

| 1 | October 20, 2015 | |
|----|---|---|
| 2 | From: | |
| 3 | Elias Agredo-Narvaez | |
| 4 | Attorney in Fact for | |
| 5 | TMELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ | |
| 6 | in care of: 1080-b East veterans highway | |
| 7 | Jackson, New Jersey | |
| 8 | WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES | |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | TO: | |
| 11 | Judge DANIEL F. SAHIN, or any seating or presiding judge | |
| 12 | Municipal Court Jackson Township | |
| 13 | 102 Jackson Drive | |
| 14 | Jackson, NJ 08527 | |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | Jackson Township Violations Bureau | |
| 17 | 102 Jackson Drive | |
| 18 | Jackson, NJ 08527 | |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | Alleged Police Officer P.O Deo? Or Officer ID# 274 | |
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| 24 | | |
| 25 | NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPLE NOTICE TO PRINCIPLE I | S |
| 26 | NOTICE TO AGENT. | |
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| 28 | In Re: COMPLAINT-SUMMONS/TICKET NUMBER 162083 | |
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| 30 | ATTN: | |
| 31 | Court's CLERK and MR; Daniel F. Sahin doing business as Fiduciary of, and JUDGE | |
| 32 | DANIEL F. SAHIN. | |
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| 34 | FOR THE RECORD | |
| 35 | | |
| 36 | One, Elias Agredo-Narvaez, NOT ELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ, in Special appearance | a |

a third party intervenor and party in interest hereby make the following statements:

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You are hereby demanded to include this and any other document sent from me in the file that you may have under the name of the fiction TMELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ© and make it part of the permanent records for future reference.

FOR THE RECORD

One, Elias Agredo-Narvaez© hereby makes a timely and Lawfully Reservation of all my Rights and Liberties under UCC-1-308, Without Prejudice and without Recourse as evidenced by the documents herein attached as **EXHIBITS A,B,C**

Let it be also on the record that I never knowingly or willingly waive any of my Rights and or Liberties and Remind the Court that: "waivers of Constitutional Rights not only must be voluntary, they must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and consequences". U.S Supreme Court, Brady v. U.S., 379 U.S. 742 at 748 (1970) And cite as a maxim of law that a mere submission does not necessary Involves consent.

One, Elias Agredo-Narvaez, I' am responding to this offer to contract because it attempts to create a colorable persona under colorable law by the name of E-L-I-A-S-A-G-R-E-D-O-N-A-R-V-A-E-Z, the artifice being used here is to deceive not just me; the only authorized registered user and signator of it, but also the "Judge" and your "Honorable Court"

FOR THE RECORD

One, Elias Agredo-Narvaez, am a natural Person and a man **on** the Land in Ocean County, Not a resident in **this State**, the Federal Judicial District in/or the District Of NEW JERSEY.

FOR THE RECORD

I' am who I say I' am NOT whom the alleged **Officer ID#274** (herein after the highway man), who refused to properly ID himself by name and Last name after failing to provide a business card when asked for one and the alleged **Municipal Court Jackson Township** (which exists in **this State** in name only since a search in the corporations list in the State of New Jersey showed no result for such business as well for the **ALLSHORE TOWING SERVICE**) (**See EXHIBITS D, E**) say I' am.
Further, I sayeth not and I stand mute.







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PETITION FOR ABATEMENT

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82 **TO:**

83 Judge DANIEL F. SAHIN, or any seating or presiding judge

84 Municipal Court Jackson Township

85 102 Jackson Drive

86 Jackson, NJ 08527

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89 **FROM**:

90 Petitioner

91 Elias Agredo-Narvaez,

92 C/O

93 ELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ

94 1080-B East veterans Highway

95 Jackson, New Jersey

96 Without the **UNITED STATES**

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Regarding: COMPLAINT-SUMMONS/DEMAND/ACCUSATION/TICKET NUMBER

162083 attached hereto and thereby incorporated as an integral part of this petition for abatement. I am rejecting such **ticket number 162083** for cause and without dishonor within the required time. I' am returning said document marked "without prejudice" thereby

retaining all of my Rights in Law and Equity.

Item# 12231972-EAN-RE-TICKET162083

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NOTICE: my statements herein are not to be construed as, and are not a plea or admissions to any of the allegations directly or indirectly, implied or otherwise. This is by content,

grounds, intent and definition a petition in abatement, and not a plea in bar; and may not be construed as a motion for dismissal or for mere amendment of the instrument. It may be justly

resolved, only by abatement by the court.

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It has come to my attention that the courts operate on silent judicial notice of presumption all

the time; therefore One simply do not understand the nature and cause of the accusation with

regard to the elements of personal jurisdiction, venue, and the nature of the action until the

prosecution properly alleges them. I am therefore unable to enter a plea to the charge until I

114 have had an opportunity to raise a meaningful defense against these elements. One cannot

115 rebut an unstated presumption.

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"Lex semper dabit remedium" The law will always give remedy"

Comes Now, Elias Agredo-Narvaez, as a Third party intervenor and as a party in interest to petition this [agency?] Court or private administrative agency office or whatever the nature of your business may be, to abate the above referenced (accusation, Complaint, Summons, Ticket) on the following grounds:

Complaint: The initial pleading that starts a civil action and states the basis for the court's jurisdiction, the basis for the plaintiff's claim, and the demand for relief. In some states, this pleading is called a petition. (**Black's Law 9**th **Ed. P 32**)

One, Elias Agredo Narvaez; am a natural man, living **on** the dry land of New Jersey; not the Fiction Summoned in the TICKET "ELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ" which is a **Puerto rican**

Situs Trust and a Transmitting utility.

