for a high-speed military response.

Nevertheless, Hodges believes the current geopolitical moment could be a turning point.

“It’s a shame that Europe needs the United States to remind it to live up to its treaty obligations,” he said, “but if this is what it takes to get countries to finally act, then maybe it’s for the better in the long term.”

Signs of this shift are beginning to appear. In early 2025, the United Kingdom and Norway announced plans for a new defense agreement focused on the High North, aimed at enhancing joint operations, intelligence-sharing, and protection of undersea infrastructure. For Hodges, the UK stands out as the European country most likely to step into a greater leadership role.

“There is more than enough combat power and potential in the region,” he said. “The problem has always been coordination and commitment.”

When it comes to nuclear deterrence, both men agreed that France and the UK are the only real options for Europe if the U.S. steps back, however, how that nuclear umbrella would be implemented remains up in the air.

“How far the UK is willing to go alone in offering what is called extended nuclear deterrence to the Northern European countries is not clear,” Hilde said. “France has talked about offering this to other European countries, but as far as I know, not been clear on details of what this will involve or how it would work. Few seem to be keen on taking up the French idea.”

Still, creating an effective European-led defense framework for the Arctic remains a tall order. Hilde doesn’t believe that existing regional alliances like Nordefco could evolve into a serious substitute for NATO, but he sees potential in a broader Northern European bloc.

“My bet would be on the Northern European countries coming together in some kind of ‘mini-NATO’ in the north… the Nordic countries, the Baltic, Poland, Germany, BeNeLux and the United Kingdom,” he said.

Ultimately, the central question isn’t whether Europe can defend the Arctic without the U.S.—it’s whether it will. For Hodges, the time to stop hoping for guarantees and start building credible alternatives is now.

“Deterrence requires capability and credibility,” he said. “The credibility part comes from showing that you’re serious.”

#### Ambitious EU Arctic policy spills over as a test case for EU supranationalism

Dr. Andreas Raspotnik, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the High North Center for Business and Governance, Nord University, Bodø, Norway “The Great Illusion Revisited: The Future of the European Union’s Arctic Engagement” https://www.kas.de/documents/272774/272823/The+Great+Illusion+Revisited+-+The+Future+of+EU+Arctic+Engagement.pdf/700a4ed7-1131-5ac8-6856-eac175f8d225?version=1.0&t=1603708374145 //DH

**EP = European Parliament, MEPs = Members of the European Parliament**

What role for the European Parliament?

Generally speaking, the EP’s Arctic voices tend to yield more controversies and are less coherent than policy statements issued by the Commission/EEAS and the Council. Especially in the early years of the EU’s Arctic policy process, considerations from the European Parliament and those of its Members have often raised eyebrows among Arctic stakeholders – be it the push for the infamous seal ban or discussions on an Arctic Treaty and moratoria on hydrocarbon exploitation. Yet, the EP has often pushed the EU’s Arctic policy to move forward and for example continuously called to develop a comprehensive Arctic ‘strategy’.

Raising its Arctic voice is of key importance to the EP. On an individual level, the Arctic and related matters of combatting climate change or environmental and animal protection, is a relatively low-hanging fruit for some MEPs to gain votes within their electorate. Moreover, as knowledge on Arctic matters is rather limited, those MEPs are easily to be considered opinion makers, offering an often-unique chance to influence and define policy. On a broader level, the declaratory and political nature of EP resolutions allows for its representatives to take more ambitious, outspoken and at times controversial or confrontational stances, as compared to other EU institutions. Thus, the continuous engagement with Arctic issues is not only important for the European Parliament and some of its MEPs to continuously re-define its regional voice, it is also essential to acknowledge the Union’s normative and decisional supranationalism. This relates in particular to the Arctic, as its policy touches many aspects of both internal and external relevance/competence for the EU.

Accordingly, one wonders if the EP could not sow the seeds for a more ambitious geopolitical European Union, using the Arctic as case study and test ground to frame an EU-ropean narrative fit for tomorrow’s power politics? This would start with specific discussions on Chinese localisation tactics in Greenland to the EP asking the Commission/EEAS for a comprehensive security analysis of the Arctic and ends with a future- and goal-oriented, honest assessment of what the EU can and wants to achieve in the circumpolar North. There are good reasons for the rather timid coverage of the security angle in the last policy statements. Yet, a policy that aims to fully integrate all Arctic concerns should explicitly recognise the strategic importance of the Arctic, examine the new geopolitical realities and present clear and ambitious EU-ropean goals – despite this might giving rise to negative responses from Arctic states.

As such, the EU could also convincingly tackle matters of key importance, such as an Arctic-based selective engagement with Russia. Could the European Arctic be an area where the EU could seek talks with Russia based on its continuing northern cross-border bond and a potential willingness on the part of Russia? The peripheral Arctic might be the venue where the EU and Russia find common ground again, not only improving their relationship but also promoting Arctic stability. Using the Arctic as arena for renewed relations, or at least talks thereof, might have positive spillover effects on other areas of dispute. As such, the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians and the active engagement of the European Parliament might offer an opportunity to promote and actively engage in related, behind-the-door-talks? Given the current world situation and the EU’s Arctic history, this might be naïve, but a policy that separates regional from systemic components, sustainable development and environmental protection from questions of hard security, offers the opportunity to delineate clear and ambitious goals for the EU’s Arctic involvement. The European Parliament could complement the other institutions to adapt a more strategic mind-set and breaking down policy silos, starting with the Arctic region.

Arctic Geopolitics the EU-ropean Way

If the European Union aims to become a truly geopolitical Union it needs to learn the language of power by translating its economic and soft power into strategic leverage. In an Arctic context this means, among others, a concrete understanding of the security concerns (some) Member States have, the definition of strategic goals and an assessment on how the Union’s economic and soft power could address and tackle future security challenges. A security analysis of the Arctic might also reveal the potential for the EU to be at the forefront of developing new regional means of ‘geopolitical cooperation’. This could provide impetus to properly manage the growing global interest in Arctic matters and counteract emerging global geopolitical competition that also affects the Arctic. Over the last ten years, we have seen a European Union that has fulfilled its Arctic commitments, from funding research to fostering ocean governance, from supporting sustainable development to promoting international cooperation. A European Union that seems to be satisfied with its Arctic status quo. However, if change is indeed inherent in any system, we might also see a European Union that aims to leave its Arctic comfort zone based on a geopolitical strategy the EU-ropean way – if Arctic states like it or not.

#### That preserves global multilateralism and solves every existential threat

Ernesto Zedillo, 2024 –Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, former president of Mexico, former Commissioner on the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament “Reinforcing the multilateral system: Counting on Europe to keep us from the brink” 10/15, https://theelders.org/news/reinforcing-multilateral-system-counting-europe-keep-us-brink //DH

Let us think of the COVID-19 pandemic, the natural disasters caused by climate change, the evident deterioration of our planet’s natural capital, the financial crisis the financial crisis just two decades ago, the wars and other conflicts that have caused millions of people to die or be displaced, and the absurd existence of nuclear weapons, which, far from being reduced, has worsened in recent years, to cite just a few of the many examples.

Despite the existence and increase of global risks, some of which have already become existential for humanity and the planet, the multilateral system, far from being strengthened, seems to be very close to collapse.

The threats hanging over the multilateral system are overwhelming: blatant violation of the essential norms of international law by major powers; non-compliance and even repudiation of international agreements and treaties; paralysis in decision-making mechanisms to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, most notably within the UN Security Council; the multiplication of war fronts as has not occurred in many decades; systematic undermining—by omission or commission—of multilateral institutions to the point of paralysis, as is the case with the World Trade Organization; deliberate efforts by some members to erode the effectiveness and credibility of international institutions by some of their members; failure to adopt and implement strategies and policies—even those recently agreed upon—to address proven risks, such as pandemics; disregard for conventions and norms on human rights; the formation of regional blocs that exacerbate high-risk rivalries; fragmentation of the international trade system; and indifference in addressing emerging risks, such as cyber threats.

Historians debate whether today's geopolitics resembles that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading up to World War I, or that of the 1920s and 1930s, on the way to the Great Depression and World War II, or whether it is something like that experienced during the "Cold War." Others go as far back as the Peloponnesian War and apply Thucydides' classic analysis. My answer when I have been part of that discussion has been: “all of the above.”

Among the circumstances that occurred in the past and are now present again, we should count the following: multipolarity displacing unipolarity, military rivalries between the alliances that emerged from that multipolarity, open confrontations between the two greatest powers, exacerbated nationalisms - hand in hand with increasing armies, deepening economic disparities – both between nations and within them, isolationism and a resurgence of protectionism, ideological competition, ‘modernisation' of nuclear weapons instead of their abolition; technological and economic disruption, and repudiation or at least detachment from institutions and international law.

In the disastrous first half of the 20th century, they caused the two great world wars. They may cause the third in our very own time, with one major difference: it would be the last for humanity. Any use of nuclear weapons, however limited it may be at the beginning, would unleash a chain reaction, where the firing of just a fraction of the existing arsenals would lead to the extermination of our species. In a war with nuclear weapons, no one wins, we all lose everything.

What can prevent not only nuclear holocaust, but also open up paths to prosperity, justice, and peace in the world, and on that path successfully face the global challenges -- or as we economists say, provide the global public goods -- that concern this Forum?

To be frank, it is not anything different from what has been used in the past. I make the point, recalling that when my admired friend, Graham Allison of Harvard, populariser a few years ago of the Thucydides trap as a theory of the China-United States rivalry, launched the intellectual challenge of formulating proposals to free ourselves from the consequences of such a dilemma, I allowed myself to tell him that since the years of the great Greek historian, among other things, humans developed such basic and useful tools as politics, diplomacy, and international law, and shown that it is possible to apply them very successfully, whilst also experiencing the consequences of ignoring them. The real challenge is to make the powerful recognize that it is in their own national interest to resort to these means of civilization and avoid those of barbarism.

I insist, this is not about invoking ethical values, altruism, or justice. It is simply about acknowledging how high the cost has been of not using international institutions and rules to resolve disputes and address common or global problems.

One cannot resist the temptation to refer to at least a couple of calamitous examples from this century, so as not to look too far back in the past.

Consider the human, economic and geopolitical costs of the US invasion of Iraq that began in 2003, costs that would have been avoided if that power had adhered to the process that was already being followed at the UN Security Council to determine the dangerousness of Hussein's regime. Three and a half trillion dollars in direct costs plus that of the destruction caused in the invaded country, as well as more than half a million lives lost, deep regional destabilization, and a dramatic loss of US influence, marking the end of the brief period of unipolarity and benevolent hegemony - as that nation was seen during the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And what about the crime perpetrated by Russia invading Ukraine - without any justification for such brutal use of force and violation of international law - with the human losses and destruction that it has and will continue to cause. To calculate the direct cost of this war, one must also think of trillions of dollars, the human lives sacrificed nearing half a million, the immense value of the destruction caused, and whatever happens, a less secure Russia, converted into a criminal state completely outside international law and less respected than at any previous time in its history. The damage and pain caused to Ukrainians is already immense and simply irreparable. The cost incurred by other countries is also colossal. None of this atrocity was necessary. Beyond President Putin's fanciful imperial ambitions, any controversy, if it really existed at all, could have been resolved peacefully through the means of diplomacy and international law.

The essential question is: where do we start to avoid the disaster looming over the planet’s geopolitics?

One possibility is to pay attention to the Pact for the Future, approved at the UN Summit just last September 22 by all member countries - except seven led by Russia.

The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, stated that the Summit was to move multilateralism away from the edge of the precipice where it now seems to be. The agreed Pact contains at least an agenda - ambitious under the current circumstances - to first preserve what remains of the system and then strengthen it. It contains critical commitments for many aspects of international cooperation, but those related to international peace and security, as well as the revitalisation of the multilateral system, are particularly important, addressing fundamental issues such as the reform of the Security Council and nuclear disarmament.

Delivering is not the same as promising. It would be serious if the Pact were to join the long list of commitments made by governments at important summits, only to be forgotten as soon as they are over. A special effort is needed to organise the provision of global public goods solemnly agreed on September 22.

The challenge is that, given the absence of a global government with the authority and capacity to regulate, enforce, and impose taxes to finance them, action to initiate the provision of global public goods must be voluntary. But given the resistance of nation states to share their sovereignty and the temptation to let others pay, the voluntarism to unleash that provision does not happen spontaneously. Historically, it has been necessary for a nation or a small group of nations, with an enlightened vision and a clear sense of responsibility, to unleash the processes leading to the solution of the problems that affect all humanity.

Who can play that role in our time?

In the past, the United States has done so, exercising the leadership it built up both through the military and economic might it had after World War II and its feverish activity in promoting the creation of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the GATT and many others during the 1940s and 1950s.

In the past two decades, the United States certainly seems interested in preserving its preeminent power but equally engaged in weakening the multilateral system --that it largely built. Its behaviour fits into a view that purports that during the period in which the hegemon's supremacy is not threatened, it will be in its interest to support the rules-based system, largely of its own construction, in order to preserve and enhance its dominant position. But when this position is threatened by the emergence of a new power—in this case China—the hegemon may turn against the rules-based system and revert to one that is based purely on power, to delay or even prevent the emerging power from taking over the dominant position. This is a short-sighted view because it is actually in the long-term interest of both the hegemon, the United States, and the emerging power, China, to operate within a system with rules that serve to contain the effect, intended or not, of the actions of the adversary country, if that is a valid term. Be that as it may, neither of them seems genuinely interested in effectively leading the defence of the multilateral system in the immediate future; rather, they are concerned with the opposite, most notably the United States.

To put it bluntly, the European Union is the only benign power on the geostrategic horizon up to the task, and one around which a coalition of middle powers could be formed that would join the endeavour --for their own national interest-- such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and at some point some developing countries with the possibility of becoming an emerging powers. For the moment, I rule out India.

The EU seems like a suitable candidate to fill the void left by the United States for many reasons. Its economic power should be highlighted --although this obviously needs to be strengthened; its proven normative capacity, starting with its attachment to democratic values, respect for human rights and the rule of law; its solid --by any comparison-- institutional structure that has materialised into an admirable supranational entity that could well be imitated in some of its features to reinforce multilateral governance; and its proven commitment to agreements and policies to address global challenges.

Of course, to assume this role, the EU must overcome multiple challenges, the most important of which is perhaps to achieve a new balance in its relationship with the United States. It could start by not imitating the latter’s trade neo-protectionism and helping to fix the damage done to the World Trade Organization by the United States since the previous American administration and which has not been repaired in any way by the current one; likewise, Europe should not imitate the acute Sinophobia that afflicts the United States, which will prove very costly for all involved. And, of course, it must take the essential components of the Pact for the Future - in whose content it had a great influence - and promote concrete initiatives for the implementation of those components.

### EU CP—1NC vs Native Renewables

#### The European Union should increase its collaborative development of tribally-owned solar and wind energy in Native Alaskan Arctic communities.

#### EU can expand its Arctic policy to achieve security and diplomatic goals – the region is key to establish its leadership

Ciolan 22, Research Fellow in the Europe in the World programme at the European Policy Centre. (Ionela Ciolan, 4-11-2022, “The EU’s geopolitical awakening in the Arctic,” https://www.epc.eu/publication/The-EUs-geopolitical-awakening-in-the-Arctic-47c318/)

The northern neighbourhood is one of the main testing grounds for the EU’s geopolitical awakening. Only through skilful use of diplomacy, deterrence, dialogue and defence will the EU successfully preserve the peace, sustainability and security of the Arctic.

Decades of exceptionalism, characterised by cooperation and peaceful dialogue, branded the Arctic a “pole of peace”. Today, it is fast transforming into a ‘pole of instability’ as geopolitics return to the High North and great power politics start to dominate this region. As the Arctic becomes a space for geopolitical competition, sharpened by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the battles will be carried out in five areas: the chase for natural resources, the rivalry for supremacy, the contest for trading routes, the race for tourism opportunities, and the run for salvaging the environment of the Circumpolar North.

The EU’s voice in the Arctic

The EU’s engagement in the Arctic has been more ambitious in words than practice. Comprised of eight states – Canada, the US, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, the Russian Federation –, the Arctic Council is the main framework of cooperation between the Arctic states and the North indigenous peoples on issues of environmental protection and sustainable development. For 21 years, the EU has been waiting for a seat in the room as an observer in the Council. As such, its work in the northern neighbourhood is dependent on the goodwill of the Arctic eight.

But things are changing. The 2021 Arctic Strategy gives Brussels a legitimate voice on Arctic issues and brakes its tiptoeing approach. By focusing the strategy on climate action and acknowledging the region as a strategic domain for European security in a growing geopolitical contest, the EU claims a rightful place within the Arctic discussions. In addition, the strategic relevance of the northern neighbourhood for the EU, along with the east and the south, was confirmed by the recently published Strategic Compass for European security and defence.

Beyond having a voice, the EU should now devise a better and more comprehensive strategy toward the Arctic. The “new normal” in the northern neighbourhood is characterised by multicrises that will require Brussels’ strategic engagement, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

More permafrost melting, less climate security

After the Amazon, the Arctic is the world’s second-biggest carbon sink, and the global “refrigerator” as it regulates global temperatures. In the High North, the effects of climate change are developing three times faster than anywhere on the globe, with implications for oceanic, atmospheric and geophysical developments.

As the Arctic heats up and more ice melts, cascading effects will further climate insecurity: extreme weather events, biodiversity loss, permafrost thawing with unimaginable consequences everywhere. Indeed, the melting of the permafrost could act as a climate bomb, releasing a billion tons of carbon gases into the atmosphere, awakening long-dormant bacteria and microbes, and changing polar landscapes that will disrupt local human activities and infrastructure.

The warming of the Circumpolar North also means competition for its vast untapped resources. The Arctic land and ocean hold 13% and 30% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves, respectively. The region is also rich in fish, natural minerals (e.g. nickel, platinum, palladium) and rare-earth elements vital to modern technology and cutting-edge innovations. Finally, it offers the possibility of shorter commercial routes, which implies profits of billions of dollars.

And with this comes geo-economic and geopolitical rivalry, too.

Rising geopolitics in the High North

Climate change acts as a conflict and risk multiplier. And nowhere on the globe are the geopolitical consequences of climate insecurity as visible as in the European Arctic. For example, Scandinavia is at the forefront of great power politics and growing competition between the West and Russia.

In the past decades, the Kremlin revitalised its Northern Fleet by constructing new Arctic military bases, complete with naval facilities, radar and testing sites, airfields and missile storage facilities, to phase “NATO out of Arctic”. Russia has returned to a version of its Cold War posture focused on securing its ballistic missile submarine fleet and operations in the North Atlantic Ocean.

To make the Arctic picture more challenging for Brussels, China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in 2018 and is pursuing the creation of, in cooperation with Russia, a global transport corridor within the Northern Sea Route. It would be 40% faster than traditional cargo routes via the Suez Canal.

Beijing’s interests in the Arctic exceed pure economic, environmental and energy interests towards military implications. In the last few years, China has developed dual-use technology within its Arctic research facilities to gain influence and a strategic position in the High North. Increased military presence in the region reveals China’s ambition to become a “polar great power” by 2030.

Enter NATO

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To make matters worse, Russia’s war on Ukraine and challenge to the European security architecture brings “a new normal [...] for Arctic security”, characterised by even more competition and enhanced defence and security risks for the Alliance. Now, even Sweden and Finland, non-NATO Arctic states, are facing the Russian threat and moving closer to NATO – which the latter would gladly welcome.

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In response to Russia’s aggression, the seven other Arctic states provisionally suspended their participation in the Arctic Council, isolating Russia. The pausing of its intergovernmental working groups was unprecedented, breaking with the tradition of keeping the Arctic out of conflicting politics.

Indeed, halting the Arctic Council affects Arctic security, governance and climate research directly. These effects will be felt across regional projects on climate change, biodiversity, oil spills, resource exploitations, search and rescue missions, and fishing. But, most importantly, the downward effect of the Kremlin’s breach of the international norms marks the return of geopolitics in the Arctic.

How can the EU respond to the multicrises?

In this volatile and fragile environment, the EU’s goal of becoming a geopolitical player should be based on a 360°-security approach, and readiness and resilience to respond to permacrisis.

The EU will have to respond to all crises – climate insecurity, rising geopolitics, instability, territorial issues, human security – simultaneously and with equal strength and resolve. As such, it will need to skilfully use four D’s.

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The new Arctic

After decades of peaceful cooperation, geopolitics is back in the Circumpolar North – and it is the European Arctic that feels the burn of rising instability and competition. From climate insecurity to increased militarisation and great power politics, this region will grow in importance, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  
The unfolding multicrises of the European Arctic will test the EU’s responsiveness, ambition and preparedness. It is time for the EU to go one step further and act on its newly founded geopolitical voice by employing the four D’s – defence, deterrence, dialogue and diplomacy – in its Arctic outlook.

