ENRI-East
European, National and Regional Identities

an FP7-SSH collaborative research project [2008-2011]
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Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities:
Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union

Series of project research reports

Summarizing and generalizing reports

Belarus
Germany
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Research Report #3

ENRI-East Thematic Comparative Papers

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About the ENRI-East research project (www.enri-east.net)

The Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities:
Nations between states along the new eastern borders of the European Union (ENRI-East)

ENRI-East is a research project implemented in 2008-2011 and primarily funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. This international and inter-disciplinary study is aimed at a deeper understanding of the ways in which the modern European identities and regional cultures are formed and inter-communicated in the Eastern part of the European continent.

ENRI-East is a response to the shortcomings of previous research: it is the first large-scale comparative project which uses a sophisticated toolkit of various empirical methods and is based on a process-oriented theoretical approach which places empirical research into a broader historical framework.

The distinct ethno-national diversity in this region, along with the problems resulting from it was generated by dramatic shifts of borders, populations and political affiliation which have continued until today. The prevailing pattern of political geography of this part of Europe was the emergence and the dismemberment of empires, a process which created ethno-national enclaves within the boundaries of new nation states. These minorities were frequently drawn into inter-state conflicts and subjected to repression, ethnic cleansing and expulsion. The subjects of interests were ethnic minorities in the supra-region "Wider Eastern Europe", i.e. the region between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, along the current geo-political "East-West" division line. Estimated 8 to 10 millions of people are affected by "ethnic splits" or minority groups, whose ethnic compatriots would constitute a titular majority in another country, some of them even on each side of this contemporary geopolitical east-west diving border line.

The complex ENRI-East study was designed as a comprehensive set of theoretical, methodological, empirical and comparative work streams exploring the interplay of identities among the twelve ethnic minorities in the supra-region of Central and Easter Europe. These ethnic groups are: Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, Belarusians and Ukrainians in Poland, Slovaks in Hungary, Hungarians in Slovakia and in Ukraine, Poles in Ukraine, in Belarus and in Lithuania, Belarusians in Lithuania as well as Lithuanians in Russia (Kaliningrad oblast). The project includes also a case study of Germany, where our target groups were the ethnic Germans returning to their historical homeland after the centuries of living in other European countries as well as Jewish immigrants (so called "quota refugees" who had moved to the country since 1989).

ENRI-East addresses four general research themes. The first one deals with the interplay of identities and cultures by comparing 'mother nations' and their 'residual groups abroad'. The second theme is a cross-cutting approach which addresses the nations and the states: more exactly, the attitudes and policies of 'mother nations' and 'host nations' toward the 'residual groups' and vice versa. The third research theme comprise the reality of self organization and representation of "residual groups abroad" (ethnic minorities) along the East European borderland. Finally, the last research theme of the project deals with path dependencies, historical memories, present status and expected dynamics of divided nations in Eastern Europe.

The empirical data base for ENRI-East was generated through 5 sub-studies implemented in all or several project countries:

- ENRI-VIS (Values and Identities Survey): face-to-face formalized interviews with members of 12 ethnic minority groups in eight countries, 6,800 respondents;
- ENRI-BIO: qualitative, biographical in-depth interviews with members of 12 ethnic minority groups in eight countries (144 interviews);
- ENRI-EXI: semi-structured expert interviews with governmental and non-governmental representatives of ethnic minority groups in eight countries (48 interviews);
- ENRI-WEB: online content analysis of weblogs and Internet periodicals run or maintained by ethnic minority group members;
- ENRI-MUSIC: special study on cultural identities and music; an innovative, multi-disciplinary pilot effort in Hungary and Lithuania.

The series of ENRI-East research reports (www.enri-east.net/project-results)

Main outcomes of the ENRI-East research program are summarized in the series of research papers and project reports as outlined below. The whole collection of papers will be publicly available on the project web-site by December 2011, while some papers can be accessed since September 2011.

Individual papers are written by ENRI-East experts from all project teams and the whole series is edited by the Coordinating Team at the CEASS-Center at the Institute for Advanced Studies under the guidance of the Principal Investigator Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich and Project Coordinator Dr. Alexander Chvorostov.

Summarizing and generalizing reports

1. Theoretical and methodological backgrounds for the studies of European, national and regional identities of ethnic minorities in European borderlands (Edited by Prof. Claire Wallace and Dr. Natalia Patsiurko)
2. Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities among the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (main results of ENRI-East empirical program) (Edited by Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich and Dr. Alexander Chvorostov)
3. ENRI-East Thematic Comparative papers and synopsizes of authored articles of ENRI-East experts (9 tender papers and further bibliography of project-related publications)

Contextual and empirical reports on ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe:
(edited by respective team leaders)

4. The Polish Minority in Belarus
5. The Slovak Minority in Hungary
6. The Russian Minority in Latvia
7. The Belarusian Minority in Lithuania
8. The Polish Minority in Lithuania
9. The Russian Minority in Lithuania
10. The Belarusian Minority in Poland
11. The Ukrainian Minority in Poland
12. The Lithuanian Minority in Russia (Kaliningrad oblast)
13. The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia
14. The Hungarian Minority in Ukraine
15. The Polish Minority in Ukraine
16. Special Case Study Germany

Series of empirical survey reports:

17. ENRI-VIS: Values and Identities Survey
    - 17-1. Methodology and implementation of ENRI-VIS (Technical report)
    - 17-2. ENRI-VIS Reference book (major cross-tabulations and coding details)
18. Qualitative sub-studies of ENRI-East project (methodological and technical reports)
    - 18-1. Methodological report on Biographical Interviews (ENRI-BIO)
    - 18-2. Methodological report on Expert Interviews and data base description (ENRI-EXI)
    - 18-3. Methodological report on the pilot study on Musical cultures and identities (ENRI-MUSIC)
    - 18-4. Methodological report and main findings of the Pilot study of web-spaces (ENRI-WEB)

ENRI-East research consortium and project details

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- University of Aberdeen (UK) (Team Leader Prof. Claire Wallace)
- Osteuropa Institut Regensburg (Germany) (Team Leader Dr. Barbara Dietz)
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- Maria Curie-Skłodowska University Lublin (Poland) (Team Leader Prof. Konrad Zieliński)

Third parties and consultants contributed to the ENRI-East project:

- Sociological agency FOCUS, Slovakia (Dr. Sylvia Šumšalová, Dr. Ivan Dianiška)
- Sociological agency GfK Polonia (Dr. Beata Steczowicz)
- Robert B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, Warsaw University (team led by Prof. Renata Siemienska)

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Project Website:

www.enri-east.net

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For further information on the Socio Economic Sciences and Humanities programme in FP7 see:
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ssh/home_en.html
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/index_en.html

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INTRODUCTION

Alexander Chvorostov

This volume in the series of ENRI-East project reports contains five comparative papers and synopses of four further articles discussing various aspects of identity formation and identities interactions in Easter Europe. The full papers are the working reports that provide the "first-sight" analysis, while the synopses stand for shorter presentation of papers that are being submitted as full-text publications, chapters or articles to various books, monographs and journals.

These none papers are based on the newly gathered empirical data obtained in the course project's programme of cross-country sociological surveys, which data are put in comparative contexts of two-fold nature. First, the authors compare satiations with different ethnic minorities in different countries and secondly, the new project data are compared with similar sociological data collected in the course of previous international and national surveys (such as Eurobarometer, European Social Survey, European Values Survey and other).

The full papers include the following items:

- **Emigration potential and identity among the national minorities in the Eastern borderzone of the EU** (written by Prof. Endre Sik);
- **Discrimination experience and identity among the national minorities in the Eastern borderzone of the EU** (written by Prof. Endre Sik);
- **Constructing Border Ethnic identities along the Eastern Borderland of Europe** (written by Prof. Maria Székelyi and Prof. Antal Örkény);
- **Diasporas in Europe's boundary regions: characteristics of general trust and trust in institutions** (written Prof. Maria Székelyi and Prof. Antal Örkény);
- **European Identity among Young People in Eastern and Central Europe** (written by Dr. Natalia Waechter and Dr. Evgenia Samoilova)

The synopses of the forthcoming publications include:

- **Identities and Music: Identity of Place and Cultural Identities of Generations: Hungarian 3G Case Study (2011)** (written by Dr. Lyudmila Nurse and Prof. Endre Sik, in: Cultures and/of Globalization. Eds.: Barrie Axford and Richard Huggins, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 171-201);
- **Music in the Identities of Ethnic Slovaks in Hungary (2011)** (written by Dr. Lyudmila nurse, in: Slovak Journal of Political Sciences, Volume 11, 2011, No3, pp. 249-266);
- **Deconstructing European identity: the impact of the media on ethnic minorities' identity formation in Eastern Europe** (written by Dr. Lyudmila Nurse, Prof. Endre Sik, Anna Gibson and Rachel Surányi, abstract submitted to Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity);
- **Identity feelings among Central and East European Ethnic Groups** (written by Dr. Victor Cebotari, forthcoming in United Nations University working papers/European Journal of Political Research)

- **Nations between the States: the effect of cross-cutting and nested forms of dual ethnic identification on allegiance of minority group members to receiving country** (written by Natalia Tchistiakova, forthcoming in: Twenty years later (1991-2011): the reshaping of space and identity and in: Identities. Global Studies in Culture and Power)

All contributions included into this volume have been written by ENRI-East experts, selected in the course the restricted tender among the project participants.

The Tender Committee has been established to secure highest quality for the projects' internal international comparative research.

The Tender Committee consisted of the Chair, two Vice-Chairs, and the Tender Secretary.

- **Prof. Christian Haerpfer** – Chair of TC, Head of ENRI-East Advisory Board
- **Prof. Antal Örkény** (TARKI) – Vice-Chair
- **Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich** (IHS/ICEUR) – Vice-Chair
- **Tender Secretary:** Pauline Oberthaler (IHS-Vienna)

The Tender Committee has internally published a call for papers for comparative analysis. The applications have been evaluated twice with the help of the following evaluators as nominated by the Tender Committee:

- **Dr. Alexander Chvorostov** (IHS-Vienna, Austria)
- **Prof. David Rotman** (BSU, Belarus)
- **Dr. Alexander Gasparishvili** (MSU, Russia)
- **Prof. Arvydays Matulionis** (ISR, Lithuania)
- **Prof. Claire Wallace** (University of Aberdeen, UK)
- **Dr. Barbara Dietz** (OSI, Germany)
- **Dr. Florian Pichler** (Vienna University, Austria)

1 PART ONE: WORKING PAPERS

Endre Sik

1.1 Emigration Potential and Identity among the National Minorities in the Eastern Borderzone of the EU

1.1.1 Abstract

Emigration potential can be considered as a proxy of identity-politics of the individual, i.e. the strength of belonging to the majority "at home" (integrated or assimilated identity) would decrease the probability of planning emigration versus to belonging to the majority "back home" (quasi-diaspora identity), would increase the likelihood of planning emigration "back home".

Following a brief theoretical introduction and a description of basic migration potential trends in the region in the course of transformation, the paper would compare the volume and the directions of emigration potential among the twelve minorities along the Eastern border of the EU.

The next section contains a logistic regression model with strong emigration potential (i.e. the probability of those who "definitely" want to emigrate) as dependent variable. The core questions of this chapter are: What determines the probability of emigration potential? After controlling for the standard control variables would identity still have a significant role in this process?

In the last section we defined a direction-sensitive form of emigration potential, i.e. split the target countries into two types: home country (a neighbor country where the minority is in majority) and non-home countries (the rest of the world). We assume that identity will have different impact on these two types of emigration potential. The regression models (otherwise identical with the general model) tests whether there is a fit between the mental map (as a "direction of identity") and the direction of emigration potential,

- those with stronger quasi- diaspora identity would be more likely to have emigration plans orienting towards "Home",
- those without quasi-diaspora identity will have a wider and more complex mental map, and will be more likely to choose non-home countries as target of their emigration potential.

1.1.2 The definition and the conceptual basis of emigration potential

The definition of migration potential is simple: the volume of those who intend to migrate[1]. Unsurprisingly to measure migration potential is equally trivial, i.e. the proportion of those planning migration in a given population. Of course when adapting this general definition and applying this simple measurement technique in a concrete situation (as Annex 1 illustrates) there are di-

[1] There are quite a few analyses of migration potential but hardly any author bother to define the phenomenon. The only (and rather awkward) migration potential definition I found is from the late 1940ies: „Migration potential might be defined as that volume of migration that might be expected if existing obstacles to migration were removed" (Julius, 1949).

verse forms of migration potential survey techniques. These techniques offer various solutions to solve the following problems of operationalisation[2]:

- The type of the migration can significantly influence the results. For example labor migration potential differs from emigration potential, i.e. different social groups on the basis of entirely different reasons might decide to work abroad or move into a different country.
- The wording of the migration potential question might bias the results. In Appendix 1 for example we find "seriously consider", "personally interested", "thought of", "ever considered" or "plan" to work or to move, to emigrate or to settle in abroad. To maximize the validity of a migration potential survey the researcher should select wording which increase the probability that the embryonic forms of migration decisions and not mere dreams are caught by the applied technique.
- To further increase the level of predictive power, i.e. to make sure that the result of the migration potential technique is a good predictor of the migration intentions the researchers have developed several additional filtering techniques. The aim of these filters is twofold: to minimize the probability that "dreams" appear instead of "plans", and to make possible the differentiation of various subtypes of migration movements. For example[3]:

Fassmann and Hintermann (1997) defined three forms of migration potential to differentiate between a "very general desire" for migration and a "probable migration decision"[4]. They used three questions:

- I have thought of going abroad.
- I have at least gathered information about the target country in question.
- I have already applied for a residence permit or a work permit.

On the basis of these proxies they defined three levels of migration potential: "The general migration potential comprises all people who answered yes to the first question (i.e. those people who merely declare a desire to migrate without taking any further steps in this direction). The probable migration potential sums up all those who answered yes to the second question. Those who gave a positive answer to the third question and thus have begun to make their migration a reality are eventually comprised in the real migration potential." (Fassmann-Hintermann, 1997 p.61)

- An alternative solution is based on the assumption that shorter and longer labor migration decisions might cover different social strata (Sik, 1992-2010, IOM, 1998, Hárs, 2004).
- Another solution to differentiate between dreams and plans is when we assume that if the potential migrant have a clear idea in regard with timing and destination their mi-

[2] Whatever filtering solution is used the methodology to increase the level of validity and reliability migration potential survey based research cannot offer theoretically or methodologically more than a weak prediction of the behavior of the supply side of the labor market. And this is far from being enough if we accept that labor migration is more a demand side than a supply side driven phenomenon.

[3] For more examples see Appendix 1

[4] Similar solution was used by IOM, 1998 ad Hárs, 2004.

gration potential is more likely a plan (versus a dream) than those without such knowledge (Sik, 1992-2010, IOM, 1998, Hárs, 2004).

- Krieger and Maitre (2006) used a technique to control both timing and spatiality to filtering out "weak" decisions. The questions they applied was as follows:

> "Do you intend to go, to live and work—for a few months or for several years—in a current European Union country in the next five years?"

In order to control the validity of the answers to this question and to construct the indicator on the general intention to migrate, they combined the results of this question with the results of questions which measure the intention of regional mobility in the next five years by moving to any place outside the same city, town or village. The firmness of the migration intention was two further tested by adding two more indicators, i.e. a question to learn the readiness of regional mobility into the EU15 and by measuring the willingness to live in a country with a foreign language.

In the ENRI survey we used an approach which focused only to emigration decision and as far as the wording of the question is concerned we made sure that such a decision is not restricted by the lack of resources (Annex 2).

With this approach we intended to maximize the probability that we measure the pre-requisites of emigration decisions instead of dreams and desires. The same was our intention when in the analysis we focus only on the strong version of this decision (i.e. only those respondents were considered as potential migrants who chose the "would definitely leave" alternative (item 1 in Box 1).

We restricted our analysis only to emigration. The reason of it (or in other word to ignore the labor market mobility oriented approach which is the standard migration potential approach (see Appendix 1)) was that our approach was based on the assumption that emigration potential is a proxy of identity-politics of the individual. We assumed that while those who strongly belong to the host nation (integrated identity) would not plan emigration, those who strongly belong to the mother nation (Quasi-diaspora identity) would want to emigrate "back home".

1.1.3 Emigration potential in Europe

As a first step to offer a context for the analysis of emigration potential among national minorities along Eastern border of the EU we introduce the emigration potential results of various migration potential surveys from the 1990ies.

Figure 1 shows that immediately after the collapse of communism the previously more open buffer zone countries had the highest emigration potential. Emigration seemed to be a "mission impossible" for countries with more closed societies during communism, i.e. without information, network, and human capital (such as language, optimism, self-esteem, etc.) emigration was not an option.

Figure 1: Emigration potential in the early-1990ies



Source: Brym, 1992

Some years later in the aftermath of the transformation the emigration potential in Poland and in post-Soviet countries (i.e. in East Europe) was significantly higher than in East Central Europe.

Figure 2: Emigration potential in the mid-1990ies



Source: from Wallace, 1998

The pre- and post-accession comparative EU migration potential and mobility surveys in the EU15 countries showed that the emigration potential in the Baltic countries and in Poland was significantly higher than those in East Central Europe (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Emigration potential in some East European EU countries[5]



Source: Haug, 2005, Mobility … 2006, Bonin et al, 2008

The results of the most recent worldwide emigration potential researches are not accessible for the research community but the index based on these surveys (Figure 4) indicates that the emigration potential in the Baltic countries is likely to be high.

Figure 4: The potential net migration index[6] in the ENRI countries[7]



Source: Gallup 2008

To sum up, we assume that if the national minorities' emigration potential is conditioned by the attitudes and practices of the majorities around them than the migration potential of minorities in Slovakia and Hungary should be lower compared to that of those in Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.

[5] The 2004 (Mobility, 2006) and 2007 (Bonin et al, 2008) data include all forms of migration intentions within five years.

[6] The potential net migration index measures the estimated number of adults who express their wishes to move permanently out of a country subtracted from the estimated number who would like to move into it and calculated as a proportion from the total adult population. Results are based on aggregated telephone and face-to-face interviews with 401,490 adults, aged 15 and older, in 146 countries from 2008 to 2010. http://www.gallup.com/poll/148559/One-Five-First-Generation-Migrants-Keep-Moving.aspx

[7] The wording of the Gallup migration potential question was as follows: "Ideally if you had the opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country? If Yes: To which country would you like to move?

1.1.4 Emigration potential of national minorities along the Eastern borderzone of the EU

Map 1 shows the raw differences of the level of emigration potential of twelve minorities in eight countries. First analyzing the inter-region and inter-country differences[8] we find that

- the emigration potential in the Baltic countries is higher than in the East- and East Central European countries, and
- in general in East Europe emigration potential is higher than in Central Eastern Europe.

These differences are in association with some basic socio-demographic characteristics of the countries proper. The selected indicators are the life expectancy (at birth)[9], GDP/capita[10] and the HDI[11]. The assumption is that the lower the ranking of a country has on these scales the higher is the development level and potential, the standard of living, etc. If we assume that these macro-level conditions influence the individual emigration potential decisions than we assume that the weaker "push" factors decrease the level of emigration potential.

Figure 5: The rank order of some selected economic and social contextual variables in countries along the Baltic, East- and Central East European EU border*



* The lower rank means higher level of the index.

Comparing these rankings with the country level aggregated emigration potential (Figure 2 and 3) we can conclude that while the low level of emigration potential in Slovakia and Hungary fits to the assumption, this is less the case with Poland where the emigration potential is high despite the good performance of the country. This deviation can be explained by historical facts and its consequences such as the frequent changes of the Polish border due to the turbulent history of the region and the emergence of a large Polish Diaspora.

[8] We are aware of the inbuilt bias of this approach, i.e. we use the historical-demographic differences to „explain" the different emigration potential levels but ignore the fact that the similar level of emigration potential might be based on entirely different historico-demographic bases as well.

[9] http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/

[10] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28PPP%29_per_capita

[11] http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/

Turning our attention to the within-country differences among national minorities (Map 1)

- in Poland Ukrainians have higher emigration potential than Byelorussians: this might be caused partially by the differences between the two national minorities for example while the former is large and spatially spread, the latter is small and very concentrated[12] literally on the other side of the border of Byelorussia[13], i.e. unlike the Ukrainians the Byelorussians form a more or less existing local society in the vicinity of "back home" [14],
- in Lithuania Byelorussians and Russians have higher emigration potential than Poles, perhaps because of the small size and bilinguality of the Byelorussians, and the large and urban Russian minority which has strong attachment to their language "back home"[15], while at the same time Poles form a big majority living close to each other, to the capital as well as to Poland[16],[17], i.e. Byelorussians are too weak to form a stable community, the big Russian minority is too urban and belong to much to "back home" to form a minority community unlike the Poles who have perfect spatial situation as well as a population enough to form a community-like minority,
- in Ukraine Poles have higher emigration potential than Hungarians, which might be explained by the fact that while both minorities are small and linguistically and religion-wise differ from the majority population, the Poles are a rather dispersed minority with a historically determined controversial relation with the Ukrainian state, the Hungarian minority is a very concentrated (in a small western region of Ukraine just on the other side of the Hungarian border) minority, and became part of Ukraine only some decades ago and almost without exception they speak Hungarian[18].

Finally, comparing the level of emigration potential among national minorities across countries we find that

- Russians have high emigration potential both in Latvia and in Lithuania: in Latvia there is as big and urban as well as dominantly Russian speaking community[19] as in Lithuania but their sociopolitical situation is much worse[20] than Russians have in Lithuania,
- the small and dispersed Byelorussians in Lithuania have significantly higher emigration potential than those living in Poland (concentrated and closed to "back home",

12 http://countrystudies.us/poland/31.htm

13 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNGEGN/docs/26th-gegn-docs/WP/WP23_Minority%20place%20names%20in%20Poland.pdf

14 To minimize the bias of using the standard terms (sending country and receiving country) of migration research to our cases (in which cases more often than nor the minority situation was not created by migration) we use the term „back home" to identify a neighbour country where the said minority is in majority position and „at home" the identify the country the minority currently resides.

15 http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/languages/langmin/euromosaic/lith2_en.html

16 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/11/Poles_in_Lithuania_Barry_Kent.png

17 http://www.minorityrights.org/4983/lithuania/poles.html

18 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarians_in_Ukraine

19 http://www.russkije.lv/files/images/text/rusinlat-buklet-en.pdf

20 http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/languages/langmin/euromosaic/lat_en.pdf

- Poles have higher emigration potential in Lithuania and in Ukraine than in Byelorussia (perhaps since they live very close to the Polish border and emigration is difficult from contemporary Byelorussia[21]), and
- Hungarians in Ukraine have much higher emigration potential than in Slovakia where a significantly larger (but as concentrated and living as close to the Hungarian border as is the case in Ukraine) with very developed political and educational infrastructure but under the pressure of significantly less "push" factors[22].

Map 1: Emigration potential of national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)*



* National minorities: Russians in Latvia, Byelorussians, Polish and Russian in Lithuania, Lithuanian in Kaliningrad Region (Russia), Polish in Byelorussia, Byelorussian and Ukrainian in Poland, Polish and Hungarian in Ukraine, Hungarian is Slovakia, Slovak in Hungary.

As to the direction of emigration potential, still on a descriptive level we see (Map 2) that

- while Poles in Ukraine forming a rather dispersed minority with a historically determined controversial relation with the Ukrainian state) would move "back home", those in Lithuania (mostly urban and educated) would prefer to go somewhere else in the EU,
- Russians both in Latvia and in Lithuania are more keen to move to another EU country than to Russia, and
- Byelorussians in Lithuania are divided into an almost equally large "pro-EU" and a "pro-home" group.

[21] http://www.minorityrights.org/4672/belarus/poles.html

[22] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarians_in_Slovakia

Map 2: Directions of emigration potential of national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (the proportion of those who would move "back home" (indicated by an arrow) or to another European country (in brackets), %)*



* National minorities with number of cases above 100: Russians in Latvia, Byelorussians, Polish and Russians in Lithuania, Polish in Ukraine.

Those cases when quasi-Diaspora[23] dominated emigration potential is especially large (Poles in Ukraine and Byelorussians in Lithuania) we assume that the socio-demographic characteristics of potential emigrants will sharply differ from the other types of potential emigrants.

1.1.5 The socio-demographic characteristics of emigration potential of national minorities along the Eastern borderzone of the EU24

While in the literature males usually have higher migration potential than females[25] in our case this is only true among the Poles in Byelorussia and Hungarians in Slovakia). In several other cases the emigration potential of males is higher than that of the females but the difference is not significant, and in two cases (Lithuanians in the Kaliningrad region and Russians in Lithuania) females have higher emigration potential).

[23] The term quasi-diaspora is derived from the general diaspora concept (Safran, 1999) and describes a special situation when the minority group was not created by migration but was an unintended effect of moving borders, however the sociological characteristics of the minority is very similar to that of a Diaspora (Sik-Tóth, 2003).

[24] I omitted Byelorussians in Poland and Slovaks in Hungary since the emigration potential in these two cases – not unrelated to the fact that these are extremely old populations – is very low.

[25] Though this gender bias is decreasing with the length of migration history (Massey et al, 1999)and is less pronounced in case of emigration compared to labor migration.

Table 1: The emigration potential by gender and age terciles[26] among the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU[27] (%)

			Age terciles			Total
		Males	Youngest cohort	Middle cohort	Eldest cohort	
Baltic region	Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region	5**	11	14	5	10
	Russians in Latvia	36	57**	33	11	34
	Byelorussians in Lithuania	38	46**	30	23	33
	Russians in Lithuania	26*	45**	32	15	31
	Polish in Lithuania	29	43**	23	9	25
Eastern Europe	Ukrainians in Poland	12	25*	16	8	15
	Polish in Byelorussia	15*	23*	6	5	11
	Polish in Ukraine	28	40**	28	18	27
East Central Europe	Hungarians in Ukraine	22	30*	18	13	21
	Hungarians in Slovakia	11**	14**	7	2	8

* = chi-square significant between 0.01 – 0.05, ** = chi-square significant below 0.009.

As to the emigration potential of the age cohorts, there is no exception from the rule, i.e. the eldest cohort has the lowest, and the youngest cohort has the highest emigration potential[28].

As Table 2 illustrates, human capital as an asset and economic inactivity as an obstacle significantly influence the level of emigration potential.

[26] Age tercile: national minority specific three age groups of equal size.

[27] In the following tables we use the standard ENRI regional grouping accept that while Poles in Ukraine were classified as East-European, Hungarians were put into the East Central European group of nationalities. The reason of this decision was based on the territorial distribution of the two minorities in Ukraine. As was already shown the Poles in Ukraine are distributed in several regions in the central and Western regions of Ukraine, the Hungarian minority is concentrated only in some small units in the most western part of West Ukraine.

[28] While it is a commonplace that the level of migration potential is decreasing with age, this is the least trivial in case of emigration which excludes usually labor migration but includes family unification and retirement mobility, i.e. forms of migrations which are less determined by age.

Table 2: The emigration potential by education, previous and current economic activity among the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

	Language		Education			Had been unemployed	Economic activity				Total
	Speaks English	Speaks German	Primary	Secondary	Higher		Active	Inactive	Unemployed	Retired	
Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region	20*	(25)**	7	12	9	12	12	(13)	X	(6)	10
Russians in Latvia	51**	46*	20	38	32	42**	40**	57	43	12	34
Byelorussians in Lithuania	39	29	X	34	32	39*	28**	X	(52)	(27)	33
Russians in Lithuania	44**	35	33	29	35	36**	36**	37	45	17	31
Polish in Lithuania	51**	26	12	28	34	29*	31**	40	44	10	25
Ukrainians in Poland	24*	X	10	19	18	16	19**	29	12	6	15
Polish in Byelorussia	17	X	5	13	13	17*	12**	26	X	6	11
Polish in Ukraine	46	32	14	28	33	34*	37**	(26)	X	15	27
Hungarians in Ukraine	(33)	X	X	19	28	26	25	21	22	14	21
Hungarians in Slovakia	13*	13*	9	8	9	10*	8**	(18)	16	2	8

X = number of cases below 40, ( ) = number of cases between 41-80,* = chi-square significant between 0.01 – 0.05, ** = chi-square significant below 0.009.

While the command of the two languages which are the most useful on the EU labor market is often associated with high emigration potential, the level of education is not. There are only minor differences among the national minorities:

- the emigration potential of those with secondary education is higher than those with higher education among the Lithuanians in the Kaliningrad region and Russians in Latvia but
- the opposite is the case among Russians and Poles in Lithuania, and Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine.

Previous unemployment spells usually (and often significantly) increase the level of emigration potential, and current unemployment or inactivity has similar effect. The opposite case is retirement. The explanation is trivial, while the unemployed and inactive population has a very uncertain future "at home", the pensioners have a certain (though not necessarily prosperous) financial basis "at home"[29]. The emigration potential of the active population falls usually between that of the inactive-unemployed and the retired but among the Poles and Hungarians in Ukraine they are the more ready to emigrate than any other economic activity group.

[29] And only „at home" since though pensions can be transferred usually it is not a viable option for ordinary people.

While previous and current labor market difficulties increases the probability of emigration potential, the lack of wealth and low social status do not. On the contrary, in some cases (e.g. Russians in Latvia, Polish in Lithuania, Hungarians in Ukraine) the lack of wealth and low social status decreases, the opposites (greater wealth and higher social status) increases the probability of emigration potential significantly.

Another common place in the sociological literature of migration is that network capital increases the probability of migration potential (Massey et al, 1999). Table 3 indicates that while among the national minorities to have friends or other types of "weak ties" "back home" usually is associated with above-the-average emigration potential, it is not the case having relatives "back home".

Table 3: The emigration potential by various network capital dimensions among the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

		Relatives "back home"	Friends "back home"	Other acquaintances "back home"	Total
Baltic region	Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region	11	13	17**	10
	Russians in Latvia	36	41**	35	34
	Byelorussians in Lithuania	33	35*	40**	33
	Russians in Lithuania	33	34	32	31
	Polish in Lithuania	28	29	30	25
Eastern Europe	Ukrainians in Poland	16	25**	23	15
	Polish in Byelorussia	12	20**	19*	11
	Polish in Ukraine	30	35**	36*	27
East Central Europe	Hungarians in Ukraine	22	29**	35**	21
	Hungarians in Slovakia	7	10	13	8

* = chi-square significant between 0.01 – 0.05, ** = chi-square significant below 0.009.

Finally, the social milieu of the national minorities usually have significant role in determining the probability of emigration potential.

Table 4: The emigration potential by various social milieu dimensions among the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

		Low tension	High tension	Lot of tension between wealthy and poor	Lot of tension between majority and national minority	Membership in ethnic NGO	Had discrimination experience	Total
Baltic region	Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region	5**	(7)	11	X	X	X	10
	Russians in Latvia	20**	48**	40**	57**	X	49**	34
	Byelorussians in Lithuania	25**	(63)**	43**	X	31	(40)	33
	Russians in Lithuania	22**	45**	37**	56**	X	45**	31
	Polish in Lithuania	14**	31**	31**	36**	(24)	29	25
Eastern Europe	Ukrainians in Poland	10*	15	13*	X	(22)	(25)*	15
	Polish in Byelorussia	11	(11)	10	X	X	X	11
	Polish in Ukraine	23	(34)	29	X	34*	X	27
East Central Europe	Hungarians in Ukraine	(19)	(28)*	33**	26	19	40**	21
	Hungarians in Slovakia	5*	13**	10	19**	X	16**	8

X = number of cases below 40, * = chi-square significant between 0.01 – 0.05, ** = chi-square significant below 0.009.

The higher the level of social and ethnic tension respondents perceive, the higher is the emigration potential, and in case low tension the emigration potential is low as well. This association is, however, rather weak among minorities in the East European region. As to the cause of tension, the high level of tension between majority and minority usually increases emigration potential more than the tension between the wealthy and the poor (the only exception being Hungarians in Ukraine). Of course not only the perception of tension but the experience of discrimination increases the probability of emigration potential significantly as well.

