Queering atrocity prevention

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This paper is inspired by and takes courage from the work of many. Its evolution has been informed by others in ways far beyond the review process. As a result there are many people whose input, knowledge, leadership, encouragement and support are not named here – there are simply too many to do so! We are lucky to work in a sector where new ideas and approaches, even and especially those that might be seen to challenge how things have previously been done, are welcomed. We are therefore particularly grateful to the warm words of encouragement from colleagues and peers in the atrocity prevention community who pushed us forward and supported the writing of this paper. Thank you to Savita Pawnday, Naomi Kikoler, Karen Smith, Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Annie Bird, Mike Edington, Alli Jernow, Jeffery Sizemore, Kelsey Paul Shantz, Cristina Stefan, Maddy Crowther, Sonja Miley, Jean Freedberg, Akila Radhakrishnan, Alex Bellamy, Wes Rist, and many others who all welcomed our proposals for this paper and wider work with such enthusiasm and warmth. Nadia Rubaii’s encouragement and excitement about this paper was particularly generous, as she was always. Her support is both something we hold on to with gratitude and will continue to miss profoundly.

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Protection Approaches exists to transform how we understand identity-based violence and so transform how we prevent it. We address structural and physical violence against groups marginalised as ‘other’ locally and internationally and believe prevention requires consistent, inclusive strategies implemented through horizontal, intersectional collaboration. We look to the commonalities of violence directed towards people because of how perpetrators – whether individuals, groups or structures – conceive their victims’ identities. This pathology of violence manifests in different ways and requires different strategies of prevention and response. However, it is our belief that more effective prevention requires us to first better understand the realities of how identity-based violence emerges and is perpetrated.

In mid-2020, Jess Gifkins came to Protection Approaches with the question of how to integrate LGBTQI+ persecution into an atrocity prevention framework. Jess recognised a disconnect between communities and organisations working on atrocity prevention, particularly under the banner of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (or R2P), and the growing backlash against LGBTQI+ people in the UK and elsewhere. These initial discussions evolved into a collaboration between Jess, Dean Cooper-Cunningham, and Protection Approaches, who appointed Jess as Queering Atrocity Prevention Research Fellow in November 2021.

Research on identity-based violence consistently shows that, across geographies and histories, risks become compounded or increased for people who are seen to belong to multiple marginalised or minoritised identities. For our team it has been the growing encroachment of LGBTQI+ people’s rights, especially those of trans individuals in the UK, where Protection Approaches is based, and the risks across Afghanistan of widespread and systematic persecution of and violence against LGBTQI+ people after the Taliban takeover, which have made and continue to make these questions all the more pressing.

Queer people’s experience of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes is not new yet this experience is not well known. In fact, queer people’s experiences are often ignored in policy and research on identity-based violence and mass atrocity. From the Holocaust to the more recent and ongoing anti-gay purges in Chechnya, LGBTQI+ communities have been deliberately targeted by widespread, systematic campaigns that can be described as atrocity crimes. These global threats are increasing, with coordinated ultraconservative movements advocating a return to valorising the heterosexual family unit over more diverse ways of living and loving. These movements portray LGBTQI+ people as a threat to the social order, the ‘traditional family’, and children. The (re)imposition or intensification of heteronormative, patriarchal power structures through legislation and culture nearly always comes ahead of widespread human rights violations against LGBTQI+ people and other groups. And yet, the specific vulnerabilities faced by LGBTQI+ communities in atrocity contexts, and the intersections of sexual and gender rights with the perpetration of atrocity crimes, are largely absent from the fields of atrocity prevention research, policy and practice. So too are the histories and experiences of queer cultures and resistance.
Taking inspiration from Jamie Hagen’s article, ‘Queering Women, Peace and Security’, and from encouragement of too many colleagues to name here, we have been exploring what it could look like to queer atrocity prevention – and to queer the responsibility to protect. As we use it here, to queer means first to bring to the fore the insecurity of those whose gender and/or sexuality is deemed improper, vulgar, and perverse by heteronormative standards, and second to adhere to a queer political commitment of always interrogating who benefits from and reimagining dominant power structures. This builds on past work Protection Approaches has done in calling for the devolution of R2P. We believe that “to live up to R2P’s best values atrocity prevention must therefore be firmly rooted in a comprehensive analysis of power, an understanding of history, context and dynamics (particularly racial, colonial, gendered, ableist and heteronormative dynamics), and an assessment of the extent to which each action damages or strengthens local agency”. By extension “atrocity prevention must be feminist, intersectional, and locally owned”. Protection Approaches has always believed that “atrocity prevention must begin – but not end – at home, with an acknowledgement that the risks of atrocities are present in all societies, and must be addressed in all societies, starting with one’s own”.

These positions were our starting points in 2020. However, as we began this project the catastrophe of the rapid withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the Taliban seizing power forced a new urgency. The devastating impact of US decision-making in Summer 2021 held up for the world to see the extent to which atrocity prevention thinking – let alone LGBTQI+ inclusive and intersectional atrocity prevention – continues to be absent from even the most seismic foreign policy choices. The urgency hit home again in early 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and reports began to emerge of LGBTQI+ people being targeted and facing distinct humanitarian challenges due to their sexual orientation and/or gender identity. Russian Orthodox Church leaders have blamed the invasion on LGBTQI+ people and gay pride parades, and the US State Department has reported intelligence of planned human rights violations against “journalists and anti-corruption activists, and vulnerable populations such as religious and ethnic minorities and LGBTQI+ persons”. In Afghanistan and Ukraine, we see an imminent and medium-term risk of widespread and systematic persecution of and violence against LGBTQI+ people, those who are believed to be queer, and their families. LGBTQI+ people are not the only ones facing atrocity risks, but with minimal LGBTQI+ focussed policy and expertise in high level responses to the human catastrophe in Afghanistan and Ukraine, the gaps are stark and need to be addressed as a matter of urgency by all actors with access to the country and to Afghan or Ukrainian populations in exile in the region. We use the examples of Afghanistan and Ukraine, and the other cases we touch upon in this paper, as illustrative rather than unique situations.

This paper, and our wider Queering Atrocity Prevention project, seek to open a conversation integrated across our community of practice. As an NGO based in London, Protection Approaches’ sphere of reference and experience starts in the UK and Europe. We exist primarily to enhance UK contributions to the prevention
of identity-based violence at home and abroad but hope – and believe – that the core questions of this paper hold relevance for the whole global north and perhaps beyond. We understand that our different positions from which we and our co-authors speak contribute to the shaping of our work and look forward to the conversations with and challenges from our colleagues and peers.

Protection Approaches has always believed in starting at our own table, something that is never easy and never complete. We are always learning ourselves how to better live, uphold, and further the pursuit of equity and justice. This paper therefore represents as much an internal commitment to challenge our own blind spots as it is a call to others. We do not have all the answers but look forward to interrogating some of the questions we raise with others.

Kate Ferguson and Jess Gifkins

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Introduction

Mass atrocities are on the rise inside and outside of conflict settings. Structural and physical violence and discrimination against people because of how others interpret their identity remains an endemic challenge in every country in the world. Protection Approaches has long argued that the forces behind identity-based violence – inequality, social fracture, democratic backsliding, resource scarcity, climate change, misinformation, and the internationalisation of malign networks – are moving in the wrong direction. As these trajectories of concern continue, our work in the UK and internationally has sought to raise the alarm that discrimination and persecution, including widespread and systematic targeting, will become increasingly more frequent.

“In all regions, people experience violence and discrimination because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. In many cases, even the perception of homosexuality or transgender identity puts people at risk”. In many states, discriminatory targeting motivated by perceptions of gender and/or sexuality is worsening – or, in some respects, we are finally turning our attention to the extent that LGBTQI+ people are targets of violence in service of variegated political agendas. In some cases, the patterns of violence are widespread and systematic, and might be considered to meet the threshold of crimes against humanity: they are often premeditated and occur systematically against civilian populations.

The history of modern atrocity crimes shows that the persecution of LGBTQI+ people and queer communities commonly foreshadows the persecution of other groups. Just as the reassertion of patriarchal, heteronormative values and legislation indicates a constriction of the rights, freedoms and safety of a society, such shifts commonly come before wider acts of violence. From Nazi Germany to genocide in Darfur to the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the imposition of ‘moral’ codes that directly assault sexual and gender identities and freedoms came before widespread state-led physical violence and atrocity crimes. More recently, we have seen LGBTQI+ people become targets for violence, abuse, and extra-judicial executions in Afghanistan under new Taliban rule. Much of the homophobia, like all forms of moralising about sexuality and gender expression, centres on notions of shame and dishonour. This doesn’t just impact the individual, but also their family and community, as they are seen to be dishonourable through their association with an LGBTQI+ person. This context means, that not only is there a criminal law sanction, there is a deeply rooted risk of honour crimes for LGBTQI+ people and their families.