#### Lack of U.S. commitment to Arctic motivates European states to develop strong independent security policies

Thorsson 25, Editor and Reporter for Arctic Today. (Elías Thorsson, 4-10-2025, “Can Europe defend the Arctic without the U.S.?” https://www.arctictoday.com/can-europe-defend-the-arctic-without-the-u-s/)

With shifting power dynamics, rising geopolitical tensions and the return of great-power competition in the High North, the question of whether Europe could defend its own Arctic territory without American support no longer feels hypothetical. As the United States flirts with isolationist rhetoric, threatens to take over allied territories and questions swirl around its long-term commitment to NATO, many European leaders and military experts are reevaluating their own readiness—particularly in the strategically vital Arctic.

Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, former commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, told Arctic Today that more than a question resources, the future of European defense was political.

“Of course Europe is capable [of defending itself], but it has to summon the political will,” he said. “Everybody knows Russia is a bad guy. And for years I’ve been hearing we need to step up without anybody stepping up.”

Hodges claimed that defending the European Arctic—especially countries like Norway, Sweden, and Finland—without the United States would be difficult, but not impossible.

“The military capabilities exist,” he said. “What lacks is not capability, but political will. Nations like Norway are wealthy enough to do much more, but have chosen not to. That’s not a resource problem—that’s a choice.”

He warned that the deterrent power of NATO, particularly Article 5, has traditionally relied not just on its legal structure but on the perception of unity and certainty. Hodges claims that the real danger lies in the erosion of NATO’s deterrent credibility.

“There never was a question about whether any country would live up to [Article 5]… Now there’s a question.”

That doubt has grown exponentially in recent months. On February 17, at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, U.S. vice president JD Vance openly questioned the sustainability of America’s military role in Europe, casting it as a strategic overreach incompatible with U.S. domestic priorities. Vance’s remarks sent ripples through European defense circles, reinforcing a sense that bipartisan consensus in Washington on transatlantic security can no longer be taken for granted.

New threats and new alliances

In terms of the threats facing the region, Hodges’ concern isn’t only about Russia’s overt aggression but also about its hybrid tactics—sabotage, cyberattacks and pressure on undersea infrastructure. These tactics have already intensified in the Arctic and the Baltic regions and could escalate if Moscow senses a weakened or divided NATO.

Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde, Professor of War Studies at the Norwegian Defence University College, agrees that the Arctic could become a serious vulnerability for Europe if U.S. support fades. But he is more cautious in his assessment of Europe’s independent capabilities.

“Will European countries be able to defend Finland, Sweden and Norway without U.S. support? In my eyes yes, if the UK and Germany and others contribute, but with much more difficulty and greater losses,” Hilde said.

However, he cautioned that defending remote and symbolically important areas like Svalbard without American assistance would likely be beyond Europe’s current capacity.

Europe’s readiness gaps are not just theoretical. Hilde pointed to strategic airlift, long-range strike capability and intelligence assets as areas where Europe remains heavily reliant on U.S. support. Even in terms of basic infrastructure, he noted that road and rail connectivity across Scandinavia remains insufficient for a high-speed military response.

Nevertheless, Hodges believes the current geopolitical moment could be a turning point.

“It’s a shame that Europe needs the United States to remind it to live up to its treaty obligations,” he said, “but if this is what it takes to get countries to finally act, then maybe it’s for the better in the long term.”

Signs of this shift are beginning to appear. In early 2025, the United Kingdom and Norway announced plans for a new defense agreement focused on the High North, aimed at enhancing joint operations, intelligence-sharing, and protection of undersea infrastructure. For Hodges, the UK stands out as the European country most likely to step into a greater leadership role.

“There is more than enough combat power and potential in the region,” he said. “The problem has always been coordination and commitment.”

When it comes to nuclear deterrence, both men agreed that France and the UK are the only real options for Europe if the U.S. steps back, however, how that nuclear umbrella would be implemented remains up in the air.

“How far the UK is willing to go alone in offering what is called extended nuclear deterrence to the Northern European countries is not clear,” Hilde said. “France has talked about offering this to other European countries, but as far as I know, not been clear on details of what this will involve or how it would work. Few seem to be keen on taking up the French idea.”

Still, creating an effective European-led defense framework for the Arctic remains a tall order. Hilde doesn’t believe that existing regional alliances like Nordefco could evolve into a serious substitute for NATO, but he sees potential in a broader Northern European bloc.

“My bet would be on the Northern European countries coming together in some kind of ‘mini-NATO’ in the north… the Nordic countries, the Baltic, Poland, Germany, BeNeLux and the United Kingdom,” he said.

Ultimately, the central question isn’t whether Europe can defend the Arctic without the U.S.—it’s whether it will. For Hodges, the time to stop hoping for guarantees and start building credible alternatives is now.

“Deterrence requires capability and credibility,” he said. “The credibility part comes from showing that you’re serious.”

#### Ambitious EU Arctic policy spills over as a test case for EU supranationalism

Dr. Andreas Raspotnik, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the High North Center for Business and Governance, Nord University, Bodø, Norway “The Great Illusion Revisited: The Future of the European Union’s Arctic Engagement” https://www.kas.de/documents/272774/272823/The+Great+Illusion+Revisited+-+The+Future+of+EU+Arctic+Engagement.pdf/700a4ed7-1131-5ac8-6856-eac175f8d225?version=1.0&t=1603708374145 //DH

**EP = European Parliament, MEPs = Members of the European Parliament**

What role for the European Parliament?

Generally speaking, the EP’s Arctic voices tend to yield more controversies and are less coherent than policy statements issued by the Commission/EEAS and the Council. Especially in the early years of the EU’s Arctic policy process, considerations from the European Parliament and those of its Members have often raised eyebrows among Arctic stakeholders – be it the push for the infamous seal ban or discussions on an Arctic Treaty and moratoria on hydrocarbon exploitation. Yet, the EP has often pushed the EU’s Arctic policy to move forward and for example continuously called to develop a comprehensive Arctic ‘strategy’.

Raising its Arctic voice is of key importance to the EP. On an individual level, the Arctic and related matters of combatting climate change or environmental and animal protection, is a relatively low-hanging fruit for some MEPs to gain votes within their electorate. Moreover, as knowledge on Arctic matters is rather limited, those MEPs are easily to be considered opinion makers, offering an often-unique chance to influence and define policy. On a broader level, the declaratory and political nature of EP resolutions allows for its representatives to take more ambitious, outspoken and at times controversial or confrontational stances, as compared to other EU institutions. Thus, the continuous engagement with Arctic issues is not only important for the European Parliament and some of its MEPs to continuously re-define its regional voice, it is also essential to acknowledge the Union’s normative and decisional supranationalism. This relates in particular to the Arctic, as its policy touches many aspects of both internal and external relevance/competence for the EU.

Accordingly, one wonders if the EP could not sow the seeds for a more ambitious geopolitical European Union, using the Arctic as case study and test ground to frame an EU-ropean narrative fit for tomorrow’s power politics? This would start with specific discussions on Chinese localisation tactics in Greenland to the EP asking the Commission/EEAS for a comprehensive security analysis of the Arctic and ends with a future- and goal-oriented, honest assessment of what the EU can and wants to achieve in the circumpolar North. There are good reasons for the rather timid coverage of the security angle in the last policy statements. Yet, a policy that aims to fully integrate all Arctic concerns should explicitly recognise the strategic importance of the Arctic, examine the new geopolitical realities and present clear and ambitious EU-ropean goals – despite this might giving rise to negative responses from Arctic states.

As such, the EU could also convincingly tackle matters of key importance, such as an Arctic-based selective engagement with Russia. Could the European Arctic be an area where the EU could seek talks with Russia based on its continuing northern cross-border bond and a potential willingness on the part of Russia? The peripheral Arctic might be the venue where the EU and Russia find common ground again, not only improving their relationship but also promoting Arctic stability. Using the Arctic as arena for renewed relations, or at least talks thereof, might have positive spillover effects on other areas of dispute. As such, the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians and the active engagement of the European Parliament might offer an opportunity to promote and actively engage in related, behind-the-door-talks? Given the current world situation and the EU’s Arctic history, this might be naïve, but a policy that separates regional from systemic components, sustainable development and environmental protection from questions of hard security, offers the opportunity to delineate clear and ambitious goals for the EU’s Arctic involvement. The European Parliament could complement the other institutions to adapt a more strategic mind-set and breaking down policy silos, starting with the Arctic region.

Arctic Geopolitics the EU-ropean Way

If the European Union aims to become a truly geopolitical Union it needs to learn the language of power by translating its economic and soft power into strategic leverage. In an Arctic context this means, among others, a concrete understanding of the security concerns (some) Member States have, the definition of strategic goals and an assessment on how the Union’s economic and soft power could address and tackle future security challenges. A security analysis of the Arctic might also reveal the potential for the EU to be at the forefront of developing new regional means of ‘geopolitical cooperation’. This could provide impetus to properly manage the growing global interest in Arctic matters and counteract emerging global geopolitical competition that also affects the Arctic. Over the last ten years, we have seen a European Union that has fulfilled its Arctic commitments, from funding research to fostering ocean governance, from supporting sustainable development to promoting international cooperation. A European Union that seems to be satisfied with its Arctic status quo. However, if change is indeed inherent in any system, we might also see a European Union that aims to leave its Arctic comfort zone based on a geopolitical strategy the EU-ropean way – if Arctic states like it or not.

#### That preserves global multilateralism and solves every existential threat

Ernesto Zedillo, 2024 –Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, former president of Mexico, former Commissioner on the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament “Reinforcing the multilateral system: Counting on Europe to keep us from the brink” 10/15, https://theelders.org/news/reinforcing-multilateral-system-counting-europe-keep-us-brink //DH

Let us think of the COVID-19 pandemic, the natural disasters caused by climate change, the evident deterioration of our planet’s natural capital, the financial crisis the financial crisis just two decades ago, the wars and other conflicts that have caused millions of people to die or be displaced, and the absurd existence of nuclear weapons, which, far from being reduced, has worsened in recent years, to cite just a few of the many examples.

Despite the existence and increase of global risks, some of which have already become existential for humanity and the planet, the multilateral system, far from being strengthened, seems to be very close to collapse.

The threats hanging over the multilateral system are overwhelming: blatant violation of the essential norms of international law by major powers; non-compliance and even repudiation of international agreements and treaties; paralysis in decision-making mechanisms to prevent and resolve armed conflicts, most notably within the UN Security Council; the multiplication of war fronts as has not occurred in many decades; systematic undermining—by omission or commission—of multilateral institutions to the point of paralysis, as is the case with the World Trade Organization; deliberate efforts by some members to erode the effectiveness and credibility of international institutions by some of their members; failure to adopt and implement strategies and policies—even those recently agreed upon—to address proven risks, such as pandemics; disregard for conventions and norms on human rights; the formation of regional blocs that exacerbate high-risk rivalries; fragmentation of the international trade system; and indifference in addressing emerging risks, such as cyber threats.

Historians debate whether today's geopolitics resembles that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, leading up to World War I, or that of the 1920s and 1930s, on the way to the Great Depression and World War II, or whether it is something like that experienced during the "Cold War." Others go as far back as the Peloponnesian War and apply Thucydides' classic analysis. My answer when I have been part of that discussion has been: “all of the above.”

Among the circumstances that occurred in the past and are now present again, we should count the following: multipolarity displacing unipolarity, military rivalries between the alliances that emerged from that multipolarity, open confrontations between the two greatest powers, exacerbated nationalisms - hand in hand with increasing armies, deepening economic disparities – both between nations and within them, isolationism and a resurgence of protectionism, ideological competition, ‘modernisation' of nuclear weapons instead of their abolition; technological and economic disruption, and repudiation or at least detachment from institutions and international law.

In the disastrous first half of the 20th century, they caused the two great world wars. They may cause the third in our very own time, with one major difference: it would be the last for humanity. Any use of nuclear weapons, however limited it may be at the beginning, would unleash a chain reaction, where the firing of just a fraction of the existing arsenals would lead to the extermination of our species. In a war with nuclear weapons, no one wins, we all lose everything.

What can prevent not only nuclear holocaust, but also open up paths to prosperity, justice, and peace in the world, and on that path successfully face the global challenges -- or as we economists say, provide the global public goods -- that concern this Forum?

To be frank, it is not anything different from what has been used in the past. I make the point, recalling that when my admired friend, Graham Allison of Harvard, populariser a few years ago of the Thucydides trap as a theory of the China-United States rivalry, launched the intellectual challenge of formulating proposals to free ourselves from the consequences of such a dilemma, I allowed myself to tell him that since the years of the great Greek historian, among other things, humans developed such basic and useful tools as politics, diplomacy, and international law, and shown that it is possible to apply them very successfully, whilst also experiencing the consequences of ignoring them. The real challenge is to make the powerful recognize that it is in their own national interest to resort to these means of civilization and avoid those of barbarism.

I insist, this is not about invoking ethical values, altruism, or justice. It is simply about acknowledging how high the cost has been of not using international institutions and rules to resolve disputes and address common or global problems.

One cannot resist the temptation to refer to at least a couple of calamitous examples from this century, so as not to look too far back in the past.

Consider the human, economic and geopolitical costs of the US invasion of Iraq that began in 2003, costs that would have been avoided if that power had adhered to the process that was already being followed at the UN Security Council to determine the dangerousness of Hussein's regime. Three and a half trillion dollars in direct costs plus that of the destruction caused in the invaded country, as well as more than half a million lives lost, deep regional destabilization, and a dramatic loss of US influence, marking the end of the brief period of unipolarity and benevolent hegemony - as that nation was seen during the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

And what about the crime perpetrated by Russia invading Ukraine - without any justification for such brutal use of force and violation of international law - with the human losses and destruction that it has and will continue to cause. To calculate the direct cost of this war, one must also think of trillions of dollars, the human lives sacrificed nearing half a million, the immense value of the destruction caused, and whatever happens, a less secure Russia, converted into a criminal state completely outside international law and less respected than at any previous time in its history. The damage and pain caused to Ukrainians is already immense and simply irreparable. The cost incurred by other countries is also colossal. None of this atrocity was necessary. Beyond President Putin's fanciful imperial ambitions, any controversy, if it really existed at all, could have been resolved peacefully through the means of diplomacy and international law.

The essential question is: where do we start to avoid the disaster looming over the planet’s geopolitics?

One possibility is to pay attention to the Pact for the Future, approved at the UN Summit just last September 22 by all member countries - except seven led by Russia.

The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, stated that the Summit was to move multilateralism away from the edge of the precipice where it now seems to be. The agreed Pact contains at least an agenda - ambitious under the current circumstances - to first preserve what remains of the system and then strengthen it. It contains critical commitments for many aspects of international cooperation, but those related to international peace and security, as well as the revitalisation of the multilateral system, are particularly important, addressing fundamental issues such as the reform of the Security Council and nuclear disarmament.

Delivering is not the same as promising. It would be serious if the Pact were to join the long list of commitments made by governments at important summits, only to be forgotten as soon as they are over. A special effort is needed to organise the provision of global public goods solemnly agreed on September 22.

The challenge is that, given the absence of a global government with the authority and capacity to regulate, enforce, and impose taxes to finance them, action to initiate the provision of global public goods must be voluntary. But given the resistance of nation states to share their sovereignty and the temptation to let others pay, the voluntarism to unleash that provision does not happen spontaneously. Historically, it has been necessary for a nation or a small group of nations, with an enlightened vision and a clear sense of responsibility, to unleash the processes leading to the solution of the problems that affect all humanity.

Who can play that role in our time?

In the past, the United States has done so, exercising the leadership it built up both through the military and economic might it had after World War II and its feverish activity in promoting the creation of the UN, the Bretton Woods institutions, the GATT and many others during the 1940s and 1950s.

In the past two decades, the United States certainly seems interested in preserving its preeminent power but equally engaged in weakening the multilateral system --that it largely built. Its behaviour fits into a view that purports that during the period in which the hegemon's supremacy is not threatened, it will be in its interest to support the rules-based system, largely of its own construction, in order to preserve and enhance its dominant position. But when this position is threatened by the emergence of a new power—in this case China—the hegemon may turn against the rules-based system and revert to one that is based purely on power, to delay or even prevent the emerging power from taking over the dominant position. This is a short-sighted view because it is actually in the long-term interest of both the hegemon, the United States, and the emerging power, China, to operate within a system with rules that serve to contain the effect, intended or not, of the actions of the adversary country, if that is a valid term. Be that as it may, neither of them seems genuinely interested in effectively leading the defence of the multilateral system in the immediate future; rather, they are concerned with the opposite, most notably the United States.

To put it bluntly, the European Union is the only benign power on the geostrategic horizon up to the task, and one around which a coalition of middle powers could be formed that would join the endeavour --for their own national interest-- such as Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and at some point some developing countries with the possibility of becoming an emerging powers. For the moment, I rule out India.

The EU seems like a suitable candidate to fill the void left by the United States for many reasons. Its economic power should be highlighted --although this obviously needs to be strengthened; its proven normative capacity, starting with its attachment to democratic values, respect for human rights and the rule of law; its solid --by any comparison-- institutional structure that has materialised into an admirable supranational entity that could well be imitated in some of its features to reinforce multilateral governance; and its proven commitment to agreements and policies to address global challenges.

Of course, to assume this role, the EU must overcome multiple challenges, the most important of which is perhaps to achieve a new balance in its relationship with the United States. It could start by not imitating the latter’s trade neo-protectionism and helping to fix the damage done to the World Trade Organization by the United States since the previous American administration and which has not been repaired in any way by the current one; likewise, Europe should not imitate the acute Sinophobia that afflicts the United States, which will prove very costly for all involved. And, of course, it must take the essential components of the Pact for the Future - in whose content it had a great influence - and promote concrete initiatives for the implementation of those components.

## 2NC/1NR

### They Say: “Permutation Do Both”

#### The permutation fails to promote independent EU supranationalism:

#### 1. Reassurance

#### a. The plan reassures European allies

James and Bodtke 25, \*US Air Force \*\*US Air Force (\*Jessie, \*\*Rebecca, 3-14-2025, “Uncharted Waters: Shaping the Future of Arctic Security” https://othjournal.com/2025/03/14/uncharted-waters-shaping-the-future-of-arctic-security/) wtk

**ASDC = Anchorage Security and Defense Conference**

The Role of the U.S. in Arctic Security

As the Arctic gains prominence in global geopolitics, the U.S. must lead in shaping the region’s future. The ASDC underscored the need for sustained investment in Arctic-specific capabilities, from icebreakers and satellite systems to training programs tailored to the region’s unique challenges. The U.S. must prioritize Arctic security in its defense planning. This includes developing a comprehensive strategy that integrates soft and hard power dynamics, aligns with the interests of Arctic nations, and addresses emerging threats. Maintaining a consistent presence in the region is crucial to deterring adversaries and reassuring allies.

The Way Forward

The inaugural ASDC set a strong foundation for future dialogue and collaboration on Arctic security. As the region evolves, the need for proactive, multilateral strategies will only grow more urgent. Moving forward, the U.S. and its allies must focus on closing capability gaps, enhancing infrastructure resilience, and addressing hybrid threats. Integrating Indigenous knowledge and fostering multilateral cooperation will be essential for navigating the Arctic’s uncharted waters. The Arctic’s future is still being written, but one thing is clear: the decisions made in this decisive decade will shape the region’s trajectory for years to come. The ASDC represents a critical step in ensuring that the Arctic remains secure, stable, and strategically advantageous for the U.S. and its allies.

#### b. The perception of reassurance reverses moves toward EU independence

Connor Fiddler, 2025 – associate deputy director of the Asia program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute “The Quiet Realignment: How allies are adapting to American uncertainty.” The Dispatch, 5/29, https://thedispatch.com/article/european-indo-pacific-multipolar-realignment/?signup=success //DH

Multipolar ordering.

The regional blocs reflect a growing recognition that Washington can no longer be counted on as a stable guarantor of the liberal international order. Yet these shifts are still in their early stages—and they are reversible. The United States remains an indispensable power: No other nation possesses the same combination of military reach, economic scale, and alliance networks. U.S. allies are not seeking to replace Washington, but to protect themselves from its volatility. If America recommits to consistent leadership—backed by credible security guarantees, renewed economic engagement, and reciprocal partnership—it can remain at the center of the emerging order. But if it continues down a path of transactional diplomacy and strategic ambivalence, it risks being sidelined—not only by adversaries, but by its closest friends. The multipolar world is taking shape; whether the United States shapes it from within or watches from the margins will depend on how it chooses to lead.