Membership in ethnic NGOs do not have significant effect on emigration potential except the Polish in Ukraine.

Focusing on the direction of emigration potential (Map 2) we find that quasi-diaspora emigration potential is high among females and the elderly.

Table 5: The quasi-diaspora emigration potential by gender and age terciles among the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

		Gender	Age terciles			
		Male	Youngest cohort	Middle cohort	Eldest cohort	Total
Eastern Europe	Russians in Latvia (N=253)	32	30**	(31)	(54)	34
	Russians in Lithuania (N=232)	(30)	11**	(35)	(61)	28
	Byelorussians in Lithuania (N=120)	(29)**	(24)**	(50)	(77)	44
	Polish in Lithuania (N=186)	(18)	14**	(34)	(48)	24
East Central Europe	Polish in Byelorussia (N=86)	(33)**	(46)	X	X	52
	Polish in Ukraine (N=103)	(63)	(57)	X	X	67

X = number of cases below 40, ( ) = number of cases between 41-80, * = chi-square significant between 0.01 – 0.05, ** = chi-square significant below 0.009.

While the association between quasi-diaspora emigration potential and gender does not deviate from the general pattern, the association between age cohorts and emigration potential differs from it, i.e. the trend that elderly people are more likely to emigrate "back home" indicates a desire of "nostalgia emigration" in the form of post-retirement mobility[30].

Contrary to emigration potential in general, quasi-diaspora emigration potential negatively correlates with the ability to command English language, i.e. those who speak English (or Russians in Lithuania German) are not likely to emigrate "back home".

Similar to emigration potential in general previous unemployment experience increases the probability of quasi-diaspora emigration potential. The strongest is the impact among Russians in Latvia and in Lithuania where inactivity and unemployment (or retirement in the latter case) significantly increases the probability of quasi-diaspora emigration potential. Moreover, the poorer and the lower status the respondent has the more likely quasi-diaspora emigration potential is.

All three forms of network capital increase slightly the probability of quasi-diaspora emigration potential. The only difference compared to emigration potential in general is that having relatives "back home" increases the probability of quasi-Diaspora emigration potential[31].

Due to the small sample size the role of social milieu cannot be analyzed properly but among Russians in Latvia and Lithuania emigration "back home" is higher among those who experienced discrimination, and those Poles in Lithuania who perceive higher tension has higher quasi-diaspora emigration potential as well.

1.1.6 Identity and emigration potential among national minorities along the Eastern borderzone of the EU

We use two proxies to analyze national/ethnic identity: self-definition and belongingness. The former identity proxy is based on a single question the respondent should define her/himself as

[30] For example while 28% of Russians in Lithuania have plans to go „back home", 63% of the pensioners would do the same.

[31] The association is the most significant is among Russians in Latvia.

any three identities of several identity elements, the belongingness proxy expresses the overlapping attitudes toward various ethnic communities (Annex 2) [32].

As to the relative strength of the three potential directions of belongingness (Table 6) we find that the typical structure is a high level of belongingness to both national minority and to the majority "at home", i.e. "assimilated minority" status with Europe being significantly less important. This is the case among Slovaks in Hungary (with emphasis on belonging to the national minority), Poles in Ukraine and Byelorussia (with emphasis on belonging to the majority "at home"), Ukrainians in Poland, Poles and Russians in Lithuania, and Russians in Latvia. The deviations from tis general trend are the Hungarians in Slovakia with a dominant national minority identity, and the balanced level of belongingness in all three directions among Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region and Byelorussians in Lithuania.

Table 6: The belongingness and self—identity among ten national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

		Belongingness to				Self-defined as member of		
		National minority	Majority "at home"	Majority "back home"	Europe	National minority	Majority "at home"	Europe
Baltic region	Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region	21	20	21	6	30	15	7
	Russians in Latvia	36	32	12	5	26	12	4
	Byelorussians in Lithuania	20	28	23	5	36	27	19
	Russians in Lithuania	32	37	15	5	28	20	11
	Poles in Lithuania	41	45	12	4	53	18	10
Eastern Europe	Ukrainians in Poland	45	44	34	19	56	16	14
	Poles in Byelorussia	36	56	18	9	58	36	4
	Poles in Ukraine	58	67	47	27	42	25	10
East Central Europe	Hungarians in Ukraine	58	31	31	22	53	5	6
	Hungarians in Slovakia	69	43	33	27	53	21	14

The structure of self-identification is very similar in all cases: national minority status dominates, followed by the majority "at home", and Europe trailing behind (except among Hungarians in Ukraine among whom Europe is as insignificant as the majority "at home"). The level of belongingness to Europe, however, is much higher among minorities in Eastern and East Central Euro-

[32] Since these two identity proxies are not the main targets of our analysis (i.e. we do not use them as dependent variables of the models only as explanatory variables which we assume that influence the level of emigration potential) we restrict the analysis to some basic conclusions.

pean countries than those in the Baltic region (though in these cases the other three forms of ethnic identity belongingness are less important as well).

As to the structure of identity proxies (on the basis of a Pearson-correlation coefficient table in Annex 3), the typical association among the identity proxies is weak positive correlation. From this it follows that there is no competition (let alone enmity) among the four directions of belongingness and the three directions of self-identification. In other words, national/ethnic identity, quasi-diaspora identity and assimilated identity live in peaceful co-existence among the national minorities along the eastern border of the EU.

There are, however, negative correlations among the identity proxies such as,

- self-identification with Europe usually is uncorrelated with all other identity proxies, however, among Byelorussians in Lithuania belonging to Europe negatively correlates with the probability of defining yourself as member of the ethnic community,
- among Poles in Ukraine those who belong "back home" are less likely to self-identify themself with the majority "at home",
- among Poles in Lithuania there are two negative associations but in both cases the minority identity is the cause of the inconsistency: belonging to the minority negatively correlates with self-identity "at home", and self-identity with minority negatively associates with European identity,
- among Poles in Byelorussia again it is the minority identity that does not fit well with other identity elements: self-identification with minority negatively associates with belongingness and self-identification "at home".

Turning our attention to the interrelation between identity and emigration potential, the first conclusion we can draw from Table 7 is that there are different forms of interaction between emigration potential and identity among the ten national minorities, i.e. there seem to be no general pattern as to how these two social phenomena are interrelated. The main types are as follows:

- Defining and feeling oneself as part of the majority "at home" (i.e. being assimilated) decreases emigration potential – Russians in Latvia, Poles in Byelorussia and in Ukraine, and Hungarians in Slovakia,
- Feeling and defining oneself as European (i.e. European citizenship attitude) increases emigration potential – Poles and Byelorussians in Lithuania,
- Being and feeling both European and part of the majority "back home" (i.e. denying assimilation from both alternative perspectives (quasi-Diaspora and Europe) increases emigration potential - Lithuanians in the Kaliningrad region and Russians in Lithuania, Ukrainians in Poland, and Hungarians in Ukraine[33].

[33] This is the only national minority where belonging to the national minority community significantly increases the probability of emigration potential.

Table 7: The emigration potential by various identity dimensions among the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

		Self-defined ethnicity			Belongingness				Total
		National minority	Majority "at home"	Europe	National minority	Majority "at home"	Majority "back home"	Europe	
Baltic region	Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region	14	(6)	X	14	12	16*	20*	10
	Russians in Latvia	32	21**	36	31	22**	33	34	34
	Byelorussians in Lithuania	31	32	(43)*	32	23*	38	39	33
	Russians in Lithuania	31	27	50**	34	28	42**	39	31
	Poles in Lithuania	20**	17*	(39)**	28	25	38**	(52)**	25
Eastern Europe	Ukrainians in Poland	18	(9)	(27)*	17	13	22*	20	15
	Poles in Byelorussia	11	7**	X	8*	8**	14	11	11
	Poles in Ukraine	26	11**	X	25	25	33*	29	27
East Central Europe	Hungarians in Ukraine	(21)	X	X	26**	17	31**	31*	21
	Hungarians in Slovakia	7	4*	9	7	5*	8	11	8

X = number of cases below 40, ( ) = number of cases between 41-80, * = chi-square significant between 0.01 – 0.05, ** = chi-square significant below 0.009.

Defining and feeling oneself as member of the national minority and belonging to the majority "back home" almost without exception increases the probability of quasi-diaspora emigration potential.

Table 8: The quasi-diaspora emigration potential by various identity dimensions among the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

		Self-defined ethnicity			Belongingness				Total
		National minority	Majority "at home"	Europe	National minority	Majority "at home"	Majority "back home"	Europe	
Eastern Europe	Russians in Latvia (N=253)	(43)	X	X	(41)	(40)	(62)**	X	34
	Russians in Lithuania (N=232)	36	(33)	(19)	(37)*	(22)	(51)**	X	28
	Byelorussians in Lithuania (N=120)	(52)	X	X	X	X	X	X	44
	Poles in Lithuania (N=186)	(40)**	X	X	(30)	(32)*	X	X	24
East Central Europe	Poles in Byelorussia (N=86)	(52)	X	X	X	X	X	X	52
	Poles in Ukraine (N=103)	(76)	X	X	(71)	(64)	(72)	X	67

X = number of cases below 40, ( ) = number of cases between 41-80, * = chi-square significant between 0.01 – 0.05, ** = chi-square significant below 0.009.

1.1.7 The general model: The role of identity in the creation of emigration potential

This section contains a logistic regression model with strong emigration potential (i.e. the probability of those who "definitely" want to emigrate) as dependent variable. The core questions of this chapter are: What determines the probability of emigration potential? Would after controlling for the standard control variables identity still have a significant role in this process?

The control variables are assumed to cover those socio-demographic and contextual features of the individuals that according to the literature of migration potential might significantly influence the decision to emigrate or not. A brief overview of the role of the control variables (Annex 4 Table 4.1) confirms that they play their role as expected in case of more than one national minority:

- the young are more, the old less likely to develop emigration plans than the middle-age cohort,
- unemployment, experiencing high level of tension or discrimination as push factors increase the probability of having emigration potential,
- command of English language as human and having friends or other forms of "weak ties" "back home"[34] as resources (making the emigration less risky) increase the probability of emigration,
- perceiving yourself to belong to the high class decreases the level of emigration potential. [35]

Controlling for the impact of all variables above, Figure 2 (based on Annex 4 Table 4.1) shows the impact of identity on the probability of emigration potential. The first conclusion we can draw is that identity variables have significant impact on the probability of emigration potential in case of all five national minorities.

The general characteristic of this impact is that quasi-diasporic experience increases the probability of emigration potential, i.e. belongingness to "back home" increases, belongingness to or defining yourself as the citizen "at home" decreases the probability of emigration potential.

There are, however, "minority specific" impacts of certain identity elements as well:

- among Russians in Lithuania defining yourself as European increases the probability of emigration potential,
- defining yourself as member of the national minority among Poles in Lithuania and feeling Polish in Ukraine decrease the probability of emigration potential.

[34] But among Russians in Lithuania having relatives „back home" decreases the probability of migration potential.

[35] As well as having low status among Russians in Lithuania.

Figure 6: The odds ratios of identity proxies in defining the probability of emigration potential among the members of five ethnic minorities along the eastern borders of the EU (based on the models in Annex 4 Table 4.1)



1.1.8 The specific model: The role of identity in defining the direction of emigration potential

The analysis of the role of identity variables in the general model showed the strong role of quasi-diasporic identity elements in defining the probability of emigration potential. However in the general model emigration potential was operationalised as a multidirectional phenomenon, i.e. countries all over the world were considered as potential targets.

In this section we defined a direction-sensitive form of emigration potential, i.e. we split the target countries into two types: “back home” country (a neighbor country where the minority is in majority status) and non-home countries (the rest of the world). We assume that the role of different aspects of the identity will have different impact on these two types of emigration potential. The regression models (otherwise identical with the general model) tests whether there is a fit between the mental map (as a “direction of identity”) and the direction of emigration potential,

- those with stronger quasi- diaspora identity would be more likely to have emigration plans orienting towards “Home”,
- those without quasi-diaspora identity will have a spatially wider mental map, and will be more likely to choose non-home countries as target of their emigration potential.

The differences between “back home” and non-home country oriented emigration potential can be recognized already by the differences the control variables influence the probability of emigration potential (the lower block of Annex 4 Table 4.2), i.e. there are different social groups in the three national minority groups who are ready to move “back home” and who are more likely to emigrate to “the rest of the world”:

- among Russians in Latvia while unemployment, discrimination experience and network capital (strong ties) “back home”(i.e. a combination of push and pull factors) increases the probability of “back home” country emigration potential, non-home country emigration potential is more likely among those who feel themselves poor and low

class, experience some tension and do not have the similar strong tie type network capital "back home" (i.e. only "general" push factors are in force).

- among Russians in Lithuania "back home" country oriented emigration potential is unlikely among the young, and those with human capital and high social class perception, non-home country oriented potential emigrants are those ready for the EU labor market, i.e. unemployed, English speaking females (who are not "pushed" abroad by high social tension).
- Finally, Poles in Lithuania are more likely to go "back home" if they are not young or poor but those with high human capital are likely to have non-home country emigration potential.

Even after controlling for the demographic and capital factors as well as for socio-economic milieu, identity has strong and minority specific impact on "back home" oriented emigration potential (Figure 7)

- Among Russians in Latvia and in Lithuania "going home" is more likely among those with quasi-diasporic identity but with different combination. While in the first case those who feel they belong to "back home" as well as define themselves as member of their national minority community, among Russians in Lithuania belonging both to the minority and to the sending country increase the probability of home-country oriented emigration potential.
- Among Polish in Lithuania, however, a completely different (and unexplainable) structure emerges, belonging to "at home" and defining yourself as member of the minority increase the probability of "back home" oriented emigration potential.

Figure 7: The odd ratios of the identity variables in defining the probability of "back home" directed emigration potential among the members of three ethnic minorities along the eastern borders of the EU (based on the model in the first block of Annex 4 Table 4.2 Section I)



As to non-home country oriented emigration potential (Figure 8), quasi-diaspora identity elements (in case of Russians in Latvia belonging to "back home" and self-definition of minority membership, in case of Russians in Lithuania belonging to the minority and to the sending country) decrease the probability of non-home oriented emigration potential. Non-quasi diasporic identity elements increase the probability of non-home oriented emigration potential – in case of

Russians in Lithuania belonging to the receiving country and to Europe, in case of Polish in Lithuania defining yourself as European.

Figure 8: The odd ratios of the identity variables in defining the probability of non-home directed emigration potential among the members of three ethnic minorities along the eastern borders of the EU (based on the model in the second block of Annex 34Table 4.2 Section II)



1.1.9 Summary

Immediately after the collapse of communism the previously more open buffer zone countries (Hungary, Poland) had the highest emigration potential. Emigration potential was lower in countries with more closed societies during communism, i.e. without information, network, and human capital (such as language, optimism, self-esteem, etc.) emigration was not an option. Some years later in the aftermath of the transformation the emigration potential in Poland and in post-Soviet countries (i.e. in East Europe) was significantly higher than in East Central Europe (Hungary, Slovakia). During and since the pre- and post-accession period among the EU15 countries the emigration potential in the Baltic countries and in Poland was significantly higher than those in East Central Europe.

Mapping the differences of the level of emigration potential of twelve minorities in eight countries we find that the emigration potential is the highest in the Baltic countries, somewhat lover in the Eastern European countries, and even lower than in Central Eastern Europe.

Comparing within-country differences among national minorities we find that in Poland Ukrainians have higher emigration potential than Byelorussians, in Lithuania Byelorussians and Russians have higher emigration potential than Poles, and in Ukraine Poles have higher emigration potential than Hungarians.

Comparing the level of emigration potential among national minorities across countries we find that Russians have high emigration potential both in Latvia and Lithuania, Byelorussians in Lithuania have significantly higher emigration potential than those in Poland, Poles have higher emigration potential in Lithuania and in Ukraine than in Byelorussia, and Hungarians in Ukraine have much higher emigration potential than in Slovakia.

Comparing the direction of emigration potential in three national minorities in three East European countries we find that while Poles in Ukraine would move “back home”, those in Lithuania

would prefer to go somewhere else in the EU, Russians both in Latvia and in Lithuania are more keen to move to another EU country than to Russia, and Byelorussians in Lithuania are divided into an almost equally large "pro-EU" and a "pro-home" group.

The core questions of our analysis are: What determines the probability of emigration potential? Would after controlling for the standard control variables identity still have a significant role in this process? To what extent would the two previous so called general) models change if we differentiate between quasi-diaspora and all other countries as potential targets of emigration potential?

The two identity proxies we use as dependent variables in our models are belongingness to and identification with national minority and majority "back home", "at home", and Europe. The typical structure of the three potential directions of belongingness is a high level of belongingness to both national minority and to the majority "at home", while belonging to the majority "back home" is somewhat, and to Europe is significantly less important. The structure self-identification is rather similar among the national minorities: national minority status dominates, followed by the majority "at home", and Europe trailing behind.

As to the structure of identity proxies, the typical association among them is weak positive correlation. From this it follows that national/ethnic identity, quasi-diaspora identity and assimilated identity live in peaceful co-existence among the national minorities along the eastern border of the EU.

There seem to be no general pattern how identity and emigration potential are interrelated. The main types are as follows:

- defining and feeling oneself as part of the majority "at home" (i.e. being assimilated) decreases emigration potential,
- feeling and defining oneself as European (i.e. European citizenship attitude) increases emigration potential
- being and feeling both European and part of the majority "back home" (i.e. denying assimilation from both alternative perspectives (quasi-Diaspora and Europe) increases emigration potential

As to quasi-diasporic emigration potential is concerned, defining and feeling oneself as member of the national minority and belonging to the majority "back home" almost without exception increases the probability of quasi-diaspora emigration potential.

With the general model we analyzed the factors influencing the probability of emigration potential identity (after controlling for the basic socio-demographic variables) significantly influenced this probability in case of all five national minorities. The general characteristic of this impact was that quasi-diasporic experience increases, assimilation/integration decreases the probability of emigration potential, i.e. belongingness to "back home" increases, belongingness to or defining yourself as the citizen "at home" decreases the probability of emigration potential. There are, however, differences in the form identity influences emigration potential:

- while among Russians in Latvia assimilation is the major factors by decreasing emigration potential, among Russians in Lithuania two different elements of identity (quasi-diaspora attitude and Europeanness) increases emigration potential,

- among Byelorussians in Lithuania the two opposite directions of belongingness (feeling close to the majority "back home" and distant to the majority "at home") have strong influence on emigration potential,
- among Poles in Lithuania and Ukraine while (as we saw in other cases as well) belongingness "back home" increases (quasi-diasporic), and self-identification "at home" (assimilation) decreases emigration potential, minority status significantly decreases emigration potential.

With the specific model we separately analyzed the factors influencing the probability of quasi-diasporic and non-home country emigration potential. It was significantly but differently influenced by the identity: among Russians in Latvia and in Lithuania "going home" is more likely among those with quasi-diasporic identity, among Polish in Lithuania, however, belonging to "at home" and defining yourself as member of the minority increase the probability of "back home" oriented emigration potential. Non-home country oriented emigration potential was significantly decreased by quasi-diaspora identity elements.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Selected questions from various migration potential survey questionnaires between 1992-2009

Reif (1992)

Have you ever seriously considered going to work in a country in West Europe? How likely is it that you will move to Western Europe to live and work? Do you think that you will...?

Sik et al (1992 – 2010)

Do you plan to … work for some weeks or months in abroad?

…. work for some years?

…. live in abroad?

When? Where?

IOM (1998)

1. People sometimes move from one country to another for various reasons. I am going to read you some of the options for going to another country and I would like you to tell me whether you would be very likely, likely, somewhat likely or very unlikely to do each of the following.

a. Go abroad for a few weeks to work

b. Go abroad for a few months to work

c. Go abroad for a few years to work

d. Go abroad for the rest of your life

2. a. To which country are you most likely to go to look for work?
   b. To which country are you most likely to emigrate?

3. Have you taken any of the following steps to prepare for migration over the last years?

a. Learn a language

b. Improve qualifications

c. Sell property

d. Obtain information

e. Apply for jobs

f. Look for somewhere to live

g. Apply for work permit

h. Obtain information

i. Other preparations

CEORG (2000, 2001)

Would you be personally interested in finding a job in one of the EU countries once your country enters the EU?

Hárs 2004

Do you plan to work in abroad in the next five years?

1: I do not plan to work

2: I can imagine but does not now know

3: Yes, for not more than one month

4: Yes, for one or two months

5: Yes, for one or two years

6: Yes, for more years

7: Yes, I would emigrate

If yes:

In which country? 1, ……, 2, ……., 00 – does not know

How could you obtain a job abroad, 1, through personal network, 2, work connections in abroad, 3, other way …..

Have you made steps already to arrange your work abroad? 1, yes, collected information, 2, yes, obtained licenses, 3, yes, already have the job, 4, no

Pavlov (2009)

"Have you ever considered, for business or any other reasons, to leave Serbia and start living in some other country on a temporary or permanent basis?"

1) I have never considered leaving Serbia,

2) I considered it and I have given up the possibility to leave the country and

3) I considered and I am still considering leaving Serbia.

Annex 2: The emigration potential and the identity questions

The ENRI migration potential questions

If you had an opportunity to leave your country and move for another one either alone or with your whole family and a good deal of monetary and social support, would you go?

1 – Yes, I would definitely leave.

2 – Yes, perhaps I would leave.

3 – No, I would never leave

IF YES

Which country would be your preference?

The Self-identification question

We think of ourselves in different terms. Some are more important to us than others. I will show you cards, and please tell me, generally speaking which is the most important to you in describing who you are? [INT: AFTER RP REPLIED, ASK]: And which is the second and third important?

	Most	2nd	3rd	Not chosen	NA
	Important				
My current or previous occupation	1	2	3	0	7
My gender (that is, being a man/woman).	1	2	3	0	7
My age group (that is, Young, Middle Age, Old).	1	2	3	0	7
My religion (or being agnostic or atheist).	1	2	3	0	7
Being a [ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP]	1	2	3	0	7
My social class (that is upper, middle, lower, working, or similar categories)	1	2	3	0	7
coming from the settlement you live	1	2	3	0	7
My preferred political party, group or movement	1	2	3	0	7
Being European	1	2	3	0	7
to be a citizen of [RECEIVING COUNTRY]	1	2	3	0	7

The belongingness question

How close do you feel to…

	Not close at all	Rather not close	Rather close	Very close	DK	Refusal
[ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[THE SETTLEMENT WHERE RP LIVES]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[RECEIVING COUNTRY]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[SENDING COUNTRY]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[REGION]	1	2	3	4	8	9
Europe	1	2	3	4	8	9

Annex 3: Association among the various forms of identity

The intercorrelation matrix of the identity proxies among six national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)

	1 with				2 with				3 with				4 with				5 with				6 with
	2	3	4	5	6	7	3	4	5	6	7	4	5	6	7	5	6	7	6	7	7
A	.32	.22		.10			.17	.16				.12	.13					.13	.10		
B	.30	.31	.13					.17		.16		.16						.11	.11		
C	.16	.28		.15				.19					.14			-.15		.15			
D	.42	.25			-.16		.14	.14				.15	.16							-.10	
E	.38	.34	.20	.13			.26	.20	-.12			.44							-.31		
F	.35	.45	.40	.25			.33	.33		.14		.57		-.22							

Empty cell: the correlation coefficient is not significant on level p= 0.05.

Minorities. A - Russians in Latvia, B - Russians in Lithuania, C - Byelorussians in Lithuania, D - Polish in Lithuania, E - Polish in Byelorussia, F - Polish in Ukraine

Identity proxies: Belongingness to 1 – minority, 2- receiving country, 3 – sending country, 4- Europe, Self-identification with 5 – minority, 6 – receiving country, 7 – Europe

Annex 4: Models of the volume and direction of emigration potential

Table 4.1: The determinants of emigration potential among five minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (logistic regression)*

	Baltic region				Eastern Europe
	Russians in Latvia	Russians in Lithuania	Byelorussians in Lithuania	Polish in Lithuania	Polish in Ukraine
-2 Log Likelihood	663,5	700,4	358,6	625,7	266,4
	(0.32)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.50)	(0.55)
Model Chi Sq. Improvement	203,3	153,9	73,3	125,9	80.5
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Goodness of Fit,	637,7	663,0	341,9	626,2	293,5
	(0.60)	(0.40)	(0.12)	(0.49)	(0.16)
Correctly predicted (%)	75	75	72	77	79
N	676	684	341	655	299
Identity variables					
Dumemg					0.44*
Dumrc	0.45**		0.39**		
Dumsc		1.75*	1.81	2.61**	3.14*
Ethnic3				0.56**	
Titu3	0.47*			0.61	0.23**
Eu3		2.61**			
Control variables					
Male		0.60*			
Young	2.51**	2.31**		2.40**	2.30*
Old	0.25**	0.42*	0.43*		0.34
Primary school		2.54*	0.76		
Secondary school					
Higher school	0.55*				0.47
Dependent					0.20**
Unemployed			2.68*	2.27**	
Pensioner					
Lack of wealth		1.97*		0.57	2.70*
High level wealth	0.61				
English knowledge	1.82*			1.40*	2.35
Low class					
High class		0.59			
Low status		0.51*			
High status					
Low tension	0.48**				
High tension	1.94**	1.71*	4.47**		
Ethnically discriminated	1.71*	1.84*			
Have relative “back home”		0.72**			
Have friend “back home”	1.71*				
Have other “weak tie” “back home”			1.98*		

* Minorities with low number of cases (below 100 respondents characterized by strong emigration potential) or if there were no cases in all four cells of the predicted probability table were omitted from the analysis. All independent variables are dummies. The reference categories (where there were more than two categories are: middle age tercile, primary education, middle level of wealth and tension, sending country language spoken at home, middle class tercile, status and level of tension. The cells contain the odds ratio and the level of significance (* = Chi square significant on level p= 0.05 – 0.001, ** = Chi square significant below level p= 0.0009). Odds ratio without star - the significance level was between p = 0.05 and 0.10. Empty cells indicate non-significant impact.

Table 4.2: The determinants of "back home" and non-home country directed emigration potential among three minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (logistic regression)*

	Section I "Back home" country oriented			Section II Non-home country oriented[36]		
	Russians in Latvia	Russians in Lithuania	Polish in Lithuania	Russians in Latvia	Russians in Lithuania	Polish in Lithuania
-2 Log Likelihood	218,1	174,8	111,2	261,1	243,8	166,2
	(0.18)	(0.75)	(0.97)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Model Chi Sq. Improvement	72,9	78,5	75,8	56,7	50,5	63,8
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Goodness of Fit,	220,0	266,8	115,2	224,0	212,8	154,2
	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.96)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.20)
Correctly predicted (%)	79	81	86	71	70	76
N	230	216	170	230	216	170
Identity variables						
Dumemg		3.43*			0.51	
Dumrc			3.81*		2.38*	
Dumsc	5.31**	3.02*		0.32*	0.39*	
Dumeu					4.01	
Ethnic3	2.33*		2.95*	0.46		
Titu3						
Eu3						3.14
Control variables						
Male					0.52	
Young		0.20**	0.27			
Old						
Primary school						
Secondary school						
Higher school						3.44*
Dependent						
Unemployed	2.80*				2.00	
Pensioner						
Lack of wealth			0.21	0.33		
High level wealth						
English knowledge		0.45			2.13*	
Low class				4.92*		
High class		0.34				
Low status						
High status						
Low tension				0.44*		
High tension				0.52	0.51	
Ethnically discriminated	2.32*					
Have relative "back home"	6.99**			0.36*		
Have friend "back home"						
Have other "weak tie" "back home"						

* Minorities with low number of cases (below 100 respondents characterized by strong emigration potential) or if there were no cases in all four cells of the predicted probability table were omitted from the analysis. All independent variables are dummies. The reference categories (where there were more than two categories are: middle age tercile, primary education, middle level of wealth and tension, sending country language spoken at home, middle class tercile, status and level of tension. The cells contain the odds ratio and the level of significance (* = Chi square significant on level p= 0.05 – 0.001, ** = Chi square significant below level p= 0.0009). Odds ratio without star - the significance level was between p = 0.05 and 0.10. Empty cells indicate non-significant impact.

[36] Including neighbor, other EU, other non EU countries.

1.2 Discrimination experience and identity among the national minorities in the Eastern borderzone of the EU

Endre Sik

1.2.1 Abstract

The core question of the paper is: What are the main factors that increase the probability of discrimination experience and how important are various aspects of identity within this context? Since the literature does not offer any theoretical basis to develop any we only argue that both quasi-diaspora (belonging to a minority created by the shift of the border between neighboring countries, and maintained by visible or cultural (language?) differences from the majority) and integration/assimilation (making efforts to change identity to fit into the majority's value system) attitudes can increase the probability to have discrimination experience since both processes might increase the sensitivity to perceive (and recall) discrimination experience.

After a brief theoretical treatise we introduce the results of the previous discrimination experience research as a context to our findings and offer a crude analysis of the association of historical and political context and discrimination experience. It is followed by a brief overview of previous discrimination experience models to offer benchmarks for the following analysis. In the next chapter we work with the individual level ENRI data, and first develop a series of logistic regressions with the ethnic minority-related discrimination experience as dependent variable using the standard socio-demographic control variables as well as a special set of identity variables as explanatory variables. The results show that identity plays significant role in determining the probability of discrimination experience in several national minorities along the Eastern border along the EU border. Secondly we analyze the same processes in four different social milieus, and find that the process of discrimination experience varies among the minorities by the social milieu.

1.2.2 The concept of discrimination experience

In the broadest sense of the word discrimination is defined as a process causing a group of people suffering disadvantages for unjustifiable reasons, i.e. individual characteristics based on their membership in a certain group or category (Measuring, … 2004). In countries where there are laws against it, discrimination can be simply defined as an infringement of these laws (Makkonen, 2007), Wrench, n.d.).

From a sociological point of view the core issue is the prevalence and types of discrimination in general and by various social groups in particular. In Europe 2007 was the year of equal opportunities for all (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/c10314_en.htm) and since then non-discrimination has remained a core issue (Non-discrimination, …. 2008) with a specialized agency (FRA, http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/home/home_en.htm) offering various and up-to-date information on the topic on a regular basis, including a yearbook annually[37]

[37] The most recent one is from 2010(http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/annual-report-2011-summary_EN.pdf).

There are several techniques to measure the prevalence of discrimination with different advantages and disadvantages[38]. In the following I compare only the two most often used methods of the prevalence of discrimination: the discrimination perception and experience survey. The regularly used discrimination perception survey technique is based on the way the population perceives discrimination (Special …, 2007, 2008, 2009). The major drawback of the perception method is that perceptions are determined by three inseparable factors (the probability of discrimination events, the (often very strongly media influenced) sensitivity of the society and the political and legal institutional environment)[39].

The technique we apply in our analysis is called discrimination experience technique. The aim of this technique is to learn whether the respondent' has had discrimination experience during a given period. The estimate we get on the basis of this technique can be based on samples of either the population of potential victims or of representative sample of the majority. The downside of this approach is that the possibility of under- or overestimating the extent of discrimination based on the responses cannot be excluded. It may be underestimated if respondents are inclined to bury their grievances, and it may be overestimated if they cannot forget old injustices and are keen to bring them up.

According to the aims of the ENRI project our discrimination experience survey was a victim survey, i.e. we sampled national minorities[40] to learn their discrimination experience[41]. In the ENRI questionnaire we used two questions to estimate the prevalence of discrimination experience (Annex 1). The first question contains four proxies to estimate the prevalence of discrimination experience, the second focuses on ethnicity based discrimination experience and contains a set of situation in which discrimination might have occurred.