I am not exercising my Right to travel freely within this state to engage in commercial

activity. **TITLE 39:3 § 39:3-10.10-Purpose:**The purpose of this act is to reduce or preven

The purpose of this act is to reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries by strengthening licensing and testing standards for drivers of commercial vehicles.....(emphasis mine) this act is also designed to substantially conform the laws of this State to the requirements and standards established under the federal "Commercial Motor vehicle safety act of 1986." (emphasis mine) As my travel is not

commercial, one is not subject to being detained or summoned to the court or to pay any moneys by Officer ID#274 while exercising the police powers of the State to enforce its **statutes in commerce.** Below are some of my reasons as to why I will neither pay the

demanded money nor appear for the defendant in the air space above before the Judge unless

defects in the service of process are corrected and notice that:

The first (and most important) element of jurisdiction: "The accused must be properly identified; identified in such a fashion there is no room for mistaken identity. The individual must be singled out from all others; otherwise, anyone could be subject to arrest and trial without benefit of "wrong party" defense. Almost always the means of identification is a person's **proper name**, BUT, any means of identification is equally valid if said means differentiates the accused without doubt. **See EXHIBIT F.**

I alleged that the alleged officer ID# 274 did intent to mislead the court by writing the name of the summoned Decedent's all in UPPER CASE since prior to his writing it. I warned him that that was not my proper name but my COLLATERAL/PROPERTY/ TRADENAME and that by using such name without my permission he will be liable for the sum of \$250.000,00



plus costs for the recovery of my private conveyance to which the officer accepted and now I intent to suit him in his private capacity for the willful violation of my Constitutional Right to free movement and due process.

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All are presumed to know the Law

Therefore if the complainant or accuser has any claim or argument against me, he/she can bring a complaint or accusation against my real name. My objections herein will make it possible for the complainant or accuser to issue a corrected writ, which is the primary purpose of matters in abatement.

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NOTICE OF ABATEMENT OF IMPROPER SERVICE

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I challenge the subject matter and in personam jurisdiction of the court for the following reasons:

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Courts enforcing mere statutes do not act judicially merely ministerial, having thus no judicial immunity and unlike courts of law do not obtain jurisdiction by service of process nor even arrest and compelled appearance. Boswell v. Otis, 9 howard 336,348

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Service of a traffic ticket on a motorist does not give the court jurisdiction over his person....Service of a traffic ticket imposes no compulsion on him, and no penalty attached for failure to heed it...purpose of traffic ticket is to secure the motorist's voluntary appearance. Colville v. Bennett, 239 NYS 2d 685.

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181 The alleged Municipal Court Jackson Township may not even be a Judicial office or 182 building attached to any government. A search for this court in the secretary of state's 183 list of corporations returns as result, NO RESULTS; While the same search in 184 MANTA returns a **Privately held company?**

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186 • Judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes(civil or criminal in 187 nature and otherwise), act as mere "clerks" of the involved agency..." K.C. Davis, 188 ADMIN. LAW, ch 1 (CTP. West's 1965 Ed)

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• Their supposed "court" becoming thus a court of limited jurisdiction as a mere extension of the involved agency for more superior reviewing purposes." K.C. Davis ADMIN.LAW. P95 (CTP,6 Ed West's 1997) FRC v G.E 281 US 464; Keller v PE, 261 US 428

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193 If the NEW JERSEY UNIFORM TRAFFIC CITATION AND/or COMPLAINT is a 194 summons requiring my appearance, the following defects must be corrected before I will 195 submit to the alleged court's jurisdiction.

The mandate contained within Amendment V of the United States Constitution requiring "due process," i.e., meaning initiatives through judicial courts with proper jurisdiction, precedes the imposition of administratively issued summonses, except where **licensing agreement(s)** obligate assets. I have no knowledge of **Elias Agredo-Narvaez** having any licensing agreement(s) with the County of Ocean/ or Jackson, State of NEW JERSEY or the United States, which obligates assets and I demand strict proof to the contrary.

The alleged Police Officer ID#274, NEW JERSEY uniform traffic Citation and Complaint, in issue does not meet the legal definition of judicial "summons" as follows:

"Summons. Instrument used to commence a civil action or special proceeding and is a means of acquiring jurisdiction over a party. Writ or process directed to the sheriff or other proper officer, requiring him to notify the person named that an action has been commenced against him in the court from where the process issues, and that he is required to appear, on a day named, and answer the complaint in such action. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk is required to issue a summons and deliver it for service to the marshal or to a person specially appointed to serve it. Fed.R.Civil P. 4(a)." Blacks Law Dictionary, 6^{th} Edition, p. 1436.

 \underline{Note} : There are no definitions for the terms "administrative summons" in Black's Law Dictionary, 6^{th} Edition.

- The NEW JERSEY uniform Traffic Citation and/ or Complaint in issue neither indicates on it's face that a lawsuit is pending, nor does it comply with the rule for "Form and content" of civil summonses and is defective in the following ways:
- The NEW JERSEY Uniform Traffic Citation and/or Complaint does not bear the wet ink signature of the clerk of the court.
- Does not have The seal of the court placed upon it.
- Does not contain the name of the court upon it **But instead** an allegedly **Privately held company** AKA Municipal court Jackson Township?
- Does not contain the names of the parties to the cause of action with their respective of designations as plaintiff and defendant.



- Does not contain the mandatory notice to the defendant of time and place in which the defendant is to appear in the air space above the judge and defend, But instead a pay by date. (giving the sensation of coordinated stage and pre-settlement on the back of the Decedent's estate, TRADENAME, trust, Federal reserve's account....)
- Does not contain the proper default warning language to defendant.
- Does not have a copy of the plaintiff's complaint and provable cause affidavit attached **But instead** an statement that suggests that there are reasonable grounds **to "believe"** that an offense was committed; furthermore the officer suggests that he will file a complaint in your court charging the DECEDENT with an offense which now leave us free to ask the following two Questions: Did the alleged OfficerID#274 file a valid cause of action against me or the DECEDENT? If the answer is yes then, How many elements are in a valid cause of action? Well; without an attached complaint and probable cause affidavit, petitioners have no way of knowing what the nature and cause of the underlaying complaint is about and what relief demanded by the plaintiff.
- Officer ID# 274 himself PRINTED and SERVED said NEW JERSEY Uniform Traffic Citation and Complaint and is the party who has an "adversarial interest" in the instant matter
- Note: "A 'Summons' may be served by any person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action." Caldwell v. Coppola, 219 Cal.App.3rd, 859.
- The prohibition of personal service of process by parties is to discourage "fraudulent service by persons with an adversarial interest in a legal action."
- It appears from the returned document, that your organization is requesting my voluntary appearance, but threatening me with conviction and judgment for an undisclosed amount exceeding the base fine if I do not voluntarily comply.
 - Since "...whatever the form in which the government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the government stays within the bounds of his authority..." Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 at 384 (1947).
- In light of the case law cited above and that by voluntarily subjecting myself to your **Privately held** organization's jurisdiction; I would put my personal property at a substantial risk of loss.
- Your organization's coercive threats of retaliation for the exercise of stewardship over my personal property seem inappropriate and unconstitutional in denying me due process of law. Especially inappropriate, in light of the fact that I am advised by a







