



Points East

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China, Japan and the Flight of European Jewish Refugees to Shanghai during World War II¹

By Gao Bei

"Three countries spat me out as a dead body is spat out by stormy seas" recalled Polish rabbi Simkha Elberg, who eventually made his way to Shanghai via Lithuania and Japan in 1941.² The city took him in, along with a flood of other European Jews. But the story of the wartime "Shanghai Jews" is not just about the escape of twenty thousand Jewish refugees to East Asia during the Holocaust. It demonstrates how the "Jewish issue" complicated the relationships between China, Japan, Germany, and the United States before and during World War II. It also shows that the Holocaust had complicated repercussions that extended beyond Europe.

Nazi Germany's persecution of the Jews is one of the most exhaustively documented tragedies of the 20th century. However, the experience of the European Jewish refugees in Shanghai during World War II is still not well known. The diaspora of Jews in East Asia is a rich and complex story that deserves our attention as well. We know from Japanese Foreign Ministry documents that by 1941, 19,451 of Jewish refugees had arrived in China.³ While many of the world's borders closed to the desperate Jews of Europe, the open port of Shanghai, which could be entered without permits, visas or any papers, became the last haven for the refugees.⁴

Before these refugees escaped to Shanghai, from the late 1920s to early 1937, China pursued a de facto alliance relationship with Germany. In 1921, the two countries reestablished diplomatic relations, which had been severed after China joined the Allied Powers during World War I. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Republic of China, recognized the value of German experience to Chinese efforts to build up their country militarily and economically. Conversely, Germany needed China's market and strategic materials for its recovery after the war.⁵ Nevertheless, the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Germany and Japan in November 1936 and the start of Japan's full-scale invasion of China in July 1937 changed the Sino-German relationship. Japan began pressuring Germany to stop exporting military equipment to the Nationalist government and withdraw German advisors from China. China lost this important strategic partner to Japan in 1937 after Germany concluded that the Japanese would provide a more effective check to the Soviet army in East Asia.⁶ China was then fighting the Japanese alone and was forced to look elsewhere for both military and financial support. Both China and Japan attempted to wring money from European and American Jewish communities, which supported the Shanghai Jews, in order to fund their war against one another. The Chinese were especially interested in the potential support from the Jewish leaders in the United States.

In fact, important Chinese leaders had been thinking about the Jews and the so-called Jewish issue for some time. Sun Yat-sen was a great admirer of the Jewish people and was a supporter of Zionism. In the early 1920s, in order to reunify, reconstruct, and modernize China, Sun Yat-sen promoted nationalism. He argued that "nationalism held a nation together and enabled it to survive," and this was "what had enabled the Jews to continue as a stateless people for almost two thousand years."⁷ He regularly cited the Jewish Zionists as role mod-

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Ignoring Longstanding Chinese Policy on Religion and its Consequences

By Jordan Paper

In 1964, I attended a summer session on Chinese linguistics. As a budding Sinologist, I developed a rapport with two fellow attendees who were high-ranked officers in U.S. Army intelligence. This was before the buildup of American forces in Vietnam, and they were of the opinion that the U.S. could not win a war there. A year later, I was with CIA analysts at the McLean headquarters, and they were of similar opinion. Obviously, intelligence specialists were ignored, and only after millions died did officials like McNamara admit that the U.S. escapade was a mistake. More recently, the younger Bush when President sent back intelligence reports regarding Iraq to be rewritten to reflect what he wanted to see. Again, only years later did it become clear that the original intelligence reports were correct and ignoring them led to disaster.

The March 2009 (24/1) issue of *Points East* has an article of mine: "Chinese Policies Regarding Religion and Chinese Judaism." I wrote the article because I found that many published statements "reflect a misunderstanding of the Chinese official attitude towards religion as well as of Chinese Judaism itself." In summarizing the history of the interrelationship of religion and government in China, I pointed out that there has never been any indication of religious intolerance by any Chinese government, but there has always been tight control over religious institutions and foreign involvement in religion in China because of its history. Virtually all regime changes were due to religio-political movements. In more recent history, the forced attempt at Christianization backed by Western armies as a prelude to colonizing China led to hatred of those converted to Western religions as well as missionaries. I ended the article with a plea to cease trying to convert Chinese Jews to European Jews.

In a letter to the editor in the March 2013 (28/1) issue of *Points East*, I pointed to the irony of American Jewish racism against Chinese and the felt need by some to de-Chinese Chinese Jews, given the racism towards Jews in the U.S. Becoming alarmed about what was going on in Kaifeng by American Jewish missionaries, I wrote "Common Misconceptions about the Kaifeng Jewish Community," which was published in the March 2014 (29/1) issue of *Points East*. The article concluded with the following sentence: "Some American tourists, out of ignorance of Chinese and Jewish history and culture, are leading the remnants of the Kaifeng Jewish community to potential disaster."

In the subsequent issue of the newsletter, there were two responses. One by Dr. Wendy Abraham concluded, "Dr. Paper's article should be required reading for anyone thinking of visiting Kaifeng or doing research in this field." The second by Barnaby Yeh castigated me for being ignorant of Chinese history and geography, as well as the Chinese government's attitude towards religion and concept of Minorities. The editor published a rebuttal by me in which I reversed those charges, apparently to little effect.

In the last issue of *Points East* (July 2016, 31/2), I sadly learned that the inevitable had taken place: embryonic Jewish institutions had been suppressed, Jewish tourism within Kaifeng was suspended, and Barnaby Yeh was not welcome in China. In a note from him published in *Points East*, the blame was put on the financial shenanigans of particular individuals and families. While I have no doubt that a primary

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SJI MEMBERSHIP

Country	Total
United States	142
Canada	27
China	19
Israel	17
England	6
Australia	3
Japan	2
Switzerland	2
Germany	1
South Africa	1
Indonesia	1
Taiwan	1
Total:	222

FROM THE EDITOR

News of the crackdown in Kaifeng gained worldwide attention after Chris Buckley, a *New York Times* reporter, based in Beijing wrote two articles, the first of which reported the current situation (“Chinese Jews of Ancient Lineage Huddle Under Pressure” <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/25/world/asia/china-kaifeng-jews.html?emc=eta1&r=0>) and the second, an in-depth interview with Moshe Yehuda Bernstein, gave background and context (“Jewish and Chinese: Explaining a Shared Identity” <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/world/asia/china-kaifeng-jews-moshe-bernstein.html>). It was the paper’s most-emailed international news story on a second day, and was reprinted in many local papers.

Michael Freund, of Shavei Israel, wrote an op-ed in *The Jerusalem Post*, which called on the Israeli government to intercede and ask Beijing to stop the crackdown, noting that “There is no excuse for Israel to be turning its back on Kaifeng Jewry, who are a living link between our two civilizations.” (<http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/FUNDAMENTALLY-FREUND-Stop-the-crackdown-on-Chinas-Jews-467140>)

Sam Kestenbaum at *The Forward* wrote a follow-up article on the situation (<http://forward.com/news/349913/who-are-the-kaifeng-jews-and-why-is-china-cracking-down-on-them/?>) and both *The Times of Israel* (<http://www.timesofisrael.com/chinese-authorities-crack-down-on-tiny-jewish-community/#.V-fd9z0jQpE>) and the Jewish News Service (www.jns.org/.../chinese-crackdown-on-jewish-practices-in-ancient-community-of-kaifeng) ran shorter articles.

In other places, Mattias Messmer, in Germany, wrote on the subject (<http://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/article/view/id/26451>) and Kenneth Tan publicized the issue on Shanghaiist (http://shanghaiist.com/2016/10/03/kaifeng_jews_crackdown.php) while *What’s on Weibo* (<http://www.whatsonweibo.com/jews-in-shanghai/>) contrasted how China is developing Shanghai as a Jewish tourist site with a mention of the crackdown in Kaifeng.

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Points East

Anson Laytner, Publisher

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Letters to the Editor and articles for *Points East* may be sent to:

Preferred Form:
e-mail:Laytner@msn.com

or to: Rabbie Anson Laytner
 1823 East Prospect St.
 Seattle, WA 9811-23307

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Sino-Judaic Institute
c/o Rabbi Arnold Mark Belzer
34 Washington Avenue
Savannah, GA 31405 U.S.A.

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From the Editor

(continued from page 2)

The news brought out well-intentioned folk who want to know how to communicate their concerns respectfully to the Chinese authorities and zealots who are all for a worldwide Jewish boycott of China.

SJI both respects China's sovereignty and wants the Kaifeng Jews to be able to flourish. To that end, SJI President Rabbi Arnold Mark Belzer will be travelling to China to meet with both officials and members of the Kaifeng community to begin talks aimed at understanding and resolving the situation.

I came across something that might point to a possible solution to the Kaifeng Jewish dilemma: Last June, the Indian state government of Maharashtra bestowed minority status on its tiny, ancient community of Jews, who number only 2466. This official recognition by Maharashtra State, as opposed to the national government, nonetheless is important because it will help the Jewish community preserve its religious and cultural traditions, educational and community institutions, and its unique heritage on the Indian subcontinent.

If Maharashtra State can do this, why not Henan Province? The Chinese national policy on the status of the Kaifeng Jews can remain what it is (if need be), but the national authorities should permit Henan and Kaifeng the flexibility to adapt things to fit the facts on the ground. In other words, no recognition as a national minority, but recognition as a local minority. Give the Kaifeng Jewish descendants a chance to survive!

Anson Laytner

Letter to the Editor

It's a bit late to complain but we were very unhappy with the article in the November issue of last year by Mohammad Turki Al-Sudairi. Even the title, which included the words "Settler-Colonialism" should have prompted the editor to reject it.