1.2.3 The context - comparative analysis of discrimination experience among majorities, migrant and national minorities in the EU countries

The aim of his chapter is to give a contextual analysis of the discrimination experience which covers all EU countries and within them almost 50 national or migrant/ethnic minorities. We would like to know how ENRI countries and national minorities fit into this general landscape.

The most comprehensive analysis of discrimination experience among migrant and national minorities in Europe was done by FRA in 2009 (EU-MIDIS, 2009a). This survey covers 47 immigrant and ethnic minority groups' in all EU countries[42]. It examines the discrimination experience and victimization in several situations in everyday life.

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[38] Since the aim this paper notto analyse the methodological niceties of discrimination I only refer to those papers which offer a comparative evaluation of the different measumerement techniques (Makkonen, 2007, Olli, 2005, Reuter at al (2004), Sik-Simonovits, 2010, Wrench, n.d.).

[39] Just as an illustrate the unavoidable bias of using perception as the basis of the estimation of prevalence we refer to the absurd results of the 2007-2009 perception surveys (Special Eurobarometer, 2007, 2008, 2009), i.e. that ethnicity based discrimination is the most wide spread (at least 75% of the respondents perceived it as wide spread) in all three years in the following countries: Sweden, the Netherlands and France.

[40] We use Konieczna, n.d.) approach which – on the basis of Brubaker's term „external national homeland" defines a national minority a a non-migration created minority which differ ethnically (often religion-wise as well) and culturally from the majority and have a clear (though not necessarily strong) group consciousness as well a diasporic attitude to the homeland.

[41] Our sampling procedure followed the EU-MIDIS procedures (EU-MIDIS, 2009b) as close as it was possible.

[42] And in some cases the majority population as control group as well.

Comparing Figure 1 with Annex 2 we can see that (except victimization of CEE migrant groups in the UK and Ireland and police profiling of Romanians in Italy) East European national minorities do not belong to those groups which have above-the-average level discrimination, victimization or police profiling prevalence in the EU. In contemporary Europe the Roma and non-European migrants suffer from discrimination above the average (and often all three form of it).

As to the comparison within the victim groups in East and Central European (Figure 1), the two national minorities (Russians in Lithuania and in Latvia) are significantly below the average in all three forms of discrimination experience, and have almost the lowest level (except ex-Yugoslavs in Luxemburg) of discrimination, and a low level of victimization experience even within this group of migrants and minorities (which compared to all other victim groups (Annex 2) have a below-the-average discrimination experience). As to police profiling, in these two groups (and among ex-Yugoslavs in Austria) discrimination experience does not exist at all.

Figure 1: The prevalence of discrimination, police profiling, and victimization experience among migrant and ethnic groups from Central and East Europe (%)



Source: Excerpt from Annex 2, based on Figure 2.1, 2.22, and 2.38 in EU-MIDIS, 2009a.

1.2.4 Discrimination experience among national minorities in the Eastern borderzone of the EU

The first conclusion we can draw from Figure 2 is that there is no general pattern in regard with discrimination experience of the national minorities. Usually ethnicity is the main cause of discrimination experience followed by age (except in Poland where for Belarusians discrimination experience is caused by religion more frequently). The lowest level of discrimination experience in all four domains characterizes Slovaks in Hungary, Poles in Belarus and Lithuanians in Russia.

Figure 2: The prevalence of discrimination experience by type among national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)



Map 1 shows the level of cumulative discrimination experience of the twelve national minorities in eight countries. The highest level of discrimination experience characterizes Hungarians in Ukraine and in Slovakia and Russians in Latvia, the lowest among Slovaks in Hungary, Poles in Ukraine and Belarus, Belarusians in Poland and Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region (Russia).

Map 1: The prevalence of cumulative discrimination experience of national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)*



* National minorities: Russians in Latvia, Belarusians, Polish and Russian in Lithuania, Lithuanian in Kaliningrad Region (Russia), Polish in Belarus, Belarusn and Ukrainian in Poland, Polish and Hungarian in Ukraine, Hungarian is Slovakia, Slovak in Hungary.

The four types of discrimination experience overlap, i.e. there is a high probability that someone feeling discriminated in one dimension shall have discrimination experience in other forms as well. This assumption is justified by Pearson correlation coefficients among the four types of discrimination experience in case of eleven national minorities (Slovaks in Hungary due to small number of cases are excluded) which usually fall between 0.10 and 0.40, i.e. indicate significant but not very strong positive association between each of the four components[43]. We found only one exception: among the Belarusians in Poland the correlation (especially between ethnicity and religion) is very strong.

As to the social milieu of ethnicity induced discrimination experience is concerned (Figure 3), usually the labor market (job search) and the workplace are the main sources of discrimination experience, except among Hungarians in Ukraine among whom school is the main cause of discrimination experience. Church, court, neighborhood are the least likely social milieus of discrimination experience.

[43] There are some non-significant correlation coefficients – usually ethnicity or religion are not correlated with one of the demographic dimensions (gender or age).

Figure 3: The prevalence of ethnicity induced discrimination experience by social milieu among three national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (%)



1.2.5 The historical-political basis of discrimination experience of national minorities along Eastern border of the EU

With the following crude and simplified analysis[44] all we intend to achieve is to introduce the reader the historical-political context because we assume it has an effect on the discrimination experience of the respective countries.

To start with as Map 2 shows in a worldwide perspective we can safely claim that the countries our analysis is focused are politically stable (with the exception of Belarus and Ukraine which are classified as country with a low level of fragility).

[44] Since we have no answer to the essential question: what mechanisms and in what ways influence the macro level context and micro level discrimination experience we measure.

Map 2: State Fragility Index and Warfare in the Global System, 2009[45]



Still keeping the worldwide perspective, none of the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU have violent relation with the majority, moreover as we saw before (Annex 2) in a comparative EU perspective these national minorities are among the least prone to have discrimination experience.

Despite the comparatively peaceful environment we found there national minorities with relatively higher level of discrimination experience (Map 1) such as the Russians in Latvia (22%), Ukrainians in Poland (22%), and Hungarians in Ukraine (29%) and in Slovakia (20%).

We base our comparative analysis of the national minorities along the Eastern border of the EU on a paper from the mid-1990 (Kovács, 1998). This theoretically elaborated, methodologically simple comparative evaluation of the European national minorities develops a typology based on an index of ethnic climate[46]. According to the country-level analysis in the 1990ies Slovakia was the most exclusive (discriminative, segregative, etc.) Hungary and Poland were the most inclusive (all other countries fall into the in-between (ambiguous) category). The combination of country and national minority-level analysis characterizes the type of ethnic relations in case of some minorities as follows:

- Poles in Belarus – low level of discrimination experience despite the restrictive (legal restrictions in a very centralized system) situation in an ambiguous environment,

[45] According to the applied typology of governance Belarus is an autocracy and Latvia is a „weak democracy". Details of the methodology can be found on the following site: http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf

[46] The index contains five dimensions in each case using a scale between 0 and 2. The dimensions are: ethnic stratification (segregation, marginalisation, segmentation), discrimination (legal, cultural), size (proportion compared to the majority), political environment, and economic transformation.

- Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, Poles in Lithuania[47] - high or medium-level discrimination experience in a competitive (competing with the majority both economically and in the "nation building project") situation in an ambiguous environment,
- Hungarians in Slovakia and Ukraine – high level of discrimination experience in an oppressive (politically organized minority fighting with the state and operating often in hostile civic context as well) situation within an exclusive (the former) or in an ambiguous (the latter) environment.

Finally, we refer to the qualitative historical-political evaluations[48] of situation of two of these national minorities which might explain the higher-than-average level of discrimination experience[49]:

- Russians in Latvia: The Minority Right Organisation claims that "Political, social and economic discrimination of the Russian-speaking community continues and in April 2002 the European Court of Human Rights decided that the Latvian Government had violated the right to stand for election of a Latvian citizen who was an ethnic Russian… Latvia ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on 6 June 2005, but at the same time, and contrary to the spirit of the FCNM, introduced two amendments requiring local government to function and street signs to be written in the Latvian language only." (http://www.minorityrights.org/4963/latvia/latvia-overview.html).

According to another source: "There is little risk of ethnic Russian rebellion in the near future in Latvia. The group exhibits only two of the five factors that encourage rebellion: persistent protest and government repression in the form of restrictions on their ability to engage in public demonstrations. Although Russia has actively negotiated on behalf of Russian minorities in the past, such activity seems to have ceased at present. … There are important signs of hope for improvements in the group's status. These include positive developments in both the Latvian government

[47] We add into this group the Slovaks in Hungary since the analysis focused on Germans in Hungary which according all existing statistical, political and economic analysis resembles to the Hungarian Slovaks to a great extent.

[48] The two major sources are from the Minority Right Group (www.minorityrights.org) and Minorities at Risk (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp).

The former is a leading international human rights organization having a consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. It works and campaigns worldwide with around 130 partners in over 60 countries to secure rights for ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities and indigenous people around the world. The site operates The World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples which is the internet's leading information resource on minorities around the globe. It provides a country-by-country profile of the history and contemporary situation as they relate to minorities and indigenous peoples.

The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project is a university-based research project that monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in all countries with a current population of at least 500,000. MAR prepares both qualitative and quantitative data sources about minority groups, such as Minority Group Assessments (an analytic summary giving a brief history of the group and its relations with the state), Minority Group Chronologies (a data resource detailing important events in the history of the group and of the state in which they reside), MAR Data and Discrimination Dataset.

[49] What this approach cannot provide is any explanation why in those cases where both the country risk analysis and the analysis of the minorities offered explanation of the high level of potential discrimination experience – but the ENRI data did not find high level of discrimination experience (e.g. Poles in Belarus http://www.minorityrights.org/4667/belarus/belarus-overview.html and http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=37002).

and economy as well as in the group's attitudes and strategies. … While the group continues to be disadvantaged compared to the Latvian population, Russians are still better off where they are than are their counterparts in most of the struggling post-Soviet economies. … Significant political, economic, and cultural restrictions still exist, which place the Russian minority in a disadvantaged position. Despite the passage of the 1998 citizenship law, approximately 50 percent of ethnic Russians have yet to attain citizenship. This lack of citizenship for a large number of ethnic Russians continues to cause them political and economic difficulties. (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36701)

- Hungarians in Slovakia: " … exhibit two factors that encourage rebellion: territorial concentration and generally high levels of group organization and cohesion. Continuing to suffer various types of discrimination, tensions between Hungarians and Slovaks have increased over the last few years. .. since 1998, there have been increasing attempts by Slovak nationalist parties to limit the power of Hungarians in the central government. …. In the absence of official discrimination, therefore, Hungarians are unlikely to engage in violence against the state. … Discrimination against Hungarians persists. Much of it is based on the entrenched anti-Hungarian feelings shared by many Slovaks who fear the magyarization of the southern region and possible discrimination in the hands of Hungarians should they gain more autonomy. Specifically, the Hungarians in Slovakia endure a higher unemployment rate and live in a greater degree of poverty compared to the majority Slovaks in other parts of the country. These issues may linger for many years, providing some potential for future conflicts. (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=31701)

1.2.6 The benchmarks - models of discrimination experience

As benchmarks to develop hypotheses in regard with the prevalence of discrimination experience in victim groups we use three discrimination experience surveys (Annex 3 and 4).

The first survey of three immigrant groups in Budapest, and a representative sample of the local population[50] as control group (first part of Figure 4 based on Table A3.1 in Annex 3). The three groups were Hungarians from a neighboring country, Chinese immigrants (from mainland China or any part of the worldwide Chinese Diaspora) and Muslims (most of them from various Arab countries or Turkey). It is hardly surprising that compared to the control group all three victim groups felt significantly more discriminated – even ethnic Hungarians who do not differ visibly from the majority population. The fact that the level of discrimination experience of migrants was much higher than that of any national minority group of the ENRI project (Map 1) might mean that migrant minorities (who arrived more recently) are more vulnerable to discrimination experience than more settled national minorities.

[50] For more detail, see http://www.um.es/localmultidem/.

Figure 4: The prevalence of cumulative discrimination experience among immigrant groups (and Budapest inhabitants) in 2009 and in 2010 (%)



Source: Sik-Várhalmi (2010).

The composition of the types of discrimination experience (Table 3.1 in Annex 3) is rather similar to the ENRI case, i.e. gender, age and religion induced discrimination experience is much less frequent than minority status (such as ethnicity, skin color, language or migrant status) based discrimination experience.

The results of a more recent survey (second part of Figure 4) partly overlaps with the previous one but covers five immigrant groups in Hungary. This survey again shows significantly higher discrimination experience among the Chinese and Vietnamese in Hungary than in case of any national minority in the ENRI project but the level of discrimination experience of ethnic Ukrainians, Hungarians from Transcarpathia (Ukraine), and Arabs is similar to the cumulative level of discrimination experience of some national minorities in the ENRI project (Map 1). This victim survey - similarly to the previous one – shows that minority status specific discrimination experience is much more frequent among the migrant groups than demographic ones (Table A3.1 in Annex 3).

As to the social milieu of ethnicity induced discrimination experience is concerned (compared to ENRI data in Figure 2), as Table A3.2 and A3.3 in Annex 3 show that for non-visible migrant groups (i.e. those which are the most comparable to the national minorities of the ENRI survey) labor market and bureaucracy are the main sources of discrimination experience[51].

Since there is no theory to deduct hypotheses from to explain the socio-genesis of discriminative experience, and there has never been sophisticated comparative empirical analysis of discrimina-

[51] Visible migrants are much more vulnerable to all forms of service and bureaucratic discrimination (in school, police and health care system as well) and public places (street, consumption, public transport, etc.) The reason of the relatively low level of discrimination experience of the Chinese on the labor market is that they are part of a rather closed and self-employment based ethnic economy.

tion experience to serve as the basis of an inductive strategy to build such hypotheses, we use the previous two surveys and a more recent survey covering the Hungarian majority as baseline models.

Using two models[52] to explain the socio-genesis of ethnicity and skin color based discrimination experience among migrants in contemporary Hungary as baseline (Table A4.1 and A4.2 in Annex 4), we found very different structures. The probability of feeling discriminated because of ethnicity or skin color was usually high among those having various forms of tension between different aspects of identity and/or social status, such as:

- ethnic Hungarians[53] from Transcarpathia (Ukraine) who distance themselves from Hungary and have strong Diasporic feelings,
- ethnic Ukrainians from Transcarpathia who want to become Hungarian but do not speak the language,
- Chinese who feel themselves successful as Diaspora members but not as immigrants (lack of success compared to natives and lack of command of their language), and want to retain their quasi-diaspora[54] status (double citizenship),
- Vietnamese[55] who want to become Hungarian (getting citizenship and getting rid of home customs).
- Arabs[56] who have strong but complex Diasporic belongingness.

In sum, we assume that identity influences the discrimination experience significantly and this can take various forms depending on the level and inclination to be integration and/or belonging to the Diaspora or "back home"

In 2009 TÁRKI carried out a representative survey including a block of labor market discrimination experience of the active – 18-62 year-old, non-retired, non-student – population. The questions referred to events related to labor hiring/dismissal and workplace experiences during the 12 months preceding the interview (Table A4.3 in Annex 4). The first indicator is the probability of discrimination experience in hiring and dismissal among the active population (labor market mobility discrimination experience). The second indicator applies to the employed population and amalgamates the questions related to experiences of discrimination in remuneration, promotion and working conditions (discrimination experience at the workplace). Finally, an aggregate likelihood indicator of discrimination experience was calculated for the employed population (cumulative labor market discrimination experience[57].

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[52] The models contain identical explanatory variables arranged into an identical structure: control variables (socio-demographic, labour market, etc.), migration variables (various aspects of the migration process such as legality, integration, etc.), and identity (belongingness toward „back home", „ at home", diaspora, minority).

[53] Dominantly male workers or students.

[54] The term quasi-diaspora is derived from the general diaspora concept and describes a special situation when the minority group was not created by migration but was an unintended effect of moving borders, however the sociological characteristics of the minority is very similar to that of a Diaspora (Sik-Tóth, 2003).

[55] Dominantly those without higher education.

[56] Dominantly the non-religious.

[57] Since the survey covered the majority, i.e. it was not a victim survey, consequently its results (11 % experienced discrimination on the labor market in the past 12 month) is not comparable to ENRI results. The less so since the

Footnote continued =>

On the basis of the discrimination experience differences on the labor market (Table A4.3 in Annex 4) we developed the following hypotheses:

- the youngest cohorts (18-37 year olds) have a higher probability of discrimination experience;
- educational attainment only plays a significant role in the course of job search,
- settlement type only has an effect on workplace discrimination experience.

To models of discrimination experience of the majority (Table A4.4 in Annex 4) shows that the following socio-demographic effects are likely to have significant effect on discrimination experience:

- the youngest respondents (18-27 year olds) are more likely to experience discrimination in general and especially significantly in the workplace,
- economic activity has a significant effect in the course of job search: the unemployed were eight times more likely to feel discriminated than those employed.

1.2.7 The socio-genesis of discrimination experience among the national minorities in the Eastern borderzone of the EU

The aim of the analysis is to describe the role of identity[58] in the process of socio-genesis of discrimination experience. The first step is to check whether the previous assumptions in regard with the role of the control variables were correct. As the second block of Table A5.1 in Annex 5 shows that:

- there is a universal and always significant positive correlation between experiencing tension and discrimination experience (and it works in both ways, i.e. low tension decreases, high tension increases the probability of discrimination experience,
- the same logic explains the negative (but much less strong) association between language use, i.e. speaking on the language "at home" alone or mixed with the language "back home") and discrimination experience.

There are, however, control variables with considerable but minority specific impact on the socio-genesis of discrimination experience. For example

- among Russians and Poles in Lithuania being unemployed or pensioner (i.e. being in a vulnerable position on the labor market) increase the chances of feeling discriminated.
- in some cases (Poles in Lithuania and Ukrainians in Poland - especially if they are young or not old) females are more likely to feel discriminated but while in the former case low education, in the latter case high education (but neither high wealth or class) increase the probability of discrimination experience,
- among Hungarians (both in Ukraine and Slovakia) the middle age cohorts are more likely to feel discriminated), in the first case especially if they have low education (but

structure of the causes of discrimination experience differs from that of the national minorities and from the migrant groups as well: the most often referred causes of discrimination experience were demographic ones (being female and having a small child in the family, age (both being young and old) followed by ethnic origin (being Roma).

[58] We used two identity questions: self-identification and belongingness (see the second part of Annex 1).

not low class position and social status), in the latter case if they have high education but low social status (but are not poor).

Turning our attention to the role of identity in this process, Figure 5 (based on the first block in table A5.1 in Annex 5) shows that

- almost without exception weak belongingness to the majority "at home" increases the chances of discrimination experience,
- and it is further strengthened in some cases (among Russians in Latvia and Lithuania and Hungarians in Slovakia[59]) by strong belongingness to the majority "back home",
- and among Hungarians in Ukraine and Poles in Lithuania strong minority consciousness increases the probability towards discrimination experience as well.

Figure 5: The odd ratios of identity variables in defining the probability of ethnicity induced discrimination experience among the members of seven ethnic minorities along the Eastern borders of the EU (based on the model in the first block of Table A5.1 in Annex 5)



Finally, focusing on the social milieu specific processes of discrimination experience in case of three minorities (Table A6.1 and A6.2 in Annex 6) we find that

- at the workplace while Hungarians (both in Ukraine and Slovakia) with stronger quasi-Diasporic feelings (and in the first case especially if they are not young, have low or higher education, are poor but not unemployed, have high social status , feel tension) have higher probability of discrimination experience, among Russians in Latvia identity does not increase the sensitivity towards being discriminated (but higher perception of tension increases it),
- in the course of job search while Hungarians in Slovakia experience discrimination more if they have stronger minority identity (and classifying themselves as low class people), Hungarians in Ukraine have the same experience if they do not feel home in

[59] Among Hungarians in Slovakia belongingness towards Europe decreases the probability of discrimination expreinece as well.

Ukraine (and have low level of education), among Russians in Latvia the probability of discrimination experience[60] is increasing if the respondent experience tension,

- in the health care system Hungarians in Ukraine are more likely to experience discrimination if they have higher level of belongingness "back home" and identify themselves as European (and also if they are uneducated, poor but not old, unemployed or low class), Hungarians in Slovakia are more likely suffer from discrimination experience if they feel themselves low class (and belong to the Hungarian minority and do not feel themselves "at home"),
- in the shops discrimination experience is not influenced by identity significantly and the control variables have also hardly any strength in this milieu (except being poor among Russians in Latvia).

1.2.8 Summary

The core question of the paper is: What are the main factors that increase the probability of discrimination experience and how important are various aspects of identity within this context? Since the literature does not offer any theoretical basis to develop any we only argue that both quasi-diaspora (belonging to a minority created by the shift of the border between neighboring countries, and maintained by visible or cultural (language?) differences from the majority) and integration/assimilation (changing identity to fit into the majority) attitudes can increase the probability to have discrimination experience since both processes might increase the sensitivity to perceive (and recall) discrimination experience.

The technique we apply in our analysis is called discrimination experience technique. The aim of this technique is to learn whether the respondent' has had discrimination experience during a given period. The ENRI discrimination experience survey was a victim survey, i.e. we sampled national minorities to learn their discrimination experience. The two discrimination experience oriented questions in the ENRI questionnaire focused on the prevalence of discrimination experience, and on the social milieu ethnicity based discrimination experience might have occurred.

We started our analysis with a contextual analysis of the discrimination experience. The point of reference was the EU-MIDIS project which covers all EU countries and within them almost 50 national or migrant/ethnic minorities. We found that - except victimization of CEE migrant groups in the UK and Ireland and police profiling of Romanians in Italy – the East European national minorities have lower-than-average level discrimination, victimization or police profiling prevalence in the EU.

Comparing the prevalence of the four caused of discrimination experience among the twelve national minorities in the ENRI survey, we found that ethnicity is the main cause of discrimination experience followed by age (except in Poland where for Belarusians discrimination experience is caused by religion more frequently). The prevalence of cumulative discrimination experience was the highest among Hungarians in Ukraine and in Slovakia and Russians in Latvia, and was the lowest among Slovaks in Hungary, Poles in Ukraine and Belarus, Belarusians in Poland and Lithuanians in Kaliningrad region (Russia).

[60] This is exactly the same in case of the discrimination experience in the health care system among the Russians in Latvia.

As to the social milieu of ethnicity induced discrimination experience is concerned, usually the labor market and the workplace are the main sources of discrimination experience, except among Hungarians in Ukraine among whom school is the main cause of discrimination experience. Church, court, neighborhood are the least likely social milieus of discrimination experience.

To describe the political and social context of national minorities in the countries along the Eastern border of the EU we found that these countries (except Belarus and Ukraine which are classified as countries with a low level of fragility) are politically stable democracies[61]. The combination of country and national minority-level analysis characterized the ethnic relations in case of some minorities as follows:

- Poles in Belarus – low level of discrimination experience despite the restrictive (legal restrictions in a very centralized system) situation in an ambiguous environment,
- Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, Poles in Lithuania - high or medium-level discrimination experience in a competitive (competing with the majority both economically and in the "nation building project") situation in an ambiguous environment,
- Hungarians in Slovakia and Ukraine – high level of discrimination experience in an oppressive (politically organized minority fighting with the state and operating often in hostile civic context as well) situation within an exclusive (the former) or in an ambiguous (the latter) environment.

The regression analysis of ENRI discrimination experience proved that

- tension significantly influences the probability of discrimination experience, i.e. low tension decreases, high tension increases the probability of discrimination experience,
- using the language "at home" at home decreases the probability of discrimination experience,
- weak belongingness to the majority "at home" increases the chances of discrimination experience, and it is strengthened in some cases (among Russians in Latvia and Lithuania and Hungarians in Slovakia) by strong belongingness to the majority "back home",
- among Hungarians in Ukraine and Poles in Lithuania strong minority consciousness increases the probability towards discrimination experience.

To sum up, the prevalence of discrimination experience (whether real or imagined we cannot know) is sensitive to the socio-political environment but simultaneously to the "direction" of the identity, i.e. whether it is "at home" or "back home" oriented (which can take the form of "back home" and/or ethnic minority orientation).

Finally, focusing on the social milieu specific processes of discrimination experience we found that

- at the workplace among Hungarians (both in Ukraine and Slovakia) with stronger quasi-Diasporic feelings have higher probability of discrimination experience,
- in the course of job search while Hungarians in Slovakia experience discrimination more if they have stronger minority identity (and classifying themselves as low class

[61] While all other countries are characterized as full democracies, Belarus is classified as an autocracy.

people), Hungarians in Ukraine have the same experience if they do not feel "at home" in Ukraine (and have low level of education), among Russians in Latvia the probability of discrimination experience is increasing if the respondent experience tension,

- in the health care system Hungarians in Ukraine are more likely to experience discrimination if they have higher level of belongingness "back home" and identify themselves as European (and also if they are uneducated, poor but not old, unemployed or low class), Hungarians in Slovakia are more likely suffer from discrimination experience if they feel themselves low class (and belong to the Hungarian minority and do not feel themselves "at home").

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Annexes

Annex 1: The discrimination experience and identity questions in the ENRI questionnaire

I. The discrimination experience questions

I would like to ask you about discrimination. By discrimination we mean when somebody is treated less favorably than others because of a specific personal feature, such as age, gender or minority background.

1. In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed in [RECEIVING COUNTRY] on the basis of one or more of the following grounds?

	Yes	No	DK	Refusal
Ethnic or national origin	1	2	8	9
Gender	1	2	8	9
Age	1	2	8	9
Religion	1	2	8	9

2. ONLY IF ETHNIC OR NATIONAL ORIGIN IS MENTIONED (19/a is 1

In which of these environments did you felt discriminated or harassed because of your ethnic origin in the last 12 months? [INT: SHOW CARD AND CODE]
CARD

	Yes	No	NA	DK	Refusal
At school/university	1	2	0	8	9
At work	1	2	0	8	9
In the health care system	1	2	0	8	9
By the court	1	2	0	8	9
By the police	1	2	0	8	9
At church	1	2	0	8	9
When looking for a job	1	2	0	8	9
In restaurants, bars, pubs, or discos	1	2	0	8	9
On the street	1	2	0	8	9
By neighbours	1	2	0	8	9
In shops	1	2	0	8	9
On public transportation	1	2	0	8	9

II. The identity questions

The Self-identification question

We think of ourselves in different terms. Some are more important to us than others. I will show you cards, and please tell me, generally speaking which is the most important to you in describing who you are? [INT: AFTER RP REPLIED, ASK]: And which is the second and third important?

	Most Important	2nd Important	3rd Important	Not chosen	NA
My current or previous occupation	1	2	3	0	7
My gender (that is, being a man/woman).	1	2	3	0	7
My age group (that is, Young, Middle Age, Old).	1	2	3	0	7
My religion (or being agnostic or atheist).	1	2	3	0	7
Being a [ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP]	1	2	3	0	7
My social class (that is upper, middle, lower, working, or similar categories)	1	2	3	0	7
coming from the settlement you live	1	2	3	0	7
My preferred political party, group or movement	1	2	3	0	7
Being European	1	2	3	0	7
to be a citizen of [RECEIVING COUNTRY]	1	2	3	0	7

The belongingness question

How close do you feel to…

	Not close at all	Rather not close	Rather close	Very close	DK	Refusal
[ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[THE SETTLEMENT WHERE RP LIVES]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[RECEIVING COUNTRY]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[SENDING COUNTRY]	1	2	3	4	8	9
[REGION]	1	2	3	4	8	9
Europe	1	2	3	4	8	9

III. The identity variables:

Dumemg: Belongingness to the minority group (1= yes).

Dumrc: Belongingness to the majority “at home” (1= yes).

Dumsc: Belongingness to the majority “back home” (1=yes).

Ethnic3: Self-identification as member of the minority group (1=yes).

Titu3: Self-identification as member of the majority “at home” (1=yes).

Euiden3: Self-identification with Europe (1= yes).

Annex 2: The prevalence of discrimination[62], police profiling and victimization[63] experience among ethnic and migrant groups in the EU (%)[64]



Source: Designed by the author on the basis of EU-MIDIS, 2009a

[62] The cumulative percentage of nine causes of discrimination experience such as "when looking for paid work |at work by people who you work for or work with | when looking for a house or apartment to rent or buy, by people working in a public housing agency, or by a private landlord or agency | by people working in public or private health services (…) | by people working in public employment or social insurance services (…)| by people working in a school or in training (…). |when in or trying to enter a café, restaurant, bar or nightclub | when in a shop or trying to enter a shop | when trying to open a bank account or get a loan from a bank." (EU-MIDIS, 2009a)

[63] The cumulative percentage of five types of victimization experience such as: "was any car, van, truck, motorbike, moped or bicycle – or some other form of transport belonging to you or your household – stolen, or had something stolen from it? (…) | Did anyone get into your home without permission and steal or try to steal something? (…) | Have you personally been the victim of any thefts that did not involve force? | Have you been personally attacked, that is hit or pushed, or threatened by someone in a way that REALLY frightened you? | Have you been personally harassed by someone or a group in a way that REALLY upset, offended or annoyed you?" (EU-MIDIS, 2009a)

[64] Only those cases when at least one of the three discrimination proxies were above-the-average.

Annex 3: The prevalence of discrimination in Budapest (2009) and in Hungary (2010)

Table A3.1: The prevalence of discrimination experience of migrant groups (and local inhabitants) in Hungary by the cause of discrimination (%)

	2010 national survey					2009 Budapest survey			
	Non visible migrant groups		Visible migrant groups				Non visible migrant group	Visible migrant groups	
	Ethnic Hungar-ians*	Ukraini-ans	Chi-nese	Vietna-na-miese	Arabs	Locals	Ethnic Hun-garians**	Chi-nese	Mus-lims
Skin color	1	0	42	29	15	2	2	26	17
Ethnic origin	18	23	34	33	13	3	24	44	23
Religion	1	4	13	5	6	0	1	5	21
Migrant status	19	19	21	20	6	2	1	7	0
Language	7	26	44	30	19	X	10	19	14
Age	6	6	13	4	5	5	3	4	7
Gender	2	2	11	3	3	1	2	1	1
Wealth	4	5	16	7	10	X	X	X	X
Handicap	X	X	X	X	X	2	1	7	0
Cumulative discrimination experience (%)	31	37	57	52	25	17	31	66	65

Source: Sik- Várhalmi (2010), Sik, 2009

* - From Transcarpathia (Ukraine), ** - From neighbor countries, X – Not questioned

Table A3.2: The social milieu of ethnicity induced discrimination experience of migrant groups in Hungary (% among those with discrimination experience)

	Non visible minorities		Visible minorities		
	Ethnic Hungarians from Transcarpathia	Ukrainians	Chinese	Vietnamiese	Arabs
N	63	72	110	105	45
Job search	64	47	24	42	50
Workplace	37	44	42	32	21
Immigration office	31	40	57	40	20
Other offices	35	65	60	36	25
Police	14	13	64	55	28
School	23	16	30	27	22
Health care system	30	39	53	35	17
Restaurant, pub, bar	11	12	67	38	64
Shopping	7	14	66	40	38
Neighborhood	16	22	21	16	32
Street	8	11	75	79	67

Source: Sik- Várhalmi (2010)

Table A3.3: The social milieu of ethnicity induced discrimination experience of migrant groups and locals in Budapest (% among those with discrimination experience)

	Budapest natives	Hungarians from abroad	Chinese	Muslim
N	600	300	300	300
Job search	14	30	13	47
Workplace	9	28	32	38
School	6	28	17	12
Health care system	2	24	21	15
Immigration office	1	34	27	17
Police	7	9	26	10
Church	0	0	4	5
Restaurant, bar, pub	7	9	34	20
Street	5	9	51	21
Neighborhood	2	8	14	9
Shopping	4	5	33	19
Public transport	3	6	38	27

Source: Sik (2009).