Similarly, moralistic anti-LGBTQI+ legislation and heteronormative internationalist projects have been a key feature of Putin’s rule over the last decade. The persecution of queerness and its visibility in Russia – as enshrined in the 2013 ‘gay propaganda law’ – paired with internationally expansionist discourse where Europe is constructed as ‘Gayropa’ and the commission of atrocity crimes in Chechnya are alarm bells that rung long ago. The task now is to remedy our inattentiveness to these alarm bells by including LGBTQI+ persecution as a warning sign of potential escalation. When the rights – including the right to life – of any group are threatened we know that the risks facing other groups are also threatened.
Despite current trends of LGBTQI+ persecution and intersections of LGBTQI+ vulnerabilities in the history of atrocity crimes, the atrocity prevention fields of practice, policy, and research have tended not to look at, learn from, reach for, or – at times – even acknowledge the queer experience of atrocity crimes. Efforts to look at the intersections of WPS, R2P, and atrocity prevention has tended to work through a cis-heteronormative understanding of gender, which has left those who fall outside the parameters of cis-heteronormative gender and sexuality consistently and unendingly insecure. As Hagen has written “those vulnerable to insecurity and violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity remain largely neglected by the international peace and security community”. Cis-heteronormative violence includes the policing of people whose gender presentation deviates from masculine and feminine norms in some way, so people who identify as heterosexual and cisgender can also be targeted where their gender presentation or behaviours are viewed by aggressors as outside traditional norms. As such, a gender analysis is necessary for a queer analysis, although the two areas are often siloed. We start from the position of explicitly acknowledging that LGBTQI+ communities are part of the ‘who’ R2P serves. From there, we ask if the tools, approaches, policies, and assumptions that underpin atrocity prevention are fit for that purpose. More broadly, this paper asks the questions of what it would mean to queer the policy and practice – and perhaps very conceptualisations of – atrocity prevention. Learning from and drawing on Hagen’s interrogation of WPS, we ask what the implications are of excluding the vulnerabilities of, the risks facing, and the experiences and leadership of LGBTQI+ people from atrocity prevention research, policy and practice. We also consider the ways in which LGBTQI+ persecution could be an early warning indicator for atrocity crimes, prior to other marginalised groups being targeted. We are not the first to ask these questions, nor do we contend to hold all the answers. This paper and Protection Approaches’ programme of work on queering atrocity prevention seek to open up a conversation that has too often taken place on the margins of our community of practice or not at all.

First, we look to the intersections of and relationships between anti-LGBTQI+ violence and mass atrocity crimes. This discussion is not exhaustive but rather is intended to illustrate the varied patterns that can be found but that too often remain outside of the mainstream discourse of atrocity prevention research, policy and practice. We then turn to these gaps, recognising that blind spots of understanding of and commitments to LGBTQI+ politics persist across the wider peace, security and human rights fields. At the same time, we acknowledge the good work already being done by colleagues. Again, this is far from exhaustive – many colleagues around the world have long looked to and confronted these intersections of violence and persecution. The third part of this paper asks what queering our work means, drawing on the lessons of queer resistance and of queer theory – and continuing Protection Approaches’ commitments to open up access to, and conceptualisation of, the responsibility to protect. Finally, we propose a series of recommendations.
In the 1920s, Berlin was a place where queer people were able to find and express themselves outside of predominant cis-hetero norms. Vienna had about a dozen gay cafes, clubs and bookstores. Several quartiers in Paris had reputations as relatively safe and open places of gay and trans culture and nightlife. Budapest’s growing gay scene was developing, even under the conservative regime of Miklos Horthy, regent of Hungary. In Weimar Germany diverse gender identities, expressions of sexuality, and of community became more vocal, public and celebrated. In 1929, the Reichstag moved towards decriminalising homosexuality but the stock-market crash prevented the final vote. At the forefront of that movement was the gay and Jewish doctor, activist and scholar Magnus Hirschfeld, whose Scientific-Humanitarian Committee, founded in 1897, is considered to be one the first LGBTQI+ people’s rights organisation in history. At its peak, the Committee had 25 branches across Germany, Austria and the Netherlands.

Just as occurs with contemporary forms of political homophobia, when Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, the Nazi party began a systemic campaign to eradicate Germany’s gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans, intersex and queer communities as a means to gain support for the Nazi’s populist political project. This coordinated attack on queer spaces and rights was one of the Nazi regime’s first priorities and underpinned a political project that sought to produce the ‘true’, ‘ideal’, and ‘pure’ ruling population. In May 1933, Nazi demonstrators raided and burned down the libraries of the Institut für Sexualwissenschaft, which also housed Hirschfeld’s organisation. Over 20,000 books on human sexuality and gender were destroyed. Between 1934 and 1935, 8,500 gay men were arrested. And after the annexation of Austria in 1938, the Gestapo endeavoured to arrest every gay man on police lists.

This assault was accompanied by, and indeed can be seen as part of, a wider imposition of traditional patriarchal Christian family values that asserted binary gender stereotypes for men and women, boys and girls. Kinder, Küche, Kirche (children, kitchen, church) quickly set the framework for Nazi policy towards women, rewarding mothers financially, in propaganda, and through ceremony for bearing children. Central to Nazi culture was the ideal heteronormative Aryan family unit, and those who fell outside of those parameters were at risk of violence and persecution.

The Nazi attack on LGBTQI+ communities between 1933 and 1945 included discrimination, persecution, imprisonment, cultural destruction, dehumanisation, physical violence, sterilisation, castration, and deportation. Much of this happened in concentration camps. Police created lists of people considered to be homosexual and an estimated 50,000 received severe jail sentences in brutal conditions. A further 10,000-15,000 (suspected) homosexuals were sent to concentration camps. While cognisant of the differences between Nazi Germany and Putin’s Russia, the appearance of LGBTQI+ people and groups on apparent target lists of potential opponents to Russia’s geopolitical agenda during the initial stages of its invasion in Ukraine and the existence of Chechen gay torture camps
should serve as a clear warning of the scale and nature of mass violence LGBTQI+ communities have experienced and are at risk of, as well as the potential that unchecked political homophobia – the arbitrary moralising about appropriate sex, desire, bodily pleasure, and gender identities and expressions – can have for conflict escalation, atrocity crimes, and imperial expansionism.  

Political homophobia and transphobia are not distinct from, but rather indicative of, processes including democratic backsliding, a shift towards authoritarian politics, and the increased risk of identity-based violence – including violence, whether physical or structural, on a widespread and systematic scale. The HRC Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, Victor Madrigal-Borloz, explains this relationship. He argues that “actors promoting regressive interpretation of LGBTQI+ rights make strong parallels between the nation and the family. Within this framing, the patriarchal and heteronormative family is depicted as the only one adding value to a country’s national heritage. “Gender ideology” is conversely framed as an attack on national identities and traditions”. Nazis used similar framing, with homosexuality viewed as a threat to masculinity, family, and the nation.

Of course, Europe’s LGBTQI+ communities were not the only victims of the Nazis and their allies, but their story is less known and almost entirely ignored in academic and policy circles. The traditional paradigm of the Holocaust and of Nazi persecution as it has often become translated into public political culture – including sometimes within the genocide and atrocity prevention movement – has distilled Europe’s experience of widespread identity-based violence and has not always captured the various marginalized communities that were also subject to persecution and violence. “In addition to six million Jews, more than five million non-Jews were murdered under the Nazi regime. Among them were Gypsies, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, blacks, the physically and mentally disabled, political opponents of the Nazis, including Communists and Social Democrats, dissenting clergy, resistance fighters, prisoners of war, Slavic peoples, and many individuals from the artistic communities whose opinions and works Hitler condemned”. There has been a reluctance to link the Nazi’s deliberate targeting of LGBTQI+ people with the concept of genocide, even within genocide studies.

The Nazis went as far as designating camps specifically for different communities they targeted, such as the Lackenbach internment camp which was dedicated to persecuting Roma communities. It is important to highlight these intersecting acts of identity-based violence committed by the Nazis because it is a narrow or simplified understanding of the Holocaust that remains the lens through which atrocity crimes are conceptualised by many practitioners and policy makers in the global north. If we are to prevent these crimes in the future, we need to become better at recognising triggers, warning signs, and the intersectional dynamics of identity-based violence. Increased risks against one group does not lead to the protection of others: it legitimises (perceived) identity as grounds for elimination and demonstrates the ease with which the state and state-adjacent actors can easily turn on a given collective for political gain. Likewise, those who identify or
are perceived by perpetrators as belonging to multiple minoritised or marginalised groups, will always face compounded threats.

Researchers have pointed out that political homophobia takes many different forms. At its core, however, it involves the targeting of those who refuse to or cannot be made to fold themselves into dominant cis-heteronormative structures that privilege those who identify (or present) as heterosexual and with the gender they were assigned at birth. Given that political homophobia can take various forms, including mass atrocity crimes, it is a tactic often used to serve a multitude of social and political goals: it is a means to an end, usually used to establish an ‘enemy’ that the state and state-adjacent actors blame for society’s ills and can legitimately target for correction or elimination.

In recent work, Dean Cooper-Cunningham identified an important practice that has been developing in tandem with domestic state homophobia over the last decade in Russian foreign policy and geopolitical posturing under Vladimir Putin: heteronormative internationalism. He argued that heteronormative internationalism is when states (or other actors) use political homophobia “as part of its foreign policy and/or as part of an internationalist political project”. Russia has consistently positioned itself as a space of ‘traditional family values’ against a morally decaying, sexually decadent Europe, known as ‘Gayropa’ in Russian policy. Russia’s geopolitical encounter with Europe over the last decade has included a stark sexualised and gendered component in which Russia positions itself as a morally superior civilisation against a European bloc in need of rescuing from its path of civilisational decay. In light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and intelligence reports of rumoured lists that include LGBTQ+ individuals, activists, organisations, and allies to be targeted upon successful Russian takeover, this heteronormative internationalism has a new and important resonance.

