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29th Northern Plains Conference  
on Early British Literature**

**NORTHERN PLAINS CONFERENCE  
ON EARLY BRITISH LITERATURE**



**SOUTH DAKOTA  
HUMANITIES COUNCIL**



**UNIVERSITY OF  
SOUTH DAKOTA  
COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES**

**University of South Dakota  
Vermillion, South Dakota**

April 21-23, 2022

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Sincerely,

Lisa Ann Robertson, Jillian Linster, and Darlene Farabee  
*2022 conference organizers*  
*Department of English*  
*University of South Dakota*

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**Conference Program**  
22nd Northern Plains Conference on Early British Literature  
Old Main, University of South Dakota  
April 21-23, 2022

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

THURSDAY

6:00-9:00pm Opening Reception (The Bean, downtown Vermillion)

FRIDAY

8:30-9:15am - **PLENARY:** Dr. Sharon Smith (South Dakota State University), “Black Lives, White Witnesses: Teaching Aphra Behn’s *Oroonoko* after 2020,” Farber Hall

9:15-9:30am - Coffee break

9:30-10:30am - **Session 1: Teaching in and with Early British Literature**, Farber Hall

Carter Johnke, “The Utopic Pedagogy of Sarah Scott’s *Millenium Hall*”

Susan H. Wood, “Teaching Eighteenth-Century Dramatic Comedy”

Shaun Stiemsma, “Sidney’s Poetics and Poetry: Teaching and Delight in the *Defense and Astrophil and Stella*”

10:30-11:30am - **Session 2: Navigating Social Constructs**, Farber Hall

Eric Furueth, “‘I’ll Drown My Book’: Does Prospero Abandon Utopia in *The Tempest*?”

11:30am-1:00pm - Lunch break

1:00-2:00pm - **KEYNOTE:** Jared Richman (Colorado College), “Kindred Forms: How Disability (re)Invents Poetry,” Farber Hall

2:00-3:00pm - **Session 3: Early British Literature and Christian Traditions**, Farber Hall

Robert De Smith, “Donne’s Credal Conclusions”

Stephen Hamrick, “‘Nothing satisfied with what was begun’: Milton and Donne on Christ”

Michelle Sauer, “‘iloued swote smelles’: The Scent of Virginity in the Middle English Anchoritic Tradition”

3:00-4:00pm - **Session 4: Finding Meaning: Symbols and Metaphors**, Farber Hall

James Titterington, “Community and the Natural World in the Colophons of *Cynewulf*”

Robert Kibler, “Patterns from the Chinese Box: How Language and Artificial Intelligence Condition Meaning in Anglo-Saxon Metrical Spells and Charms”

Bruce Brandt, “Chess Metaphors in Jacobean Drama”

4:00-5:00pm - **Session 5: Gender Tensions**, Farber Hall

Elias Donstad, “Performativity in *Fantomina*”

Amanda Pugh, “‘There Was a Terrible Large Place Called the World’: Monasticism and Gender in Early Female Gothic Fiction”

Bentley Snow, “An Ode to Ander Monson”

6:00pm - Banquet (Dinner at 7pm; Valiant Vineyards, Vermillion)

## SATURDAY

9:00-9:45am - **PLENARY:** Kimberly Cox (Chadron State College), “Nonreciprocal Handgrabbing as Sexual Assault in Eighteenth-Century Fiction,” Farber Hall

9:45-10:00am - Coffee break

10:00-11:00am - **Session 6: Eighteenth-Century British Women’s Writing: Defining, Confining, and Writing Women**, Old Main 106

Roundtable discussion: Amelia Howard, Mike Speegle, and Clara MacIlravia Canas

10:00-11:00am - **Session 7: Adventures in Morality**, Farber Hall

Alec Faiman, “The Righteous Middling Class in Eighteenth-Century Britain: David Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Sarah Fielding’s *David Simple* and *Volume the Last*”

Peter Ramey, “The Development of the Warrior-Saint in Early Medieval Hagiography”

11:00am-12:00pm - **Session 8: Women’s Agency**, Old Main 106

CoryAnne Harrigan, “‘The terrors of the earth!’: Revenge in Shakespeare’s *King Lear* and Kurosawa’s *Ran*”

Christopher Lozensky, “‘Thou wost ful lytel what thou menest’: (Mis)Recognition in Chaucer’s *Book of the Duchess* and Breton Lais”

Rachel Mitchell, “*A Sicilian Romance*: Women Do That Which is Right”

11:00am-12:00pm - **Session 9: Old English Hagiography**, Farber Hall

Sam Amendolar, “Sacred Space and Lives of Saints: Proximity in Ælfric’s account of Saint Swithun”

Violet A. Severinson, “Spiritual Warfare and Immortality in Ælfric’s Lives of Virgin Martyrs”

Aaron Halverson, “Mid Lufe’: The Art of Relics in Ælfric’s *St. Edmund*”

12:00-1:00pm - **Session 10: Constructions of Medieval Masculinity**, Old Main 106

Charles Henry, “The Construction of Identity and Religious Masculinity in Saint Guthlac”

Mark Patterson, “A Queen Spurned: Treason and Sodomy in King Arthur’s Court”

Kyle Moore, “Knight vs. Wild: Wilderness, Violence, and Masculinity in *Sir Eglamour of Artois*”

12:00-1:00pm - **Session 11: Origin Stories: Interrogating Source Texts**, Farber Hall

Art Marmorstein, “The Tragedy of the Common Blended Family: Nathaniel Lee’s *Constantine the Great* and Its Sources”

Jeremiah Davis, “The Delayer in Shakespeare: Petruchio as Fabius Maximus in *Taming of the Shrew*”

1:00-2:30pm - Lunch break

2:30-3:30pm - **KEYNOTE:** Tara Lyons (Illinois State University), “Who Made Early Modern Plays? A New History of English Drama,” Farber Hall

3:30-4:30pm - **Session 12: Writing/Righting Men: Male Characters in Eighteenth-Century Novels by Women**, Farber Hall

Mary Johnson, “Marital Representations in Ann Radcliffe’s *A Sicilian Romance*”

Miranda Liebsack, “A How-to Guide for Talking with Women by Women: *The Adventures of David Simple* by Sarah Fielding and *A Sicilian Romance* by Ann Radcliffe”

Taya Sazama, “Dutiful Young Ladies & their Guardians: The Influence of the Male Voice in  
*Evelina* and *The Victim of Prejudice*”

5:00-7:00pm - Dinner break

7:30pm - Play performance, *Triumph of Love* (Knutson Theatre, USD)

## The Utopic Pedagogy of Sarah Scott's *Millenium Hall*

Carter Johnke  
University of South Dakota

*"The few think, the many feel. The few comprehend a principle, the many require illustration."* - Frederick Douglass

In her novel, *Millenium Hall* (1762), Sarah Scott imagines a utopian space for her female characters to escape to when they have been oppressed, exploited, and generally mistreated by a patriarchal society. Two male travelers, an unnamed narrator and his young friend Lamont, stumble upon Millenium Hall after an accident in their travels. The rest of the novel consists of them taking a tour of the Hall, discussing with the ladies who reside there, and listening to the 'histories' of those ladies. Their histories contrast their unsavory experiences with the world outside of the perfect Millenium Hall with their lives within. In his introduction to the novel, Gary Kelly notes that Scott uses "characters, description, dialogue, allusion, and plot designed to imply a reformative relationship between Millenium Hall and the world outside" (26). Through her descriptions of her utopia and her inset narratives that depict the 'world outside,' Scott creates the reformative relationship and places it at the didactic center of *Millenium Hall*. On the original cover of Sarah Scott's *Millenium Hall*, she notes that the book contains "anecdotes and reflections, as May excite in the Reader proper Sentiments of Humanity, and lead the Mind to the Love of Virtue" (51). Not only does the title page indicate the didactic intentions of the story, but it also introduces Scott's faith in the power of education to "lead the mind" to virtue and humanity. However, by tracking the novel's philosophy, we come to a better understanding of Scott's pedagogical strategy and its goals.

This paper seeks to examine *Millenium Hall's* pedagogy and its idealistic utopian goals. Scott directs the pedagogic ends presented in the aforementioned title page towards both the male travelers of Millenium Hall and the reader of *Millenium Hall*. Scott importantly grounds her pedagogy in Lockean epistemology to justify her didacticism. Comparing Scott's pedagogy with contemporary publisher John Newbery, who also grounds pedagogy in Lockean epistemology, provides valuable

insight into Scott's novel. Heeding Locke's advice on children's education, Newbery utilized illustrations to help children connect abstract concepts to the material world. In a similar fashion to serve the same ends, Scott includes physical examples and non-examples that teach abstract values like Shaftesburyan universal love, helping her adult readers connect her philosophy to the world outside utopic Millenium Hall. Because *Millenium Hall* conveys abstract philosophy to its spectators through an imagined utopian space, this paper enters the conversation around *Millenium Hall* as a philosophical and utopian work. However, Scott recognizes that she has to convey a practical philosophy that connects the philosophical to the worldly to "lead the mind to a love of virtue." Scholars have noted that Scott emphasizes a moral transformation in her readers and the male travelers; however, close reading additionally exposes an argument for a moral transformation of society. Ultimately, Scott utilizes a Lockean-grounded pedagogy of illustrations to achieve utopian goals of universal benevolence.

### **The Philosophical Groundwork of Utopia**

*Millenium Hall* is a philosophical novel that makes a recognizably utopian argument. Within the first couple pages of *Millenium Hall*, Scott invokes John Locke's epistemology by referencing tabula rasa: "[F]or the foundation of most of our virtues, or our vices, are laid in that season of life when we are most susceptible of impression, and when on our minds, as on a sheet of white paper, any characters may be engraven" (Scott 53-4). Scott employs this empiricist philosophy early in the novel to serve her utopian argument. While I expand on the novel's utopian argument in the third section of this paper, it is worth noting here Christine Rees's assertion that "it is the business of the utopian imagination to conceive ways of turning [power, property, and privilege that shape human relations] to good account and to ameliorate the conditions that distort and inflict suffering on individual lives" (4). For now, it is worth viewing the 'utopian' elements in *Millenium Hall* as a social thought experiment that manipulates the relations mentioned by Rees that usually define our real-



world social environment. Furthermore, by subscribing to tabula rasa epistemology, Scott suggests that the environment shapes the behaviors and attitudes of the individual. This epistemology serves as the groundwork of Scott's utopia.

Scott subscribes to Locke's belief in the power of custom, which suggests that individuals' minds adapt to their customary environments. Recent scholarship on Locke has been concerned with the issue of custom and its influence over the individual. Because Locke believed the child's blank slate of a mind to be malleable, children are particularly susceptible to "cultural transmission" (Grant 611). Sara Henary notes Locke's belief that "if human beings are not 'hardwired' with certain ideas or tainted by original sin, the environment in which they develop will be the exclusive source of ideas and a significant influence on behavior" (186). Thus, the empiricist Locke was concerned with the power of custom as it dictates attitudes and behavior. Condensing Locke's argument, Ruth Grant states, "beliefs govern behavior and customs govern beliefs," thus, customs govern behavior (609). So, when Scott invokes tabula rasa at the beginning of *Millenium Hall*, she acknowledges the power of custom as Locke sees it. British patriarchal culture continues to pass its patriarchal beliefs and behaviors unto the next generation. However, the separatist community of Millenium Hall allows the ladies to construct their own customs, thus harnessing the power of environmental influence and avoiding the influence of the patriarchy. For example, outside the controlled environment of the Hall, the notably debased Lady Sheerness's "understanding and principles were left to the imperfection of nature corrupted by custom" (Scott 173). Lady Sheerness's unprincipled behaviors were the consequence of an unprincipled society. That Scott signals the corrupting forces of custom further demonstrates that her utopia accepts Locke's epistemology. However, Scott contends that if custom can corrupt individuals, it can also redeem them and proliferate customary attitudes and behaviors for the well-being of society.