Annex 4: Discrimination experience models in Hungary

Table A4.1: The model of ethnic origin induced discrimination experience among four migrant groups in Hungary[65]

	Ethnic Hungarians*	Ukrainians	Chinese	Vietnamese
Control variables				
Male	3.37			
Entrepreneur	0.18			
No command of Hungarian language		2.89	0.39	
Migration variables				
Successful – compared to Hungarians			0.40	
Successful – compared to non migrants back home			6.45	
Identity variables				
Strong towards Hungary		3.62		
Wants Hungarian citizenship	0.37			1.97
Strong ties with homeland	1.89			
Follows home customs				0.48

* - from Transcarpathia.

Source. Sik – Várhalmi (2010)

[65] Since the model serves only as benchmark do develop further hypotheses we included to the table only those variables which were significant at least in case of one minority.

Table A4.2: The model of skin color induced discrimination experience among three migrant groups in Hungary[66]

	Chinese	Vietnamese	Arabs
Control variables			
High education		0.47	
Religiosity			0.27
Migration variables			
Successful – compared to non migrants back home	3.72		
Identity variables			
Strong towards Hungary			0.18
Strong ties with homeland			2.42
Follows home customs		0.28	
Wants double citizenship	3.16		2.68

Source. Sik – Várhalmi (2010)

Table A4.3: The three proxies of labor market discrimination experience by labor market groups (%)

	Labor market mobility discrimination experience (active population)	Discrimination experience at the workplace (employed)	Cumulative discrimination experience (employed)
Total	6	9	11
Age			
18–27 years	15	X	X
28–37 years	7	11	13
38–47 years	5	5	6
48–62 years	3	7	8
Significance (χ^2)	*0.002*	*0.025*	*0.014*
Educational attainment			
Primary	13	X	X
Vocational training	6	9	11
Upper secondary	7	11	13
Tertiary	2	7	8
Significance (χ^2)	*0.016*	0.662	0.743
Settlement type			
Budapest	4	18	20
County seat	9	4	7
Town	6	10	11
Village	7	5	6
Significance (χ^2)	0.507	*0.007*	*0.009*

Note: statistically significant values of χ^2 are marked in italics, *X* = low cell count.

Source. Sik – Simonovits (2010)

[66] Since the model serves only as benchmark do develop further hypotheses we included to the table only those variables which were significant at least in case of one minority.

Table A4.4: Factors affecting discrimination experience (logistic regression)

	Labour market mobility discrimination experience, active (*N* = 602)			Discrimination experience in the workplace, employed (*N* = 399)			Cumulative discrimination experience, employed (*N* = 399)		
	Wald test	Significance	Odd ratio	Wald test	Significance	Odd ratio	Wald test	Significance	Odd ratio
Age (38–47 years)	*7.762*	*0.051*		12.167	*0.007*		7.785	*0.051*	
– 18–27 years	3.193	0.074	2.700	10.802	*0.001*	7.009	7.277	*0.007*	5.502
– 28–37 years	1.987	0.159	2.104	2.818	0.093	2.243	1.659	0.198	1.946
– 48–62 years	0.593	0.441	0.598	0.511	0.475	1.475	0.609	0.435	1.564
Employment (employed)	23.967	*0.000*		–	–	–	–	–	–
– Self-employed, entrepreneur	0.000	0.997	0.000	–	–	–	–	–	–
– Temporary work	3.229	0.072	4.682	–	–	–	–	–	–
– Unemployed	21.311	*0.000*	8.470	–	–	–	–	–	–
– Maternity leave	0.041	0.840	0.842	–	–	–	–	–	–
Constant	19.209	0.000	0.003	13.730	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.998	0.000

Note: Only those explanatory variables are illustrated which have significant effect at least in one model. Statistically significant values (Wald test level of significance is smaller than 0.05) are marked in italics; reference categories are shown in brackets.

Source. Sik – Simonovits (2010)

Annex 5: Models of ethnicity induced discrimination experience

Table A5.1: The determinants of ethnicity induced discrimination experience among nine minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (logistic regression)*

	Baltic region				Eastern Europe	East Central Europe	
	Russians in Latvia	Russians in Lithuania	Belarusians in Lithuania	Poles in Lithuania	Ukrainians in Poland	Hungarians in Ukraine	Hungarians in Slovakia
-2 Log Likelihood	600,6	458,8	249,2	463,3	248,7	256,6	493,3
	(0.98)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(0.99)	(0.85)	(0.99)
Model Chi Sq. Improvement	64,9	73,7	40,2	60,8	55,5	97,7	71,8
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.02)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Goodness of Fit,	741,4	761,5	383,4	798,0	320,9	274,6	658,2
	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.99)	(0.61)	(0.72)
Correctly predicted (%)	83	88	85	89	85	80	86
N	731	743	372	760	340	309	706
Identity variables							
Dumemg						3.19**	
Dumrc		0.60	0.31*	0.58*	0.24**	0.19**	0.55*
Dumsc	3.10**	2.06*					1.82*
Ethnic3				2.08**		0.55	
Titu3							
Euiden3							0.48

	Baltic region				Eastern Europe	East Central Europe	
	Russians in Latvia	Russians in Lithuania	Belarusians in Lithuania	Poles in Lithuania	Ukrainians in Poland	Hungarians in Ukraine	Hungarians in Slovakia
Control variables							
Male				0.57	0.53		
Young					2.52*		
Old				0.42*		0.18*	0.22**
Speaking at home on the language "at home"	0.18	0.18	0.25				
Speaking at home both on the language "at home" and "back home"		0.37*					0.32**
Primary school				0.49	3.11*	5.43*	
Higher school			2.09				3.28**
Unemployed		2.37*		1.89			
Pensioner		2.42		2.99**			
Lack of wealth							0.35**
High level wealth					0.37		
Low class		1.67				0.21**	
High class					0.49		
Low status						0.37	2.36*
Low tension	0.43*	0.17**		0.31*			0.42**
High tension	1.98**	1.91*	3.10**	1.92*	3.31**	2.34*	

* The model shows only the explanatory variables (all dummies) with significant impact. The reference categories (where there were more than two categories are: middle age tercile, secondary education, middle level of wealth and tension, sending country language spoken at home, middle level of class, status and tension terciles. The cells contain the odd ratio and the level of significance (* = Chi square significant on level p= 0.05 – 0.001, ** = Chi square significant below level p= 0.0009). Odd ratio without star - the significance level was between p = 0.05 and 0.10.

Annex 6: Social milieu specific models of ethnicity induced discrimination experience

Table A6.1: The determinants of ethnicity induced discrimination experience at the workplace and in the job search, among three minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (logistic regression)*

	At the workplace			In the job search		
	Russians in Latvia	Hungarians in Ukraine	Hungarians in Slovakia	Russians in Latvia	Hungarians in Ukraine	Hungarians in Slovakia
-2 Log Likelihood	94,4	49,8	84,8	110,5	59,5	76,3
	(0.06)	(0.60)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Model Chi Sq. Improvement	39,1	48,1	34,5	26,0	38,2	41,0
	(0.03)	(0.002)	(0.08)	(0.35)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Goodness of Fit,	85,7	54,0	85,2	128,5	54,9	85,6
	(0.16)	(0.43)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.32)	(0.05)
Correctly predicted (%)	77	84	77	75	80	79
N	99	78	90	104	76	89
Identity variables						
Dumemg						7.03*
Dumrc		0.01*			0.23*	
Dumsc		28.0*	4.87			
Ethnic3			0.23			
Titu3						
Euiden3						
Control variables						
Young		0.12				
Primary school		83.2			25.3*	
Higher school		112,3**				
Unemployed		0.01*				
Lack of wealth	0.07	210.0*				
High level wealth						
Low class						26.7**
High status		612,1**				
Low tension	0.07*					
High tension	0.34	8.4		4.33*		

* The model shows only the explanatory variables (all dummies) with significant impact. The reference categories (where there were more than two categories are: middle age tercile, secondary education, middle level of wealth and tension, sending country language spoken at home, middle level of class, status and tension terciles. The cells contain the odd ratio and the level of significance (* = Chi square significant on level p= 0.05 – 0.001, ** = Chi square significant below level p= 0.0009). Odd ratio without star - the significance level was between p = 0.05 and 0.10.

Table A6.2: The determinants of ethnicity induced discrimination experience in the health care system and in the shops, among three minorities along the Eastern border of the EU (logistic regression)*

	In the health care system			In the shops		
	Russians in Latvia	Hungarians in Ukraine	Hungarians in Slovakia	Russians in Latvia	Hungarians in Ukraine	Hungarians in Slovakia
-2 Log Likelihood	109,8	61,5	99,8	133,5	48,4	98,7
	(0.07)	(0.20)	(0.01)	(0.003)	(0.65)	(0.01)
Model Chi Sq. Improvement	25,5	42,4	24,4	20,4	30,7	20,5
	(0.38)	(0.01)	(0.46)	(0.38)	(0.16)	(0.67)
Goodness of Fit,	111,9	76,6	85,8	111,5	48,6	87,3
	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.68)	(0.07)
Correctly predicted (%)	81	85	71	72	87	72
N	114	78	95	117	78	94
Identity variables						
Dumemg						
Dumrc			0.24			
Dumsc		9.11*	3.55			
Ethnic3		6.9	0.24			0.19
Titu3						
Euiden3		25.7*				
Control variables						
Old		0.01**				
Speaking at home on the language “at home”					23.1	
Primary school		135,0*				
Unemployed		0.03				0.15
Lack of wealth	15.7**	167,7*		3,33*		
Low class		0.03	0.13*			

The model shows only the explanatory variables (all dummies) with significant impact. The reference categories (where there were more than two categories are: middle age tercile, secondary education, middle level of wealth and tension, sending country language spoken at home, middle level of class, status and tension terciles. The cells contain the odds ratio and the level of significance (= Chi square significant on level p= 0.05 – 0.001, ** = Chi square significant below level p= 0.0009). Odd ratio without star - the significance level was between p = 0.05 and 0.10.

1.3 Constructing Border Ethnic Identities along the Frontier of Central and Eastern Europe

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1.3.1 Introduction

The following analysis is based on an empirical sociological survey aimed at exploring the various aspects of people's diaspora affiliations and the social psychological characteristics of their ethnic and national identity on the borderland of Europe. Analysing border ethnic identity researchers have several options to carry out their analysis. First, the stock of knowledge of ethnic and national identity can be approached from various historical, political and cultural aspects, and second, it can be examined within the political and intellectual process where this knowledge is shaped and altered, and where the different actors transform, re-write and re-shape the fabric of knowledge. Third, this knowledge is manifested in representations like ethnic and national symbols, objects, texts and events (Gerő 2006). Finally, and of utmost importance for this analysis, we can make an attempt to reveal the components of identity and identification mechanisms which manifest in everyday life and to analyze how they change over time. Therefore the subject of this investigation is not the diaspora or ethnic minority as historically conceived community, or an intellectual narrative, or a cultural tradition, but as a community of members, of ordinary people. The goal of our approach is to reconstruct the image of the ethnic minority, which is created through everyday observations, attitudes and value judgments in the individual's mind, as well as the image that is organized into a coherent identity as some sort of collective stock of knowledge at the societal level.

The exploration of the everyday social psychological features of national consciousness and ethnic identity implies a model which was developed by György Csepeli based on his surveys in the 1980s and 1990s (Csepeli 2000) a variant of which also appears in analyses by Henk Dekker (Dekker 2003). Essentially, these models describe identity as a stock of knowledge based on cognitive and affective components, which is built and organized as a coherent structure from a hierarchy of closely linked parts. The primary level of ethnic or national affiliation is spontaneous emotional identification, which creates the individual's sense of closeness to the group defined by the members of the nation. On this emotional base various attitudes, drives, values and ideologies are built which organize his identity. Nation as a social group or ethnic group membership gain the form and content which create for the individual the framework of psychological identification, beginning from an instinctive form and becoming increasingly conscious, through various categorizations, attributions, stereotypes, and also ethnocentrism and nationalism. Cognitive and affective mechanisms can represent a variety of themes from the natural environment through constructing a historical past to the big questions of culture, politics, the economy or even morals.

This study will follow the Dekker-Csepeli model's structure as best as possible. Our main question is which factors determine the assimilation strategies of ethnic diasporas: whether an individual continues, interrupts or reiterates the multi-thread story as a result of which he specifies himself as a member of one or the other ethnic group, or just the opposite, emotive and affective factors have decisive role in it. Our main hypothesis is, that in case of ethnic diasporas the ethnic identity is not only influenced by cognitive and affective mechanisms, but also life path moments. We assume that these two factors determine the choice between assimilation and integration strategies.(Csepeli, Örkény, Székelyi 2000)

The examination of the ethnic background of respondents' ancestors shows that the ethno-history of the family carries the contradictory tendencies which are inspired by the national homogenization processes inherent in the development of the nation state and carry both assimilation and dissimilation tensions. We need to find answers to the question what degree successive generations are able to transfer the pattern of ethnic homogeneity within the family, and if not, when this pattern is broken, how it is replaced by heterogeneity.

Since we asked respondents from which national and ethnic group they chose their spouses, we can also demonstrate the current pattern of ethnic homogeneity or heterogeneity within the family. Marriage has a clearly visible key role in the survival strategy of an ethnic diaspora in minority position. Linguistic tolerance deeply influences the relationship between ethnic minorities and the majority which is considered the state-constitutive nation.

Linguistic homogenization is hidden in the program of national homogenization, which poses a significant challenge for members of the group interested in maintaining minority language use. They can face this challenge only if they acquire the language which is considered the official language of the state, i. e., the language of the majority. Not only language use practices but the ethnic homogeneity or heterogeneity of the personal network plays an important role in preserving or restraining personal ethnic identity. The ethnic composition of the circle of friends can have a strong influence on identity building and self-identification.

To justify our main hypothesis, first we discuss the personal history of identity, and we demonstrate how certain diaspora are similar and how they are different when they establish their own ethnic identities. Next step we introduce some cognitive building blocks (such as spontaneous emotional identification and feeling of pride toward own ethnic diaspora, social distance and trust relations toward the own and other groups) that are part of the construction of identity. In the final section we consider integration-assimilation strategies characteristic of the diaspora and attempt to describe the category system behind these strategies, based on which the members of diaspora construct their national identities.

1.3.2 The logic of this analysis

Empirical social science often debates whom to consider a member of given groups (ethnic, religious, etc.). Those who declare themselves as belonging or those who are labelled as belonging by outsiders might be considered members. Such debates do not affect the international study conducted in eight countries67 in 2010. The research design considered only the self-identification of the respondents as an indicator of group membership, and ignored the judgment of outside actors. The study, however, covered many levels of analysis, as having respondents from minorities in eight countries made possible the creation of dyads. For example, we could compare Slovaks living in Hungary to Hungarians living in Slovakia and thus compare how given countries „treats" an ethnic group whose mother country is a place of residence for a minority "torn" from the majority society. Further, we can examine how given countries are perceived by minorities living there. For example, do Poles and Byelorussians living in Ukraine have the same experience living there? We can go further and ask which country serves as a more liveable home for given minorities. For example, is the situation of the Polish minority better in Ukraine or in Byelorussia? Incorporating other international studies we examine the situation of given minorities, comparing their attitudes with those of their host countries' majorities, case by case.

[67] The countries in the study are: Byelorussia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine.

The logic of this analysis means that one country from the ENRI project – namely Latvia – will not be a part of your further examination, given that no Latvian ethnic minority lives in any of the other countries of the study. Further, some ethnic minority groups from the ENRI field study are "lost" to us given that the other partner in the dyad is not part of our study. It is for this reason that we neglect, for example, Poles in Lithuania (we did not collect data on Lithuanians in Poland) or Hungarians in Ukraine or Byelorussians in Lithuania.

Our analysis employs four dyads with eight ethnic minority groups[68], which are the followings:

1.	RUSSIANS IN LITHUANIA	LITHUANIANS IN RUSSIA
2.	POLES IN UKRAINE	UKRAINIANS IN POLAND
3.	BYELORUSSIANS IN POLAND	POLES IN BYELORUSSIA
4.	SLOVAKS IN HUNGARY	HUNGARIANS IN SLOVAKIA

1.3.3 Personal ethnic identity

To belong to a nation, or to develop national identity, it is necessary that the individual have some kind of relationship with his/her (national-ethnic) group. Clearly, everyone tries to construct group belonging based on feelings and values that are deemed positive. The act of birth in a legal sense makes obvious group belonging, but from a psychological point of view it is a necessary condition for "filling" and strengthening identity with emotional and cognitive content. For diaspora, however, the situation is not so simple. In Eastern Europe national borders have been repeatedly modified. Thus, it is a fact that birth in the territory of one country does not guarantee that one will remain a citizen of that state, even if the individual does not change residence in his/her lifetime. This paradox actually strengthens the role of emotional and cognitive elements in the development of ethnic identity. We did not study the question of which factors define whether the individual continues, terminates or restarts the multi-stranded history through which he/she marks him/herself as the member of a diaspora group. We are certain that the history of diaspora – and within them the histories of the individual members – are related to the contradictory assimilation and dissimilation stresses in the national homogenization process inherent in the development of the nation state.

Acknowledging the above we now return to the basic question posed in the introduction, namely whether members of given minority groups mark themselves as belonging to the host or the mother country. Does the diaspora in the country of residence provide the basis of identity, or do such individuals use ancestry to distinguish themselves from the majority?

[68] The sample size of the ethnic groups in the given countries was 400 to 800. In the interest of later interpreting differences between groups, such that the complex indicators developed would have equal weight in all the groups, we "changed" the sample size of all the ethnic groups. We did this through simple weighting.

Table 1: Ethnic status, based on self-identification according to minority group, percent

	Mother country	Diaspora	Host country, but originating in mother country	Host country	Total
Russians in LITHUANIA	22.6	61.7	*14.5*	1.2	100.0
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	*7.6*	49.5	38.6	4.3	100.0
Poles in UKRAINE	11.8	68.4	19.8	----	100.0
Ukrainians in POLAND	15.5	65.9	17.3	1.3	100.0
Byelorussians in POLAND	*2.5*	*36.6*	59.3	1.5	100.0
Poles in BYELORUSSIA	21.5	60.5	18.0	------	100.0
Slovaks in HUNGARY	----	65.8	21.9	12.2	100.0
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	16.4	69.0	13.4	1.3	100.0
Together[69]	12.3	59.7	25.3	2.7	100.0

During self-identification the respondents chose mainly the ethnic minority, or belonging to the diaspora. Particularly Hungarians in Slovakia and Poles in Ukraine (almost 70 percent for both groups) chose belonging to the diaspora as the basis for their identity. The second most common option was belonging to the majority society, although the minority group as the group of origin was marked as well. This is how Byelorussians in Ukraine see themselves (60 percent), as do many Lithuanians in Russia (close to 40 percent). It is more rare for the members of ethnic minorities to declare themselves as members of their mother countries. Compared to the other groups Russians in Lithuania and Poles in Byelorussia have a relatively high proportion (above 20 percent) of members who declare themselves as belonging to the mother country. Complete melting into the population of the host country is rather rare. Only Slovaks living in Hungary showed a proportion in this alternative of over ten percent. The alternatives offered for defining ethnic identity - starting from strict adherence to the original ethnic group to complete inclusion in the majority society – can be seen as the stations of the assimilation process. In this sense the Slovaks in Hungary and the Byelorussians in Poland can be considered the most assimilated minorities, while Russian in Lithuania, Lithuanian in Russia and Hungarians in Slovakia are minorities that preserve their difference.

1.3.4 Life path moments as the basis of identity

If one's parents are members of an ethnic minority, but was born in the host country, there is a chance that he/she will feel close to the country of residence. The chances of this are higher when (at least) [70] one of the parents is a member of the majority group.

[69] The eight ethnic groups taken together cannot be interpreted as a group, thus the row titled „Together" is somewhat devoid of meaning. We included it because it can help us to form an impression of what a characteristic „average" ethnic group would look like. It may be easier to understand differences among groups by paying attention to a kind of „total".

[70] There are cases where the respondent's parents were deemed to be part of the majority group of the host society, but where the child takes on the identity of the grandparents, from which point the child will claim to be close to the diaspora or the former mother country.

1.3.5 Ethnic roots, nationality of parents

First let us consider the ethnic roots of the respondents, whether they grew up in ethnically mixed marriages, or whether both parents were members of the ethnic minority group.

Table 2: Ethnic affiliation of parents, percent

	From host country	Host and mother country or diaspora	Mother country or diaspora and third ethnic group	Mother country and diaspora	Mother country	Total
Russians in LITHUANIA		13.8	20.5	*10.5*	54.9	100.0
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	4.5	26.1	8.7	*2.6*	58.0	100.0
Poles in UKRAINE	1.2	30.8	2.1	*2.4*	63.4	100.0
Ukrainians in POLAND	1.7	*7.3*	2.9	33.7	54.4	100.0
Byelorussians in POLAND	1.1	*4.6*	*1.7*	80.8	*11.7*	100.0
Poles in BYELORUSSIA		15.7	4.0	29.7	50.6	100.0
Slovaks in HUNGARY	6.1	11.9	*1.9*	71.6	*8.5*	100.0
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	1.0	14.5	2.8	17.6	64.0	100.0
Together	2.0	15.5	5.7	31.1	45.6	100.0

We can state that for all minority groups, parents tend to choose a marriage partner from among their own ethnic group. It is also apparent how the peoples of East Central Europe drifted thanks to border revisions, annexations of regions, and the resettlement of large groups. The majority of the parents of respondents were born in the mother country but became citizens of the host country, often without changing their place of residence but instead because of the changes of state borders. (Three-quarters of parents belonging to the ethnic group of the mother country are citizens of the host country.) The homogenous marriages of the parents appear even more common if we include parents where both members are members of the diaspora. Ethnically mixed marriages were rare in the parents' generation, although they occur someone more often among Poles in Ukraine and Lithuanians. There are some respondents who considered themselves members of ethnic minorities both of whose parents belonged to the host country's ethnic majority. This case occurs more than average among parents of Lithuanians in Russia and Slovaks in Hungary, but this is hardly more than five percent in both cases. It is not the number of cases that is of interest here; the phenomenon is worthy of attention because it is a unique addition to the stations of assimilation. The parents had already lost their original ethnic identities, but the generation of respondents underwent what appears to us to be an identity renaissance. We can assume the "newly" established countries of Lithuania and Slovakia had a positive effect on the resurrection of these identities.

The parents of the majority of the *Russian-Lithuanian dyad* (55 and 58 percent, respectively) chose partners from the mother country. The parents of the Lithuanian minority often lived in ethnically mixed marriages (i.e., chose a Russian spouse). A higher than average number of Lithuanian respondents had two Russian parents. This paradox can be understood by considering that under Soviet rule there was little opportunity for the official and precise presentation of ethnic identity. Of course it is also possible that the phenomenon is reflective of the very first signs of the national awakening of Lithuanians. We will return to this point below. Russians living in a minority situation are regularly from families where one parent is Russian, while the other is

from another (non-Lithuanian) ethnic group. To understand this we again must consider the former Soviet Union acted as a great ethnic melting pot.

In the case of the *Polish-Ukrainian dyad* the majority of parents chose spouses from their own ethnic group (83 and 54 percent, respectively). Polish parents gave up on ethnic homophony relatively often (31 percent) and chose Ukrainian partners. Closed borders meant that there were very few marriages between members of the diaspora and citizens of the mother country within the parents' generation.

In the *Polish-Byelorussian dyad* the Byelorussian parents married almost exclusively within their own ethnic group (93 percent), though more than 80 percent of the parents of Polish respondents lived in ethnically homogeneous marriages. The parents of Poles living in Ukraine had ethnically mixed marriages more often than the Ukrainian parents on the other side of the dyad.

Finally, the *Slovak-Hungarian dyad* is also a case in which the vast majority of parents were in a homophone marriage (80 percent). While the parents of Slovaks were such that one parent was often a member of the diaspora and the other was from the mother country, for Hungarians most marriages were within the diaspora.[71] The proportion of Slovak-Hungarian mixed marriages compared to the rest of the ethnic groups was average (12 and 15 percent). Among Slovaks in Hungary we also noticed – much like for Russians in Lithuania – that while the parents considered themselves part of the ethnic majority of the host country, the respondents considered themselves part of the minority group. We will return to the question of strengthening ethnic self-identity.

1.3.6 Life Path Stations

The emotive attachment behind personal identity is likely partly dependent on whether one was born in the host country or whether the country became a place of residence only later, perhaps even in adulthood through moving or other means. Another defining factor is whether the individual attended school in his/her mother tongue, and whether the family spoke the language of the mother country or the host country. This latter factor is related to whether the family was ethnically homogeneous or mixed, i.e., whether the spouse (should there be one) was of the host or mother country.

Place of birth

As a first step we will consider the place of birth. Table 3 shows that most of the members of the examined ethnic groups were born in the host country. The only exception is the Lithuanian-Russian dyad, where one quarter of the Russians living in Lithuania and more than one third of the Lithuanians living in Russia were born in the mother country. However, it is not rare to see respondents in this dyad having been born in third countries. It thus appears that in terms of place of birth we have a consistent picture across minority groups. The results for schooling are more interesting.

[71] It is important to note that such differences can be explained by the distribution of age in the sample. The Slovak sample is older, and their parents married earlier, when the border changed often. The respondents could not remember precisely whether their parents were born in the mother country or whether they were members of ethnic minorities living in territories annexed by Hungary

Table 3: Respondents' place of birth, according to ethnic group, percent

	Host country	Mother country	A third country	Total
Russians in LITHUANIA	59.0	25.0	16.0	100.0
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	54.0	37.5	8.5	100.0
Poles in UKRAINE	98.5	.8	.8	100.0
Ukrainians in POLAND	100.0	- -	- -	100.0
Byelorussians in POLAND	100.0	- -	- -	100.0
Poles in BYELORUSSIA	97.0	1.0	2.0	100.0
Slovaks in HUNGARY	99.3	.8	- -	100.0
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	96.5	1.8	1.8	100.0
Together	88.0	8.3	3.6	100.0

Schooling in the mother tongue

Before we turn to considering how regularly members of ethnic minorities attended school in their mother tongue across groups, we should clarify that the indicator points to more than the role of language in the preservation of ethnic identity. The historic period in which the schooling took place is also of importance, as is whether or not the host country made minority schooling available, and whether minority schools and universities existed at all. With this in mind, let us consider our results in Table 4.

Table 4: Regularity of schooling in the mother tongue, percent

	Did not receive schooling in mother tongue	Received schooling in mother tongue	Total
Russians in LITHUANIA	10.3	89.8	100.0
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	64.0	36.0	100.0
Poles in UKRAINE	78.3	21.8	100.0
Ukrainians in POLAND	34.0	66.0	100.0
Byelorussians in POLAND	33.5	66.5	100.0
Poles in BYELORUSSIA	91.0	9.0	100.0
Slovaks in HUNGARY	29.0	71.0	100.0
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	20.5	79.5	100.0
Together	45.1	54.9	100.0

With the exception of the Slovak-Hungarian dyad, the dyad members are characterized by inverted positioning. While the majority of Russians in Lithuania studied in their mother tongue, only about one third of Lithuanians living in Russia studied – or was able to study – in native language schools. Poles did not have much opportunity to study in Polish in Ukraine, while the majority of Ukrainians attended non-Polish schools in Poland. The Poles were no better off in Byelorussia, given that 91 percent of them attended Russian language schools, while the majority of Byelorussians in Poland could study in their own language. Having the opportunity to study in their own languages and making use of it characterized both members of the Hungarian-Slovak dyad.

To gain insight into the effect of changes in education opportunities over time, we should examine how cohorts born in various time periods used, or were able to use, schooling in their mother tongues.

Table 5: Changes in mother tongue schooling in minority groups, percent

		Before WWII	Up to the 20th Congress	Brezhnev era	Gorbachov and after	Together
Russians in LITHUANIA	Did not attend	6.5	5.3	9.4	34.2	10.3
	Attended	93.5	94.7	90.6	65.8	89.7
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	Did not attend	16.4	54.0	75.1	76.8	64.0
	Attended	83.6	46.0	24.9	23.2	36.0
Poles in UKRAINE	Did not attend	74.4	92.6	80.2	57.9	78.3
	Attended	25.6	7.4	19.8	42.1	21.8
Ukrainians in POLAND	Did not attend	54.5	41.2	26.9	19.0	34.0
	Attended	45.5	58.8	73.1	81.0	66.0
Byelorussians in POLAND	Did not attend	36.3	20.0	35.0	46.7	33.5
	Attended	63.7	80.0	65.0	53.3	66.5
Poles in BYELORUSSIA	Did not attend	80.5	98.6	95.0	89.7	91.0
	Attended	19.5	1.4	5.0	10.3	9.0
Slovaks in HUNGARY	Did not attend	39.0	15.2	22.4		29.1
	Attended	61.0	84.8	77.6	100.0	70.9
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	Did not attend	13.4	19.6	22.1	28.6	20.3
	Attended	86.6	80.4	77.9	71.4	79.7

The expansion of liberties affected the minorities of the Soviet empire in different ways. Russians wanted to be less and less „Russian" in Lithuania, while Lithuanians increasingly chose Lithuanian schools as we move from the Stalin period toward to collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Polish-Ukrainian dyad both ethnic groups increasingly made use of mother tongue education opportunities. Regarding the Byelorussia in Poland, the definition of mother tongue is unclear. More than 90 percent of the population of Byelorussia speaks Russian, and the Byelorussian language (which is foremost an official language) is spoken much less. With this in mind, the fluctuating trend of native language education is not a reflection of changes in the opportunity to study in Byelorussian, but of the relationship with the Russian language.

Knowledge of mother tongue

Linguistic tolerance can deeply affect the relationship between ethnic-national minorities and the state-founding majority. National homogenization carries the possibility of linguistic homogenization, which can be a major challenge for the members of the group with an interest in preserving the use of the native languages. The challenge can only be met if they learn the official language of the state, i.e., the language of the majority. At the same time one of the necessary conditions for preserving identity is the knowledge and use of the mother tongue in everyday life. In this sense the Byelorussians and Ukrainians are in a peculiar situation, given that the majorities in their mother countries speak Russian and thus knowledge of the mother tongue hardly occurs among them. The majority of the rest of the minority groups (80 percent) speak their mother tongue. Mostly the Poles (49 percent in Byelorussia and 30 percent in Ukraine) have lost their mother tongue, and one quarter of Lithuanians living in Russia does not speak Lithuanian. All the Hungarians and Russians speak their mother tongue, and only one tenth of Slovaks no longer

speak Slovak. (It is worth noting that integration is only possible through knowledge of the host country's official language. The members of the minority groups have learned the official languages of the host countries. One exception is Russians in Lithuania, as more than 10 percent of them do not speak the official language of the state. Among Russians the very old (average age of 67) were able to live all their lives without knowing Lithuanian, and they have not learned the language up to this point).

The everyday use of the mother tongue is characteristic of one third of the minority groups. Another third uses both the mother tongue and the language of state in the home, while the final third uses only the host country's language at home. There are significant differences between minority groups.

Figure 1: Language use in the family across minority groups, percent



As can be seen in Figure 1, Russians and Hungarians speak their native languages in the home, and will at times make use of the state language concurrently. (This phenomenon foreshadows the fact that an important indicator of identity preservation is the ethnic composition of the family). Polish and Lithuanian families hardly use the mother tongue. Byelorussians and Ukrainians use two languages for domestic communication, one being the host country's official language, the other being nor Byelorussian or Ukrainian, but Russian instead.72 Slovaks are characterized by bilingualism, but many speak Hungarian at home.

Language use in the home is largely dependent on the language knowledge of the members of the family. We say that a wide majority of minority group members speak the language of the host country, and most know their native languages well.

[72] See the discussion of use of mother tongue in this section.