Sincerely,
Dr. Noel Fishman
La Jolla, CA

Jewish Refugees

(continued from page 1)

els for the Chinese and their nationalist movement.⁸ Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, but his followers in the Nationalist Party and government continued to support Zionism.⁹

In the spring of 1939, Sun Ke, Sun Yat-sen's only son, proposed a plan to settle Jewish refugees in southwestern China.¹⁰ Sun Ke emphasized that this was consistent with Sun Yat-sen's teachings that China should help and ally with minor powers and peoples. He also believed that this plan would help bring China substantial benefits. For example, it might help to attract Jewish capital from abroad and favorably impress the British and U.S. governments, which he hoped would aid China in its war against Japan.¹¹ But, since China at the time was still nominally an ally of Germany, the Chinese also had to be aware of their plan's reception by Berlin. China could not afford to make Germany another enemy. Therefore, China's Jewish settlement plan initially aimed to assist "stateless" Jews, or non-German and Austrian Jews. In the months following March 1939, the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Military Affairs, Finance, and Transportation of the Nationalist government's Executive Yuan studied the settlement plan and established specific regulations for the entry of Jewish refugees into China. During the discussions, almost all the ministries concluded that the nationality of the Jewish refugees was an important factor that would affect China's future control over them. For example, if the refugees were from a country that exercised consular jurisdiction in China, they were not subject to Chinese law. Therefore, the final draft of the settlement plan presented to the Highest National Defense Council contained specific articles pertaining to the entry of "Jews with nationality" and "Jews without nationality."¹² Only later, after American Jewish leaders enthusiastically participated in the settlement plan and pledged to convince the Roosevelt administration to support China financially, did Chinese officials gradually abandon their concerns about Germany. Although the Nationalist government did not want to aggravate its already troubled relations with Germany, China's highest priority during this period was to win international assistance in its war against Japan.

Actually, the Chinese government's settlement plan, which favored stateless refugees, was not practical since very few Jewish refugees in Europe, at least at the time, were stateless. Almost all retained their original nationality.¹³ Still, a German Jewish businessman, Jakob Berglas, and a politically active American Jewish dentist, Maurice William, presented plans to both the Nationalist and American governments to transplant oppressed European Jews, German Jews in particular, to China.

Jakob Berglas proposed to let 100,000 Jewish emigrants settle in China's southwestern Yunnan Province, which had a small population and a great deal of uncultivated land. He also asked the Chinese government to pro-

vide protection for the Jews, and offer them employment opportunities. Most important, Berglas emphasized that each Jewish immigrant should be before his or her arrival in China pay £50. So eventually, a total of £5,000,000 would be brought into the country. Berglas believed that the Jewish immigrants would constitute what he called "a valuable asset for the reconstruction and industrial development of China."¹⁴

Maurice William also enthusiastically communicated with the Chinese government about the possibility of transplanting German Jews to China. During the Sino-Japanese War, William was secretary of the American Bureau of Medical Aid to China and an important member of the United Council for Civilian Relief in China, along with former President Herbert Hoover and Albert Einstein. In fact, as early as 1934 William and Einstein had come up with the idea of finding a home in China for German Jews.¹⁵ In 1939, after William learned of the Chinese government's plan to establish a settlement for Jewish refugees, he immediately contacted the Chinese ambassador to the United States. William emphasized to him that Chinese and Jews were both victims of aggressive wars and should cooperate and provide one another with aid. He also stressed that China needed America's financial help in its war with Japan, and he was confident that American Jews could raise a powerful voice to help persuade the U.S. government to provide financial and military support to China.¹⁶ Eventually, in August 1939, the Chinese government officially invited William to come to China to investigate the possibility of settling Jews who were expelled from Germany.¹⁷ The possibility of obtaining financial support from the United States obviously brought new hope to China in its war effort. From then on, Chinese officials no longer worried about the refugees' German nationality.

However, no record exists that proves William actually visited China. The Sun Ke plan, the Jakob Berglas plan and the Maurice William plan all ended suddenly and mysteriously. It is clear that the lack of support from the American government was at least in part responsible for the failure of these Jewish settlement plans. Beginning in 1939, the Roosevelt administration distanced itself from efforts to rescue European Jews. The American government restricted its quota of Jewish immigrants to the United States, and public opinion was against providing further help to European Jews.¹⁸ The Roosevelt administration's general indifference to the plight of the Jews was reflected in its unwillingness to support the Chinese government's Jewish settlement plans. As a result, the Chinese officials may also have lost interest in those plans because of the lack of American support.

Although the Nationalist government's settlement plans were ill-fated, they are still important to our understanding of Chinese politics and diplomacy during the Second World War. First, they shed new light on the

character of the Chinese Nationalist war effort. Many scholars through the years have criticized Chiang Kai-shek's regime for being corrupt and for being incompetent in the way it fought the Japanese, but this research demonstrates that the Chinese Nationalists were determined not only to fight the war, but to use every possible tool, domestic and international, to win.

Yet, these settlement plans also underscore a more general dilemma that the Nationalist government encountered during the early stages of the war. They illuminate the gap between China's intentions and capacities in handling important international issues. Thus, Chinese leaders constantly found themselves developing ambitious plans that they were frequently incapable of executing.

Chinese diplomats in Europe also became deeply involved in the Shanghai Jewish refugee issue. Their activities merit closer scrutiny, because their role has been mostly misunderstood. It was true that the majority of Jewish refugees came to the city without visas, but from 1938 to 1940 Chinese diplomats in Europe issued visas to refugees wishing to go to China. These Chinese visas served as evidence of their intention to leave Nazi Europe during the time of forced migration. Shanghai survivors later recalled that they were required to show Nazi officials evidence of their plans to depart before receiving formal permission to leave Germany or Austria.¹⁹ Those who were unable to obtain foreign entry visas to leave their countries might find themselves put in concentration camps.²⁰

The story of He Fengshan, the Chinese Consul General in Vienna who issued life-saving visas to Austrian Jews, is generally well known, especially among the Shanghai survivors and in Austria. He was one of only two Chinese named "Righteous Among the Nations" by Yad Vashem, Israel's Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority. Although the Jewish refugees did not need visas to enter Shanghai at the time, officials at Yad Vashem explained that He Fengshan disobeyed the orders of his superior, the Chinese ambassador to Germany, in order to issue visas to escaping Austrian Jews.²¹ This has caused a misunderstanding that he issued visas to Jewish refugees on his own initiative and in defiance of the policies of the Chinese Nationalist government. In fact, the Chinese consulate general in Vienna was not the only consular office that provided visas to Jewish refugees to China. Shanghai survivors' visas reveal that other Chinese consuls in multiple European cities also granted Jews travel documents.²² The consulate general in Vienna never challenged the order of the Chinese government. The diplomats there simply followed the instruction of the Foreign Ministry to pursue a "liberal visa policy," and granting visas to Jews was not a personal decision.

Actually, Consul General He Fengshan him-

self clearly stated in his memoirs that the Chinese Consulate General in Vienna received an order from the Foreign Ministry to "be generous to Jews who wished to come to China and not to reject [their requests for visas.]"²³ Unfortunately, this firsthand source concerning the Nationalist government's Jewish policy has long been neglected. Only the story of He Fengshan's heroic personal efforts to save the lives of Austrian Jews has frequently been repeated.

It is worth noting that the most frequently cited "He Fengshan visa," which has appeared in the Chinese and international media in stories concerning He Fengshan, was not signed by him. Hans Kraus's visa of October 27, 1938, was actually issued by Consul Zhou Qiyang.²⁴ A picture of this visa is currently displayed in the Shanghai Jewish Refugees Museum in Shanghai. The words underneath the picture assert that this visa is "signed" by He Fengshan himself.²⁵ The direct translation should be rendered: the visa is "signed in He Fengshan's own handwriting." On the website of Yad Vashem, the page concerning He Fengshan contains the image of a visa issued to Josefina Raubicek on March 18, 1939, which is described as having been issued "by Consul Ho in Vienna."²⁶ This visa is also signed by Consul Zhou Qixiang.

It is clear that Chinese and international media played an important and successful role in promoting He Fengshan's story. In the early 21st century, less than a decade after the introduction of He Fengshan to China and the world, the Chinese media was stirred by another exciting discovery, that of Wang Ti Fu, a second "Chinese Schindler" who issued 12,000 visas which saved Jewish lives.

Wang Ti Fu was a Chinese diplomat serving the Japanese puppet regime of Manchukuo during the 1930s and 1940s. In the late 1980s, he revealed to a journalist his wartime experience of issuing visas to European Jews.²⁷ Soon, stories of Wang Ti Fu's efforts to rescue German Jews appeared in the Chinese media, and two books about him were published by 2002.²⁸ Eventually, while the Chinese were excited by this new opportunity to bolster their country's international prestige, Wang Ti Fu himself issued a public statement stressing that he regrettably found that many accounts of his diplomatic experience during the 1930s and 1940s were exaggerated or fabricated. He said that between spring 1939 and May 1940, he issued entrance visas to Manchukuo to German Jews (most of whom eventually travelled to the United States). Wang Ti Fu explained that the decision to issue Manchukuoan visas to Jews was based on a request and direct negotiation between the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and the Manchukuoan legation in Germany. The Germans were still implementing their forced emigration policy, but it was difficult for Jews to obtain visas from other European countries. Therefore, the Germans requested that Manchukuoan diplomats issue visas to Jews who were leaving Germany.²⁹ Even after

Wang Ti Fu made it clear that he was simply doing his job rather than saving Jewish lives on his own initiative or for humanitarian reasons, the Chinese media continued to portray him as a hero. Until 2005, Yad Vashem used a copy of a visa issued by Wang Ti Fu in its story regarding He Fengshan.

Just as the Nationalist government worked to bring European Jews to China, the Japanese also articulated a Jewish policy that promoted their own war aims. After Japan drove the Chinese Nationalist government from Shanghai in late 1937, it became a major power controlling the city along with twelve Western countries. Japan and Germany signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, and became allies, but the pragmatic Japanese treated the Jewish refugees in Shanghai less harshly than the Nazis. Instead of exterminating the Jews, the Japanese tried to take advantage of supposed Jewish financial and political power to support Japan's conquest of China and East Asia.