Although thoroughly grounded in Lockean epistemology, Scott also seems to borrow ideologies from Locke's former pupil and critic, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. It is worth noting here that Shaftesbury argued that humans have an innate moral sense and are born with a sense of right and wrong (Barker-Benfield 105). To an extent, this moral epistemology seems to contradict Locke's *tabula rasa*. However, what must be understood here is that Locke himself noted that there are limits to the malleability of persons. Locke saw the child as "highly malleable" and "open to the influence of custom" (Henary 187). Locke acknowledged that "the *tabula rasa* premise must not be carried beyond its proper sphere of applicability" (Henary 187). Locke admitted that there "are relatively constant features of the human condition" and that each tended to have a particular temper (Henary 187). Locke and Shaftesbury agree that individuals have stable aspects of character and temperament (Henary 187-8; Boeker sec. 2). Scott was concerned that the mind was *mostly* malleable and *highly* susceptible to the influential forces of custom, not that the mind was under complete subjugation of its environs. Because of this concession, Scott can invoke Locke's *tabula rasa* for its applicability in illustrating the power of custom and still subscribe to some aspects of Shaftesbury's philosophy.

Shaftesbury believed that philosophy should always have a practical element, a view that Scott also shared as evidenced by her title page's didactic intentions. Matching the language on *Millenium Hall's* title page, Ruth Boeker notes that, "For Shaftesbury, philosophy is meant ... 'to refine our Spirits, improve our Understandings or mend our Manners'" and that "it should guide our intellectual and moral development" (sec. 2). Shaftesbury notably realizes that the intellectual journey of striving towards moral perfection was just that—a journey. Thus, Shaftesbury adopts a developmental approach to his philosophy that suggests that an individual should undergo the process of "developing a stable moral character" (Boeker sec. 3). This developmental facet of Shaftesbury's philosophy emphasizes his "view that philosophy is meant to be practical" (Boeker

sec. 1). It seems then that both Scott and Shaftesbury saw that philosophy should be practical and educational. They viewed philosophy and refined reason as a route of development for an individual. However, in *Millenium Hall*, Scott takes it a step further and applies the development to an entire society because of the moral development of the few ladies who govern the estate.

Scott accepts a Shaftesburyan developmental model as articulated in Boeker's article. Boeker demonstrates the developmental dimension of Shaftesbury's philosophy by analyzing the dialogue between fictitious characters Theocles and Philocles within Shaftesbury's influential *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Boeker dissects Shaftesburyan moral development into five different phases; while the first two deal with the two inner selves (the higher self and the base self) and stability of character, the latter three phases of Boeker's analysis more closely align with ideas in *Millenium Hall*. Boeker designates that the third phase of Shaftesburyan philosophical development involves developing "the character of a genuine friend," which involves a love of humanity, not just love towards specific individuals (sec 2). Shaftesbury's "genuine friend" ideal is an abstract concept, requiring the "friend of humanity" to think and feel at the metaphysical level (sec. 2). In *Millenium Hall*, Lamont critiques the attitude of working for humanity by suggesting that the ladies seem "to choose to make us all slaves to each other," to which Mrs. Mancel counters, "No ... I would only make you friends. Those who are really such are continually endeavoring to serve and oblige each other; this reciprocal communication of benefits should be universal" (Scott 112). The ladies of Millenium Hall seem to be Cristian versions of Shaftesbury's "genuine friend." They practice and preach love of humanity in the abstract.

However, it is the elite and more educated Theocles that was able to speak of this universal love; the more ordinary Philocles interestingly worries that "this *complex universal* sort [of love] was beyond my reach." Thus, Boeker concludes that it may be "too demanding to love humanity in the abstract" (sec. 2). Boeker notes that this doubt from Philocles signifies the fourth stage in

Shaftesburyan development—that is, to return from universal reflections to “worldly interactions.” Because humans have to operate within their mortal lives, even intellectual elites like Theocles must practice their philosophies within their temporal limitations. Finally, stage five once again brings Theocles and Philocles back to “cosmological reflections on the self of the universe.” Philocles’s doubts following the third stage pose one of the roadblocks to the utopic desire for perfect social benevolence—it is simply too intellectually demanding and too abstract to maintain a love for all of humanity. Because Scott understands and accepts that “many people lack the intellectual resources that equip them for highly abstract love of humanity” (Boeker sec 2.), she adopts a pedagogical strategy to assist her readers in making connections to this universal love. Scott needs more individuals to develop the capacity to love in the abstract so that her utopia may adequately function. Thus, *Millenium Hall* seeks to guide its reader through this difficult intellectual terrain.

Like Shaftesbury’s, Scott’s philosophical argument subscribes to attitudes of moral and philosophic development. In *Millenium Hall*, the governing ladies establish a schoolhouse for girls. Speaking on the outcomes of the schoolgirls’ education, Scott writes, “one can set no bounds to the advantages that may arise from persons of excellent principles, and enlarged understandings ... In every thing their view is to be as beneficial to society as possible” (160). Education of moral principles advances both the individual and the society towards utopic goals of universal social benevolence. This passage indicates Scott at the crossroads of Locke’s epistemology and Shaftesbury’s universal social benevolence; by educating the girls who are still “in that season of life” when “any characters may be engraven” (Scott 53-4), the ladies of the Hall “hope to do extensive good” by making ideas of universal social love easier to develop (160). By educating and “greatly improv[ing]” the “rising generation,” Scott seeks to construct a mass culture of universal love and benevolence. Shaftesbury was notably concerned with the “relativity of all morality” present in Locke’s philosophy of customary impressions and influences (Barker-Benfield 107). Scott too

feared, but also admired, the power that customary forces have over social bodies; thus, she emphasized that we utilize the developmental power we have over ourselves and our youth for social goodness. Because custom could corrupt and be corrupted, Scott saw the control of customary forces as a war of moral relativity that needed to be won in favor of the true moral principles of God. To that end, Mrs. Mancel states, “in the Bible, there, independent of the political regulations of particular communities, is to be found the law of the supreme Legislator. There, indeed, is contained the true and invariable law of nations” (Scott 166). While Scott advocates for persons to imitate God’s universal love, Scott and Shaftesbury certainly agree that intellectual and moral development’s ends should be a universal love of humanity.

Deborah Weiss also observes connections between Shaftesbury and *Millenium Hall*. To Weiss, the scene in which Lamont observes the enclosure that he assumes to be a zoo but is actually the home for the deformed ‘monsters’ aligned closely with Shaftesbury’s ideas on suffering (478). Lamont notably states that the taming and subjugation of animals “was a triumph of human reason, which could not fail to afford great pleasure” (Scott 71). Weiss claims that “for Shaftesbury, the act of taking pleasure from the pain of others was not only inhumane, but also inhuman and incomprehensible. In a system such as his, in which every creature was understood to work for either its own good or the good of a larger whole, a pleasure that did no one any good” was wholly “unnatural” (478). Scott and Shaftesbury share an interest in the social good that comes from humanitarian views. However, Weiss sees that Scott and Shaftesbury’s similarities on the subject end there; Weiss contends that Scott sees that humanitarianism stems from God, whereas Shaftesbury claims it stems from our innate responses. Weiss concludes that Scott condemns the innate response as emotional and thus unreliable, for without “learned principle . . . there is no telling what the results of one’s emotional reaction might be, whether it would be the impassioned pity of a Shaftesbury or the callous pleasure of a Lamont” (479).

Johanna Devereaux also notices the Shaftesburyan elements of the enclosure episode, although she sees it as evidence of alignment to Shaftesbury's idea of innate human virtue, whereas Weiss saw Lamont's initial reaction as contradictory to that innate virtue. In *Millenium Hall*, Lamont and the narrator enter the enclosure of the 'monsters' and the narrator remarks that "instead of feeling the pain one might naturally receive from seeing the human form so disgraced, we were filled with admiration of the human mind, when so nobly exalted by virtue, as it is in the patronesses of these poor creatures" (Scott 74). Devereaux sees this episode as evidence of a "Shaftesburyan re-education" since the travelers' innate sense of virtue was restored by being shown "the redemptive power of social benevolence" (63). Thus, we face a dilemma in understanding this episode: is Lamont's initial reaction evidence that we cannot rely on our innate emotional responses, as Weiss argues, or are the travelers' reactions afterward evidence of a return to their Shaftesburyan innate virtue, as Devereaux argues?

I contend that turning to Scott's subscription of Locke's philosophies on tabula rasa and the power of custom is crucial to addressing this dilemma. The travelers came from society outside the Hall; thus, they enter with minds that the forces of custom have already engraved; this explains Lamont's initially heartless response. However, upon being exposed to a culture of true friendship and universal love of humanity, the travelers begin to develop more humanitarian attitudes. In other words, the travelers see an example of the abstract universal love that Shaftesbury advocates for and consequently begin to appreciate social benevolence despite it being an abstract concept. When the enclosure's wall stood between the travelers and the 'monsters' inside, Lamont could only value the conquest and "triumph of human reason" (Scott 71). However, once provided a physical and worldly example of abstract Shaftesburyan social benevolence, Lamont connects humanitarian behaviors with universal happiness. In this episode Lamont, as a proxy for the reader, exemplifies

Scott's utopian pedagogy. Scott offers the reader, as the ladies offer the travelers, evidence of universal benevolence which establishes a connection between the worldly and the philosophic.

### **Advocacy and Pedagogy**

Scott's education takes on two dimensions. On the one hand, she must advocate that the malleable future generations are brought up with sound moral principles of Christian virtue. On the other hand, she wishes to develop her adult readers towards a universal love of humanity with a Shaftesburyan developmental model. To the former, Scott demonstrates the social benefits of education, particularly for girls. To the latter, Scott adopts a pedagogy similar to that of Newbery's children's books by offering illustrations to help people connect their worldly lives and abstract concepts important in achieving utopic values. In this section, I will start by discussing that Scott advocates for moral education of children by illustrating the social benefits. Then, I will discuss how Scott seeks to teach and advance her readers towards universal love.

Scott establishes the need for a moral education system to create a more perfect society.

Returning to *Millenium Hall's* title page's desire to "lead the Mind to the Love of Virtue" in tandem with Scott's invocation of tabula rasa, Millenium Hall must make sure that the 'characters engraved' on the next generation are proper moral principles. Because of this subscription to tabula rasa, the bookcase at the sponsored school of Millenium Hall contains "excellent treatises of divinity, several little things published for the use of children, and calculated to instill piety and knowledge into their infant minds" (Scott 196). To reemphasize an earlier point, Locke believes the "child is a blank slate with respect to innate ideas or principles" (Henary 185); thus, Scott and the ladies of the Hall deem it crucial that these children are armed with moral principles and not "left to the imperfection of nature corrupted by custom" (Scott 173). The social benefits of this education are evident. The women "bred up at the schools these ladies support are so much esteemed" that young farmers "prefer them to girls of much better fortunes" because of the "manner of their

education” (168). Women have a crucial role in the betterment of communities; however, there must be a system in place that does not oppress their development. Millenium Hall serves as a model space separated from the oppressive patriarchal norms and regulations where women can fulfill this essential role. By constructing this model, Scott hopes to “tempt any one to” work to imitate the Millenium Hall model, even if it be “on a smaller scale” (Scott 249).