While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has not been explicitly justified on grounds of sexual moralism, this context is especially important in light of reported target lists containing LGBTQI+ organisations and individuals, and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church’s assertion that the war in Ukraine is partly about Western pro-LGBTIQI+ politics and Russia’s anti-queer, pro-traditional values opposition, and given that the invasion has been positioned as a move to ‘save’ Ukraine from Europeanisation, so-called far right and Nazi politics, and NATO and EU expansionism. Sexual politics has been a key part of Putin’s strategy for establishing Europe as a threat to be defeated, balanced against, and/or rescued from its path of moral decay. The construction of Europe and Europeanisation as a threat to Ukraine, which Putin has recently constituted as Russian, is part of Putin’s geopolitical project, of which heteronormative politics is a crucial constituent element. The idea that Europe is civilisationally different – and morally bankrupt because of its sexual politics – has enabled and sought to provide legitimation for increasing Russian influence on the European continent. Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, which are in part justified with extreme heteronormative politics and the export of ‘traditional family values’ abroad, including into Europe, have consequences for queer people’s lives and their security. In this political moment, these are particularly manifest for queer people living in Ukraine.
In Hungary and Poland, the erosion of the rights and protection of LGBTQI+ people is indicative of rising risks for LGBTQI+ communities as well as wider societal threats. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his ruling party Fidesz employ rhetoric of ‘Christian’ or ‘family values’ under threat from ‘LGBT ideology’ emanating from the West. This has translated into significant curbing of LGBTQI+ people’s rights, including constitutional changes ending legal gender recognition, defining marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman, excluding queer people from adoption and banning the “positive promotion of non-traditional sexual behaviour or gender expression” in schools and TV-shows for people under the age of 18.

In Poland, President Andrzej Duda and his Law and Justice (PiS) government have consistently used fearmongering, anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric similar to Orbán. Now, over one third of Poland’s local governments have declared themselves ‘LGBT-free zones’ while heteronormative patriarchal ‘pro-family’ politics have been used to further restrict reproductive rights, including a near-complete ban on abortion.

Persecution of LGBTQI+ people has consistently been followed by oppressive politics and violence, even towards those who supported the scapegoating of queer people in the first place. Ideas about ‘traditional family values’ may first target queer collectives, but they usually very quickly turn to other agendas such as reproductive rights. In both Poland and Hungary, the erosion of LGBTQI+ people’s rights has been accompanied by political and popular hate speech; undermining of freedom of speech and independent media; extensive usage of executive and emergency powers, especially in the wake of COVID-19; and attacks on the independent judiciary. These developments create a toxic ecosystem in which the frequency of attacks against LGBTQI+ communities are rising, all while the constitution of LGBTQI+ communities as threats provides right-wing governments with popular mandates to curtail rights – as we have already seen in states including Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Uganda. For example, PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński said there are plans to “bring order” to the Polish media landscape, justified due to LGBTQI+ visibility and its wrongly perceived threat to children.

While Poland and Hungary are extreme, they are not anomalies in Europe. As Detmer Kremer has argued, the “alarm bells are ringing” across the continent – and “we are ignoring them”. The UK, for instance, performs fairly well in international rankings of legal rights for LGBTQI+ people, however the “focus on ‘rights’ and particularly the securing of the right to marry are, in some ways, red herrings as the rights mask the continued violence against LGBTQ folk”. In fact, such political homophilia can be strategically instrumentalised in much the same way as political homophobia. Further, the presence of one does not necessarily negate the other, and both can co-exist, sometimes fuelling each other. Hate crimes on the basis of homophobia and/or transphobia have increased year-on-year in England and Wales from 2016 to 2021, to the point where reported crimes have doubled over this time period. And yet, studies repeatedly find that the majority of LGBTQI+ people who are subjected to hate crimes do not report these to the police, meaning that the official figures miss the vast majority of LGBTQI+ hate crimes. The UK is also home to a small but very vocal minority who oppose trans rights, as part of a broader culture war. There were, for example, 230 articles in 2018 in the Times alone sensationalising trans issues and creating a stigma around deviation from...
dominant sexual and gender identity norms. The practice of atrocity prevention teaches us that dehumanising and fearmongering rhetoric leaps easily from the page and the screen and contributes to the rise of persecution and identity-based violence. To give just one example, the UK’s LGBTQI+ hate crime reporting service Galop reported in 2022 that 30% of trans and non-binary people in the UK have experienced sexual violence that they believed was intended to convert them to heterosexuality or their assigned gender at birth, or to punish them for their gender or sexual identity. While Galop found that those who had experienced this kind of ‘corrective’ sexual violence were people of all LGBT+ orientations and gender identities, those who were trans women, trans men, non-binary people, ace people and intersex people were more likely to report that they had experienced sexual violence that aimed to convert or punish them.

The legislative consequences of the UK’s transphobic ‘culture wars’ – such as restrictions to medical services including puberty blockers for trans and non-binary youth – has a demonstrable impact on the physical and mental health of this community and contributes to disproportionate rates of exclusion, self-harm and suicide. Even cursory analysis from the perspective of seeking to prevent any manifestation of identity-based violence raises deep concerns of the trajectory and medium-to-long term impacts of these trends in the UK if left unchecked.

The more extreme cases of Poland and Hungary, and the alarming developments in the UK are indicative of wider European trends chipping away at the protections and rights of LGBTQI+ communities. Dusting off old strategies to expand or maintain power, governments across the region are mounting threats to democratic institutions and principles across Europe and weaponizing identities of communities with pre-existing vulnerabilities, like LGBTQI+ communities, to justify and rally support for their actions. This includes a disregard for the rule of law; the dismantling of the judiciary; and undermining independent and diverse media. What we are witnessing and warning against are the direct human costs of these divisive strategies. This asks questions of those of us working in or on Europe towards the prevention of identity-based violence and mass atrocity crimes.

Academics have long pointed out that the creation of an enemy ‘other’ – be they internal or external – is fundamental to the creation of a coherent and identifiable ‘self’. The constitution of queerness as dangerous and ‘other’ has facilitated policies of correction and annihilation of queer collectives the world over. The demonisation of queerness and the creation of a queer ‘other’ has done irreparable harm to queer communities, legitimising violence based on deviation from gender norms, and fanning the flames of a culture war that, in effect, is founded on arbitrary moralising by those with the structural power and social and political capital to draw lines around how people can express their gendered identities in ways that purport to ‘protect’ certain groups (often cis women in the case of anti-trans movements) while effectively limiting the space for freedom of expression for everyone beyond dominant normative structures. Deviating from the norm, then, is often to put oneself at risk of being constructed as a threat to society and to become viewed as a legitimate target of violence for exposing the shaky ground upon which the dominant normative structures that constitute society are built.

These tactics of demonising LGBTQI+ communities – in its entirety or through composite parts – through moralistic laws fuelling increasing persecution of and violence against queer communities are familiar. One of the most vehement examples of queer persecution in recent European history comes from Chechnya, where there has been a ‘gay purge’ in which hundreds of (those perceived as) gay men and women have been subject to detention, torture (including starvation, electrocution, and other forms of violence), and, in many cases, have been murdered.57 While predicting mass violence remains a persistent challenge to the practice of atrocity prevention the sector recognises the importance of identifying and responding to warning signs. The fact that signs such as the anti-LGBTQI+ legislation from mid-2013, commonly known as the ‘gay propaganda law’ prohibiting the promotion of so-called ‘non-traditional’ sexualities and gender expression to minors, and the subsequent increase in violence towards LGBTQI+ communities, especially LGBTQI+ youth, were not recorded in atrocity risk frameworks (or by the sector in other ways) indicates a failure to understand how identity-based violence in Russia, and subsequently Chechnya, and the accompanying anti-LGBTQI+ policies and legislation are part of wider architectures of violence.58 As we have pointed to above, the initial persecution of LGBTQI+ people is an indicator of a dangerous politics: when we leave out anti-LGBTQI+ politics from our understandings of risk and prevention we not only compound the insecurities people face on the basis of their (presumed) identity, but establish a dangerous precedent where homophobic and transphobic violence is not deemed worthy of attention.

The failure of self-constituted LGBTQI+ friendly and R2P-championing institutions such as the EU and the UN, and countries such as Canada, the US, and the UK to act decisively on this widespread, systematic campaign of violence against gay men and women in Chechnya that likely meets the threshold of a crime against humanity is not only indicative of passivity to the threats queer people face but of: (a) the assumption that sexuality and gender identity and expression are understood as issues below the level of international security concern, even when they are the basis of mass atrocity scale violence; and (b) the heteronormative underpinnings of international security architectures, including human security frameworks such as WPS and atrocity prevention mechanisms.59 While exceptions exist, the invocation of the responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes, and the wider peace and security field remains too often blind to and ignorant of anti-LGBTQI+ politics and the role it plays in fanning much deeper identity-based conflicts. Moreover, countries resettling refugees often have few mechanisms through which to provide assistance to those fleeing sexual- and gender-identity-based atrocity crimes. Despite its histories of mass identity-based violence there is a persistent assumption across Europe that atrocity prevention is an outward-looking activity to be supported in states elsewhere.60 Mainstream discourse and press coverage of the invasion of Ukraine appear to reinforce this European exceptionalism rather than challenging the fact that the risks of mass violence are present – and thus can and must be prevented – in all societies. Europe continues to fail to integrate the prevention of identity-based violence in a systematic way, whether in its regional contributions, at its own borders, or at the domestic level. To frame this in terms of R2P, Europe continues to focus on pillars two and three – international and regional.
The intersections of atrocity crimes and LGBTQI+ violence

responsibilities – to the detriment of focussing on pillar one responsibilities at home and at national borders. Although LGBTQI+ movements must be credited with the significant protections and acceptance they have secured within a short amount of time across Europe, worrying trends throughout the continent are eroding these and impeding further successes.61

This is not a European challenge, but a global one. As a European organisation we start there but fully recognise the global nature of – and regional and local specificity – of these trends and intersections. Here we consider two situations we find to be of grave concern where LGBTQI+ people are facing the risk of and or experiencing ongoing atrocity violence: Afghanistan and Egypt. We then turn briefly to two cases that have traditionally drawn the attention of the atrocity prevention community, but where the intersections of LGBTQI+ rights and atrocity violence is less well known. We hold up these examples as illustrations of the trends and intersections that we believe we should better understand.