From the late 1920s to the early 1930s, through a series of violent actions in Manchuria and at home, the Japanese military assumed control over Japan's foreign policy.³⁰ The military's leading role in determining Japan's foreign policy made it possible for army colonel Yasue Norihiro and navy captain Inuzuka Koreshige, Japan's "Jewish problem experts" in Manchuria and Shanghai, to convert their ideas into national policy. The two men were either individually or jointly responsible for making Japan's Jewish policy in 1938 and 1939.

Japan's anti-Semitism during World War II was unique. The military "Jewish experts" did not simply absorb traditional European anti-Semitism, nor did they blindly follow their Axis allies' Jewish policy. Yasue and Inuzuka attempted to use the connections of the Jewish refugees in the world, the United States in particular, to help bring Jewish investment into Japanese-occupied China and to improve Japan's relationships with the United States.

Many Japanese military officers, including Yasue Norihiro and Inuzuka Koreshige, developed an interest in Jewish affairs during the Siberian Expedition in the early 1920s because of the easy accessibility of anti-Semitic works there.³¹ Actually, Yasue and Inuzuka themselves authored many anti-Semitic tracts in the 1920s and 1930s under different pen-names.³² In the 1930s, Colonel Yasue and Captain Inuzuka also conducted comprehensive research on Jewish-related matters with the assistance of the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Third Department of the Naval General Staff.

The Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company published nearly fifty reports and issued a periodical on Jewish related matters from 1938 to 1943. The research topics focused on the social, political, and economic influence of Jews in European

countries and the United States, and most of the reports exaggerated or fundamentally misunderstood the role that Jews played in those countries.³³ At the Third Department of the Naval General Staff, Captain Inuzuka was in charge of three different newsletters on Jewish issues that were issued around 1938: Jewish Information, Secret Jewish Information, and Top Secret Jewish Information. From early 1938 to late 1939, the Third Department published nearly one hundred issues of these newsletters. The Jewish Information series focused on two major issues: Jewish political and financial power in the United States, and the European Jewish refugees in Shanghai.³⁴

The result of Yasue's and Inuzuka's research confirmed to them their belief that Jews, American Jews in particular, were financially and politically powerful in the Western world. It also reinforced their determination to exploit "Jewish power". This belief eventually shaped the "Jewish experts'" unique policy toward the Jewish refugees who fled to Japanese-occupied Shanghai from the summer of 1938. Yasue and Inuzuka deeply believed that the Jewish refugees under their control would be able to contribute to Japan's final victory in its "holy war" in Asia.

On the other hand, the South Manchurian Railway Company's research reports and the Navy Third Department's Jewish information newsletters demonstrate that the Japanese military "Jewish experts" in Manchuria and Shanghai had a well-prepared and well-researched long-term plan for harnessing the European Jewish refugees. Ultimately, Japan did not save the Jews for humanitarian or ethical reasons. Such a decision would not require spending multiple years and enormous sums of money researching the "Jewish problem."

Colonel Yasue, of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, was a faithful supporter of the Kwantung Army's plan to introduce foreign, especially American, capital to develop Manchuria. The Japanese Army considered the Soviet Union its most immediate potential enemy and prepared for war with the Russians in Manchuria.³⁵ At the same time, the army needed additional funds for its growing offensive against China. As a result, the colonel promised the Jewish community in Manchuria safety in exchange for their cooperation.³⁶ Manchuria at the time was home to another prominent Jewish community in China. Yasue tried to use his "kind" treatment of the Manchurian Jews to impress and to obtain capital from their wealthy co-religionists in Shanghai and the United States. As a key element of this strategy, Yasue initiated a policy of "embracing" the Jews. This idea was eventually presented to the Japanese government in December 1938, and was accepted as Japan's first official Jewish policy.³⁷ Japan's official policy guaranteed that the Japanese would not persecute Jews.³⁸

Meanwhile, Captain Inuzuka controlled the

destinies of the Jewish refugees in Shanghai. Inuzuka believed that the tens of thousands of European Jewish refugees under the Japanese Navy's control in Shanghai were, in a way, hostages. As long as the international Jewish communities agreed not to conduct anti-Japanese activities and American Jewish leaders were willing to pressure the Roosevelt administration on Japan's behalf, the refugees' well-being would be assured. At the same time, the captain insisted that the Japanese government always keep the Shanghai Jews under its thumb. Exploiting the Jews, he argued, would be like eating the delicious, but potentially poisonous blowfish. If prepared properly, it could bring Japan great benefits. However, if it were done improperly, the risk would be very high; Japan might even be used by the Jews.³⁹ For their own survival, Jews in China did not have any choice but to cooperate with the Japanese. For their part, in the summer of 1939, the "Jewish experts" proposed that the Japanese government establish a settlement for European Jewish refugees in Shanghai.⁴⁰ Concerning the Jewish settlement, Captain Inuzuka and Colonel Yasue believed that in providing Jews a "safe refuge," the Japanese government could use this opportunity to (1) favorably change American public opinion toward Japan; (2) make Jewish loans and investment more easily accessible; (3) increase the sympathy of American and European Jews for Japan; and (4) obtain the absolute cooperation of the East Asian Jews with Japan.⁴¹

However, because Japan's Jewish policy of 1938 and 1939 reflected the strategic needs of the military, the development of the war and the evolution of war aims naturally affected the policy itself. After the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940, pro-German factions in both the military and the government gained power. A war with the United States became inevitable; Japan's efforts to maintain a good relationship with the Americans no longer made any sense. Yasue and Inuzuka's Jewish policy thus became meaningless for Japan's newest plan for war.

The few scholars who have written about the Japanese and the Jewish refugee community in Shanghai argue that Japan adopted a different Jewish policy from that of their allies, Germany and Italy.⁴² However, they neglect Germany's influence over Japan's Jewish policy making at the time the two nations concluded the Tripartite Pact. Japanese Foreign Ministry documents demonstrate that around September 1940, pro-German factions in both the military and the government came to power because of Japan's ongoing negotiation of a military alliance with Germany. The "Jewish experts," Colonel Yasue and Captain Inuzuka, were soon removed from their positions in China, and the Japanese government decided to change its policy toward the Shanghai Jews.⁴³ These scholars each contend that after Pearl Harbor the Japanese realized that the Jews were useless to

them and decided to put them into a ghetto in Shanghai. In fact, Pearl Harbor was not the cause; what befell the Jewish refugees following Pearl Harbor resulted, ultimately, from the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact more than a year earlier.

The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact ended Japan's hopes for a friendly relationship with the United States. The military alliance immediately provoked American hostility against Japan. From this moment, there was little Tokyo could do to salvage its relationship with Washington. Japan did not have a chance to use the Jews under their control to ease the tensions between the two countries. Consequently, the Jewish refugees in Shanghai lost their value to the Japanese.

When the Jewish refugees fled to Shanghai, China and Japan were at war, so both the Chinese Nationalist government and the Japanese occupation authorities thought very carefully about the Shanghai Jews. They both formulated detailed plans to use the Shanghai Jews to win international financial and political support in their war against each other. However, a thorough examination of both the Chinese and Japanese archives reveals that the Chinese Nationalists never had the intention to retaliate physically against the refugees if they failed to help implement these arrangements. They appeared resigned merely to put their plans aside without repercussions for the refugees if financial assistance from the international Jewish community was not forthcoming. The Chinese government officially adopted "General Principles Governing the Working of the Plan for the Immigration of Jews into China" on July 25, 1939. The General Principles clarified that "Jews with foreign nationality will be treated exactly as all other foreigners are treated in this country."⁴⁴ For Jews without nationality, "the Chinese government would order its diplomats abroad to grant special passports or visas to assist them in entering China."⁴⁵

In contrast, there is ample evidence in the Japanese record that the "Jewish experts" regularly threatened the safety of the refugees if they refused to play the role assigned them in Japan's settlement plans. For instance, before the Second Far Eastern Jewish Conference in Manchuria in late 1938, Colonel Yasue assembled all the Jewish leaders and delivered a speech in a private capacity. In his speech, Yasue pointed out that he expected the Jewish leaders to display their leadership prudently and properly. "If [the principles of] your leadership contradict Japan's... holy ideals," he warned, "it will definitely cause sorrow for your fellow Jews." Therefore, Yasue concluded that the guiding principles of the Jewish leaders would directly affect the destiny of the Jews in East Asia. As a result, at the conference, the Jewish leaders were forced to promise their support and collaboration in establishing Japan's new order in East Asia.⁴⁶ Yasue's counterpart, Captain Inuzuka in Shanghai, regularly cautioned his

government that the last thing Japan should do was to be too “friendly” to the Jews. Instead, the captain insisted that the Japanese government must restrain the Jews constantly and effectively; Japan should completely subdue the Jews and always “keep our hands around their throats.”⁴⁷ Obviously, the Japanese military “Jewish experts” did not save the Jews for humanitarian or ethical reasons, as their supporters claimed after the end of World War Two.⁴⁸ They did so out of expediency.

Ironically, it was Yasue Norohiro and Inuzuka Koreshige’s plan to exploit the Jews that ultimately saved the lives of many European Jewish refugees in Shanghai during the global conflict. The refugees escaped to China from the late 1930s to early 1940s because it was the only place to offer them sanctuary. They chose Shanghai because they had no other option. Nevertheless, Shanghai Jews survived while their families and relatives in Europe became victims of the Holocaust.

Gao Bei is assistant professor of History and International Studies at the University of North Carolina Wilmington. She can be reached at gao@uncw.edu.

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“Three Country Spat Me Out” in Irene Eber ed., *Voices from Shanghai: Jewish Exiles in Wartime China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 59–60. Gao, p. 137.

Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1868–1945, S series, microfilms (hereafter AJMFA). Secret, no. 1592, Yangshupu Police Station, May 18, 1943. Takahashi Takeji, Police Chief of the Yangshupu Police Station of the Japanese Consulate General in Shanghai and Police Inspector of the Ministry of the Greater East Asia, to Consul General in Shanghai, Yano Seiki. “Concerning the Actual Conditions of the Jewish Refugees in Shanghai in the Past Three Years,” S9460-3, 2587-2588.

Jewish refugees could go to Shanghai without visas because of its unique status as a city under the control of foreign powers. Before the first European Jewish refugees escaped to Shanghai in 1938, the city was ruled by fourteen different countries and divided into four separate administrative units: the “Chinese City,” the French Concession, the International Settlement and Hongkou (Hongkew), the eastern side of the International Settlement which was exclusively dominated by the Japanese after August 1937. Chiang Kai-shek’s regime directed passport control in Shanghai until the outbreak of the hostilities between China and Japan in July 1937. However, after the Japanese defeated the Nationalists and drove them out of the city in late 1937, no other country with a presence in Shanghai was given authority to take charge of passport control. (Avraham Altman and Irene Eber, “Flight to Shanghai, 1938–1940: The Larger Setting,” *Yad Vashem Studies*, Vol. 28, 2000, pp. 61–63.) Gao, p. 5.

Guo Hengyu, “Sun Zhongshan yu Deguo” [Sun Yat-sen and Germany]. *Guoshiguo guankan* [Journal of the Academia Historica], no. 23, 1997, 83. Gao, p. 35.

Memorandum by Weizsacker, July 22, 1937, 917; “Dirksen to German Foreign Ministry,” Tokyo, July 27, 1937, 918; “Memorandum by Heyden-Rynsch,” October 19, 1937, 920; “Dirksen to German Foreign Ministry,” Tokyo, November 8, 1937, 925; “Memorandum by Neurath,” September 22, 1937, 926, all in Zhang Boleng and Zhuang Jianping, eds., *Kang Ri zhan zheng [The Anti-Japanese War]* Vol. 4, no. 1; Tao Wenzhao, ed., *Kang zhan shiqi Zhongguo wajiao [Chinese Diplomacy during the Anti-Japanese War]* (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1997). Gao, pp. 35–36.

Audrey Wells, *The Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen: Development and Impact* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 72. Gao, p. 15.

Sun Yat-sen and Zhang Qiyun, *Guo fu quan shu [The Complete Works of the Founding Father]* (Taipei: Guo fang yan jiu yuan, 1960), p. 198; Sun Yat-sen, translated by Frank W. Price, *The Principle of Nationalism* (Taipei: Chinese Cultural Service, 1953), pp. 20–23. Gao, p. 15.

For instance, on the tenth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration in November 1927, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent a letter of goodwill to the Shanghai Zionist Association. The message once again confirmed that “the Chinese government is quite in sympathy with the Zionist aspiration for the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people.” The Zionists in Shanghai considered this message “another indication of her [China’s] desire to associate herself in the universal joy of New Judea’s awakening.” (“Tenth Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration—China and Japan Greet New Judea,” *Israel’s Messenger*, December 2, 1927, pp. 4–5.)

Gao, p. 15.

Academia Historica (the National Archives of Taiwan), Foreign Ministry Documents, 611.21/72–1/3046 (hereafter FMD). “The Executive Yuan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Establishment of a Jewish Settlement in Southwest China and the Drafting of Overseas Propaganda,” March 14, 1939. Also see “President of the Legislative Yuan Sun Ke’s Proposal concerning ‘the Establishment of a Settlement in Southwestern China to Accommodate Destitute and Homeless Jewish People,’” March 2, 1939. Shao Minghuang, ed., “Kangzhan shiqi guomin zhengfu rongliu Youtairen jihua dangyan yizhi” [Collection of Documents concerning the Nationalist Government’s Plan to Accommodate Jews during the Sino-Japanese War], *Jindai Zhongguo [Modern China]* (February 25, 2002), no. 147, pp. 168; 170–171.

Ibid. Gao, pp. 32–33.

Academia Historica, Executive Yuan Documents, 271.12/1/62/1330 (hereafter EYD). “Minute of the 408th Meeting of the Executive Yuan,” April 4, 1939. Also see “Drafted Memorandum Submitted to the Highest National Defense Council: Opinions of the Executive Yuan concerning the Jewish Settlement Plan,” April 20, 1939, in Shao, “Collection of Documents,” pp. 171–175. Gao, pp. 33–34.

EYD, “Text of a Telegraphic Message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chungking, May 6, 1939,” attached to ambassador Hu Shi to Maurice William, May 18, 1939. Gao, p. 43.

FMD, “Jakob Berglas to H.H. Kung,” June 6, 1939. Attachment, “Plan for the Immigration of Central European Immigrants into China.” Gao, p. 37.

The two corresponded between 1934 and 1935 concerning this Jewish resettlement plan. William told Einstein that he had “made a special study of this important problem” and had “discussed it in great detail with the Chinese Minister at Washington.” Einstein was deeply impressed by William. In his letter of February 1934, Einstein praised William’s plan as “very hopeful and rational and its realization must be pursued energetically.” Although questions about the William-Einstein plan remain, there is no record that demonstrates whether William ever discussed this plan with the Chinese government, or if so, how the Chinese government reacted. (The Maurice William Archives (hereafter MWA), UCLA, the Center for Chinese Studies, <http://www.international.ucla.edu/china/WilliamMauriceArchive/>, A7.001, Maurice William to Albert Einstein, January 30, 1934. MWA, A7.002, Albert Einstein to Maurice William, February 13, 1934.) Gao, pp. 41–42.

EYD, “Text of a Telegraphic Message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chungking, May 6, 1939,” attached to Hu Shi to Maurice William, May 18, 1939. FMD, Maurice William to Hu Shi, May 31, 1939. Gao, pp. 43–45.

EYD, Wei Tao-ming to Maurice William, August 9, 1939. Gao, p. 46.

David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938–1941* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 1985), pp. 210–211. Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933–1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 232, 8–9. Gao, p. 49.

See Vivian Jeanette Kaplan, *Ten Green Bottles: The True Story of One Family’s Journey from War-Torn Austria to the Ghetto of Shanghai* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), p. 93; Berl Falbaum, *Shanghai Remembered: Stories of Jews Who Escaped to Shanghai from Nazi Europe* (Royal Oak, MI: Moment Books, 2005), pp. 85, 98; Sidney B. Kurtz, Marcel Singer: *The Gentle Butcher of Hongkew* (Philadelphia: Xlibris Corporation, 2003), pp. 20–23. Gao, p. 50.

Sigmund Tobias, *Strange Haven: A Jewish Childhood in Wartime Shanghai* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), pp. 3–4; Ross, *Escape to Shanghai*, p. 18. Gao, p. 50.

“Chinese Visas in Vienna, Feng-Shan Ho, China,” <http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/ho.asp>, accessed December 16, 2015. Gao, p. 50.

For instance, Chinese diplomats in Chinese consulate generals in Paris and Hamburg, and legation in Sweden also issued Jewish refugees visas to Shanghai. A visa from the Chinese consulate general in Paris was provided to the author by a Shanghai Jewish survivor with whom she corresponded in 2004. Visas from the Chinese consulate general in Hamburg were obtained from the collections of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), catalog no. 2005.24, “Lubinski Family Papers, USHMM: Gift of Susan Herlinger.” A visa from the Chinese legation in Sweden is available on the website of the USHMM’s Photo Archives, “Schenker Citizenship Document,” http://www.ushmm.org/exhibition/flight-rescue/search_results.php?type=2&q=&objekt_type=Document, accessed December 16, 2015. Gao, p. 51.

He Fengshan, *Wajiao shengya sishi nian [Forty Years of My Diplomatic Life]* (Hong Kong: Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 1990), pp. 75–76. Gao, p. 52.

This visa currently can be found on the websites of the University of Minnesota’s Center for Holocaust and the Genocide Studies (www.chgs.umn.edu/museum/exhibitions/rescuers/), “Diplomat Rescuers and the Story of Feng Shan Ho” and the Shanghai Star (<http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/history/0004-11/01-en.html>), in the article “Courageous Diplomat Lauded,” Tuesday, April 11, 2000, accessed December 16, 2015.

Author’s collection.

“Chinese Visas in Vienna, Feng-Shan Ho, China,” <http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/stories/ho.asp>, accessed December 16, 2015.

Jin Shumei, “Wo he wei Man wai jiao guan de yi duan te shu jiao wang,” [A Special Connection between Me and a Manchukuoan Diplomat]. *Meizhou wenhui zhoukan*, [Sino Times], no. 403, January 30, 2010. http://www.sinotimes.com/403/up_art/p21.htm, accessed December 16, 2015.

Wang Tifu and Jin Shumei, *Wei Man wai jiao guan de hui yi* [Memoirs

of a Manchukuoan Diplomat], (Ha’erbin Shi: Heilongjiang ren min chu ban she: Zheng xie Heilongjiang sheng wai yuan hui wen shi zhi fiao wai yuan hui ban gong shi fa xing, 1988.) Wang Tifu and Yang Mingsheng, *Jian guo Xi-te-le yu jiu guo You-tai ren de wei Man wai jiao guan* [The Manchukuoan Diplomat Who had Met Hitler and Saved Jews], (Ha’erbin Shi: Heilongjiang ren min chu ban she, 2002).

Wang Tifu and Yang Mingsheng, *Jian guo Xi-te-le yu jiu guo You-tai ren de wei Man wai jiao guan*, p. 2.