The use of mother tongue in family communication is probably more common when the members of the family know the language, i.e., when the spouse is from the same ethnic group. (No doubt that there are instances where a minority language is used in the family even when not every member speaks that language. Research on ethnic minority groups, however, shows that ethnically mixed families will use the language of the majority, and in this sense mixed marriages are a precursor to assimilation.) Let us examine the ethnic composition of marriages.

The ethnic composition of marriages

A little more than half of the respondents (56 percent) are married or are in a long-term partnership. Thus the ethnic origin of spouses is limited as an indicator of identity protection or assimilation.

Table 6: Ethnicity of spouse in minority groups, percent

Dyad elements	Ethnicity of spouse				Total
	Third ethnic group	Diaspora	Mother country	Host country	
LT, Russians	18.4	21.4	41.3	18.9	100.0
RU, Lithuanians	8.5	20.6	2.2	68.6	100.0
UA, Poles	4.4	9.7	41.3	44.7	100.0
PL, Ukrainians	3.1	35.8	29.2	31.9	100.0
PL, Byelorussians	.9	81.8	4.7	12.6	100.0
BY, Poles	5.4	5.8	55.6	33.2	100.0
HU, Slovaks	1.4	43.5	1.4	53.6	100.0
SK, Hungarians	1.2	24.6	58.5	15.7	100.0

Mixed marriages are most common among the Lithuanian and Slovak groups, while they are relatively rare among Byelorussians and Hungarians. The choice of a partner from the mother country, much like the choice of a native language school, is not just a function of individual choice. There were times when it was difficult to marry someone from across the border, and there were times when the diaspora was still part of the mother country and the choice of a partner from here posed no problem whatsoever. These days borders do not have such a strong separating role (the Hungarian-Slovak border is a case in point), while some borders are still difficult to cross. We can also state that the majority of Byelorussians (86 percent), Hungarians (83 percent), Ukrainians (65 percent) and Russians (64 percent) are in homophone marriages, and this applies to a lesser degree to Poles in Byelorussia and Ukraine (61 percent and 51 percent respectively).

Circle of friends

The „willingness" of an ethnic minority to assimilate, i.e., the degree to which its members attempt to maintain their distinctiveness within the mother country or conversely to which they attempt to blend into the majority society, is well illustrated by the composition of the circle of friends.

Table 7: The makeup of the circle of friends, by minority group, percent

Dyad elements	Friends				Total
	Host country only	Mixed	Diaspora only	Mother country only	
LT, Russians	8.8	51.1	27.3	12.8	100.0
RU, Lithuanians	29.0	65.7	2.7	2.7	100.0
UA, Poles	23.1	46.8	28.8	1.3	100.0
PL, Ukrainians	36.2	33.8	27.5	2.5	100.0
PL, Byelorussians	16.1	25.9	56.7	1.3	100.0
BY, Poles	4.5	67.4	28.1		100.0
HU, Slovaks	27.2	22.9	48.7	1.2	100.0
SK, Hungarians	4.1	40.7	50.0	5.2	100.0

Table 7 is set up along an assimilation slope: it starts on the left with those minority members who have friends from only the host country's majority and then moves on to ethnically mixed groups, then groups made up exclusively of contacts from within the diaspora network, to individuals with friends only from the mother country. The minorities are placed at varying points along this process, but for all groups the majority – to a lesser or higher degree – chooses to keep with friends from their own group. However, for a network of friends to be composed exclusively of diaspora members (with some from the mother country), or for friendships to have formed with members of the host country strongly depends on the country and the minority in question. From an ethnic point of view the most closed minorities are the Byelorussians and the Hungarians, with 58 percent and 55 percent respectively choosing friends from the diaspora or the mother country only. (Friendship with those from the mother country is relatively rare, which is not an indicator of distance from the mother country. Over a longer period of time it was almost impossible to cross borders, and thus the old ties of friendship weakened.) It is common among Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Slovaks to have friends only from the host country (around 30 percent). Individuals who build their networks of contacts by making room for both the diaspora and the members of the majority society take a balanced approach. This is typical of Lithuanians and Poles in Byelorussia. Ethnically heterogeneous circles of friends are most rare among Slovaks and Byelorussians.

1.3.7 Cognitive building blocks of diaspora identity

In the previous sections we analyzed how ethnic ancestry, national origin and personal life history moments are interrelated to various forms of personal ethnic identity. On the other hand, behind personal (ethnic) identity lies a cognitive and affective set of knowledge that is constructed of elements that build on one another and that are tightly related. The primary level is that of spontaneous emotive identification, which for the individual creates the feeling of closeness to the diaspora, the nation of origin or the ethnic group that constitutes the majority of the host country as defined by its members. It is upon this emotional basis that various attitudes, urges, values and ideologies are placed and by which ethnic and national identity is organized.

The spontaneous national or ethnic attachment as an unreflected identity is considered self-evident and natural, from constructed national or ethnic identity, which represents and reproduces all or part of the ideological elements. In our analysis we tried to capture both types as far as our project made it possible for us. Following again the logic of the Dekker-Csepeli model, sponta-

neous emotional component was measures by the strength of national and ethnic affiliation, while the cognitive dimension was reconstructed by such factors as social distance (measured by the level of generalized trust), feeling of pride, and sense of discrimination

1.3.8 Spontaneous emotive identification

When an international study aims to deal with societies with divergent historical pasts, differing levels of economic development, and various types of ethnic pluralism, it must deal with the fact that translated words and terms mean different things in different countries. When we tried to answer the seemingly simple question of the degree to which respondents feel closeness to the mother country, the host country or the diaspora, it is worth considering that „closeness" means one thing in communities in which extroverted behaviour is deemed normal, and something else in groups where reserved and distant emotional expression is the norm. Thus, when we wanted to find out which ethnic minority group is most closely tied to its mother country, diaspora or host country, we decided to control for the distorting effect described above. [73] Table 8 illustrates feelings of closeness free of distortions caused by such cultural differences. It is generally true for most ethnic minorities that the feel no connection to East-Central Europe, and Europe is a distant concept for them as well. The mother country is distant as well, with short distances from the mother country shown only in the Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Hungarian groups. Another possible source of the preservation of ethnic identity is connection to the diaspora in the minority situation. This kind of feeling of closeness is visible in all groups, mostly among Russians and Hungarians, and least of all among Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians. Residence, the microclimate of which can reduce tension that is inherent in the minority experience, is the strongest bind for Poles, whether they live in Ukraine or Byelorussia. Inclusion into the majority society and connection to the host country is most characteristic of Slovaks, Poles in Byelorussia and Russians. The varying strengths of binds in a sense provide a profile of the given ethnic groups. The members of the dyads often judge their embededness in opposing ways.

[73] In the case of spontaneous emotional affiliation we accomplished this by comparing the average feeling of closeness with those of the given points of binding. The negative values in the table mean that closeness was lower than the characteristic average for the given ethnic group, while positive values mean that closeness is higher than the average.

Table 8: Feeling of relative closeness[74] according to minority groups, average range

	Mother country	Diaspora	Residence	Host country	East-Central Europe	Europe
Russians in LITHUANIA	-.2366	.4512	.5358	.5211	-.7070	-.5887
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	-.0497	.1276	.3352	.2467	-.3931	-.3342
Poles in UKRAINE	-.6177	.2516	.6061	.4187	-.4072	-.2954
Ukrainians in POLAND	-.0189	.1620	.2773	.2738	-.3792	-.3162
Byelorussians in POLAND	.1813	.1694	.4525	.1731	-.5456	-.5889
Poles in BYELORUSSIA	-.8505	.2750	.5957	.5583	-.5137	-.0865
Slovaks in HUNGARY	-,2620	,2705	,5313	,5683	-,6924	-,6725
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	-,0638	,4416	,3172	,0706	-,5736	-,2702
Together	-,2412	,2692	,4564	,3552	-,5236	-,3888

Russians living in Lithuania almost uniformly feel close to Lithuania, their places of residence and their own minority group. They hardly feel closeness to the mother country or Europe, nor is East-Central Europe a factor in their identity. This indicates embededness in the country of residence, which is coloured by a strong connection to the own ethnic group and a segregationist attitude.

Lithuanians living in Russia feel close foremost to their places of residence. For them the mother country, the country of residence and their own minority group are important yet more distant binding points. European identity does not characterize them. Lithuanians appear less embedded in their country of residence, in comparison with the other group in the dyad.

Ukrainians living in Poland and their dyad partner, Poles living in Ukraine, have a similar bind-map. They lack European identity and are only loosely connected to the mother country. They only deem their residences, country of residence and own ethic group as close, although, as seen in Table 2, there are differences in the measure of closeness.

The members of the Polish-Byelorussian dyad display both similarities and differences. Both groups are characterized by a strong bond with residence and country of residence, and they feel strong affinity with their own ethnic groups. They differ, however, in strength of bond with the mother country. Though neither group has a strong attachment to the mother country, Poles in Byelorussia feel closer to their mother country than do Byelorussians who, of all the offered points of binding, feel furthest from Byelorussia.

In the case of Poland we have the opportunity to compare two minorities that live in the country. The Byelorussian minority group feels closer to Poland than do Ukrainians, and they are less attached to their mother country than Ukrainians to Ukraine. If we examine the responses of Poles living in Ukraine and Byelorussia, it appears that Poles in Byelorussia are an integrated community while Poles in Ukraine feel distant from that host country. Accordingly, for Poles in Ukraine the mother country is closer than it is for Poles in Byelorussia. Feelings of closeness and distance affect one another for the minority groups living in the three countries.

[74] The table contains average closeness for the given ethnic group and differences in distance on a scale from +1 to -1. The highest values mean the strongest, the lowest values the weakest attachment.

Finally, we can consider the members of the Hungarian-Slovak dyad as to being the inverse of one another in a certain aspect. Hungarians feel closest to their own ethnic group and are attached to their residences, but they do not feel close to Slovakia or Hungary. This "homelessness" is not weakened by European identity, given that there is little attachment to East-Central Europe and Europe. Slovaks in Hungary are strongly attached to their country of residence Hungary, and their integration is indicated by the importance of residence in their group. Slovakia is not a mark of identity to them, nor do they have a strong attachment to East-Central Europe. On the other hand, they feel closer to Europe than their partner in the dyad, Hungarians in Slovakia. Thus, this dyad shows us the outlines of a group that is attached to its country of residence and integrated, and another that seems "homeless".

1.3.9 Generalized trust as "social distance"

It is said that friendships are built on trust. Those individuals who build networks only among members of his/her diaspora are likely distrusting of people outside the diaspora. We can state that if one is capable of trusting only members of his/her own ethnic community, then they will not choose to have friends from without the diaspora.

The „quantity" of trust is difficult to measure. Should we ask a trusting and non-trusting person how much they trust members of their own ethnic group, the trusting respondent's reply will likely tend toward "very much," while the suspicious respondent will choose the "somewhat" option. The distortion arising from this can be best avoided by examining which group one trusts most: those from the host country, those from the diaspora, or those from the mother country. The results show that the vast majority of the members of minority groups (close to 90 percent) trust those from the mother country, the disapora and the host country at the same level. There is no difference between groups in the sense of how much trust they have in people in general. According to the responses, the minority groups are characterized by high levels of trust, and this trust is strongly projected toward members of the diaspora, the mother country and the residents of the host country.

The observations on trust allow us to conclude that the minorities hardly feel social distance[75], whether in regards to the mother country or the host country. More than 9- percent of respondents would accept an individual from the mother country or the host country as a member of their family. In this sense there is no difference among groups.

1.3.10 Feeling of pride

The national pride is emotional stable base of ethnic or national identification which incite respondents to overstate, maximize positive elements in their own identities. By our data this tendency is valid in general, but due to historical and cultural specificities the rejection of negative emotional elements are diverse in different dyads.

[75] Social distance was measured using a Bogardus scale.

Table 9: Strength of pride, 4 point scale average

	Proud of sending country	Proud of receiving country	Proud of own diaspora
Russians in LITHUANIA	3,23	2,23	2,98
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	3,01	2,98	2,92
Poles in UKRAINE	3,57	3,08	3,38
Ukrainians in POLAND	3,49	3,16	3,38
Byelorussians in POLAND	3,34	3,13	3,46
Poles in BYELORUSSIA	3,29	2,87	3,41
Slovaks in HUNGARY	2,64	3,14	3,17
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	3,26	2,48	3,37
Together	3,23	2,94	3,27

In general, the greatest is the confidence in the diaspora, this followed by the homeland, and the least confidence is toward host country's people. The strength of pride toward homeland does not differ in the different dyads. The only exception is the Slovak-Hungarian dyad, where the Slovaks show much less pride toward their homeland as the Hungarians feel toward Hungary. The strength of pride toward the host country varies much strongly within the dyads. Lithuanians are much more proud of Russia as the Russians toward their host country, Lithuania. Byelorussians in Poland also pride of host country than Poles in Byelorussia. Finally, Slovaks in Hungary are feeling stronger pride toward Hungary, as Hungarians toward Slovakia. The diaspora as a social group usually generate stronger confidence in minority people. The exceptions are the Russians in Lithuania and the Lithuanians in Russia, where the confidence level is much lower.

1.3.11 The model of personal ethnic identity

After having examined those potential indicators – that were part of the questionnaire – of the degree to which a minority group preserves its ethnic identity, it is now worth trying to attempt a more complex characterization. We assume that the „cornerstone" of personal ethnic identity is the start that the individual receives in the parental home. (This start is indicated by the ethnic identity of the child, i.e., the respondent, and the choice of a mother tongue school.) Upon this is built all that which occurs over a lifetime. The stations of life utilized in the questionnaire are limited to the composition of the circle of friends, the ethnic identity of the spouse, language use in the home, and consumption of newspapers, television and internet materials from the mother country (i.e., the consumption of mother tongue culture). This is all affected and given emotional content by the binds that the member of the minority feels with the other members of the same group and those from the mother country, the trust in one's own group, and the pride felt in belonging to one's own group. These three factors affect how one will define one's own ethnic identity: whether one feels part of the mother country or the diaspora or the host country, or whether one feels he/she has unique ethnic roots or is simply a citizen of the host country. We illustrate the elements that make up ethnic identity using a path model.[76]

[76] Path analysis is a complex regression model. The outlined models show to what degree various ethno-historical and cognitive factors explain strength of ethnic identity. "Explanation" means the strength of the tie between two variables, its degree being indicated by arrows linking boxes. These figures are beta values of regression, the positive sign indi-
Footnote continued =>

Figure 2: Building blocks of personal ethnic identity, multivariate linear regression model (path analysis)



A person belonging to an ethnic minority is not likely to give up his/her original group-identity if he/she is grew up in a family where both parents belong to the minority group (or the mother country) and one attended school in the native language. This ethnic start leads to choices made in adulthood that support the preservation of the original identity, e.g., choosing friends from among members of the diaspora (and perhaps the mother country) and not limiting speaking the mother tongue to the family sphere by consuming media in the mother tongue. These all result in an emotional identification with minority existence, strong ties to the diaspora and even the mother country, pride in origins, and trust toward co-members of the minority. Thus there is a high probability that he/she will claim to belong to the mother country.

In our model we can see that the parental home has an effect on personal ethnic identity even when the respondent diverges from the parental pattern in adulthood, and even when minority existence no longer has emotional content. There is a direct path from the ethnic start to personal identity. We can also see that the parental pattern is ineffective when the individual moves away from his/her own ethnic group in adulthood, where emotional attachment that is necessary for the preservation of ethnic identity dries up (there is no direct path from the ethnic start to the emotive aspect).

We can view the path model above as being capable of describing the possible scripting of minority identity. Strong ethnic roots positively affect the maintenance of ethnic identity for every diad. However, this influence is of varying degrees across given diad members. In the case of the

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cating that the two variables move together, a negative sign that they move in opposite directions. Path analysis shows how independent variables affect the dependent variable directly and through other variables, and the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

Russian-Lithuanian diad, Russians could keep their ethnic identity even if their parents were in ethnically mixed marriages. For the Lithuanians, having parents in mixed marriages significantly weakened the strength of their own ethnic identity. In the case of the Polish-Ukrainian dyad, origin had an equal, albeit a rather weak effect on maintaining ethnic identity. Differences were more significant in the Polish-Byelorussian dyad, where the maintenance of identity for Poles was much more strongly influenced by origin in comparison to the Byelorussians. In the Slovak-Hungarian dyad we measured a very small difference. However, the existing difference indicates that Hungarians in Slovakia are more capable of keeping (or perhaps losing) their Hungarian identity, regardless of origin.

Table 10: The effect of strong ethnic roots to strong personal ethnic identity in the different dyads, adjusted R square

	Adjusted R Square
Russians in LITHUANIA	,154
Lithuanians in RUSSIA	,341
Poles in UKRAINE	,149
Ukrainians in POLAND	,121
Byelorussians in POLAND	,050
Poles in BYELORUSSIA	,156
Slovaks in HUNGARY	,172
Hungarians in SLOVAKIA	,125

1.3.12 Types of minority groups in the construction of personal ethnic identity

In our analysis we show how the building blocks of personal ethnic identity shown in Figure 2 build upon one another in the given dyads or in the minority groups. We will attempt to show commonalities and differences among dyads and between ethnic groups. We have chosen the hierarchical cluster analysis method, in which the strength77 of characteristic relations in given minority groups are compared. Using these comparisons we can look for types in which similar minorities can be grouped.

The types of relationships between ethnic background of the parent and the personal ethnic identity

Parental start hardly influences the embrace of minority identity for most minority groups, who are thus included in the first type. This includes Ukrainians, Slovaks, Hungarians, Russians and Poles in Ukraine. The second type is composed of the two minorities of the Polish-Byelorussian dyad. This type is characterized by the parental start having no significant effect on undertaken personal ethnic identity. Lithuanians comprise a type of their own. In their circle the parental pattern has an unusually strong role in the undertaking of ethnic identity.

[77] The coefficients (betas) derived from the path model of the given group (encountered in Table 2) provide the cluster variables.

Figure 3: Types of relationships between parental ethnic background and personal ethnic identity.



The typology clearly illustrates the differences in how given host countries treated their minorities one or two generations ago.

Types of relationships between life moments and ethnic identity

Russians, Slovaks and Hungarians comprise a type in which the character of identity preservation in the life path has a weak effect on undertaken ethnic identity. The second type contains Poles, whether they live in Byelorussia or Ukraine. For them the life path has a strong effect on personal identity. In the third type we find Lithuanians and Ukrainians where the life path has no effect on undertaken personal identity. This indicates that for these two minorities we have a "fresh", newly appeared ethnic identity that does not consciously use constructed life paths but instead were awakened by historic changes and the newfound independence of the mother countries that allowed for the embrace of ethnic identity. The Byelorussian minority is closely related to this type (it is very similar) with the difference being that for them there are few opportunities along the life path to keep ethnic identity awake (they did not have their own native language schools, their mother tongue is an "adopted" language, namely Russian, which in this case does not inspire closer affiliation that the language of the state in which they reside, i.e., Poland. Despite all this, we suspect we are witness to a kind of renaissance of ethnic identity in their case. (Life path and personal ethnic identity are connected by a negative beta, which shows that their personal ethnic identity does not arise from their life path.)

Figure 4: Types of relationships between life moments and ethnic identity



The relationship between moments on the life path and identity indicates – with some minor variances – that there is a kind of ethnic self-awareness awakening, which is thanks not in the least to democratic processes that have played out to varying degrees in the host countries. These processes have emphasized the importance of human rights and allowed for space in which ethnic difference can be rediscovered.

Types of relationships between emotions and ethnic identity

In Figure 2 we saw that affinity with the mother country and diaspora, trust in the members of the group of origin and pride in belonging to the minority group were all factors that could come into being without the parental start. Stations in the life path can strengthen emotions that in turn strengthen ethnic identity. The connection between emotions and identity, however, do not develop in unison. In fact, there are four characteristic types that come into relief. The first type contains Lithuanians and Ukrainians. Their ethnic identity is backed up by strong emotional confirmation. Related to this type are the Poles of Byelorussia, but the role of emotions in identity is somewhat weaker in their case. The second type is made up of Russians and Hungarians, whose emotional bond only slightly affects their identity. What is even more odd is that the parental start and the moments of the life path do not have strong roles in undertaken identity either. It seems these two groups accept or deny their minority identity according to some predestined effect, given that their life paths and emotions hardly have an effect on their proclaimed identities. In their case, narratives from research on minorities lead us to suspect once it has taken root, the maintenance of minority identity and consciousness requires little support.

The connection between emotions and identity has a third type, in which we find Byelorussians and Slovaks. For them the emotive aspect has a relatively strong effect on personal identity (though this is weaker than for the first type). Despite a similarity between the two groups, the parental model and stations on the life path have entirely different effects on the identity of both groups.

Figure 5: Types of relationships between emotions and ethnic identity



This observation foreshadows the fact that the building blocks of personal ethnic identity are organized entirely differently when we look at the model as a whole. Returning to the relationship between emotions and identity, we can see a singular “group”, namely the Poles of Ukraine. For them the emotive aspect of minority existence has almost no effect on identity. However, the

Poles of Ukraine – unlike the Hungarians and Russians – refer to the moments of their life paths when discussing their identities.

1.3.13 The building blocks of ethnic identity in the minority groups

Above we showed how origin, life path and the emotional content of belonging to a minority group affect minority identity, or how the relationships among these factors lead to various types. Now we will construct a model that shows which minority groups resemble one another in terms of ethnic identity characterizing the group and parental patterns, as well as the objective and affective moments of the life path. We will use the cluster analysis method. Minority groups in the same type have similar ethnic identities, parental starts, characteristics of life paths and emotional identification with members of their own group.

Figure 6: Types of relationships between building blocks of ethnic identity and identity



It is important to mention this again because the two minority groups that most resemble one another are Russians and Hungarians. At first glance this similarity is difficult to explain. Why would we even compare Russians in Lithuania with Hungarians in Slovakia? However, if we keep in mind that our statements are based on data from a questionnaire in which the memories and interpretations of the respondents form a picture of the country of birth, and that we have retrospective information about the moments along the life path, then it is not beyond question that we will find an explanation for this unlikely similarity. Both the Russians and Hungarians have a historical memory in which they recall a time when their ethnic group, or a good portion of it, was part of the economic, political and perhaps even cultural elite. When considering the population of their current host countries, they have a tendency to feel superior in comparison. The period of the situation of advantage passed, and may even have reversed. Despite the fact that the historical processes were much more complicated and indirect than in our brief description, the emotions arising from the judgment of the situations are quite similar. It is these emotions that certainly colour all emotional binds to the country of origin, life paths and membership in the ethnic group in a similar fashion. This similar historic "career" explains the similarity between the Russian and Hungarian minorities.

The second type is made up of Lithuanians in Russia and Poles in Ukraine and Byelorussia. As minorities they live in countries that were all Soviet republics, and in this sense their experiences as minorities were similar. The collapse of the Soviet empire did not bring about a significant divergence in their social and political environments, as successor states. The previous homogeneity of the host countries and their later similarity created conditions in which the affected ethnic minorities moved along parallel paths.

The third type is composed of the two groups living in Poland, namely Ukrainians and Byelorussians. It is possible that the paths leading to their minority existence in Poland are not the same, but it is not a stretch to say that the uniform minority policy of the host country made the development of the ethnic identity of the two groups similar.

The fourth "group" is made up of Slovaks in Hungary only. Their fate diverges significantly from that of the other minorities. The majority of them settled in Hungary in the 17th century. They have been living in the country for generations. Their assimilation is more advanced than that of any of the other diaspora in the study. This unique situation is the cause of their separation in the typology.

1.3.14 Assimilation versus preservation of identity

The nature of the relationship between the ethnic groups in the minority situation and the majority society are an influence on the assimilation attempts of the minority groups. The minority can choose to melt into majority society or to try and maintain its minority identity. The majority of respondents stated that the preservation of identity is their strategy of choice. (The importance of maintaining identity was stressed by an average of 60 percent of the respondents across groups.) The goal of balancing accommodation to the majority society and the preservation of ethnic identity was chosen by close to a quarter of the respondents. Only the final quarter claimed it was desirable to choose separation and the strict preservation of ethnic identity. Naturally there were differences among the various minority groups.

The desire to preserve identity was remarkably strong among Hungarians in Slovakia and among Poles, whether they be in Ukraine or Byelorussia. Lithuanians in Russian were unequivocally supportive of assimilation. The rest of the minority groups fell somewhere in between, but the maintenance of ethnic identity was an important and possible path for them as well, even though they did not reject accommodating the majority society.

We would be justified to ask what feeds the feeling and knowledge among ethnic minorities that allow them to delineate the borders of their groups and to differentiate themselves from members of other groups who in a political sense are members of the same national society. There is another aspect to such knowledge: does the diaspora draw its borders in such a way that it is still possible to feel membership in the mother country?

We know the historic answer. Group borders drawn based on like political citizenship are not the same as those drawn based on feeling common history, common cultural realities and common ethnic ancestry. National identity works with an alternate framework compared to membership based on political nationality (citizenship).

The group of questions used to measure national identification employed elements in all countries that were related to political citizenship (which is a necessary element of political nation building), territorial belonging, and respect for the country's institutions, as well as elements that are part of the nation concept's accessories in a cultural sense, like mother tongue, blood ties, cultural sameness and self-identification. We assume that the members of the national majority accept political national identity to a higher degree, whereas the members of the national minority are more attracted to the idea of national membership based on culture. At the same time we anticipate that the political national identity concept of the national majority fits well with a cultural approach as it is a more or less perfect match with the stressing of the importance of the dominant cultural community. The majority then not only expects the ethnic minority to be part of the host country in terms of citizenship, place of birth and place of residence, but in terms of

language use, religion and traditions as well. This can be based on national intolerance or on assimilation expectations. At the same time the national minority's culturally based self-identity can be a forbearer of segregation and/or distrust of the majority, which can lead to the impossibility of communication between the majority and the minority and the poisoning of interethnic relations. But it can also be an expression of insistence on the mother country and cultural roots, which can be reflective of a pluralist nation concept that fits well with the feeling membership in both the host country and the mother country.

Ethnic minorities take up a unique position in both political and cultural space. We can place any of the dyads into the framework utilized in Table 11, in which we examine the Slovak-Hungarian dyad just as an example.

Table 11: The relative political and cultural position of the Hungarian-Slovak dyad

	political ingroup	political outgroup
cultural ingroup	Hungarian diaspora: Hungarians in SLO	Hungarian diaspora: Hungarians in HU
	Slovak diaspora: Slovaks in HU	Slovak diaspora: Slovaks in SLO
cultural outgroup	Hungarian diaspora: Slovaks in SLO	Hungarian diaspora: Slovaks in HU
	Slovak diaspora: Hungarians in HU	Slovak diaspora: Hungarians in SLO

When the members of a diaspora express the criteria they deem important for accepting people as members of given nations, they differentiate according to whether they are discussing membership in the host or mother country. In Figures 7 and 8 we show the importance various diasporas ascribe to political and cultural nation concepts in order to view someone as a member of the host nation, and what they think it takes to be a member of the mother nation. Where possible the figures stress how they view the host or majority society.[78]

[78] The ISSP 2003 survey covered four countries (Hungary, Poland, Russia and Slovakia) and contained identity questions from which we could draw conclusions about the nation concepts of the majority society.

Figure 7: Criteria for membership in the host nation among diaspora members and the majority society of the host nation



Figure 8: Criteria for membership in the mother nation among diaspora members and the majority society of the host nation



Generally – whether we are discussing criteria for membership in the host or mother country – the members of the diapora deem the cultural markers of national membership definition more important. The relative devaluation of aspects of political nation – which is particularly strong when applied to the host nation – indicates that the members of the diaspora feel that just because someone is born in a "foreign country", lives there and is a citizen there does not automatically make the person a part of the nation. When members of the diaspora evaluate the political dimension of belonging to the mother country they accept that mostly those belong there who live there and have citizenship there. The subsequent tension from the feeling of belonging nowhere can at best weaken the emphasis on cultural aspects. For example, Poles in Ukraine are not automatically Ukrainian by being members of the political community. Further conditions for that membership are use of the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian ancestry and mostly self-identification as a Ukrainian. This means that the members of the diaspora feel free to define their own identity all while only unenthusiastically feeling part of the host country's national community. At the same time the members of the Polish diaspora in our example may also feel that "real" Poles are those who belong to the Polish nation in a political sense. But in order to be able to emphasize cultural markers a space is opened through which language, culture and self-identity allow them to feel part of the mother nation (as well). This necessary dual affiliation is characteristic of every diaspora we studied.

Finally we will demonstrate how categorizing patterns of belonging to a nation are connected to the very difficult question of whether diaspora members ascribe importance to melting into the majority society or preserving their minority identities.

Table 12: Relationship between importance of criteria of belonging to the mother country and preserving identity[79] (linear correlation coefficient)

	Mother country		Host country	
	Political nation	Cultural nation	Political nation	Cultural nation
LT, Russians	No data	,130	-,087	-,123
RU, Lithuanians	-,106	-,179	-,104	-,242
UA, Poles	No data	,105	-,120	nsz
PL, Ukrainians	-,128	,216	-,131	nsz
PL, Byelorussians	-,070	-,069	-,084	-,102
BY, Poles	No data	,186	nsz	nsz
HU, Slovaks	,211	,237	nsz	,200
SK, Hungarians	-,065	,195	-,146	,096

Table 12 shows that the given diaspora try to create cognitive and emotional harmony in questions of minority identity and national belonging in different ways. There is a relatively uniform opinion whereby diaspora members striving to maintain their identity see that it is necessary to share a cultural community with the host nation in order to also belong to the host nation. The exceptions to this are Lithuanians in Russia and Byelorussians in Poland. However, in their cases

[79] The indicators used to measure identity maintenance were arrived at by measuring the difference between two positions. The fist position: „it is better for an ethnic minority group to melt into the majority society." The second statement: "it is better for an ethnic group to preserve its own traditions and customs." The high positive values of the indicator imply preserving identity, while high negative values indicate an intent to assimilate.

they uniquely do not expect political or cultural criteria in order to belong to the host or mother nations. This indicates a kind of general tolerance, i.e., they allow the fulfilling of any criterion to allow everyone to freely decide which nation they belong to. This can mean a kind of confusion as well. Namely, in the case of Lithuanians the fact of a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, ethnically mixed majority in the host society makes it impossible to construct a coherent national identity. In the case of Byelorussians, the mother country's lack of independence for a long period of time, the withering away of their ethnic language and the resurgence of national awareness all led to a similar result.

If we ignore the Lithuanian and Byelorussian positions, the rest of the diaspora are united in the sense that the more important they feel retaining identity is, the more importance they ascribe to the cultural criteria of belonging to the mother nation. For the diaspora this provides an opportunity to feel connected to the mother nation when political borders separate them from it. They have unified and coherent views on the political criteria of belonging to the mother nation. The more important the preservation of one's own ethnic identity, the more likely they are to think that people who are politically excluded can still be members of the mother nation.

The highest uncertainty (or non-significant relation) is observed when the relation between the ethnic identity of the diaspora and the importance of political criteria for belonging to the host nation is examined. With Slovaks in Hungary being an exception, interpretable correlations show that the more a diaspora tries to maintain its ethnic identity the less it will be inclined to accept belonging to the nation upon whose territory it lives and whose citizenship it carries. The unique position of the Slovaks in Hungary shows that the historical background (which we have discussed above) causes them to be able to maintain their identity while at the same time unequivocally feeling they are citizens of Hungary.

Our findings of our study on the ethnic identity of diaspora indicate that while working on national homogenization programs under nation-state development it is the majority society that defines the parameters of success. For the minority group the path of assimilation can be an advantage leading to higher social positions. At the same time higher social status assumes a higher level of education, which in itself assumes a more tolerant and open attitude toward multiculturalism. These two oppositely directed forces define the situation of the diaspora in terms of the survival of their ethnic identity or conversely their melting into the majority society.