Since the Taliban takeover, there has been a campaign to purge components of Afghan society deemed morally corrupt, against supposed traditional and alleged Islamic norms, and/or foreign – particularly Western – in nature. There have been reports of LGBTQI+ Afghans being victims of torture, extrajudicial executions and violence from across all actors in society, including notably from family and community members. There is evidence of bribery, threats and hoax offers of assistance to LGBTQI+ people seeking to leave Afghanistan to draw them out of hiding, followed by violence. In their recent report on the situation for LGBTQI+ communities in Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover, Outright Action International and Human Rights Watch reported a dramatic worsening of the violence targeting LGBT communities. LGBTQI+ people who were interviewed for the report shared that they are subject to different forms of sexual violence and are receiving threats of violence from families, neighbours, acquaintances and even sexual partners who decided to join the Taliban following the takeover.62 Women and gender non-conforming individuals interviewed also reported facing compounded risks of violence, as many were beaten on the streets for wearing clothes that didn’t conform to cisgender norms.63

Testimonies shared with Stonewall make the fear and threat LGBTQI+ Afghans experience palpable “I am really terrified and as a gay I feel they will kill me or stone me to death any moment. If they found out that I am gay they will kill me and my family members.”64 These fears are not uncommon but are commonly felt and experienced by those in hiding and those looking for a way out of the country. Many fear being on the streets in case they are stopped by the Taliban, they fear their families, and their neighbours. The dilemma faced by those working to evacuate and protect LGBTQI+ Afghans is that the very act of announcing their insecurity exposes them to greater risk.65 Threats of violence abound on social media, as do calls to the Taliban not to allow any LGBTQI+ people to leave the country and for them to be killed. This is strikingly similar to the ‘gay purge’ in Chechnya.

Through common rhetorics of shame and dishonour, much of the homophobia and transphobia is also perpetrated in support of but not always by the Taliban. Threats
Queering atrocity prevention

The violations of the rights of LGBTQI+ people and these communities’ vulnerabilities are illustrative of the deep human rights deficits present in Afghanistan and of the acute risks of widespread identity-based violence facing all marginalised communities in the country. Identity-based violence is widely perpetrated by the Taliban and other armed actors in Afghanistan against groups because of their actual or perceived religion, ethnicity, race, nationality, gender, sexuality, education level, profession, disability, economic background, or political affiliation. These risks are interlinked and compound one another, which is why responses to Afghanistan must not only address atrocity risks for one group but cast a wider net to properly chart out architectures and methodologies of violence. Specific strategies and programmes are often needed but should always be situated within an inclusive policy that recognises the rights, vulnerabilities and needs of all – and works towards intersectional, sustainable goals. Any such strategies and programmes that fail to include patriarchal and cis-heteronormative weaponisations of identity in how it monitors, analyses, communicates and responds to (risks of) mass violence, fail to grasp the scale, trajectories and scope of campaigns of violence. How to do this in ways that truly contribute to the safety of LGBTQI+ people and do not perpetuate further harm must be addressed – not in spite of but because it is difficult to do so.

Political homophobia is a modular phenomenon that comes in multiple forms. It may look different across contexts but we can see similar outcomes and similar patterns of violence emerge. In Egypt, for example, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s authoritarian rule has been characterised by – and began with – a brutal crackdown on what is presented as a decline in morals and a loss of traditional values. The country’s LGBTQI+ people and atheists have faced particular attack. Campaigns of arrest, intimidation and entrapment can be seen as part of the regime’s efforts to instill the state’s vision of Islam but the weaponisation of the queer ‘other’ and the political utilisation of a patriotic moral code to target those who fall outside of – or pose threat to – Sisi’s authority is a common playbook.

Egyptian authorities work together with conservative media platforms to bring attention to the state’s brutal assault on queer spaces, rights groups and individuals, successfully spreading the regime’s moral vision and instilling fear among those at risk. In December 2014, Egyptian police raided a bathhouse in central Cairo and arrested at least 25 men, claiming that the bathhouse was a den for the spread of AIDS in Egypt. The arrested men were dragged out of the bathhouse half-naked, and their pictures were circulated in state-owned newspapers and on social media accounts. The high profile arrest in 2017 of least six people after activists raised rainbow flags at a Mashrou’ Leila concert in Cairo drew international attention. The arrests also drew attention to a long-standing practice by Egyptian police
forces – forcefully subjecting individuals arrested on charges of being gay to anal exams to ‘determine’ their sexual orientation, a practice that was deemed to meet the thresholds of torture by human rights organizations.\textsuperscript{70} The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights has documented the regular and systematic utilization by police authorities of gay dating applications to entrap LGBTQI+ individuals between 2014-2018, by posing as potential partners on dating applications, luring them into meeting, and arresting them.\textsuperscript{71}

This assault on Egypt’s queer populations did not begin with Sisi, but the trajectory and intensity of violence, arrest, intimidation, and use of torture has now reached a threshold comparable to the purges in Chechnya.\textsuperscript{72} The systematic and continuous police targeting of LGBTQI+ populations in Egypt, arguably meets the threshold for crimes against humanity, as it constitutes a systematic, widespread attack directed at a civilian population. Police forces have a long-demonstrated history of not only arresting LGBTQI+ populations, but also of targeting and entrapping them, reflecting a systematic and intentional approach to attacking and persecuting LGBTQI+ people in Egypt. Political moralising about sex and gender performance are often the first steps towards the state’s persecution of its own people and as justification for civilisationist geopolitical posturing against mainly Western states that are constituted as morally defunct queer Sodom and Gomorras.

As in Russia, Chechnya, Hungary, and Poland, the persecution of LGBTQI+ people in Afghanistan and Egypt precipitated and has been accompanied by other authoritarian violence against and repression of other collectives (e.g., women, religious minorities). Political homophobia around the world is a tactic that is strategically employed to meet a given political objective: it almost always serves a larger goal and, as such, must be understood as a warning sign of increased risk of identity-based violence and atrocity crimes with far-reaching consequences that extend to other marginalised groups.

If this is the case, what can be learned about the trajectory of modern atrocity crimes? Not all cases of genocide and crimes against humanity progress along the same lines, but can we reflect upon just two cases that commonly inform the atrocity prevention sector’s work as a means of exploring if and how political homophobia or the aggressive imposition of cis-heteronormative political culture and legislation intersect?

Sudan has preoccupied the atrocity prevention community of research, policy and practice for practically as long as the fields have existed, but the experience of queer people has scarcely been addressed. The morality code of President Omar Al-Bashir’s regime was harsh and discriminatory but rarely seen as being related to his assault on populations in Darfur, Blue Nile or South Kordofan, or his authoritarian grip on human rights, journalism, and culture. From 1991 to his overthrow in 2019, the Public Order Act was in force; a conservative legal document which punished those who transgressed ‘public morals’ through flogging and specifically restricted women’s ‘freedom of dress, movement, association, work, and study’, was still in effect.\textsuperscript{73} Sudan’s sodomy laws stipulated the death penalty and flogging as punishment for engaging in gay sex or same-sex intimacy
until 2020. Following the imposition of this repressive regime and alongside its implementation these repressive measures, Bashir’s government committed widespread atrocity crimes, which led to the deaths of an estimated 300,000 people through violence and preventable illness fueled by displacement. Bashir himself is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Now, as the country - and the atrocity prevention community - seeks to navigate a course from revolution, overthrow of Bashir, and the 2021 coup towards a more hopeful and peaceful state much of the old status quo remains. Some legislative gains made in the wake of Bashir’s removal have not led to demonstrable improvements in the safety of Sudan’s minoritised and marginalised groups, including its queer communities, which continue to for the most part exist in hiding or hidden spaces. As uncertain trajectory of Sudan’s new leadership evolves, all those who are seen to fall outside of its vision for Sudanese society will remain at risk. A question for those that seek to help prevent or mitigate identity-based violence in Sudan – whether they are based in the country or outside of it – is how an inclusive and intersectional understanding of rights and freedoms can inform those endeavours? Further interrogation between Bashir’s morality politics and his ethnic, religious and racial politics would inform these efforts and contribute to a wider understanding if the extent to which this correlation interplays in practice – and what such improved understanding might hold for the practice of prevention.

The campaigns of mass atrocity crimes that drove the disintegration of former Yugoslavia were preceded by religious revivals in the Croatian Catholic and Serbian Orthodox churches and in many of Bosnia’s mosques. The religious patriarchies and populist parties advocated for a reassertion of traditional gender roles, challenging the socialist social structure that had celebrated women as worker-mothers of a united nation with nationalist motifs resurrected from the pre-war years. Women’s rights were more severely curtailed in Croatia when new laws on abortion and divorce were introduced as part of a programme to protect the new nation. Abortion became an act not only against God, but against the Croatian state. A new culture of patriotic masculinity coincided with and reinforced the regional discrediting of ideals associated with the communist regime, including gender equality. While many of its neighbours were experiencing an opening up of sexual politics and culture, Yugoslavia was closing down. Gendered politics was a core component of the new nationalisms and the legacies of the cis-heteronormative visions for the future continue in the post-atrocity recovery. LGBTQI+ communities continue to find themselves excluded from the peacebuilding, democratisation, reconciliation and development activities funded by donors or agencies that consider themselves to be ‘inclusive’ or ‘LGBTQI+ friendly’. LGBTQI+ communities and rights organisations in the western Balkans, like its Roma communities and other marginalised or minoritised groups that are seen as distinct from the Croat, Serb and Bosniak identities fall through the cracks. The OSCE doesn’t monitor LGBTQI+ hate crime and no one appears to be looking at the specific impacts growing tensions – and populist Serbian nationalism – is having on Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia’s queer communities. Russian influence and the intensification of political tensions in the Western Balkans – and particularly in Serbia and Bosnia – propelled by Russian aggression in Ukraine will impact all minoritised and marginalised people, as well
as fanning risks of atrocity violence in Bosnia. How these dynamics interact is not – yet – a focus of donors, states, or of many (though not all) atrocity prevention organisations working to avert escalation in the region.