decision of the United States Supreme court to pause, reflect and accurately ascertain your organization's official capacity and authority.

When a petition for abatement is before a court, that court is charged with according to the petitioner the benefit of the doubt. In addition, courts should take cognizance of the law that provides: Where conditions for its issuance exist, abatement is a matter of right, not of discretion; The misnomer or mis-description of a party defendant is ground for abatement; and, Grounds for abatements are the same for equity and law cases.

I have included within this communication a Memorandum of Law on the Subject of my Right to travel upon the public highway. I think that it will enlighten you as to my position and gives you ample evidence and reason to abate the Traffic Citation.

I expect your response to my Abatement and correction of the errors, by the issuance of a proper summons or an Affidavit in rebuttal to the above legal position. Signed by the appropriate judicial officer in black ink with the court seal of your organization and service of the summons by the County Sheriff. In addition a clarification of any error you claim I have made in this Abatement along with all the documents you offer in support of your position, within the reasonable time of your receipt of this NOTICE OF ABATEMENT. If you need additional time please make your request in writing and it will be granted

If I do not hear from you by November 5; 2015which is the pay by date on the accusation/ticket number 162083, your lack of response will establish for the record the presumption that the returned document was improperly served, that there exist no unresolved material facts in issue or that a controversy between the parties exist. A Notice of Default may be issued to you. By your acquiescence in the matter your organization will have accepted my position as being applicable in this instance, thus closing the matter. Time is therefore of the Essence.

GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY

Respectfully,

Reserving all Rights UCC1-308



Non-negotiable signature Elias Agredo-Narvaez, Sui Juris







MEMORANDUM OF LAW In re TICKET #162083

- The Motor Vehicle Commission Department(s) states that in order for one to show proof of ownership of their personal property, they must receive a certificate of title from the state, and then they must register it, turning it into a motor vehicle, which then places it as their (Motor Vehicle Department) property under commerce.
- Ministerial officers are incompetent to receive grants of judicial power from the legislature, their acts in attempting to exercise such powers are necessarily nullities."
 Burns v. Sup., Ct., SF, 140 Cal. 1.
- "A judge ceases to seat as judicial officer because the governing principle of administrative law provides that courts are prohibited from substituting their evidence, testimony, record, arguments, and rationale for that of the agency.
 Additionally, courts are prohibited from substituting their judgment for that of the agency. Courts in administrative issues are prohibited from even listening to or hearing arguments, presentation, or rational." ASIS v. US, 568 F2d 284.

Am I the owner? No I 'am not

On February 10,1987, while testifying in court, Tennessee Department of revenue operation supervisor Denise Rottero Told judge Greer how Tennessee's auto registration works. The process begins with the "surrender" of the manufacturer's statements of origin(MSO) by the auto dealer to the department of revenue in exchange for Certificate of title. Asked if a MSO is proof of ownership-Legal title- to the automobile. Ms Rottero said "YES". Are you telling me that the ownership of the automobile is NOT Title; it's merely evidence that title exist. Your car's legal Title is the MSO, which the dealer surrendered to the state. Ms Rottero said the MSO is put on microfilm for permanent keeping, the original destroyed.

After the trial, spectators expressed shock that their personal automobiles were actually owned by the state. "no wonder state law officers stop people for no reason!"



said a housewife. If your car has got Tennessee plates it's theirs, and they can do anything they like to you." That's the law but it is voluntary, No one but judge Greer has dared say that if you don't surrender your car to the state in exchange for plates, you go to jail.

Now, based on the above; it is clear that the legal owner of every vehicle/Motor vehicle/ Automobile is the State so now that begs the question of WHY IS NOT THIS STATE PAYING FOR THE REGISTRATION OF THE VEHICLES?

- "...the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary." Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 So. 782 (1915).
- "The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the **right to enjoy life and liberty**, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business." *Teche Lines vs. Danforth.*, 12 So. 2d 784 (1943);
- "Personal liberty -- or the right to enjoyment of life and liberty -- is one of the fundamental or natural rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from nor dependent on the U.S. Constitution... It is one of the most sacred and valuable rights [remember the words of Justice Tolman, supra.] as sacred as the right to Private property...and is regarded as inalienable." 16 C.J.S. Const. Law, Sect. 202, p.987.

As we can see, the distinction between a "Right" to use the public roads and a "privilege" to use the public roads is drawn upon the line of "using the road as a place of business" and the various state courts have held so. But what have the U.S. courts held on this point?

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• "First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are public property, and their primary and preferred use is **for private purposes**, and that **their use for purposes of gain** is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit." *Stephenson vs. Binford*, 287 U. S. 251 (1932); *Packard vs. Banton*, 264 U. S. 140 (1924), and cases cited; *Frost Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission*, 271 U. S. 582 (1926); *Railroad commission vs. Jater-City Forwarding Co.*, 57 S.W.2d 290; *Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines*, 164 A. 313.

So what is a privilege to use the roads? By now it should be apparent even to the "learned" that an attempt to use the road use as a place of business is a privilege. The distinction must be drawn between...

Traveling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads, which is our Right; Using the public roads as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business, which is a privilege.