#### 2. Independent EU action in the Arctic is critical—that requires severing dependence on the US.

Zaccagnini & Cavalluzzi 25, \*Ph.D. student enrolled in a joint programme between the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome and the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the VUB in Brussels, \*\*MA in Intelligence and International Security from King’s College London, security and Defence Analyst currently working for NCT Consultants in Leiden, The Netherlands. (\*Ivan Zaccagnini, \*\*Yan Cavalluzzi, 5-2-2025, “Melting Away? The European Union’s Geopolitical Role in the Arctic,” https://csds.vub.be/publication/melting-away-the-european-unions-geopolitical-role-in-the-arctic/)

Russian militarisation and the expansion of military capabilities along the Arctic coast require a calibrated response from the EU. Until now, the EU’s focus on diplomacy and environmental cooperation, while important, has not adequately addressed the growing strategic competition. Should the conflict in Ukraine end in the near future, Sweden and Finland can act as facilitators to integrate an Arctic security dimension into the EU’s approach, while promoting a multilateral dialogue to prevent escalation. The presence of both Sweden and Finland in NATO could result in an increase in the EU’s military presence and legitimacy in the region. The EU’s ability to influence regional stability depends on its success to act as a mediator between the major powers. This posture, given the breakdown in regional cooperation with Russia, it seems not yet willing to take. Ideally, the EU could position itself as an independent actor in the Arctic, capable of promoting international standards for the sustainable management of maritime resources and shipping routes. However, it is impossible not to overlap NATO’s interests with those of the EU given the large number of common members. Thus, excluding this hypothesis, one could reflect on the role the EU could play in defusing tensions between China and the US in the Arctic, along with like-minded partners. We argue that the EU is well-placed to try this, although the approach is not without considerable risks. Such cooperation is unlikely to prevent an alignment between China and Russia on Arctic affairs, but the EU’s and China’s common interests in secure maritime trade routes could lower tensions.

Despite the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU is not a military alliance, but an expression of the cooperation of European nations. This cooperation, however, is limited regarding security. In contrast, security is theoretically guaranteed by NATO, an expression of Western cooperation. However, the US clearly holds a dominant position within the Alliance. This means that although the strategic interests between the EU and NATO in the Arctic may be similar, they are not entirely the same. Nowadays, for example, while war threatens the EU’s borders, Trump’s election in the US highlights an anti-interventionist stance, potentially weakening NATO’s relevance. In this respect, the EU member states should strive to lower their dependency on the US in defence terms. Arctic security exemplifies the EU’s security limitations, risking insufficient competitiveness if NATO deems it non-essential given also the shift of US strategic priorities towards the Indo-Pacific. Without a more assertive posture by the EU in the Arctic, regional security will depend on third-party management, limiting the Union’s independence and bargaining power in political strategies. Weak bargaining ties Europe to the US’ willingness to employ deterrence, which could, however, turn out to be devalued if other states know the US’ posture. A more independent EU defence would better protect EU interests, securing fair Arctic resource access and enhancing mediation through independent deterrence capabilities. It would also help the EU develop its own strategic culture, foster military-technological innovation and boost its autonomy.

The Arctic shows, much like the war in Ukraine, that there is a need for the EU to be able to formulate and pursue its own goals without being overly dependent on Washington. To be clear, the US will remain the EU’s main ally but it should not be overly dependent on Washington, especially given recent signals by the Trump administration on Greenland and the broader Arctic region. A military role for the EU in the Arctic or elsewhere means not only potential active involvement in kinetic action, but also the ability to monitor and protect critical infrastructures and ensure credible deterrence against possible aggression or external interference, and only then, possibly, direct intervention if necessary. In fact, exerting deterrence and pursuing de-escalation in the Arctic could represent a shared goal for the EU and NATO, should the US administration desire this. Either way, European nations must develop independent technological capabilities to secure the EU’s strategic interests in the Arctic region. To this end, the EU should prioritise region-specific surveillance and defence technologies including underwater acoustic monitoring systems and unmanned platforms (USV, UUV, UAV). Such efforts would allow the Europeans to track Russian movements, especially near the Kola Peninsula, while safeguarding EU-funded and co-funded connectivity projects in the Arctic like the North Pole Fiber and Northern EU Gateways among others. Additionally, investment in Arctic-appropriate naval defence systems, such as patrol vessels and icebreakers, would secure trade routes, subsea cables and enhance the EU’s role as a stabilising force.

#### 3. Relegation—the perm makes the EU a junior partner – only a clean break from the US can get other middle powers on board with EU autonomy – that’s key to multilateralism

Niklas Helwig, 2023 – The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki “EU Strategic Autonomy after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Europe's Capacity to Act in Times of War” Journal of Common Market Studies, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jcms.13527 //DH

The mixed reactions to the war of governments in the Global South once more underlined the need for the EU to enhance its political and co-ordinative diplomatic capacities. Efforts by the EU to salvage the multilateral system are not new. Since the 2016 election of Donald Trump, the EU together with its member states had been focused on ensuring the functioning of the rules-based co-operation in a more contested environment (Schuette and Dijkstra, 2023). The High Representative and the European Commission (2021) outlined in a joint communication how the EU should ‘leverage the EU's collective strength’ by better co-ordinating the EU's and member states' activities. After the Russian invasion, the EU's concerted diplomatic efforts somewhat benefitted from the fact that there was already a momentum towards joined diplomatic engagement.

However, questions remain on the long-term approach towards countries in the Global South. They seem to hedge their bets in the global competition, unwilling to prematurely sign up to either a US-led or Chinese-led vision of the global order. Whilst the EU has shown some successes to ‘win the vote’ of middle powers on a case-by-case basis, the ‘fence-sitters’ (Spektor, 2023) see their neutral position as a virtue to navigate the uncertainties of a shifting world order. From their perspective, a strategically autonomous EU that does not ‘ride the coattails of the US’ but speaks with its own voice might be an attractive proposition. 2 However, a strong EU voice entails that Europe has more to offer for the Global South than its usual talking points on the need to condemn Russia or on other issues, such as migration. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the EU can make an attractive offer to global partners independent from the United States and China, as the EU was instrumental in setting up a global alliance on vaccines and increased its support for the World Health Organization (WHO) (Jokela et al., 2023).

The Russian invasion revealed the potential strength of the EU's diplomatic capacities in multilateral fora. In organisations such as the UN and the WHO, the EU can leverage its sizeable co-ordinative capacities. The EU's recent successes in the UN General Assembly pay testament to that. However, in order to count as a strategically autonomous actor in the current context of growing strategic competition, the EU is in need of more political capacity to become not only a ‘majority whip’ of the Global South but also its partner.

Conclusions

No one can deny the structural constrains of the international system that position the EU and its member states strongly in the ‘West’ and under a firm lead of the United States. The Russian war of aggression underlined that the EU and its member states need global partners and allies. Strategic autonomy from the rest of the world is even less of an option than before. Instead, the question for the EU is whether it can display agency within the system of its US security alliance and global economic dependencies and thereby exercise strategic autonomy to accomplish its aims. In other words, does the EU merely have capacity to implement decisions set by others, or does it have capacity to act based on its own preferences and politics and thereby the power to influence global politics on its own terms?

The EU shows signs of increased agency on some matters in the context of the Russian war of aggression. The historic decisions in the first months of the war to decouple energy relations with Russia, to provide membership prospects to Ukraine and to invest more in European defence had to be done under the pressure of the crisis. However, they were not dictated by the United States or pre-agreed on in NATO and instead showed the political capacity of the EU to act and the ‘transformative force’ (Wessels, 2021) of the European Council. In the response to the war thereafter, the EU showed that it is more than just a simple regional implementation body of policies set by the United States or the G7. The initially close economic ties between EU members with Russia and the sectorial competences of the European Commission put the EU in a favourable position to actively shape the complex economic response. The EU also influenced the global diplomatic response to Russia's war, because it benefitted from the diverse member-state diplomatic ties and from the fact that it is not the United States, which has its own controversial history of military engagement.

A similar influence over global policies can be identified in the debate on how to handle security challenges relating to China. The EU's economic security strategy from June (European Commission, 2023b) embodies its approach to strategic autonomy, which is not focused on decoupling from global economic flows, and instead seeks a better management of related risks. Whether this more nuanced de-risking approach to containing China will prevail over the more hard-nosed decoupling strategy, which is favoured by many in Washington DC, will also depend on China's policy choices regarding support for the Russian regime and conceivable military actions against Taiwan.

Even a nuanced reading of strategic autonomy cannot conceal the shortcomings that the EU is facing in its defence policy. The military support that the EU and its member states are providing to Ukraine is substantial. However, the war underlined the scepticism in Central and Eastern Europe against ideas of strategic autonomy that go beyond EU efforts in support of member-state and alliance policies. Whilst EU member states are increasing their joint co-ordinative and political capacity, they also link their security more closely to the United States, as the decisions of Sweden and Finland to join NATO exemplify. Growing EU agency on traditional security and defence matters remains an unfulfilled ambition. Short of a transformational crisis in the transatlantic alliance, the EU's role on security and defence is set to become that of a muscled-up junior partner to the United States and NATO.

### They Say: “US Key to Counter Russia/China” (Domain Awareness)

#### Stronger EU capabilities deter Russia and China

Zaccagnini & Cavalluzzi 25, \*Ph.D. student enrolled in a joint programme between the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome and the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the VUB in Brussels, \*\*MA in Intelligence and International Security from King’s College London, security and Defence Analyst currently working for NCT Consultants in Leiden, The Netherlands. (\*Ivan Zaccagnini, \*\*Yan Cavalluzzi, 5-2-2025, “Melting Away? The European Union’s Geopolitical Role in the Arctic,” https://csds.vub.be/publication/melting-away-the-european-unions-geopolitical-role-in-the-arctic/)

Towards a more credible EU Arctic strategy

So far, this CSDS Policy Brief has outlined the security challenges facing the EU in the Arctic. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has altered the EU’s geopolitical stance, but there is a long way to go before the EU can be called more than a diplomatic actor. So far, the EU has not yet established a specific and coordinated security policy for the Arctic region. The lack of autonomous military capacity has limited the EU’s ability to influence the balance of power in the region. EU interests range from energy security and the protection of trade routes to environmental sustainability and cooperation with local communities. The presence of vast oil and gas reserves and the opening of new sea routes make the Arctic crucial for diversifying European energy supplies, as well as reducing transport times between Europe and Asia. For the Russian economy, which is mainly based on trade in raw materials and hydrocarbons, the supply of Arctic resources is undoubtedly a key element, especially at this time of internal economic instability. However, the EU rightly watches the evolving regional dynamics with concern, as this could mean possible future energy instability for the nations of the Union, especially if bilateral relations with the Kremlin remain frosty.

Russian militarisation and the expansion of military capabilities along the Arctic coast require a calibrated response from the EU. Until now, the EU’s focus on diplomacy and environmental cooperation, while important, has not adequately addressed the growing strategic competition. Should the conflict in Ukraine end in the near future, Sweden and Finland can act as facilitators to integrate an Arctic security dimension into the EU’s approach, while promoting a multilateral dialogue to prevent escalation. The presence of both Sweden and Finland in NATO could result in an increase in the EU’s military presence and legitimacy in the region. The EU’s ability to influence regional stability depends on its success to act as a mediator between the major powers. This posture, given the breakdown in regional cooperation with Russia, it seems not yet willing to take. Ideally, the EU could position itself as an independent actor in the Arctic, capable of promoting international standards for the sustainable management of maritime resources and shipping routes. However, it is impossible not to overlap NATO’s interests with those of the EU given the large number of common members. Thus, excluding this hypothesis, one could reflect on the role the EU could play in defusing tensions between China and the US in the Arctic, along with like-minded partners. We argue that the EU is well-placed to try this, although the approach is not without considerable risks. Such cooperation is unlikely to prevent an alignment between China and Russia on Arctic affairs, but the EU’s and China’s common interests in secure maritime trade routes could lower tensions.

#### That’s especially true for maritime security

Bueger and Edmunds 23, \*Professor of Political Science at University of Copenhagen, Denmark. \*\*Professor of International Security and Research Director in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol. (\*Christian Bueger, \*\*Timothy Edmunds, Spring 2023, “The European Union’s Quest to Become a Global Maritime-Security Provider” Naval War College Review: Vol. 76: No. 2, Article 6. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8347&context=nwc-review) wtk

Maritime domain awareness and information sharing are both important potential force multipliers for the EU in maritime security. Efforts to strengthen intra-European architecture in these areas are under way, but governments must work to fill gaps in data and expertise. Capacity building, along with naval operations, remains the key instrument in the EU’s global maritime-security repertoire. Yet, as we have argued, EU programs have yet to fulfill their full potential, and sometimes they even risk having contradictory or conflicting objectives. The EU also must make a greater effort to order its relations with NATO, the United States, and with its most important neighbor, the United Kingdom, and ask when and how coordination and an appropriate division of labor is possible. Finally, while the EU has been agile and responsive to emerging challenges in the past, it must continue to be so in finding appropriate answers to the problems of environmental security at sea, climate change, and critical infrastructure at sea.

### They Say: “US Key to Monitor” (Domain Awareness)

#### Better EU awareness effectively deters threats

Leccese and Zaccagnini 25, \*Master degree in International Relations from LUISS Guido Carli in Rome and a second-level professional Master programme in “Intelligence and Emerging Technologies” from the Centre for High Defence Studies (CASD) of the Italian Ministry of Defence and the University of Udine. \*\*Ph.D. student enrolled in a joint programme between the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome and the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the VUB in Brussels (\*Giacomo Leccese, \*\*Ivan Zaccagnini, 6-5-2025, “Securing the Depths: Rethinking EU Critical Infrastructure Protection in a Contested Underwater Domain” https://csds.vub.be/publication/securing-the-depths-rethinking-eu-critical-infrastructure-protection-in-a-contested-underwater-domain/) wtk

First, echoing the proposal of the EU Action Plan on Cable Security to launch a dedicated surveillance drone programme – air, surface and underwater –, we recommend that the EU continues to incentivise and support European projects focused on USV and UUV capabilities. Several ongoing programmes are already advancing these technologies for maritime security applications. One example is the Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection (CSIP), which aims to ensure the protection of infrastructure from natural events, intentional attacks and deliberate sabotage through the use of both autonomous (AUVs) and remote-controlled (ROVs) underwater drones, as well as mobile and resident hosts. Another initiative worth highlighting is the recent SEabed and Anti-submarine warfare Capability through Unmanned featuRe for Europe (SEACURE), which promotes an integrated system of unmanned platforms to perform joint anti-submarine and seabed warfare operations to protect critical maritime infrastructure. Strengthening investments in these platforms would not only improve Europe’s ability to safeguard critical undersea infrastructure, but also enhance broader maritime situational awareness and deterrence capabilities. To counter the rising threat of hybrid attacks on underwater assets, EU defence initiatives should prioritise resilient, adaptable and scalable monitoring solutions.

#### EU tech can enhance missile defense and monitoring capabilities

Fiott 21, former Security and Defence Editor at the EU Institute for Security Studies. (Daniel Fiott, 7-26-2021, “Naval gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU's maritime presence” https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/naval-gazing-strategic-compass-and-eus-maritime-presence) wtk

However, naval platforms alone will not be enough to ensure the EU’s maritime security. Just as important will be investments in advanced maritime sensors, space-based assets, propulsion, remotely piloted maritime and aerial vehicles, marine robotics, directed energy and laser capacities, digital connectivity, precision strike and missile defence and an ability to use AI to manage vast amounts of maritime data produced by ports, marine operators and seafarers. There is also a need to counter the increased use of loitering munitions and drones at sea. Without such capacities, Europe will continue to lag behind the United States and China in maintaining its naval presence. The Compass could spell out how EU member states will achieve greater stealth, range and lethality at sea with specific timeframes for delivery and call for a healthy mix of naval platforms and enabling systems and technologies (30).

### They Say: “US Key to Science Diplomacy” (Science Diplomacy)

#### EU-Russian cooperation is key to science diplomacy

Shok and Ginsbach 24, \*public policy fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. \*\*senior associate with the Center for Transformational Health Law at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center. (\*Nataliya Shok, \*\*Katherine Ginsbach, Spring 2024, “Channels for Arctic Diplomacy” Issues in Science and Technology 40, no. 3 https://issues.org/disease-surveillance-arctic-diplomacy-shok-ginsbach/) wtk

Second, the science diplomacy community, housed in universities and connected through national scientific academies, should continue to play a leading role in Arctic science diplomacy by incentivizing researchers to build new scientific partnerships across borders. This would require the European Union and NATO members that discontinued projects with Russian institutions after Russia invaded Ukraine to take a step forward in reestablishing collaborations with Russian partners. Resumed research partnerships should prioritize studies on the climate risks associated with permafrost thaw and the mitigation of potential reactivation of ancient microbiota and dormant pathogens. There should also be a much more significant focus on cooperation between Arctic states and Indigenous peoples’ organizations, with a research agenda that intertwines scientific and local knowledge.

#### The EU has expertise in Arctic science diplomacy

Jouhier 24, Blue Book Trainee at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport who holds an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe in Bruges. (Stanislaw Jouhier, 2024, “The European Union’s Capacity to Act in the Arctic: Charting Degrees of EU Actorness in the European and Circumpolar Territories” https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/EDP%202-2024\_Jouhier.pdf) wtk

The EU’s key role in Arctic research has been accompanied by the pursuit of active science diplomacy. The 2016 Joint Communication identified “science and investment” as valuable areas of cooperation to enhance the Union’s bilateral and multilateral relations with Arctic stakeholders.159 The EU has built strong cooperation networks with third parties, particularly the Arctic Council and the U.S. 160 In the Circumpolar Arctic, these efforts in scientific collaboration have garnered positive perceptions by Arctic states and bodies, thus enhancing the EU's legitimacy in the region.161

### They Say: “US Key to Climate Science” (Science Diplomacy)

#### EU climate data is sufficient to solve warming

Jouhier 24, Blue Book Trainee at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport who holds an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe in Bruges. (Stanislaw Jouhier, 2024, “The European Union’s Capacity to Act in the Arctic: Charting Degrees of EU Actorness in the European and Circumpolar Territories” https://www.coleurope.eu/sites/default/files/research-paper/EDP%202-2024\_Jouhier.pdf) wtk

When it comes to environmental protection, the EU has a ‘high’ capacity to act in the European Arctic. The region faces significant challenges related to climate change and environmental degradation, compelling the EU to be proactive. The EU has established a strong legal and environmental policy acquis, albeit with certain limitations in the energy sector. Furthermore, the EU’s commitment to address climate change enjoys widespread support from the Arctic states in the European Arctic. In the Circumpolar Arctic, the EU's ability to promote environmental protection is rated as ‘medium’. Despite facing similar climate change and environmental challenges, the EU lacks influence when it comes to conflicting perspectives among Arctic states regarding the ‘Arctic paradox’. The EU’s internal environmental presence can have an external impact to some degree. External perceptions are mixed, with the EU still often viewed as an outsider, but its environmental research and science diplomacy contribute to a degree of legitimacy.

#### EU solves climate data even if Russia says no

Coninsx 24, enior Associate Fellow, Egmont Institute - Royal Institute for International Relations (Belgium) and First EU Ambassador at Large for the Arctic. (Marie Anne Coninsx, 10-10-2024, “Science Diplomacy in and for the Arctic: Opportunities in Turbulent Times” https://www.arcticcircle.org/journal/science-diplomacy-in-and-for-the-arctic-new-opportunities-in-turbulent-times) wtk

Major EU Research Programs, such as Horizon Europe, are focused on cooperation in Arctic science. The European approach is based on the promotion of networking and collaborative research in polar science, as well as bringing together different expertise, data and resources in a systematic manner. An illustration is the recent European Polar Science Week, marked by strong cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the European Space Agency, regarding polar science. Its aim was to bring together the European polar science community and to reinforce European cooperation for polar science.

Arctic research cooperation in the field of climate change has been impacted particularly by the paused cooperation between Russian and Western scientists due to the war and sanctions imposed on Russia. However, not all climate research has been affected in the same way. Some research cooperation is more disturbed than others. For example, research that requires long-term data such as permafrost research is likely to be most affected.

It is important to put these changes into perspective, without downplaying the issue. This is for the following reasons:

Firstly, Arctic science cooperation has by no means ended. On the contrary!

Already before the war, there was and still is, an impressive amount of Arctic science cooperation, without Russian participation. This was demonstrated at a seminar of the Polar Institute / Wilson Center on EU-US research cooperation related to the Arctic. It discussed the global importance of Arctic science and research, how science diplomacy supports the safety and stability of Arctic regions, and particularly the importance of US-EU scientific cooperation to build bridges of understanding in a world moving towards strategic competition. One example of the strong EU-US scientific cooperation related to the Arctic is the INTERACT Project, which involves a network of one hundred research stations in the Arctic and over 1000 researchers.

