

# Monetary Tightening, Quantitative Easing, and Financial Stability

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
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- ▶ Little known on QE implications on financial stability over business cycle
  - \* Riskier behaviour of financial intermediaries?

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- ▶ Little known on QE implications on financial stability over business cycle
  - \* Riskier behaviour of financial intermediaries?
- ▶ QE recently repurposed as financial stabilisation tool
  - \* In 2022, substantial interest rate hikes
  - \* Subsequent financial turmoils in US, UK, Switzerland
  - \* Temporary balance sheet expansions

# SVB crash, March 2023



**Figure** FED balance sheet (Trln. USD), Policy rate (pp.)

# This paper

- ▶ What are implications of QE
  - \* on financial stability **over business cycle**?
  - \* on price and financial stability in **tightening cycle**?

# This paper


- ▶ What are implications of QE
  - \* on financial stability **over business cycle**?
  - \* on price and financial stability in **tightening cycle**?
- ▶ QE implies:
  - \* More **frequent and longer-lasting** financial stress episodes
  - \* Significant **costs to price stability** in tightening cycle



# Today

- ▶ Model
- ▶ QE, stabilisation, & financial stress frequency
- ▶ QE in tightening cycle

# Model overview



# Banks

- ▶ Agency problem as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
  - \* Balance sheet:

<b>Assets</b>	<b>Liabilities</b>
Firm Equity	Deposits
Safe Assets	Net Worth

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- ▶ **Moral hazard:** can divert fraction of assets

- \* Non-absconding in equilibrium (leverage constraint):

$$\text{Net Worth PDV} \geq \text{Divertible Assets} \quad (1)$$

- \* Safe Assets  $\uparrow \implies \downarrow$  Divertible Assets



# Quantitative Easing

- ▶ **Role of QE:** inject safe assets, stabilise asset prices
- ▶ QE targets financial stability

$$\text{Asset acquisition} = (\text{Credit Spread})^{\phi_{QE}^i} \quad (2)$$

# QE: macro stability and financial stress

**Figure** St. dev. change (left) and stress frequency (right)



# Why longer stress under QE?

- ▶ **Risk channel:** Bank precautionary behaviour
  - \* Banks dislike net-worth variance
  - \* Pick lower leverage to avoid hitting constraint
  - \* Under QE, **net-worth variance lower**  $\implies$  smaller precautionary motive





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- ▶ **Recapitalisation channel:** Slower recapitalisation during stress

# QE: financial stress decomposition










**Figure** St. dev. change (left) and stress frequency (right)












# QE in a tightening cycle

- ▶ Implications of QE on price and fin. stability in tightening cycle?
  - \* Simulate large markup shock
  - \* Counterfactuals w/out fin. frictions and with QE











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








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# Conclusion

- ▶ **Key policy takeaway:** QE **effective short term**  $\implies$  more **frequent** and **longer-lasting financial stress** long term;
  - \* Bank risk taking
  - \* QE real distortions  $\implies$  slower recapitalisation