

**Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities:
Nations between States along the New Eastern Borders of the European Union**

Series of project research reports

**Contextual and empirical reports
on ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe**

Research Report #11

**The Ukrainian Minority
in Poland**

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About the ENRI-East research project (www.enri-east.net)

The Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities: Nations between states along the new eastern borders of the European Union (ENRI-East)

ENRI-East is a research project implemented in 2008-2011 and primarily funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. This international and inter-disciplinary study is aimed at a deeper understanding of the ways in which the modern European identities and regional cultures are formed and inter-communicated in the Eastern part of the European continent.

ENRI-East is a response to the shortcomings of previous research: it is the first large-scale comparative project which uses a sophisticated toolkit of various empirical methods and is based on a process-oriented theoretical approach which places empirical research into a broader historical framework.

The distinct ethno-national diversity in this region, along with the problems resulting from it was generated by dramatic shifts of borders, populations and political affiliation which have continued until today. The prevailing pattern of political geography of this part of Europe was the emergence and the dismemberment of empires, a process which created ethno-national enclaves within the boundaries of new nation states. These minorities were frequently drawn into inter-state conflicts and subjected to repression, ethnic cleansing and expulsion. The subjects of interests were ethnic minorities in the supra-region "Wider Eastern Europe", i.e. the region between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, along the current geo-political "East-West" division line. Estimated 8 to 10 millions of people are affected by "ethnic splits" or minority groups, whose ethnic compatriots would constitute a titular majority in another country, some of them even on each side of this contemporary geopolitical east-west diving border line.

The complex ENRI-East study was designed as a comprehensive set of theoretical, methodological, empirical and comparative work streams exploring the interplay of identities among the twelve ethnic minorities in the supra-region of Central and Easter Europe. These ethnic groups are: Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, Belarusians and Ukrainians in Poland, Slovaks in Hungary, Hungarians in Slovakia and in Ukraine, Poles in Ukraine, in Belarus and in Lithuania, Belarusians in Lithuania as well as Lithuanians in Russia (Kaliningrad oblast). The project includes also a case study of Germany, where our target groups were the ethnic Germans returning to their historical homeland after the centuries of living in other European countries as well as Jewish immigrants (so called "quota refugees" who had moved to the country since 1989).

ENRI-East addresses four general research themes. The first one deals with the interplay of identities and cultures by comparing 'mother nations' and their 'residual groups abroad'. The second theme is a cross-cutting approach which addresses the nations and the states: more exactly, the attitudes and policies of 'mother nations' and 'host nations' toward the 'residual groups' and vice versa. The third research theme comprise the reality of self organization and representation of "residual groups abroad" (ethnic minorities) along the East European borderland. Finally, the last research theme of the project deals with path dependencies, historical memories, present status and expected dynamics of divided nations in Eastern Europe.

The empirical data base for ENRI-East was generated through 5 sub-studies implemented in all or several project countries:

- ENRI-VIS (Values and Identities Survey): face-to-face formalized interviews with members of 12 ethnic minority groups in eight countries, 6,800 respondents;
- ENRI-BIO: qualitative, biographical in-depth interviews with members of 12 ethnic minority groups in eight countries (144 interviews);
- ENRI-EXI: semi-structured expert interviews with governmental and non-governmental representatives of ethnic minority groups in eight countries (48 interviews);
- ENRI-BLOG: online content analysis of weblogs and Internet periodicals run or maintained by ethnic minority group members;
- ENRI-MUSIC: special study on cultural identities and music; an innovative, multi-disciplinary pilot effort in Hungary and Lithuania.

The series of ENRI-East research reports (www.enri-east.net/project-results)
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Main outcomes of the ENRI-East research program are summarized in the series of research papers and project reports as outlined below. The whole collection of papers will be publicly available on the project web-site by December 2011, while some papers can be accessed since September 2011.

Individual papers are written by ENRI-East experts from all project teams and the whole series is edited by the Coordinating Team at the CEASS-Center at the Institute for Advanced Studies under the guidance of the Principal Investigator Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich and Project Coordinator Dr. Alexander Chvorostov.

Summarizing and generalizing reports

1. Theoretical and methodological backgrounds for the studies of European, national and regional identities of ethnic minorities in European borderlands (Edited by Prof. Claire Wallace and Dr. Natalia Patsiurko)
2. Interplay of European, National and Regional Identities among the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (main results of ENRI-East empirical program) (Edited by Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich and Dr. Alexander Chvorostov)
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9. The Russian Minority in Lithuania
10. The Belarusian Minority in Poland
11. The Ukrainian Minority in Poland
12. The Lithuanian Minority in Russia (Kaliningrad oblast)
13. The Hungarian Minority in Slovakia
14. The Hungarian Minority in Ukraine
15. The Polish Minority in Ukraine
16. Special Case Study Germany

Series of empirical survey reports:

17. ENRI-VIS: Values and Identities Survey
 - Methodology and implementation of ENRI-VIS (Technical report)
 - ENRI-VIS Reference book (major cross-tabulations and coding details)
18. Qualitative sub-studies of ENRI-East project (methodological and technical reports)
 - Methodological report on Biographical Interviews (ENRI-BIO)
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 - Methodological report and main findings of the Pilot study of web-spaces (ENRI-BLOG)

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The treatment of historical, statistical and sociological data and facts, their scientific accuracy and the interpretations as well as the writing style are the sole responsibility of the authors of individual contributions and chapters published in the ENRI Research Papers. The positions and opinions of the project coordinator and of the editors of ENRI-East series of research papers as well as of the ENRI-East consortium as a whole may not necessarily be the same. By no means may the contents of the research papers be considered as the position of the European Commission.

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1 UKRAINIANS IN POLAND: A BACKGROUND OVERVIEW

Konrad Zieliński

1.1 Polish majority and Ukrainian minority relations

1.1.1 Historical overview

The Ukrainians within the borders of contemporary Poland are an autochthonous population that was forcibly removed from the lands bordering Ukraine where they had lived for centuries following World War II as a result of the infamous “Akcja Wisła”.

The ancestors of the Ukrainians in Poland began settling in the region of Eastern Poland in the 14th century. Poland’s borders extended far into modern-day Ukraine following the 1569 Union of Lublin, which created the single state Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and led to the consolidation of a Polish elite.