Moreover, we are witnessing a substantive increase of research cooperation elsewhere. The following examples are mentioned in a publication by the Academia European Bergen Special Report, on “The future of Arctic science and science diplomacy”:

The seven Western Arctic States have expanded partnerships between them. A stronger Nordic science collaboration is being established. Norwegian universities are building new scientific partnerships with Canada, the US, and Greenland. At the European level, scientists are connecting closer, sharing experiences, best practices, and data. EU programs, such the EU-Polar Net, the European Polar Board, and the EU Polar Cluster, are of high value in the current situation.

I would like to add the invaluable contribution of non-Arctic States to polar research to this already impressive list of increased scientific cooperation. Indeed, the need to increase cooperation among the like-minded has created opportunities for non-Arctic States. One example is Belgium, which has historically strong ties with the Arctic states, expertise in polar science and climate research, and a long tradition on multilateral cooperation. In May 2022, the IASC welcomed Belgium as the 24th new member country.

The changing landscape of scientific collaboration in the Arctic also offers the ‘opportunity’ to shift the focus of climate research to regions other than Russia. More studies by SIOS, the Svalbard Integrated Arctic Earth Observation System are now done in Greenland; and permafrost research by the German Alfred Wegener Institute has shifted to the American Arctic, after more than 30 years of scientific research cooperation with Russia on permafrost in Siberia.

The lack of scientific data from Russia is problematic, but strategies exist for scientists to close some of the data gaps. Scientists now cooperate more intensively with the earth observation community, providing opportunities for global space-based observations. Already now, the EU’s Space Program, COPERNICUS, with its Climate Change Services, helps researchers in understanding permafrost thaw, and its impact on infrastructure, society and people. The new Sentinel mission, the CIMR—Copernicus Imaging Microwave Radiometer—is particularly interesting for monitoring permafrost. Moreover, the (planned) Copernicus CO2M constellation of satellites will enable detailed monitoring of emissions of methane.

To summarize, some Arctic scientific cooperation might indeed be affected by the current global tensions, but it is not a black and white picture. New avenues and promising opportunities have been created.

### They Say: “Russia Says No” (Science Diplomacy)

#### EU-Russian science cooperation is feasible

Marinova and Gricius 24, \*PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. \*\*Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute and PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. (\*Iren Marinova, \*\*Gabriella Gricius, 2-7-2024, “The Arctic potential: cutting the Gordian knot of EU–Russia relations?” *European Security* Volume 34, Issue 1, accessed via University of Michigan Online Library) wtk

Nevertheless, in October 2022 EU High Representative Josep Borrell delivered a keynote address at the Arctic Circle Assembly Plenary in which he indicated some shifts in the conflict/cooperation dichotomous relations between the EU and Russia in the Arctic. While he suggested that “Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine requires us to take a renewed look at Arctic cooperation” and that “where we used to engage with Russia, which is no longer possible right now”, thus indicating a pause rather than a hard break in relations, he also emphasised the importance of cooperation on climate change and other regional issues. Most importantly, Borrell did not primarily address Russia as the regional menace, but instead painted climate change as the main threat to the Arctic and insisted that cooperation on Arctic science and research requires multilateral cooperation, and that “joint work must continue” (Borrell Citation2022). Thus, even with the more assertive conflict aspect present in this speech, the majority of it was dedicated to reiterating the need for cooperation regardless of ongoing tensions. Overall, the general lack of attention to the Arctic by the EU at the moment may be strategic, as not talking about the Arctic and thus avoiding the conflict in the EU–Russia relationship currently could be a strategy to keep conflict out of the EU’s Arctic rhetoric. While this proposition is clearly speculative and may develop differently in the future, available documents – limited as they may be – suggest it to be the case.

This speech comes relatively in contrast to other EU discourse on Russia, which has emphasised a need to break Europe’s dependence on Russian energy and the severe energy sanction regime (e.g. European Commission Citation2022, Council of the European Union Citation2023). This is particularly clear in a blog post from Borrell in which he emphasises the EU’s “impressive success in ending our toxic dependence on Russian gas imports in less than 12 months” (Borrell Citation2023). Nevertheless, future EU Arctic documents might or might not reflect these sentiments, and the themes prevalent in them should be explored by future research efforts.

Conclusion

Overall, our analysis suggests two main conclusions. First, we find that the conflict/cooperation dichotomy has indeed been present in the EU–Russia relations in the Arctic, albeit to a somewhat different extent. Second, we found cooperation to be the overarching theme in the analysed documents, thus representing the EU’s preferred avenue for pursuing its interests in the region. In 12 out of the 13 documents examined, the EU’s prioritisation of cooperation on important issues pertaining to the environment and multilateral governance took centre stage over the inclusion of and focus on traditional security and geopolitical concerns. There was only one document – the 2021 EP Resolution – that featured a more pronounced security language, but the importance of cooperation and the maintenance of the Arctic as a low-tension region was still made very clear.

Thus, based on the above analysis, we make three concluding suggestions which we discuss in more detail below: (1) across 2008–2021, the EU pursued cooperation with Russia in the Arctic, relatively separate from their relations elsewhere (although this is expressed differently pre- and post-2014); (2) nevertheless, the EU–Russia relationship in the Arctic shifts in tandem with the EU–Russia relationship outside of the Arctic – meaning the region is not nearly as exceptional as it may seem and (3) the Arctic may thus help us understand how even in a region that is relatively shielded from the ups and downs of geopolitical moods elsewhere, the conflict/cooperation dichotomy is still central to the EU’s relationship with Russia. Despite this, however, cooperation in the Arctic is pursued out of necessity and mutual interest in the midst of conflict – it is a choice in the face of necessity. This implies that we cannot think about the future of EU–Russia relations without recognising the conflict/cooperation dichotomy as the core of any future relationship rather than as an obstacle to overcome, and that the Arctic is not fully immune to tensions in the broader EU–Russia relationship.

#### EU-Russia cooperation is likely in the Arctic

Marinova and Gricius 24, \*PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. \*\*Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute and PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. (\*Iren Marinova, \*\*Gabriella Gricius, 2-7-2024, “The Arctic potential: cutting the Gordian knot of EU–Russia relations?” *European Security* Volume 34, Issue 1, accessed via University of Michigan Online Library) wtk

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Russia in the past 30 years has been complex, encompassing periods of hope, optimism and cooperation but also elements of competition, conflict and complicated geopolitical tensions. There is an omnipresent pattern of intertwined conflict and cooperation that has run through the core of the relationship, until reaching a stalemate following the 2022 Russian aggression in Ukraine. We identify the current state of EU–Russia relations to resemble a Gordian knot or a deeply entrenched and unsolvable problem. Nevertheless, a site where the EU and Russia meet face to face to pursue interests on a plethora of issues is the Arctic. We examine whether the EU–Russia relations have been qualitatively different there, and whether it might hold lessons for cutting the identified Gordian knot. We employ discourse analysis to the official EU documents on the Arctic from the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, and examine how Russia has been presented in these documents – as a competitor or a cooperation partner. We discover more cooperation rather than conflict language, indicating the Arctic might hold some lessons about the future EU–Russia relations after a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine.

#### Both sides want to cooperate in the Arctic

Marinova and Gricius 24, \*PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. \*\*Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute and PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. (\*Iren Marinova, \*\*Gabriella Gricius, 2-7-2024, “The Arctic potential: cutting the Gordian knot of EU–Russia relations?” *European Security* Volume 34, Issue 1, accessed via University of Michigan Online Library) wtk

Nevertheless, one area where mutual interests for the EU and Russia are particularly visible is the Arctic region (see Melchiorre Citation2022). The region incorporates a broad range of issues – from climate change and environmental concerns to shipping routes, indigenous rights and military-strategic considerations. Over time, the Arctic has become a space over which global powers – the United States, Russia and China, especially – confer and compete, underscoring its geopolitical importance on both regional and global scale (Pincus Citation2020, Weber Citation2020). Relevant to this article, the Arctic is the only region in which both the EU and Russia “meet” directly across every issue area, without their relations being mediated via other sovereign parties. All the other facets of the EU–Russia relationship play out in spaces that are populated by other sovereign states (e.g. the post-Soviet space in the Eastern neighbourhood) that possess their agency, interests and historical legacies – factors that serve to refract and shape EU–Russia relations (see Delcour Citation2017). In other words, the EU and Russia compete for influence in sovereign states whereas in the Arctic, there are no states to compete over – and thus the EU and Russia meet directly as they are composite parts of the region. In this sense, the Arctic is unique because it provides a site for analysing EU–Russia relations in their “purest” form. What becomes clear is that, while the EU and Russia have both shared and competing strategic interests in the Arctic, the EU’s approach toward Russia in this region is visibly distinct from their overall relations elsewhere. Namely, it has been noticeably more optimistic and cooperative toward Russia. The 2016 EU Global Strategy (p. 33), for example, identifies the Arctic as a “matter of European interest” over which the EU would seek “selective engagement” with Russia, along several other issue linkages. Moreover, the EU has explicitly expressed a desire to maintain the Arctic’s current status of a “low tension area” (EU Global Strategy Citation2016, pp. 38–39).

The idea of Arctic exceptionalism is not new. On the contrary, it has received significant attention in the literature from analysts who identify the Arctic as a region with a surprisingly low level of military tension and a relatively high level of cooperation among adjacent states, despite the competing interests of powerful actors. Especially since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Arctic surprised many observers by remaining relatively hospitable to international cooperation in contrast to the diplomatic isolation being imposed upon Russia in other realms of international society (Byers Citation2017). Others have similarly explored how the EU–Russia cooperation has endured despite increasing geopolitical tensions within the complicated relationship (Wegge Citation2011, Østhagen Citation2016, Østhagen Citation2018, Skripnikova and Raspotnik Citation2019). Yet others have grown increasingly disillusioned with the idea of Arctic exceptionalism following Russia’s war of choice in Ukraine and the region’s rising geopolitical significance, viewing it as nothing more than “wishful thinking” (Smith Citation2022) or a naïve understanding of the region that has been successfully exploited by Moscow for its geopolitical gains (Mikkola et al. Citation2023). But while the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought attention to matters of high politics to the Arctic (Young Citation2022, Kornhuber et al. Citation2023), others have viewed it as a region where the Cold War never truly ended but rather remained dormant in the 1990s and 2000s, indicating that the Arctic has never ceased to be a central point of competition in the international system (Huebert Citation2019).

In this article, we delve into the exceptionalism puzzle to explore the Arctic as a case for EU–Russia relations and whether it might hold useful lessons for cutting the Gordian knot of general EU–Russia relations after the end of the war in Ukraine. Given its unique geographical and locational characteristics for the EU and Russia, we probe whether the Arctic has been an exceptional region for the relations between the two parties and whether cooperation has been pursued regardless of tensions in their relations elsewhere. Since the general relations between the EU and Russia have largely been characterised by simultaneous patterns of conflict and cooperation for the past three decades, we wager that similar patterns should be observed in their Arctic relations as well. We argue that by focusing on the EU’s approach to the Arctic and Russia’s place within it, we can better understand the deeply intertwined relationship between the EU and Russia more broadly because Arctic cooperation should not be separated from the larger EU–Russia relationship.

For that purpose, we apply the conflict/cooperation dichotomy as a conceptualisation of the EU–Russia general relations to the Arctic to help us obtain a clear understanding of the dynamics between the two parties in the region. We aim to discover whether the conflict/cooperation dichotomy has also been present in their relations in the Arctic and, if so, have they differed in important ways from the general EU–Russia relationship. In other words, can we characterise the Arctic as exceptional in the broader picture of EU–Russia relations? We argue that discovering similar patterns of conflict and cooperation in the Arctic would allow us to draw lessons about the resumption of relations between the EU and Russia after the end of the war in Ukraine. We employ the dichotomy as a starting point to distinguish specific areas of cooperation and conflict within the EU–Russia relations in the region as visible in the official EU approach to the matter. To achieve this, we conduct discourse analysis of the official EU documents on the Arctic from three of the main EU institutions: the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC) and the Council of the European Union (Council).Footnote3 Specifically, we examine how Russia has been presented in these documents – as a competitor or a cooperation partner and identify substantive issues within this dichotomy. At the time of publication, there have been no new official Arctic policy documents since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, so towards the end of the article we discuss the sole recent speech on the Arctic from the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to examine the presence of this conflict/cooperation dichotomy. We continue with a discussion of our findings and offer concluding remarks on the significance and potential of the Arctic for the European Union’s relationship with Russia – past, present and future.

Our findings indicate that the conflict/cooperation dichotomy manifests in the Arctic, albeit to a different extent, as the Arctic is not fully immune to tensions in the broader EU–Russia relationship. Nevertheless, cooperation rhetoric and emphasis have remained strong despite the tensions between the two parties in other regions. If there is anything unique about the Arctic as a site of EU–Russia relations, it is that the EU seems to recognise the indispensability and unavoidability of working with Russia to achieve its interests in the region. In that, we suggest that the Arctic can help draw lessons about the future of EU–Russia relations after the end of the war by recognising the likely return of the conflict/cooperation dichotomy as the core of any future relationship rather than as an obstacle to overcome.

### They Say: “Russia Says No” (Russia LNG)

#### Russia will say yes to EU energy cooperation

Gricius and Marinova 23, \*Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute and PhD Candidate at Colorado State University., \*\*PhD Candidate at Colorado State University. (\*Gabriella Gricius, \*\*Iren Marinova, 9-5-2023, “A Path to Dialogue: The Arctic for EU-Russia Relations” https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/path-dialogue-arctic-eu-russia-relations/) wtk

Given the invasion of Ukraine and the deadlock of EU-Russia relations, the Arctic could be a key site for engagement between the two parties. Although there are long term complexities in the Russia-EU relationship in the Arctic, it may be more palatable for Russia to work with the EU as a whole – which already has Arctic Member States – rather than continue to invite increasing Chinese investment and presence. Russia has long been wary of Chinese intentions in the Arctic but in the wake of sanctions, it has been incentivized to cooperate with China on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), LNG extraction, and oil and gas exports due to increasing demand for Russian resources in China. It is not the case that this tense relationship would vanish entirely but rather that it does not serve Russia’s energy or economic security to be ostracized from the rest of the Arctic. If working with the EU provided an opportunity to restart energy deals, technological investment in Arctic shipping, and incentivized shipping through the NSR, then it would certainly be in Russia’s interest to cooperate with the EU in the Arctic. It remains to be seen, however, given that Russia has recently been perceived as an unreliable energy provider, indicating that there may be less European appetite for Russian resources even if the situation stabilizes.

#### EU-Russia cooperation is likely in the Arctic

Marinova and Gricius 24, \*PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. \*\*Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute and PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. (\*Iren Marinova, \*\*Gabriella Gricius, 2-7-2024, “The Arctic potential: cutting the Gordian knot of EU–Russia relations?” *European Security* Volume 34, Issue 1, accessed via University of Michigan Online Library) wtk

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Russia in the past 30 years has been complex, encompassing periods of hope, optimism and cooperation but also elements of competition, conflict and complicated geopolitical tensions. There is an omnipresent pattern of intertwined conflict and cooperation that has run through the core of the relationship, until reaching a stalemate following the 2022 Russian aggression in Ukraine. We identify the current state of EU–Russia relations to resemble a Gordian knot or a deeply entrenched and unsolvable problem. Nevertheless, a site where the EU and Russia meet face to face to pursue interests on a plethora of issues is the Arctic. We examine whether the EU–Russia relations have been qualitatively different there, and whether it might hold lessons for cutting the identified Gordian knot. We employ discourse analysis to the official EU documents on the Arctic from the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, and examine how Russia has been presented in these documents – as a competitor or a cooperation partner. We discover more cooperation rather than conflict language, indicating the Arctic might hold some lessons about the future EU–Russia relations after a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine.

#### Both sides want to cooperate in the Arctic

Marinova and Gricius 24, \*PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. \*\*Senior Fellow at The Arctic Institute and PhD Candidate in Political Science at Colorado State University. (\*Iren Marinova, \*\*Gabriella Gricius, 2-7-2024, “The Arctic potential: cutting the Gordian knot of EU–Russia relations?” *European Security* Volume 34, Issue 1, accessed via University of Michigan Online Library) wtk

Nevertheless, one area where mutual interests for the EU and Russia are particularly visible is the Arctic region (see Melchiorre Citation2022). The region incorporates a broad range of issues – from climate change and environmental concerns to shipping routes, indigenous rights and military-strategic considerations. Over time, the Arctic has become a space over which global powers – the United States, Russia and China, especially – confer and compete, underscoring its geopolitical importance on both regional and global scale (Pincus Citation2020, Weber Citation2020). Relevant to this article, the Arctic is the only region in which both the EU and Russia “meet” directly across every issue area, without their relations being mediated via other sovereign parties. All the other facets of the EU–Russia relationship play out in spaces that are populated by other sovereign states (e.g. the post-Soviet space in the Eastern neighbourhood) that possess their agency, interests and historical legacies – factors that serve to refract and shape EU–Russia relations (see Delcour Citation2017). In other words, the EU and Russia compete for influence in sovereign states whereas in the Arctic, there are no states to compete over – and thus the EU and Russia meet directly as they are composite parts of the region. In this sense, the Arctic is unique because it provides a site for analysing EU–Russia relations in their “purest” form. What becomes clear is that, while the EU and Russia have both shared and competing strategic interests in the Arctic, the EU’s approach toward Russia in this region is visibly distinct from their overall relations elsewhere. Namely, it has been noticeably more optimistic and cooperative toward Russia. The 2016 EU Global Strategy (p. 33), for example, identifies the Arctic as a “matter of European interest” over which the EU would seek “selective engagement” with Russia, along several other issue linkages. Moreover, the EU has explicitly expressed a desire to maintain the Arctic’s current status of a “low tension area” (EU Global Strategy Citation2016, pp. 38–39).

The idea of Arctic exceptionalism is not new. On the contrary, it has received significant attention in the literature from analysts who identify the Arctic as a region with a surprisingly low level of military tension and a relatively high level of cooperation among adjacent states, despite the competing interests of powerful actors. Especially since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Arctic surprised many observers by remaining relatively hospitable to international cooperation in contrast to the diplomatic isolation being imposed upon Russia in other realms of international society (Byers Citation2017). Others have similarly explored how the EU–Russia cooperation has endured despite increasing geopolitical tensions within the complicated relationship (Wegge Citation2011, Østhagen Citation2016, Østhagen Citation2018, Skripnikova and Raspotnik Citation2019). Yet others have grown increasingly disillusioned with the idea of Arctic exceptionalism following Russia’s war of choice in Ukraine and the region’s rising geopolitical significance, viewing it as nothing more than “wishful thinking” (Smith Citation2022) or a naïve understanding of the region that has been successfully exploited by Moscow for its geopolitical gains (Mikkola et al. Citation2023). But while the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought attention to matters of high politics to the Arctic (Young Citation2022, Kornhuber et al. Citation2023), others have viewed it as a region where the Cold War never truly ended but rather remained dormant in the 1990s and 2000s, indicating that the Arctic has never ceased to be a central point of competition in the international system (Huebert Citation2019).

In this article, we delve into the exceptionalism puzzle to explore the Arctic as a case for EU–Russia relations and whether it might hold useful lessons for cutting the Gordian knot of general EU–Russia relations after the end of the war in Ukraine. Given its unique geographical and locational characteristics for the EU and Russia, we probe whether the Arctic has been an exceptional region for the relations between the two parties and whether cooperation has been pursued regardless of tensions in their relations elsewhere. Since the general relations between the EU and Russia have largely been characterised by simultaneous patterns of conflict and cooperation for the past three decades, we wager that similar patterns should be observed in their Arctic relations as well. We argue that by focusing on the EU’s approach to the Arctic and Russia’s place within it, we can better understand the deeply intertwined relationship between the EU and Russia more broadly because Arctic cooperation should not be separated from the larger EU–Russia relationship.