These illustrative examples highlight an interconnectedness of LGBTQI+ persecution, wider repression of the rights of other marginalized groups, and the perpetration of atrocity crimes. We have not undertaken a comprehensive analysis and these cases certainly do not tell a full story. But a look across different regions and historical periods of persecution raises evidence of important trends and relationships. While restrictions on LGBTQI+ people’s rights do not necessarily always and inevitably lead to atrocity crimes there is a relationship between the persecution of queer people and broader persecution that does, in some cases, reach the level of atrocity crimes. At the same time, as we are seeing in both Afghanistan and Ukraine, the experience and needs of LGBTQI+ people in situations of conflict, mass atrocity and humanitarian crisis frequently fail to be taken into account, planned for, or responded to. Actors and organizations involved in the prevention of atrocity crimes need to challenge their queer blind-spots. This means recognising both that LGBTQI+ people are often the canary in the coal mine when it comes to the perpetration of atrocity crimes and that measures of crisis response, humanitarian need, civilian protection and atrocity prevention must be designed to meet the varied and specific needs of LGBTQI+ people. This begins with challenging the cis-heteronormative assumption that currently underpins much of the atrocity prevention literature and practice, integrating LGBTQI+ experience into early warning indicators, and learning from LGBTQI+ people and communities both via a reconsideration of historical case studies and more inclusive analysis of current crises.
Despite these intersections and despite both the diversification of how R2P is conceived and the opening up of the atrocity prevention research agenda, engagement with LGBTQI+ persecution in our fields has been limited. While worthy efforts have been made to ensure women, refugees and migrants, people from the Global South, and children are more fully understood to fall within the protective architecture of the principle, LGBTQI+ populations have so far fallen through the cracks in the more policy-oriented literature.76

The invisibility of LGBTQI+ communities from much atrocity prevention architecture normalises, and not only institutionalises assumptions of the cis-heterosexuality of communities facing and experiencing violence, but renders implausible and invisible the fact that atrocity crimes against people on the basis of non-heteronormative sexuality and non-cisgender identities occur across the world. Widespread and systematic violent targeting of LGBTQI+ people can often look different to the widespread and systematic violent targeting of ethnic, religious and racial groups that traditionally dominate the atrocity prevention agenda, but may still meet the conceptual and legal thresholds of crimes against humanity.

The Genocide Convention and most definitions of the crime of genocide do not include LGBTQI+ communities as possible victims. As shown by Nellans, this misses the intrinsic connections between heteronormativity – systems which normalise, legitimise and prioritise heterosexuality as the natural or preferred sexual orientation – and genocide. She connects nationalism and homophobia as “queers are depicted as traitors to the nationalist cause” that prevent the reproduction and pollute the purity of a people.77 Other researchers show how common understandings of genocidal sexual violence are premised on a logic of heteronormativity to the exclusion of gender and sexual minorities.78

LGBTQI+ communities are protected by the Rome Statute. As Lisa Davis and Jamie Todd-Gerr set out “as with all forms of persecution, accountability for gender persecution requires establishment of the underlying discrimination. Targeting women, men, girls, boys, LGBTQI+, non-binary and gender non-conforming persons on gender grounds is a crime against humanity”.79 However, this has not been reflected in the either the language used to describe widespread and systematic violations against LGBTQI+ communities or in recognising LGBTQI+ communities as groups that can be vulnerable to identity-based atrocity crimes.

Recent studies have found that “sexual minorities are at greater risk of war crimes, including conflict-based issues of forced displacement, migration, and social cleansing, in addition to the psychological and physical trauma that accompanies persecution and violence”.80 Research by governments, agencies and academics are finding that humanitarian response systems continue to exclude LGBTQI+ people even where they are at heightened risk.81 And while there has been growing attention on mainstreaming access during humanitarian crises for women, girls, disabled people and the elderly, there has not been commensurate mainstreaming for LGBTQI+ access during crises and stigma can prevent access to support.82 There are specific needs that LGBTQI+ people can have during humanitarian crises.
or in conflict zones, such as family-appropriate accommodation, toilet and shower facilities that recognise the additional safety risks LGBTQI+ people can face, and challenges in accessing support services for gender diverse people who may not have identity documentation that matches their gender presentation. During humanitarian crises, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, gender diverse people were excluded from systems designed to provide aid and compensation. In fact, a 2018 survey of the 10 largest humanitarian response plans found no inclusion of LGBTQI+ people or their specific needs during humanitarian crises. LGBTQI+ people fleeing Ukraine are being forced to seek sanctuary in countries hostile to their rights.

Each year states gather at the UN General Assembly for an annual dialogue on R2P, and the statements given there are a useful resource for ‘temperature checking’ the positions, activities, and areas of concern that states hold on R2P and its implementation. These meetings “have helped to forge a shared understanding of R2P,” all be it a largely inflexible one, whereby a large number of states flesh out their official understandings of R2P. As such, the annual dialogues are a useful site for assessing how states understand the relationships between R2P and identity-based violence. References to identity categories, such as women or refugees, are common in statements and indeed have increased over time. Yet across the same time scale there were no references to LGBTQI+ people or the component identities of gay, lesbian, homosexual, bisexual, or transgender until 2019. In 2019 Costa Rica’s statement and Uruguay’s statement both included references to enhanced domestic legal protections for LGBTQI+ people. There was also a reference in Russia’s statement in 2019, however it served to dismiss protections of LGBTQI+ people saying that Ukraine “needs real democratization, and not just colourful gay parades in the central squares of Kyiv”. This shows that while some states move towards understanding the relevance of R2P to identity categories such as women and refugees, there is still very limited understanding evident in statements on the relevance of LGBTQI+ identities to R2P protection. This is compounded by how LGBTQI+ issues at the United Nations remain siloed, and as a result disjointed from Security Council topics like R2P, under the Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures. Greater inclusion of LGBTQI+ people in annual statements on the responsibility to protect – their risks, resilience, and resistance – would help to integrate these currently siloed areas of work. This would draw attention not only to the prevalence of state-sponsored political homophobia but also to practices of state homophilia, where there is little follow through on promises of support for queer collectives. Likewise, the UN Joint Office for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect could lead by example in explicitly acknowledging that LGBTQI+ people are part of the ‘who’ R2P – and thus its mandate – covers. The UN Secretary writes a report on the responsibility to protect each year, none of which in the past have mentioned LGBTQI+ people or their rights, sanctioning in effect the sector’s blindness. And so, despite increasing risks to LGBTQI+ communities around the globe, engagement with LGBTQI+ risks, vulnerabilities and expertise in atrocity prevention and R2P practice, research and policy have remained limited.

These examples highlight the need for LGBTQI+ mainstreaming across the atrocity prevention and humanitarian spheres.
The limited inclusion of LGBTQI+ people goes beyond R2P and humanitarian programming however, to encompass the UN as a whole. A recent comprehensive analysis of UN actors and agencies found that until 10 years ago no part of the UN was engaged in dedicated programming for LGBTQI+ people, and as recently as five years ago the UN was only starting to consider the needs of LGBTQI+ people beyond the HIV/AIDS epidemic.89 Even though the WHO was an early UN agency to engage with the needs of LGBTQI+ people, it has been slow to condemn so-called ‘conversion therapies’ or non-consensual and invasive surgical procedures on intersex children.90 UN actors that have engaged more than others with LGBTQI+ programming include the UNDP, OHCHR, and UNHCR but progress is slow. UNHCR has had guidance on handling asylum claims on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity since 2008.91 Implementation of these guidelines, however, is lacking. UN Women has more engagement with gender and sexual diversity than its predecessor UNIFEM, however “many LGBTI activists still find it difficult to work with UN Women, describing it as one of the more conservative agencies”.92 The WPS agenda, which exists both inside and outside the UN, has been critiqued for its “continued silence about homophobic and transphobic violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer individuals in conflict-related environments”.93 Two recent reports by the HRC give a strong evidence base to the increase of ultraconservatism opposing the rights of LGBTQI+ people, the money that is channelled to anti-LGBTQI+ movements in the US and internationally, and what is at stake in these regressive actions for queer people around the world.94 The UN Joint Office does not engage with LGBTQI+ people’s rights, either as an indicator of atrocity risk or in recognition of the vulnerability to atrocity crimes queer communities face around the world.

These exclusions are both the product of and contribute to further reinforcing similar exclusions in large parts of the programming and prioritisation of internationally facing civil and state-level policy. Funding and the donor space also replicates many of these exclusions; when there is money for LGBTQI+ rights-based work on the international level it tends to be siloed and not intersect with the challenges of conflict prevention, atrocity prevention, and humanitarian response. Crisis response in the face of specific calamities rarely trigger funding options that encourage LGBTQI+ inclusive or LGBTQI+ specific work. At the same time, the worthy drive towards funding ‘local’ risks reinforcing ‘local’ biases and prejudices, which might exclude the rights of LGBTQI+ people and their needs. Donors should also be making the active and deliberate effort to support civil society organisations at all levels to truly embed the principles of decolonising and queering their internal processes and work through the provision of funding that is genuinely able to respond to the diverse needs and ongoing development such necessary and necessarily ongoing endeavours require.