Religion was a very important element in shaping the national culture of the Ukrainian population even though the community was divided over its confessions, as in Ukraine. A religious union between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church on the territories of Ukraine took place in 1596 in Brest leading to the creation of the Greek Catholic Church (also known as the Uniate Church). However, not all Ruthenians converted to the Uniate Church and to this day Russian-orthodox Ukrainians who belong to the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church continue to live in Poland.

In the following centuries, the Polish-Ukrainian relations were not going well. Ethnic conflict has often been synonymous with class conflict, between the Polish nobleman, owner of lands, and Ukrainian peasant. In the seventeenth century Cossack bloody uprising, including the Khmelnytsky one, created in Polish consciousness the stereotypical image of a Ukrainian as primitive and cruel robber. On the other hand, the bloody suppression of uprisings, cruel treatment Ukrainian peasants by the Polish or Polonized gentry, effectively separated the two nations from each other. Partitions of Poland in the second half of eighteenth century, policies of Russia and Austria, guided by self-interest and pursuing a policy of 'divide et impera', contributed to strained relations. With such a burden of mistrust and dislike Poles and Ukrainians in 1918 found themselves in one state.¹

The collapse of Tsarism in the east, the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, and the defeat of Germany in World War One led to the creation of an independent Polish Republic. The Polish-Soviet war seriously damaged Polish-Ukrainian relations and exacerbated the position of Ukrainians who remained on the Polish side of the border and who accounted for 16% of the inter-war Polish population of 27 million people. While the ethnic Polish population constituted 65% of the whole population, in the Eastern territories (the so called Eastern Borderlands), particularly in the Polesie, Volhynia and Eastern Galicia Provinces, Poles were a minority.

The Polish government promised to introduce territorial autonomy for Ukrainians, in line with the demand of Allied powers, and to allow the Ukrainian language in administration bodies and create a Ukrainian university. However the Polish state did not fulfill these promises. The Ukrai-

¹ More on the subject: D. Beauvois, *Trójkąt ukraiński. Szlachta, carat i lud na Wołyniu, Podolu i Kijowszczyźnie 1793-1914* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS 2005).

nian university was never established and the Ukrainian language was systematically removed from public office. Regardless of numerous declarations, information on Ukrainian history and culture was eradicated from the school curricula.² The attitude of the Polish authorities towards the Ukrainian minority was dominated by fears of Ukrainian irredentism skillfully fuelled by Soviet Russia and its emissaries as well as the local members of the communist movement. The authorities regarded every expression of cultural and national activity as sabotage and cooperation with Bolshevik Russia, with whom relations were very tense, particularly after Pilsudski's coup in May 1926, which established an authoritarian regime. Following a protest by Belarusian Peasants' and Workers' Union, the government introduced policies towards the so-called Eastern Territories aimed at imposing a Polish and Roman Catholic character on the region, including settlement of Poles in these areas, including where ethnic Ukrainians lived.³

Fuelled by a reaction against injustices in land ownership and discrimination of Ukrainian peasants at the hands of the state, the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was founded in 1929, which carried out terrorist actions against the Poles.⁴ Ukrainians attacked and burnt down Polish villages and manor houses, while the Polish authorities carried out brutal pacifications of Ukrainian villages. These acts were not stopped despite the signing the so-called Polish-Ukrainian Agreement of 1935, which was respected only by some, more conciliatory Ukrainian parties. The underlying attitude of the Polish government towards the Ukrainian minority is indicated by its decision in the same year of 1935 to pull out of the League of Nations treaty on ethnic minorities on the grounds that its own laws were adequate. The state also involved itself more deeply in religion by attempting to polonize the Orthodox Church and subordinate it to the government.⁵ In 1935, after the death of Pilsudski a new wave of repressions was unleashed upon the minorities. The Polish side further violated the terms of the Polish-Ukrainian Agreement by closing down Orthodox churches or turning them into Catholic churches in 1938, which affected parts of the Ukrainian population.

Poles and Ukrainians in Poland entered World War II at variance with one another. Parts of the Ukrainian population welcomed the aggression of the USSR against Poland on 17 September 1939 and participated actively in the persecutions of the Poles under the auspices of the Soviet authorities. Following Soviet repression against the Ukrainian nationalist movement, Ukrainian nationalists with the support of the Germans carried out a number of repressive actions against Czech colonists and, first and foremost, against the Polish citizens of Volhynia.⁶ This violence was initiated by the activists of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists under the command of Stepan Bandera and carried out mainly by the quasi-military formations of the Ukrainian

² H. Składanowski, 'Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w okresie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej w polskich programach nauczania i podręcznikach historii dla szkół powszechnych wprowadzonych po reformie z 1932 roku' [in:] *Polska i Ukraina. Sojusz 1920 roku i jego następstwa* (Materiały z konferencji naukowej, Toruń, 16-18 listopada 1995 r.), ed. Z. Karpus, W. Rezmer, E. Wiszka, (Toruń: Wydawnictwo UMK 1997), p. 486.

³ H. Chałupczak, T. Browarek, *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce 1918-1995* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS 2000), p. 105-110.

⁴ R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), p. 84-103; K. Zieliński, 'Population Displacement and Citizenship in Poland, 1918-1924' [in:] *Homelands. War, Population and Statehood in Eastern Europe and Russia 1918-1924*, ed. N. Baron, P. Gatrell (London: Anthem Press 2004), p. 105-110.

⁵ <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-1258.html> (15-11-2009).

⁶ J. Lewandowski, 'Kwestia ukraińska w II Rzeczypospolitej' [in:] *Szkło bolesne, obraz dni... Eseje nieprzedawnione*, ed. J. Lewandowski, (Uppsala: Ex Libris 1991), p. 91-111.

Insurgent Army (UPA) aided by the peasants. A great role in inciting the crimes was played by the Orthodox clergy (Orthodox priests who refused to inspire crimes were murdered together with peasants who did not want to participate in them). The peak of the murders was in summer 1943.⁷ It is estimated that in the attacks, which lasted from 1942 to 1944, about 60,000 Poles were murdered as well as a few thousand Ukrainians. A similar situation was observed in Galicia, although it is difficult to estimate the number of Polish victims (in the case of western Ukraine the Greek Catholic clergy sometimes also played an important role in inciting the crimes).