On June 4, 1928, a group of young officers in the Kwantung Army, who were disappointed by the government’s failure to take a hard-line foreign policy toward north China, assassinated Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin. Eventually, as navy minister Okada Keisuke pointed out, the “Kwantung Army proved by this event that it was more powerful than the Japanese government in Tokyo.” (Fujiwara Akira, “Nihon rikugun to taibei senryaku” [The Japanese Army and Its Strategies toward the United States], in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto, Imai Seiichi, and Rōyama Michio, eds., *Nichi-Bei kankeshi-kaisen ni itaru 10 nen (1931–41nen)* [The History of Japanese-American Relations: 10 Years to the Outbreak of the [Pacific] War (1931–41)], vol. 2. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971), pp. 75–76. Yale Candee Maxon, *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930–1945* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 73–74.) [Gao, p.65] The Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932 further confirmed the army’s role in determining Japan’s foreign policy, especially in China. (JACAR: A01200631600. “General Plan to Unify Institutions in Manchuria” by Prime Minister Saitō Makoto, July 26, 1932.) [Gao, p.66.] On May 15, 1932, a group of young naval officers, with support from their army counterparts, killed Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. After the May 15 Incident, the military increased its political presence in an effort to establish a pliable cabinet. It also worked to ensure that the army and navy ministers gained a stronger voice in both domestic and foreign affairs. (Imai Seiichi, “Naikaku to tenmō jūshin” [The Cabinet, the Emperor and the Senior Statesmen], in Hosoya Chihiro, Saitō Makoto, Imai Seiichi, and Rōyama Michio, eds., *Nichi-Bei kankeshi-kaisen ni itaru 10 nen (1931–41nen)* [The History of Japanese-American Relations: 10 Years to the Outbreak of the [Pacific] War (1931–41)], Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971), pp. 8–9.) [Gao, p.67] Eventually, the military took over political initiative within the government as a result of the February 26 Incident of 1936, a revolt led by radical young officers who briefly seized power in Tokyo. (Ibid., p. 19) [Gao, p. 67.]

David Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, *Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural Stereotype* (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 77. Yasue Hiroo, *Dairen tokumu kikan*, pp. 34–35. Gao, p. 20.

For instance, Yasue published *Yudaya minzoku no sekai shihai?* [The Jewish Control of the World?] under his real name in 1933. (Yasue Norihiro, *Yudaya minzoku no sekai shihai?* [The Jewish Control of the World?] (Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1933).) Inuzuka published *Yudayajin no inbō to kokusai supai* [The Plot of the Jews and International Spies] in 1938 and *Yudaya mondai to Nihon* [The Jewish Problem and Japan] in 1939 under the pseudonym Utsunomiya Kiyō. (Inuzuka Koreshige, *Yudayajin no inbō to kokusai supai* [The Plot of the Jews and International Spies] (Tokyo: Naikaku Jōhōbu, 1938); Utsunomiya Kiyō [Inuzuka Koreshige], *Yudaya mondai to Nihon* [The Jewish Problem and Japan] (Tokyo: Naigai shōbō, 1939).) Gao, pp. 21–22.

The details about the reports and periodicals are based on the author’s research at the Library of Congress. Also see John Young, *The Research Activities of the South Manchurian Railway Company, 1907–1945: A History and Bibliography* (New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1966), pp. 585–589; Xie Xueshi, *Ge shi yi si: ping Man tie diao cha bu* [Thoughts Left by the Last Generation: Reviewing the Research Department of the South Manchurian Railway Company] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), p. 617; Aja Keizai Kenkyūjo Tocho Shirōyū, ed., *Kyū shokuminchi kankai kikan kankōbutsu sōgō mokuroku* [General Catalogue of the Publications of the Organizations Related to Former Colonies] (Tokyo: Aja Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1973–1979), pp. 565–567. Gao, pp. 24–25.

AJMFA, “Summary of the Jewish Refugee Issue in Shanghai,” *Top Secret Jewish Information*, no. 5, January 27, 1939. S9460-3, 960–963. Gao, p. 27.

Fujiwara Akira, “Nihon rikugun to taibei senryaku,” pp. 75–76. Gao, p. 65.

The Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (hereafter JACAR). This digital archive may be found at <http://www.jacar.go.jp/>. B04013204800, 0076–0077. *Top Secret Jewish Information*, No. 2, “Detailed Report on the First Far Eastern Jewish Conference,” February 17, 1938; JACAR: B04013204800, 0085. *Top Secret Jewish Information*, No. 2, “Detailed Report on the First Far Eastern Jewish Conference,” February 17, 1938; AJMFA, No. 1472, From Foreign Minister Kono Fumimaro to consular offices in China and Manchukuo. “Colonel Yasue’s Speech at the Meeting of the Committee on the Muslim and Jewish Problem,” October 13, 1938, S9460-3, pp. 750–766; Liaoning sheng dang’an guan [The Archives of the Liaoning Province], ed. Man tie mi dang’an Man tie yu qin Hua Ri jun [Secret Documents from the South Manchurian Railway Company: The South Manchurian Railway Company and the Japanese Invading Army] (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999), vol. 18, pp. 303–308. Gao, pp. 60, 62, 69–70.

Inuzuka Kiyoko, *Yudaya mondai to Nihon no kōsaku* [The Jewish Problem and Japanese Maneuvering] (Tokyo: Nihon Kōgyō Shinbunsha, 1982), p. 77; Yasue Hiroo, *Dairen tokumu kikan to maboroshi no Yudaya kokka* [The Dairen Intelligence Agency and the Phantom Jewish State] (Tokyo: Yahata Shoten, 1989), pp. 109. 76. JACAR: B04013208300, 0282, “Opinions concerning the Treatment of Jewish Refugees,” Consul General Miura in Shanghai to Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō, April 18, 1940. Gao, p. 74.

JACAR: B04013205700, 0068–0072. Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō to Japanese ambassadors to Germany, the United States, and Manchukuo, and consulates in China concerning Jewish refugees, December 7, 1938.

Gao, p.74.

JACAR: B04013210300, 0215–0235. Top secret, “Summary of Captain Inuzuka’s Report at the Committee on the Muslim and Jewish Problem: Personal Opinions on Current Situation of and Measures Taken toward the Jewish Refugees in Shanghai,” January 18, 1939. Gao, p. 59.

AJMFA, “Joint Report of Investigation on the Jewish Issue in Shanghai,” July 7, 1939. S9460-3, 1268–1274. Gao, p. 83.

AJMFA, “Supplement to the Joint Report of Investigation on the Jewish Issue in Shanghai— Opinions of the Parties Concerned,” July, 1939. S9460, 1339–1367. Gao, p. 83.

See David Kranzler, *Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938–1945* (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1976), Marcia Ristaino, *Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora Communities of Shanghai* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), and Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, *Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees: A World War II Dilemma* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

AJMFA, Foreign Minister Nomura to Consul General Miura in Shanghai, January 13, 1940. S9460-3, 1686. “Dairen Jewish Community Holds Banquet in Honor of Colonel Yasue,” *Israel’s Messenger*, January 24, 1941, 2. JACAR: B04013209400, 0099–0100. Foreign Minister Matsuo-ka Yōsuke to the Japanese consular offices overseas, October 10, 1940. AJMFA, “Reasons for Proposing the [New] Basic Policy toward Jews and Proposals for a [New] Basic Jewish Policy,” November 14, 1940. S9460-3, 2357–2361. Gao, pp. 102, 107, 111.

EYD, Wei Tao-ming to Jakob Berglas, July 26, 1939. Gao, p. 34.

EYD, 271.12/162/1330. “Minute of the 408th Meeting of the Executive Yuan,” April 4, 1939. Also see “Drafted Memorandum Submitted to the Highest National Defense Council: Opinions of the Executive Yuan concerning the Jewish Settlement Plan,” April 20, 1939, in Shao, “Collection of Documents,” pp. 171–175. Gao, p. 39.

JACAR: B04013210700, 0046–0047. Yasue Norihiro, “Report on the Second Far Eastern Jewish Conference (Part Two),” December 30, 1938. Gao, p.76.

AJMFA, “[Report] Concerning the Jewish Issue in Shanghai,” October 12, 1938. S9360-3, 746–749. Gao, p. 20.

For a discussion of how the Japanese, especially the military officers, saved and protected the Jewish refugees in China during World War II, see Uesugi Chitoshi, *Yudaya nanmin to hakkō ichiu* [The Jewish Refugees and Hakkō Ichiu] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2002); Inuzuka Kiyoko, *Yudaya mondai to Nihon no kōsaku*; and Yasue Hiroo, *Dairen tokumu kikan to maboroshi no Yudaya kokka*. Gao, p. 30.

Chinese Policy

(continued from page 1)

interest, at least by some of the Kaifeng community, is in the money they can wring out of Jewish institutions and tourists, which my wife and I directly experienced in Kaifeng in 2014, it seems not yet understood that the actions of foreigners in Kaifeng are the root cause of the Chinese government’s action.

Instead of working with the Chinese government from the beginning, Chinese laws and procedures were not just ignored but violated by foreigners. It seems the government was willing to turn a blind eye to this, since it affected a small number and encouraged tourism, so long as no one rocked the boat. Well, the boat was rocked by multiple factors.

I detect that the government’s action remains totally misunderstood. The imperial government came to understand Western missionaries as seditious in the early 18th century (the Japanese came to understand it in the mid-17th century) and threw out all the missionaries. They came to understand foreign controlled religions as a threat to their sovereignty from the mid-19th-century, when missionaries and converts were protected by Western military forces. When China was unified in the mid-20th century, foreign controlled religions were disallowed and missionaries were again deported. Hence, the Chinese action was predictable.