The UK fund that supported the production of this paper was a rare and welcome window that sought out “gender-transformative, inclusive and equitable peacebuilding projects that also consider sexual orientation and gender identity minorities”.95 However, while states, philanthropic donors and grantmaking organisations continue to become more interested in intersectional approaches to reducing conflict, the wider challenge in the peace and security funding space
Queering atrocity prevention – where ‘firefighting’ so far outstrips attention on prevention – is ensuring that large humanitarian agencies do not remain the primary recipients, crowding out organisations that are for a variety of reasons able to be more nimble, progressive, and nuanced. Moreover, a pivot in the US funding landscape towards domestic identity-based violence related issues – and a welcome one – appears to have contributed to a reduction of funding for atrocity prevention more broadly, even at a time where incidents of atrocity are rising and the global drivers of identity-based violence and mass atrocities (namely climate change and democratic backsliding) indicate the mid-twenty first century could be characterised by new scales of violence against groups. A sea change is needed. While the focus of this paper is on the atrocity prevention sphere, there are broader intersecting issues of LGBTQI+ exclusion from UN programming and the WPS agenda.

This low-level practical engagement of R2P practitioners with LGBTQI+ persecution is matched in the literature of R2P. The premier journal for articles on R2P – Global Responsibility to Protect – features no articles focused on LGBTQI+ persecution across its first 13 volumes. It does, however, include an article on feminisation in international relations which includes discussion of increased violence against LGBTQI+ people, and it also includes an article on the arms trade and gender-based violence, which discusses violence against LGBTQI+ people. 96 The largest compendium on R2P - the Oxford University Press Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect - spanning over a thousand pages includes only one passing reference to LGBTQI+ identities. 97 This limited academic engagement with LGBTQI+ identities in R2P academic literature further highlights the urgent need to meaningfully engage with LGBTQI+ experiences, vulnerabilities and expertise when it comes to atrocity prevention and identity-based violence in order to better respond to existing and emerging threats to LGBTQI+ communities. We are not singling out specific actors or authors within the R2P or atrocity prevention community in this critique - we have all missed out on opportunities to draw these connections in the past - but we are asking that we are all more mindful of LGBTQI+ persecution in our work on R2P in the future.

Within genocide studies, however, there is longer and growing interest in exploring the intersection of LGBTQI+ identities and atrocity crimes. While the Nazi persecution of gay men is not often framed as genocide in the academic literature, Matthew Waites argues that it fits the definitional criteria if sexuality constitutes a ‘group’ as set out in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention). 98 He also argues that crimes committed against gay men in Uganda can be considered acts of genocide. Expanding the application of the Genocide Convention further, David Eichert shows how legal determinations of genocide have focused on sexual violence when it was perpetrated against cisgender women rather than people of other genders. 99 He shows how sexual violence against men, trans women, and non-binary people can and does fit the legal definitions set out in the Genocide Convention, including actions which cause death, forced pregnancy, the prevention of pregnancy, serious bodily or mental harm, or symbolic destruction. Eichert gives examples from a United Nations International Fact-Finding Mission for Myanmar where sexual violence against cisgender women was determined to constitute “acts of genocide” while
“functionally identical” sexual violence committed against cisgender men and transgender women was labelled as “crimes against humanity”, showing how understandings of gender go as far as to inform understandings of crimes. Waites and Eichert both show how common understandings of genocidal sexual violence are premised on a logic of cis-heteronormativity to the exclusion of gender and sexual minorities.

Nellans calls for a “queer(er) Genocide Studies”. Drawing on Cynthia Enloe’s earlier provocative question of “where are the women?”, Nellans asks “where are the queers?” She argues that when genocide studies has considered queer lives, it has been almost exclusively focused on Nazi Germany and that, even still, when persecution of gay men in Nazi Germany is discussed, there is often a reluctance to link it explicitly with genocide. This misses the intrinsic connections between cis-heteronormativity and genocide, Nellans argues, where the kinds of violence perpetrated within genocides often focuses on reproductive futurism, for example torture that targets genitals or reproductive capacities. She also draws powerful connections between nationalism and homophobia whereby non-heterosexual or non-cisgender people are seen as a threat to the nation. These recent pieces of scholarship in genocide studies make compelling arguments that we are missing a lot, if we do not consider both how queer people are targeted in genocide, and how enforcing cis-heteronormativity is integral to the logic of genocide.

These understandings of atrocity crimes do not yet feed in to many of the practical tools of atrocity prevention. According to the sector’s primary tools of analysis, we do not currently look either at the specific atrocity risks that face LGBTQI+ communities or the intersections of LGBTQI+ persecution and atrocity crimes. In the 15 publicly available frameworks of atrocity risk indicators, not one mentions LGBTQI+ communities or vulnerabilities they may face. This is surprising, given that queer people have been targeted in atrocity crimes as far back as the Holocaust.

For over 10 years these analytical frameworks and check lists of risk factors have become something of a backbone to the practice of atrocity prevention. An early version was the US Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response policy handbook, published in 2012, a forerunner of more distilled and detailed analytical tools, but it presented accessible discussion of where genocide comes from and provided guidance on identifying risks. The US State Department soon developed their own risk framework alongside USAID’s field guide on atrocity prevention following the creation of the Atrocities Prevention Board. A Strategic Framework for Mass Atrocity Prevention was drafted by former R2P Special Adviser Jennifer Welsh et al in 2013 for the Australian Government. In 2014, the UN published its Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes that set out common risk factors, as well as specific risk factors for “intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups” and “signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group”. Since then, numerous other frameworks of analysis or risk matrices have been developed. The European Union launched its atrocity prevention tool kit through the European External Action Service in 2019, building on the UN framework and the findings of the European Task Force on the Prevention of Mass Atrocities, which also detailed a table of common risks factors...
of atrocity crimes. In 2018 the Africa Working Group for the Global Action Against Mass Atrocities presented their manual of best practice for the prevention of mass atrocities, which included a list of indicators.¹⁰⁴

None of the formal international frameworks of atrocity risks reviewed as part of this study include violence against LBGTQI+ groups as an indicator of atrocity crimes towards such groups or in general. This means that those who rely upon these frameworks or use them as starting points for making assessments, designing programmes, or developing their own understanding of atrocity risks, are starting from a position of gaps that could readily be closed.

The absence of LGBTQI+ vulnerabilities and experiences in atrocity risk frameworks is matched by wider gaps relating to gender and sexuality. The Global Justice Centre has found that “[d]espite a detailed breakdown of indicators evidencing eight common risk factors, and two additional factors relevant to genocide, the framework fails to discuss how different violations might target male and female victims differently. There is also no attempt to differentiate how early warning signs might manifest themselves in the form of gendered harms. The ten risk factors mention women only twice, and in both instances they are grouped together with children”.¹⁰⁵ Such explicit gaps in the very frameworks that guide many of the conceptual and practical underpinnings of atrocity prevention policy and practice give indication of the extent to which LGBTQI+ people’s rights and vulnerabilities have been excluded by our fields – not by all but by many. Redressing those gaps in our tools of monitoring and analysis therefore stands as a practical step that would trigger something of a waterfall effect through our sector. It is, as well as being logical, also imminently feasible.

There is, in contrast, some discussion of LBGTQI+ risks in assessments by atrocity prevention organisations. The Institutional Capacities for the Implementation of R2P in West Africa: A Case Study of Ghana, for example, found that “[r]ecent trends reveal that LGBT persons constitute at risk population in regard to R2P”.¹⁰⁶ The Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect has highlighted increased atrocity risks towards LGBTQI+ people in their risk assessments of Laos and Brunei.¹⁰⁷ The Auschwitz Institute for the Prevention of Genocide (AIPG) has run training and produced research on recognising risks facing LGBTQI+ populations in its atrocity prevention state level training. The Auschwitz Institute co-organized a study on the impact of religion and religious laws throughout Southeast Asia with a special focus on the impacts for members of the LGBTQI+ community on their rights to equality, non-discrimination, and physical integrity. AIPG also serves as the Technical Secretariat of the Latin American Network for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and in this capacity, cooperates with the Network’s Member States to develop domestic policies protecting LBGTQI+ persons. However, these are exceptions in atrocity prevention monitoring, analysis and practice. While many local organisations undertake work at the intersections of LGBTQI+ violence and atrocity prevention, this knowledge has not yet contributed to influencing the global discourse of the practice.
Co-creating risk frameworks and identifying risk factors

Even prior to this project, Protection Approaches had found that, formative though the UN Framework of Atrocity Analysis has been in developing conceptual understanding and practical implementation of atrocity prevention, key gaps in the risk factors have been replicated in other international, national and more local iterations of the tool. These findings reinforced conclusions from work by Protection Approaches and the Beni Peace Forum in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which recommended a new approach to local-international early warning and response systems designed around a symbiotic feedback loop of sharing information and analysis, and co-designing risk assessment tools and response strategies, that intentionally seeks to deepen relationships, cross-working, and understanding, and even lead to coordinated interventions between local and international actors.

Research for this project and finding the extent to which the rights of LGBTQI+ people and vulnerabilities are missing from risk analysis frameworks has underlined for us the need to develop an approach to understanding and monitoring risk indicators that is informed by both the professional skills of atrocity prevention best practice (which itself should be inherently intersectional) and the lived experience of those who witness and understand the dynamics of identity-based violence and mass atrocity crimes. Protection Approaches advocates, therefore, a process that recognises both the utility of a common set of indicators that our field recognises across time and space as well as the need for specificity and local context. We recommend then that ‘master’ frameworks redress gaps around gender and sexuality but that the principle of co-creation drives the development of ‘living’ frameworks for specific local contexts.