For that purpose, we apply the conflict/cooperation dichotomy as a conceptualisation of the EU–Russia general relations to the Arctic to help us obtain a clear understanding of the dynamics between the two parties in the region. We aim to discover whether the conflict/cooperation dichotomy has also been present in their relations in the Arctic and, if so, have they differed in important ways from the general EU–Russia relationship. In other words, can we characterise the Arctic as exceptional in the broader picture of EU–Russia relations? We argue that discovering similar patterns of conflict and cooperation in the Arctic would allow us to draw lessons about the resumption of relations between the EU and Russia after the end of the war in Ukraine. We employ the dichotomy as a starting point to distinguish specific areas of cooperation and conflict within the EU–Russia relations in the region as visible in the official EU approach to the matter. To achieve this, we conduct discourse analysis of the official EU documents on the Arctic from three of the main EU institutions: the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC) and the Council of the European Union (Council).Footnote3 Specifically, we examine how Russia has been presented in these documents – as a competitor or a cooperation partner and identify substantive issues within this dichotomy. At the time of publication, there have been no new official Arctic policy documents since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, so towards the end of the article we discuss the sole recent speech on the Arctic from the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to examine the presence of this conflict/cooperation dichotomy. We continue with a discussion of our findings and offer concluding remarks on the significance and potential of the Arctic for the European Union’s relationship with Russia – past, present and future.

Our findings indicate that the conflict/cooperation dichotomy manifests in the Arctic, albeit to a different extent, as the Arctic is not fully immune to tensions in the broader EU–Russia relationship. Nevertheless, cooperation rhetoric and emphasis have remained strong despite the tensions between the two parties in other regions. If there is anything unique about the Arctic as a site of EU–Russia relations, it is that the EU seems to recognise the indispensability and unavoidability of working with Russia to achieve its interests in the region. In that, we suggest that the Arctic can help draw lessons about the future of EU–Russia relations after the end of the war by recognising the likely return of the conflict/cooperation dichotomy as the core of any future relationship rather than as an obstacle to overcome.

### They Say: “US Key to Arms Control” (Russian LNG)

#### EU diplomacy is key to effective arms control

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The global arms control architecture is crumbling. While this trend is often framed as a U.S.-Russia (or, sometimes, a U.S.-Russia-China) problem, the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the potential expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) on February 5, 2021, also severely affect the security of European states. The European Union can and should play a more effective role in influencing U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations. This is how.

Interconnected Arms Control Challenges

Since 2014, when the Obama administration first reported Russian noncompliance with the INF treaty, U.S. officials have repeatedly raised INF treaty violations with Moscow. The United States is mainly concerned about the flight-testing of Russian missiles with ranges of over 500 kilometers, particularly the SSC-8/9M729 missile. Russia argues that the United States has developed weapons systems that blur the line between missiles covered by the INF and missiles not covered by the INF. For instance, it points to the Aegis Ashore launch platform, which U.S. officials insist can only fire missile interceptors, but which has been used to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles when deployed onboard U.S. Navy ships. Russia has also alleged that the United States outfits unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in ways that would meet the INF definition of a cruise missile. The United States responds by arguing that the INF only covers “one-way” delivery vehicles, while UAVs can be reused.

The slow demise of the INF has further weakened the already fragile nuclear arms control architecture. With the New START treaty as the only remaining strategic arms control agreement between Russia and the United States, the expiration of the INF leaves open questions about how the United States will maintain the support of its allies, uphold strategic stability with Russia, and create a new negotiation framework that accounts for emerging actors and technologies like China and hypersonic weapons. It also raises concerns about the viability of existing verification measures.

According to some of its proponents, the withdrawal of the United States from the INF treaty was necessitated in part by the growing imbalance of military power between the United States and China. In the past, China strongly opposed joining the INF treaty, and the United States felt that its agreement with Russia constrained its ability to deploy intermediate-range (conventional and/or nuclear) missiles to counter Chinese INF-range weapons in South East Asia. Facing the expiration of New START in February, the United States and Russia will have to either let this treaty die, extend it (which is a relatively simple and quick procedure that does not require lengthy renegotiations), or enter into talks to replace it. Russia wants to extend the treaty, with President Vladimir Putin arguing that it keeps a devastating arms race at bay. However, U.S. officials have expressed dissatisfaction with New START, preferring a trilateral agreement that includes China, though this position has changed over the course of the most recent bilateral negotiations.

Either way, the end of the INF treaty cannot be explained only by considering U.S. and Russian interests as they relate to intermediate-range nuclear weapons in isolation. Rather, both Washington and Moscow formulate their interests regarding the INF in the context of broader strategic considerations, such as other arms control agreements and the changing balance of power among the United States, Russia, and China. While the United States would prefer including China, Russia has voiced a preference for including the United Kingdom and France. It is also interested in maintaining good relations with China and though not fundamentally opposed to including China in a multilateral agreement, it has dismissed U.S. attempts to do so in August as unrealistic and counterproductive. What could be done to solve this conundrum, address both U.S. and Russian underlying interests, and strengthen the international arms control regime? This is where the European Union and the concept of a negotiation campaign comes in.

European Arms Control Interests

The INF treaty eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons that posed a direct threat to European security: short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The expiration of the INF treaty permits the reintroduction of these weapons into the nuclear arsenals of both Russia and the United States, which would gravely destabilize European security. Russia, for its part, is concerned about the potential for conventional INF-range missiles weapons deployed in NATO member countries by the United States. Specifically, the short flight time of such missiles (under 20 minutes) would leave Moscow almost no time to detect and subsequently decide how to react to a launch, thereby making a response based on wrong or incomplete information more likely. To counter this threat and as well as the perceived conventional superiority of the United States and NATO, Russia could deploy the kind of missiles that were eliminated under the INF treaty. The presence of these missiles increases the likelihood that a regional conflict between Russia and the United States will escalate—be it unintentionally or because of miscalculation—above the nuclear threshold, with potentially devastating consequences for Europe.

While NATO and EU officials have recognized Russian violations of the INF, they are generally wary of a nuclear arms architecture without the INF, in which Russian intermediate-range nuclear weapons could target Western European cities. Recognizing Russia’s larger geopolitical strategy, NATO has expressed its intent “to counter and reject any arms control offers from Russia that serve no purpose other than to divide NATO Allies, bring legitimacy to aggressive Russian steps, and promote a military balance in Europe that favours Russia.” In a replacement for the INF, NATO would prefer clauses that limit Russia’s military superiority in regions close to NATO territory, its ability to mobilize overwhelming numbers of conventional forces, and disrupt NATO reinforcement options.

The EU would like to see improved transparency and verification measures in a renegotiation of the INF, recognizing the importance of the existing arms control infrastructure to the security of Europe. It would prefer to continue the restrictions imposed by the INF and, failing that, to extend New START. Beyond intermediate-range nuclear weapons, the EU would also benefit from limitations on strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. It emphasizes that Russia, as the party with the largest arsenal, should eliminate the most weapons.

For its part, France prefers a multilateral renegotiation of the INF treaty. French President Emmanuel Macron has pushed for a policy of “strategic autonomy” around European defense, which would suggest a desire to end the pattern of U.S. domination over nuclear talks with Russia. However, critics say this kind of linkage between the French nuclear deterrent and a European defense could fuel a nuclear arms race instead of ending it. Germany, facing the possibility of becoming stuck in an arms race between Russia and the United States, seems prepared to give up some of the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed within its borders.

From Subsidiary Deals to a Negotiation Campaign

Negotiation experts Jim Sebenius and David Lax have argued that negotiation campaigns are necessary when an individual deal is unlikely to be sustainable because of linkages between the issue at stake and issues included in other (potential) agreements. In these situations, the skilled negotiator must craft several “subsidiary deals” grouped into “negotiation fronts” to reach the ultimate “target agreement.” This concept is applicable to the arms control conundrum. It can guide a European negotiation campaign aimed at strengthening the international arms control regime by addressing underlying European, U.S., Russian, and Chinese interests as well as the concerns of other actors. Of course, “Europe” is a heterogenous actor when it comes to the nuclear issue (i.e., depending on focusing on the EU, the European NATO members, or all European states, etc.). Instead of dissecting how each of these coalitions could proceed, let’s assume that the European Union decides to launch an arms control negotiation campaign and apply the six-step negotiation campaign concept to such a scenario. This is how EU diplomats could do it:

Envision the ultimate target deal. Rather than trying to convince the United States and Russia to revive INF in isolation, Brussels should set a more ambitious but ultimately more sustainable goal: a new international arms control architecture that addresses the legitimate security interests of all relevant parties.

Decide how a European arms control campaign will influence this target deal. The EU should conduct a realistic appraisal of its sources of leverage in the context of arms control negotiations. Does Brussels seek to focus on creating value at the negotiation table through offering concessions? If so, Paris could signal to Moscow its willingness to accept restrictions on its nuclear arsenal, and Brussels could negotiate with London to bring the U.K. on board as well. The goal of this negotiation move would be to have Moscow reciprocate on issues where the EU and the United States need help, for example through using the Russian relationship with China to convince Beijing to join multilateral arms control talks. Alternatively, should the EU focus instead on weakening the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) of the United States and Russia? If so, the EU could refuse to support the deployment of U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), as a signal to Washington, or step up its cooperation with NATO on issues such as military mobility and force readiness, as a signal to Moscow. For the GLCM move to work, Brussels would have to first convince Warsaw to not do a U.S.-Polish side deal on such deployments. While both of these BATNA-weakening negotiation moves might seem detrimental to European security in the short term, they could change the U.S. and Russian negotiation calculus, if combined with clearly formulated European goals as they relate to arms control.

Identify and characterize all key players. European diplomats should identify and engage all actors that would have to be included in international negotiations about a new arms control architecture, either directly or indirectly. Who would need to sit at the negotiation table? What are the players’ interests regarding arms control? How could those states that do not have nuclear assets, yet have profound and legitimate security concerns regarding other states’ arsenals, be included in negotiations and/or agreements? Who can influence the players “away from the table”? Which concerns regarding current arms control agreements do these influencers have and how could these be addressed by new frameworks? For example, what about American arms control critics who say that the United States should not agree to any restrictions on its own military capabilities as long as, they argue, China makes no concessions and Russia continues to cheat? An effective negotiation campaign includes a careful analysis of the domestic landscape of all key players with the goal to address legitimate concerns in the ultimate target agreement or in one of its subsidiary deals.

Group the parties into “fronts.” Looking at the previously identified actors, how could these be grouped into collections that share similar arms control interests? The key is to avoid simplistic labels that might not reflect the nuances of a party’s position. For example, rather than labeling China as a member of a (perceived) “anti-arms-control” front because of its reluctance to join INF and New START negotiations, China could be grouped into a “missile defense” front because this issue is one of Beijing’s top concerns in the context of U.S. military capabilities.

Assess interdependence among fronts. What are the issues and interests that cut across these fronts? This is where savvy negotiators find opportunities to create value. For example, there may not be a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) between the United States and Russia in bilateral INF negotiations; however, once linked with the China question, this assessment may change. Using “what if” scenarios, European diplomats could probe for possible U.S. and Russian concessions that become tenable were Beijing to rethink its resistance to joining arms control talks.

Decide how to orchestrate the process among fronts. Equipped with the political and technical knowledge acquired through the previous five negotiation steps, the EU would be in a formidable position to spearhead a diplomatic effort to reform and save the international arms control architecture, rather than protesting its demise. European diplomats would need to figure out which negotiation fronts to prioritize, which parties to engage first, and which sets of talks should take place simultaneously rather than sequentially. Which linkages between which subsidiary arms control deals promise a negotiation breakthrough, and which linkages should be avoided because they will make an ultimate agreement more difficult? Here, EU diplomats could also draw on their expertise gained through the Iran nuclear negotiations, specifically regarding sources of leverage that Europe brought to the table during those talks that may be transferable to an international arms control negotiation campaign (lifting sanctions, access to financial systems, etc.).

This roadmap could help generate progress on several significant arms control issues. Take the example of Washington’s recent attempts to bring Beijing into its bilateral talks with Moscow. Thus far, these attempts have failed. However, Beijing could find an invitation by Brussels to join exploratory talks about the need to reform the international arms control architecture more difficult to reject. In fact, Beijing could take advantage of such a forum to explain its concerns pertaining to U.S. missile defense, thereby enhancing the EU’s understanding of Chinese security concerns, which would in return enable Brussels to probe (in informal, bilateral EU-U.S. talks) for potential U.S. concessions vis-à-vis China.

Given the mistrust between all three dyads in the U.S.-China-Russia triangle, a European arms control negotiation campaign can create important spaces to think more creatively about changes to existing agreements that could be beneficial to all parties. The EU should conduct these negotiations neither as a neutral mediator among the United States, Russia, and China (which it is not, given the EU’s geopolitical alignment with its U.S. allies) nor because of unrealistic great power illusions. Instead, the EU should simply formulate its own, legitimate security interests related to arms control and extend a pragmatic offer to the United States, Russia, and China to do some of the hard diplomatic work it takes to put a comprehensive negotiation campaign together.

### They Say: “US Key for Native Renewables” (Native Renewables)

#### The EU is best equipped to provide renewable energy to indigenous communities in the Arctic

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Greening geopolitics

Knowledge-building, research, and an increasing emphasis on the green transition are key components of the EU’s policy towards the Arctic regions. The European Commission’s (EC, together with High Representative) latest Joint Communication on Arctic matters, published in October 2021, did not greatly change the EU-European course towards the Arctic, but it highlighted newer elements, such as science diplomacy and the EGD, through which stronger engagement could be sought. What the EU and its Arctic Member States should still consider, however, is how such elements are put into practice without jeopardizing Indigenous Sámi communities. The EU aims to actively engage with the Sámi to have “their voice heard” in policy processes, but tensions remain, perhaps best exemplified in conflicts regarding green industrial development.

The political environment in the Arctic has fundamentally changed due to Russia’s unlawful war of aggression in Ukraine. And while the war’s policy-specific consequences on EU-Russia relations in an Arctic context are still difficult to fully comprehend, it is not unlikely for the EU to aim for a stronger presence in the Arctic through climate and energy related domains. Among many things, the war has underlined the urgency for EU Member States to better respond to Russia’s weaponization of energy. This, in part, translates into a need for more geopolitically aware climate and energy policies particularly in terms of the EGD. Establishing a solid evidence-base and designing subsequent policy interventions that promote the EGD will need to take into consideration a changed global political environment and associated strategic risks. Recognizing the challenges green energy development can pose on Indigenous livelihoods in the Arctic, the EC and relevant bodies should thoroughly consider its intended and unintended effects on Indigenous livelihoods and Sámi communities both within the EU area (where the Sámi reside as EU citizens) and beyond, where the EU’s regulatory power and policy-making can have an impact.

Decarbonization is a central component of the EGD, which requires ambitious investments into renewable energy and the sustainable extraction of critical minerals. Furthermore, in order to secure desired levels of resilience to relevant supply chains, such developments should build on European capabilities. In other words, to successfully implement and meet the objectives of the EGD, while recognizing current and emerging geopolitical demands, the EC sees that actions should appropriately emphasize European production and processing.

However, as significant deposits of critical minerals in Europe are located in Northern Finland and Sweden, the EU (including the EC) will need to take stock of local and regional demands regarding Arctic industrial development. Co-productively engaging with Sámi communities to produce comprehensive knowledge on intended and unintended impacts or the political, economic and social potential of such development projects will allow the EU to build equitable and (geo-)politically resilient relationships with local Indigenous peoples.

Resilience through co-production

The EU recognizes and endorses the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which implies certain commitments to protect Sámi rights and to ensure Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the policy process. This has also been explicitly stated in the 2021 Joint Communication on Arctic matters. Consultations, such as official regulatory hearings or unofficial arrangements for expert advice, carry limitations and often require specific guidance to be successfully implemented. Consultative processes can be burdensome as they require resources – money, time and representation – that marginalized communities might lack.

Hearing those directly or indirectly affected by regulations and policies primarily allows law-makers to anticipate potential outcomes or evaluate their impact. Here, appropriate interaction early on is crucial, which, if poorly done, could potentially lead to inadequate transfer of knowledge and consequently a weaker evidence-base for desired policies or regulations. Effective and just participation throughout the knowledge-building and policy-making process increases the legitimacy of decisions by allowing participants to take ownership of the knowledge or policies created. EGD-related Arctic initiatives need to be recognized as legitimate by local Indigenous communities, not least when such actions take place or have impact on Sápmi – the Sámi homeland.

Making use of the best available knowledge is crucial to developing effective and comprehensive evidence-based policies. Academic institutions, established research practices and the scientific process have long been central to developing and reviewing evidence for policy-making. Such structures, practices or actors, however, often reflect Western, Eurocentric or industrialized views and approaches that can carry colonial legacies and particular epistemic hegemony – a primacy of a particular way of knowing or in creating knowledge. Practices and actions that can be seen as green colonialism in the Arctic might thus be inherently tied with a coloniality of knowledge, where policies are legitimized by subjugating traditional and Indigenous forms of knowing under industrialized science. Understanding and critically reflecting on the relationship between colonialism and knowledge-production is necessary to decolonize Arctic science and ensure equitable co-production of policy-relevant knowledge. Co-production of knowledge, although still conceptually ambiguous, enables different actors and stakeholders to collectively integrate and negotiate different knowledge systems as a shared foundation for solving complex challenges in policy-making.

Considering the gravity of the consequences of green industrial development on Sámi communities in Europe, openly advocating for decolonial co-productive processes in scientific initiatives or policy-planning could provide added legitimacy and resilience to the EU’s Arctic agency. However, such efforts should also recognize that resource limitations and colonial trauma among communities can contribute to inequality and imbalance in official interaction between Indigenous and non-Indigenous representatives during policy-making processes. In addition, it is equally important to consider that co-productive knowledge-building for policy-making does not automatically equate to an approval of any policy in question – the approach only aims for a more legitimate evidence-base to be built. In other words, co-producing knowledge for particular objectives does not mean that any policies then designed to reach those objectives would be inevitably approved of. The right to oppose or support policies should not be restricted regardless of the knowledge-building processes. Co-production needs to enhance Indigenous political agency, not limit it.

In light of Russia’s war in Ukraine and associated uncertainties globally, the EU is increasingly framing its Arctic and green policies within a resilience-seeking context. Policies must therefore acknowledge associated geopolitical risks and appropriately address them. Here, it is important to take into consideration the scope of such actions and the components from which resilience is built. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it is crucial to consider with whom geopolitical resilience is built. A geopolitically resilient and greener EU will benefit all its citizens, but as these targets are essentially tied to contentious energy and extractive developments in the Sámi homeland, it is particularly important that ownership of such targets and the policies to reach them are also shared by local Indigenous communities. While not a silver bullet to past or current injustices, co-producing the knowledge required for Arctic or EGD policies can offer the EU an avenue that accommodates both normative and geopolitical objectives. Key here is that co-productive approaches need to be inherently decolonial to be mutually beneficial. An established EU-funded research program, as advocated for in the Saami Council’s Sápmi-EU Strategy, aiming to bridge Indigenous and non-Indigenous knowledge systems and to strengthen Sámi research capacities would be a good start.

#### The EU incorporating indigenous perspectives into global climate mitigation solves globally

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The Arctic’s rapid warming has dire consequences for ecosystems and livelihoods in the region. But the impacts will also be felt in European Union (EU) countries because several member nations are home to the Sámi Peoples. Numbering about 100,000, the Sámi live in the Sápmi region that winds across the upper reaches of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. As DAN ZIEBARTH writes, the Indigenous People of the Sápmi region should not be forgotten as the EU looks for ways to adapt to climate change. Protecting the Arctic environment—and Sámi culture and livelihoods—will depend on finding a way to embed Sámi knowledge into EU climate frameworks.

Sámi traditional activities—reindeer herding, fishing and foraging—are deeply intertwined with the Arctic environment. Their knowledge systems emphasize a relational worldview and long-term ecological vision rooted in respect for nature.

But climate change is disrupting this equilibrium, causing unpredictable snow conditions and ecosystem shifts that threaten reindeer herding practices and the Sámi cultural identity that is tied to them.

To address challenges like these, the European Commission—the executive body of the EU—and the Sámi must collaborate. The commission has a crucial role to play in proposing new legislation, implementing the decisions of the European Parliament and Council, managing EU policies, allocating funding, and ensuring the enforcement of EU law across member states. The challenge for the Sámi will be figuring out how to contribute their traditional knowledge within the framework of the EU’s broader climate policies.

Providing the necessary funding and leadership

There are two critical first steps along the path to this cooperation.

First, the EU must budget more funds to consider and make use of Indigenous Knowledge in climate adaptation measures to enhance the effectiveness of its Arctic policies. This funding should support the braiding of Indigenous and scientific knowledge and the participation of Indigenous Knowledge holders in the co-production of knowledge processes—along with climate adaptation practices, infrastructure development, civil society collaboration, and a think tank focused on climate change and Indigenous knowledge in the Arctic.

Second, to ensure the relevance and effectiveness of these initiatives, Indigenous leaders and local communities should have primary control over the use of these funds. For example, the EU must include Indigenous representatives in its delegations to international climate summits and negotiations. Establishing a diplomatic envoy to advocate for Indigenous communities would amplify the reach and impact of Indigenous knowledge on the global stage, contributing to more informed and inclusive climate policies.