In 1944 the Polish and Soviet governments moved 480,000 Ukrainians to Ukraine.⁸ The census conducted in February 1946 showed that 162,000 people out of a total of about 24 million people in Poland declared Ukrainian nationality.⁹ The results of the census did not reflect the true ethnic representation of the country. The post-war migration flows and resettlements had not yet been finished and under pressure from the authorities and their war experiences many ethnic groups hid their origins, among them Jews and Ukrainians. At the end of the 1940s, however, Poland became a country with a low percentage of citizens from national minorities.¹⁰

In 1947, the Polish authorities brutally displaced the Ukrainian population which managed to escape resettlement to the USSR from the Krakow, Rzeszów and Lublin Provinces. This move, called “Akcja Wisła,” led to the resettling of the Ukrainian population (including Lemko and Boyko people) in the Northern and Western Territories. It is estimated that the deportation from April 28 to July 31, 1947 involved 130,000 – 140,000 persons. “Akcja Wisła” was allegedly directed against the UPA. However, many historians, both Ukrainian and Polish, are of the opinion that the destruction of a very few units did not merit resettlement on such a scale, including territories where the UPA had never been active. Instead it seems that the destruction of the greater Ukrainian settlements was intended to contribute to the dispersion and subsequent assimilation of the Ukrainian population.¹¹ The fact that the Ukrainians were resettled onto the poorly developed and scarcely populated lands acquired from Germany after World War One, the so called Regained Lands, indicates that it was a way to increase the economic potential of the new lands in

⁷ W. Siemaszko, E. Siemaszko, *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939-1945*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo "von Borowiecky" 2000), *passim*. R. Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy. Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo PWN 1993), p. 260.

⁸ Chałupczak, Browarek, p. 81, 87, 89.

⁹ A. Gawryszewski, *Ludność Polski XX wieku* (Warszawa: Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego zagospodarowania PAN 2006), p. 312-313; S. Szulc, 'Demographic Changes in Poland: War and Postwar', „Population Index”, 1947, Vol. 13, no. 1, p. 3-4.

¹⁰ For the international context of Polish post-war politics towards the national minorities, see F. J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press 1986); C. Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War. Soviet Strategies in Europe 1943-1956* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1999); W. LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-2000* (New York: McGraw-Hill 2002); P. Wiczorkiewicz P., 'Wokół modelu polskiej polityki Stalina' [in:] ed. J. Dec, A. Tyszkiewicz, *Związek Radziecki wobec krajów Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej 1920-1991* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Dante 2004).

¹¹ J. Hrycak, *Historia Ukrainy 1772-1990* (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 2000), p. 278-279; M. Zajączkowski, 'Propagandowe uzasadnienie akcji „Wisła” w ówczesnej prasie polskiej' [in:] ed. J. Pisuliński, *Akcja Wisła* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IPN 2003), p. 177-186; G. Motyka, 'Łuny w Bieszczadach Jana Gerharda a prawda historyczna' [in:] *Polacy o Ukraińcach, Ukraińcy o Polakach. Materiały sesji*, ed. T. Stegner (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG 1993), p. 174-182.

the West and North.¹² As a result, the Polish-Ukrainian community that had inhabited these territories for ages was totally destroyed.

After World War II and the inclusion of Eastern Galicia into the USSR, the Greek-Catholic Church was liquidated under the pressure of the authorities as part of the “Akcja Wisła” and was no longer allowed to perform religious rites. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Public Safety and the Office of Religious Faiths (1950) the government confiscated the property of the Russian Orthodox Church. A decree of 1953 allowed the authorities to control the nominations of clerical functions. This made it possible to use repressions against the “rebellious” priests and “elements” that were considered reactionary. Consent to teach religion in Ukrainian schools was also withdrawn and churches were cut off from foreign aid.

After “the Polish October” of 1956 the Polish authorities allowed a certain freedom to the Ukrainian minority, which founded the Ukrainian Social and Cultural Society (UTSK). Although it was controlled by the authorities it remained the only institution representing the interests of the Ukrainian minority in Poland up to 1989. Some legal steps were taken in order to regulate the problem of Ukrainian property lost as a result of the “Akcja Wisła”. In 1956 Greek Catholics obtained the possibility to carry out some activities. However other changes included the growth in mixed marriages and migration of the Ukrainians from villages to towns, which undermined the tradition of Ukrainian national culture, particularly folk culture. From the 1960s onwards the number of Ukrainian schools decreased. The aim of the government in the 70s of building a homogenous socialist society meant the intensification of policies directed at the assimilation of the Ukrainian minority. This led to greater control over minority organisations, less support from the state and the gradual removal of the Ukrainian language from school curricula.

In the 1980s new initiatives were undertaken by many minority groups but the authorities refused at that time to register any associations and organisations that could not be controlled by them. As a result of the emergence of the “Solidarity” movement in the early 1980s party supervision over national minority organisations was eased. The introduction of martial law led to the weakening of minority rights again, blocking attempts by Ukrainian students to organise the Union of the Ukrainian Students in Poland. Some activists left the UTSK and joined the oppositional stream of “Solidarity” while others gathered around the Russian Orthodox Church Brotherhood, established in 1983. The Ukrainian students, along with Belorussian and Lithuanian students, created the All-Polish Cultural Council of Students of the National Minorities, which was part of the Polish Students’ Union. Only in the second half of 1989 the assimilation policy was abandoned.¹³ Only at the end of the 1980s however were the first Greek-Catholic bishops after World War II appointed.¹⁴ The Ukrainians constitute the majority of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in two dioceses: Przemysko-Nowosądecka established in 1983, and Chełmsko-Lubelska reactivated in 1989.¹⁵

¹² K. Zieliński, ‘To Pacify, Populate and Polish: Territorial Transformations and the Displacement of Ethnic Minorities in Communist Poland, 1944-1949’ [in:] Warlands. Population Resettlement and State Reconstruction in the Soviet-East European Borderlands, 1945-1950, ed. P. Gatrell, N. Baron, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan 2009), p. 197-198.

¹³ Chałupczak, Browarek, p. 293-295.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 82.

¹⁵ <http://www2.mswia.gov.pl/porta1.php?serwis=pl&dzial=61&id=37#ukraincy> (15-11-2009).