Overlooking localised expressions of gender and sexuality can compound vulnerability during and after violence, for example when services like housing and healthcare provided to refugees operate with a rigid gender binary or do not recognise certain family configurations. Overlooking localised expressions of gender and sexuality can compound vulnerability during and after violence, for example when services like housing and healthcare provided to refugees operate with a rigid gender binary or do not recognise certain family configurations. There are significant issues with translating sexuality and gender identity and expressions across borders – be they linguistic, cultural, country, and/or continent – that leave out those whose sexuality and gender falls outside Western understandings of non-normative sexuality and gender. In this sense, many displaced queer people face a triple insecurity bind when seeking security. Those insecurities come in various forms: (a) as people move across borders their sexual and gender knowledge can become dislocated from its point of origin and risks being deemed incomprehensible in the (Western) geographies in which those sexual/gender knowledges are received, leading to questions about whether one really is ‘queer’; (b) having announced queerness as the basis of an insecurity claim, individuals effectively ‘out’ themselves and further entrench the insecurity they face on the basis of sexuality and gender identity if refugee status is denied and they are further displaced or, worse, returned; and (c) risk discrimination and persecution in the receiving society/country where discriminatory (usually racialised) anti-queer politics and social structures are not necessarily absent.

It is important not to rely upon co-creation and to adjust the ‘master’ frameworks
however. In our work in Eastern DRC, our partners built out a more extensive and locally sensitive risk framework, complete with risk indicators, but it could not be considered comprehensive: LGBTQI+ communities, for example, were not identified but do suffer discrimination and higher levels of violence in the North Kivu region. It thus becomes a pertinent question of how atrocity prevention actors, particularly those situated in the global north, can work with local partners abroad in ways that do not risk reinforcing or replicating existing patterns of exclusion and discrimination. More specifically, how can atrocity prevention actors integrate LGBTQI+ viewpoints in contexts where discrimination against the queer community is already so entrenched?

In working with partners, both locally and internationally, our communities of practice need to consider how to simultaneously centre long-marginalized local sites of knowledge and insight, without contributing to the weaponization of cultural relativism against minority groups abroad or alternatively, perpetuating western ideological patrimony. Perhaps one place to start is to reject instrumental attempts at distilling the debate on LGBTQI+ people’s rights as existing between Western and non-Western cultures, and also to reject elite attempts to monopolize definitions and perceptions of what ‘local culture’ looks like. Instead, we must consider the multiplicity of groups involved and invested in these debates and the notion that relativism can often be a typical argument of authority. We must conduct our due diligence to identify and reach into often-marginalized and silenced groups and ensure that their perspectives, experiences and needs are represented in our work, as opposed to limiting our engagement with ‘the local’ abroad only to hyper-visible, public and mainstream perspectives. This may include leveraging organizational networks to reach into expertise housed in civil society organizations, informal collectives, and minority communities in safe, sensitive and productive ways, paying attention to centring knowledge and expertise rather than exporting the burden to already-strained communities, organizations and collectives.

Protection Approaches has previously called for a political framework for atrocity prevention; such a framework must contain a thorough understanding of the interplay between and within those hierarchies and drivers and risk factors of atrocities, be they race, class, gender, sexuality, dis/ability, colonialism or other forms of power and/or grievance. In other words, atrocity prevention must be intersectional. This poses a question then of how can states, donors, NGOs and others wishing to make contributions to the prevention of atrocities abroad do so, while being supportive of local and community leadership? Interrogating and dismantling those interrelated structures of power and of violence is the goal and the challenge.
We have started from the position of explicitly acknowledging that LGBTQI+ communities are part of the ‘who’ R2P serves. We then assume that the tools, approaches, and policies should be fit for that purpose. Protection Approaches has long worked to push for more plural and devolved understandings of the responsibility to protect and so a second assumption of our starting position is that R2P must also be felt to belong to LGBTQI+ people, communities, and organisations. As Kate Ferguson and Fred Carver have argued “the goal for those wishing to preserve, promote, and strengthen the principle is therefore to “open up” how R2P and atrocity prevention is understood, “taking it out” of the UN, and integrating it into state structures and civil society practice”. This entails a pluralising of conceptual access to, and invocation of, R2P that would neither remove nor reduce R2P’s influence at the UN but would instead represent better mainstreaming of the principle and build consolidated means for action.

Queering R2P and atrocity prevention, however, requires a triple interrogation of who, what and where. In too often conflating the experiences of cisgender heterosexual women with gender, the atrocity prevention and WPS fields of practice further entrench assumptions that pre-suppose and naturalise a predominately Western system of cis-heterosexuality. Hagen points out that queering WPS enables the recognition of more localised sexual orientation and gender identities, expressions and definitions, and so queering our field can help guard against the naturalisation of culturally-specific, often Western, notions of gender, culture, and community.

Queering atrocity prevention asks us to go beyond identifying and accounting for the risks and vulnerabilities queer communities face. While this in itself is an urgent and systematically neglected endeavour, queering atrocity prevention includes the ways in which LGBTQI+ communities offer unique insights into and play key roles in systems and dynamics of change, justice and prevention. Especially as the positionality of LGBTQI+ communities as both insiders and outsiders of their societies opens up new ways of seeing and thinking and enables ruptures with oppressive and exclusionary systems. Queering atrocity prevention concerns itself with how to transform atrocity prevention beyond cosmetic or performative commitments to inclusion or mainstreaming of LGBTQI+ communities. These lessons can be learned through histories of queer resistance to past and ongoing instances of mass atrocity.

Queering R2P, then might help in our endeavours to further interrogate who R2P is ‘for’ and owned by, which of its pillars are prioritised and where implementation occurs. UN Secretary-General Guterres has called for member states to develop national mechanisms on atrocity prevention and integrate norms and tools in existing policy processes while the UN-World Bank study Pathways for Peace concluded both national and international attention must urgently be refocused on prevention. Successful domestication of R2P requires the integration of prevention and protection into domestic policies to safeguard all populations within domestic borders, and into national development, foreign and defence policies in order to be able to properly contribute to the safeguarding of populations abroad.
This process, already underway, arguably queers R2P as it directly dislocates what was the prevailing focus on the practice of a very narrow interpretation of the third pillar of R2P, specifically protective or preventative armed action, as a tool of multilateral policy – and particularly of the UN Security Council.

Queer forms of resistance have always had to be innovative. From the early Pride parades that became commonplace after the Stonewall riots in the US, to the production of visual memes by artists in response to Russian state homophobia, to flying the rainbow flag above Ukraine’s Motherland Monument, queer forms of resistance have shown us that we must sometimes look in the not-so-obvious places for warning signs of queer persecution. This is not because anti-queer violence is not tangible and happening to queer bodies but because those violences are often side-lined in major news reportage. For example, very little mainstream media is reporting on trans issues or the particular dangers a Russian occupation poses to queer individuals in Ukraine.

The fields of atrocity prevention must learn from contributions of resistance made by queer communities. Christ Bryant’s recent history of British gay and bisexual MPs who fought Hitler noted that “most families, biographers and historians deliberately exorcised any hint of their sexuality” but that “their sexuality was an essential aspect of their bravery”. In diverse Indigenous communities across North America it is often those who are part of LGBTQI+ communities, such as two spirit individuals that hold central and sacred knowledge about living in equitable relationship with the land and one another. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, it is the linking of this Indigenous knowledge with scientific, practitioner and other forms of knowledge that can engender inclusive and community-supported climate resilient development. The linking of knowledges can in turn prevent maladaptation to climate change, a process which risks exacerbating pre-existing inequalities and metastasising underlying grievances and marginalisation into violence.

Reaching in, supporting, collaborating and partnering with LGBTQI+ communities is then required for effective, future-proofed, joined up, horizontal atrocity prevention – to understand, monitor, analyse and communicate risks but also as key actors in designing, planning, implementing and leading prevention. Our research and practice indicate neither top-down nor bottom-up models will be sufficient without partnership with the other. What is still frequently missing in effective prevention and protection work is the bridging or convening role to ensure that expertise, information and perspectives of all communities are effectively shaping the responses of external actors and wider international behaviour. This is how LGBTQI+, and other still marginalised, voices can join and drive the conversation in a manner that truly seeks to be collaborative rather than extractive.

Being able to mobilise and integrate queer resistance to violence into atrocity prevention requires commitments to creating the inclusive and cohesive societies necessary for LGBTQI+ communities to thrive. This calls for an explicit recognition of how the responsibility to protect must also be devolved across domestic legislation to safeguard communities from harm and throughout our societies. For LGBTQI+
communities, harms that impede the safety and wellbeing that persist in some form in almost all states include conversion therapy; invasive mandatory surgeries, including at birth for intersex individuals or sterilisation for LGBTQI+ adults; rising hate crime; lack of family recognition; lack of employment, and lack of (adequate) healthcare or housing protections. These protections are essential in all societies and can create the circumstances for LGBTQI+ communities to share their expertise and leadership in endeavours to prevent mass violence wherever it may occur. Imagine, for example, what further contributions Bayard Rustin, Alan Turing and Sarah Hegazi might have made if they had been celebrated for who they were, rather than persecuted?125
The lessons of identity-based violence teach us that moments of juncture, or of political or economic stress, weaponizing ‘other’ can be highly effective for political elites. Likewise, the politicisation of homophobia is used in response to a political or economic crisis.

As an organisation based in Europe, we have looked first to our own region but have endeavoured to open up a global conversation. In the decades since 1945 the rights that LGBTQI+ people enjoy have increased rapidly in Europe – and in many parts of the world – but, as is so often the case in the advancement of rights, new freedoms have not been won easily and in some instances have triggered backlashes against LGBTQI+ people. Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic marginalised people have been disproportionately impacted around the world, as have marginalised and minoritized groups nearly everywhere. Past risks have been exacerbated by the pandemic, building on already present and growing negative global trends. Recent reports, for example, from the UN Human Rights Council’s Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity highlight the rise of ultraconservatism from those “seeking to exclude trans and gender-diverse people from protection”. A challenge for the atrocity prevention community is to consider to what extent our priorities, programmes and tools are able to learn from and respond to these risks, perhaps particularly as they interplay with the trajectory towards democratic backsliding, identity-based violence, and atrocity crimes.