### They Say: “EU Leadership Fails”

#### The EU is well-positioned to fill leadership gaps

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But other governments and even IO bureaucracies can step up as alternative leaders and help remaining member states to overcome the challenges of US withdrawal. They can defend institutions’ continued value and fill the gap left by the US. However, alternative leaders’ success is not unconditional but requires persuasiveness and the mobilisation of sufficient contributions from other member states. After all, no single actor can compensate for the loss of the US as the hegemonic power. Alternative leaders thus need soft power to convince others of the continued value of the institution and their plan to sustain. And alternative leaders also need to enlist sufficient hard power to address global problems without the US.

The EU is very well positioned to provide alternative leadership due to its soft power and its often already substantial hard power. In response to Trump 1.0, the EU and its members stepped in. In the case of the Paris Agreement, the EU took on an important leadership role. They not only defended the agreement but also acted as a role model by increasing their own efforts to combat climate change. They also included China as the most important emitter in their response strategy to the US withdrawal. The EU even used its position of economic power to bind Brazil to the agreement under Jair Bolsonaro, who threatened to follow Trump’s example. As a result, the Paris Agreement remained resilient as other member states stuck to their commitments and even increased their emissions targets. In the case of the WHO, European member states, in close cooperation with the WHO Secretariat, also succeeded in defending the organisation against Trump’s criticism and combating the COVID-19 pandemic without the US.

To respond to Trump 2.0 and maintain the LIO, Europe must be prepared to take the lead and fill the gap after US withdrawal. The EU and the most powerful European states such as France, Germany, and the UK should, firstly, continue to champion multilateral institutions and abide by their rules to maintain their reputation as supporters of liberal principles. This will help their soft power, which they can use to win partners for their coalitions. European governments will have to rely more on non-Western partners who can support multilateralism.

Second, to effectively and efficiently increase their autonomous capabilities, Europeans should pool their hard power resources from defence to finance. Only together do Europeans have enough capacities to make a difference on the international stage when it comes to problems ranging from the environment and development aid to free trade and security policy. This can be done at the EU level or in additional cooperation agreements with the UK. It is also important to realise our own dependencies and reduce them.

#### Political divisions within the EU can be overcome

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Books and Ideas : You sound rather optimistic in assuming that European powers will provide alternative leadership, but the EU seems pretty divided now: do you see signs of willingness to assume a renewed role in multilateral institution?

Tim Heinkelmann-Wild: Europe indeed faces multiple challenges today that spur internal tensions and have the potential to constrain an effective response to US withdrawal today: First, Trump’s re-election and his government’s open support for authoritarian populists emboldens those forces in Europe that contest its commitment to the rules-based, multilateral order from within. Second, Russia’s military threat increased Europe’s dependency on US security guarantees. This makes Europeans, especially those at its Eastern flank, particularly vulnerable to US retaliation for acting against Trump’s will. Third, and relatedly, Europeans are thus faced with strong imperatives to build-up their own defence capacities. This general shift in focus threatens to undermine their commitment to multilateral institutions and development aid. Finally, even if European governments and the EU generally agree to sustain multilateralism, the sheer speed and simultaneity of Trump 2.0’s attacks against numerous multilateral institutions is likely overwhelming and spurring conflicts about which to prioritize.

While EU officials and Europeans governments have condemned the latest US withdrawals from multilateral institutions, we have still to see whether this is backed up by deeds. Despite the described challenges, there are also good reasons to expect them to follow suit. Europe and its economy continue to profit immensely from the LIO. European policymakers in power should thus generally be willing to ensure these benefits by stepping up for multilateral institutions. Moreover, the response to Trump’s attacks can typically build on a past consensus among European leaders. For instance, previous agreement among the EU’s membership helped the Commission and the External Action Service to defend institutions such as the Paris Agreement or the UNFPA despite of sceptic member state governments. The centralization of decision-making power in the EU further facilitates a united response. For instance, due to its authority over the Common Market, the Commission could define and implement a swift response to the US blockade of the WTO’s Appellate Body. In the domain of development aid, the Commission also has considerable leeway when it comes to the implementation of the budget. The EU’s ability to promote leadership at international stage can thus be further facilitated by expanding majority voting or delegating tasks to the Commission. Finally, Europe’s dependence on partners beyond the West to effectively address global problems has also increased in the last decades, especially with the US becoming less reliable under Trump. The EU and European governments thus also face strong imperatives to support multilateral institutions to cater their soft power and enlist non-Western partners.

#### Support for a stronger EU is higher than nationalist support

Theo Zenou, 2025 - historian and journalist who recently completed a doctorate at the University of Cambridge “It’s time for a United States of Europe” Boston Globe, 7/6, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2025/07/06/opinion/united-states-of-europe/ //DH

But failure is not inevitable. Public opinion across Europe is complicated — and more pro-European — than it might seem. Voters may be frustrated with the EU, but they are not opposed to a unified Europe. To the contrary. According to the latest Eurobarometer poll, 81 percent of Europeans support “a common defense and security policy among EU member states” while 74 percent approve of the euro. On average, Europeans also trust the EU more than their national governments. These are all signs that a federalist project might resonate with many, maybe even the majority of, Europeans.

### They Say: “Multilateral Order Resilient”

#### The multilateral order is collapsing now because of Trump’s withdrawal

Wu 25, climate governance researcher at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. (Shoutao Wu, 7-23-2025, “Opinion – Multilateralism’s Collapse Under Trump and the Call for Global South Pluriverse” https://www.e-ir.info/2025/07/23/opinion-multilateralisms-collapse-under-trump-and-the-call-for-global-south-pluriverse/) wtk

Although the retreat from globalization, multilateralism, and global governance has been perceptible over the past decade, the Trump administration is taking it to a whole new level. Both his first and second presidencies were marked by withdrawals, or announcements of withdrawals from significant international organizations, treaties, and agreements. These withdrawals, funding cuts, and denunciations of international institutions, spanning critical sectors such as trade and finance, climate change, geopolitical security, foreign aid, human rights, and public health, reflect a unifying theme: a fundamental shift toward unilateralism, protectionism, and anti-globalism under the “America First” foreign policy. This political orientation prioritizes U.S. interests above all else, disregarding the far-reaching consequences of wars, conflicts, climate collapse, pandemics, and other global crises on regions, countries, and communities beyond U.S. borders.

Beyond multilateral institutions, the Trump administration also poses a serious threat to the rule-based international order. Biersteker outlined the contours of classic liberal institutionalism: In the global society, the equal dignity and sovereign integrity of different states are supported with rules of law that are maintained through the articulation and enforcement of norms, as well as constitutional checks in the form of interventions by the UN Security Council that are intended to maintain international peace and security.

These are the foundations of the rule-based international order, which is under dire threat as “liberal institutionalism” is being replaced by “illiberal nationalism” under the current authoritarian regime. In the past months, the administration threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Canada, Denmark, and Panama for the imperial claim of the “51st state,” Greenland, and the Panama Canal. Trump proposed the mass relocation plan for two million Palestinians to neighboring nations, not allowing them to return, while the U.S. would take over the Gaza Strip. The U.S. shifted its position on the Russia-Ukraine war to downplay the forcible territory annexation and military violence, while claiming mineral benefits in exchange for defense support. The U.S. joined Israel to bomb nuclear sites in Iran to “prevent Tehran from developing nukes”, adding to the military chaos, conflicts, and deaths in the Middle East.

What we are witnessing is not merely the United States disengaging from global governance and multilateralism, but a deeper, more unsettling breakaway from the post-WWII Western alliance and its professed political philosophy, one that has long emphasized democracy, law, human rights, free trade, territorial sovereignty, and international institutions, even though how those ideologies were historically built and offered is contested. This retreat signals a turn toward a political orientation increasingly marked by colonial entanglements, imperial ambition, militarization, dictatorship, and the normalization of totalitarian tendencies.

#### Consensus of experts agree that the multilateral order is being eroded

Mair 25, Director and executive chairman of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. (Stefan Mair, Apr-Jun 2025, “The World According to Trump” *CEBRI Journal, Brazilian Center for International Relations*, Year 2025, No. 14, Apr-Jun 2025, ISSN 2764-7897, https://cebri.org/revista/en/artigo/198/the-world-according-to-trump) wtk

When John Irving published his best-selling novel The World According to Garp in 1978, he could not have imagined that almost 50 years later a man whose eccentricities surpass even Irving’s extraordinary fictional characters would become President of the United States of America. If Donald Trump's first presidency held surprises for many experienced politicians and experts, his second term promises even more unconventionality and turbulence. Since his inauguration on January 20, the 47th President keeps the world in suspense. Whether it was his announcement to take back the Panama Canal, the proposal–or rather the threat–to make Canada the 51st state, the offer to buy and the serious aspiration to ultimately take over Greenland, his vision to expel the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and turn it into a second Riviera, or the innovative method to calculate the amount of tariffs that exporting countries owe to the American customs authorities: Donald Trump's first hundred days truly offered a wealth of innovative ideas. Observers disagree on whether these ideas are part of a grand strategy whose beauty escapes the understanding of the uninitiated, or the President is playing by ear and simply following his instincts and gut feelings. Be that as it may, some foreign policy experts already regard Donald Trump as the most consequential President for international affairs since Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he is certainly the most disruptive one in modern history. It is therefore essential to try to understand the workings of the world according to Trump, what it is all about, what it means for his allies and neighbors, and how they can deal with it. But before we get there, we need to take a look at the present state of the world.

THE END OF THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER

There is a broad consensus among international affairs commentators and writers that the world is in a state of disorder, which, in turn, is the result of the end of the liberal, rules-based international order. This order was set up by the United States (U.S.) and the victorious European powers of World War II, enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, and applied by various multilateral institutions. Though its rules were regarded as universal, until the end of the Cold War their validity had been more or less limited to the Western world. The repressed societies of the Soviet bloc and the millions of civilians suffering from proxy wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Korea, and elsewhere were hardly aware of these liberal rules.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the universalization of this rule-based order became so pronounced, that Francis Fukuyama was not alone in believing that he was witnessing the end of History. The bipolar world was replaced by a unipolar one in which the overwhelming political, economic, and military power of the U.S. was unchallenged by any peer competitor. The only remaining superpower adopted the role of a world policeman, taking upon itself the global responsibility to protect and to promote liberal values even if this required the use of military force. Looking back at the heyday of the unipolar moment in the 1990s, it is often neglected that this liberal rule-based order was not universal even then. The hundreds of thousands of people on the African continent who died in armed conflicts, from the rampant AIDS pandemic or from famine, were only the most visible outsiders of this order. September 11, 2001 was the first credible challenge to this order. Since then, it has been gradually disintegrating. Several factors have brought this about.

Initially and ultimately, the West itself undermined the belief in the values and their universality that has been the basis of the liberal order. The war on terror has been accompanied by excesses and human rights violations, which made the commitment to these values less credible. The full-fledged war of the U.S. and their allies against Iraq in 2003 was a fundamental breach of the norms of the UN Charter. And some would argue that also NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 1999 was a gross violation of these norms, though it was certainly more guided by human rights concerns than by geostrategic reasoning. Nevertheless, the perception in many parts of the world became more pertinent that the West was applying double standards in its pursuit of liberal values and that some States, especially one, were more equal than others. In 2007 this unsettling of liberal political values became supplemented and reinforced by the unsettling of economic liberalism. The financial crisis, which began in the world’s most capitalist country and then spread to the rest of the world, sowed deep doubts about the superiority of liberal and deregulated markets. All the more so because the Chinese version of State capitalism seemed to be better prepared to deal with the crisis than liberal capitalism. Finally, liberal values have come under domestic pressure in those countries that have traditionally been most committed to them and have promoted them most vigorously on the international stage. The rise of illiberal democracy, right-wing populism and xenophobia in Europe and North America contributed to the increasing discrediting of these values in other parts of the world.

These developments occurred in parallel with a global power shift. China in particular, but also other parts of Asia, benefited greatly from the economic globalization, markets opening, and establishment of global supply chains that followed the end of the Cold War. In 1995, the share of U.S. GDP in world GDP was around 25%, and that of China around 2.5%. While share of the U.S. economy remained pretty stable since, the latest figures for 2023 show a Chinese share of 17%. High economic growth rates enabled China to heavily invest in its military capabilities, to make attractive offers to other countries in the form of private investment, unconditional loans and infrastructure construction–signified by the Belt and Road Initiative–and, as a consequence, to create economic dependencies that can be used for economic coercion. In addition to these elements of hard power, China offered a development model quite attractive to authoritarian leaders in Africa, Asia and Latin America–a bit of an unusual form of soft power.

At the same time, we have witnessed a continuous weakening of multilateral institutions driven by two different dynamics. On the one hand, China has increasingly penetrated, instrumentalized and sidelined multilateral institutions and distorted their rules. The biggest victims of this strategy have been the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the other hand, these institutions have proved unable to adapt to the global power shifts and to reform themselves–be it the composition of the UN Security Council or the voting shares in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs): the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The consequence has been a significant loss of cohesive power and relevance: the UN Security Council has become increasingly unable to reach consensus on how to deal with violent conflicts, the IFIs hardly played any role in mastering the global financial crisis, the WTO has made no substantial progress in completing the Doha Round for further market liberalization, and the WHO has failed to manage the Covid-19 pandemic.

The declining willingness and ability of the U.S. to play the role of world police and the guarantor of peace and stability in many parts of the world amount to a third factor. The partial withdrawal from world affairs already began under the Obama administrations as a consequence of the Neocons’ failure to enforce liberal values by any means–including military force. At the same time, growing segments of U.S. society developed the conviction that the U.S. were overburdened by its international commitments, exploited by too many free-riders on their security guarantees and unfairly treated economically by friends and foes alike. These beliefs gave way to the first Trump administration, which already dealt a serious blow to the liberal rules-based order and to the Western alliance. But also the brief “America Is Back” phase of the Biden administration was marked by the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan that U.S. partners perceived as a betrayal.

In combination with the increasing discreditation of liberal values, the global power shift and the increasing irrelevance of multilateral institutions, the partial withdrawal of the U.S. from world affairs created a power vacuum that called for a renewed great power rivalry very similar to the period before World War I. For a while, the staging of this rivalry seemed to be confined to the realm of geoeconomics. Foreign policy objectives were pursued through the creation of economic dependencies and economic coercion, through competition for control of markets, critical raw materials and trade routes, and through the imposition of sanctions and boycotts. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has brutally reintroduced military force into the great power equation. The global financial crisis, China's resort to economic coercion and, finally, the fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have raised awareness in the West of the vulnerabilities that come with globalization. Interdependencies that had previously been positively connotated were reassessed as relationships of asymmetric dependency–and a security threat. The discourse on the international economy has become increasingly dominated by terms such as resilience, and friend-, near- and re-shoring replacing concepts of efficiency, just-in-time, economies of scale and global value chains. The end of globalization as we knew it is the economic fallout of the disintegration of the liberal rules-based order.

### They Say: “International Fiat is a Voting Issue”

#### International fiat is good:

#### 1. International Education—it’s an international topic, so we should be able to learn about the policy making process in other countries—just learning about the US defeats a core purpose of the topic

#### 2. Negative Ground—international counterplans are key to check against small, unpredictable affirmatives because they force the affirmative to have a strong “US Key” warrant

#### 3. It’s not illogical—policymakers always consider what actor is best suited to do a job. The judge also isn’t a policymaker, they are trying to analyze a policy problem, not pretending to be a member of congress.

#### 4. It doesn’t unlimit—the vast majority of countries or organizations don’t have Arctic-specific solvency advocates. The aff would only have to prepare for the ones that are in the core topic literature like EU

#### This is not a voting issue—rejecting the team is a step too far—rejecting the counterplan would be sufficient to remedy their offense.

### They Say: “Conditionality Bad”

#### Conditionality is Good:

#### 1. Most Logical — the judge should never be forced to choose between a bad plan and a bad counterplan when the status quo is a logical third option. Logic is an objective and fair standard that teaches valuable decision-making skills.

#### 2. Argument Innovation — because debaters are risk-averse, they won’t introduce new positions unless they retain a reliable fallback option. Innovation keeps the topic interesting and encourages research and preparation.

#### 3. Gear-Switching — being able to change gears and defend different positions over the course of a debate teaches valuable negotiation skills and improves critical thinking. Deciding what to go for is a useful skill.

#### 4. No Infinite Regression — each additional position has diminishing marginal utility. We’ve only read one counterplan. This is reciprocal: they get the plan and permutation and we get the counterplan and status quo.

#### 5. Strongly Err Neg — the judge should be a referee, not a norm-setter. Unless we made the debate totally unproductive, don’t vote on conditionality — doing so gives too much incentive for the aff to abandon substantive issues in pursuit of an easy theory ballot.

# Aff Answers To: European Union Counterplan

## 2AC

### 2AC Answers to: European Union CP (Domain Awareness)

#### 1. Permutation do both—the EU establishing an Arctic policy AND the US doing the plan would still allow the EU to prove they are committed to multilateralism

#### 2. The US is key:

#### a. US leadership is necessary to deter Russian and Chinese aggression in the Arctic

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The end of an era of cooperation is turning the Arctic region into an unsettled proving ground for nations competing for access to natural resources, trade routes and military advantage.

At the heart of the breakdown in relations is Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Ukraine, actions that alienated fellow Arctic nations. Further tensions have been caused by Russia’s increased activity in the Arctic due to warming waters that make passage possible as Russia expands investment there, asserts its boundaries and facilitates China’s entry into the region.

With the end of a cooperative framework, the Arctic is rapidly becoming the next contested area in great power competition, and the U.S. is in danger of being a day late and a dollar short. It is time to take the lead and invest both civilian and especially military resources in this incredibly important geo-political region of the world. Failure to do so may have serious consequences.

The strategic importance of the High North

The High North is defined as the region north of the Arctic Circle, or above 66.5 degrees latitude. The region encompasses 6 percent of the earth’s surface in an area of 8.2 million square miles, two-thirds of which comprises the Arctic Ocean.

The area is rich in resources and is estimated to hold one-third of the world’s natural gas, 13 percent of global oil reserves and vast quantities of minerals and rare-earth metals. The Arctic also offers three valuable trade routes for navigating the polar region, including the Northwest Passage, the Transpolar Sea Route and the Northern Sea Route, the latter of which is normally open for only a brief period each year.

Finally, the region is of continuing military strategic importance due to its proximity to the U.S. and Russia and as a crucial link between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of operation. Its location is also essential for communications infrastructure including satellites.

Access rights to resources are held by eight Arctic nations including Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia and the U.S. However, due to the region’s economic and strategic advantages, both Arctic and non-Arctic nations seek a presence in the region.

The end of cooperation

Until recently, the High North enjoyed geopolitical stability and cooperation among the Arctic nations, including the establishment in 1996 of the Arctic Council. An independent intergovernmental body, the council began its mission by serving as the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation and coordination among the Arctic nations, Arctic Indigenous peoples and other inhabitants with a focus on sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

As the council evolved, its members supported creation of an adjunct Arctic Chiefs of Defense Conference consisting of periodic meetings during which the highest-ranking military leaders of the Arctic nations would resolve issues, foster collaboration and provide transparency for regional military operations. This stability earned the region the label of “High North, Low Tension.”

Unfortunately, these cooperation efforts were deeply damaged when Vladimir Putin illegally annexed Crimea in 2014 and then attacked the sovereign territory of Ukraine in 2022. As a result of these acts of aggression, the council members ostracized the Russian Federation and froze communications. Putin acutely felt this due to reliance on foreign investment and technology to fuel his plans to achieve polar great power status.

But Russia has proven surprisingly resilient, and its economy has rebounded. Its military has also been boosted by a resilient industrial base. There is currently no dialog with Russian political or military leaders in the chambers of the Arctic Council, and this has resulted in a situation akin to having a “hot line” where neither side picks up the phone when it rings.

Warming waters increase access and interest

The changing climate is also changing the dynamic. While accessing the Arctic’s resources and trade routes previously had been difficult due to the challenging environment, the region is now warming at least twice and perhaps as much as four times the global rate, contributing to a reduction in Arctic ice, which is now at historical lows. An examination of satellite imagery shows that the Arctic region is now more blue water than white ice.

With more open water and unhindered passage through the Arctic region for longer periods, the great powers are taking on a new level of interest. For example, Russia, with more than 50 percent of the Arctic coastline – and more than half of the Arctic population – has invested heavily in the economic, societal and military development of its Arctic zone.

It has also sought to monetize the Northern Sea Route, declaring that passage through the Northern Sea Route requires sovereign state permission, 45 days’ notice, pre-paid tariffs for safe passage and the requirement to use Russian pilots and Russian icebreakers as escorts, which is rejected by Western nations that demand the right to transit passage of an international strait in accordance with the U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea.