- "[The roads]...are constructed and maintained at public expense, and no person therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested right to their use in carrying on a commercial business." *Ex Parte Sterling*, 53 S.W. 2d 294; *Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners*, 17 P. 2d 82 (1932); *Stephenson vs. Binford*, supra.
- "When the public highways are made the place of business the state has a right to regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience of the public as well as the preservation of the highways." *Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners*, supra.
- "[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature of the business and the use of the highways in connection therewith." Ibid.
- "We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate. The use of the highways for gain." *Robertson vs. Dept. of Public Works*, supra.

There should be considerable authority on a subject considering the importance of this deprivation on the liberty of the individual "using the roads in the ordinary course of life and business." However, it should be noted that extensive research has not turned up one case or authority acknowledging the state's power to convert the individual's right to travel upon the public roads into a "privilege".

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Therefore, it must be concluded that the Citizen does have a "Right" to travel and transport 411 his property upon the public highways and roads and the exercise of this Right and it is not a 412 413 "privilege". 414 III. DEFINITIONS 415 In order to understand the correct application of the statute in question, we must first define 416 the terms used in connection with this point of law. As will be shown, many terms used today 417 do not, in their legal context, mean what we assume they mean, thus resulting in the 418 misapplication of statutes in the instant case. 419 AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE 420 There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle. An automobile has 421 been defined as: 422 "The word 'automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the 423 transportation of persons on highways." American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 424 vs. Chaput, 60 A. 2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200. 425 While the distinction is made clear between the two as the courts have stated: 426 "A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than 427 an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received." International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle' 251 P. 428 429 120. The term 'motor vehicle' is different and broader than the word 430 431 'automobile'." City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 N.E. 2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio 432 App. 232. 433 The distinction is made very clear in United State Code, Title 18, §31: 434 "Motor vehicle" means every description or other contrivance propelled or 435 drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and property. 436 437 "Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for 438 any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in 439

connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.



Clearly, an automobile is private property in use for private purposes, while a motor vehicle is a machine, which *may be* used upon the highways for trade, commerce, or hire.

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444 TRAVEL

The term "**travel**" is a significant term and is defined as: (and the alleged officer ID# 274 was clearly told that I was neither a DRIVER nor DRIVING but TRAVELING)

- "The term 'travel' and 'traveler' are usually construed in their broad and general sense...so as to include all those who rightfully use the highways viatically (when being reimbursed for expenses) *and* who have occasion to pass over them for the purpose of business, convenience, or pleasure." [Emphasis added] 25 Am. Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect. 427, p.717.
- "Traveler-- One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or health." *Locket vs. State*, 47 Ala. 45; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 3309.
- "Travel -- To journey or to pass through or over; as a country district, road, etc. To go from one place to another, whether on foot, or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile, carriage, ship, or aircraft; make a journey." Century Dictionary, p. 2034.

Therefore, the term "travel" or "traveler" refers to one who uses a conveyance to go from one place to another and included all those who use the highways as a matter of Right. Notice that in all these definitions the phrase "for hire" never occurs. This term "travel" or "traveler" implies by definition one who uses the road as a means to move from one place to another.

Therefore, one who uses the road in the ordinary course of life and business for the purpose of travel and transportation is a traveler.

DRIVER

The term "driver" in contradistinction to "traveler" is defined as:

• "Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagen, or other vehicle..." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 940.

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Notice that this definition includes one who is "**employed**" in conducting a vehicle. It should be self-evident that this person could not be "traveling" on a journey, but is using the road as a place in the conduct of business.

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OPERATOR

Today we assume that a "traveler" is a "driver," and a "driver" is an "operator." However, this is not the case.

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485 486 • "It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms 'operator' and 'driver'; the 'operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire; while the 'driver' is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the same person to be both 'operator' and 'driver'." *Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co.*, 60 S.E. 2d 658.

To further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observed that this was a vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business of carrying passengers. This definition would seem to describe a person who is using the road as a place of business, or in other words, a person engaged in the "privilege" of using the road for gain.

This definition then is a further clarification of the distinction mentioned earlier and therefore:

- Traveling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads as a matter of Right meets the definition of a traveler.
- Using the road as a place of business as a matter of privilege meets the definition of a driver or an operator or both.

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TRAFFIC

Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle," "traveler," "driver," and "operator," the next term to define is "traffic":

• "...traffic thereon is to some extent destructive, therefore, the prevention of unnecessary duplication of auto transportation service will lengthen the life of the highways or reduce the cost of maintenance, the revenue derived by the state...will also tend toward the public welfare by producing at the expense of those operating for private gain, some small part of the cost of repairing the wear *Northern Pacific R.R. Co. vs. Schoenfeldt*, 213 P. 26.

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Note: In the above, Justice Tolman expounded upon the key of raising revenue by taxing the 501 502 "privilege" to use the public roads "at the expense of those operating for gain." 503 In this case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with the unnecessary Auto 504 Transportation Service, or in other words, "vehicles for hire." The word "traffic" is another 505 word, which is to be strictly construed to the conducting of business. 506 "Traffic-- Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, or 507 the like. The passing of goods and commodities from one person to another for 508 an equivalent in goods or money..." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 509 3307. 510 Here again, notice that this definition refers to one "conducting business." No mention is 511 made of one who is traveling in his automobile. This definition is of one who is engaged in 512 the passing of a commodity or goods in exchange for money, i.e. vehicles for hire. 513 Furthermore, the word "traffic" and "travel" must have different meanings, which the counts 514 recognize. The difference is recognized in Ex Parte Dickey, supra: • "...In addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses, taxicabs, and hacks, 515 516 when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the ordinary traffic and travel and 517 obstruct them." 518 The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a distinction between the two. But, 519 what was the distinction? We have already defined both terms, now to nail the matter down: 520 "The word 'traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, and has 521 reference to the business of transportation rather than to its primary meaning of 522 interchange of commodities." Allen vs. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18 (1917). 523 Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined the word "traffic" (in either 524 its primary or secondary sense) in reference to business, and not to mere travel! So it is clear 525 that the term "traffic" is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege." The net result being 526 that "traffic" is brought under the (police) power of the legislature. The term has no

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529 LICENSE

It seems only proper to define the word license," as the definition of this word will be extremely important in understanding the statutes as they are properly applied.

application to one who is not using the roads as source of income or a place of business.