Additionally, the ladies are generating a culture of proper principles through this sort of education. The ladies offer the girls a practical and moral education and consequently promote those values in the surrounding country. Slowly this practice will begin to harness the forces of custom to generate a society that practices more principled livelihoods. Mrs. Mancel asserts that “love, as well as the pleasures of society, is founded in reason, and cannot exist in those minds which are filled with irrational pursuits,” which indicates the importance of engraving, through education, the virtues of love and reason so that the mind does not ‘fill’ with irrationality. Mrs. Mancel continues that proper society “is a state of mutual confidence, reciprocal services, and correspondent affections” (Scott 111). Both quotes from Mrs. Mancel strongly reflect Shaftesbury’s insistence on social benevolence. Because Scott also subscribes to Lockean philosophy, Scott’s utopia allows the ladies of the Hall to harness the power of custom to maintain the individuals within. However, once the utopic customs are maintained, Millenium Hall situates itself in Shaftesbury’s ideal notion of virtue: social harmony and universal benevolence. Therefore, Scott promotes the education of yet malleable children to inculcate their minds to a love of virtue in hopes of a resulting culture of social benevolence.

When it comes to adults whose minds are likely already engraved with material and patriarchal customs, Scott offers a Shaftesburyan moral development through an illustrative pedagogy. I will be comparing Scott’s pedagogy here to that of her initial publisher, John Newbery. Both Scott and Newbery ground their pedagogies in Lockean epistemology to achieve similar ends.



Newbery notably sought to educate children through illustrations and other interactive, more material means. I argue that Scott's framing of *Millenium Hall* offers her readers histories and descriptions to educate and reform her readers. Gillian Brown argues that "Newbery's didactic books underscore the connection between materiality and abstraction" (357), just as I argue that Scott's didactic book connects elements of the real world, familiar to the reader, with an abstract, philosophic utopia.

Comparing Scott's pedagogy with Locke's and Newbery's demonstrates how Scott establishes a connection to the abstract and forces a reflection of it. Newbery utilizes materiality and illustrations to inculcate moral principles in child readers. As one scholar notes, "illustrations induce the process of examining and judging the links among ideas or between various representations of an idea" (G. Brown 353). Newbery takes this idea further by providing physical toys with his didactic books. In *Pretty Little Pocket Book*, Newbery sells pins and pincushions with each copy of the book. In the book, one of the characters, Jack the Giant Killer, addresses the child-reader and informs them to stick a pin on either the red or black side of the pincushion depending on if they have performed a good action or a wrong action (Klemann 223-4). Heather Klemann writes, "The make-up of this book-toy composite suggests the primacy of the physical and material alongside the linguistic activity of juvenile didactic reading" (224). The story builds a bridge between the fictional world of Jack the Giant Killer and the reader's real world. Newbery hopes to impart a practical moral lesson by engaging the reader's imagination and situating a lesson in real life. "Thus Newbery marries Lockean pedagogy and epistemology in his publications" (Klemann 225). Newbery provided moral guidance for children, "but through the accompanying toy, implied that this moral education was readily actionable in the home" (Klemann 225).

Scott parallels this didactic function; although she does not supply picture-illustrations or attach a copy of the Bible with *Millenium Hall*, she offers example-illustrations and shows an example

that a Bible can be picked up and read. Klemann concludes that Locke and Newbery utilize their material pedagogy to serve “practical, instructional ends” (227). Klemann points out that Locke interacts with the reader directly in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, forcing the reader to acknowledge that they can receive his ideas. Thus, readers must acknowledge the physical tool of morality and instruction—the book. Klemann writes that the moments when Locke references the materiality of the book and its ideas “compel the reader not simply to read, but to encounter, observe, and reflect upon the text” (227). While Scott does not refer to the text of *Millenium Hall*, her travelers visit Millenium Hall to learn the same lesson as the reader of Scott’s novel. So, when the traveler Lamont eventually concludes “that [the ladies’] religion must be the true one” (Scott 248), the reader may also arrive at the same conclusion at having also experienced the description of Millenium Hall. Scott takes the materiality a step further, too; in the book’s final pages, she depicts Lamont reading the New Testament (Scott 248). As Weiss notes, “Through their example, the ladies provoke in Lamont an analytical revelation about the connection between one’s philosophy and one’s ethical role in the world” (484). Because the reader sees the fictional character of Lamont picking up the Bible, a text that the reader can also acquire and pick up, the reader reflects on their ability also to reform themselves. Thus, the novel furnishes the reader with a reason to advance their understandings of true benevolence and an illustrative model to follow.

Additionally, Scott provides non-examples of the corrupt, patriarchal outside world, so her spectators can contrast and further understand the social benevolence of the Hall. In order to ensure that a thorough education of the spectators, the ladies do not conceal any part of their lives. Ana Acosta argues that because of “the desire to instruct the reader,” didacticism and utopia intimately rely on transparency (109-10). Under this transparency, the spectators are given a complete tour of the Hall, so its perfection can be seen in its entirety—a truly perfect space can have no secret exploitations or skeletons in the closet, so to speak (Acosta 112-3). Acosta also notes that *Millenium*

*Hall* “[has] a narrative structure that mirrors the spatial organization of the place in which they are set” (116). She notes the framed structure of Scott’s novel and observes that the male travelers exist in the frame of the novel, and the inlaid stories of the women make up the interior space of the novel (114). The narrator in *Millenium Hall* notes that he was “curious to know” how the ladies got to where they were, to which Mrs. Maynard replies, “I see no good reason ... why I should not comply with your request, as my friends are above wishing to conceal any part of their lives ... If they have any follies they do not desire to hide them” (Scott 76). For the sake of transparency and education, the reader and the travelers are given complete illustrations of the ladies’ lives outside the Hall.

The earlier mentioned enclosure episode offers insight into the didactic nature and transparency of Scott’s framing of the novel. When the narrator observes a “seven or eight” foot hedge, he cannot help but ask what it contained. Acosta convincingly argues that “this opaque enclosure within the Hall can be seen architecturally to recreate the narrative structure, making Millenium Hall function as a frame, while the monster’s enclosure becomes the space contained by that frame” (115). Like the inlaid histories, although interior, Scott’s descriptions lay bare the enclosure and its contents, making it transparent to the travelers and readers. In order that the spectators may wholly and thoroughly contrast the perfection of the matriarchal Hall with the corrupt nature of the patriarchal outside world, Scott and the ladies must reveal their histories in full. The spectators are told about all the woes of the ladies’ pasts: Miss Mancel’s unsavory ultimatum at the hands of the depraved Mr. Hintman; Mrs. Morgan’s forced loveless marriage and the resulting abuse; Lady Mary Jones’s encounters with rakes and a fraudulent marriage. Descriptions and discussions of the utopia interrupt these troubling pasts. Just as Newbery equipped his didactic books with illustrations or toys to emblemize moral lessons, Scott pairs illustrations of a society lacking a culture of social benevolence with a society built on social benevolence. So, Scott’s

pedagogy not only offers spectators evidence and illustration of universal love, but they are also given clear non-examples from the more familiar outside world. Rees notes the utopian trope of the travelers experiencing an “alien culture” that they are forced to compare to their familiar ones (216). The travelers and the readers live in a patriarchal, mercantile society and must “re-examine” their understandings and beliefs by exposure to the ideal alternative (Rees 216-7). Thanks to the contrast that the framed distance allows, spectators can learn the benefits of Millenium Hall’s practices and the consequences of not adopting those practices.

Therefore, Scott’s pedagogy fulfills the promise of the title page: Scott offers “A Description of Millenium Hall and the Country Adjacent: Together with the Characters of the Inhabitants, And such Historical Anecdotes and Reflections, as May excite in the Reader proper Sentiments of Humanity and lead the Mind to the Love of Virtue” (Scott 51). Parallel to Newbery’s pedagogy, Scott entices the reader’s imagination with descriptions of a fictional utopia and then situates the lessons in the ‘real world’ through the descriptions of the Hall and the inlaid ‘histories’ of the ladies. Not only does this pedagogy tie in Lockean epistemology, but it also marries itself to Shaftesburyan practical philosophy. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Shaftesbury offered a philosophy that encourages the reader to practice love on a universal scale. Hence, Scott’s pedagogy grounds itself in Lockean epistemology but with a Shaftesburyan and utopian desire for the reader to connect abstract universal love with their everyday lives.

### **The Utopian Goal**

This section of the paper defines the idyllic society that Scott demonstrates and desires to be replicated in the real world. Scott’s utopian goal is mentioned repeatedly throughout the scholarship and is patently evident in both the text itself and indicated on the title page: her goal is to achieve the very things that Millenium Hall practices. True to didactic novels, Scott makes her goals and

intentions quite clear. However, I want to look at Scott's utopian goal regarding education and her overall pedagogy.

As has been mentioned, Scott's utopian goal is to advance individuals and thus society towards perfect social benevolence rooted in a universal love of humanity. I agree with Weiss that "*Millenium Hall*, functioning as a philosophical novel, can be an alternate to the social world and an engagement with it at the same time" (462). *Millenium Hall* has to exist in the real world to be practical, but it must remain distant to demonstrate the benefits of generating a benevolent culture. Through the lens and argument I have established, Scott's overall goal can be understood as a Christian version of Shaftesbury's ideal social model. However, it is essential to note that Scott has not failed if her goal is not fully achieved. She adopts a developmental and educational approach to her utopic desires. While Scott wants Christian moral principles to be adopted and realized entirely and wholly in society by its individuals, she assumes her readers and her travelers can likely only "imitate them on a smaller scale" (Scott 249). Shaftesbury understood philosophic understanding as developmental; one was not simply either clear cut philosophic or non-philosophic; rather, everyone is progressively developing their philosophies. So too does Scott adopt this model. A society is not clearly a perfect utopia or a definite dystopia; rather, cultures are developing their principles. Scott wants to push that development in the right direction. Hence, Scott's utopia is pedagogic and developmental.

Before looking at the practical elements of Scott's utopia, it is important to note that her utopia is separate from the corrupt outside world, although not completely isolated from it. *Millenium Hall* has to be distant from the real world so that Scott may demonstrate the beneficial results of adopting sound moral principles and protecting its women from oppression so they may practice those principles. This distance allows the Hall to demonstrate the constructive and advantageous practice of harnessing the power of custom. Because the Hall is self-sufficient, the

ladies can construct a private culture of benevolence and humanity. Accordingly, all children brought up and educated under the influence of this system are naturally inclined towards social benevolence. The Hall's separation exposes the spectators to the ideal alternatives to the real world customs. As Devereaux notes, the space of Millenium Hall espouses 'real' Christian values as the ideal alternative to the "tyrannical mercantilism" and "fashionable foppery" of the outside, male-centered society (58). Millenium Hall's enclosure of deformed 'monsters' further mirrors the Hall's seclusion. Hilary Brown argues, "the monsters can be seen in some respects as a contorted mirror image of the ladies themselves. In the outside world, the human dwarves and giants—like single women—are cruelly abused by dominating masters" (473). In the outside world, the monsters "are put on display in the same manner as young girls waiting to be courted. However, at Millenium Hall they are treated with great sensitivity and regain a sense of self-worth" (H. Brown 473). Weiss also claims that "the structure of the enclosure in which the 'poor wretches' live can be read as an analogy for the ladies estate—a protected enclave, far from the prying eyes and corrupting influence of 'the world'" (481). Scott's utopia is distant and isolated enough from society to avoid being corrupted by it; it is enough of a social vacuum that it can practice and proliferate its own benevolent customs.

However, because the novel faces the real-world challenges of economy, poverty, and systemic oppression, some scholars challenge the novel's ability to be a utopia. Even so, I argue that because Scott's utopia concerns itself with practical education and development, it must interact with real-world problems to an extent. As Devereaux notes, Scott agreed with Shaftesbury that social benevolence could not exist in isolation (62). Virtue must be practiced towards the public good. Mrs. Mancel indicates that people's "happiness consists in fulfilling the design of their maker, in providing for their own greatest felicity, and contributing all that is in their power to the convenience of others" (Scott 112). True to the Shaftesburyan social model, Mrs. Mancel states that

a decent society “is a state of mutual confidence, reciprocal services, and correspondent affections” where each person is “contributing all that is in their power to the convenience of others” (Scott 111-2). A true and perfect utopia with no problems to solve could not develop towards anything. Developing a pedagogy or philosophic argument that cannot serve the real world serves no practical purpose. As Devereaux states, “happiness and virtue are, for Mrs. Mancel, grounded in social interaction (62-3). Scott sees that those benevolent, reciprocal services need to be practiced in the confines of the real world.