Furthermore, since 2001 Russia has challenged the status quo and traditional boundaries on the continental shelf bordering the Russian Federation in the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).

In fact, in August 2007, the Russians planted a one-meter titanium flag at the base of the Lomonosov Ridge, near the North Pole, which the Russians claim is connected to the Siberian continental shelf of the Russian Federation.

Canada and Denmark challenge these claims with both submitting their own claims due to their own sovereign interest in oil and gas exploration in this area. The Russians have a good chance of a favorable ruling, potentially giving the Russian Federation control over 460,000 square miles or 70 percent of the Arctic continental shelf, inclusive of the oil, gas and mineral harvesting rights therein.

An increasingly militarized region

The Arctic was once known as a region of peaceful cooperation but is now becoming better known for its militarization. Many Arctic and non-Arctic nations now operate their warships and submarines in the Arctic Ocean, and there is no regulatory body to provide deconfliction or risk mitigation when different navies interact.

Seven of the eight Arctic Council nations are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and this allows for coordination and cooperation amongst those members’ navies, but neither Russia nor China has a seat at the table in NATO headquarters.

Accordingly, the Arctic region risks becoming a proving ground for large-scale exercises and testing and experimentation of Western, Russian and Chinese weapons of war. Russia has long used the North to conduct weapons testing. It is currently conducting sea trials of its mammoth new submarine, Belgorod, which is capable of deploying a nuclear-powered deep diving mini-sub and the dual-use Poseidon torpedo with long ranges that can traverse the Atlantic Ocean.

Likewise, the Russians have perfected hypersonic weapons, already employed in the Ukraine conflict, and the Arctic proving ground offers another area for testing and evaluation. Some Russian icebreakers are even capable of being armed with the Kalibr cruise missile, which is similar to the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile.

Putin has also been expanding Russia’s global interests by strengthening partnerships with China and North Korea, while courting regimes across Africa and Asia. It is only a matter of time before the Chinese exploit their growing partnership with Russia in the High North by conducting military operations in the Arctic region.

We should not be surprised in the next few years when a Chinese nuclear submarine surfaces at the North Pole.

China’s interest in the Arctic is part of their long-term strategy of domination, including the development of strategic infrastructure. The Chinese have been in the market for an Arctic operating base for more than a decade to complete President Xi’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.

In order to facilitate operations on the “Polar Silk Road,” the Chinese know that they must ensure a robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and communications architecture in space, thereby placing them in direct competition for bandwidth and orbits over the polar region.

As the ice melts, it will present opportunities for seeding new networks of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) in the form of pipelines or communication cables, as well as the opportunity to interdict existing or future networks of CUI from Western nations.

The West falls behind

The Western allies are woefully behind in the race to establish an enduring presence in the Arctic region.

For the U.S. Navy, while submarines periodically operate in the High North, we no longer build surface warships fit for Arctic operations. The U.S. Coast Guard has one 48-year-old heavy icebreaker, Polar Star, and we have fallen behind in the timeline for delivery of a replacement. The planned U.S. Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) is not scheduled to deliver until 2028, nor deploy until 2030 or later.

As a gap filler, the Coast Guard is considering the leasing of one commercial icebreaker while we wait for the arrival of the PSC. Though the Coast Guard’s medium icebreaker, Healy, has traditionally conducted the research missions of the Arctic, it is insufficient to fulfill the presence, research and law enforcement missions demanded by the evolving strategic environment.

By contrast, the Russians have more than 50 icebreakers, some of which are nuclear powered, giving them the ability to remain on station indefinitely. Likewise, the Chinese are following suit and building their own icebreaker fleet.

In order to compete in the polar region, it would be premature to flood the area with warships or icebreakers without a robust supporting infrastructure. Domain awareness and communications capabilities are at the forefront of requirements. Frankly, we have ignored the development of networks over the poles due to competing priorities.

There is currently limited capacity for Western geosynchronous orbiting satellites over the poles as well as limited land based supporting infrastructure. SpaceX has launched more than 5,000 Starlink satellites in the last few years. Intended for commercial use, Starlink has quickly adapted to military requirements, particularly during the war in Ukraine. The network currently has 200 dedicated satellites over in the polar region, but it is insufficient to rely on a sole source commercial solution to solve the current gap in bandwidth and military requirements.

Essential next steps

Clearly, more must be done.

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has identified the critical need and is programming resources to fill the void. Meanwhile, we should take advantage of commercial solutions and provide incentives for others to follow suit.

The Saint Lawrence Island, which is part of Alaska, presents both a strategic foothold in the Bering Sea and opportunities for infrastructure investment. Since the Saint Lawrence Island is sovereign U.S. territory, it would be prudent to base the first tranche of land-based infrastructure in support of space operations there with deference to environmental concerns.

The need for infrastructure in the Arctic is not just pertinent to the ability of the U.S. to maintain a presence in the region and ensure freedom of passage through the global commons. The tangible threat to the homeland represented by Russia, and increasingly China, necessitates a close look at this issue in the context of our ability to effectively defend the homeland.

Specifically, substantial gaps exist in Arctic domain awareness and in the ability to command and control homeland defense forces in the far reaches of the region. A robust ability to communicate and to move data across the broad expanse of the Arctic is essential to both. The existing communications backbone organic to the Department of Defense (DOD) is wholly inadequate to the task, but there is strong potential to leverage commercial assets currently in place and planned for the future. DoD must redouble its efforts to engage with commercial partners if they are to invest commensurately in the capabilities required to meet defense needs.

#### b. US monitoring is key to effective deterrence

Penney et al. 25, \*Senior Resident Fellow, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, \*\*Senior Resident Fellow for Airpower Studies, Mitchell Institute, \*\*\*USAF, NORAD Deputy Director of Operations, \*\*\*\*RCAF, NORAD Deputy Director of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. (\*Heather Penney, \*\*Brig Gen Houston Cantwell, USAF (Ret.), \*\*\*Maj Gen Mark “Pied” Piper, \*\*\*\*Brig Gen James Hawthorne, 2-8-2025, “Countering China and Russia in the High North: The Arctic Challenge” episode 222 of the Aerospace Advantage Podcast from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Transcript available at https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/podcast/episode-222-the-arctic-challenge/) wtk

And then you mentioned the importance of the Arctic for the future. multiple reasons. It’s obviously a source of competition and that is going to only grow in importance for economic and there’s very few places where economic competition doesn’t have some overlaying of military competition as well.

So, whether or not, and I’ll let James talk to what’s mentioned about the, I think it’s the fundamental priority of the Arctic and the Canadian strategy. But just from the U. S. perspective, you know, we have a national Arctic strategy that looks at the importance of the Arctic being peaceful, stable, prosperous and cooperative. You know, we want to ensure continued things like freedom and navigation rule of law. So, there’s some big high level concepts that are important there from a kind of a grand strategy from the North American perspective, [00:10:00] but from a military perspective, specifically.

Specifically, as it relates to NDS priorities of deterring aggression, defending the homeland and strategic deterrence, right? We need to be present. We need to be there as North America as the United States as Canada as Arctic free world nations. To ensure our presence, to ensure we can monitor and respond, to deter that aggression. From a homeland defense standpoint, as you mentioned, it’s a potential axis of attack for North America. That is always something that’s on our mind always has been and always will be. And then if you just look at our increased ability to operate in the Arctic, whether or not it’s our detection capability, or our presence, or just our ability to say, operate in the air domain in the Arctic, that will only increase the crediting capability of our strategic deterrence.

#### 3. No net benefit—

#### a. EU Leadership is impossible because of populism and internal crises

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In this context, is the EU’s leadership structure fit for the Herculean tasks, or does its fragmented decision-making leave it struggling to respond when a clear answer is needed? A leadership crisis is not just the absence of strong personalities—it is rather a failure of direction, coordination, and the ability to secure public trust. In the context of the European Union, a leadership crisis manifests itself when institutions lack the ability to project authority and inspire confidence and stability. It is not about the lack of a single, charismatic figure, but rather about whether the EU's decisionmakers can both provide clear and effective governance and bring Union-level politics closer to the citizens.

And while the European Union was never designed to be led by a single figure, certain leaders in its history have played a key role in shaping its direction and serving as “faces” of the EU. Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, possessed the vision to lay the groundwork for the modern EU, the Single Market, and the euro. Leaders like the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, though primarily a national figure, exerted perceivable and, most importantly, recognizable influence over EU affairs, contributing to steering Europe through crises such as the eurozone meltdown. These well-known names represent examples of how leaders can set direction but, most importantly, build trust internally and represent the EU externally.

Yet, over the years, the European Union’s leadership has arguably become less visible and more fragmented. This is not entirely accidental—as the EU expanded from its founding members to the current 27 nations, decision-making became increasingly complex, requiring a redefinition of power sharing. The more voices involved, the harder it became for any single figure to emerge as the face of European leadership. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty reshaped the EU’s governance, creating new positions such as the President of the European Council, aimed at limiting the prominence of the Commission President. While successfully distributing power more evenly, the EU also made its leadership less recognizable. The rise of populism and nationalist movements across Europe has weakened the authority of EU institutions even further, as some national leaders frame Brussels in dictatorial terms, antagonistic to the national interests of member states.

Instead of contributing to building a stronger EU leadership, some members have grown more reluctant even when it comes to competencies already given to the EU, leading to decision-making gridlock, as in the current case of enforcing sanctions against Russia and continuing to offer support to Ukraine. And while this political strategy brings short-term electoral gains at the national level precisely by exploiting the existing disconnect between the Union and EU citizens, it ultimately undermines the already weakened foundation of European cooperation, alienating Europeans further from the EU. While populist national leaders in some member states pledge to “regain” sovereignty at the expense of acting at the Union level, the EU continues to face problems that cannot be solved by individual action but instead require an EU-wide response.

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#### b. The multilateral order is resilient

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### 2AC Answers to: European Union CP (Science Diplomacy)

#### 1. Permutation do both—the EU establishing an Arctic policy AND the US doing the plan would still allow the EU to prove they are committed to multilateralism

#### 2. The US is key:

#### a. Russia says no—they won’t cooperate with the EU as an organization

Aliyev 24, Senior Research Fellow in the European Neighbourhood Chair at the College of Europe in Natolin (Nurlan Aliyev, 12-22-2024, “Frosty relations: Russia and the EU in the Arctic” https://ridl.io/frosty-relations-russia-and-the-eu-in-the-arctic/) wtk

It should be noted that the need for dialogue among the Arctic states are repeatedly stated by Russian foreign policy officials. They noted the growing confrontation, uncertainty in relations, and the lack of dialogue on all pressing issues, including in the sphere of security policy, are of serious concern. However, it seems that, like with before the invasion of 2022, Moscow mostly wants to have cooperation with the Arctic states, including EU members rather than with the EU as an institution.

#### b. US-Russia cooperation is key to prevent biased climate models

Wiliams 25, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. (Margaret, 6-17-2025, “U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Science and Conservation in the Bering Strait Region: Past Achievements and Current Status” https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/us-russian-cooperation-science-and-conservation-bering-strait-region-past) wtk

A key area of bilateral work between Russia and Alaska has been assessing the impacts of rising Arctic air temperatures on permafrost, the layer of frozen soils which stretches across much of the circumpolar. Russia encompasses most of the permafrost-covered soils in the Arctic. The wartime prohibition on communication meant that U.S. scientists stopped sending equipment to Siberia, and Russian scientists could no longer send data to their Western partners. One Russian permafrost scientist noted that in his field, an interruption in shared data collection and analysis can be tolerated for a short while because anticipated changes in Siberia can be inferred by research in Scandinavia and Alaska. However, the scientist said that, in the long term, the loss of information coming from Russia will cause “estimates of changes in global permafrost [to be] biased.”

#### c. US involvement is key to science diplomacy and trust

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Russian and American interviewees alike spoke about the value of both personal and professional relationships with their respective international colleagues. They recounted how developing research questions jointly, then working together, often for multiple years in a row, built strong foundations of trust and respect for the other “side.” These bonds helped many cooperative projects flourish over three decades. This core element of successful bilateral work, however, is now in jeopardy, as two years of little to no in-person fieldwork (during the pandemic), followed by three years of virtually no communication, have eliminated the opportunities for Russian and American experts to meet, share ideas, conduct fieldwork, and nurture their working relationships.

#### 3. No net benefit—

#### a. EU Leadership is impossible because of populism and internal crises

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In this context, is the EU’s leadership structure fit for the Herculean tasks, or does its fragmented decision-making leave it struggling to respond when a clear answer is needed? A leadership crisis is not just the absence of strong personalities—it is rather a failure of direction, coordination, and the ability to secure public trust. In the context of the European Union, a leadership crisis manifests itself when institutions lack the ability to project authority and inspire confidence and stability. It is not about the lack of a single, charismatic figure, but rather about whether the EU's decisionmakers can both provide clear and effective governance and bring Union-level politics closer to the citizens.

And while the European Union was never designed to be led by a single figure, certain leaders in its history have played a key role in shaping its direction and serving as “faces” of the EU. Jacques Delors, the President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, possessed the vision to lay the groundwork for the modern EU, the Single Market, and the euro. Leaders like the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, though primarily a national figure, exerted perceivable and, most importantly, recognizable influence over EU affairs, contributing to steering Europe through crises such as the eurozone meltdown. These well-known names represent examples of how leaders can set direction but, most importantly, build trust internally and represent the EU externally.

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### 2AC Answers to: European Union CP (Russian LNG)

#### 1. Permutation do both—the EU establishing an Arctic policy AND the US doing the plan would still allow the EU to prove they are committed to multilateralism

#### 2. The US is key:

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It should be noted that the need for dialogue among the Arctic states are repeatedly stated by Russian foreign policy officials. They noted the growing confrontation, uncertainty in relations, and the lack of dialogue on all pressing issues, including in the sphere of security policy, are of serious concern. However, it seems that, like with before the invasion of 2022, Moscow mostly wants to have cooperation with the Arctic states, including EU members rather than with the EU as an institution.

#### b. Direct US involvement is key to any successful arms control agreement

Charap and Reif 25, \*distinguished chair in Russia and Eurasia policy and a senior political scientist at RAND. He served in the Arms Control Bureau at the U.S. State Department. \*\*senior international/defense researcher at RAND, served as U.S. deputy assistant secretary of Defense for threat reduction and arms control. (\*Samuel Charap, \*\*Kingston Reif, 6-4-2025, “Where Trump and Putin Could Make a Deal” https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/06/where-trump-and-putin-could-make-a-deal.html) wtk

U.S. President Donald Trump's approach toward Russia has been dominated by his push to end the country's war against Ukraine. But the administration has an opportunity to make progress on another urgent national security imperative: nuclear arms control. In fact, after returning to office this year, Trump wasted little time in calling for negotiations with Russia and China to “denuclearize … in a very big way.”

To be sure, reaching any new agreements, especially one that includes China, will take time. But as a first step, Russia and the United States could immediately return to implementing a currently moribund agreement that is already on the books: the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, better known as New START. Though New START's February 2026 expiration is fast approaching, reinvigorating it and resuming a regular dialogue could lay the foundation for more far-reaching agreements, demonstrating to the world that the United States and Russia can still cooperate to manage nuclear risks.

New START caps U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals at 1,550 deployed warheads and 700 deployed long-range missiles and heavy bombers each. The treaty contains an elaborate data-sharing, monitoring, and on-site inspection regime to verify compliance. Like earlier U.S.-Russian arms-control agreements, it has served as a powerful brake on unconstrained nuclear competition.

Both sides faithfully implemented New START for its ten-year duration, and in early 2021, both agreed to extend it for five years. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, however, the treaty all but collapsed, as did bilateral dialogue intended to maintain strategic stability. In February 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would suspend its participation in New START, including its verification provisions, owing to U.S. support for Ukraine. A few months later, the United States responded with legal countermeasures that essentially mirrored Russia's move.

While then-President Joe Biden's administration did attempt to engage the Kremlin on the issue of strategic stability, Putin rejected these overtures, stating that the United States could not hope for strategic stability if it sought Russia's “strategic defeat” in Ukraine. But the situation has changed. In a little-noticed shift after Trump took office, Putin called for bilateral engagement on arms control without explicitly insisting on a full halt to U.S. military aid to Ukraine as a precondition. Putin's shift and Trump's stated desire to “denuclearize” has created an opportunity for the United States and Russia to prove that nuclear arms control is still viable.

Of course, if past is precedent, negotiating a new deal to replace New START could take many months, if not several years. Talks will need to address thorny issues that have bedeviled attempts to reach new arrangements over the past 15 years. These include so-called nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons, China's growing nuclear arsenal, strategic missile defenses, and advanced conventional strike capabilities.

If New START expires with nothing to replace it, there would be no agreed-upon limits on the world's two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades. By contrast, restoring New START and resuming a strategic-stability dialogue would provide a needed foundation from which to pursue more far-reaching follow-on arrangements. As an additional near-term step, both sides could make a political commitment to adhere to the treaty's limits beyond its expiration date, while they negotiate new caps and attempt to bring China into the arms-control fold.

Even in the face of a growing Chinese arsenal that is not subject to treaty limits, keeping the New START limits in place makes sense. China is not projected to become a nuclear peer of either country in terms of deployed warheads for at least another decade, and the United States would still have enough force flexibility to delay that outcome.

Moreover, an active U.S.-Russia arms-control regime is probably a necessary condition for any future arms-control arrangements with China. It also could remove incentives for China to rush to parity with Russia and the United States—an outcome that both Russia and the United States want to avoid. A U.S.-Russia commitment to remain at the New START force levels, combined with the pursuit of new caps, could reduce the need for the United States to make costly investments to build up its forces at a time when its nuclear modernization effort is already facing major budget and schedule challenges.

With over 85 percent of the world's nuclear warheads between them, the United States and Russia have a special obligation to reduce the existential threat posed by these weapons. Returning to New START compliance and resuming dialogue on strategic stability would be an immediate step in that direction.

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### 2AC Answers to: European Union CP (Native Renewables)

#### 1. Permutation do both—the EU establishing an Arctic policy AND the US doing the plan would still allow the EU to prove they are committed to multilateralism

#### 2. The US is key to energy sovereignty—only reversing federal cuts to renewable energy can rebuild trust

Elk 25, Grist Indigenous Affairs Reporting Fellow. (Miacel Spotted Elk, 7-17-2025, “Clean Energy Projects on U.S. Tribal Lands Were Booming. Then Came Trump’s Tax Bill.” https://www.theenergymix.com/clean-energy-projects-on-u-s-tribal-lands-were-booming-then-came-trumps-tax-bill/) wtk

Donald Trump signed his massive domestic policy and tax bill into law on Friday, July 4. As his administration celebrates, many Americans are contemplating its effects closer to home. With deep cuts to Medicaid, food stamps, and renewable energy projects, the bill is likely to have a devastating effect on low-income and rural communities across the country.

But while Republican governors in states that rely on those programs have largely remained silent about the bill’s effects, tribal leaders across the country are not mincing words about the upcoming fallout for their communities.

“These bills are an affront to our sovereignty, our lands, and our way of life. They would gut essential health and food security programs, roll back climate resilience funding, and allow the exploitation of our sacred homelands without even basic tribal consultation,” said Chalyee Éesh Richard Peterson, president of the Tlingit and Haida in Alaska, in a statement. “This is not just bad policy—it is a betrayal of the federal trust responsibility to tribal nations.”

Tribes across the country are particularly worried about the mega-bill’s hit to clean energy, complicating the development of critical wind and solar projects. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, tribal households face 6.5 times more electrical outages per year and a 28% higher energy burden compared to the average U.S. household. An estimated 54,000 people living on tribal lands have no electricity.

Under the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the Biden administration opened up new federal funding opportunities, increased the loan authority of the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program, and created new tax credits for wind energy, battery storage, large-scale solar farms, and programs to repurpose lands harmed by environmental degradation for related energy projects. Trump’s new bill largely dismantles these programs.

Historically, tribes have had limited access to capital to fund clean energy projects. Through the IRA, new projects were driven by tribes to address community and infrastructure needs on their terms. According to tribes and energy advocacy groups, these projects not only help build energy infrastructure for each tribal nation but also create jobs, boost local economies, and affirm sovereignty.

Crystal Miller, a member of the Walker River Paiute Tribe who heads government affairs and policy at the Alliance for Tribal Clean Energy, underlined the existential outcomes for tribal communities. “It is extremely life or death if you’re talking about clean energy projects, in particular solar, which provide energy to homes, provide heat to homes that wouldn’t have it without, because they don’t have lines run to their community,” she said.