1.1.2 Political overview

The cultural realisation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland improved after 1989 when responsibility for national minorities moved in part from the Ministry of the Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Culture, which deals with all educational and cultural issues. These new circumstances offer significant freedom to the Ukrainian minority to undertake activities in order to develop and cultivate its culture and identity. Like other minority organizations, some Ukrainian organizations receive state support, and can apply for grants from Ministry of Culture and National Heritage and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Polish EU accession has not only improved the economical situation of the state and its inhabitants (including the minorities), but also made possible EU subsidizing for many educational and cultural projects of the Ukrainian minority, which is able to apply usually through its local self-governments for special EU programmes.

The provisions on the rights of individual national minorities are included in bilateral treaties which Poland has concluded with its neighbors.¹⁶ In relation to Poland's bilateral ties with Ukraine, the Polish Parliament and Government as well as social organisations and academic circles have many times commemorated the victims of the Volhynia massacre. The Ukrainian side remained silent until July 2003 when, at the 60th commemoration of the massacre in Poryck, a monument for the victims was unveiled with the participation of the highest Polish authorities and the then President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma. The attitude of Ukrainians to the UPA crimes is itself divided. Some Ukrainians, including former President Yushchenko who sought to radically improve relations with Poland following the Orange Revolution, regard this organisation as the main advocate of an independent Ukraine in its day and view its members as national heroes. Other Ukrainians, by contrast, particularly those who are more closely associated with favourable relations with Russia, such as Ukraine's new President, Viktor Yanukovich, condemn the UPA for collaborating with Nazi Germany in fighting against the Soviet Union. In Poland attempts to commemorate the UPA as heroes evoke protests from the local population, veterans' societies and the families of the victims. Although Polish-Ukrainian relations have improved, according to Polish public opinion it is the main issue that still divides Poles and Ukrainians (such impression is caused by insufficient awareness of historical events on both sides and the fact that media focus on painful past). However, according to results of survey of the ENRI-East project, the historical events does not play such significant role in perception of Poles by the Ukrainian minority, and Ukrainian minority by the Polish majority.

The Senate of the Republic of Poland condemned the "Akcja Wisła" and President Kwasniewski expressed regret for the Action in 2002. However the World Ukrainian Congress demanded further official apologies from Poland for "Akcja Wisła" in 2007. The Polish President Lech Kaczyński and the President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko condemned the Action in February 2009. They issued a common statement that said that "Akcja Wisła" broke fundamental human rights. The issue of the compensation for its victims still remains unsolved.

The renovation of the Polish Military Cemetery in Lviv also provoked emotions. Young defenders of the city against the Ukrainians in 1918 were buried in the cemetery. The Cemetery was restored despite the fact that the Ukrainian authorities of Lviv were opposed to this idea. Representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland maintained neutrality in the matter. The 70th commemoration of the destruction of the Russian Orthodox Churches by the Polish authorities in

¹⁶ Ibidem.

1938 did not evoke high-profile coverage in the media. These examples show that there is a memory of conflict than conflict itself in the present.

Despite the difficult past, the Ukrainian minority found themselves within the reality of the contemporary Polish state. In addition, their role in the cultural life of Poland is visible and important. Ukraine has become “fashionable” in Poland and not only among the young generation. An indicator of this is the popularity of Ukrainian writers in Poland and the literature of the Polish writers writing about Ukraine or the Ukrainian minority. Poland’s engagement in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine brought not only the nations closer together but also the Poles and the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

1.2 Demographic overview

1.2.1 The 2002 census

The Ukrainian minority in Poland numbers 27,172 citizens according to a nationwide census carried out in 2002. The figure states 0,08% of the total population (36,7 mln people in 2002). The only criterion used in the census of 2002 was the respondents’ nationality declaration. In such a situation people from mixed families were forced to declare only one nationality, while many of them feel themselves simultaneously Polish-Ukrainian. This regulation was criticized by the minority organizations in Poland.¹⁷

1.2.2 Language Usage

The census does not provide data on the home language or mixed-marriages among ethnic Poles and Ukrainians. ENRI-East project showed that 35% respondents speak Ukrainian at home (majority of them are elderly and people with the lowest education), similar percentage speak both, Polish and Ukrainian languages (31%) to the same extent. Although it is widely recognised that migration from the country to the city accelerates the process of assimilation to Polish society among the Ukrainian minority, language, beside religion and rather sentimental than real bonds with Ukraine, is the main base for Ukrainian national identity.

1.2.3 Age structure

The age structure of this population is similar to the age structure of the whole Poland.


1.2.4 Geographic Distribution

Ethnic Ukrainians resided in the following provinces: Warmia and Mazury (11,881), Western Pomerania (3,703), Podkarpacie (2,984), Pomerania (2,831), Lower Silesia (1,422), Podlasie (1,366), Lubuskie (615), Mazovia (579), Little Poland (472), Lubelskie (389), Silesia (309).¹⁸

The map below illustrates geographical distribution of Ukrainians in Poland according to the Nationwide Census of 2002.

¹⁷ T. Czapko, *Mniejszość białoruska w Narodowym Spisie Powszechnym z 2002 roku*, „Facta Simonidis” 2009, nr 1, p. 75; M. Materko, ‘Liczebność, rozmieszczenie i struktura społeczna mniejszości żydowskiej w Polsce po 1989 roku’ [in:] *Wokół akulturacji i asymilacji Żydów na ziemiach polskich*, ed. K. Zieliński (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS 2010), p. 178-182.

¹⁸ <http://www2.mswia.gov.pl/porta1.php?serwis=en&dzial=10&id=56#UKRAINIANS> (12-11-2009).



Source: http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrai%C5%84cy_w_Polsce

In the territories of significant numbers of Ukrainians, two language are officially used.

1.2.5 Religious affiliation

According to the newest publication of the Main Statistical Office based on the Church statistics, the number of Greek-Catholics is estimated on 55,000. Similarly, the general number of Orthodox in 2008 was 504,150.¹⁹ In the case of Greek Catholics the language of religious activity (mass etc.) is Ukrainian.