While one can argue that this reciprocal social interaction could be practiced in a trouble-free utopia wholly disconnected from the real world, a utopia of that sort would be impossible to replicate in the real world; Scott’s practical utopia needs to be attainable at least to a developmental degree. Millenium Hall has to exist in the real world for Scott’s pedagogy to be practicable by her readers; to Scott, an unpractical moral principle is useless. Weiss also notices this practical element between idyllic escape and real-world engagement. At the start of the *Millenium Hall*, the narrator wants to leave his economic endeavors in Jamaica behind him as he anticipates his retirement and isolation from the real world economy (Scott 54-55). However, his education at Millenium Hall has shown him to balance the utopic with real-world engagements. As Weiss states, “utopian desires are transformed into a blueprint for ethical action” (485). The reader, too, is offered this blueprint by reading *Millenium Hall*. “As a result of having heard the stories of the ladies, of having engaged in philosophical conversations, and of having seen the effects of the ladies moral philosophy, each man has learned the lesson most necessary to his own improvement” (Weiss 483). That Millenium Hall is not perfectly removed from worldly engagements is a crucial element of the utopia. Hilary Brown notes that Scott’s utopic vision was rooted in her real-life charitable practices (473). Brown argues that Scott’s utopic goal was not meant to be an unachievable “no-place” as some scholars label it; Scott practiced the principles of charity that her novel preached. Like Shaftesbury’s practical model

for philosophy, “Scott hoped to promote values which could be applied to the real world” (H. Brown 473). As Rees notes, *Millenium Hall* “assimilates the utopian genre to the novel of formal realism” (216). Scott practiced the charity her novel preaches within her life’s limitations. Scott’s placement of her utopian imagination on her real-life activities thins the line between the imagined utopia and the real world.

Therefore, Scott creates a utopia that seeks primarily to educate and advocate. Her utopia strives towards abstract goals of universal benevolence but grounds itself in reality. Scott imagines that if each individual could imitate the model of Shaftesbury’s “genuine friendship,” which is a love of humanity on the universal scale, our real-world communities would begin to look more like idyllic *Millenium Hall*.

## **Conclusion**

The thought experiment of *Millenium Hall* illustrates the utopian results of harnessing the power of custom to diffuse virtuous principles. By invoking Locke’s tabula rasa epistemology, Scott exhibited that education has the potential to mold the behaviors and attitudes of individuals. Practicing and espousing Christian morals because of an abstract universal love of humanity proliferates those principles within a culture and, consequently, advances society. This moral advancement of society is Scott’s utopic vision in *Millenium Hall*. However, merely exemplifying that society is not enough to achieve it, so Scott created a didactic novel with pedagogical intentions of teaching principles of universal love and Christian benevolence to its readers. Like Shaftesbury, Scott understood that loving humanity at the universal degree was no simple task. So, Scott offers her spectators examples and non-examples of universal social benevolence. In the enclosure scene and throughout *Millenium Hall*, spectators see the positive results of this abstract love. In the misfortunes of the ladies’ histories, spectators see the negative consequences of patriarchal customs



that lack social benevolence. Therefore, Scott adopts a pedagogy of framed illustrations that bridge the gap between the familiar realistic and the unfamiliar abstract.

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## Burney's "A Busy Day" and the Teaching of Restoration / Eighteenth-Century Comedy: The Wanderers, or "Student Difficulties"

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I have taught British surveys for over 25 years, my first effort occurring about 1994 at a sophomore level. My current job, where I have been since 2000, has a junior-level course that is taken by sophomores, juniors, and seniors. Additionally, we have a vibrant theatre program, and some students take Theater History and Intro to Drama as elective courses.

I have taught plays since very early in my career in the literature-survey composition courses that used to be common in the late 1980s, but I quickly discovered that Shakespeare was difficult and other non-Modern dramas close to impossible as many students had never been inside a theater or even watched a high school play! Therefore, it seems to me that I taught "The Way of the World," (Norton Anthology 6<sup>th</sup> Ed) in 1994, and then I did not teach the course again till 2001 (see attached chart for a summary of my work). The anthology I used in 2001 had no Restoration or Eighteenth-Century drama in it (Longman Compact, 2000). A later edition included "The Beggar's Opera," but nothing from Restoration drama. Around 2006, I began to use a supplemental anthology that contained 4 Restoration dramas (*Four Great Restoration Comedies*. Dover book). After assigning many of these, I scaled back to two, then one, and finally none—which is what I assigned in my last course (2020)! My original plan had been to study a play by Dryden during "Restoration" week, but that got cut as we struggled in getting behind (Fall 2020 when many students had to be absent). Students generally did not find Restoration comedy amusing at all. They were offended by the verbal jokes and found the plays sexist and unappealing

Therefore, we have several problems getting the students to be interested in and responsive to plays of the Restoration and Eighteenth Century.

1. Comedy is not funny! *The Country Wife* is sick and crass!!

2. Don't grasp the use of stock characters, such as the rake, the wit, the adventuress .... as their knowledge of the culture of the period is just developing.
3. Don't understand social class in Britain ...such as why marriage and love are not aligned.
4. Comedy of manners just seems mean-spirited and not amusing.

So---is there any reason for trying to teach drama of the Restoration / Eighteenth Century anymore?

Obviously, several textbook publishers in the early 2000s were de-emphasizing it. I came up with a few ideas why I might want to continue with it:

1. It has by far the most works by women, and of several genres, and would squelch some of the impatience with Middle Ages and Renaissance literature.
2. The era really gives birth to the woman writer with the Bluestockings and debates by Wollestonecraft and other radicals.
3. The concept of plot is very well taught by a Restoration play.
4. The use of stock characters is a helpful device to unlock many works of drama and fiction.
5. Social class may be one of the most important characteristics of Britain in the past, so a stronger understanding of it in theme and characterization will help students understand many British works better.
6. Manners may seem like a petty concern, but it was a powerful form of social control in earlier times, and it is especially important to see how it controlled people's behavior and actions.
7. The concept of wit is essential to the era; an appreciation for words and for manipulating them was a hallmark of the time.

So—What does “A Busy Day” have going for it? The reviews it got in 2016 suggested that it was just as well it had never been produced, and that these versions would close soon (Dalglish).

(Despite this, the play has been performed many times since 1993 (Sabor, *The Complete Plays* xi-xiii; Sabor “The Rediscovery” 153). The play was composed by Frances Burney after three successful novels and several play failures. Burney had tried to produce the comedy “The Witlings” in 1779, but her father was not pleased to have a daughter involved in the theatre (Burney, *The Witlings*, intro). After her marriage and publication of *Camilla* (1796), Burney was able to have her tragedy *Edmy and Elgiva* produced, but it received disastrous responses and closed after one performance in Drury Lane, March 21, 1795 (Doody 180). She had written three other tragedies 1790-91 while she was still at court (“The Siege at Pevensey,” “Hubert De Vere,” and “Elberta”—a fragment.) All of these existed only in manuscript when I was a student in the early 1990s, but in 1995 a scholarly edition of the work appeared (Sabor, *The Complete Plays*). Burney’s “A Busy Day” is termed a “Late Comedy” by Margaret Anne Doody; it was written 1800-1801, after Burney had left court (200). The other unproduced works included “Love and Fashion” and “The Woman-Hater”; Burney was frequently controlled by her father and his expectations in all aspects of her career (Sabor, “The Rediscovery” 146).

Despite Dalglish’s disdain, “A Busy Day” has several advantages:

1. It is by a woman. Burney is an interesting woman; I have taught several of her novels, but novel assignments have also fallen by the wayside. To read Burney’s novels, the students need a lot of time and concentration, which we do not have in a survey course. However, “A Busy Day” might take us 2 days of class only.
2. The students do not like the comedy to be too witty and harsh, so this might appeal to them more. While the characters are very rude to one another (especially based on class conceptions of difference), the play lacks the double-entendres and witty repartee one might find in Wycherley. Though this is of high value to a connoisseur, it is likely to annoy and confuse students!

3. It has an intricate plot, and if one thing gets the dutiful student busy, it is finding out what the plot is about. Definitely students had more enthusiasm for “The Rover” (Behn) than many other dramas, and one reason for that had been the plot.
4. The characters may not be as engaging as those in “The Rover” or “She Stoops to Conquer,” but I am inclined to think that is because they spend all their time in “public” posturing in social roles. The other plays have more scenes of a private nature that perhaps Burney did not feel comfortable displaying. Still, this would make a good way to discuss stock characters. Ideally, I could have all three of these plays!
5. The characters reflect social class, and their actions largely are evaluated in a framework of manners. However, if this were played up in a class table-read, it could allow the students to begin to see and understand the reasons behind how people speak and act. Also, a play like that of Congreve often has just the upper class and the servant class, whereas Burney has a large scope—the gentry, the cits, the shabby genteel Clevelands, the newly wealthy Miss Percival, in addition to several servants and poor relations. I have several actors in my classes usually, so I could appoint one of them the “director” who must explain to each character the “motivation” in the role.
6. Within this milieu, people attempt to use manners as a mode of exclusion. Burney manages to make nearly all the characters insufferable. The only genuine character is the East India-raised Eliza Watt (who is realizing that her idealized long-lost parents are people of no education or social graces). Similarly, Cleveland’s isolation from his family in India has made him more broad-minded and “civilized.” Perhaps this is a product of Burney’s own marriage to a French person.
7. From this play, one definitely gets the idea that real life, real marriage, and real gentility come from India, and that England is beset by one class aping another while the upper

classes think of ways to alienate the lowly as much as possible. Hardy has observed the possible post-colonial themes possible with this work (132; 143).

My course is divided up into thirds; I have about 4-5 weeks of Medieval literature. Then I have 5 weeks of Renaissance which include Shakespeare, Spenser, and Milton. Finally, I have about 5 weeks of Restoration/ Eighteenth Century.

So, my plan for 2022 is to include Behn and Burney (we have had an initiative that will focus upon equity and inclusion), and possibly one more, in a play unit that focuses upon comparing and contrasting the plays of this era to those of Shakespeare (I allow the class to vote on a Shakespeare play to read earlier in the term, and they usually pick a comedy because they are less apt to have read any in high school.

Behn is a typical Restoration playwright, but the fact that she has a more complex presentation of women in “The Rover” is very helpful. Also, “The Rover” has an excellent plot and is not overly focused on verbal play, as one finds in “The Man of Mode” or “The Country Wife.” Burney’s play, “A Busy Day,” as an Eighteenth Century work is gentler and less inclined to deceit per se, and more towards machinations on the part of the hero to re-organize the muddle and confusion in favor of himself. The play is similar to *Much Ado About Nothing* in that the “second leads” are the more important characters in the play. However, unlike a Restoration comedy which is about maintaining order through the money staying in the upper class and love being conducted as illicit affairs, “A Busy Day” is about finding the most suitable marriage. Burney is fond of showing the nouveau riche as figures of fun, and making gentility a more cultural concept rather than part of a historical bloodline.

Of course, students may find “A Busy Day” pointless and “The Rover” too confusing. Their response to “The Importance of Being Earnest,” even after watching it, was that they did not understand it. They did not think it was funny, and indeed, the film made it not a farce and not over-



the-top. Students were not that amused that someone would be loved only for his name and rejected only because he was an orphan. They expected verisimilitude which the play did not have. I think the whole idea of exaggeration is confusing to them. Hopefully, if they see the concept of satire and exaggeration in Dryden's "Mac Flecknoe" and in Swift's "Gulliver's Travels" and Pope's "The Rape of the Lock." By including both Behn and Burney, I could cover both Restoration and Eighteenth Century, I could satisfy my female students who are so appalled by things like "The Rape of the Lock" and "Paradise Lost," and perhaps clarify some of techniques of drama that have students not feeling like plays are fun to read. However, there are a lot of challenges to Restoration and Eighteenth Century—is this worth the effort?