• "The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort." *People vs. Henderson*, 218 N.W. 2d 2, 4.

"Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent." Western Electric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F. 2d 116,118.

In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state would have to prove the position that the exercise of a Constitutional Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life and business is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state could then regulate or prevent. This position, however, would raise constitutional questions, as this position would be diametrically opposed to fundamental constitutional law. (See "Conversion of a Right to a Crime," infra.)

In the instant case, the proper definition of a "license" is:

• "a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation or to carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the police power." [emphasis added] Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy, 158 P. 2d 199, 203.

This definition would fall more in line with the "privilege" of carrying on business on the streets.

- Most people tend to think that "licensing" is imposed by the state for the purpose of raising revenue, yet there may well be more subtle reasons contemplated; for when one seeks permission from someone to do something he invokes the jurisdiction of the "licensor" which, in this case, is the state. In essence, the licensee may well be seeking to be regulated by the "licensor."
 - "A license fee is a charge made primarily for regulation, with the fee to cover costs and expenses of supervision or regulation." *State vs. Jackson*, 60 Wisc. 2d 700; 211 N.W. 2d 480, 487.

The fee is the price; the regulation or *control of the licensee, which is the real aim of the legislation*.

Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate government or are they nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power into every facet of our lives? Have our "enforcement agencies" been diverted from crime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, now



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busying themselves as they "check" our papers to see that all are properly endorsed by the
state?
At which Legislative Session will it be before we are forced to get a license for Lawnmowers,

Generators, Tillers, and Air Conditioners or before Women are required to have a license for their "blender" or "mixer?" All have motors on them and the state can always use the revenue. At what point does the steady encroachment into our Liberty cease?

571 POLICE POWER

The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain act or omission to act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be *paid for certain occupations*. The power used in the instant case cannot however, be the power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a Right would be open to constitutional objection. (See "taxing power," infra.)

- Each law relating to the legitimate use of police power must ask three questions:
- Is there threatened danger?
 - 2. Does a regulation involve a constitutional Right?
- Is the regulation reasonable?

People vs. Smith, 108 Am. St. Rep. 715; Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed.,
 under "Police Power."

- When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very important issues are clarified.
- 1. First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using his automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life and business? The answer is No!

There is nothing inherently dangerous in the use of an automobile when it is carefully managed. Their guidance, speed, and noise are subject to a quick and easy control, under a competent and considerate manager, it is as harmless on the road as a horse and buggy, possibly more so. It is the manner of managing the automobile and that alone, which threatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to respond quickly to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the least dangerous conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December, 1905.)

• "The automobile is not inherently dangerous." Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876; Blair vs. Broadwater, 93 SE 632 (1917).

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To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary course of life and business, because one might in the future, become dangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.)

2. Next, does the regulation involve a constitutional Right?

This question has already been addressed and answered in this brief, and need not be reinforced other than to remind this Court that this Citizen does have the Right to travel upon the public highway by automobile in the ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore be concluded that this regulation does involve a constitutional Right.

3. The third question is the most important in this case. "Is this regulation reasonable?"

The answer is *No*! It will be shown later in "Regulation," infra, that this licensing statute is oppressive and could be effectively administered by less oppressive means.

Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police power in accordance with the general principle that the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is established beyond question that every state power, including the police power, is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment (and others) and by the inhibitions there imposed.

Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulations must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates to limit the field of the police power to the extent of preventing the enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the Amendment protects. (See *Parks vs. State*, 64 N.E. 682 (1902)).

• "With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority." Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540 (1902); Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.y. Co., 24 A. 848 (1892); O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 103 A. 887.

"The police power of the state must be exercised in *subordination to the* provisions of the U.S. Constitution." [emphasis added] *Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission*, 294 U. S. 613 (1935); *Buchanan vs. Warley*, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).



"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions." *Tighe vs. Osborne*, 131 A. 60 (1925).

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language." *Mehlos vs. City of Milwaukee*, 146 N. W. 882 (1914).

As it applies in the instant case, the language of the Fifth Amendment is clear:

No person shall be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process of law. As has been demonstrated the courts at all levels have firmly established an absolute Right to travel. In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to all entities, natural and artificial persons alike, the legislature has deprived this free and natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due process of law.

DUE PROCESS

• "The essential elements of due process of law are.. Notice and The Opportunity to defend." Simon vs. Craft, 182 U. S. 427 (1901).

Yet, not one individual has ever been given notice of the loss of his/her Right, before signing the license (contract). Nor was the Citizen given any opportunity to defend against the loss of his/her right to travel by automobile on the highways, in the ordinary course of life and business. This amounts to an arbitrary government deprivation on Liberty.

- "There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty..." *Barbier vs. Connolly*, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885); *Yick Wo vs. Hopkins*, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
- "The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta." *Kent vs. Dulles*, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).

The focal point of this question of police power and due process must balance upon the point of making the public highways a safe place for the public to travel. If a man travels in a manner that creates actual damage, an action in law would be the appropriate remedy (civilly) for recovery of damages. The state could then also proceed against the individual to deprive him of his Right to use the public highways, *for cause*. This process would fulfill the due

process requirements of the Fifth Amendment while at the same time insuring that Rights

guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the state constitutions would be protected for ail.

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- But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there is no cause for interference in the private affairs or actions of a Citizen.
- One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of due process of law is that of Daniel Webster in his *Dartmouth College Case*, 4 Wheat 518 (1819), in which he declared that due process means "a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry,
- and renders judgment only after trial." (See also State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020 (1910);
- 666 Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333.)