1.3.15 Summary

The ethnic minority groups surveyed in the eight countries of the study made possible the contruction of unique dyads. With the help of the dyads we demonstrated how countries "deal" with ethnic groups where the mother country serves as a place of residence for an ethnic minority that is "removed" from the given country's majority population. Further, we examined whether given countries present a unified image to the various minorities living in it. First we described the various types of ethnic identities found among the diasporas, then we discussed the personal history of identity and introduced some cognitive building blocks that help in the construction of identity. We demonstrated the differences and similarities among diasporas when creating their own ethnic identities. We saw that for ethnic groups belonging to given dyads the strength of the role of origin in preserving ethnic identity varied. We found some dyads where ethnically homogeneous ancestry and the pattern of identity preservation provided by the family strongly defined the ethnic identity of the respondents. However, we also found cases where there was a significant difference between ethnic groups making up the dyad in this regard.

In the chapter on the building blocks of ethnic identity we discovered types of building blocks that bridged dyads, and types that cut across dyads. These at first surprising similarities are explained by similarities in the historical changes in economic and political influence of the origin and receiving countries. We also showed that a unified minority policy in the receiving country washes away differences between the various diasporas.

Finally, we considered the dilemma arising from managing the tensions between the defining criteria for belonging to a nation and maintaining ethnic identity. The relative devaluation of the aspects of political nationhood indicates that the members of diasporas do not automatically become members of the host country's nation. Further, members of the mother nation are foremost those who live in the mother country and have citizenship there. The feelings of tension arising from the sense of belonging nowhere are at best minimized by emphasizing cultural aspects.

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1.4 Diasporas in Europe's boundary regions: characteristics of generalized trust and trust in institutions

Antal Örkény / Mária Székelyi

1.4.1 On Trust

Trust is a social-psychological mechanism that positively influences social behaviour and that acts as a connection between personal motivations and creeds on the one hand and desired organizational and societal goals on the other. The opposite of trust is *suspicion*, which distances and questions the reciprocal relationship between the individual and society (or, simply put, „others"), and which psychologically brings doubt into the meaning and success of the actor's actions (Festinger, 1957). Trust and suspicion manifest themselves as a social phenomenon connected to the individual. Trust is a kind of social capital[80] that positively influences the individual's chances for social success, while suspicion can obstruct such success. Further, on the social level, trust is one of the most important elements of social integration, while the lack of trust leads to social disintegration and delegitimization of the social system (Misztral, 1996).

The question of trust has become a popular topic in various social sciences over the past few decades: the birth of theories of social trust has led to numerous research projects in economics, political science, sociology and social-psychology, covering topics like the economic behaviour of individuals, consumer behaviour, political participation and legitimacy, and the organization of community relations. Researchers have separately examined the characteristics of manifestations of trust and its potential strength in complete societies as well as in certain social groups. Surprisingly, there are hardly any analyses on the ethnic-cultural aspects of trust and the role of trust in the everyday life of religious, ethnic or migrant groups.[81] This holds despite the fact that trust plays a special role in the social relations of ethnic diasporas, the norms and mechanisms of guiding their coexistence with the majority, social and cultural integration, personal success, and the ability of the majority to accept the otherness of an ethnic minority.[82]

The goal of this analysis is to use the tools of empirical sociology to examine the role of trust in a unique social situation: the process of integration of ethnic diasporas. In this analysis we begin by exploring a few general questions on trust and some that apply specifically to the situation of ethnic minorities. We then consider the degree of trust potential across various ethnic groups, how the host country and the microclimate of the residential area affect the level of trust, and how specific ethnic backgrounds influence trust. We attempt to establish different types of trust

[80] Beyond the Marxist use of term 'capital', there are a growing number of similar terms used to explain economic and social relations, including the relation system of individuals (social capital), inherited and acquired knowledge (cultural capital and habits), influence potential and power position (political capital). These kinds of capital work separately and in conjunction to define the social position of the individual. The types of capital and the conversion mechanisms between them largely define the methods and limits of attaining status in given societies. Individual freedom and opportunity lies in choosing the optimal capital acquirement and conversion mechanisms (Coleman 1989; Bourdieu 1977).

[81] As an exception: Victor Nee and Jimmy Sanders. (Nee, 2001)

[82] Naturally if we widen the concept of trust then we cannot neglect the robust social science tradition that has long dealt with characteristic mechanisms between minorities and majorities (ethnic minority categorization, stereotyping, social distance, prejudices, discrimination, racism). Theories using a narrower reading of trust have not produced literature that links trust and the above-listed phenomena.

concerning the general trust in people, institutions and the faith in one's own ethnic group, the people of the sending and the receiving countries.

The examination of the question of trust is relatively new in sociology. As sociologists have begun to move from examining grand social relations, the behaviour of institutions and social groups toward more hidden aspects of human relations, the question of trust has gained in importance. Though researchers have still not agreed on an exact definition, there is a wide consensus on the significance of trust in large-scale societies and in smaller groups. There are some who interpret trust as a personal characteristic and a psychological phenomenon. Others stress the value component in trust and emphasize the moral aspect (Uslaner, 2002). The most common approach understands trust as a social „good" which functions as a capital asset that can be mobilized by the individual, and which is an important precondition or tool for effective social cooperation (Gambetta, 1989). Macro-level approaches treat trust as a glue serving for the moral integration of society (Elster, 1989).

Behind the various definitions three quite divergent interpretative options can be formulated. The first is motivated by theories focusing on relations between people and economic, social, and cultural exchange activities that drive effective interest assertion mechanisms. This approach sees trust as central element in rational behaviour and decision-making, reciprocity and cooperation among individuals or groups, the establishment and acceptance of rules, and the belief that the other party will comply with the rules. On the level of individuals and interpersonal relations trust increases the predictability of actions, minimizes risk, strengthens solidarity with others, and provides participants with environments of security, satisfaction and friendship (Hardin, 2002). On the macro level, this kind of trust (or trust in this interpretative framework) makes the functioning of social systems predictable, relies on the principle of reciprocity in establishing opportunities for participating in public decisions, deepens the legitimacy of the system, and creates faith in all areas of life. At the macro level trust is a type of commodity, something that can and ought to be acquired by individuals and collectives (private and public good), and a social capital which significantly assists individuals in attaining success.

Another interpretation stresses trust as a cognitive form. In this reading behavioural elements learned through socialization are responsible for the presence (or absence) of trust. Trust in others is not necessarily a concrete goal, and it is not necessarily dependent on external conditions. This type of trust is a kind of belief in other people, which is to a degree a characteristic of the individual personality, part of a person's disposition, and is manifest in a generally positive and optimistic approach to others, or may become an everyday behaviour pattern. A different but related theory posits that consciousness of belonging to one's own group and the differentiation from other groups lead to trust forming the foundation of personal identity. In this reading trust is an important part of our social identity and helps establishing harmony with group membership.

The third possible interpretation of trust is the one which emphasises moral aspects. The basis of this is *generalised trust*[83], displayed toward not individuals but toward entire communities (and all their members) or institutions, whereby these groups and institutions are expected to behave in predictable and socially acceptable ways. If these expectations have a normative content then generalized trust will take the form of moral trust. According to the normative interpretation trust links morally the individual to his/her group, ensures the acceptance of social prestige, and generally generates widely accepted value fields which serve as a foundation for social coexistence.

[83] This term originates from the English-language literature.

Erik Uslaner defines two rather different types of trust. One is called general or moral trust while the other is described as partial or strategic trust. "Trust in other people is based upon a fundamentally ethical assumption: that other people share your fundamental values" (Uslaner, 2002:2) The moral trust approach posits that individuals not only have to cooperate with each another, but they have to perceive each other as credible and should have feeling of mutual moral obligation. According to Uslaner the culture of trust assumes fundamental egalitarianism, and is paired with the belief that we should pursue not only our own interests but should attempt to help others as well. Moral trust is characterised by a strengthening function in which is derived from the individual's moral obligation. Trust can be directed toward institutions and individuals, or groups, without expecting reciprocity. Moral trust is stable and is characterized by permanence, unlike partial trust.[84] Moral trust ensures acceptance of societal rules and institutions and as such is a necessary condition for social integration (Uslander, 2002).[85]

Although they view the social role of trust in different ways, the various approaches described above have in common the fact that they approach the phenomenon from the point of view of the entire social system or the social embededdness of the individual. But what happens when we look for the existence of trust on the periphery of society, when trust is examined through the relations between minorities and majorities? How are we to interpret the scenario where an ethnic group does not reside in its mother country? Does trust function in such situations? Of the previously mentioned instrumental, moral and cognitive moments, which enhance and which weaken trust? In typical situations members of diasporas experience weakened trust stemming from the lack of confidence that is a result of their „difference".

Trust capital can thus be a differentiated "good" for a minority group. However, it is also possible that a minority group living in a host country in a position of cultural foreignness – despite its best efforts – will not be able to generate trust within its own circle, or to gain the trust of others. Trust in outsiders plays many roles in relationship. First, it constructs bonding relationships within all sorts of more or less closed communities (these trust networks bind personal networks of family, religious community, and ethnic identity); second, it has a bridging function between individuals, groups and cultures that are different from one another; third, it can establish linking relationships between individuals and groups that are in different positions in the social hierarchy (Hardin 2002; Tóth 2005).

In the case of ethnic minorities trust is important particularly in its bonding and bridging functions. Physical distance from the mother country weakens (or fully destroys) traditional social networks that act as a defence. In this way the member of a minority group necessarily turn to his/her own ethnic-national diaspora to seek that community with whose members he/she will identify based on linguistic and ethnic identity, or religious relations and common culture and past. Ethnically based trust builds tight links based on ancestry and common culture: this can demand a deep commitment from the member of the group, while at the same time it can give

[84] Moral trust (or lack thereof) that permeates through society and general honesty (or suspicion) are definitive organizing principles of social integration that operate meaningful mechanisms of choice concerning cultural patterns and values. For this reason moral trust or lack thereof can only change slowly over time, and in drastic events have to occur for such positions to change. In contrast to this, trust capital that assists coexistence and cooperation is quite unstable: any negative event affecting us can destroy the trust we held earlier.

[85] According to Uslaner, strategic trust works entirely differently. This form of trust always assumes two different parties, and such trust increases effective cooperation between the parties. Strategic trust is always directed toward concrete individuals and assumes reciprocity.

rise to suspicion of other ethnic groups. The nature of trust in the minority life situation is two-fold. On one hand the relationships that are organized in this manner help to preserve cultural self-identity in a foreign socio-cultural environment, while for the ethnic community ethnic trust is an important tool for cohesion. On the other hand such trust often leads to ethnic differentiation and segregation, which obstructs successful social integration and can strengthen the majority intolerance of the minority and the majority's segregationist efforts (Uslaner, 2002).

Bonding trust must be accompanied by bridging trust for those in the minority life situation. This is a condition for successful social integration and is a cause of the level of success the minority group will have in being accepted by the majority. If bridging trust – which builds a bridge between the host and the accepted – is damaged or does not come to exist, then ethnic segregation and conflicts with the majority will be the result.

The nature of trust capital for minority groups can be interpreted using the Uslaner approach. On one hand we can speak of general or moral trust that is manifested in relation to the host country and which expresses the degree to which members of the diaspora trust the host country's institutions, public officers and citizens. On the other hand – inspired by the above-mentioned scenarios of lack of trust or low trust – they can feed themselves with partial or strategic trust, foremost toward co-nationals who share their fate and toward personal networks: such targets of trust are personally known and generate the calming feeling of 'belonging somewhere'.

1.4.2 On diasporas

The EU-funded ENRI-East research project examined twelve ethnic minorities in eight countries. The study researched the ethnic-national identity of minorities living in diaspora situations; bonds with the mother country and the host country; pride in ancestry and the current host country; and opportunities for the ethnic minority to retain its identity and to integrate in the majority society. An important research question focused on mapping trust in people and institutions with a focus on measuring the importance of feelings of trust in the construction of ethnic identity and in integrating into majority society. In our analysis we apply the standard terminological distinction between the two main types of social trust: namely we use the term generalized trust when we are talking about trust in people, versus confidence in different institutions, which is called as institutional trust.

An important aspect of the research design was to identify ethnic minorities living in host countries on the periphery of the European Union, whose mother countries host diasporas from the given host country. In this way dyads and triads came into being. This made it possible for us to research whether a given ethnic minority's situation resembled that of its cohorts in another country. We could also examine the degree to which two different diasporas resembled one another when they lived in the same host country. We also had the opportunity to compare the members of various dyads and triads. For example, we examined how and why Lithuanians living in Russia differed from Russians living in Lithuania. Similarly, we examined the degree to which history influenced the situation of Slovaks in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovakia, whether Poles fared better in Byelorussia or Ukraine, or whether Poland serves as a true home for Ukrainians or Byelorussians.[86]

[86] Given the importance of dyads in this study, we did not analyze Russians in Latvia, Byelorussians in Lithuania, or Hungarians in Ukraine. These groups lack partners with which they can form dyads.

1.4.3 The degree of trust in the periphery

Before we view trust as a type of "lubricant" that can ease interaction between members of the diaspora and the majority, we must examine the degree of trust ethnic minorities have toward their peers, and whether they have more trust in those in their mother country or those in their host country. From this we can extrapolate whether they relate to people differently depending on their origins. We assume that an ethnic group displays high generalized trust toward those in the mother country and co-members of the diaspora and a lack of generalized trust toward the citizens of the host country. Our data, however, showed something quite different.

Figure 1: Level of generalized trust commonly, members of the diaspora, and people of the host and sending countries, on a 4-degree scale.



Figure 1 shows the degree of generalized trust various diasporas display toward people in general, their own diaspora, and citizens of the host country and the mother country. It is apparent that there is no significant difference in generalized trust toward the four groups. There is no significant difference between the various diasporas of the various countries either: they are all characterized by having generalized trust. The leads us to conclude that the degree of generalized trust is influenced foremost by psychological and social-psychological factors, covering the cultural-historical differences between diasporas or even the differences in the economic-political situations between host countries.

We must ask, however, whether this high level of generalized trust is a general characteristic of the periphery of the European Union. The answer to the question lies in the 2008 *European Values Survey*. We can examine the degree to which this assumed high level of generalized trust is characteristic of the citizens of the host countries and mother countries compared to the members of our different ethnic samples. In Figure 2 we show the percentage of respondents who stated that they have unconditional generalized trust in people. The Figure shows proportions of members of the diaspora, citizens of host countries and citizens of mother countries who have maximum trust in people.

Figure 2: The degree of unconditional generalized trust in people, percent



* European Value Survey, 2008.

Figure 2 shows significant differences not only among diasporas, but in the degree of unconditional trust characteristic of given countries as well. The given diasporas were put in descending order in the Figure in terms of unconditional trust. Thus it can be seen that one-fifth of Poles, whether they live in Ukraine or Byelorussia, have unconditional generalized trust in people. Among members of Byelorussian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Russian diasporas, a little more than ten percent have maximum trust. They are followed by the slightly lower proportion of ten percent of the Hungarians, followed by the least trusting Lithuanians. In their group there were hardly any respondents who trusted others unconditionally.

The difference between diasporas is even bigger if we take into account the characteristic level of generalized trust in the mother countries and the host countries. Only Poles living in Ukraine can be characterised as having little difference in the level of trust from those living in the mother country and the host country. There are some diasporas that do not at all follow the patterns of the host or mother countries. Ukrainian, Russian and Lithuanian diasporas are such examples. These are characterised not only by having almost the same proportion of trusting respondents in the host and the mother countries, but also by the fact that the members of the diasporas do not follow these patterns and are in fact much less trusting. The Byelorussian and Hungarian diasporas do not follow such patters either. They are characterized – somewhat differently from one another – by the fact of being rather untrusting themselves while the members of the host country are more trusting, while the members of the mother country are the most trusting. Poles living in Byelorussia and Slovaks living in Hungary are situated in countries where generalized trust is higher than in the respective mother countries. At the same time these two groups differ from one another, given that the Slovaks are more trusting than their peers in the mother country and then Hungarians in Hungary, while this group of Poles is less trusting than their peers in the mother country.

The main conclusion from Figure 2 can be summarised as follows: the general level of trust shown in Figure 1 is only partially true, given that diasporas are characterised by a lack of unconditional generalized trust compared to the mother and host countries. The other important conclusion is that with one exception diasporas do now follow given patterns: they diverge from patterns in the mother country, nor do they follow the patterns of the host country. We consider this the first sign that points to the specific characteristics of diaspora existence.

Trust in institutions[87] is especially important for persons living in a diaspora. It can strengthen a feeling of security and a feeling of being a member of society with full rights. Institutional trust is lower for all diasporas in comparison to personal trust (see Figure 3 compared to Figure 1). While we experienced a kind of homogeneity among diasporas in terms of trust in people, institutional trust reveals significant differences.

Figure 3: Trust in the institutions of the host society, 4-point scale average



We can assume that these differences arise from the political-economic characteristics of the host country. This is supported by the observation that Ukrainian and Byelorussian diasporas living in Poland have the very same levels of institutional trust, which means that various diasporas in a given country have the same opinion on the operation of institutions. This assumption is also supported by the fact that when one ethnic minority lives in different countries we find divergent levels of institutional trust (Poles living in Byelorussia have higher institutional trust than average, while their peers living in Ukraine have trust in the institutions of the host country that is much lower than the average).

In the case of institutional trust it is worth comparing diasporas with members of the host societies and the mother countries. Given the above, we expect there to be a smaller difference be-

[87] The institutional trust index is composed of trust in the host country's parliament, government, police, courts and media, averaged on a four-degree scale.

tween the members of the host country and the members of the diaspora it is hosting, given that they live with the same institutions. Figure 4, however, does not support this assumption.

Figure 4: Average trust in the institutions of the host society, 4-point scale average



* European Value Survey, 2008.

Although the characteristic average level of institutional trust for diasporas is somewhat more similar to that of the members of the host country than of the mother country, the fact that the members of the host country and of the diaspora were judging the same institutions is not at all evident in the data. The only exception is the Poles in Ukraine group, whose institutional trust was the same level as that of the Ukrainians. With the exception of the Russian diaspora, the institutional trust held by diasporas is higher than that held by the citizens of the host country.

If we view institutional trust as an indicator of citizen security, then we can think that ethnic minorities view institutions as „resources", given that along with laws, governance and the media it is these institutions that establish an environment that guarantees that existence as a minority will not result in negative differentiation. The Russians are the only exception. The social position of Russians in Lithuania changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Lithuania. The group lost its former privileges. Russians had to face the strengthening of Lithuanian national consciousness, and Lithuanians were not inclined to forget the wounds inflicted by the Soviet empire. Lithuanian institutions serve Lithuanian interests and are not inclined to compensate for the loss of the prestige of Russians. This is likely the main factor explaining that Russians have less trust in Lithuanian institutions than do the Lithuanians themselves.

In the case of some diasporas the members of the mother country have higher trust in their institutions than is characteristic in the host country. Poland, Hungary and Lithuania are three countries whose diasporas see the mother country as a place that where people can feel safe and se-

cure. We may ask whether the minorities arising from these countries feel a surplus of trust, or a kind of nostalgic view of the mother country as a „better" place than that in which they currently live. This question is discussed in our study on identity.

We have established that personal trust is much stronger than institutional trust among ethnic minorities. Figure 5 serves to show how these two types of trust develop. We can see that low personal trust does not necessarily come hand in hand with low institutional trust.

Figure 5: Levels of generalized and institutional trust, 4-point scale average



This graph strengthens our conviction that the two types of trust have vastly different roots. Personal trust is explained by life histories, cultural traditions and social psychology, while institutional trust is explained mainly by the social-political system of the given country and the legitimacy of the institutions, which are only slightly distorted by the point of view of minority groups.

1.4.4 The social embededness of generalized and institutional trust in diasporas

In the previous chapter we saw personal trust develops according to social psychological factors and personality marks, while institutional trust is significantly influenced by the environment that embodies the host country for the members of the diaspora. Figure 6 once again shows that generalized trust characteristic of the host country develops differently than it does for the diasporas living there.[88] In the case of institutional trust, the citizens of the host country and the members of the diaspora have similar sentiments.[89]

[88] There is no significant relationship between characteristic trust between the host country and the diaspora living there.

[89] The correlation between the two types of trust is significant, with a Pearson R value of 0,75.

Figure 6: The development of generalized and institutional trust in the population of host society and the in the diaspora, percent and 4-point scale average



* EVS: European Value Survey, 2008.

It follows that if we examine the social embededness of generalized trust, then we should search for its foundations in those interpersonal relations and in those feelings toward the host country that effect the level of sense of security. In the case of institutional trust the source of sense of security must be sought in the host country's political-economic-cultural environment.

1.4.5 The building blocks of generalized trust in diasporas

As a first step we considered all those characteristics we thought would have a role in the increase or decrease of generalized trust.[90] We assumed that if those belonging to diasporas felt tension between various social groups, i.e., poor and rich, management and employees, men and women, the elderly and the young, and between ethnic and religious groups, then generalized trust would not increase. It also seems safe to assume that if someone feels she/he belongs to one or more groups, then that fact can strengthen generalized trust felt toward people.[91] We thought that any negative differentiation experienced based on membership in an ethnic minority would result in distrust. Another factor that could affect generalized trust is whether over her/his life the member of a diaspora made efforts to retain her/his ethnic identity.[92] It is likely that the size of the circle of friends is also an indicator of trust toward people, given that a wide circle of friends shows openness toward people, which is a good fit with high trust.

[90] We need not emphasize that we could only search for the building blocks of generalized trust using the comparative international study.

[91] The questionnaire contained questions measuring binds with the diaspora, the place of residence, the host and mother countries, Eastern Europe and Europe.

[92] Aspects like use of mother tongue in school, preference for mother tongue media, use of mother tongue in the family and the ethnic composition of family circles were used here.

We sought to test the effect of all these factors together in a model[93], though we were disappointed to find that the correlations were rather weak. One aspect did appear interesting, however. We found that members of diasporas have high levels of generalized trust not only when they feel bound to the host country, but also when they feel a strong bind with their own diaspora.

In light of the above we distinguished three groups. The first is characterized by the fact that they are connected neither to the diaspora, nor to the host country. The second type feels bound to the diaspora only. Finally, members of the third type feel bound to the diaspora and the host country equally. This distinction is merited because we notices that the more bonding points there are in the life of a diaspora, the more coherent the construction of generalized trust toward people among its members.

Those diaspora members who do not feel bound to the host country or the diaspora only feel strong generalized trust when they do not experience tensions between various social groups in the country in which they reside. Those who feel bound to the diaspora only experience an increase in generalized trust if they do not experience discrimination in the host country. In the case of diaspora members with strong ties pride in the mother country, a feeling of closeness to the host country and a wide circle of friends all increase generalized trust, while disadvantageous differentiation and a social environment full of tensions increase distrust.

We must consider whether these factors that strengthen or weaken trust are generalizable, or whether they apply only in the microclimates of various diasporas, as it is possible that measured differences are caused by these factors only. To answer this question we constructed a model that utilizes the characteristic indicators of the host country.[94] The numbers describing the host country were taken from the 2008 European Value Survey data set. We used four aggregate variables to characterize the host country: the average status point of those living in the host country (which enabled us to indicated the level of development of the host country), the commitment to democracy among the population of the host country, the desire for a strong leader and order, and the estimate of the anomic state of the host country.

The constructed model showed that when one moved from unconditional trust to complete lack of trust, the environment of the host country had no effect. This kind of distrust is caused only by the poor "disposition" of the members of the diaspora. Poor disposition means that the society of the host country is rife with tension; that the members of the diaspora are subject to negative discrimination; and complete isolation of the diaspora.

[93] We constructed a multinomal logistical regression model.

[94] This is a multinomal logistic regression model in which general trust is the dependent variable and beyond the set of variables considered the building blocks of trust we include numbers about the milieu of the host country among the independent variables.

Figure 7: Factors leading to complete distrust



* The effect of the four aggregate indicators characterizing environment were tested in a multinomal logistic regression model, and the strength of the partial effect was indicated by probability quotients. In this case none of the probability quotients were significant.

** The building blocks of trust are all those cognitive or emotional factors that are capable of influencing generalized trust. For example: tensions that can be felt in the host society, negative discrimination experienced in the host country, the degree of bind to the host country and the diaspora, pride in the host country, and size of the circle of friends. The effect of this set of factors was tested in a multinomal logistic regression model, and the strength of the partial effect was indicated by probability quotients. In this case the effect was significant.

It appears that those members of the diaspora characterized by complete lack of trust do not spring from differentiated judgment of general conditions, but from a feeling of frustration resulting in a lack of general trust.

Movement from unconditional trust to moderate trust is effected by the environment of the host country and the general disposition of the ethnic minority. These effects are illustrated in diagram 8, on factors leading to moderate trust.

Figure 8: Factors leading to moderate trust.



* Values indicating the environment of the host country were expressed in probability quotients. In this case these probability quotients were all significant.

** On the building blocks of trust, please see the notes in Figure 7. Among the building block partial effects measured as probability quotients, tension and feeling of discrimination were not significant in all cases.

We observed that the variables called building blocks of trust have a gradually weakened effect on generalized trust as we move toward groups characterized by higher trust.[95] The environment of the host country has a stronger effect on generalized trust as we move toward more trusting groups.[96]

The model we constructed to explain trust only partially show what generalized trust depends upon.[97] We would have more powerful explanations if:

- We had a more accurate description of the environment of the host country (the data we have available to us does not help in this regard);
- We could build character traits into the model that affect generalized trust (such data was not included in the study);
- We could describe the histories of the members of diasporas and minorities such that events that strengthen generalized trust or increase distrust could be included in the model (again, the available data does not make this possible).

It is not possible to make such adjustments. Listing the limitations of the model, however, is a useful exercise: it confirms the assumption that diaspora existence – including historical processes, wars, border revisions, and regime changes – has a unique role in the development of general

[95] This holds true such that for those moving from feeling unconditional trust toward being labeled „I tend to trust in people" are not effecting by feelings of discrimination and tension.

[96] The parameters of the model are described in Table I in the Appendix.

[97] The R-square of the model is 14%.

trust. This is why it is worth examining the given diasporas one at a time in the following chapters. By comparing the dyads we can attempt to reveal the characteristics of diaspora existence.

1.4.6 Generalized trust in the dyads

It is possible for us to compare four dyads. The unique research design also makes it possible for us to decide which of Ukraine or Byelorussia is better suited to strengthen trust in the case of the Polish diaspora. We can also decide whether Ukraine serves as a new home for the Ukrainian or Byelorussian diaporas; one where it is worth trusting people.

The Lithuanian-Russian dyad

The average score for generalized trust in people is the same for Lithuanians as it is for Russians (a value of 2,8 on a four-point scale). However, Russians are more polarized in this regard then are the Lithuanians (see Table M2). From this we conclude that minority existence effected Russians in a way different from how this existence affected Lithuanians living in Russia. The two diasporas interpret the environment of their host countries differently. The Russians feel rootless, they are not attached to their own ethnic minority, nor to Lithuania, and the find no pride in being members of their diaspora or in their host country. The feeling of comfort is much better among Lithuanians. We see a similar pattern of difference between the two diasporas when we study how they judge conditions in the host countries: Russians see Lithuanian society as rife with tensions, and they often experience discrimination. Lithuanians have a much better opinion of Russia and diaspora existence there (see Table M3). Lithuanians' distrust is increased by a feeling of rootlessness and difficulties with diaspora existence, where distrust in the Russian groups is dependent only on rootlessness.

The Polish-Ukrainian dyad

The level of generalized trust shown by the two groups in this dyad is again very close to one another, with the average value being three. This means that both ethnic minorities treat people with trust. Unlike the earlier dyad, neither group in this pairing feels a sense of rootlessness, and neither one feels discriminated against. What is more, they do not sense social tensions in their host countries (see Table M4). Both these factors have a role in increasing trust for both ethnic groups. The only difference between the two groups is that Ukrainians in Poland have distanced themselves from their country of origin, while Poles in Ukraine are more attached to Poland.

The Byelorussian-Polish dyad

The Byelorussians are characterized by somewhat stronger generalized trust, but the Poles are not far behind (the score for general trust is 3,0 and 2,9, respectively). However, there is a significant difference in the feeling of rootlessness: Poles are not attached to their own group, or to their host country. Furthermore, their sense of pride in these two objects is low. The Byelorussians are quite opposite. They have a strong sense of attachment to, and pride in, their origins and their host country. The Poles feel homelessness strongly, despite the fact that they do not feel social tensions in Byelorussia and do not experience discrimination in their host country. Byelorussians in Poland, on the other hand, feel strongly rooted despite the fact that they sense tensions in Polish society and from time to time experience discrimination (see Table M5). It is possible that the two ethnic minorities differ more in the sense of rootlessness aspect than in feeling they live in environments rife with tension and discrimination: trust toward people is influenced only by the conditions in the host country. Distrust for both groups is clearly strengthened by feeling tensions and experiencing discrimination.

The Slovak-Hungarian dyad

In this dyad we see a large difference in the level of generalized trust: Hungarians in Slovakia are characterized by significant distrust, while Slovaks in Hungary are considerably more trusting. The distrust among Hungarians is not due to rootlessness, given that they are strongly attached to their diaspora. It is instead caused by the difficulties of diaspora existence. They feel that Slovak society is full of tensions, and what causes bad feelings even more so is regular discrimination. Slovaks in Hungary have trust kept strong by feeling rooted in Hungarian society, where they do not sense tensions and they do not feel they are discriminated against (see Table M6). For the Slovaks general trust in positively affected by feeling at home and the lack of tension in the host society along with a lack of discrimination. Hungarians in Slovakia, on the other hand, are significantly more distrusting and less rooted in the host society, but the conditions of the host society do not affect their level of trust. This indicates that their low level of generalized trust is a result not of „objective" conditions, but of their sentiments only.

1.4.7 The contextual model of institutional trust

In an earlier section of this study was emphasized the importance of trust toward institutions for ethnic minorities. We also mentioned that trust in institutions is influenced foremost by the economic-political-social characteristics of the host country. In this section we will show how the personal histories of the members of ethnic minorities effects trust in institutions, especially if we pay attention to how these institutions function in given countries. However, we do not simply specify host countries but instead describe them with indicators that are capable of reflecting the level of development and the political and moral „condition" of the given host countries.[98]

Institutional trust is affected strongest by the level to which citizens of the host country are committed to democratic values. Trust in institutions is also strengthened when the population demands that the country have a strong leader who can guarantee order. Institutional trust is weakened when people see their country as anomic. However, institutional trust is affected positively when the citizens of the country have a relatively high standard of living.[99]

Naturally the political environment of the host country has a role in determining the level of institutional trust with the diaspora experience. We postulate that the level of institutional trust also depends on how the member of the minority group defines his/her own ethnic status: i.e., whether the respondent feels him/herself to be a member of the host country, the diaspora, or the mother country. Another important role in the development of institutional trust is that of whether diaspora members choose an assimilation strategy to try and integrate with the majority society, or choose to preserve their identities as a goal. Related to all this is the influence of sentiments on institutional trust, which derive from feelings of rootedness and pride. Everyday use of language, the ethnic composition of friendship groups and consumption of culture all play a role in how people experience their ethnic identity. This is related in turn to the level of trust in institutions.

These relationships are not obvious. Imagine a person living in a diaspora who claims to be a member of his/her mother country, regularly uses the language of the diaspora in daily life, does

[98] We established these characteristic using the 2008 EVS data. We used four aggregated variables to characterize the host country: the average status point of those living in the country, which made it possible to measure the level of development of the country; the level of commitment to democracy characteristic of the population of the host country; the expressed need for strong leadership and order; and the judgment of the host country's anomic state.