1.2.6 Education

Decades of decline in Ukrainian language education resulted in the Ukrainian language being taught only in a few places, such as the high schools in Rzeszów and Słupsk. Nowadays the Regulation by the Minister of National Education increased educational subsidies to national minority schools by 20% and 50% compared to other schools. There is a lack of information regarding the degree of financial help of the Ukrainian government and organizations to such institutions.²⁰

The number of students who learned Ukrainian and who were taught in the Ukrainian language started to increase after the political transformation in 1989, quickly reaching 2,000. Also the number of teachers of the Ukrainian language has grown.²¹

According to data from the school year 2005/2006 the Ukrainian language was taught in 162 educational institutions for 2,740 students who are from the Ukrainian minority. In mixed settlements Ukrainian is taught also by Poles. Nowadays Ukrainian is also taught in 84 primary schools, in 48 lower high schools and 7 high schools of different types (school year 2008/2009).²²

A number of Poles study Ukrainian Philology at Polish universities. Some universities in Warsaw, Lublin, Szczecin, Poznań and Krakow have offered courses on Ukrainian Philology since before 1989. The College of the Polish and Ukrainian Universities in Lublin offered courses mostly for students from Ukraine (Ph.D. studies). It was planned to reform it into the Polish-

¹⁹ Wyznania religijne. Stowarzyszenia narodowościowe i etniczne w Polsce 2006-2008, ed. G. Gudaszewski, M. Chmielewski, Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2010, p. 38, 49.

²⁰ http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portals/en/10/57/Fundamental_rights.html (26-04-2010).

²¹ <http://www2.mswia.gov.pl/portals.php?serwis=pl&dzial=61&id=37#ukraincy> (15-10-2009).

²² http://www.stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/PUBL_oz_maly_rocznik_statystyczny_2009.pdf (26-04-2010). See also: G. Janusz, *Ohrona praw mniejszości narodowych w Europie*, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS 2011), p. 637.

Ukrainian University, but, unfortunately, College was resolved on May 16, 2011 due to financial problems. The realisation of this plan depended to a great extent on financial subsidies from the governments of both states. The agreement has not been reached: finally, the Ukrainian government refused to subsidize the College (although the Ukrainian students stated majority of students and Ukraine subsidized only small part of the total cost). In its place a new structure – the Eastern Europe Centre of the Maria Curie Skłodowska University (UMCS) was established. It will be, on a much smaller scale, a continuation of activity of the College.

On the other hand, after Polish accession to the EU, there are relatively many research and student exchanges between Poland and Ukraine. A few research and educational projects undertaken by the universities and colleges are realized with participation of Ukrainian minority organizations.²³

1.2.7 Employment

The employment of Ukrainians seems to be typical for employment structure of given region of Poland. The employment structure of minorities is not available in Poland. The accession of Poland to the European Union improved the economic situation of the state and its inhabitants, including the minorities.

1.3 Ukrainian self-organisation in Poland

1.3.1 Political Organisation

In the election to the to the Sejm and Senat minority organizations have election privileges. The electoral regulation of 12 April 2001 to the Polish Sejm and Senat made an exception for the electoral committees of national minorities, who do not have to exceed 5% electoral threshold.²⁴ However, there is not a Ukrainian minority party in Poland and therefore the Ukrainian minority has not taken advantage of the electoral legislation. The allowances provided for the national minorities mean that theoretically national minorities could unite themselves and establish their party, which requires the minority to gather 5,000 signatures of voters living in given territory (constituency). Taking into consideration the dispersion of the Ukrainian minority in Poland, this is practically impossible. So, the minorities, including Ukrainian one, are not enough strong to influence the politics on the central level.

In local self-government at a municipal level the minority organizations do not have election privileges. During the elections to local self-governments in 2006 the Ukrainian minority did not form its election committees. Candidates representing the Ukrainian minority contested for mandates from the lists of various election committees, and some candidates were supported by the Union of the Ukrainians in Poland. Representatives of the minority were mostly candidates in the Warmia and Mazury Province. Particular candidates were also placed on the lists in Western Pomerania, Lubuskie, Podlasie and Lower Silesia Provinces. The result of these elections is that a representative of the Ukrainian minority won a seat in the self-government of the Warmia and Mazury Province (he is a chairman of the provincial self-government), eight of them won seats in the county self-governments (in Ostróda, Kętrzyn, Gołdap, Bartoszyce Counties in the Warmia

²³ B. Halczak, *Ukraińcy (po 1989 r.) [in:] Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w Polsce po II wojnie światowej. Wybrane elementy polityki państwa*, ed. S. Dudra, B. Nitschke (Kraków: Zakład Wydawniczy Nomos 2010), p. 119-120)

²⁴ http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/pl/61/38/Podstawowe_prawa.html (26-04-2010)

and Mazury Province; the Koszalin and Szczecinek Counties in the Western Pomerania Province), two became local borough leaders (the Lower Silesia and Warmia and Mazury Provinces), eight won seats in the village councils in the Warmia and Mazury Province and one is now a member of Przemyśl City Council (the Podkarpacie Province).²⁵

1.3.2 Civil society organisation

In 1990 after political transformation in Poland, the UTSK turned into the Union of the Ukrainians in Poland.²⁶ In 1990, the pro-Ukrainian Union of the Lemkos (according to the Polish legislation the Lemkos are an ethnic minority) was established as well as a number of regional Ukrainian societies, the majority of which are still active.

The main organisations of the Ukrainian minority are the Union of the Ukrainians in Poland and the Podlasie Union of the Ukrainians. There are a number of smaller groups: The Ukrainian Society in Lublin, The Foundation of St. Vladimir the Baptist of the Kiev Old Russia, the Union of the Ukrainian Women, The Society of Ukrainian Political Prisoners of the Stalin Era, and the Ukrainian Historical Society. There are also some youth organisations active: the Ukrainian Youth Organisation “PŁAST” and the Union of the Independent Ukrainian Youth. Other organisations are the Ukrainian Teachers’ Society in Poland and the Association of the Ukrainian Physicians.²⁷

It seems that net of the Ukrainian civil society organizations, despite dispersal of this minority, is organized very well. Even Belarussians in Podlasie region complained that Ukrainian organizations tried to dominate the Belarussian ones and convince some Belarusians that they – in real – are Ukrainians), what is a source of conflict between these minorities in this region.