So, will my plan work? What do you think???

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own a copy; I had to turn it in when I left U of Tennessee.] Contained Congreve, *The Way of the World*.

## Sidney's Poetics and Poetry: Teaching and Delight in the *Defense* and *Astrophil and Stella*

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Between *The Defense of Poesy* and *Astrophil and Stella*, Sir Philip Sidney has left critics enough apparent contradictions, biographical connections, and conflicting intentions to keep us busy: when *Astrophil & Stella* is considered as an application of the poetics espoused in the *Defense*, there is probably sufficient material to keep us talking without end. In briefly considering these two works together, I do not intend to resolve these issues, but simply to look at how the cruxes in the *Defense*—particularly in the nature and purpose of poetry—manifest themselves in *Astrophil & Stella*. I'll look at just one of the sonnets—Sonnet 51 in the series—to explore these connections, in part because it so clearly displays another attribute of Sidney's writing, the lightness of his touch, or “comic solemnity” as Geoffrey Shepherd put it.<sup>1</sup> This aspect is often ignored or marginalized in the pursuit of such lofty ideals as Protestant Poetics, Absolutist Aesthetics, Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy, political and autobiographical intrigues, but it might well inform these readings rather than getting in their way.<sup>2</sup> In Sonnet 51, even more than in the *Defense*, the lightness of Sidney's touch is central to any good reading, as he freely ironizes himself and his subjects, teaching readers and critics alike the humility not to take themselves too seriously.

The central cruxes of the *Defense* are commonly noted and widely explored. At the most basic level, the very definition of poetry in the work seems split in at least two significant ways: “Poesie therefore is an arte of imitation, for so *Aristotle* termeth it in his word μίμησις [*Mimesis*], that is to say, a representing, counterfetting, or figuring foorth: to speake metaphorically, a speaking picture: with this end, to teach and delight.”<sup>3</sup> Sidney borrows from Aristotle that poetry is an art of imitation, but he also emphasizes the poet as maker—a literal translation from Greek—who fictionalizes with “speaking pictures.” In the rest of the *Defense*, this distinction is never

resolved, as he insists on referring to “imitation” even when describing the freedom that the poet has in creating a “golden world” rather than reflecting the “brazen” one that he lives in. This initial opposition is immediately followed in his definition by another seeming contradiction, that poetry is to delight and teach. These are actually ONE end in the *Defense*, as if two were the same thing. However, his *Defense* goes on to issue warnings about delight and the corruption that delightful poetry can teach. Though he writes in part to refute Stephen Gosson’s tract *School of Abuse*, in which Gosson tears apart drama for corrupting audiences, Sidney’s own comments on poetry in his day are not far from the criticisms Gosson puts forth.<sup>4</sup> The possibility of corruption through delight in poetry brings out a final crux in the purpose of poetry: for Sidney, teaching is not mere “well-knowing,” but “well-doing;” that is, poetry’s delightful instruction must not merely teach facts about virtue (*gnosis*) but actually move men to its practice (*praxis*).<sup>5</sup>

Applying these concerns to *A&S* only creates more difficulties.<sup>6</sup> Sidney’s opening sonnet in the sequence articulates a purpose for the whole sequence that reflects the end he articulated in the *Defense*. Sonnet 1 gives an anadiplosis to show Astrophil’s hope for his poems: that “dear She might take some pleasure of my paine: / Pleasure might cause her reade, reading might make her know, / Knowledge might pitie win, and pitie grace obtaine” (2-4).<sup>7</sup> This sequence seems to reflect the full scope of his claims for poetry’s purpose, moving from pleasure in reading, to knowing, to acting in response. However, her pleasure is in enjoying his pain, the knowledge gained would lead her to earthly love—a very earthly, even adulterous love—and the action that such knowledge might inspire would hardly be seen as “fit” by Sidney’s own *Defense*. This purpose is a considerable problem for critics, especially given Sidney’s grand claims about the power of poetry to inspire virtue in the *Defense* because Sidney’s Astrophil is certainly no Aeneas to delight readers and instruct them in virtuous action.<sup>8</sup> Thus, critics have suggested that the entire sequence is intended entirely

as a negative exemplum, and Astrophil is a tool to reveal the dangers of erotic desire.<sup>9</sup> Mike Mack goes so far as to identify the 108 sonnets of the series with the 108 suitors of Penelope in the *Odyssey*, so that each only further shows the danger of an increasing bodily desire, one that corrupts absolutely in time.<sup>10</sup> Such a reading is tempting,<sup>11</sup> and I won't attempt to refute it here, but it also seems incomplete, as so much of the delight of the sonnet series is in Astrophil's clever word play, experimental structures, and sympathetic human nature, and a purpose to instruct only in revulsion seems to undo much of the impact of the series as a whole, and takes away almost all delight from digging into the sonnets individually: it is not without reason that many have read these as genuine expressions of love and/or moral development.<sup>12</sup>

This problem of oppositions that won't resolve brings me to what I see as a key for reading both texts, and an important link between the two, as well, which is Sidney's comic sincerity in dealing with even the heaviest, most consequential aspects of his thinking and writing.<sup>13</sup> Sidney opens the *Defense* by referring to his riding instructor's arguments for the greatness of horses and horse-riding, only to point out that one ought not to trust an argument about the superiority of horses from one whose livelihood is horses. The irony of this warning to introduce an essay about the importance of poetry by one whose livelihood is poetry is only deepened by the fact that Sidney also concludes the work with a jesting curse about the use of poetry. Although I do not suggest that Sidney is never in earnest throughout, we should hold his positions with a lightness appropriate to his own stance. The lightness of Sidney's touch is no less evinced in the opening of his sonnet sequence, as Sonnet 1 famously expresses Astrophil's inability to write poetry for his love, despite the irony that he is doing so, and he complains that others' "feet" were in his way, even as he creates his own metrical pattern in hexameters. The irony of a startlingly original poem that cannot find its own voice and an expression of love that cannot be expressed makes an

appropriate start for a series that carries lightness and heaviness together throughout, from a claim that his poems are mere “toys” to deliberately misconstruing a double negative from his beloved as her saying yes to him.<sup>14</sup> All of this in a dizzying display of structures, rhythms, and images makes it hard to believe that Sidney intended his readers only to scorn the lack of virtue they find in Astrophil: Sidney’s *Defense* suggests that, especially in comedy, the teaching should come from the delight rather than in opposition to it, as scorning and delight are ill-suited to one another.<sup>15</sup>

Though I hope to explore the series more thoroughly both as a sequence and as individual poems, I’ll take one example to consider how the oppositions of the *Defense* come together in *A&S* with a heavy dose of Sidneian lightness. Sonnet 51 opens with levity, as Astrophil apologizes on behalf of his ears. [put on slide] In researching this poem, I have found much heavier readings than I anticipated: for example, one recent critic even read the poem as referring to Stella’s voice, arguing that Astrophil must learn wisdom from listening to Stella.<sup>16</sup> In the full context of the poem, the voice must most emphatically not be Stella’s, and the whole point is that there is no wisdom to be gained from it. Other readings have suggested that it is about the words of other poets, a complaint lodged elsewhere in the series, or even a complaint against Astrophil’s own poetic failures.<sup>17</sup> Though other poems in the series complain of the words of poets and even of Astrophil himself, these emphasize that the words either are unequal to the object<sup>18</sup> or show a lack of original expression, limited to Petrarchan conceits. However, the complaint here is not about words’ failure to conform to Astrophil’s expectations for poetry, but that the content of them is not worth the hearing. Further, the emphasis from the start is on his ears and the speaker’s tongue—hearing is central to the poem, unlike the poems dealing with the shortcomings of poetry. In fact, it seems safe to me to say that only a desire to interpret this poem as a part of a larger pattern of meaning would lead a reader to any of these readings, although published editions put

them forth as authoritative.<sup>19</sup>

I would suggest that the identity of the speaker ought to matter no more to us than the content of his speech matters to Astrophil. What Sidney does here is to create delight in portraying an easily recognized circumstance of a listening to a bore, but he expressively captures the inner sense of the experience through poetic means, instructing his readers in recognizing themselves in both Astrophil and the unnamed speaker.

The poem opens with an inverted foot—a trochee with the word “Pardon” (1), as he mockingly begs forgiveness first for his ears, in an absurd synecdoche, and then himself for failing to listen to the speaker. From this opening, the poem proceeds for 11 lines of perfect metrical regularity—5 iambs in each line, suggesting the monotonous regularity of the speaker’s words. He grants the speaker permission to continue to talk, as long as he talks to anyone else who might “such entertainment need” (3). He further emphasizes the dullness of the speech by repeating the “So may” opening in lines 2 and 4, and the second use of STILL is in an accented position, emphasizing the unending noise of his talk and impossibility of saying something of interest. Such punning mockery establishes the tone of the poem, as he makes the dullness of the speaker plain and yet interesting, as the interest is in the readers’ recognizing it.

The second quatrain carries the absurdity and wordplay forward, layering ironies on its addressee, even as it continues in metrical regularity, capturing the speech his ears hear but refuse to listen to. He begs to be free of the “burthen” (5) of “grave conceits” (6), doubling down on language of heaviness and death, and completing the pun with an image of birth in making these conceits the stillborns of a dull brain. In addition to its glancing at death, “grave” is loaded with not only the notion of unbearable heaviness and seriousness, which he will pick up in his closing sestet, but also the dullness and stupidity of his conceits. Astrophil then makes a classical allusion and a horse pun—another connection to the *Defense*—to suggest a replacement for his “silly” (5)—



innocent—self.<sup>20</sup> By making himself Atlas, Astrophil suggests that the speaker wishes to lay on him not the heavenly wisdom of line 8, but the weight of the world, and so he must find a Hercules to pass the load on to, in his “steed” (7), a deliberate misspelling to suggest the desire for the speaker—and the gravity of his speaking—to be carried away. It is tempting to read the last line simply as sarcasm, but again Sidney’s choices deliberately delight and teach. The wisdom in the speaker’s words is intended to teach, but its failure to delight makes it incapable of creating the desired change in Astrophil, as he will not take on the burden of his words.

The sestet is a curious blend of structure and language at odds, as the last six lines follow a cdcdee pattern, a typical closing that suggests a subdivision of a quatrain and a couplet, whereas the syntax and sense of the lines create a structure of two sets of three.<sup>21</sup> As the sestet opens, Astrophil warns us that the volta intended is not so simply accomplished, as he first shifts to speaking for himself, but after asserting only “For me” (9) he interrupts with the speaker’s words again, reminding us that the pardon his ears have begged has not yet been granted. Here, a new image is introduced: fishing in troubled streams is a picture of Elizabethan courtly life,<sup>22</sup> but the progression from “troubled streames” (10) to “straying wayes” (11) to following the guidance of “valiant errorr” (11) indicates the increasingly “grave” nature of the talk Astrophil wishes not to hear. The speaker may be trying to correct Astrophil, as the syntactical relations allow the clause “when valiant errorr guides” (11) to complete the image of straying fishers, but also—perhaps more likely, even—to be attached to “me” from line 9. The ambiguity only furthers the playfulness of the sonnet, as Astrophil’s half-listening suggests the ironic ambiguity of his own understanding. After one of the longest metrically regular passages in any of the sonnets, Astrophil finally gets to completing the volta he announced in line 9, as he interrupts the blur of reported speech with a strong spondee—“Mean while” (12)—to shift to his own mental state. Here, he looks into his heart and finds that it “confers” (12) or converses with, Stella’s eyes, which accounts for his failure

to attend to any of the grave conceits or wisdom that has been forced upon him and his ears. This delayed turn in the poem reflects the incessant prattle of the speaker, the “brazen” world of “unsuted speech” (14) that interrupts the “golden” world of the poet’s imagining, as the poem simultaneously reflects the real world and imagines itself in another.