[99] The R-square for the regression model that explain institutional trust with the state of the host country is 14%.

not have bonds of friendship with members of the majority society, and refuses assimilation strategies. This kind of separation could easily be a source of distrust in the institutions of the host country. However, we imagine that such a life strategy can be employed by a person who acknowledges that institutions guarantee that ethnic identity can be proclaimed safely. These two examples show not only that preserving identity can go hand in hand with very high or low trust in institutions, but that life strategies and institutional trust can be one another's causes and results.

The path model[100] in Figure 9 illustrates a structure in which the embrace of ethnic identity influences everyday language use, contacts and consumption of culture allows one to „practice" his/her identity. This everyday „practice" has an effect on the strength of insistence on origin and such sentiments move diaspora members toward identity preservation strategies. Taken together, these are related to institutional trust. The paths between proclaiming identity and institutional trust are simple and complex, and vividly demonstrate the dual nature of the relationship. Proclaiming identity inspires segregation strategies, and these result in institutional distrust, although to a small degree. Proclaiming ethnic identity is also paired with people trying to preserve identity in their daily lives, and this also increased institutional distrust. However, if proclamation of identity and its practice are paired with rootedness and pride in origin, then trust in institutions increases. Thus it is clear that assuming ethnic identity can result in a kind of separation, loss of rootedness and ensuing distrust in the sense of emotively tied relations with institutional trust. These two types of oppositely directed relations result in a situation where the explanatory power of our model tying minority identity to institutional trust is rather weak.[101]

[100] Path analysis is a complex regression model. The outlined models show to what degree various factors (personal identity, ethnic pride, or assimilation strategies) explain strength of institutional trust. "Explanation" means the strength of the tie between two variables, its degree being indicated by arrows linking boxes. These figures are beta values of regression, the positive sign indicating that the two variables move together, a negative sign that they move in opposite directions. Path analysis shows how independent variables affect the dependent variable directly and through other variables, and the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

[101] The unexplained variance of the dependent variable is only 4%, but still significant. Taking into account the very complex nature of the dependent cognitive dimension (institutional trust), this low explanatory level is entitled for interpretation.

Figure 9: Co-relation system of institutional trust and ethnic identity



However, we can imagine the relation between assuming ethnic identity and institutional trust in another way. The environment of the host country, the history of the ethnic minority and the relationship with the majority together create an atmosphere which can be responsible for general trust or, oppositely, general distrust. This trust can result in a sense of security which allows for members of ethnic minorities to cling to their own group, be proud of their origins, chose the preservation of identity as a life strategy, and practice identity preservation in their day to day lives. Thus, when responding to the question of how they characterize themselves, the can safely state that they belong to their mother country and/or the diaspora. A high level of trust in institutions can result in the minority giving up the practice of identity preservation, and thanks to this such a person will claim membership in the majority society when asked about identity. Thus, trust in institutions can enhance assimilation. We can thus see that whether we believe that assumption of identity will influence whether the member of a minority group will feel trust toward the institutions of the host country, or whether we believe that trust in institutions of the host country defines whether ethnic minorities will choose to assimilate or separate, relations of opposite tendencies fit into the models. Strong ethnic identity can result in institutional trust or distrust, and strong institutional trust can lead to assimilation or encourage separation of ethnic groups.

1.4.8 Institutional trust in the dyads

In the case of institutional trust we expect a much bigger difference between members of the dyads. This kind of trust is influenced strongly by the environment of the host country, more so than was the case for personal trust.

The Lithuanian-Russian dyad

Lithuanians in Russia have strong trust in Russian institutions, while Russians in Lithuania experience a kind of distrust. We suspect that if a country's population (or its representative sample, to be exact) feels trust towards its institutions, then this is evidence of the functionality of the institutions. Using this logic the EVS data shows that Russian institutions ought to be seen as just as trustworthy as Lithuanian institutions.[102] It appears that our ethnic minority groups have unique points of view on the host country institutions. Lithuanians in Russia trust in Russian institutions slightly more than the representative sample. The sense of security arising from institutional trust results in the Lithuanians having pride in their ethnic identity, which they openly proclaim.

Russians in Lithuania, however, have more distrust in Lithuanian institutions. The explanation of this distrust lies in the change in status Russians experienced in the decades after the regime change. This also explains that trust is experienced by only those Russians in Lithuania who try to hide their identity and hope to assimilate into society as „real" Lithuanians.

The Polish-Ukrainian dyad

Polish public opinion is characterized by high institutional trust, and this trust is even higher for Ukrainians living in Poland. This trust surplus is responsible for the willingness of the Ukrainian minority to melt into Polish society.

In Ukraine, however, both Ukrainians and Poles distrust institutions. This trust deficit is not dependent on the uniqueness of diaspora existence, but on the general malaise affecting all in Ukraine, whether they are members of the local Polish minority or of the majority society.

The Byelorussian-Polish dyad

Both members of the dyad display higher institutional trust than that of the majority populations of the host countries.[103] The data also shows that institutions in Byelorussia are trusted more than those in Poland.[104] Both members of the dyad show increased institutional trust when the minorities have positive feelings about belonging to the diaspora, when they are proud of their origins, and when they have strong attachments to their own group.

[102] According to the EVS data Russian institutions are scored at 2,3 points on a 4-point scale by the population, while Lithuanian institutions score at an average of 2,2. The difference is not significant.

[103] See EVS data.

[104] This trust surplus, which was confirmed in two separate studies, can only be explained by the respondents' desire to comply during interviewing. One can hardly postulate that Byelorussian institutions are more legally legitimate and effective than those in Poland.

The Slovak-Hungarian dyad

Slovak society has a better opinion of its own institutions than does Hungarian society.[105] Slovaks in Hungary, however, have higher trust in Hungarian institutions than do Hungarians themselves. At the same time Hungarians in Slovakia are clearly distrustful of Slovak institutions. Slovaks in Hungary are to a degree, and Hungarians in Slovakia are even more subjected to the effect of assimilation strategies that strengthen trust in institutions, and this kind of emotive security, which means a kind of pride in origin and ties to the diaspora, also strengthens trust. Or oppositely, if institutions are worthy of the minority's trust, this can lead them to feel safe about proclaiming their ethnic identity.

1.4.9 Conclusions

Trust in people can be a differentiated „good" for the minority group, but can also lead to cultural „estrangement" and distrust.

In the case of ethnic minorities the bonding and bridging roles of trust gain significance. Ethnically-based bonding trust is based on ancestry and common culture and thus results in tight bonds. Bridging trust, on the other hand, is a prerequisite for members of minority groups to successfully integrate socially. Their ability to make themselves accepted by the majority population depends on this.

Our data shows that diasporas are characterized by lacking trust in both the mother country and the host country. Diasporas in this sense do not follow patters: they are removed from the patterns of the mother country and do not follow the patterns characteristic of the host country. For people who are members of diasporas, trust toward institutions is important, given that such trusts provides them with a sense of security and a sense of membership with full rights. Though we observed a kind of homogeneity among various diasporas in terms of trust in people, there was a significant difference between diasporas when measuring trust in institutions.

The sources of trust in people and trust in institutions are different. Personal trust is a result of life history, cultural traditions and social-psychological factors, while trust in institutions depends primarily on the given country's social and political system and the legitimacy of institutions. These change a minority groups perspective to a small degree only.

Diaspora existence, and the historical processes, wars, border revisions and regime changes that are found in it, have a role in the development of trust toward people.

We can claim that it is evident that the general political and social environment of the host country significantly effects institutional trust, but it is clear to see that such institutional trust is also dependent on the unique characteristics of diaspora existence. Institutional trust itself has an effect on how members of ethnic minorities experience their diaspora existence: those countries where institutions generate trust are more capable (even from a social-psychological point of view) of offering a home to ethnic minorities, allowing them to preserve their identities or try to assimilate.

[105] See EVS data.

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Annexes

1 Table M1: Multinomal regression model of generalized trust

			B	Sig.
Complete distrust		Intercept	12,060	,126
	Environment of the host country	Average status of host country's population	9,008	,191
		Desire for order and strong leadership	15,784	,111
		Desire for democracy	24,683	,084
		Anomy	-11,902	,153
		Institutional trust of majority population (EVS)	-,522	,076
	Unique characteristics of diaspora existence	Feeling of rootlessness	1,111	,000
		Minority vicissitude	,550	,000
Moderate distrust		Intercept	18,412	,000
	Environment of the host country	Average status of host country's population	13,371	,001
		Desire for order and strong leadership	21,090	,001
		Desire for democracy	31,429	,000
		Anomy	-16,719	,001
		Institutional trust of majority population (EVS)	-,678	,000
	Unique characteristics of diaspora existence	Feeling of rootlessness	,655	,000
		Minority vicissitude	,306	,000
Moderate trust		Intercept	27,816	,000
	Environment of the host country	Average status of host country's population	21,384	,000
		Need for order and strong leadership	31,882	,000
		Desire for democracy	44,336	,000
		Anomy	-25,638	,000
		Institutional trust of majority population (EVS)	-,986	,000
	Unique characteristics of diaspora existence	Feeling of rootlessness	,437	,000
		Minority vicissitude	,093	,200

Reference group: unconditional trust

Table M2: Level of generalized trust in people

	Russians in Lithuania	Lithuanians in Russia
Complete distrust	6,0%	2,4%
Some distrust	21,2%	15,4%
Some trust in people	57,9%	77,1%
Unconditional trust in people	14,9%	5,1%
Total	100%	100%

Table M3: Characteristics of diaspora existence in the first dyad

Dyad elements	rootlessness (distance from host country and from diaspora, does not feel pride)	vicissitude (Feeling discrimination and host country full of tensions)
Russians in Lithuania	,8869434	,4368205
Lithuanians in Russia	,5832984	-,2598031

Table M4: Characteristics of diaspora existence in the second dyad

Dyad elements	rootlessness (distance from host country and from diaspora, does not feel pride)	vicissitude (Feeling discrimination and host country full of tensions)
Poles in Ukraine	-,3656790	-,0889060
Ukrainians in Poland	-,1581593	,0359565

Table M5: Characteristics of diaspora existence in the third dyad

Dyad elements	rootlessness (distance from host country and from diaspora, does not feel pride)	vicissitude (Feeling discrimination and host country full of tensions)
Byelorussians in Poland	-,2376813	-,0548026
Poles in Byelorussia	,1033327	-,3269136

Table M6: Characteristics of diaspora existence in the fourth dyad

Dyad elements	rootlessness (distance from host country and from diaspora, does not feel pride)	vicissitude (Feeling discrimination and host country full of tensions)
Slovaks in Hungary	-,3474566	-,1213860
Hungarians in Slovakia	,0395219	,4572057

1.5 European Identity among Young People in Eastern and Central Europe

Natalia Waechter / Evgenia Samoilova

1.5.1 Abstract

Since the collapse of the communist regime(s) a new generation was born and raised. This young generation is assumed to be more Europe-oriented than the older generations and to have developed more positive attitudes towards the European Union (Eurobarometer, 2005). We were especially interested in those young people who belong to an ethnic minority group and who live in Central and Eastern European countries which already have become or might become EU members. In the FP7 research project ENRI-East[106], funded by the European Commission, we have investigated those assumed differences between the young (aged 18 to 29) and the older generation regarding their "European attitude". Furthermore, we have analyzed if those existing attitudes of the young people have been translated into political participation. For our analysis we have used the unified ENRI-VIS data set as collected within the project (n=6000). First results show that the young people in our sample have a positive or neutral attitude towards the European Union. Compared with the adults they are clearly more positive in general, however, in some ethnic groups the young people are more skeptical regarding the positive impact of the EU on their country of residence. Furthermore, we have detected differences regarding their educational background and their countries' location (inside or outside the EU). Finally, the data indicates that although the young people appear to be more positive in their attitudes towards Europe and the EU, their positive attitudes do not result in more active participation at the EU level compared to the older generations. In opposite to what we would expect, the respondents older than 29 years report higher political participation at both national and the EU levels than the younger individuals. The factors which influence the likelihood of the youth participation in the last European elections include education, fears about the loss of social benefits, and identification of the young people with their ethnic group. Such factors as the country of origin and belonging to a specific minority group, reported image of and attitudes towards the EU, as well as identification with Europe do not impact the decision of the ethnic minority youth to participate in the EU elections.

1.5.2 Introduction and Research Question

We have investigated if and to what extent the young generation who belongs to an ethnic minority group in our researched countries has already developed a different understanding of their possible European identity than the older population. As part of the young generation we consider those who are 29 or younger. In contrast to the older population, they have not made experiences with the communist regimes themselves and were raised in the post-communist era. We wanted to find out if the younger population is more European oriented and has a more positive attitude towards the European Union. We have also analyzed if the existing attitudes towards the European Union have been translated into the engagement of the groups into European politics. Thereby we have conducted two levels of comparative analysis: Firstly, we will compare the young people with the adult generation within the ethnic minority groups. Secondly, according to

[106] The data used in this paper was generated from the project ENRI-East – European, National, and Regional Identities (http://www.enri-east.net), an FP7-SSH collaborative research project (2008-2011) funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme.

previous survey research (Jamieson, 2005) we have assumed differences between countries regarding their attitudes towards Europe and the European Union. We wanted to find out if these country-specific differences also apply to the younger ethnic minority generation. Additionally, we have checked for the impact of education, gender, and other possible variables on the attitudes towards the European Union as well as on political participation.

1.5.3 State of the Art

European Identity of Young People

In the research areas of identities and nationalities, several authors have discussed the diverse uses of the term "identity" (e.g. Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Hall & Du Gay, 1996; Jenkins, 1996). Summarizing the discussion, the overall trend to constructivist theories in the social sciences also influenced the concepts of identity. The previously predominating concepts of identity, that are now called "strong" concepts, have been replaced by the "weak" versions. These "weak", "fluid" or "flexible" versions of identity do not assume a fundamental and durable sense of self-hood, but stress fluidity, impermanence, and context sensitivity of identities. It is assumed that identities are constructed in multiple ways and that the process of identity construction is never completed. They are parts of an ongoing process of emerging, changing and redesigning. The "weak" concept considers identities not as a state but as a process and it stresses that individuals have multiple or hybrid identities. Applying this concept to territorial identity the "flexible" approach means that there are several territories that people feel attached to at the same time.

In youth research, it has become common to acknowledge both concepts of identity which results in the notion that individuals have only one "self" but several aspects of identity with some aspects becoming primary. Such primary aspects of identity are gender, age, religion or nation, whereas European identity is not considered being likely to be integrated into individuals' primary identity aspects (Bauböck, 2000). Research on territorial identities with young people shows that the European identity is the least important one compared to their identification with the city, country or region of residence or origin (Spannring, Waechter, & Datler, 2005; Jamieson, 2005, Machacek, 2004). One plausible explanation is that people are likely to negotiate identity in day-to-day interactions and since European identity is not often present in individuals' interactions, people are not likely to identify with Europe (Spannring et al., 2005).

Results from an international research project ("Youth and European Identity") show that only a rather small proportion of young people have developed a strong European identity. There seem to be regional differences regarding the level of identification with Europe, ranging from less than a quarter to around a half claiming a European identity. It is predominantly the group of the well-educated and qualified young people, those who can speak foreign languages, travel a lot and/or come from a family with migration experience (Jamieson, 2005). The project also found that geography and the political alliance of the European Union were important to more respondents than values or the economic alliance expressed by the Euro. However, they did not confine the geography of Europe to the European Union. Defining Europe in contrast to Asia, America and the Islam, it seemed to be easier for the respondents to determine what Europe is not than what it is (ibd., 2005).

International research on European identity also shows that the younger population is more likely to identify with Europe and the European Union than the older population. Regarding age, one of the main results of the Eurobarometer (2005) is that the older the respondents, the more likely they feel only as citizens of their country and not as citizens of Europe. The younger they are, the

more likely they can imagine being citizens of their own country and citizens of Europe at the same time. However, also among those aged 15 to 39 this only applies to around 50%. The respondents belonging to the youngest analyzed age group (15 to 24 years old) are the most likely to be proud of being European (74%). They are also most familiar with the European flag. Furthermore, they are more likely to wish a faster development in building up Europe. At the same time they seem to be more critical towards an unequal development in different countries; they wish that all countries develop with the same speed. In general, they are less concerned about all possible worries usually connected with the European Union. However, 50% or more are worried about the following items: the shift of production sites to countries where production costs are cheaper, the rise of drug trafficking and international organized crime, more difficulties for national farmers, national payments to the European Union, and the end of the national currency (Eurobarometer, 2005).

So far, no international research on European identity has been carried out that would have focused on young people belonging to ethnic minority groups. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap.

Political participation of ethnic minority youth

While both political and academic debates with regard to European identity converge in the belief that a common European Identity is important for the legitimation of EU actions as well as for the achievement of societal cohesion and integration (Fossum, 2001; Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; Karolewski & Kaina, 2006; Mach & Pozarlik, 2008; Kraus, 2008), the questions of what European identity means and how it should be approached are open and still disputed.

The authors have established that the European identity is a social, collective identity (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004). It was also recognized, at least on the part of constructivist approaches, that collective identities of individuals can be seen as relational, contextual, and situational: they are shaped by the contexts, actors, and interactions (Rummens, 2003). In other words, identities are neither inherent nor solid. They are subjected to processes of construction and reconstruction. Thus, it should be noted that a European identity of the minority groups in question is just one of the possible identifications for individuals, which is constructed by their experiences and interactions. Therefore, the question here is: How can we empirically grasp the process which is defined as being constantly in flux?

One of the possible approaches to this challenge is to take into consideration not only identity as such but also the identification practices. In other words, it is important not only to look at feelings of belonging towards a particular community, but also at how individuals practice and articulate their sense of belonging. Within the conceptualization of European identity as a political identity, where it signifies belonging to the political community of Europe, political practices of individuals at a European level can serve as an important indicator of their political identifications.

Conceptualization of European identity as a political identity is based on the fact that the European Union provides a common institutional as well as territorial framework and thus a basis for a political identity (Jacobs & Maier 1998). Within this context, European identity is closely connected to the emerging concept of European citizenship (Karolewski 2006).

Given the common reference of the European identity debates to the importance of societal cohesion, political identification of ethnic minorities and migrants, often seen as politically passive and disloyal, is highly relevant. Social cohesion is often seen as the essence that holds society

together via shared characteristics and high levels of in-group identity. Potential barriers in access to political resources are important impediments to the minorities' capacities to get fully engaged in their political community.

The recently increasing interest in political agency of migrants and ethnic minorities has helped to bring the concepts of political membership and sense of belonging even closer. Several writers have distinguished between passive and formal sense of political participation vs. participatory citizenship, a more active notion (Bosniak, 2006: 13; Castles & Davidson, 2000: 2008; W. Kymlicka & Norman, 1994: 353). The latter has often been referred to as *active citizenship* and conceptualized as a continuous process of participation and feelings of belonging (Van Bochove, Rusinovic, & Engbersen, 2010).

According to Bosniak, the question of what political practices and identifications stand for is addressed more than the question where these citizenship practices take place (Bosniak 2006). Although granting political membership is still in the disposition of the nation-state, political participation and identification of migrants and minority groups are no longer exclusively related to the nation-state, but challenged by the local, transnational, and European levels. However, research on political participation of minorities and migrants at the European level is scarce.

Although an increasing number of studies are concerned with a description of political involvement of migrants and minorities (van Bochove et al., 2010), rarely has there been an attempt to take into account a birth cohort. As a result, the issue of youth participation and migrants and minority ethnic participation have developed as separate areas of concern. Therefore, there is little research on ethnic minority youth political involvement (O'Toole & Gale, 2010).

Taking into account the inter-generational difference is highly essential. As Edmunds and Turner have argued, generations are sociologically significant groups because their distinct cohort experiences give rise to a collective identity. Therefore, generations can act in historically significant ways (Edmunds & Turner, 2002). Different birth-cohorts of ethnic minorities are also characterized by different social contexts as well as resources at their disposal. Therefore, sometimes one could observe even contradicting demands in political practices of different birth-cohorts of the same migrant or minority group (Pero & Solomons, 2010).

This paper attempts to address the above discussed gaps in the literature. We will analyze participation of ethnic minority groups of Central and Eastern Europe in the last European elections according to their generation, country of origin and belonging to a particular minority group, as well as their attitudes towards European Union and Europe.

1.5.4 Hypotheses

Hypothesis A: We expect the young generation within the ethnic minority groups to have a more positive image of the European Union compared to the adult generation.

Sub-hypotheses:

- We expect the young generation to have a more positive image of the European Union compared to the adult population.
- We expect the young generation to have a more positive attitude towards the European Union regarding the related potential national benefits.
- We expect the young generation to be more positive towards the European Union regarding the related situation of the minority groups.

- We expect the young people to having less fear for the future related to Europe and the European Union.

*Hypothesis B: W*e expect country-specific differences regarding the young people's attitudes towards Europe and the European Union.

Hypothesis C: We expect the young people to be more actively engaged in the European politics compared to the older generation within the total sample of ethnic minorities.

Hypothesis D: We expect country-specific differences regarding the young people's political participation at the European level.

1.5.5 Methodology

All data used for writing this article is from the ENRI Values and Identities Survey (ENRI-VIS). The survey aims at being representative for all persons belonging to the surveyed ethnic minority groups aged 18 and older, residing in private households in the surveyed country for at least one year at the time of the interview, regardless of their citizenship status and/or language spoken. Furthermore, the interviewees had to identify themselves as members of a researched ethnic minority group. The survey was not specified on young people and covered several aspects of territorial identities including national, ethnic and regional identities.

ENRI-VIS focused on ethnic minority groups in Eastern European countries which usually due to migration flow as well as shifting borders have established a diverse ethnic population. The survey covers 12 minorities from 8 countries; for each country the largest ethnic minority/minorities have been taken into account:

Table 1: Ethnic minority group population statistics selected for ENRI-VIS

Minority ethnic group	Country of Residence	Size (Official Data)	Proportion (%) of Total Population (Official Data)
Russian	Latvia	703,243	29,6
Hungarian	Slovak Republic	514,235	9,5
Polish	Belarus	396,712	3,9
Polish	Lithuania	234,989	6,7
Russian	Lithuania	219,839	6,3
Hungarian	Ukraine	156,566	0,3
Polish	Ukraine	144,130	0,3
Belarusian	Poland	47,640	0,1
Belarusian	Lithuania	42,866	1,2
Slovak	Hungary	17.693 (39,266)	0,4
Ukrainian	Poland	27,172	0,1
Lithuanian	Russia (Kaliningrad)	17,700	1,9

Note: Official data are taken from the latest available official sources (census) in each country. Data in parentheses for the Slovakian minority in Hungary are based on expert estimates.

ENRI-VIS used two different target sample sizes: larger samples with 800 respondents for those ethnic minority groups which constitute either a significantly large population or a considerable share of a country's total population; and smaller samples with 400 respondents for ethnic groups regarding their number and their density. The top 5 in table 1 were considered large minorities (n=800).

The survey was not carried out across the whole countries; we selected those regions which showed the highest density rate of the ethnic minority group among the total population. Depending on the size of that density in the selected regions, three different sampling methods were applied: random route sampling (RRS); random route sampling boosted (RRFE); and snowball sampling strategies:

- In areas where the ethnic minority constitutes 30% or more of the total population, ENRI-VIS applied a random sample using random route procedures within its primary sampling units (RRS).
- In areas, where the ethnic minority constitutes between 10% and 29.99%, ENRI-VIS also uses random route samples but boost these with focused enumeration (RRFE). That is, ENRI-VIS will also contact neighboring households to the one initially identified by the random routes and identify eligible persons there.
- In areas where ethnic groups constitute less than 10% of the total population, ENRI-VIS did not use random mechanisms but snowballing techniques due to the anticipated low response rate. In order to enhance diversity in the snowball sample we have used different starting points for snowball chains (such as known individuals and institutional actors/contact centers).

Depending on the ethnic minority's density, we chose for each region which sampling method had to be applied. Sampling methods were not allowed to be mixed within one region. Starting addresses for RRS and RRFE were drawn randomly from available complete address registers. The number of starting addresses was proportional to the density of the ethnic minority group among the total population in that region.

The survey was carried out between December 2009 and February 2010 for all ethnic minority groups except Belarusians in Lithuania where the field work had to be postponed due to the severe winter. The response rates for RRS and RRFE differ between the surveyed ethnic minority groups from 32% (Polish minority in Lithuania) to 87% (Hungarian minority in Ukraine). The average across all response rates for RRS and RRFE is 58% (not considering different sample sizes).

In the questionnaire, many questions were used from other big surveys, such as the European Value Survey (EVS), the World Value Survey (WVS), or the Eurobarometer. For the specific topic of European identity questions from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the Eurobarometer 62.0 have been used.

1.5.6 Sample Description ENRI-VIS

For this paper we have divided our ENRI-VIS sample in two basic groups: first, into the 18 to 29-year-olds, and second, into those who are older than 29. The first group we have labeled "young generation" or "young people" and the second group we refer to as the "adult generation". Even though many young people in the age group between 18 and 29 may regard themselves as adults, there is an overall European trend of a prolongation of the youth phase due to social and economic changes (more years of education, difficulties entering the labor market, etc.). In this respect we think it is appropriate to still refer to that age group as "young generation." For our researched minorities in Eastern and Central European countries, belonging to the "younger generation" has an additional meaning: They belong to the first generation which has experienced their youth in a post-communist regime. Most of them were still born in the communist era, but have already been politically socialized into the new regime. Those who are older

than 29 have also experienced the political and economic transformation; at the time of the fall of the iron curtain they were at least ten years old.

From our total sample (n=6839) almost 1000 belong to the young generation (n=995). In the questionnaire, we have only asked for the year of birth and since most of the data collection took place at the beginning of 2010, we do not have many 18-year-olds in our sample (18 or older was one of the requirements for eligibility). Other than that, we have an equally distributed sample of the young generation regarding their year of birth (1981-1991).

Regarding the young generation and our 12 researched ethnic minorities, we have different sample numbers for each minority (see table 2):

Table 2: Sample sizes 18-29 year olds

Ethnic Minorities	Sample Sizes for 18-29 year olds
Russians in Latvia	153
Russians in Lithuania	150
Hungarians in Slovakia	109
Poles in Belarus	103
Poles in Lithuania	96
Lithuanians in Russia	96
Hungarians in Ukraine	80
Poles in Ukraine	71
Belarusians in Lithuania	57
Ukrainians in Poland	52
Belarusians in Poland	21
Slovaks in Hungary	7

The different numbers result partly from the diverse age distributions within the whole population of those ethnic groups and partly because of difficulties in data collection. Same ethnic minorities typically lack younger people (especially true for Slovaks in Hungary). Typically, they live in rural, less developed areas where mostly older people have stayed to live there. Furthermore, the younger people are more mobile and hard to reach at home for a personal face-to-face interview. For overall analysis we will include all ethnic groups regardless of their individual sample size. For comparative analysis (between ethnic groups) we will not consider Slovaks in Hungary and Belarusians in Poland because of their small samples sizes for young people.

For the sample of young generation the gender distribution is more equal than for the whole sample or for the group of the adults; there are 56.2% young women compared to 43.8% young men. In the group of the adults, there are 63.2% women and 36.8% men. Again, that unequal distribution results from women being more at home (and therefore being more available for questioning) and from having an unequal gender distribution in the whole population. For some ethnic groups the gender distribution among the young generation tends to be equal (Poles in Ukraine, Belarusians in Poland, Hungarians in Slovakia, Ukrainians in Poland), and for some ethnic groups it tends to be as unequal as it is for the whole adult sample (Poles in Lithuania, Russians in Lithuania, Poles in Belarus).

Regarding the educational background we have built three groups (primary, secondary and tertiary education) according to the highest level of education the respondents have achieved: The

majority has completed secondary education (64.0%), a third has completed tertiary education (34.1%) and only 1.3% have achieved not more than primary education.

1.5.7 Results: Attitudes towards the European Union & Political Participation

European identity among other individual identities

In order to identify the relevance of European identity within the whole set of individual aspects of identity, we asked the respondents what is most important to them in describing who there are. They were asked to check their first three choices. First, we looked at the results by the first, second and third choice. Not surprisingly, their most important first choice identification items are gender, occupation and age group. Their most often checked second choice identification items are age, gender and being member of their ethnic minority group. Finally, their most important third choice items are age, their settlement, and being member of their ethnic minority group.

Regarding their territorial identities, quite obviously, being European is not part of their core identity. Among the items of their first choice it is ranked next to last, and in the second and third choice lists it is ranked third to last (see Table 3). Looking at the items ethnic minority group, settlement, resident country, and Europe, a lot more young people identify with their ethnic minority group and the settlement that they live in than with their resident country and Europe. Interestingly, a quite similar number of young people reported identifying with Europe and with their resident country. In surveys with total populations, the respondents' identification with their home country is significantly stronger compared to their identification with Europe or the European Union (Eurobarometer, 2005; Jamieson, 2005).

Table 3: What is the most important to you in describing who you are?

	First choice	Second choice	Third choice
My gender	207	125	91
My current occupation	201	117	93
My age group	137	196	129
Being a *[ethnic minority group]*	92	122	96
My settlement	71	65	118
My religion	62	81	65
My social class	54	87	94
Being a citizen of *[resident country]*	51	43	75
Being European	26	47	72
My preferred political party, group…	3	5	21

n=904; respondents aged 18-29

Image of the European Union

First of all, we wanted to know which general image the young generation of the researched ethnic groups of the European Union has. The respondents were asked to position their image of the European Union on a scale of five (very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, very negative). More than half of the young people say that their image is very or fairly positive (13.3% very positive; 34.9% fairly positive). For another third, 33.6%, the image is neutral, and only a small number state that their image is fairly negative (7.5%) or very negative (2.5%). Regarding gender, there is a slight tendency that young women have a more positive image than young men (r=.150; p=.000). The educational background does not make much of a difference:

we have found a weak correlation (r=.125; p=.000) meaning that those with a higher level of education are a bit more likely to have a positive image of the European Union.

In our sample there are 12 ethnic minority groups from eight countries. Five of those countries are EU member states and three are not EU members (yet). However, regarding the image of the European Union, it does not make a difference if the respondents come from EU or non-EU member states.

Comparing with the adult generation we found significant differences: In general, the young generation has a more positive image than the adult generation (r=.150; p=.000). When analyzing separately for the female and male population, we find that this generational difference is true for both men and women.

The attitude towards the European Union also differs between the researched ethnic groups. Three ethnic minority groups are standing out because of their positive image (mean= ~2.00): the young generation of the Poles in Ukraine, the Ukrainians in Poland, and the Hungarians in Slovakia state to be more pro-European Union. Their perception of the European Union can be described as "fairly positive". The most negative image is documented by the young Russians in Latvia (mean=3.04). However, their perception still has to be labeled as "neutral".

Summarizing, the young generation seems to have a generally positive or neutral attitude towards the European Union with only a few being very positive or (rather) negative. Comparing the young and adult generation for each ethnic minority group we found a clear result: For all ethnic groups that we have analyzed the young population has a more positive image towards the European Union than the adult generation.

Attitudes regarding their countries' (potential) benefit from being EU member

In our total sample, the respondents' image of the European Union is highly correlated with the attitudes they have regarding the (potential) benefit that their resident country has from being an EU member (r= .684, p=.000). In the questionnaire we asked them using a scale of four (benefits a lot, rather benefits, rather does not benefit, does not benefit it all) if they thought that their country benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union. Those respondents who live in countries without EU membership were asked if they thought that their country would or would not benefit.

Above all, we were interested in the young generation's attitudes. The majority of the young adults interviewed think that the country of residence benefits (would benefit) from being an EU member (benefits a lot 14.2%, rather benefits 42.6%). A third of the young generation across all researched minorities does not see benefits for their country of residence from being (becoming) an EU member (rather does not benefit 18.5%, does not benefit at all 8.3%). Whereas it did not make a difference for the *image of the European Union* whether the respondents live or do not live in a member state, we found a correlation of EU membership and the *attitude towards benefit* (r=.181; p=.000). Those young people who live in a member state are more likely to see benefits for their countries than those who live in a state (still) outside the EU.