1.3.3 Arts and culture

The Ukrainian minority in Poland organises a number of cultural events and some of them have earned a permanent place in Poland’s cultural life. The most prominent of them are: The Festival of the Ukrainian Culture in Sopot, the Youth Fairs in Gdansk, the Festival of the Ukrainian Culture in the Podlasie Province “Podlaska Jesień”, and “Bytowska Watra” as well as “Spotkania Pogranicza” in Głębock. Among the most popular are The Days of the Ukrainian Culture organised in Szczecin and Giżycko, The Children Festival of Culture in Elbląg, an event called “Na Iwana, na Kupala” in Dubicze Cerkiewne and “Noc na Iwana Kupala” in Krukłanki, the Festival of the Ukrainian Children Groups in Koszalin, the Folk Fairs “Z malowanej skrzyni” in Kętrzyn, “Pod wspólnym niebem” in Olsztyn, and The Days of the Ukrainian Theatre in Olsztyn.²⁸

At the Ukrainian departments in universities there are literature and tourism/travel societies as well as theatre groups. Poles, representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland and students from Ukraine take part in them.

1.3.4 Religious observation

As well as numerous cultural and educational organisations, the cultural life of the Ukrainian minority in Poland rotates around the Russian Orthodox and the Greek-Catholic churches. At the

²⁵ <http://www2.mswia.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=pl&dzial=61&id=37#ukraincy> (15-10-2009)

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 91.

²⁷ Chałupczak, Browarek, p. 82.

²⁸ <http://www2.mswia.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=pl&dzial=61&id=37#ukraincy> (15-10-2009).

end of the 1980s the first Greek-Catholic bishops were appointed after World War II.²⁹ The Ukrainians constitute the majority of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in two dioceses: Przemysko-Nowosądecka established in 1983, and Chełmsko-Lubelska reactivated in 1989.³⁰ Church choirs play an important role in the cultural life of the Ukrainian minority.

Radio Orthodoxy is linked to the Russian Orthodox Church. It broadcasts once a week a programme in Ukrainian called “Ukraińskie Słowo”.

1.3.5 Publishing and the press

The political transformation of the 1990s briefly led to the development of the press and Ukrainian cultural and academic periodicals started. This was a result of the free market economy and not the policy of the authorities. Since then some publications have managed to survive. The most important magazine in the Ukrainian language today is “Nasze Słowo”. The weekly was initially published as an organ of the UTSK (until 1990) and now is being issued as the magazine of the Union of the Ukrainians in Poland. Another important magazine is “Nad Buhom i Nawoju”, a bi-monthly issued since 1991 (since 1999 an electronic version has also come out) by the Podlasie Union of the Ukrainians.³¹ After 1989 the main issue of “Nasze Słowo” is supplemented by cultural inserts and publications for children, presently suspended.³² Both periodicals have also shortened versions in Polish and their own websites. Cultural and education societies as well as diplomatic posts in Poland are subscribed to the Ukrainian press. The same is true for Ukrainian departments of the universities.

1.3.6 The media

The Ukrainians in Poland do not have their own television channel. Once a week the Regional Station of the Polish Public Television in Białystok broadcasts a programme in Ukrainian: “Przegląd Ukraiński”. The programme covers subjects concerning the Ukrainian minority living in the Podlasie Province. Since 1991 the Polish Radio Białystok has broadcast programmes in Ukrainian three times a week. The programs are titled “Ukraińska Dumka”. However, there are no viewer statistics. Similarly, in the east-south part of Poland public radio Rzeszów broadcasts programs for Ukrainian minority (half an hour per week). Also, some regional radio stations broadcast short programs in Ukrainian. Since 1995 TV Telenowyny broadcasts programs in Ukrainian; apart from that, some radio stations can also be received by internet (<http://www.harazd.net>, the first Ukrainian news portal in Poland and <http://www.domiwka.net>, portal of Ukrainian youth in Poland). People in the eastern provinces of Poland can receive Ukrainian TV programs.

In fact, some respondents of the ENRI-East project complained that the number of Ukrainian media, time for Ukrainian-language programs on public TV and radio is not enough, however, the Polish media, delivering information on everyday issues and popular TV programs, shows, movies, are much more popular among this minority.

²⁹ H. Chałupczak, T. Browarek, *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce 1918-1995* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS 2000), p. 82.

³⁰ <http://www2.mswia.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=pl&dzial=61&id=37#ukraincy> (15-11-2009).

³¹ http://nadbuhom.free.ngo.pl/page_redakcja.html (15-10-2009).

³² <http://nslowo.free.ngo.pl/> (15-10-2009).

1.4 Overview of existing surveys

There are some empirical data sets for Ukrainian community in Poland provided by the Main Statistical Office (Główny Urząd Statystyczny). The last publication of the GUS dealt with religion and ethnic and national organizations in Poland in the years 2006-2008 and included data on all registered churches, religious associations and ethnic and national organisations. However, there is no statistical data on, for example, the number of Ukrainians who belong to the Orthodox or the Greek-Catholic Churches etc.³³

The National Population and Housing Census 2002 offers information on education, marital status, citizenship and nationality, sources of income, disabled people, family and household structure as well as domestic and international migration (http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_3697_PLK_HTML.htm). Basic information on the Ukrainians in Poland one can find also on the web pages of the Ministry of Interior and Administration (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji, <http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/en/>). More information about the life of Ukrainians in Poland is in the archives of Ukrainian organizations in Poland, e.g. the Union of Ukrainians in Poland (<http://www.zup.ukraina.com.pl/>). Diocese and parishes of the Orthodox Church are in possession of more detailed and specific statistics and information. However, these statistics are not published.

The results of the most recent nationwide census of 2011 (April-June), including data on national and ethnic minorities in Poland, should be known by the end of this year.

1.5 Conclusions and generalizations

Summing up, the situation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland has improved after 1989, when a part of the matters concerning national minorities has moved from under a full control and supervision of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs to the supervision of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage. All the educational and cultural issues are under the supervision of the latter one, which leaves a significant freedom in undertaking activities for development and cultivation of one's own culture and identity. Nowadays, due to administrative reasons, Ministry of Internal Affairs deals with bigger part of minority questions. The Polish legislation is compatible with the policy of the European Union in matters concerning the national and ethnic minorities and the protection of their rights. Act of 6 January 2005 on national and ethnic minorities and on the regional languages seems to be a good regulation of situation of the national and ethnic minorities in Poland. In general, this Act "regulates the issues connected with the maintenance and development of the respective cultural identity of national and ethnic minorities, the preservation and development of the regional language, and the observance of the principle of equal treatment of individuals irrespective of their ethnic descent; it also defines the tasks and powers of government administration agencies and of local government units in this regard"³⁴.