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- Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that "no one shall be personally bound (restricted) until he has had his day in court," until he has been duly summoned to appear and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such summons and opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld where it is unfairly administered. (12 Am. Jur. [1st] Const. Law, Sect. 573, p.269.)
- Note: This sounds tike the process used to deprive one of the "privilege" of operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should be kept in mind, however, that we are discussing the
- arbitrary deprivation of the Right to use the road that all citizens have "in common."
- The futility of the state's position can be most easily observed in the 1959 Washington Attorney General's opinion on a similar issue:
 - "The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the public highways for private, rather than commercial purposes is recognized..."
 - "Under its power to regulate private uses of our highways, our legislature has required that motor vehicle operators be licensed (I.C. 49-307). Undoubtedly, the primary purpose of this requirement is to insure, as far as possible, that all motor vehicle operators will be competent and qualified, thereby reducing the potential hazard or risk of harm, to which other users of the highways might otherwise be subject. But once having complied with this regulatory provision, by obtaining the required license, a motorist enjoys the privilege of traveling freely upon the highways..." Washington A.G.O. 59-60 No. 88, p. 11.
 - This alarming opinion appears to be saying that every person using an automobile as a matter of right, must give up the Right and convert the Right into a privilege. This is accomplished under the guise of regulation. This statement is indicative of the insensitivity, even the
- ignorance, of the government to the restrictions placed upon government by and through the

693 several constitutions.

Page 20 of 22



That legal proposition may have been able to stand in 1959; however, as of 1966, in the United States Supreme Court decision in *Miranda*, clearly demonstrated that even this weak defense of the state's actions must fail.

697 698 699 "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." *Miranda vs. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436,491 (1966).

Thus the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the Citizen's Right to travel upon the public roads, by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive his Right and convert that Right into a privilege. Furthermore, we have previously established that this "privilege" has

been defined as applying only to those who are "conducting business in the streets" or

704 "operating for-hire vehicles."

The legislature has attempted, by legislative fiat, to deprive the Citizen of his Right to use the roads in the ordinary course of life and business, without affording the Citizen the safeguard of "due process of law." This has been accomplished under supposed powers of regulation.

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REGULATION

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- "In addition to the requirement that regulations governing the use of the highways must not be violative of constitutional guarantees, the prime essentials of such regulation are reasonableness, impartiality, and definiteness or certainty." 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect. 260.

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"Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by government sufferance of permission." *Davis vs. Massachusetts*, 167 U.S. 43;

Pachard vs. Banton, supra.

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SURRENDER OF RIGHTS

A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name of regulation.

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"...The only limitations found restricting the right of the state to condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent U.S.

highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent U.S.
Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such

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use..." [emphasis added] Riley vs. Lawson, 143 So. 619 (1932); Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.

If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to surrender Rights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must this maxim of law, then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into use) a Right?

- "To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of the common law, would not be the law of the land." *Hoke vs. Henderson*, 15 NC 15.
- "We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." *Simons vs. United States*, 390 U.S. 389.

Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exercise the privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the police power, due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statute which is oppressive and one which has been misapplied to deprive the Citizen of Rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the state constitution.



EXHIBIT A PAGE 1



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September 30, 2013

04 PAGE(S)

AFFIDAVIT OF RESERVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER UCC 1-308/1-207

PUBLIC
THIS IS A PUBLIC COMMUNICATION TO ALL

Notice to agents is notice to principles
Notice to principles is Notice to Agents
Applications to all successors and assigns
All are without excuse

Elias:Agredo-Narvaez©, sui juris
All rights reserved UCC 1-308/1-207
c/o 1080-B 1080 East veterans highway
Jackson, New Jersey a republic near [08527]
Phone: [973-390-7100]
Non-domestic without the United States

Let it be known to all that I,Elias:Agredo-Narvaez© explicitly reserves all of my rights. See UCC 1-308 which was formally UCC 1-207. "§ 1-308. Performance or Acceptance Under Reservation of Rights.

(a) A party that with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as "without prejudice," "under protest," or the like are sufficient."

I retain all of my rights and liberties at all times and in all places, nunc pro tunc (now for then) from the time of my birth and forevermore. Further, I retain my rights not to be compelled to perform under any contract or commercial agreement that I did not enter knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally. And furthermore, I do not accept the liability of the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract or commercial agreement. I am not ever subject to silent contracts and have never knowingly or willingly contracted away my sovereignty. Further, I am not a United States citizen or a 14th amendment citizen. I am a State Citizen of the republic and reject any attempted expatriation. See 15 united States statute at large, July 27th, 1868 also known as the expatriation statute

Violation fee of my liberty is \$250,000 per incident or per 15 minutes or any part thereof. Wherefore all have undeniable knowledge.

AFFIDAVIT

Affiant, Elias:Agredo-Narvaez©, sui juris, a natural born, Nationalized Citizen of (New Jersey) in its in dejure capacity as a republic and as one of the several states of the union created by the constitution for the united States of America 1777/1789. This incidentally makes me an American national and a common man of the Sovereign People, does swear and affirm that Affiant has scribed and read the foregoing facts, and in accordance with the best of Affiant's firsthand knowledge and conviction, such are true, correct, complete, and not misleading, the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

EXHIBIT A PAGE 2

ed By: Dum Brance Co

sui juris, This Affidavit is dated 19092012

NOTARY PUBLIC

State: New Jersey, County of Ocean

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, the above signed Elias:Agredo-Narvaez©,

This 8th day of October, 2012 year

Notary Public

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

SUNNY PATEL

ID # 2421758 NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF NEW JERSEY My Commission Expires June 8, 2017



EXHIBIT B PAGE 1

TMElias:Agredo-Narvaez©, Secured Party and Creditor c/o 1080-B 1080 East veterans highway Jackson, New Jersey [08527-9998] united States of America

ATTN: ALL CORPORATE AGENCIES

Date: October, 8th, 2012

Debtor: TMELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ ©, A LEGAL ENTITY FOR USE IN COMMERCE Social Security#

Creditor: TM Elias: Agredo-Narvaez ©, A Living, Breathing, Flesh-and-blood, Natural Male, and Secured Party.