The behavior of a number of foreign Jews in

China, both tourists and temporary residents, while well meaning, is based on ignorance of Diaspora Judaism and of Chinese history, culture and government policy. In the first aspect, except for possible remnants of Jews remaining in Babylon, where Judaism as distinct from Israelite temple-based religion began, all Jews adopted the language, culture and physical appearance of where they ended up. In that regard, Chinese Jews are no different from Ashkenazi, Sephardi, South Asian, North African, South African, and North American Jews. For Chinese Jews to speak Chinese, etc., is no different than most American Jews speaking American English and adapting to American culture. Yet American Jews encouraged the Chinese (= Han) Jews to request Minority status; that is, not be considered Han (= Chinese). Minority status is somewhat similar to Native American status in the U.S.; it has some advantages and disadvantages. I do not see American Jews petitioning the U.S. government for Native American status, so why are they encouraging Chinese Jews to do the equivalent? Nor do I see American Jews petitioning the U.S. government to stamp “Jewish” on their passports and driver’s licenses; I trust they saw enough of that in Nazi Germany.

Minority status in China means a people who are not Han (ethnically Chinese) in having a non-Sinitic language, distinctive traditional dress, often different social patterns (for example, the Naxi, with whom I am familiar, are matrilineal, matrilocal and matrifocal), and living on the fringes of China in the same geographic location where they have lived for many, many generations. It is not a religious designation; for example, Chinese Buddhists and Christians are Han and do not have Minority status. The anomaly are Chinese Muslims, as the name of an ethnic group in northwestern China who are Muslim, the Huihui, was generalized to all Muslims (later recognized as an error, definitely not to be repeated, and corrected where feasible – I have long been close friends with researchers on Minorities at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and elsewhere). Han Muslims registered as Huihui still consider themselves Han but are happy to accept the goodies given Minorities (to maintain loyalty) by the government (see my “A Note on a Recent Visit to Xi’an” in *Points East* July 2014). If the Chinese Jews were accorded special status, then Chinese Buddhists and Christians could claim the same. If everyone in China claimed special status for economic benefits (the reason given by Barnaby Yeh for claiming Minority status for the Kaifeng Jews in his criticism of me in *Points East* July 2014), then there would be no Chinese, the government would go broke and collapse, and there would be anarchy.

The Kaifeng Jews were encouraged to replace the designation of being Han (or Chinese) with the recent term *Youtai* (meaning foreign Jew), applied to them for a while in error a few decades ago. The term *Youtai* is not the traditional name for the Chinese Jews, which was *Qingzhen* (Purity and Truth) – also the name for Chinese Muslims. The Chinese per-

ceived little difference between the two; the major identification was the color of the caps they wore – Chinese Jews wore blue caps and Chinese Muslims wore white caps, as elder males still do.

The term *Youtai* probably was created by Protestant Christian missionaries in the early 20th century to designate foreign Jewish merchants (virtually none of the missionaries would have been aware of the Jewish descendants in Kaifeng). Christian missionaries, typically anti-Semitic, taught the Chinese that *Youtai* means miserly and mercenary, and that meaning continues today, as is apparent in modern Chinese dictionaries. Although the term is simply using Chinese logographs for the sound, its double meaning determines the term to be pejorative. Furthermore, the logograph chosen by Christian missionaries for the you sound is itself derogatory, suggesting Jews are dogs – there are other more common logographs for the sound you. The term *Youtai* is not found in Giles’ massive dictionary (1912) but is in the missionary Mathew’s dictionary (1943), (it is also not in the major Chinese encyclopedic dictionary) so it had to have been created sometime between these dates. (One finds constantly repeated in Wikipedia that *Youtai* first appeared in an 1830 translation of the Bible without providing chapter and verse; there is no 1830 translation.)

According to Bishop White, who resided in Kaifeng in the very early 20th century, before he arrived, the Kaifeng Jews called themselves *Tiaojin Jiao* (Religion of Plucking the Sinews – referring to koshering red meat), which was the name of the street where the synagogue was located. Shortly before he arrived, they instead called themselves *Jiaojing Jiao* (Religion of Teaching the Canon [Torah]), this name being more felicitous. Do the current remnants of the community remember this?

A corollary of being encouraged to give up their status of being Chinese is that the Kaifeng Jews were expected to be converted to Ashkenazi Judaism (when reaching Israel), that is, a foreign Judaism rather than the traditional Chinese Judaism; in other words, Chinese were to be converted into foreigners. The French language version of the treaty following the Second Opium War granted Chinese converted to Christianity extraterritoriality (to be legally non-Chinese and not subject to Chinese laws). The resulting hatred towards converts led to many thousands of converts and missionaries being slaughtered during the so-called Boxer Movement.

The Jewish foreigners working with the Kaifeng community were de facto missionaries, whom the Chinese government, for reasons I made clear in my earlier articles, do not tolerate, nor does it tolerate the conversion of Chinese into non-Chinese for security reasons. The situation is exacerbated by the influx of foreign money, which the present government is rapidly disallowing. Even worse, the required conversions are under the supervision of a foreign body in Jerusa-

lem. The Chinese government brooks no control by foreign bodies over any institution or religion in China. Hence, a Vatican-controlled Catholicism is not allowed in China, but there is an indigenous Catholic Church in China not recognized by the Vatican. Accordingly, neither will a Jerusalem-controlled Judaism be allowed. American and Canadian conservative Protestant missionaries seeking to encourage Chinese to take part in non-registered "house" churches (assumed by the government to be subversive) are deported or jailed when caught. One Canadian Christian missionary was deported after two years in jail as I write this essay.

It should also be understood that Chinese values are closer to traditional Jewish values than American values based on Protestant Christianity. The American government promotes religions of individual salvation, that individual freedom is more important than society. Judaism does have individual salvation, but more important is the redemption of the Jewish people as a whole, if not the world. China has always considered society more important than the individual, and that the good for many is far more important than good for the few. The major social value, at least for the last twenty-five hundred years, is harmony (see the introduction to my "The Issue of the Jewishness of the Chinese Jewish Magistrates" in *Points East* March 2016). Anything that disrupts social harmony is to be eradicated. Considering Jewish values, as reflected in the Prophets, rather than American values, should help in understanding Chinese political values.

So what can be done to ameliorate this deplorable situation? At the moment, given that not only the Kaifeng community but the direction of the Chinese government in a number of regards is in flux, nothing. Complaining to the Chinese government that they are prohibiting religious expression will only make matters worse. The Chinese are acting on a perceived threat to social harmony and possible sedition; to their understanding, the Kaifeng situation has nothing to do with religion. Such protestations would reify that what was going on was subversive. Chris Buckley, a reporter, writes: "The local office of the party's United Front Department, which manages ethnic and religious affairs, referred questions to the city's state security service, which deals with political threats and espionage. Officials there declined to comment." ("Chinese Jews of Ancient Lineage Huddle Under Pressure," *The New York Times* online: 24 Sept 2016).

The Chinese Communist Party is confused about religion. It is officially atheistic from a Marxist meaning. Yet it has been quietly encouraging the return of Chinese Religion since the early 1980s, after attempting to destroy it during the Cultural Revolution, as Chinese Religion is the basis of Chinese social order and ethical behavior. Chinese Religion is not recognized as "religion" in China, since it is not recognized outside of China, but as the basis of Chinese culture, which it is. The Chinese government only recognizes

"religions" that are recognized in the West, since "religion" itself is a foreign concept.

I have been invited to China to lecture on religion a number of times. Most important were lecture series to advanced scholars I gave in Beijing in 2012: one series was on Chinese Judaism, which few know about, and one was on a theoretical framework of religion that fits Chinese Religion (subsequently published in Taiwan). In 2014, I was again invited to Beijing to lecture on the traditional Chinese government as a religious institution (part of that lecture is reflected in my article in *Points East* March 2016). My lectures were actually created to communicate with the government. I know that I succeeded in reaching the government, as I received a friendly mild "correction" from the Party during the discussions in 2014. But encouraging a revised broader understanding of religion in China will take considerable time.

Once things settle down, the situation still cannot be ameliorated until those supporting the Jewish remnants reconsider what they have been doing and what they can and should be doing. But since the Kaifeng community is fragmented, and different Jewish organizations were working at cross purposes in Kaifeng, I am pessimistic that this will take place. The Chinese government is correct in understanding Chinese Judaism to be defunct. It has been so for a century and a half.

Chinese Judaism was both fully Chinese (see my *The Theology of the Chinese Jews, 1000-1850*) and fully Jewish (see Simons, *Jewish Religious Observance by the Jews of Kaifeng China*). Just as most American Jews fully take part in Americanism (with its symbols, values, and holidays – Thanksgiving and July 4th), so the Chinese Jews fully took part in those aspects of Chinese Religion which were compatible with Judaism. Their synagogue was as much Chinese as it was Jewish (see the Grand Mosque in Xi'an which is still there and very similar to the synagogue that was in Kaifeng), as were their homes. Their Chinese neighbors understood them to be fully Han, with adjunct religious practices, similar to their perception of Chinese Buddhists. That the Chinese Jews were not considered different, save in a minor aspect, is why they could have had civil and military officials far out of proportion to their population. This is also why the Kaifeng synagogue community lasted at least as long as any synagogue community in Europe, over eight centuries. Chinese Judaism was perhaps the most successful experience in the history of Diaspora Judaism, for only in China did Judaism exist in an utterly benign atmosphere (with one known brief and minor exception during Mongol rule which also was applied to Muslims).

But are the remnants of this community aware of this great tradition? Or have they been taught that only northern European Judaism is real Judaism, and that to be Jewish, they must adopt a foreign culture. Their origins were in Persia, and originally they spoke and wrote Judeo-Persian, the lingua franca of the maritime trade. When they came to China, Ashke-

nazi Judaism was in its embryonic stage. Yet it was Ashkenazi missionaries who were sent to them, not Mizrahim, to help them return to Judaism. If they must be converted, then it is an admission that they are not Jewish, supporting the Chinese government's understanding. "Purification" through a Mikvah and, of course, circumcision for males could take place in China without calling it "conversion." There must be no consideration of becoming foreign Jews or being subject to foreign rabbis. Most American Jews do not consider themselves subject to the recent equivalents of popes in Jerusalem, so why is this expected of those in Kaifeng, with a considerably longer history? The only alternative is to arrange for those who wish to do so to immigrate to Israel, be converted to non-Chinese Judaism and become Israelis.