Ukrainians in Poland are characterized by a strong sense of national identity. Especially after 1989 there was a strong increase a sense of national identity that minority, especially among the younger generation. Strong sense of national identity was typical for Ukrainians in Poland, how-

³³ Wyznania religijne. Stowarzyszenia narodowościowe i etniczne w Polsce 2006-2008, ed. G. Gudaszewski, M. Chmielewski (Warszawa: Główny Urząd Statystyczny 2010).

³⁴ <http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=pl&dzial=353&id=4392&sid=a52d5ee252af087abbddb45b9eec0f4a> (24-08-2011)

ever, during the communist period, due to state politics of assimilation and some historical, traumatic issues, many of them hide it.

The Polish-Ukrainian conflicts and memories of the Ukrainian minority's traumatic past to an ever lesser extent influence the perception of Poles and Ukrainians towards each other. It can be observed for instance in the fact that the Ukrainian language on the terrains of mixed population is taught also by the Poles. Some Poles study the Ukrainian language in Polish universities. Moreover, Ukraine is "fashionable," and not only among the young generation. Interest in Ukraine is proved by the popularity of the Ukrainian writers in Poland and the literature of the Polish writers writing about Ukraine or the Ukrainian minority. It seems that the engagement of Poland in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine brought not only parts of both of the nations together but also the Poles and the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

Contrary to stereotypical ideas of, difficult history is not a source of conflict between Poles and Ukrainian minority. It seems that the media publicize events related to the murders in Vohlynia during WWII make that an average TV viewer-Pole, in the Ukrainians still see the blood descendants of the UPA bands. Such perception is caused by the stereotypical presentation of Ukrainians, Ukraine and the Polish-Ukrainian relations in media. They focus on painful past and, eventually, Ukrainian folk culture, and there is no information on the present day or life of the Ukrainian minority in Poland or Ukraine. It is possible that common organization by Poland and Ukraine EURO 2012 football championship could change this situation.

The model of historical education in Poland makes that few people are able to see and understand that for the Ukrainians the members of UPA are also fighters for independent Ukraine. On the other hand, in the opinions of respondents of the project does not actually appear Volhynia and murders of Poles. For many Ukrainians, especially younger ones, this is only a distant past. For many of them more important is the fact that Poland supported the Orange Revolution than the memory of the Akcja Wisla or genocide of Poles by the UPA troops in Volhynia.

The fact that the painful historical events for the younger generation are now only a distant history, the partial opening of the borders, as well as the Polish accession to the EU meant that being a Ukrainian in Poland ceased to be regarded as something shameful. On the contrary, especially for young people belonging to minority is an additional reason for pride, reinforcing a sense of uniqueness.

Importantly, the Ukrainians in Poland seem to be more "conscious citizens." Evidence of this commitment is not only relatively many, especially young people and the middle generation, in various kinds of community initiatives and Ukrainian organizations, but also active participation in the election to the central, local, or EU structures and institutions. The frequency of Ukrainian in Poland in the elections is much higher than the Poles. Although there is not constant pattern of voting in elections, it seems that the Ukrainians minority sympathizes rather with Civic Platform, at the moment the most influential, ruling political party in Poland.

It is important to note that the cultural policy of the European Union favourable for strengthening of the European cultural diversity and subsidizing many of the educational and cultural projects seems to support new initiatives among the Ukrainian minority in Poland. Those initiatives, which are perceived with the increasing interest by the Polish side, provide grounds for optimism for the future.

Ukrainians are positive about Polish accession to the EU, have recognized its benefits, but are not hurray-optimistic. And still many of them feel a stronger bond with the East and the countries of

South-Eastern Europe than the West. The Ukrainian minority appreciates the financial possibilities for the development of their own, Ukrainian organizations and initiatives, but consider it insufficient. However, Polish access to EU is considered as an additional warranty rights of national minorities in Poland.

Generally evaluated negatively is the fact that Poland found itself in the Schengen area, and the introduction of the need to obtain visas for Ukrainian citizens.

Ukraine for the minority remains rather mythical homeland, possibly frequently visited, but few of the respondents would like to move there. This is due to more attractive Polish standard of living, the mental and real remnants of the Soviet era in Ukraine, as well as the fact that today Ukraine is in the opinion of the respondents divided into pro-Russian eastern part and the 'truly Ukrainian' west. This fact is negatively perceived by the Ukrainian minority in Poland. Moreover, for majority of 'Polish Ukrainians' their homeland was and is within the borders of today's Poland.

Respondents of the project, representatives of NGOs complain that their cultural and other initiatives are rather local. It seems that this is an assessment underestimated: some of the Ukrainian festivals already permanently etched into the cultural map of Poland. The fact that their coverage is often local, not due to the fact that these are projects organized by the minority, but from the specificity of the cultural market in Poland. Many events of the "pure Polish character" is also local. It depends on the media attention, and these are governed by the business market. The Ukrainian minority has the possibilities to obtain external, including governal funds for its activity. There are no sufficient funds to meet all needs, but this situation significantly improved compared with the period before 1989 and before 2004 (Polish access to the EU).

The fact is that Poland has fulfilled its obligations towards the minority, but does so on the principle of "neither less nor more than is written in the law or regulations". However, as mentioned, the Ukrainians in Poland are quite aware and active citizens. They can benefit from a change in the political and social climate in Poland. They exploit the potential of Polish presence in the EU, participate in local political life. Multiplying the latter effort could this situation even improve. It's the fact that there is little chance of the existence of the Ukrainian minority in the nationwide political scene, but it does not seem to be important or necessary for the development and cultivation of their own national consciousness.