AFFIDAVIT OF STATUS AS SECURED PARTY AND CREDITOR

Elias:Agredo-Narvaez©, sole authorized agent for the Debtor and by sovereign administrative judgement hereby serve your office with official notice of my lawful standing as Sovereign Secured Party and Creditor. I have supreme authoritative power of attorney, (document#12231972-EAN-POA) sole security interest, and am the holder in due course of first right of claim over the Debtor, evidenced by a \$10,000,000.000.000 commercial lien. I control all affairs of the Debtor, own all assets of the Debtor, and am exempt from levy and relieved of all liability from the Debtor.

NOTICE: The following lawful establishments shall apply upon this notice:

- 1. All commercial contracts listing the Debtor have been lawfully cancelled, rescinded and revoked and are invalid and unenforceable.
- 2. As a Sovereign Creditor and Secured Party, I am distinguished and set apart as a separate entity from the Debtor established so by lawful filings into the public and noticed with THE SECRETARY OF STATE, and the UNITED STATES TREASURER. My identity,
- 3. TM Elias: Agredo-Narvaez©, is copy written and no agency or person has authorization to use, disclose, report, list or store my name or my personal information for any purpose. Your agency is hereby ordered by Estoppel to remove all computer entries, records, histories, paper documents, references and details in the name of the Debtor and give notice to The

EXHIBIT B PAGE 2

Secured Party addressed below. Failure to comply is considered an International Criminal Action under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODES with severe penalty at law.

4. No agency or corporate entity shall have jurisdiction over the Secured Party whatsoever. The flesh and blood man, TMElias:Agredo-Narvaez©, does not require licenses or permission to exercise any natural right.

If you find this AFFIDAVIT OF STATUS AS SECURED PARTY AND CREDITOR to be in error, send rebuttal of the points herein to the Secured Party and Creditor, signed by an authorized representative or attorney for your corporation under oath and agreement to testify to the facts and understanding before a jury under penalty of perjury.

Furthermore: If your corporate agency has any lawful commercial claim against the Sentient, Flesh and Blood, Non-Corporate, Natural Man, Elias: Agredo-Narvaez@, submit it within (10) **Ten days** of the date of this notice to the address below with valid proof of claim.

If an authorized representative of your agency fails to respond with a valid affidavit of truth in the form of a rebuttal or does not or cannot provide a True Bill of Commerce and a Complete Assessment of any commercial claim against my natural being, or you ignore this notice and remain silent without stating your claim for a period of (10) Ten days, THEN YOU ACCEPT MY CLAIM OF LAWFUL ESTABLISHMENTS HEREIN by tacit agreement and MY AFFIDAVIT STANDS AS TRUTH IN COMMERCE. Your default under the maxims of law will constitute your AGREEMENT that any alleged claims against this Living, Breathing, Fleshand-Blood, Sentient, Natural Man, and Sovereign Creditor and Secured Party, Elias: Agredo-Narvaez© are unfounded in common law and thus DO NOT AND CANNOT EXIST.

Honorably,

Affiant By: C Elias: Agredo-Narvaezo, Secured Party, and Creditor

1080-B 1080 East veterans highway Jackson, New Jersey [08527-9998]

united States of America

Authorized Signature: DEBTOR ELIAS AGREDO-NARIAEZ

Autograph & Seal By: Secured Party Creditor

WITHOUT PREJUDICE-WITHOUT RECOURSE-NON-ASSUM

All Rights Reserved-Errors & Omissions Excepted

Day of October , 2012

Notary Public's Signature: duny lete

Notary Public's Seal:

STATE OF NEW JERSEY Commission Expires June 8, 2017

Item#12231972-EAN-AOSASP

Affidavit of Publication

Publisher's Fee \$129.60 Affidavit \$35.00

State of New Jersey

Monmouth/Ocean Counties

Personally appeared

Of the Asbury Park Press, a newspaper printed in Freehold, New Jersey and published in Neptune, in said County and State, and of general circulation in said county, who being duly sworn, deposeth and saith that the advertisement of which the annexed is a true copy, has been published in the said newspaper 3 times, once in each issue as follows:

1/15/14, 1/22/14, 1/29/14

A)D.

Sworn and subscribed before me, this

29 day of January, 2014

Notary Public of New Jersey

OTHER HEADINGS

PUBLIC NOTICE OF RESERVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER UCC 1-308 THIS IS A PUBLIC COMMUNICATION TO ALL

OF RIGHTS UNDER UCC 1-308
THIS IS A PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
TO ALL
Notice is hereby made public that; Elias
Agrado-Navaez; A Citizen of New Jersey,
reserves air Rights and Liberties under
U.C.C. ARTICLE 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS (2001) - PART 3. TERRITORIAL APPUCABILITY AND GENERAL RULES ,
(a) A party that with explicit reservation of
rights performs or promises performance or
asserts to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party does
not thereby prejudice the rights reserved.
Such words as "without prejudice," "under
protest," or the like are sufficient. therefore;
I, Elias Agredo-Narvaez Retain all of my
Rights and Liberties at all times and places,
Nunc-pro tune from the time of my live birth
and forever more. Further, I retain my
Rights no to be compelled to perform under
any contract or commercial agreement that
I did not enter knowingly, voluntary and intentionally. And furthermore, I do not accept
the liability of the compelled benefit of
any unrevealed contract or commercial
agreement. I am not ever subject to silent
contracts and have never knowingly or
willingly contracted away any of my Rights
States citizen or a 14th amendment. Citizen
or freedoms. Further, I am not a insteal
States citizen or a 14th amendment. Gibzen:
I am a natural born, Nationalized Citizen of
one of the several states of the union as
New Jersey Republic (or same as adopted
by Oath) This incidentally makes me an
American national and I Reject any attempted expatriation statue. Violation fee of
any of my Rights, Liberties or Freedoms is
\$250,000 per incident or per 15 minutes
or any part thereof, wherefore all have undeniable Knowledge
(\$129,60)

Kathleen A. Gibson Notary Public State of New Jersey My Commission Expires Dec. 18, 2014 - Collect N.J. State Sales Tax

- Issue N.J. Resale Certificates (ST-3)

This Certificate of Authority (CA-1) must be displayed at your place of business.