Foreign Jewish authorities have insisted that the Chinese Jews are not Jews, supporting the government's understanding that the descendants ceased to be Jews long ago. The Haredi control of immigration and citizenship in Israel, trying to limit recognition to their own supporters, led to the proclamation that Judaism is a matrilineage. That of course is utter nonsense from every aspect of Jewish religious practice and the scholarly use of the term in anthropology. They are using a criteria for inclusion to exclude, and that deems the Chinese Jews not to be Jews. Indeed, they can claim that most Jews are not Jews; they have proclaimed that almost all North American Jews are not Jews. Therefore, the Chinese self-proclaimed Jews must be converted to be Jews, and they must be converted by foreigners. Thus, the case cannot be made internally for recognition of continuing Chinese Judaism, because there are no Chinese Jews, and there never have been Chinese Jews, since intermarriage took place as soon as male Persian Jewish merchants became permanent residents in China and slowly became Chinese Jews a thousand years ago. By the way, the same logic means that there are no Ashkenazi Jews, since the Askenazim are descended from merchants who took local wives around the same time in northern Europe, and their descendants probably merged with the Kazars who became Jewish en masse and thus did not undergo modern rabbinic conversion (see the first chapter of my book).

There is no reason why Chinese Judaism cannot be resurgent in China, if there is a real desire among the descendants for this to happen. But it must actually be Chinese Judaism, and it is possible because the general knowledge of their particular practices has not been lost, and Mizrahi Judaism remains viable. I am certain the Chinese government would have no problem with this, if they can be made to understand it. Given recent events, this will be far from easy. However, given that a major interest of many claiming Jewish ancestry is to immigrate to the West due to poverty and low social status, especially in Kaifeng given its weak economic situation, the consideration of Judaism as a foreign religion may be perceived positively. Judaism may be understood as a way out of China.

This affair has all the makings of classical Greek drama. It started with hubris and ended in inevitable tragedy. At the moment, any further involvement by foreign Jews will only make a bad situation worse for the Kaifeng community. Patience is crucial.

ADDENDUM at the request of the Editor (pardon the repetition)

If the Chinese Jews are to be recognized by the Chinese government, assuming this is now possible given the present circumstances, to my understanding, the following steps need be taken. The first three steps are in regard to the actions of foreign Jews; the last two steps are for the Chinese Jews in order to be in accord with the Chinese constitution and legal procedures:

1. There must be strong support by non-Haredi Jews for acknowledgment that the Chinese Jews are Jews, for either they are or they are not. If they are not recognized as Jews outside of China, then why would they be so recognized inside of China?
2. The insistence by foreign Jews that one cannot be both Chinese (Han) and Jewish must cease, for that is a denial of the reality of Chinese Judaism. No one denies that Christian Chinese and Buddhist Chinese are Chinese, then why deny that the Chinese Jews are Chinese. If for the Chinese Jews to be recognized as Jews means to cease being Han, then government recognition would be impossible, because it means that for a Chinese to be Jewish necessitates a Chinese being transformed into a foreigner.
3. The negative pressure from foreigners over the affair is simply understood in China as typical anti-Chinese American propaganda to destabilize China that has been going on for over sixty years. This makes it impossible for Chinese Judaism to be recognized by the government, since the issue will then continue to be understood as one of state security rather than religion. Rhetoric of understanding will be far more fruitful than rhetoric of condemnation.
4. The Chinese Jews must themselves re-establish their Judaism, assuming they are so inclined. There must be sufficient numbers willing to work very hard for a long period of time to bring back their Judaism. They must send people, both men and women, abroad to study Mizrahi practices and bring them back, because traditional Mizrahi women's practices are highly compatible with Chinese women's normative religious practices in the home. At least one must be trained as a Mizrahi rabbi. They must study what is known of the practices of the Kaifeng Jews that are specifically Chinese and revitalize them (at least some already practice aspects); they are parallel with those aspects of Chinese religion that are compatible with traditional Mizrahi practices. In summary, they must recreate the synthesis that existed before but, of course, in a contemporary mode.
5. Working with recognized Chinese scholars, they must establish an internal authority to authenticate their religious practices and

certify that they are in accord with the constitution regarding religion (support "social harmony" and be congruent with "socialist principles"). This should not involve any foreign authentication, although foreign recognition would be very important. This is the first required step before proceeding to the two relevant governmental authorities for official recognition as a religion.

Jordan Paper is Professor Emeritus, York University (Toronto), and Fellow, Centre for Studies in Religion and Society, University of Victoria (BC). He may be reached at jpaper@yorku.ca

The Chinese Lady Who Joined the Ashkenazic People

by Kevin Alan Brook

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In recent years, advances in genetics have enabled scientists to pinpoint our origins and relationships to specific geographic regions and ethnic groups with a fairly high degree of accuracy.

Geneticists nowadays examine mitochondrial DNA, which passes from mother to child, Y chromosomal DNA, which passes from father to son, and autosomal DNA, which derives from a multitude of ancestral lines and typically picks up portions of the genetics of all sixteen of an individual's great-great-grandparents. By following the trails blazed by all three types of DNA, including patterns of mutations in the uniparental types, one can reconstruct a compelling narrative of migrations related to an individual or an ethnic group.

Jews of all kinds, but especially Eastern European Ashkenazic Jews, have been eager to take DNA tests to learn more about their deep ancestors and relatives, since the paper trail of vital records from the Russian and Austrian empires runs cold for most families before the early-to-mid 19th century and most surnames were adopted relatively recently.

Ashkenazim with ancestors from Eastern and Central Europe make up large portions of the testing pools of the top three American direct-to-consumer DNA testing companies – FamilyTreeDNA, 23andMe, and AncestryDNA – and have been recruited for numerous genetic studies over the past two decades.

Much of this research has established that the vast majority of Ashkenazic lineages trace back to Europe and the Middle East 2,000 years ago, with a large portion coming from ancient Israel and its environs. But this research has also turned up traces of unexpected roots.

Many Ashkenazic people living in the West are interested in aspects of Chinese culture like the abacus, tai chi, and Chinese and Chinese-American food. There has also been an increase in recent years in so-called "intermarriage" between Ashkenazim and ethnic Chinese, exemplified by Facebook's co-founder Mark Zuckerberg's marriage to Priscilla Chan and CBS Corporation's CEO Leslie Moonves's marriage to Julie Chen.

Nevertheless, China is understandably perceived by most Ashkenazim in the West as an exotic "other". Except it's not entirely foreign after all.

Six scientists from the Chinese Academy of Sciences teamed up with the British geneticist Martin Richards and the Dutch historian Jits van Straten to research the worldwide distribution of the mitochondrial haplogroup called M33c. The team obtained new genetic samples to supplement samples that had already been collected by others to build the most comprehensive analysis of M33c lineages to date.

The results of their work were published in February in their article "A Genetic Contribution from the Far East into Ashkenazi Jews via the Ancient Silk Road" in Scientific Reports, an online journal from the Nature Publishing Group.

The lead author Jiao-Yang Tian and his colleagues confirmed that M33c originates in East Asia. They showed it's mostly found among ethnic groups living in China. Members of the Han, Zhuang, Yao, Miao, Kam-Tai, and Tibetan peoples were found to possess M33c.

Most, but not all, of those who belong to this lineage live in southern regions of China. A few people from Thailand and Vietnam also have it, but it reaches its highest genetic diversity inside China, so that is believed to be where it began after it split off many thousands of years ago from the varieties of M33 that are found in India.

The authors also found a branch of M33c they call M33c2 that's shared in their data pool between a Han Chinese person from the Sichuan province and fourteen Ashkenazim with maternal roots in towns that are now located in Belarus, Russia, western Ukraine, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. (Separate from the study, it has also been found in an Ashkenazic family from Lithuania.) They estimate M33c2 entered the Ashkenazic population in medieval times no later than the year 1400.

A Jewish merchant who traversed the trade routes connecting the East and the West is plausibly the man who formed the relationship with the Chinese woman to produce one or more half-Ashkenazi half-Chinese children, including at least one daughter who was raised Jewish, married a Jew, and passed M33c2 along to successive generations.

And he wasn't alone, for there are two other mitochondrial DNA haplogroups from East Asia – called A4 and N9a3 – that are likewise found in Eastern European Ashkenazic maternal lineages. However, current genetic evidence raises the potential that those women may have lived in more northern territories, perhaps even in eastern Siberia – but not necessarily, since N9a3 is found among Chinese in Qingdao, Shanghai, and Taiwan (but also among natives of Korea, Japan, Mongolia, and Siberia) and A4 is also found among some Chinese (but also among Crimean Tatars and Amerindians).

Only about 1.1% of all Ashkenazic direct maternal lineages stem from these three Asian women, but many more Ashkenazim have indirect maternal lineages descended from them, for example from having a paternal grandmother who was N9a3.

Autosomal studies corroborate the fact that Chinese and Siberian people form part of the ancestral heritage of Ashkenazim from Eastern Europe and that they are much less a part of the heritage of Ashkenazim from further west and not part of the formative heritages of Sephardic Jews, Bukharan Jews, Afghanistani Jews, or any other Jewish group aside from the Jews who stayed for centuries within China including the city of Kaifeng. Sephardim from Turkey bearing traces of this ancestry probably got it from having partial Ashkenazic ancestry rather than from partial Turkish ancestry.

Laboratory research conducted by Doron Behar and his colleagues showed that Eastern European Ashkenazim tend to show around 2.2% of East Asian ancestry autosomally. This ancestry was also detected in the genomes of many Eastern European Ashkenazim who joined National Geographic's Geno 2.0 project, often in the proportion of 2% or 3%. It was more faintly detected by many, but not all, of those who tested through 23andMe, which uses a different analytical technique and explores some different portions of a person's single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).