That world, the poem’s closing couplet argues, is a comic world of romance and happy endings,<sup>23</sup> and the invasion of such brazen concerns “irkt” the speaker out of that “so sweet comedie” (13) of Stella’s eyes. The comic world the poet wishes to create has no place for the “unsuted speech” that he has had to endure, but this reality keeps invading the poem. The delight of the poetry, according to the *Defense*, is what makes it possible to instruct and even move its readers, whereas the lack of delight in the speaker he has endured makes instruction impossible.

If the speaker fails to instruct, how can such a poem, such an absurd toy, fit with the high ideals of the *Defense* for what poetry ought to do, in instructing and moving readers to virtue? Even if the delight is plain in reading the poem—recognizing the reflection of experience in its content, appreciating the artistry of the meanings and sounds of its language, identifying the emotional context—one can scarcely see instruction even at the level of knowledge (*gnosis*) let alone at the level of the application of virtue (*praxis*). But to look for an absolutizing moral might miss the lightness of his touch—the most serious, or grave, things can be taken lightly in the comic world of poetry, as even his profession as poet is taken lightly by Sidney in his *Defense*. But to assume that his “comic solemnity” can have no application to virtue is also to miss his purpose, as he outlines specific purposes for “Satirick” poesy in the *Defense*: with lightness it “sportingly never leaveth, until hee make a man laugh at folly, and at length ashamed to laugh at himself, which he cannot avoid, without avoyding the follie.”<sup>24</sup> Thus, through Sidney’s satiric construction, we can recognize our own incongruous efforts at constructing a golden world of the brazen “unsuted speech” we encounter while we try to live out our own comedies. Astrophil shows us ourselves, creates a

“speaking picture” that reminds us that, whether we are burdening others with our wisdom’s heavenly sway or lost in the comic world of our lover’s eyes, the virtue of humility would suggest we should all learn to take ourselves a bit more lightly.

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<sup>1</sup> Qtd. In Barnes, Catherine. 1971. “The Hidden Persuader: The Complex Speaking Voice of Sidney’s Defence of Poetry.” In Kinney, Arthur F. 1986. *Essential Articles for the Study of Sir Philip Sidney*. The Essential Articles Series. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.

<sup>2</sup> The list of sources for these kinds of readings, particularly those which disregard the ironies in his style, is almost a bibliography of Sidney criticism in itself. I’ll just reference Alan Sinfield, whose work on Sidney moves from a 1974 study of his irony and wordplay in *A&S* to a 1992 denunciation of his “absolutist aesthetics” in the *Defense* with no acknowledgement of the playful contraries Sidney incorporates in the work. See Sinfield, Alan. 1974.

“Sexual Puns in Astrophil and Stella.” *Essays in Criticism* Xxiv (4): 341–55.

doi:10.1093/eic/XXIV.4.341, and 1992. “Sidney’s *Defense* and the Collective-Farm Chairman: Puritan Humanism and the Cultural Apparatus.” In *Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading*. Berkeley: University of California Press. <sup>3</sup> 10, All references to Sidney’s *Defense* are quoted from Sidney, Philip. 1951. *Apologie for Poetrie*. Ed. Evelyn S. Shuckberg. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

<sup>4</sup> Gosson, Stephen. 1579. “The Schoole of Abuse: Containing an Invective Against Poets, Players, Pipers, Jesters, & Co.” in *Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apology for Poetry and Astrophil and Stella: Texts and Contexts*.” 263-272. Ed. Peter C. Herman. Glen Allen, VA: College Publishing.

<sup>5</sup> Insert a sampling of references focusing on this topic.

<sup>6</sup> The primary concern for many critics, one I will scarcely touch here, is the biographical identification of Astrophil and Stella.

<sup>7</sup> All quotes from *A&S* are from Sidney, Philip, and William A. Ringler. 1962. *The Poems: Edited by William a. Ringler*. Oxford U.P.

<sup>8</sup> This problem has led to critics insisting on a strong break between Sidney and his poetic persona, so that at least Sidney himself is not so immoral. See Bates, Catherine. 2001. “Astrophil and the Manic Wit of the Abject Male.” *SEL: Studies in English Literature 1500-1900* 41 (1): 1–24, for a thorough exploration of this critical tradition and a deconstruction of both the poems and the critics.

<sup>9</sup> Again, the list of references for such a reading is practically a bibliography in itself, so a few key landmarks will do: see

<sup>10</sup> “Sidney and Philosophy,” in the forthcoming *Oxford Handbook to Philip Sidney*.

<sup>11</sup> It also has at least some grounds in the tradition of Sidney’s own time, as both Thomas Nashe and Thomas Newman’s introductions to early printings of the sequence indicate a reading that is based upon shunning Astrophil. See Roche, Thomas P. 1989. *Petrarch and the English Sonnet Sequences*. AMS Studies in the Renaissance, No. 18. New York: AMS Press, for an argument using these texts to argue for a “negative example” reading of *A&S*.

<sup>12</sup> See Hamilton, A. C. 1969. "Sidney's Astrophil and Stella As a Sonnet Sequence." In Kinney, Arthur F. 1986. *Essential Articles for the Study of Sir Philip Sidney*. The Essential Articles Series. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, for a more typical positive reading, and see Shufran, Lauren. 2018. "At Wit's End: Philip Sidney, Akrasia, and the Postlapsarian Limits of Reason and Will." *Studies in Philology* 115 (4): 679-718, for a more recent and subtly positive reading.

<sup>13</sup> See Levy, Charles S. 1984. "Sidneian Indirection: The Ethical Irony of *Astrophil and Stella*. In Waller, Gary F, Michael D Moore, and International Conference, "Sir Philip Sidney in His History and Ours" (1982): Wilfrid Laurier University). *Sir Philip Sidney and the Interpretation of Renaissance Culture: The Poet in His Time and in Ours : A Collection of Critical and Scholarly Essays*. London: Croom Helm, for an argument about how dramatic irony functions centrally in moving the reader.

<sup>14</sup> Sonnet 18 and 64, respectively. See Kuin, Roger. 2020. "Mechanical Toys: Sir Philip Sidney and the Lyric." *Spenser Studies* 34 (1): 157–66. doi:10.1086/706604, for an exploration of the playfulness of Sidney's sonnets.

<sup>15</sup> Sidney claims of comedy that "delight hath a joy in it either permanent or present; laughter hath only a scornful tickling." He cites an example: "in Hercules, painted with his great beard and furious countenance, in a woman's attire, spinning at Omphale's commandment, it breeds both delight and laughter; for the representing of so strange a power in love procures delight, and the scornfulness of the action stirreth laughter:" delight is in seeing the inversion and the dramatic irony, not in merely scorning the foolishness of his action. Roche claims that the whole sequence is intended to function on precisely this DISCONNECTION between pleasure and instruction, as he claims, "I think that Sidney wanted us to be delighted by Astrophil's wit and to be instructed by the image of a man whose reason gives way to his will and whose hopeful desires finally lead him into despair."

<sup>16</sup> Kullmann, Thomas. 2019. "The Construction of Female Nobility in Sir Philip Sidney's *Astrophil and Stella*." *Virtus | Journal of Nobility Studies* 26: 146–55. doi:10.21827/5e0210582ee0e.

<sup>17</sup> See Sidney, Philip. 1967. *Astrophil and Stella*. Edited by Max Putzel [1st ed.]. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books. <sup>18</sup> Sonnet 50 does so overtly, and its preceding this sonnet has likely influenced some readers to see them as continuing on a single theme.

<sup>19</sup> As noted, Putzel does so regarding the sonnet being about poetry, and others place it in the series of poems about rejecting the moral advice of a friend, though even this seems unnecessary.

<sup>20</sup> See Bess, Jennifer. 2020. "I On My Horse, and Love on Me': Contextualizing the Equestrian Metaphors of Philip Sidney's *Astrophil and Stella*." In *Reading the Natural World in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance : Perceptions of the Environment and Ecology*, 177–96. doi:10.1484/M.ASMAR-EB.5.120901, for a fun exploration of horse imagery in the sonnets.

<sup>21</sup> See Williamson, Colin. 1980. "Structure and Syntax in *Astrophil and Stella*." In Kinney, Arthur F. 1986. *Essential Articles for the Study of Sir Philip Sidney*. The Essential Articles Series. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, for an exploration of the uses Sidney makes of setting structure and syntax at odds in the closings of his sonnets (268-269). <sup>22</sup> Sidney, Philip, and Katherine Duncan-Jones. 2002. *The Major Works*. Oxford World's Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 364, suggests the image is a common one for the Elizabethan court.

<sup>23</sup> Per Ringler, 476.

<sup>24</sup> 29.

## How Ludwig Wittgenstein's Theory of the World and Language Makes Magic of a Tenth-Century Anglo-Saxon Metrical Charm

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The argument continues over which is the chicken and what the egg, but the general inclination is to assert that magic precedes religion in most cultures, and that there is a formal distinction between them. Magic, for example, gives control to the magician, whereas religion locates control elsewhere. Little wonder then that kingship has always championed religion and condemned magic as the irrational and unauthorized hooey of the deplorable lower classes and outlaw rustics. Doing so gives kingship and the priesthood power over belief, people, and over the sanctified words used to constitute belief. Magic, by contrast, is centered more directly in the natural world—and for centuries magicians.<sup>i</sup> So what happens when unauthorized sympathetic magic coopts the sacred and authorized language of transcendental religion as its own? There are some obvious answers, but beyond these? Examining a 10<sup>th</sup> century CE Anglo-Saxon charm, I hope to suggest that Ludwig Wittgenstein's assertion of the physical reality of language conditions our reception of the nature of language and sacred communication to the benefit of written charms and spells and to the detriment of authorized religion.

Herodotus in the 5<sup>th</sup> BCE makes first use of the term *μαγισσ* or *μαγοι*, when noting the Magi, high priests of the ancient Medes, expert at divination.<sup>ii</sup> By Plato's time the word had come to normally be associated with the "control of natural phenomena."<sup>iii</sup> Pliny notes magic as associated with medicine, astrology and compounded natural elements.<sup>iv</sup> Indeed, it has always been more associated with unorganized pseudo-science than has religion, its emphasis on observation and on an odd sort of reasoning based in a false but invariable *sympathy between objects*, operating expressly within the natural world, mixing its potions, charming its ghosts.. Pliny suggests<sup>v</sup> the divining incantations of

the *magi* eventually make their way to the world of the ancient British Celts, wherein the earliest observations find them chanting to nature,<sup>vi</sup> “their groves devoted to inhuman superstitions, human sacrifices, and ravings in strange languages.”<sup>vii</sup> Whether or not Pliny is right in seeing Mid-eastern magic as moving north, or whether this is another question of chicken or egg, the British Celts of old were nevertheless naturals for magical ways--primitive people, striving for control of the cosmos by outlaw means. To keep such people and traditions at bay is doubtless why the ultimate representative authority of any age, the Roman Empire, began forbidding magic by law as far back as the era of the Twelve Tables. Hundreds of years later, Rome was still burning books, executing magicians, and condemning chants and incantations made outside of its authorizing gaze.<sup>viii</sup> Power had to be kept out of the hands of such people as inclined to magic, always. We know it was no different in Northern Europe, especially as Christianity gained its dominant foothold *circa* 11<sup>th</sup> CE. Indexing to follow, *et cetera* (we might consider what orthodoxy thinks of its opposite, even today).