Unlike the image the respondents have of the European Union, the attitude towards benefit does not depend on the educational level; neither is there a gender difference. Compared with the adult generation (30 years and older) the young people are also just a little more likely to see benefits (r=.090; p=.000).

When we checked separately for each ethnic minority group, we received similar results as for the question regarding the image of the European Union. A bit more positive (towards the benefit impact of the European Union) than the average for the young generations across all ethnic groups were again the Poles in Ukraine, the Ukrainians in Poland, and the Hungarians in Slovakia. Russians in Latvia again were more skeptical than average, however, the Hungarians in Ukraine were the most skeptical group. In order to find some structure for interpretation, we tried to group respondents in regard to their resident country's as well as to their ethnic group's home country's relation to the European Union. In this perspective we have formed three groups: both their resident country and their ethnic group's home country are EU members (e.g. Poles in Lithuania); their ethnic group's home country is an EU member but not their resident country (e.g. Hungarians in Ukraine); and their resident country is an EU member but not their ethnic group's home country (e.g. Russians in Lithuania).[107] The results show clearly that the relation of the respondents' resident country and their ethnic group's home country regarding EU membership does not influence how they perceive possible EU benefits, nor does it influence their general image of the European Union.

Whereas across all ethnic groups young people are more likely to have a positive image of the EU than the adult generation, that correlation is more divers regarding the question of benefit: in three ethnic groups (Hungarians in Ukraine, Lithuanians in Russia, Poles in Ukraine) the young generation is more skeptical about the positive impact on their (non-EU) country than the adult generation. Note that all three ethnic groups live now outside the EU whereas their ethnic home country has become an EU member. Regarding our country/EU membership typology, we can draw the conclusion that those respondents whose ethnic home country is an EU member state while their resident country is still a non-EU member are more likely to show EU skepticism than their parents' and grandparents' generations.

Attitudes towards their ethnic group's benefits of EU membership

Since ethnic groups tend to be disadvantaged in many respects in their resident countries, we were especially interested if the respondents thought that their ethnic group's situation has changed for the better or the worse since their resident country became an EU member.[108] We asked on a scale of five (much better, rather better, much the same, rather worse, much worse) to evaluate if their ethnic minority group "has a say in making political decisions" and how the culture of their ethnic group is now recognized, both compared to the old system. There is not much difference between the outcomes of both questions: Most young people think that the situation for their ethnic group is much the same (58.3% regarding political decisions and 55.5% regarding the recognition of culture). However, there are more young people having a positive attitude than having a negative one. About a third think that their ethnic group has more of a say in making political decisions (30.2%), and that their culture gets more recognized (34.0%), while only 11.5% assume less of a say in making political decisions and 10.4% report less recognition of their culture.

Considering those questions, there is no significant difference between the young and the older generation. The majority of both age groups evaluates the situation as much the same as it used to be before EU membership.

[107] Our sample did not include any respondents whose resident country and ethnic group's home country, both, are non-EU members.

[108] For those respondents whose resident country has not joined the EU yet, we referred to "a conditional joining".

The young people (as well as the adult generation) in our sample differ in their opinion depending on their EU membership status of their resident country. Those who live in an EU country, are more likely to think that their ethnic group's situation is pretty much the same, whereas those who live outside the EU are more likely to assume a positive change for their ethnic minority group after their country will have become an EU member (regarding political decisions r=-.155; p=.000; regarding culture r=-.244; p=.000).

There is no gender difference but the educational level has a small influence on how they perceive the relation of EU membership and their ethnic group's situation for political decision making (r=-.104; p=.003). Also regarding the young people's assumption on the recognition of their ethnic culture is not related to gender but education (r=-.127; p=.000). There is a tendency that the more education, the better they regard the situation of their ethnic group since their country joined (will join) the EU. We may interpret that those with tertiary education are more likely to profit from EU membership (e.g. student exchange programs) whereas those with primary or secondary education do not (expect to) experience much improvement.

Summarizing, young people with higher education and young people living outside the EU are more likely to see a positive impact of the being part of the European Union on the situation of their ethnic minority group.

Fears about the future of Europe and the European Union

In general, the young people in our sample are a little less fearful about the future than the adult generation. They were asked if they are/are not afraid of five future scenarios in the European Union. The majority of the young men and women are afraid of an increase in drug trafficking and international organized crime (68.2%) as well as of the loss of social benefits (54.4%). In contrast, a much small number of young people are afraid of more difficulties for ethnic and national minorities (38.1%), the loss of their national identity and culture (34.7%), and the loss of their ethnic identity and culture (28.6%) which means that the majority of our young people in the sample do not share those fears. It is especially interesting that they are more likely to fear those scenarios that are not related to ethnic identity or national identity but might have a more direct effect on their well-being. The outlook on not receiving social benefits or becoming a victim of crime clearly is more threatening to them than seeing the ethnic and national identity decreasing. For all questions there is no correlation with gender or education.

Political participation of the minority youth

The question of the survey we have used as a proxy for measuring political participation at the European level was concerned with the respondents' participation in the European elections. The respondents were asked to report whether they took part in the last European parliamentary elections in a receiving country. Those who indicated that they voted in the last elections were asked to specify for which party. In this paper, we are mainly interested in the cross-country and cross-generational comparisons. Therefore, we have focused on the dichotomous variable of the election participation of the respondents, omitting the question of which parties the participants supported. Dichotomization of the outcome variable has limited our method choice to binary logistic regression. In order to make sense of the data, we have also limited our sample only to those respondents, who were eligible to vote in the EU elections.

The results have indicated a significant difference in the EU elections participation between the two generations. It is important to note that in our regression model, generational difference accounted for the biggest effect on the decision to politically participate. However, the direction of

the difference has turned out to be the opposite of what we initially expected (Exp(B)=2.762, *p*=.000). The adult population is more likely to take part in the EU elections compared to the younger generation.

Descriptive statistics illustrates this divergence in the participation between the two generations. 40.7% of the eligible young people under 29 years old reported that they voted in the last EU elections compared to 62.6% of the eligible adult population. While the majority of the young people (59.3%) did not participate in the EU elections, only 37.4% of the adult population did not vote.

We found similar results, when we looked at the participation at the national level as well as interest in the politics of a receiving country, sending country and ethnic minorities. On average, the young people reported lower level of political involvement when compared to the adult population. When the participation at the national and the EU level is compared within generations, the analysis shows that the two generations differ in their participation patterns. The majority of the adult population participated in both national and the EU elections (77.8% and 62.6% of the adults respectively). The majority of the younger generation reported to be more involved in the elections at the national level. 40.7% of the young people voted in the last EU elections, compared to 57.9% who voted in the last national elections.

The Polish youth in Lithuania stands out as the most actively involved in the EU elections (55%) followed by Belarusians in Lithuania (55.3%) and Russians in Latvia (46.4%). Inter-country difference proved to be significant (*p*<.001 for all dummy variables apart from Poles in Lithuania compared to Russians in Latvia, Exp(B)=.460, *p*=.020) for the whole sample. However, when we have run the model for the two generations separately, the country and minority group the young people belonged to had no significant effect on their decision to vote in the EU elections (apart from a difference between Russian minority youth in Latvia and Lithuania). The country and minority origin remained significant for the adult population.

Among other factors we have found in explaining participation in the EU elections, education plays an important role. Both primary and secondary education compared to tertiary as a base line proved to be highly significant (Exp(B)= .358, *p*=.000 and Exp(B)=.588, *p*=.000 respectively) for the adults. However, for the young people education was significant only when tertiary education was compared against secondary education (Exp(B)=.594, *p*=.029). Therefore, the young people with tertiary education are more likely to vote compared to youth with secondary education.

Knowledge of the language of a receiving country highly affects the decision of the adults to participate in the EU elections (Exp(B)= 1.377, *p*=.034). For the minority youth, the knowledge of the language was insignificant.

Gender of the respondents did not indicate any significant effect on the political participation of the respondents neither among the youth nor among the adults.

Another set of variables analyzed in relation to political participation at the EU level included reported attitudes of the respondents towards the European Union. The results showed an interesting relationship (or its absence) between the reported attitudes of the respondents and their participation in the EU elections. While there is no significant relationship between the identification of respondents with Europe and their participation in the EU elections, there is a significant effect of the respondents' identification with their ethnic group. This equally applies to both young (Exp(B)= .746, *p*=.047) and adult populations (Exp(B)= .770, *p*=.000). The less respond-

ents identify themselves with their ethnic group, the less likely they will take part in the EU elections.

The model did not show any significant relationship between the EU elections participation and the attitudes described above towards the European Union, such as image of the European Union, attitudes regarding their countries' (potential) benefit from being an EU member, attitudes towards their ethnic group's benefits of the EU membership, and fears about the future of Europe and the European Union. The only reported attitude which appeared to have a significant and quite large effect among both the youth (Exp(B)= 1.375, *p*=.006) and the adults (Exp(B)= 1.375, *p*=.006) was the respondents' fear regarding the loss of social benefits as a result of joining the EU Bigger fears of the respondents corresponded to their more active participation in the EU elections.

1.5.8 Discussion

The results support our assumption that among the ethnic minority groups in our research countries in Eastern and Central Europe the younger generation is more likely to identify with the European Union than the adult generation: The younger ones aged 18 to 29 report to have a generally positive or neutral image of the European Union, and compared to the adult generation, the young people's attitude is significantly more positive. They are also more likely to report that their resident country benefits from being a member of the European Union. Furthermore, the young generation is more likely to say that the European Union had a positive impact on the situation of the minority group that they belong to. Also, across the whole sample, they are less concerned with typical fears related to the enlargement of the European Union such as loss of social benefits or increase of drug trafficking and international organized crime. The results therefore show that what has been found out for whole national populations regarding their attitude towards the European Union and generational differences is also true for ethnic minority groups: the younger, the more likely they sympathize with the European Union.

However, even though their attitude is rather positive, especially compared to the one of the adult generation, they have still not really incorporated a European identity into their individual sets of identity aspects. They show a much stronger identification with their settlement where they live at. Interestingly though, while other research showed that young people as well as adults identify more with their country than with Europe or the European Union (Eurobarometer, 2005; Jamieson, 2005), the young people in our sample reported to identify with being European as much as with being a citizen of their resident country. It seems that the ethnic minority youth feels less connected with their resident country than the ethnic majority youth does. It is also possible that they have developed a more positive attitude towards the Europe/the European Union because they are oriented towards two nations, their resident country and their ethnic home country, and have developed a "double identity" (Weiss, 2007). This two-nation-orientation supports the development of a "European attitude".

Our results only partly support our hypothesis regarding country-specific differences in the young people's attitudes towards Europe and the European Union. Basically, we have not found country-specific differences but differences regarding their ethnic minority group. The youths of three ethnic groups have a particular positive image of the European Union: young Poles in Ukraine, young Ukrainians in Poland, and young Hungarians in Slovakia. Before drawing fast conclusions, we want to analyze further qualitative empirical material from our ENRI-East study (biographical interviews and expert interviews) for a well-considered and sound standing interpretation.

The results did not support our initial hypotheses regarding the youth political participation in the European elections. Although the young people appear to be more positive in their attitudes towards Europe and the EU, their positive attitudes do not result in more active participation in the European elections compared to the older generations. On average, the young people tend to be more involved in national politics than in the European one. However, at both national and European levels the respondents older than 29 years old report higher political participation than the younger individuals. Furthermore, the young people seem to be homogeneous in their political behavior regardless of which country and minority group they belong to.

Can we conclude based on these results that the minority youth is politically disengaged and passive? Public debates recently feature political engagement of ethnic minority young people in the light of disengagement, disaffection, or extremism. Falling electoral turnouts have been often blamed on turnouts among ethnic minority groups in general, and ethnic minority young people in particular (O'Toole, 2009). However, we should bear in mind that in this paper we have dealt with a particular kind of political participation, voting. Falling levels of electoral engagement, especially among youth, have been evident among populations in general across different states (O'Toole, 2009). Therefore, in order to confirm the statement that ethnic minority youth stands out for its lower electoral involvement when compared to the older generation, we would have to consider political participation of the majority of the population.

However, we can conclude that the minority youth of Central and Eastern Europe is less involved in the conventional political participation in comparison to the older generations of the ethnic minorities. This finding goes in line with literature on the declining interest in formal politics especially among young people (O'Toole, 2010). This mainstream literature often has a very narrow definition of "the political." It treats non-participation in formal politics as political apathy. O'Toole et al. (2010) suggests that these approaches are short-sighted. If a person does not engage in conventional political participation, it does not automatically follow that she or he is politically apathetic. There is a need for a broader understanding of political participation, which goes beyond voting and party membership. This especially applies to young people, who, according to O'Toole should be studies as "a specific group with their own particular circumstances and concerns" (2010: 46). Thus, there is a need to go beyond electoral participation of the minority youth and study different manifestations of their political behavior.

The findings shed light on what factors influence the minority youth's conventional participation. As we have expected, the young people with high education are more likely to participate in the elections than those who have secondary education. It is puzzling, however, why there was no significant difference when we compared the youth with tertiary education against the young people with only primary education.

We have also found out that identification with Europe does not impact the youth's decision to vote in the European elections. What does influence the voting is the young people's identification with their ethnic group. Although the minority youth does not see a significant change in the minority situation after joining the EU, the stronger they identify themselves with their ethnic group, the more likely they will participate in the elections. This result would need to be explored further to understand such paradoxical relationships in more depth and detail.

Another factor which increases the likelihood of the young people taking part in the European elections is their fears about the loss of social benefits. While a positive image of the EU and benefits of the EU membership does not constitute a sound ground for the young people to vote, fears have more powerful effects on the minority youth's decision to participate. Those young

people who have higher fears regarding the loss of social support are more likely to take part in the EU elections.

Although we did not find a direct and straightforward relationship between the youth's reported attitudes towards the EU and their political involvement, the results show an interesting interplay between how minority youth see the EU and how it translates into their political action. This relationship does not follow one clear direction and needs to be explored in more depth. Moreover, the research should be extended to other forms of political participation, especially unconventional involvement.

1.5.9 Limitations and further findings

One of the limitations of the ENRI-VIS study is that only 12 ethnic minority groups have been analyzed whereas an initial investigation showed that there are approximately 50 ethnic minority groups in the Eastern and Central European region. Another limitation is the sample which cannot be regarded as being representative for the target population(s) because in some investigated settlements the density of the analyzed ethnic minority group within the whole population was too small for random sampling. Therefore snowballing sampling techniques had to be applied as well. On the one hand, this enabled to receive a more diverse sample regarding the areas of residing ethnic minority groups, on the other hand we had to take a loss regarding representativeness.

This paper presents the current state of our analysis. We have already continued to investigate the relationship between ethnic identity, European identity and political participation at EU level and seek to answer how certain aspects of identity translate into political action.

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2 PART TWO: SYNOPSES OF FURTHER PAPERS

2.1 Measuring Identity Feelings among Central and East European Minority Groups

Victor Cebotari

This paper is set to explore the substance of three identity values, namely: pride in the nationality of the hosting country (national pride), pride in the nationality of the sending country (diaspora pride), and pride in the own ethnic group (ethnic pride). The analysis also establishes a comparative perspective at three levels: across the 12 ethnic minority groups, across the 3 pride values, and to a smaller extent, across ethnic status (minority – majority groups). At the same time, the empirical method used in this study comparatively analyse pride feelings in their hierarchical composition (not proud, moderate pride, and strong pride).

The paper is structured upon the consideration that people usually build cultural barriers around their ethnic, national, or diaspora pride feelings. This means that pride as a value tends to be approached through perceptions which go beyond the immediate observed realities. Many of the group specific or national based values are usually negotiated within society and are highly susceptible to integration and accommodation policies.

Yet, integrating ethnic minorities is a very sensitive process which has to deal mainly with the rigidity of people's beliefs. Throughout the analysis, it was observed that there is a constant tendency among ethnic groups to sense differently when it comes to their national, ethnic and diaspora pride feelings. There are ethnic communities which have low feelings in one pride category while having high feelings in another pride measurement. Also, there are ethnic minorities which have consistent low values in all three pride categories. One might carefully stipulate that divergent feelings of pride among ethnic minority groups could be the direct results of insufficient policies of assimilation and accommodation in their host countries. In order to better assess the context of change in pride feelings, additional theoretical and time-series research should be conducted.

When it come to national pride feelings, it should be mentioned that the low/high trends in this pride category match very well among both minority and majority groups. This reality is somehow surprising since the literature underlines the constant tendency among majority groups to feel more proud of their nationality as compared to ethnic minority groups. The hardship of the transition period, correlated with the recent economic downfall, may serve as a convincing argument to explain the general lowering trend in national pride feelings among both minority and majority groups in the same country.

The intensity to which different pride feelings are adopted by individuals also varies across groups when associated with structural and socio-demographic characteristics. The applied empirical model has analysed the intensity of pride values in its hierarchic order and has tested the impact of the employed characteristics on each level of the three dependent variables. Although in line with most of the established assumptions, it was also found that, ceteris paribus, ethnic minorities perceive differently the negative, moderate, and strong pride feelings in relation to the tested characteristics. Also, within each intensity level, there are several indicators (education, ethnic density, and discrimination) which hold different but significant explanatory patterns

across the three identity measurements. Two other indicators (religious participation and trust) have significant and more uniform analytical results. These patterns may have several reasons one could sense from the ideological and social background of each enclosed sample.

The diversity of the obtained findings suggests the need for further investigation of some interesting correlations. Because religious participation proves to be a strong and robust predictor of the pride feelings, the role of religion should be further investigated in relation to national and ethnic pride feelings. The strong association between pride feelings and trust may also serve as an idea for future research. The results of this study reiterate the idea of considering identity feelings and ethnic diversity always in connection with the discrimination status of the minority groups. There is a strong observed association between discrimination and negative pride feelings which prompts us to consider this aspect of an utmost importance. This paper also acknowledges the time changing pattern of pride feelings. Since the attitudes toward pride are volatile and time-varying, the dynamics of these feelings should be certainly the target for future research.

This paper will be published in:

- *United Nations University working papers*
- *European Journal of Political Research*

by Dr. Victor Cebotari.

2.2 Music and Identity

Lyudmila Nurse / Endre Sik

This paper analyses the relationship between musical preferences and the sense of ethnic identities among the twelve ethnic minorities in the ENRI-EAST study. It is based on the quantitative studies designed to examine music preferences as a proxy of ethnic identities. The analysis of the role of music in identities formation has been part of academic and political discourse recently. It has also been the subject of ethnic-musicological studies, which indicate the rise of the importance of music as a symbol of reviving national and ethnic identities in various parts of Europe. However, there has been somewhat less attention given to the ways the link between music and identities can be measured empirically.

The paper comprises the following parts:

- Music and identity in the literature and hypotheses
- Musical preferences of twelve ethnic minorities in the nation-states from the new EU Eastern borderlands
- Association between musical preferences and identity
- The model
- Results and conclusions

Results indicated that, the probability of closely identifying with an ethnic minority is significantly influenced by musical preferences among certain ethnic minorities:

- Russians in Latvia (positively) by those who like Latvian music;
- Among Belarusians in Lithuania and Poland, and Poles in Belarus by those who like ethnic minority music.

The sense of belonging to the country of residence negatively influences musical preferences: of global music (Belarusians in Lithuania, Poles in Balarus, and Slovaks in Hungary) and of minority music Lithuanians in Russia and Slovaks in Hungary). Among Slovaks in Hungary, preferring Hungarian music (only) decreases "closeness" to Hungary, i.e. only mixed music preferences increases the feeling of being Hungarian.

Preferring ethnic minority music increases the probability of having an ethnic minority as a "core" component of one's identity composition as for example is observed among Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovaks in Hungary, while it is the opposite case among Hungarians in Slovakia (albeit insignificantly) among Russians in Lithuanians. In the latter cases, liking global music has the same effect, while preferring global or country or residence music decreases the importance of ethnic minority identity in several other cases as well.

The country of residence related identity is less often influenced significantly by musical preferences than is the case with ethnic minority music; however, among Hungarians in Slovakia it is a significant factor, while global music preference is an inhibiting factor among Belarusians and Poles in Lithuanians and Slovaks in Hungary among whom the preference from ethnic minority music also decreases their sense of Hungarian identity.

The paper contains the following parts:

1. Introduction
2. Media and identity of ethnic minorities

   Identity within the era of globalisation
   Media and identity in Eastern Europe
   Media and Identities of ethnic minorities in Eastern European borderlands
   Hypotheses
3. Qualitative analysis

   Case study
   Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia
   Conclusions from qualitative analysis
4. Overall conclusions

This paper is published in:

- *Identities and Music: Identity of Place and Cultural Identities of Generations: Hungarian 3G Case Study (2011) in: Cultures and/of Globalization. Eds.: Barrie Axford and Richard Huggins, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 171-201.*



by Dr. Lyudmila Nurse
and Prof. Endre Sik.

2.3 An Exploration of the Impact of the Media on Ethnic Minorities' Identity Formation In Eastern Europe

Lyudmila Nurse / Anna Gibson / Ráchel Surányi

In this paper, the authors are concerned with the relationship that the media has with the identity-forming process of ethnic minorities along the new EU border in Eastern Europe, particularly given the proliferation of mass media consumption following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This leads them to question how the media affects the identities of ethnic minorities in terms of an affinity with their country of origin, their country of residence, and with the European continent as a whole. Throughout the paper they undertake a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis of primary empirical data - namely questionnaires undertaken by ethnic minorities in 8 Eastern European countries relating to media consumption and identity perception, as well as analysis of biographical interviews – in addition to drawing on theoretical analysis from the existing state of the art discourse.

As satellite television, print media, radio and the worldwide web bring continuous news and popular opinion to ethnic minority communities in Eastern Europe, spatial boundaries have become increasingly blurred and the already convoluted process of identity construction has become ever more fluid. As a result, ethnic minorities are faced with negotiating trends of media-induced cultural assimilation on the hand, and the creation of 'virtual' communities that sustain ethnic and territorial allegiances on the other. The role of the media as a ubiquitous force for the dissemination of knowledge and ideas is thus inextricably connected with how people form and perceive their identity, making identity formation an increasingly reflexive practice. As such, the media provides a wider spectrum of choice and global awareness to the self-identification process that had not been afforded to previous generations; it also facilitates the preservation of historical links and ethnic culture by ethnic minorities outside of their country of ethnic origin.

Nonetheless, while the media's generalized role as a mediator between identity, politics and culture is widely accepted, it is the *extent* to which the media interacts with minorities' identity formation that is highly ambiguous, and that which we seek to examine further.

Ultimately, by better understanding the link between media and identity formation we can garner a clearer insight into notions of community-based, national and European cohesion that are invaluable to the fruitful interaction of Eastern Europe at large. Without this understanding, the media can be used to provoke or sustain divisive allegiances and structural inequality along ethnic lines; apprehending the inter-causality between the media and ethnic minority identity formation can therefore be harnessed to prevent this societal dislocation.

This paper will be published in:

- *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*
  by Dr. Lyudmila Nurse, Anna Gibson and Ráchel Surányi

2.4 Nations between States: The Effect of Dual National Identification on Allegiance of Minority Group Members to the "Host" Country

Natalia Tchistiakova

A lack of attachment of minority group members to their country of residence is often considered to be one of the main causes of incoherence in culturally heterogeneous societies. The study of disintegrating tendencies in modern European societies raises issues about the role of national identification of ethnic minority groups in determining their allegiance to the host country.

Using data for individuals sampled within 8 East European countries this paper focuses on identification with the country of ancestry and the country of residence in relation to allegiance to the 'host' society among various established minority groups.

The analysis shows persistent differences in levels of allegiance to the host country between respondents with different types of national identification. More specifically, cross-cutting forms of identification with the "mother" and "host" nation goes together with stronger allegiance to the host country than nested forms of national identification (viz. with the minority group within the borders of host nation).

The implication of these findings for intergroup relations and the social cohesion in diverse societies is discussed. The results of the research indicate that in a certain social environment minority group members maintain the adherence to the mother nation and develop cross-cutting dual national identification, *in order to be successfully and decently integrated* into the host nation. The analysis shows that they maintain this attachment not at the expense of allegiance to the host society but, on the contrary, as a basis for the success of integration into the host society.

The study also reveals some important characteristics of the social environment that stimulates cross-cutting form of identification and largely explains the strange resilience and even resistance of minority group members to the pressure of acculturation policies. Specifically, the study emphasizes the role of relative prototypicality of majority group in determining the allegiance of minority group members to the host country. The results of the analysis support theoretical arguments for the positive impact of cross-cutting form of national identification with mother and host nations on the allegiance to the host country under the social circumstances characterized by high perceived relative prototypicality of majority group.

This new approach may reverse established notions and possibly give a key to the resolution of stagnating problems of culturally heterogeneous societies. The findings, important from theoretical prospective, could also have a valuable practical impact if taken into account in policy making aimed at integration of multiple cultural groups, harmonization of inter-group relations and creation of coherent multicultural societies.

This paper will be published in:

- *Twenty years later (1991-2011): the reshaping of space and identity – the collection of articles after the conference*
- *Identities. Global Studies in Culture and Power*

by Natalia Tchistiakova

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Dr. Chvorostov Alexander is Director of the Center for Comparative Eurasia Studies and Surveys (CEASS-Center at the IHS-Vienna). He is an experienced sociologist and research manager with an extensive track record of international teaching, research and consulting since early 1990s. He has been teaching various undergraduate and post-graduate courses in Sociology in a number of universities in Moscow, Prague and Vienna. His research practice embraces the fields of social transition, educational policies and comparative studies on EU and CIS countries. He has worked as a consultant for various international organizations (such as World Bank, UNDP or UNEP) and governmental institutions in Russia and Austria. Furthermore, Dr. Chvorostov has coordinated a series of FP5, FP6, FP7 and INTAS projects.

Gibson Anna was the Research Coordinator for Oxford XXI, where she coordinated multidisciplinary research activities with a wide-ranging set of global partners, in addition to undertaking extensive data and text analysis. Her background is in political science and international development, holding an MSc in Development Management from the London School of Economics, where her research fields included global political economy of development and global civil society networks. Previously, she has been Research Manager for think tank *Re-Define*, where she coordinated their trans-national research team and published papers on European crisis management.

Dr. Nurse Lyudmila is a co-founder and a Director of Oxford XXI. Her educational background is in history and social sciences. She further studied sociology at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and after completing her dissertation in 1987, she also studied at the Department of Sociology at the University of Manchester, UK. After heading a research center at the Youth Institute, Moscow, she became a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Lyudmila was a visiting research fellow at the Universities of Edinburgh, Warwick and the City University of London. Her research interests focus on cultural identities, cultural reproduction, biographical methods and methodology of multi-disciplinary comparative studies. She has been involved in research in social institutions, education and employment, generational and cohort studies, social analysis, including her work in a major longitudinal project in Russia. Dr. Nurse's experience includes over 15 years of international consultancy work in social monitoring and evaluation, and social policy projects in new EU member states, accession and, CIS countries, providing consultancy services for the Council of Europe, EC, The World Bank and UN. She is a member of the ISA, ESA and the European Cultural Parliament.

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Prof. Endre Sik is a project manager at TÁRKI and a professor at ELTE (Eötvös Loránd University Budapest). His main fields of research are: migration, Diaspora; xenophobia, labour market, informal economy, households' economic behavior; social network capital. He has been engaged in a broad range of international research activities, among them: "Diaspora-politics in Hungary, in Russia and in Ukraine" (COLPI, Budapest 1998-2000); "Cultural Identity of Hungarian Migrants in Austria" (1997-2001, European Cultural Foundation, Wien-Budapest); "The Social Costs of Transformation"(1994-1996, Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Wien/Austria); "Migration Potential" (1993-5, European Community, COST, Brain Drain Project).

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Prof. Székelyi Mária is Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University Budapest, and the Head of the Department of Methodology. Her major research fields are cross-national surveys on social justice, national identity and national stereotypes, inter-ethnic relations, attitudes, prejudice and discriminatory behavior. She is an expert in research methodology. She was the author of the book titled *Grappling with National Identity. How Nations See Each Other in Central Europe*. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 2000 (co-authors: György Csepeli and Antal Örkény).

Tchistiakova Natalia graduated in Social Philosophy and Sociology at Lomonosov Moscow State University, was an editorial board member and head of the section of sociology of politics in science magazine "Socis" ("Sociological Researches"), Moscow Russia; and a Special correspondent of political magazine "Partner TPPRF" publication of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russian Federation**.** Published articles about immigrants integration as a challenge to European democracy, political crisis in European Union, problems of social integration in modern European countries, European experience of combating corruption and other social and political issues. Currently participates in the Research Master Program on "Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism" at Utrecht University.

Dr. Waechter Natalia graduated in Sociology and Political Science at the University of Vienna, is Senior Researcher at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna (Department of Economics and Finance). She is lecturing at the Department for Educational Studies, University of Inns-

bruck, Austria, and at the Institute for Education of Students, Vienna/Chicago (IES). Her training included a Post-doc year at the Department of Psychology at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). In 2010 she was elected European President of the Research Commit-tee 34 (Sociology of Youth) of the International Sociological Association (ISA).

ANNEX: PROJECT'S EMPIRICAL DATA BASES AND RULES OF ACCESS

Overview of empirical data sets produced within the frameworks of ENRI-East

Description of exploitable foreground	Confidential	Foreseen embargo date	Exploitable product(s) or measure(s)	Timetable, commercial or any other use	Patents or other IPR exploitation	Owner & Other Beneficiary(s) involved
Values and Identity Survey (ENRI-VIS)	Yes	Till October 2015	Survey manual, sampling tables, SPSS data file, Code & reference book; technical report	Starting from 2012	Access to database only in cooperation with project partners	Project consortium (all beneficiaries)
Biographical Interviews (ENRI-BIOG)	Yes		Methodology and survey tools; survey manual; transcripts of interviews in original languages; accompanying information and files; summaries or translations in English; technical report			
Expert interviews (ENRI-EXI)	yes					

General rules of access to and exploitation of ENRI-East empirical data bases

The exploitable foreground of the project consists of different data bases:

- ENRI-VIS: quantitative data base, 6800 respondents of the ethnic minority groups
- ENRI-BIO: 144 qualitative, biographical interviews with members of the ethnic minority groups
- ENRI-EXI: 40 qualitative expert interviews with representatives of NGOs, mass media and governmental officials

The data is exclusively held for the use of the ENRI-East consortium for three years after the end date of the project after which time they will be made generally available to a wider public to conditions explained below.

ENRI qualitative interviews (expert interviews and biographical interviews) are stored on a password secured online storage platform (interview transcripts, technical reports, related documents and graphic files) until three years after the end of the project. Every project team leader has access

to this platform. The coordinating team will then transfer the data set to an appropriate institution for scientific data bases.

The quantitative data base will be available for all consortium members after the closure of the project as before. Access is guaranteed through the ENRI-East website in the member section until three years after the project. The coordinating team will then transfer the data set to an appropriate institution for scientific data bases.

Access rights may be granted to third parties royalty-free or to fair and reasonable conditions. All requests for access rights shall be made in writing to the coordinator, who will than initiate further actions. The granting of access rights to third parties is conditional on the acceptance of co-authorship of at least one party of the ENRI-East consortium, including ensuring that data will be used only for the intended purpose and that appropriate confidentiality obligations are in place.

Within the next years and beyond the foreground will mainly be exploited in form of publications in academic journals. First analyses and interpretations are included in the ENRI-East reports on every minority and available in the ENRI-East Working Paper Series on the project website (http://www.enri-east.net/project-results).

The project ENRI-East, a cross-national study of trans-boundary social and ethnic groups in Europe did not create any foreground which leads to patents, trademarks, registered designs or the like, except the acknowledged publications in peer-reviewed journals and a variety of other media sources.