Notables whose recent ancestry is all East-Central and Eastern European Jewish and carry traces of East Asian ancestry detected by 23andMe include the writer Neil Gaiman, the playwright Tony Kushner, and the attorney Alan Dershowitz. 23andMe reported that only 0.1% of their SNPs as tested by the company's techniques come from East Asia.

Finally, data compiled by Kenneth Kidd, a professor of genetics at the Yale School of Public Health, show that about 1.7% of Ashkenazim carry the East Asian-specific 1540C allele in the Ectodysplasin A Receptor (EDAR). This allele is responsible for increased scalp hair thickness.

Found in large frequencies among modern East Asians like the Japanese and the Qiang of Sichuan province, and in smaller frequencies among peoples of Central Asia

and Eastern Europe who have only partial East Asian ancestry like Hazara, Hungarians, Finns, and Russians, it is never found among Sephardic Jews, Yemenite Jews, Samaritans, Israeli Bedouins, or Palestinian Arabs who all carry 1540T instead. This is how we know 1540C didn't come into the Ashkenazic population from the ancient Israelites.

Jews in China whose ancestors had arrived from western lands, including Persia, sometimes married local Chinese women and over time the community became more and more Chinese ethnically and culturally whereas the opposite happened for the descendants of the Chinese woman whose family took root in Eastern Europe. So it was that the Kaifeng Jews and Ashkenazic Jews both ended up being heirs to the ancient civilizations of China and Israel.

Sara Schechter-Schoeman, a proud descendant of a Jewish woman from the Russian Empire whose direct maternal lineage has been confirmed by a relative's DNA sample to be M33c by Family Tree DNA, is delighted by the evidence for her connection to China and possibly to the Silk Road and plans to celebrate each Chinese New Year with her Taiwanese daughter-in-law.

Kevin Brook (kbrook@khazaria.com) is the author of the book *The Jews of Khazaria* as well as articles about Ashkenazic, Sephardic, and Karaite history and genetics including "Sephardic Jews in Lithuania and Latvia" in the August 2016 issue of *ZichronNote, Journal of the San Francisco Bay Area Jewish Genealogical Society*.

BOOK NOOK

Shanghai Grand: A Conversation with Author Taras Grescoe

By Robert Sarner

Excerpted from *The Times of Israel*, 17 September 2016

MONTREAL — Sitting in his daily perch in a café on Montreal's east side, writer Taras Grescoe is a world away — both in place and time — from the focus of his new non-fiction book. In "Shanghai Grand," he recreates the long-vanished glamour and opium-fed decadence of the Chinese metropolis in the 1930s. It was a time when it was known as the "wicked old Paris of the East," and, as he discovered in the course of research, it was also a doomed world in which Jews had a starring role.

In a recent conversation with Grescoe at Café Club Social near his home in Montreal's hip Mile End quarter where he goes every morning for a dry macchiato, he speaks authoritatively about Shanghai,

past and present. And he has tales to tell, all of them true, following four years of extensive research and several trips to China.

The treaty port of Shanghai in the 1930s was a special moment in history that Grescoe evokes deftly in the book through a novel-like narrative. He presents a compelling portrait of the city, especially its foreign-controlled International Settlement and French Concession in which people from 14 mostly Western countries enjoyed extraterritorial rights, free of Chinese law...

"Shanghai was a place to which the ambitious, the wily and the desperate could escape to discard old identities and recreate their lives from scratch," Grescoe writes early in the book...

By then, Shanghai's Jewish community, which dated back to the mid-19th century, had a significant presence... Among those were the Sassoons, Harpoons, Ezras and Kadoories, who thrived in the opium, cotton, and eventually, the real estate business...

At the heart of "Shanghai Grand" is an unusual three-sided love story between British real estate mogul Sir Victor Sassoon, swashbuckling American writer Emily (Mickey) Hahn and Chinese poet Zau Sinmay. When Grescoe set out to write the book, he had little idea Jews would figure so prominently in its pages, including two of its three main protagonists.

"I knew from the start that two main characters in the story were Jewish," says Grescoe, referring to Hahn and Sassoon. "I was surprised, however, at just how many of the subordinate figures — outlandish adventurers, idealistic dreamers, selfless heroes and yes, a fair share of scoundrels — turned out to be Jewish."

A rough count of people in the book of Jewish ancestry turns up no less than 30, spanning a wide range of ages, professions, personality types, political leanings, religious observance and geographical origins. Had it not been for reasons of space, Grescoe could have easily added several more Jews.

In addition to Hahn and Sassoon, who dominate the book, other Jewish larger-than-life figures appear on the page, all of whom Grescoe clearly relishes introducing to the reader — and to those he meets even today.

"I wonder if some Jewish readers have a conflicted attitude toward individuals like Morris 'Two-Gun' Cohen and Trebitsch Lincoln," says Grescoe. "Cohen was a real tough who spoke with a bastard Cockney-Canadian accent and became a general in the Chinese Nationalist army. As for Lincoln, he was a rabbi's son from a small town near Budapest who had an astonishing career as an in-

ternational triple agent.”

Other Jewish figures, who make brief appearances, include Mikhail Borodin, a delegate to the Chinese Communist Party from Moscow’s Politburo; Freddie Kaufmann, manager of the Tower Club in Sassoon’s majestic Cathay Hotel in Shanghai; Al Israel, a nightclub entrepreneur; Harold Isaacs, Newsweek’s correspondent in China; Aline Sholes, Director at Shanghai’s International Arts Theatre; and Serge Voronoff, a Russian-born surgeon, who became famous for grafting monkey testicle tissue onto men’s testicles to supposedly rejuvenate the recipients. (I’m not making this up.)

Even some of the non-Jewish characters cited in the book have a Jewish connection, such as Ladislav Hudec, the architect of several landmark buildings in Shanghai. As Hungary’s Honorary Consul in Shanghai during World War II, he helped Jewish refugees from Europe by issuing them passports to travel safely to Canada and the United States...

Grescoe, who is not Jewish, was born in Toronto and grew up in Calgary and Vancouver. He moved to Montreal in 1996 after also living in Paris. “Shanghai Grand” is his sixth non-fiction book and the first to have such pronounced Jewish content.

Not surprisingly, the preponderance of Jewish characters in the book added to his perception and understanding of Jews.

“Characters like Mickey Hahn and [novelist] Vicki Baum made me reflect on the interesting status of Jews in the Diaspora,” says Grescoe. “As outsiders from [the] gentile culture, they were put in a position to be observers and chroniclers. They could function in the dominant culture, and often thrive, but they remained distinct. Their marginalization, even if it was subtle, gave them a fresh outlook.”...

“The majority of the writers who have influenced me have been Jewish, and outsiders in their own communities,” says Grescoe. “Franz Kafka in Prague. Marcel Proust in Paris. Giorgio Bassani in Ferrara and Rome, author of the brilliant *Garden of the Finzi-Continis*. Grace Paley in New York, Saul Bellow in Chicago, the list is never-ending.”

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A Taste of Poland in America via Shanghai

By Joan Nathan

Excerpted from *Tablet*, tabletmag.com, 22 August 2016

Many years ago, when I lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, a friend of mine introduced me to her mother—an elegant woman named Julia Kronhill, who told me her amazing story. She and her husband, Jacob, had left their home in Lublin, Poland, and crossed the border to Lithuania on September 6, 1939, just after WWII started. They lived in Vilna until January 1941 when, courtesy of Japanese diplomat Chiune Sugihara and his life-saving transit visas, they were able to travel across Russia to Vladivostok and then to Kobe, Japan. In September 1941, the Japanese transferred all nonresident aliens to Shanghai, where the two lived until the war

ended. Then, with the help of the Joint Distribution Committee, they moved to Melbourne, Australia, where Julia raised two children—including my friend Irene Pletka, who was living in Brookline, Massachusetts, when I met her [mother], shortly before Julia passed away.

As Julia told me her personal history, she also described to me a luscious raspberry tart that she remembered from growing up in Lublin. I wanted to taste it—immediately... Whenever I make this amazing tart for family and friends, I like to tell of the luck of two people from Poland and the memory of a flavor that followed them halfway around the world.

Polish Raspberry Tart

(Serves 6 to 8)

CRUST:

- 1 stick unsalted butter or
4 ounces coconut oil
- 3/4 cup sugar
- Pinch of salt
- Grated rind of 1 lemon
- Juice of 1/2 lemon
- 1/2 teaspoon vanilla
- 1 1/2 cups all-purpose flour
- 1/2 teaspoon baking powder

FILLING:

- 2 to 3 tablespoons good quality
raspberry jam
- 2 to 3 pints fresh raspberries
- Confectioners’ sugar for sprinkling

1. Using a food processor with a steel blade, pulse to cream the butter or coconut oil with the sugar, salt, grated lemon rind, lemon juice, and vanilla.

2. Gradually add the flour and the baking powder and process until a ball forms. Cover with plastic wrap and refrigerate for at least one hour or overnight.

3. When you remove the chilled dough, preheat the oven to 375 degrees and press one-third of the dough into the bottom of a 9-inch spring-form pan. Bake for 15 minutes and remove from the oven.

4. Press another third of the dough on the sides of the pan and spoon the bottom with the raspberry jam. Then spread all the raspberries on top of the raspberry-smearred crust.

5. Roll out the remaining third of the crust and, using a dull knife or pie liner, roll out 1/2-inch strips and make a lattice crust and then, with the remaining dough, make a snake around the edge, attaching the lattice top to the sides. Return to the oven and bake for 45 minutes, or until golden. Remove from the oven and sprinkle with confectioners’ sugar. When cool, remove from the pan and serve with vanilla ice cream.

中國-猶太學院

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