



# Cross-Border Legal Strategy for Sovereign Debt Restructuring

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**Executive Summary:** Sovereign debt restructuring represents one of the most intricate and legally nuanced processes within international finance. The intersection of public international law, municipal laws of creditor jurisdictions, and the inherent political dimensions of sovereign insolvency creates an environment that demands precision, legal sophistication, and strategic foresight. This report undertakes a technical analysis of cross-border legal strategies in sovereign debt restructurings, with a particular emphasis on judicial precedents, enforcement mechanisms, and evolving legal doctrines. The framework herein is designed for practitioners advising sovereigns, multilateral institutions, and institutional investors engaged in sovereign debt litigation or restructuring negotiations.

## I. Legal Foundations:

**A. Sovereign Immunity and Waivers:** A cornerstone of sovereign debt litigation is the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Historically derived from customary international law, the doctrine shields sovereign states from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. However, with the proliferation of sovereign borrowing in capital markets, most jurisdictions have codified commercial activity exceptions. The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA, 1976) and the UK State Immunity Act (SIA, 1978) are foundational statutes.

Notably, most sovereign bond contracts include express waivers of jurisdictional immunity and limited waivers of execution immunity. Nevertheless, courts have consistently drawn a distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from enforcement. For instance, in *FG Hemisphere v. Democratic Republic of Congo* (Hong Kong, 2011), the Court upheld execution immunity over DRC-owned bank accounts despite prior waiver clauses. Jurisdictions such as France and Germany have applied heightened thresholds for asset seizure, especially for central bank assets, under the doctrine of *reserves of the state*.

**B. Choice of Law and Jurisdiction:** New York and English law govern the majority of external sovereign bond issuances. Such clauses often include express submission to jurisdiction and irrevocable appointment of process agents. Recent jurisprudence confirms the enforceability of these clauses, subject to public policy considerations. In *The Law Debenture Trust Corporation plc v. Ukraine* (UK, 2023), the Court of Appeal affirmed the enforceability of a \$3 billion Eurobond under English law despite claims of duress and coercion under international law.

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Arbitral dispute resolution clauses, though rare, have gained traction in debt-for-investment instruments or hybrid project-linked financing. ICSID jurisdiction under bilateral investment treaties (BITs) remains contingent on the characterisation of sovereign debt as an investment, as debated in *Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic* (ICSID, 2011).

## II. Collective Action Clauses (CACs):

CACs represent a contractual mechanism designed to mitigate holdout litigation risk by enabling a supermajority of bondholders to bind dissenting creditors to a restructuring.

**A. Evolution and Standardisation:** The Greek PSI (Private Sector Involvement) of 2012 constituted a watershed, as Greece retrofitted CACs into domestic law bonds, triggering substantial creditor litigation. The ruling in *Poštová banka v. Greece* (CJEU, 2015) denied jurisdiction under EU investment treaties, reinforcing the need for contractual protections.

Following the Greek precedent, the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) standardised enhanced CACs in 2014, promoting single-limb aggregation to prevent cross-series holdout strategies. However, uptake has been uneven across jurisdictions, and legacy bonds remain vulnerable to holdouts.

**B. Strategic Modelling:** Legal advisors must construct restructuring scenarios under alternative CAC thresholds (typically 75% or 85%) and model the implications of inter-creditor disputes. In *Red Mountain Finance Ltd. v. Ukraine* (UK, 2021), the Court dismissed an injunction request from minority bondholders challenging a CAC-approved exchange offer, reinforcing the enforceability of aggregated CACs.

## III. Case Law and Judicial Precedents:

**A. NML Capital v. Argentina (US, 2012–2016):** This landmark litigation culminated in the affirmation of the *pari passu* clause as a basis for equitable injunctions. The Second Circuit upheld the right of holdout creditors to block payments to restructured bondholders, leading to a temporary sovereign default. The decision emphasized the extraterritorial reach of US courts in enforcing sovereign debt claims through third-party financial intermediaries.

**B. Crystallex International Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (US, 2021):** US courts permitted attachment of shares in PDV Holding, a U.S.-based entity, to satisfy ICSID awards against Venezuela. The case demonstrates the U.S. willingness to pierce corporate veils in the context of sovereign-controlled entities, thereby expanding the enforcement landscape.

**C. Kensington International v. Republic of Congo (UK, 2003):** Kensington obtained disclosure orders against financial institutions and successfully traced diverted oil revenues. This case established precedents for asset tracing via third-party discovery and revealed the strategic value of injunctions and Mareva relief.

**D. Elliott Associates v. Peru (Brussels, 2000):** Belgian courts upheld the injunction preventing Euroclear from processing payments on restructured bonds, thereby enforcing holdout claims. The case signaled the global enforceability of sovereign bondholder rights in clearing systems.

#### **IV. Enforcement Strategy:**

**A. Asset Tracing and Recovery:** Enforcement against sovereign assets remains limited due to execution immunity, particularly concerning diplomatic and central bank property. Legal strategy must prioritize commercial assets and state-owned enterprises engaged in non-sovereign functions. Instruments such as Letters Rogatory, Article 1782 Discovery in the U.S., and Norwich Pharmacal Orders in the UK provide discovery avenues for identifying attachable assets.

#### **B. Interim Measures:**

- Mareva Injunctions (UK): Used to freeze assets globally.
- Anton Piller Orders: Allow for the seizure of evidence where there is a risk of destruction.
- Worldwide Freezing Orders (WFO): Facilitated in jurisdictions with mature common law systems.

**C. Political Risk Insurance and Litigation Funding:** PRI providers often subrogate enforcement rights post-payment, necessitating coordination with creditors. Litigation funders offer capital in high-value sovereign enforcement cases (>\$50 million) with returns linked to recoveries. This third-party ecosystem must be carefully structured to avoid champerty and maintenance concerns under local laws.

#### **V. Sovereign Restructuring Workouts:**

**A. Institutional Mechanisms:** Sovereign workouts typically occur via the Paris Club (official bilateral creditors) and the London Club (commercial banks). Recent restructurings, including those of Zambia (2021) and Sri Lanka (2023), reflect the increasing role of multilateral coordination, though China's participation remains opaque and often bilateral.

**B. Legal Structuring:** Debt exchanges, exit consents, and consent solicitations remain the main restructuring mechanisms. Advisors must ensure compliance with securities law disclosure obligations and mitigate risks of coercion or misrepresentation.

**C. Debt-for-Climate Swaps:** Emerging as a novel class of restructuring instrument, these swaps require specialized legal documentation, involving conservation performance guarantees, verification mechanisms, and sovereign guarantees.

## VI. Outlook and Recommendations:

The legal landscape for sovereign debt restructuring is poised to evolve in response to geopolitical realignments, climate finance imperatives, and the proliferation of ESG-linked debt instruments. Legal practitioners must proactively anticipate:

- Increased litigation risk in non-traditional forums (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, DIFC).
- Greater scrutiny of ESG covenants and sustainability-linked metrics.
- Expanded use of arbitral and hybrid dispute mechanisms.
- Rise in creditor activism and bondholder class actions.

**Conclusion:** A legally robust and operationally agile approach to sovereign debt restructuring demands comprehensive jurisdictional analysis, creative enforcement strategies, and foresight into regulatory and geopolitical developments. Legal advisors must bridge public international law, finance, and dispute resolution expertise to serve stakeholders navigating sovereign debt challenges.

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