EXHIBIT

AGE 1

- Issue N.J. Exempt Use Certificates (ST-4)
You <u>must</u> have a valid N.J. Sales Tax Certificate to collect Sales Tax or issue certificates.
If you are <u>not</u> subject to collect N.J. Sales Tax but need to issue Resale or Exempt Use Certificates, you can request to be placed on a "Non-reporting Basis". Call or write the Division to obtain the proper forms (ST-6205) at:
State of New Jersey Division of Taxation P O Box 252 Trenton, N.J. 08646-0252 (609) 292-9292.

140-026-708/000

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Certificate of Authority

DIVISION OF TAXATION TRENTON, N J 08695

Acting Director, Division of Taxation

The person, partnership or corporation named below is hereby authorized to collect NEW JERSEY SALES & USE TAX

pursuant to N. J. S. A. 54:32B-1 ET SEQ.

This authorization is good ONLY for the named person at the location specified herein This authorization is null and void if any change of ownership or address is effected.

AGREDO-NARVAEZ, ELIAS ELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ C/O 1080-B EAST VETERANS HIGHW JACKSON NJ 08527 Tax Registration No XXX-XXX-708/000

Tax Effective Date: 09-14-15

Document Locator No.: I0000981856

Date Issued: 09-15-15

This Certificate is NOT assignable or transferable. It must be conspicuously displayed at above address

CERT-1 04-08, D205846L

(See Reverse Side)

EXHIBIT D PAGE 3

A GANNETT COMPANY

ASBURY PARK PRESS APP.com

Agency:

ELIAS AGREDO ELIAS AGREDO 1080 B EAST VETERANS HWY JACKSON, NJ 08527 ATTN: same

Client: ELIAS AGREDO

1080 B EAST VETERANS HWY,

JACKSON, NJ 08527

Acct No: 9733907100ELIA

Acct: 9733907100ELIA

| Order# | Advertisement/Description | # Col x # Lines | Rate Per Line | Cost |
|------------|--|---------------------------------|------------------|--------|
| 0000612512 | LEGAL NOTICE OCEANCOUNTYNOTICEISHEREBYGIVENTHATELI SAGREDONARVAEZMITHHISDESIGNATEDADDRE | 1 col x 16 lines | \$0.75 | \$0.00 |
| | | Affidavit of Publication Charge | 0 | \$0.00 |
| | | Tearsheet Charge | 0 | \$0.00 |
| | | Net Total Due: | | 0.00 |

Run Dates: 07/25/15, 07/26/15, 07/27/15 Check #: CERTIFICATION BY APPROVAL OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION BY RECEIVING AGENCY I CERTIFY AND DECLARE THAT THIS BILL OR INVOICE IS CORRECT, AND THAT I, HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS, CERTIFY AND DECLARE THAT THE SUFFICIENT FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE TO SATISFY THIS CLAIM. THE PAYMENT GOODS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED OR THE SERVICES RENDERED AND ARE IN SHALL BE CHARGEABLE TO: COMPLIANCE WITH THE SPECIFICATIONS OR OTHER REQUIREMENTS. AND SAID CERTIFICATION IS BASED ON SIGNED DELIVERY SLIPS OR OTHER REASONABLE APPROPRIATION ACCOUNT(S) AND AMOUNTS CHARGED: P.0. # PROCEDURES OR VERIFIABLE INFORMATION. SIGNATURE: SIGNATURE

CLAIMANT'S CERTIFICATION AND DECLARATION:

I DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE AND CERTIFY UNDER THE PENALTIES OF THE LAW THAT THIS BILL OR INVOICE IS CORRECT IN ALL ITS PARTICULARS; THAT THE GOODS HAVE BEEN FURNISHED OR SERVICES HAVE BEEN RENDERED AS STATED HEREIN; THAT NO BONUS HAS BEEN GIVEN OR RECEIVED BY ANY PERSON OR PERSONS WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS CLAIMANT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE CLAIM; THAT THE AMOUNT HEREIN STATED IS JUSTLY DUE AND OWING; AND THAT THE AMOUNT CHARGED IS A REASONABLE ONE.

Date: 07/27/2015

Federal ID #: 061032273

Signature:

Official Position: Clerk

Kindly return a copy of this bill with your payment so that we can assure you proper credit.

Asbury Park Press


New Jersey Press Media Solutions P.O. Box 677599 Dallas, TX 75267-7599

Ad Number: 0000612512 Run Dates: 07/25/15, 07/26/15, 07/27/15 PAGE 4

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Elias Agredo-Narvaez with his designated address AKA c/o 1080-B East Veterans Highway Jackson, New Jersey [08527] has registered the trade name "ELIAS AGREDO-NARVAEZ" as of May 18, 2015, with the County of Ocean. The general nature of the business is small paint jobs. And the alternate address is: P.O. Box 1572 Lakewood New Jersey, [08701]. (\$36.00)

-0000612512-01

EXHIBIT E PAGE 1



| П | sin | PEC | No | me | |
|---|-----|-----|----|----|--|

ERGEN COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION A NJ NONPROFIT CORPORATION

URLINGTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.

URLINGTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION

IUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION OF NEW JERSEY

UNICIPAL COURT ATTORNEYS LLP

EW JERSEY MUNICIPAL COURT ATTORNEYS LLP

CEAN COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION

EASIDE HEIGHTS SECRETARIES' ASSOCIATION - MUNICIPAL COURT CHAPTER INC.

HERMAN MUNICIPAL COURT SERVICES, INC.

HE MUNICIPAL COURT MATTERS, INC.

RI-COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S ASSOCIATION, INC.

Showing 1 to 11 of 11 entries

Municipal court Jackson township NO