James Fraser famously asserts magic as antecedent to religion, and so its association with primitive magic is perhaps natural in sequence. Yet there is a foundational difference between them, as well as a key similarity. Religion offers prayers and supplication in a spirit of humility to those gods who hold the power elsewhere beyond the spheres. Magic, by contrast, assumes control of nature and of whatever gods it can summon to it. It retains the power of compulsion, and its invocations are imperatives.<sup>ix</sup> And no matter how much magic embodies a religiosity, or religiosity embodies certain elements of magic, this distinction forever divides them.<sup>x</sup> Yet it is in their shared sense of the power of words where religion and magic meet as kin. “In the beginning was the word,” as we know, the Old Testament locating the power of those words in the abstract beyond.<sup>xi</sup> Just as certainly, magic holds that control of nature happens through the correct use of what J. Borsje observes as “words of power,”<sup>xii</sup> influencing reality by way of curses, blessings, spells, charms, and incantations, all meant to

control conditions on the ground from the ground. But what makes the words in magical spells even more powerful, especially as magic is the poor man's vocation, is of course the integration of that powerful language of formal hierarchically elite authority in mixed with its own.

Magical appropriations of authorized Latin occur in twelve written charms from Anglo-Saxon England, found in a variety of some of manuscripts. Dobbin notes several of them among the medico-magical collection known as the *Lacnunga*, surviving from the 10-11<sup>th</sup> centuries, and among the oldest in the language.<sup>xiii</sup> They feature a syncretic understanding of both the Christian religion and pagan magical tradition, but their express purpose is to magically charm. Two such charms purpose against a dwarf, thought to cause fevers, sleeplessness, or nightmares.<sup>xiv</sup> They are part of the Harley MS 585, folio 165r, in the British Library, and contain runic crosses, Greek letters, and especially, Latin names and phrases, all mixed in with a preponderance of Anglo-Saxon. One imperatively orders the sufferer to write the names of saints "along the arms against a dwarf,"<sup>xv</sup> and the one I have translated commands the names of seven saints (Roman numeral VII) be written in Latin each on sacramental wafers.<sup>xvi</sup> These are to be hung or dangled over the sufferer amid chanting of the particular spell chosen to get rid of the "*spiderniht*,"<sup>xvii</sup> a name with reference to either the dwarf or the disease brought by the dwarf. The chant ends with a Christian "*Amen*," and with a final *Fiað*, a Latin imperative finished with an Anglo-Saxon *eth*, "let it be done." All told, in a charm of 128 words, 74 in prose and 54 of metrical chant in Anglo-Saxon half-lines, 10 words or symbols are in Latin, and one phrase references the religious mass.

So how does this coopting of Christian Latin into an Anglo-Saxon poem benefit the charm? Certainly Latin is the language of power and authority in 10-11-th century England, so using such words must empower a pagan charm with that same authority. Yet we also know that the syncretic interpolation of one language into another is so common that it may mean nothing more than the

blending of two cultures through language. Certainly several charms are half Latin and half Anglo-Saxon, for example, and macaronic verse is a literary staple of many ages. Yet Christian Latin's word power comes from its purported link to a transcendental elsewhere, and this, for magic, founded in nature, is an estranged oddity, were it true. For magic, it is not. For if we consider the very nature of words as conceptually earthbound expressive elements, stripped of their universal or transcendental properties, then interpolated sacred Latin words show themselves to simply aspire to abstraction, even though like all words else, divested of intent, they are more the province of magical than of non-existent religious power. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* offers us the way to see all words in just this way.

From Plato and Aristotle in the 4<sup>th</sup> BCE through Russell and others well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, western philosophy has understood every bit of our world as material substance derived from an immaterial conception. Our understanding of a table, for example, comes from our Socratic awareness of the abstract idea of a perfect table existing somewhere in conceptual space. Similarly, Aristotle locates this abstract idea within the material substance itself. Since the form is in the thing, to parrot the chief phrase, observing fifty differing cats will allow the observer to identify certain shared attributes that characterize the immaterial ideal perfect form of *catness* itself. In both instances, however, the perfect immaterial form is conceptualized as a separate universal reality. The Plotinian *materia* in hypostases is no different. *Et cetera, through time.* Wittgenstein recognizes the same material or substantial form in relation to immaterial idea or structure, but for him, the immaterial form or structure is not abstract. It is factual, immaterial but objective, conceptually tangible, real, of the world, and fundamentally, if you will, magical (2.024).

In his *Tractatus* of 1918, Wittgenstein offers a *schematic* by which to understand the world and language. For him, the world consists of irreducible atomic facts. Call them conceptual objects (2.0122) -- truths, if you will -- property-free insubstantial frameworks (2.033) that in themselves have no



value, no meaning, no identity. But when property-free insubstantial irreducible facts/objects/truths link together in configuration or relation, as in a chain, they form the conceptual world-- Wittgenstein's "states of affairs" (1.3). As states of affairs, linked facts evoke logical pictures that not only exist in a particular time and space, but also logically allow for conceived realities beyond their own present state of affairs (2.06). Imagine a circle, for example, made up of a series of irreducible dots —atomic facts or objects (2.0122). They have no dimension in reality themselves, these dots, nor possess any properties, but set in relation, they form the circle, a conceptual object, an object that has an existence as a tangible thought object in the world and of the world. Reality is the conceptual circle, resulting from a linked state of affairs, or of atomic facts set in a particular relationship, constituting something conceptually real (2.06). The medium of the circle, the arrangement, is, as Wittgenstein notes, "the fact itself (2.221)."

What is more, Wittgenstein's state of affairs constituting the circle is but one state of affairs, and as such, has a limit within an amorphous conceptual whole--but also a key freedom. Imagine if I take a group of wood blocks and assemble them into a house. I have thereby precluded the assembly of the blocks into a car. But because atomic facts or objects do not entail specific states of affairs, they can be shared, become part of other states of affairs, configure as other realities. For us to know this, and to think about it, is at one and the same time to be constrained in our thoughts about a particular state of affairs, but also to be freed by the independence of atomic facts to conceive of other states of affairs that do not yet exist. Put another way, to think about existence, so to speak, is to think about non-existence or other conceptual existing states of affairs too (2.151). As such, every atomic fact or conceptual object, existing like sugar granules which can be a constituent of many consumable dishes, allows us to thoughtfully traverse from one constituted reality to another conceivable one, from the circle to the rectangle, the house to the car. So the world, duly constituted, can imagine and even become another (2.151). The only limit, for Wittgenstein, is that conceptual truth, to be truth,

must always map to reality (3). Truth thus exists in perpetual interrelationship. This is key.

It is virtually the same with language, and Wittgenstein argues that in their configurations, letters and words are real to the degree they map to the world in much the same way that atomic facts link to enact the circle (3.0) The word “cat” must have a corresponding sense of cat to validate it as a truth—not the material cat itself, which links to the real cat, but the conceptually real cat. So language serves as the transverse gateway through itself into presently non-existent but conceptually palpable other truths, configured as differing states of the world deploying similar language. Language in this sense is the concrete embodiment of possibility, offering present truth, while serving as venue to inconceivable other truths or states of affairs. In this sense, Wittgenstein’s understanding of language comports with the generally held view that all language conceptually derives from a deep pool of metaphor underlying our shared or mapped ability to express through language the varied states of the world in which we exist. Understanding language in this way allows us to recognize how the appropriation of authorized Latin by unauthorized magical charm is in many ways, a kind of planet bound homecoming.

Authorized language that assumes its power through a link to an immaterial transcendental reality certainly benefits the authorized priest and king controlling that language, for they gain from its power but can shirk responsibility for it when necessary--the key to successful leadership, perhaps. But its authority is fraudulent, according to Wittgenstein, because the immaterial universality on which it depends for its authority is formally non-existent, being mapped to the conceptually unknowable, about which, he suggests, of necessity, we must remain silent (7). Magical charms, by contrast, factually authorize language in the world, as linked to irreducible atomic facts, thus informing the linguistic volition of incantation in the here, the now, and the conceivable elsewhere all in one map, one state of affairs (2.023). Such incantations need only the configuration of the incantation itself to constitute a real truth and to thus be effective now, here. Likewise, interpolated Latin becomes

part of the magically configured state of affairs in the world that is the charm, a part needing no more authorization for its power than its very existence, written and mapped in the world and expressed through language. As such, magical words hold power in all languages, separate from language hoping to express the unknowable. They do so by dint of their act of mapped configuration, and for magicians through time as for Wittgenstein, no Latin sung by a priest can say nearly as much, so truthfully.

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- i Fraser, 56-7
  - ii Tavenner, 1-2
  - iii Tavenner, 1-2
  - iv Tavenner, 6-7
  - v Tavenner, 22.
  - vi Strabo, *Geography*, 4.4.4
  - vii Tacitus, *Annales*, 14.32
  - viii Tavenner, 13.
  - ix Tavenner, 11-12.
  - x Tavenner, 13.
  - xi Fraser, 57.
  - xii Borsje, 5.
  - xiii Dobbie, cxxxiii
  - xiv Dobbie, cxxxiv.
  - xv <https://thijsporck.com/2020/05/03/dwarf-begone/>
  - xvi Williamson, 1075. Williamson notes that Gratton and Singer explain the seven names belong to the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, Christians who fled from the Emperor Decius (249-51) and who hid in a cave, only to be walled up.... Many years later, once the Empire had converted to Christianity, the cave was opened and the sleepers awoke. Interesting that the power comes from early believers, before Christianity had the power.
  - xvii Dobbin, 121.

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## The Chess Metaphor in Jacobean Drama

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References to chess in Jacobean drama do not indicate that the playwright has any in-depth knowledge of the game, nor do they require anything more than a superficial awareness of the game by the audience. Rather, chess is used to suggest cunning and manipulative ability, particularly in the political arena and in gender politics. This brief presentation will explore the use of chess in four plays: William Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, Thomas Middleton's *Women beware Women*, John Fletcher and Philip Massinger's *The Spanish Curate*, and Middleton's *A Game at Chess*.

The best-known of these chess references occurs in *The Tempest* when Prospero reveals Ferdinand and Miranda playing at chess. We are privileged to overhear a brief dialogue between them before they take notice of their astounded audience:

Miranda

Sweet lord, you play me false.

Ferdinand

No, my dearest love,  
I would not for the world.

Miranda

Yes, for a score of kingdoms you should wrangle,  
And I would call it fair play.

(5.1.173-77)

Multiple reasons have been suggested for Shakespeare's choice of chess. For one, the scene may symbolically equate Prospero to a chess master who has been moving men here and there around his island chessboard and overcome the king who has opposed him. Additionally, the scene mirrors Prospero's penchant for using a symbolic tableau to mark an instructive turning point in play's action, as is seen in the vanishing banquet scene and the scene in which Iris, Ceres, and Juno bless the coming union of Miranda and Ferdinand. However, in those two scenes, as Prospero tells us, the actors are not actually substantial beings, but spirits who ultimately melt into thin air. The opposite is

true of the chess scene, in which Alonzo fears that the actual appearance of his son may be only “A vision of the island” (5.1.78).