As pointed to above, under Putin, an agenda to save Europe from itself has been fostered and a heteronormative internationalist project is underway. Putin’s recent moves to constitute Ukraine as Russian and under threat from European values, then, means that sexual politics is a significant part of this geopolitical confrontation: political homophobia and notions of a ‘Gayropean’ threat have legitimised Russian offence to balance against the influence of this ‘barbaric’ bloc and, thus, the domestic discourses about the ‘defence’ of Ukraine against EU/NATO influence becomes much more readily digestible, legitimate even, when the seeds of civilisational barbarism are already planted. The inclusion of such dynamics – where queer sex and gender have become constituent components of geopolitical moves and tensions over social, political, and cultural influence – in atrocity prevention frameworks is now overdue.

If we are to adequately account for and prevent mass atrocities and conflict escalations, we must take heed of situations such as those unfolding in Russia and then Chechnya as precipitants to much larger conflicts such as the situation in Ukraine; we must look to the patterns of violent discrimination in Egypt, acknowledge specific risks in Afghanistan, commit to including the needs of LGBTQI+ communities in our prevention efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sudan. We need to better monitor the specific risks and indicators of LGBTQI+ vulnerability to identity-based atrocity crimes.

The increased targeting of LGBTQI+ people signals both an increased risk of identity-based violence against LGBTQI+ people but also increased identity-based violence against others. Coordinated anti-LGBTQI+ action appears to be a common
canary in the coal mine of not only atrocity crimes but also, when paired with narratives of civilisational decay, much larger expansionist geopolitical projects such as that of Russia in Ukraine and potentially other parts of Europe deemed in need of ‘saving’ or of the Taliban’s vision for Afghanistan. In light of the historical and contemporary evidence offered in this paper, which suggests that the persecution of gender and sexual minorities often precedes and/or accompanies increased levels of violence and atrocities, a deeper and more systematic study of these connections is necessary. What we have tried to highlight, given the links we identify between atrocity and the persecution of sexual and gender minorities, is that the exclusion of LGBTQI+ people and queer work in conflict and atrocity frameworks to date is a significant oversight that needs addressing.

We are not suggesting that all mass atrocities begin against a backdrop of LGBTQI+ persecution, but we do argue that such violence tends to be a precursor to violence escalation and deeper, faster democratic backsliding. We are drawing attention to the fact that queer people face significant and unique insecurities during conflicts and atrocities that must be accounted for in conflict and atrocity frameworks. We ask that identity-based atrocity crimes against LGBTQI+ people are more explicitly acknowledged and confronted.

Queer political thought has consistently forced scholars and activists to focus their attention on relations to power and the consistent, unending reconfiguration of all power structures. What we are calling for here is for policymakers and scholars alike to think about the heteronormativity that is baked into atrocity prevention; the blindness to anti-LGBTQI+ atrocities that have taken place both historically and contemporarily, and how ignorance to the political homophobia and transphobia red flag has left us less well equipped to prevent – or at least mitigate the severity of – mass atrocity and war.

Queering atrocity prevention is not just about seeing the violence affecting LGBTQI+ people, it is also about advancing a queer political conviction that we are morally obliged to ceaselessly question how dominant organisations of society enable the dehumanisation of some and the protection of others on the basis of arbitrarily drawn lines of differentiation such as gender identity and expression or sexual desire and pleasure, and to imagine and build different ways of being in loving and safe community. While we are here arguing for recognition of anti-LGBTQI+ atrocities to be recognised as warning signs of much larger – often authoritarian and far right-wing – political agendas, we are also advocating a queer politics rooted in challenge to all systems of privilege – be they racial, gendered, sexualised or otherwise.

Where next?
Recommendations

We ask civil society organisations that work towards the prevention of mass atrocity crimes and in the wider peace and security fields to consider:

• using their platforms to publicly commit to look to their blind spots and encourage a sector-wide conversation about how we can ensure our tools and practices are fit for the purpose of contributing to the protection of LGBTQI+ people from atrocity crimes
• ensuring proactive and inclusive internal policies protect the rights and recognising the needs of their LGBTQI+ staff
• including LGBTQI+ people in early warning research, both as researchers and as communities that face additional risks
• the risks for LGBTQI+ people in specific contexts when developing analysis, in their advocacy, and in programme design

We ask researchers in the fields of R2P and atrocity prevention to consider:

• moving beyond the implicit assumption that the communities they are researching and advocating for are cisgendered or heterosexual
• acknowledging that translating sexuality and gender across borders is a difficult task that requires working with local populations (or their accounts of their experiences of domestic sexual politics) to understand what ‘non-normative’ sexuality is in that context: it may not always fit into Western identity labels/categories such as L/G/B/T/Q/I, etc.
• not only focusing on gender (or gender as ‘women’) but to think more expansively about the intersections of gender and sexuality, queer politics and feminist politics
• looking more broadly at the way sex and gender are implicated in geopolitics and international political campaigns that mark out ‘deviant’ bodies for punishment because of their sexuality and/or gender performances
• examining the growing tensions between so-called ‘queer friendly’ and ‘queer hating’ countries that may lead to, or enable, conflicts and or mass atrocity crimes

We ask States to consider:

• developing, adopting and implementing an inclusive, intersectional national strategy of atrocity prevention
• investing in cross-cutting agenda development that brings together WPS, R2P, civilian protection, humanitarian response, atrocity prevention, and the rights of LGBTQI+ people in domestic and international policy
• moving towards the depoliticisation of sex, acknowledging that sexual desire and gender identities/expressions are as varied as the individuals who hold them
• delivering interventions supporting the protection and inclusion of LGBTQI+ communities within the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and through recommendations given through the Universal Periodic Review
• inviting the Independent Expert on sexual orientation and gender identity to make a country visit
• ensuring high-level ministerial attendance, including ministers whose portfolio includes atrocity prevention and R2P focal points, to attend the Safe To Be Me conference and future international LGBTQI+ ministerials
• funding R2P focal points to ensure they have the capacity to both queer and devolve R2P

We ask donors to consider:

• providing easy, accessible, quick-release as well as long-term funding for LGBTQI+ organisations, especially in situations of or at risk of violence
• ensuring that the projects and organisations funded are LGBTQI+ inclusive in ways that reflect localised contexts and political circumstances, noting that the language and terminology for sexual and gender minorities varies around the world, as does the level of safety in framing inclusion of LGBTQI+ people
• making the active and deliberate effort to support CSOs at all levels to truly embed the principles of decolonising and queering their internal processes and work through the provision of funding that is genuinely able to respond to the diverse needs and ongoing development such necessary and necessarily ongoing endeavours require

We ask the UN Joint Office for the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect to consider:

• explicitly acknowledging that LGBTQI+ people are part of the ‘who’ that the mandate of the joint office, and the principle of the responsibility to protect, covers
• opening up the framework of analysis to include indicators relating to sex and gender, and issue guidance on the importance of co-creation for specifical contexts, populations and at risk groups
• including LGBTQI+ communities and the risks they face in the activities of the joint office, both by reaching in to CSOs and in the risk assessments they undertake
• pushing for accountability for systematic targeting of LGBTQI+ people through the ICC or draw lessons from human rights courts
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Endnotes


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


9. In this report, while we acknowledge the recent turn in UN and other policymaking circles to the term SOGIE, we have opted to use the terms LGBTQI+ and queer to refer to those whose sexual orientation and/or gender identity falls outside cis-hetero norms. We acknowledge that no acronym (e.g., LGBTQIH+) can account for the diversity of sexual desire and gender identity/expression, but use the identity-based LGBTQI+ acronym because it is often, on account of being (read as) L/G/B/T/Q/I/+ that individuals are subject to violence and atrocity crimes. This report is about violence and atrocity crimes motivated by (presumed) identity, and while we acknowledge that sexual desire ought not to be elevated to an identity in its own right, all kinds of so-called ‘deviant’ sexualities often function as an identity category that perpetrators assign to those targeted. Hence, in this case, LGBTQI+ seems most appropriate.


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30. Following Michael Bosia and Meredith Weiss, Ashleigh Currier, and Dean Cooper-Cunningham’s respective works, we define political homophobia and transphobia as the strategic use of homophobia and/or transphobia in services of some political end, regardless of any ‘real’ hatred of those who deviate from cis-heteronormativity. It involves the disparaging and constituting as deviant those individuals and collectives whose gender expressions and sexual desires do not align with cis-heteronormative prescriptions of ‘good’, ‘normal’, ‘natural’ gender or sex and desire.; SEE: Dean Cooper-Cunningham, “The International Politics of Sex: Visual Activism in Response to Russian State Homophobia” (PhD diss., University of Copenhagen, 2021); 3; Ashley Currier, Politicizing Sex in Contemporary Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Michael J. Bosia, Meredith L. Weiss, “Political Homophobia in Comparative Perspective,” in Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and the Politics of Oppression, ed. Michael J. Bosia, Meredith L. Weiss (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2013): 1-29.


49. The strategic mobilisation of support for the rights and protections of some queer sexualities and/or genders. SEE: Dean Cooper-Cunningham, “The International Politics of Sex,” 2021.


56. Carmichael et al, “Short-Term Outcomes of Pubertal Suppression in a Selected Cohort of 12 to 15 Year Old Young People with Persistent Gender Dysphoria in the UK,” PLOS ONE, 21 February 2021, https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0243894; Anna I.R. van der Miesen, Thomas D. Steensma, Annelou L.C. de Vries, Henny Bos, Arne Popma,


63. Ibid.


72. Ibid.


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Endnotes

82. Ibid.
85. A 2013 statement from Finland referred to increased protection for minorities including ‘sexual orientation’.
89. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.


114. Ibid.

115. Ferguson and Carver, Being the Difference, 2021


117. Ibid., 322.