Prior to the House of Representatives vote on the bill, the Alliance for Tribal Clean Energy was part of a broader group that sent letters to Congress warning of the consequences for tribes, treaties, and domestic energy priorities. These “are not only economic but also environmental and humanitarian,” they wrote, after the U.S. Senate narrowly approved the bill 51-50 earlier this week, with Vice President JD Vance casting the tie-breaking vote.

Miller pointed out that tribes weren’t consulted on the terms of the bill before it headed to Trump’s desk, yet they will be forced to live with the consequences. Tribal leaders across the United States warned the legislation could jeopardize projects critical to their communities’ energy needs: A tribal village in Alaska’s attempt to curb high electricity costs by establishing a tribal utility; the Cheyenne River Sioux’s efforts to navigate long, harsh winters in South Dakota; and California tribes’ development of microgrids to offset power outages due to wildfires. The Hopi Tribe in Arizona said the sovereign nation’s microgrid would fail after a historic transition from coal.

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The majority of countries in the world will likely continue to affirm support for political democracy. However, political variations among “democracies” will likely increase, even in the West. As a result, either the requirements of “liberal democracy” may become relaxed, or “illiberal democracies” may become tolerated under a broad framework of democracies versus explicit autocracies. NATO already tolerates such ideological heterogeneity, as several of its member states are viewed by others as “illiberal.”

The expansion of complexities and uncertainties within the international system may be mitigated by another factor: the strategic interests of countries in seeking geopolitical stability through strategic alignment and constraints. The Trump administration, for instance, may seek geopolitical stability in Europe and the Middle East to strategically prioritize China and the Asia-Pacific. U.S.-China strategic conflicts may be mitigated by constraints designed to prevent mutually detrimental economic and military losses.

#### 4. International fiat is a voting issue—A. It’s illogical because no policymaker can choose between the US or EU. B. It unlimits what the aff has to be prepared for because there are almost 200 countries plus a large number of international organizations that could potentially do the plan.

### 2AC Conditionality Bad

[Read only if the CP is conditional.]

#### (\_#\_) Conditionality is a Voting Issue — the neg should get the status quo or an unconditional counterplan, not both. Conditionality creates an unproductive argument culture because it values coverage more than engagement. This discourages in-depth clash and argument resolution (because less time is spent on each position) and lowers the barrier of entry for low-quality arguments (because the neg is trying to distract the 2AC). Different advocacies should be debated in different debates, not crammed into this one. Vote for the theoretical position that best encourages high-quality debates.

## 1AR

### Extend: “US Key to Deterrence” (Domain Awareness)

#### US leadership is key to counter aggressive Russian and Chinese militarization.

Pechko 25, M.A. graduate from Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy & International Relations specializing in International Security and Europe. (Kiel, 1-7-2025, “Rising Tensions and Shifting Strategies: The Evolving Dynamics of US Grand Strategy in the Arctic” https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/rising-tensions-shifting-strategies-evolving-dynamics-us-grand-strategy-arctic/) wtk

Arctic development and policies have transitioned from cooperative to competitive due to Russian development, militarization, and the PRC’s expanding influence, necessitating a recalibrated US grand strategy. The 2022 US National Strategy for the Arctic Region presented a comprehensive response, prioritizing security, climate resilience, sustainable development, and international governance. Its multi-pronged approach, emphasizing the immediate need for a unified NATO Arctic strategy, furthers US interests and aligns military, economic, and environmental policies among Arctic NATO members.

When engaging Russia, the US must present a strong deterrent while pursuing selective diplomatic efforts on shared concerns such as environmental protection and accident prevention. This balanced strategy, valuing both strength and diplomacy, is necessary to reduce the risk of miscalculations. At the same time, strengthening the US role in multilateral forums like the Arctic Council is essential to counter PRC’s influence and prevent it from gaining leverage as a self-proclaimed “near-Arctic” stakeholder.

Climate change will create shipping opportunities and natural resource access, accompanied by the potential for economic growth and strategic challenges. In navigating this evolving landscape, the US strives to balance energy, security, and environmental protection but conflicting interests complicate policy coherence. Political changes and stakeholder sentiment can significantly shape strategy, often resulting in abrupt shifts. Maintaining consistency is crucial, especially as environmental issues increasingly intersect with energy independence and national security.

Security remains central to US strategy, but vulnerabilities exist due to military and infrastructure gaps. Russia’s aggressive Arctic buildup contrasts with the US’s limited fleet and infrastructure. The US relies on strengthening alliances, mainly through NATO, which Sweden now reinforces and Finland’s membership. Balancing defense, diplomacy, and coalition-building is vital to safeguarding US interests and Arctic stability. The US can shape the Arctic’s future through strategic investments and leadership, ensuring alignment between national security, environmental, and economic goals.

### Extend: “US Key to Monitoring” (Domain Awareness)

#### US governmental data collection is key

Penney et al. 25, \*Senior Resident Fellow, The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, \*\*Senior Resident Fellow for Airpower Studies, Mitchell Institute, \*\*\*USAF, NORAD Deputy Director of Operations, \*\*\*\*RCAF, NORAD Deputy Director of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. (\*Heather Penney, \*\*Brig Gen Houston Cantwell, USAF (Ret.), \*\*\*Maj Gen Mark “Pied” Piper, \*\*\*\*Brig Gen James Hawthorne, 2-8-2025, “Countering China and Russia in the High North: The Arctic Challenge” episode 222 of the Aerospace Advantage Podcast from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Transcript available at https://www.mitchellaerospacepower.org/podcast/episode-222-the-arctic-challenge/) wtk

Heather “Lucky” Penney: And I would think that domain awareness would extend beyond just simply detecting threats that might be inbound, whether or not they’re high altitude, non maneuvering like they were back in the Cold War, ICBMs or bombers, but also, uh, we would want to look at what activities are going on in the Arctic.

So, having that sustained and persistent surveillance to be able to watch activities that are happening, not just threats that are inbound. And those, I think, are two different challenges. Brig. Gen. Houston “Slider” Cantwell, USAF (Ret.): Yeah, totally agree. and also add that recapitalization of these ground sensors has been delayed for years.

[00:17:00] And, uh, despite this vulnerability, I think it’s safe to say there’s a big risk here and we’ll have to see, hopefully the NORAD folks can give us some insights into, you know, what efforts are being made to try to prioritize, some of these upgrades. Real quick about space. Hey, I think it’s so important to bring up space because, uh, there’s been an explosion of space based capabilities. And, there’s certainly opportunity for improved Arctic domain awareness. But there’s some unique challenges that these extreme northern latitudes are bringing to satellite operations. I wanna make sure our listeners understand that. Heather “Lucky” Penney: Yeah, I know. That’s really important. Please dig into that because I don’t think folks understand how challenging polar orbits or polar surveillance is from space.

Brig. Gen. Houston “Slider” Cantwell, USAF (Ret.): Right, right. And so a lot of our low earth orbits are optimized for coverage below the Arctic Circle, because as was mentioned earlier, there’s not a lot of human beings living above the Arctic Circle and these are commercial satellites, so they want to optimize for the lower latitudes.

And then you’ve got the fact that geostationary orbits are actually masked by [00:18:00] the curvature of the earth and there’s highly capable satellites out in geo. Unfortunately, they do us very little use up in the northern latitudes. Heather “Lucky” Penney: Yeah, because they’re geo because they’re able to exploit, the rotation of the earth.

So they have to be along the equator or within that rotational plane. Brig. Gen. Houston “Slider” Cantwell, USAF (Ret.): Exactly. So, these challenges are resulting in less communication capabilities and less sensor capabilities as you move into the high latitudes. And I think that’s important to understand.

Heather “Lucky” Penney: And even the, position and navigation of the Arctic is challenging too, because of the magnetic variations.

And also, um, because of the GPS coverage. So, having position and navigation is a major challenge in the Arctic as well. So, there’s a lot of things that are different that go beyond just, Hey, it’s cold weather. It’s bad weather that we have to be able to overcome to be able to maintain that persistence surveillance.

Brig. Gen. Houston “Slider” Cantwell, USAF (Ret.): Yep. Totally agree. One more thing on the sensing and that is, information sharing. Because, if you look at the remarks that our current, US NORTHCOM commander has said, and previous have [00:19:00] said. We’ll say getting left of launch is more important than ever, and, this is going to require multi domain sensors.

Gonna have to combine that with seamless information sharing, and this information sharing has got to go on between U. S. governmental departments. As well as internationally, and it’s so important moving forward, I wish our folks could understand how we need to identify the conditions leading up to an attack before the attack actually happens.

### Extend: “US Key to Climate Models” (Science Diplomacy)

#### Cp alone fails without the plan—Russia’s exclusion from the Arctic Council undermines EU Arctic research, data collection and climate monitoring

De Cuyper 22, Content Writer in EU Affairs at The New Global Order and Masters student in Diplomatic Studies at the University of Oxford. (Fiona De Cuyper, 12-2-2022, “Polar Power Plays: Is the EU’s Arctic Policy Still Relevant?” https://thenewglobalorder.com/world-news/polar-power-plays-the-eus-arctic-policy-in-the-high-north/)

Climate change continues to be the most pressing challenge in the Arctic region as the repercussions of global warming are most visible in the circumpolar region. The strong climate focus of the EU’s Arctic policy is therefore highly timely. However, the war in Ukraine is increasingly posing more and more challenges to engagement in the Arctic region. The economic consequences of the war are, for example, impacting the progress and priority position of the Green Deal, as well as the EU’s imports of minerals and energy. The EU is mainly occupied with resolving its internal challenges for the time being as it needs to send a clear signal to its citizens that their well-being prevails over the Union’s geopolitical aspirations. If it fails to do so, it would only further fuel Euroscepticism and the rise of populist governments within member states.

In addition, Russia has been excluded from key collaborative infrastructure in the Arctic, such as the Arctic Council, bringing about a deadlock in circumpolar cooperation. This can, in turn, undermine the Union’s activities including maritime research, data collection and monitoring of the climate in the region, as data on a significant part of the Arctic would be omitted.

Another key pillar of the Union’s Arctic policy is international cooperation, meaning that the EU’s circumpolar engagement has also been key in the cultivation of its relations with Russia and increasingly also with China. It allowed for peaceful cooperation on various aspects, such as people-to-people interactions with Indigenous peoples and businesses as well as scientific cooperation. These joint EU-Russian efforts have now come to a standstill and there are no prospects of a revival in the near future.

### Extend: “US Key to Arms Control” (Russian LNG)

#### US and Russian negotiators have decades of experience working together—that

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In the case of Russia, the path to nuclear negotiations is relatively straightforward. U.S. and Russian negotiators have been at this business for nearly 60 years and know each other well. Since the 1970s, when Washington and Moscow were at each other’s throats, the two parties have managed to control, limit, and reduce nuclear weapons no matter what else was happening in their relationship. Especially after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the nearest the two sides came to nuclear war, both appreciated that nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to humanity and committed to isolating the nuclear dialogue on its own track. The United States and Russia continued implementing New START amid the first Russian invasion of Ukraine, when Putin seized Crimea in 2014.

### Extend: “US Key to Native Renewables” (Native Renewables)

#### US federal programs are key to adoption of renewable energy

Raimi and Davicino 24, \*fellow at Resources for the Future and a lecturer at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan. \*\*Graduate Research Assistant. O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs. (\*Daniel Raimi, \*\*Alana Davicino, January 2024, “Securing energy sovereignty: A review of key barriers and opportunities for energy-producing Native nations in the United States” Energy Research & Social Science Volume 107, January 2024, 103324) wtk

As discussed in Section 2, federal policies and programs have often been barriers to, rather than enablers of, tribal energy sovereignty. However, recent legislative and executive actions have sought to change this dynamic. One example is the development of a “Tribal Playbook” to ensure Native nations are aware of, and able to access, the large amounts of federal funding made available through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 [99].

Other programs have supported tribal energy development for decades. The DOE's Tribal Energy Program, established in 2002, provides funding and technical assistance for tribal energy planning [62]. The DOE generally considers these plans to be “a roadmap to achieving community energy goals in both the near and long term,” and are developed with extensive community input [100].

One analysis of these programs [62] found a statistically significant and moderate association between a formal energy plan or vision and having energy development activities. This may indicate that formal energy plans helped tribes overcome barriers to development. However, the study is unable to make a causal claim because tribes that develop plans may have more capacity in general, making it more likely that they will successfully develop their energy resources.

The Department of Energy also offers loans and loan guarantees to tribes for energy development projects under its Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program (TELGP). In early 2022, the DOE removed fees that were seen as significant barriers to participation, which could increase the likelihood of future participation, and the Inflation Reduction Act increased the program's loan authority to $20 billion [102]. However, no projects had been funded as of September 2023 [103]. Future research could help shed light on why the TELGP has not been taken up to date.

Other programs and grants offered by the DOE Office of Indian Energy and Economic Development may also serve as tools for securing tribal sovereignty through energy development. In 2014, for example, the SUIT received a $1.5 million grant to offset construction costs in building a community-scale solar facility, which began operations in 2017 [104].

In addition to these existing programs, lawmakers continue to propose new policies to secure tribal energy sovereignty and improve the consultation process between the federal government and Native nations. For example, US House Representative Raul Grijalva (D-AZ) and Senator Martin Heinrich (D-NM) introduced several bills in 2021 and 2022 to enhance tribes' input into decisions regarding land use or sites that tribes consider culturally or spiritually significant. These bills include:

1) The Requirements, Expectations, and Standard Procedures for Effective Consultation with Tribes (RESPECT) Act,5 introduced by Grijalva, which would require that federal agencies conduct tribal consultation before finalizing any regulatory action or starting any activity that may have a tribal impact or affect federal land that borders Indian land. It also lays out criteria for how federal agencies should identify tribal impacts, conduct outreach to tribal governments, and initiate consultation sessions [105].

2) The Advancing Tribal Parity on Public Land Act, introduced by Grijalva and Heinrich in House and Senate companion bills, respectively, which seeks to prevent the sale of public land that contains tribal cultural sites, provides tribes right of first refusal when certain federal lands are listed for transfer or disposal, and requires public land advisory boards to include at least one tribal representative [106].

3) The Tribal Cultural Areas Protection Act, introduced by Grijalva and Heinrich in House and Senate companion bills, respectively, which would establish a Tribal Cultural Protection Areas System that would protect and preserve significant cultural sites on public lands [107].

As of September 2023, however, none of these bills had become law.

3.5. Access to “direct pay” for federal energy tax credits

As noted in Table 1, Native nations and tribally-owned corporations have typically been unable to take advantage of federal tax incentives for energy projects due to their lack of federal income tax liability. The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 changed this by allowing for tribes to receive a payment worth the value of the tax credit. This option reduces the need for tribes to seek tax equity partners, a process that typically would reduce profitability and increase complexity [108].

Although it is difficult to know with precision how this change in policy will affect the deployment of new energy technologies on Native lands, it fundamentally alters the economics of certain projects. According to practitioners at the intersection of energy policy and economic development, the Act represents “an absolute game changer” for tribes seeking access to financing for energy projects [109]. For example, a $100 million solar project could be eligible for $30 to $50 million in federal incentives, making it easier for Native nations to finance projects directly or borrow funds to begin construction.

### Extend: “EU Leadership Fails”

#### Energy dependence blocks strategic autonomy

Batuhan Gunes, 2025 - is an MA graduate in European Studies from KU Leuven University. His expertise lies in European Union Common Security and Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy and NATO. “EU in the Post-American World Beyond U.S. Hegemony” Foreign Analysis, Spring

https://foreignanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/FOREIGN-ANALYSIS-SPRING-2025-1.pdf //DH

Since 2017, both French President Emmanuel Macron, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and EU bureaucrats have stated on different occasions that Europe should be self-sufficient and that there should be a military power to complement the EU’s undeniable economic power. Thus, the initiative for a European army was reborn—this time with tangible actions such as Strategic Autonomy, the European Army Project, and the Strategic Compass Initiative. Second, Europe has been dependent on other powers and states for its own energy consumption. Although energy dependency on non-EU countries varies greatly between EU states, the average energy import dependency rate was 63% in 2022. There is no exact number demonstrating that the EU’s dependency on energy from non-EU countries has declined.

As frequently pointed out by the European Commission, the EU’s imports from Russia have indeed declined; however, this gap was quickly filled by other non-EU countries like Norway, the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and Azerbaijan. Moreover, it is suggested that Russian natural gas continues to be an important resource for some European countries due to the internal conflicts that some EU member states are having with the supranational administration in Brussels. Taking all these developments into account, one may argue that the EU has achieved some success in reducing its reliance on Russian energy. However, it remains dependent on other major suppliers, such as the United States, which the EU and its politicians themselves have labeled an unreliable partner following President Trump's election victory. Third, internal divisions and conflicts within the EU pose a significant challenge to the bloc.

#### Political divisions prevent strategic autonomy

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As is well known, the EU derives its strength from its unity in facing other blocs or global powers, so a display of dissatisfaction or disobedience toward common EU decisions puts the whole bloc in jeopardy. In recent policies or years, countries like Hungary, Poland, and, from time to time, Italy and Slovakia have followed a different path from Brussels or have not joined common policies in areas such as energy, foreign policy, and migration. Furthermore, there still seem to be major differences between Western and Eastern European countries in terms of economic development, financial stability, humanitarian progress, and the status of the rule of law in these countries. In fact, the Iron Curtain, once thought to have divided the two camps at the start of the Cold War, may still persist in ideology, development, economy, and the way Western and Eastern European countries perceive Russia: as a threat or as an inevitable partner.

Fourth, today, there is a lack of leadership even at the highest ranks of EU bureaucracy. The leaders of the most important EU institutions do not come into office through a direct election by the public but rather through selection by heads of state or formal appointment procedures. This not only signifies that there is still a democratic deficit—meaning that people have yet to be fully integrated into the system—but also that one competence (for instance, foreign policy or representing the union abroad) may be shared between two or more officials in power. This, in turn, may further trigger leadership discussions within the EU.

### Extend: “Multilateral Order Resilient”

#### Trump will maintain the current order and existing alliance structure; Russia and China can’t contain the US

Jong Eun Lee, 2025 - Ph.D. is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. “The Order of the Disorder: From Pax Americana to Global Uncertainty” Foreign Analysis, Spring https://foreignanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/FOREIGN-ANALYSIS-SPRING-2025-1.pdf //DH

The geopolitical trends of competing geopolitical actors and institutions, shifting political values, and transactional strategic alignments will likely result in the transformation of the current liberal order. However, such a transformation does not assume the dismantling of the international order into chaos, but rather an evolution into a new version of the international order. One important continuity from the previous world order would be the role of the United States in asserting global influence and utilizing strategic alliances. To be sure, domestic political fatigue toward “nation-building” and “peacekeeping” projects abroad has galvanized political support behind Trump’s “America First” slogan.

Yet, Trump’s second term, far from advocating an isolationist foreign policy, appears to be committed to defending U.S. geostrategic interests in the Western Hemisphere and maintaining strategic and technological superiority over China. Many U.S. allies will likely continue their strategic alignment with the superpower. They may encounter contentious bargaining and pressures to accommodate Trump’s transactional demands. However, many U.S. allies will calculate that in turn, their transactional benefits from the alliance (even with reduced U.S. involvement in certain policy areas) will outweigh the costs and uncertainties. Skillful allies may also perceive the opportunity to attain their key objectives through quid pro quo dealmaking with the U.S.

In contrast, the alternative bloc of revisionist countries lacks sufficient capacity to dominate the international order on an equal footing with the U.S.-aligned bloc. While fighting a war in Ukraine, Russia has lost much of its regional influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Even after the war’s end, recovering from the war’s socioeconomic costs would constrain Russia’s geopolitical capability. China is falling behind in its quest to surpass the United States, hampered by economic recessions and social unrest. Despite the expansion of its international influence (through projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative), China has fallen short in consolidating strategic alliances, as countries, especially in Asia, maintain wariness toward its regional leadership.

#### The US-led order is less liberal, but still provides stability

Jong Eun Lee, 2025 - Ph.D. is an assistant professor of political science at North Greenville University. “The Order of the Disorder: From Pax Americana to Global Uncertainty” Foreign Analysis, Spring https://foreignanalysis.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/FOREIGN-ANALYSIS-SPRING-2025-1.pdf //DH

There are indeed geopolitical trends shifting the international system away from the aspired goals and policies of the “liberal” international order. What, then, is emerging as an alternative international system? For now, the international order appears to be evolving into a “less liberal,” “more eclectic,” yet still U.S.-led order where the superpower imposes restraints against its lesser geopolitical rivals, albeit with changed ideological priorities and strategies. Paradoxically, such geopolitical trends suggest the continuity of the “order” over the increasing “disorder” in the contemporary international system.