Focusing on Ferdinand and Miranda, many critics have found that their chess game reflects the long tradition of chess in tales of Aristocratic courtship and love. Courtly love often entails seduction, and the flirtatious tone of their banter may remind us of Frank Kermode’s observation that the accusation of “playing false” may hint at the realism of Prospero’s concern over premarital chastity (Loughrey and Taylor 114). Others have found “playing false” and “wrangling for kingdoms” to have darker connotations. Tracing “wrangle” and “wrangling” throughout Shakespeare’s canon, William Poole finds that wrangling frequently appears in association with marital strife and is thus “a term boding ill for newly betrothed couples” (69). Moreover, just as Prospero has been wrangling for a kingdom throughout the play, so the young man who will eventually be a king may need to wrangle for a kingdom, or even the hyperbolic “score of kingdoms.” Jeffrey Netto argues that Miranda’s willingness to call false play fair play means not only that she will acquiesce to Ferdinand’s political maneuvers, but “hints at her probable acquiescence to any extra-marital wrangling, in the form of sexual dalliance, that her future husband may desire” (222). To me, Netto’s conclusion seems overly cynical, and we need not read “you play me false” as cheating. Froissart’s *Chronicles* contains the story of a chess game between Edward III and the Countess of Salisbury. The countess played with “all the wit and skill she could, that the king might not hold her too simple and ignorant; and the king played false, and would not play as well as he knew” (Golembek). If she lost one of her pieces, he would deliberately lose one as well to keep the game even, and he eventually lost. In short, we might see playing false not as cheating, but as Ferdinand not exerting himself to defeat Miranda or, indeed, perhaps allowing her to win. Miranda’s statement that he is playing false implies that she understands what he is doing.

*Women Beware Women* centers on Bianca, an aristocratic woman who has eloped with Leantio, a man below her social station who will be unable to provide her with the quality of life she is used to. Bianca is extremely beautiful, and to protect his marriage Leantio keeps her sequestered at home. Unfortunately, she one day looks out of the window and is seen by the duke, who enlists the aid of the evil Livia to bring Bianca to him.

The scene of Bianca's entrapment utilizes chess both as a straight-forward part of the action and as a metaphor for what Bianca experiences. Livia invites Leantio's mother and Bianca to come for an afternoon visit, and Bianca is offered a tour of the palace while Livia and the mother play chess. Bianca is led to the duke, who rapes her (Dawson). Although he promises seductive rewards, saying that he can offer wealth and honor in contrast to her husband, his threat of violence and her lack of meaningful consent is manifest: "Strive not to seek / Thy liberty" (2.2.330-1); "Take warning, I beseech thee; (2.2.344); "I can command: / Think upon that" (2.2.363-4). The confrontation between Bianca and the Duke is mirrored by the chess game between the mother and Livia. "Duke" being an alternative name for a rook gives a double meaning to lines such as Livia's "Has not my duke bestirred himself?" and the mother's response "H'as done me all the mischief in this game" (2.2.416-17). The most pointed comment is Livia's:

Here's a duke  
Will strike a sure stroke for the game anon;  
Your pawn cannot come back to relieve itself.  
(2.2.301-3)

Like a pawn that can only move forward and not "come back," Bianca feels changed forever by the duke's "sure stroke" and unable to revert to what she was. From here on, she sees her only option to be to continue in her forced liaison with the duke, turning against her husband and, in short, leading an evil life.

*The Spanish Curate*, by John Fletcher and Philip Massinger, is most likely the least well-known of these four plays. It is a comedy with a threefold plot involving a king who needs an heir to

disinherit his brother, a courtier who wants to seduce the wife of a rich lawyer, and a curate who swindles his parishioners. Chess figures in the second plot. Desiring Amaranta, the wife of the influential and corrupt lawyer Bartolus, Leandro obtains a place in the lawyer's household as a law student. The beguiling of the lawyer climaxes with a chess game between Bartolus and Amaranta, which Leandro has been invited to observe. The dialog is suggestive. For one example, when Bartolus boasts that he is close to mating, it prompts Leandro's aside "You are a blessed man that may so have her. / Oh that I might play with her."

When Bartolus is called away by clients during the game, Leandro seizes the opportunity to reveal his identity and declare his love. Amaranta whacks him over the head with the chessboard, but does not betray him to her husband, and when her husband must leave for two hours, she immediately sends for Leandro to come to her. When Bartolus and Amaranta first sat down to play, Bartolus boasted that could beat her. Amaranta retorted, "As learned as ye are, Sir, I shall beat ye," and beaten him she has.

Thomas Middleton's *A Game at Chess* depicts the struggle between the English and Spanish courts as a chess game. The characters bear the names of chess pieces, such as Black Knight or White King; the three pawns who enter at the play's beginning may be suggestive of a Queen's Gambit; and the final white victory is described as a mate by discovered check. However, after the first few speeches, there is no attempt to mimic actual move order, and many events make no sense in terms of chess, where pieces cannot move twice in a row and cannot change colors and switch sides. Some pieces clearly represent actual people, such as the Duke of Buckingham and the Spanish Ambassador Gondomar. Others are more broadly allegorical, as when the Black King instructs the Black Bishop's Pawn to rape or prostitute the White Queen, which represents Jesuit attempts to weaken the Church of England. The most direct reference to current events is Middleton's justification of Charles and Buckingham's trip to Spain to facilitate the proposed marriage to the



Spanish Infanta. However, the play is more concerned with issues of morality and religious conflict than politics. Much of the plot revolves around the efforts of the Black Bishop's Pawn to seduce the White Queen's Pawn, who trusts him as a spiritual advisor. She is saved by the Black Queen's pawn, who in a classic example of the bed trick, switches places with her and preserves her honor.

*A Game at Chess* thus uses the game differently than it was used in our first three examples, but the reasons for its choice seem much the same. The planning and subtlety required of winning chess was seen as characterizing the cunning or even Machiavellian traits required for political or sexual conquest.

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## ***A Sicilian Romance: Women Do That Which is Right***

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In Ann Radcliff's novel *A Sicilian Romance* (1790) the female characters tend to suffer at the hands of the men until they become free, or they die. At the end of the novel it states, "In reviewing this story, we perceive a singular and striking instance of moral retribution. We learn, also, that those who do only **THAT WHICH IS RIGHT**, endure nothing in misfortune but a trial of their virtue, and from trials well endured derive the surest claim to the protection of heaven" (Radcliff 199). Although this seems like a worthy statement of the thrilling novel, the bolded words followed by the term "virtue" calls for a closer analysis to the true meaning of this novel. If virtue was a top priority the story would've followed a more traditional, religious, and predictable path. Radcliff created a novel that is filled with scandals, secrets, and the desire for more than the immediate world has to offer for the female characters, not the test of virtue. I argue that the women in this narrative give the readers a true horror and visual of the physical and mental reciprocity experiences that are imposed by men, contrary to the virtue that the final passage speaks of. For this presentation I will be examining small quotes from Julia, Louisa, and Maria Del Vellorno.

Our protagonist Julia is a fascinating character to analyze due to her desire for freedom and the weight she feels from her father who oppresses that freedom. Radcliff positions Julia in an interesting position early on in the novel,

"From Julia's mind, the idea of happiness was now faded. Pleasure had withdrawn her beam from the prospect, and the objects no longer illumined by her ray, became dark and colourless. As often as her situation would permit, she withdrew from society, and sought the freedom of solitude, where she could indulge in melancholy thoughts, and give a loss to that despair which is so apt to follow the disappointment of our first hopes" (Radcliff 26).

This is an example of love and terror but ultimately highlights the victimhood she lives in. First, it can be seen as loving them for doing what is right for herself and trying to avoid the unhappiness her father's control brings. Second, there's the terror from the imagery depicted in the language. The mingling of darkness and solitude with freedom and hope is an interesting position Radcliff puts Julia in to give the readers an idea of the controlling nature that occurs in the castle by her father. This all plays into the larger picture that the concept of virtue is a decoy and the truly oppressed nature women live in to showcase the burdening of patriarchal men. Julia must seclude herself from society and those in charge to have full autonomy. Her happiness is nonexistent and still chooses to be alone instead of under the thumb of patriarchal rule. This is the beginning of Julia growing further away from the expectations and reciprocity. Although there is a long way from where she desires to be, it is the beginning of her constant flight in search of happiness. Early on we can see her virtue does not come into play.

Moving onto Julia's mother who similarly suffers. Possibly the most pivotal and intriguing scene in the novel is when Julia comes across her mother Louisa locked in a cave. The moments leading up to this moment are very claustrophobic and dark as Julia "groped along the winding walls for some time, when she perceived the way was obstructed" (Radcliff 173). This reflects what the cave symbolizes. It is not just the place that has held Louisa for 15 years, but it also gives a tone to what that cave has turned into for the family. It contains Mazzini's biggest secret, Louisa's longing to see her children again and the controlling hand of Mazzini has turned the place toxic. It is the suffocating power that men have and Louisa, now Julia, experiences. In "No Country for Old Women: Gender, Age and the Gothic" there is a statement that examines the reuniting of mother and daughter, "The determined heroine's discovery of her real mother, incarcerated for many years in an underground cavern, reveals 'a pale, emaciated figure'. Weakened by age and imprisonment, a victim of a tyrannical husband, she is emblematic of disempowerment" (Horner 186). Horner's

observation aligns with the concept that the cave is no longer just a rock prison but reflects the power men have to control these women and do as they please until they are essentially emaciated. This particular section is also important in understanding the unity and picture Radcliff creates among Louisa and Julia. Volz states, "Rather than attempting to verbalize the 'voicelessness' of the female sex, Radcliffe allows portraits and metaphorical likenesses to communicate" (Volz 96). Radcliff does not draw attention to the voicelessness of the women as Volz states but gives the situations of the characters similarities. This can be seen especially during the scenes between Louisa and Julia. When the two decide to leave the cave and Julia becomes discouraged because she remembers she has no money, "she commanded her feelings, and resolved to conceal this circumstance from the marchioness, preferring the chance of any evil they might encounter from without, to the certain misery of this terrible imprisonment" (Radcliff 182). The women within this novel are oppressed by the men at every turn. Whether they are in a castle, cave, or abbey it seems that powerful men constantly loom over to control their moves. What Radcliff does in this section is demonstrate how the male presence of Mazzini is felt within the cave and since both Julia and Louisa have experienced it, it was only right for the two women to break from it together after finally being unified after 15 years of separation. There still doesn't seem to be a test of virtue but the reader cannot get away from the looming controlling men.

The Mazzini's control continues with Maria Del Vellorno, his second wife.

"TO THE MARQUIS DE MAZZINI: Your words have stabbed my heart. No power on earth could restore the peace you have destroyed. I will escape from my torture. When you read this, I shall be no more. But the triumph shall no longer be yours—the draught you have drank was given by the hand of the injured" (Radcliff 190). Maria is one of the few women who dies throughout the novel. What is important to note about her character is that she takes her own life. In the quote she states that the Mazzini has stolen her peace that can never be restored and to escape the tortuous

environment and actually be at peace she must take her own life. She also does the world a potential favor by poisoning this man that has been a repressing force on the women throughout the novel. Maria takes her fate into her own hands, which is not a test of virtue but a desire for freedom.

After exploring some of the key moments in the text we draw back to the end of the novel where it is argued that what is right is the test of virtue and they will receive happy endings. What these scenes exploit is not a virtue, but the reciprocity in which the men use to control women. In this particular instance, the Mazzini's presence constantly trying to contain Julia, Louisa, and Maria as well as what is supposed to be a sanctuary turns into another place to flee. Julia is just one of the many women in *A Sicilian Romance* that fit into the conversation of oppression caused by men and the personal sacrifices they must make to attain their freedom. There was a glimpse of Louisa who not only was a prisoner to her former husband, but her body was almost withered up from the control and lack of freedom and care she endured. To reconsider the passage, "THAT WHICH IS RIGHT, endure nothing in misfortune but a trial of their virtue, and from trials well endured derive the surest claim to the protection of heaven" (Radcliff 199). It is clear now that Julia does experience misfortune for following the path she desires to take. Her virtue is not tested but her sanity and safety are. Julia escapes a controlling father, alludes banditti's, stays in a controlling abbey, and ends up in the same cave her father put her mother in 15 years ago. That is misfortunate and not a test of virtue. This novel put virtue as a decoy to make readers question even more if virtue was at play or if other elements were at play. After some of the major scenes are considered the same concept and principles could be further analyzed on the other female characters. Although virtue might have been the decoy for this novel, that which is right is the freedom and happiness the women deserve in *A Sicilian Romance*.

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