The Ukrainian minority in Poland is very active and well-organized. It's optimistic that more and more young people not only admits to Ukrainian nationality, but is proud of it and try to cultivate it. Despite the distraction and the inevitable migration from rural to urban, which is not conducive for using of Ukrainian language on a daily basis, it seems that this language will be the second or home language of the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

2 MAIN FINDINGS OF THE ENRI-VIS SURVEY (ENRI-VIS)

Lukasz Widła / Anna Domaradzka

2.1 Methodology and sample

Research was carried out on a sample of 398 respondents, who declared being of Ukrainian origin and who have lived in Poland at least for a year. The research location was selected with the aim of ensuring its representativeness – in total, the research project was conducted in 24 locations, within the territories inhabited by a significant number of representatives of the Ukrainian minority (warmińsko-mazurskie, podkarpackie provinces). Respondents were selected using the snowball sampling method, meaning that one respondent provided contact information of another person, who, in their opinion, could fit the research project as well. Efforts were made to ensure representativeness in terms of gender and age. Research was carried out using the face-to-face structured interview method on the basis of a survey in Polish. Field research was commissioned to GfK Polonia company. The materials gathered were subjected to frequency analyses, cross tables were prepared (taking into account, in particular, gender, age, education and number of children). In some cases, when it was justifiable, analyses were supported by correlation analyses. Detailed results have been provided in tables in the annex. Analyses taking into account the size of the town/city of residence was not possible due to lack of such variable in the database. For the same reason, the education was analyzed only basing on the three level education variable (primary, secondary, tertiary).

Table 1. Sample structure


		N=	%
Total		398	100,0%
Sex of respondent	Male	165	41,5%
	Female	233	58,5%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	13,1%
	30-49	153	38,4%
	50 and more	182	45,7%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	6,3%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	14,3%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	78	19,6%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	6,8%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	96	24,1%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	104	26,1%
Education Levels	Primary	77	19,3%
	Secondary	201	50,5%
	Tertiary	120	30,2%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	106	26,6%
	1	62	15,6%
	2	129	32,4%
	3 or more	100	25,1%

2.2 Ethnicity and ethnic identity, national identity

2.2.1 Identity

One of the most significant factors that influence maintaining of identity, particularly with regard to minority identity, is knowledge of the mother tongue. However, there is no clear language pattern, when it comes to the Ukrainian minority in Poland: it is true that 35% of the respondents most often speak Ukrainian at home; however, another 31% speak Polish at home, and the same percentage admits speaking both these languages to the same extent. Higher percentages of persons speaking exclusively their mother tongue at home were recorded among the elderly (44.5%), in particular, among the elderly men (one half of the men examined, aged 50 or more, used only Ukrainian language at home). Mother tongue is spoken mostly by persons with the lowest education (42.9%) and those having more than two children.

Chart 1. What language or languages do you speak most often at home?




The respondents, however, declare a strong link with their ethnic group (44.6% declared a very strong link), and a weaker link connecting them with Ukraine (34.2% feel strongly connected). The respondents declared a stronger link with the place, in which they live, and with Poland (47.3% and 43.9% of those feeling a strong link, respectively). As for links with own ethnic group and Ukraine as such, it is stronger among women and persons with the highest education level. A stronger link with the place of residence is declared by elderly persons and those having more than two children. On the other hand, the link with Poland is the strongest among women, the elderly, persons with elementary education and those having more than two children.

Attachment to own ethnic group does not change with age of the respondents: among young people, it is declared to be very strong by 46.2%, among the elderly – by 46.1%. However, the feeling of attachment to Ukraine as such is much stronger among younger people (43.1%) in comparison with the elderly (32.2%). Accordingly, as it seems, the youngest respondents feel the least attached to Poland (23.5%), while among the oldest, the percentage is 50.8%. The same has been confirmed by correlation analyses – R^2 coefficient for the youngest respondents amounted

to 0.28 as for the connection between the ethnic categorization and attachment to Ukraine, while among the oldest respondents, this coefficient amounted only to 0.16. There is also a visible trend of attachment to the place of residence and attachment to Poland. While among the youngest respondents R^2 for these two variables amounted to 0.25, in the medium age group it was 0.34, and in the oldest group – 0.45.


Our respondents felt less attached to Eastern Europe and to Europe as such. 16.6% of them declared attachment to Eastern Europe, and slightly more – only 18.6% - feel attachment to Europe as such. Except for young people, declaring attachment to Eastern Europe and Europe less often (11.8% each), no differences can be observed between respondents in this regard.

Chart 2. How close do you feel to...



Summing up, it can be said that young people are much less interested in geographic divisions; their identity is rather built upon ethnic self-categorization (this is the only category, in which the youngest respondents provided the same answers as the remaining groups). This self-categorization, however, is correlated strongly with a sense of close attachment to their homeland. Such phenomenon, although it can be observed in all age groups, is most visible among the youngest. The elderly, although they declare attachment to their ethnic group just as often, examine this category apart from their attachment to Ukraine. The third conclusion is that attachment to Poland is mediated through attachment to the place of residence – there is a strong correlation between the two categories.

As it has been mentioned above, ethnic identity seems to be a very strong determinant of identity as such – more than ¼ of all respondents referred to membership in the ethnic group as the most significant component of their identity. On the second place, the respondents selected gender (20.6%) – only a slightly greater percentage than religion (18.2%) or occupation (17.2%). It is worth noting that there is significant diversity between the groups examined: women, describing themselves, choose gender first, then – religion, and ethnicity occupies the third place. For young people, the basic trait is gender (34% of first choice answers), while the second place is occupied together by ethnicity and occupation. The elderly put emphasis mainly on their ethnic group and religious beliefs.

Chart 3. Generally speaking which is the most important to you in describing...

The respondents could select three key features to describe themselves. The analysis of all features selected also indicates a very strong position of ethnic origin: more than 60% respondents were eager to select this trait as one of the three key categories. Their further choices were religion (48.8% respondents) and gender (42.6%). It is interesting that the youngest respondents, not eager to select ethnic identity as the main trait to describe themselves, were most eager among the three groups to select this trait among the first three (in total, 66% of people aged 29 or less believed their ethnic origin to be one of the key traits when describing themselves). Such percentage was not recorded even among the oldest population, which traditionally is associated with attachment to traits related to ethnicity (ethnic origin was mentioned as one of the main traits by 62.4% respondents in the oldest age group). However, it should be noted that while among the youngest, the next traits in hierarchy after ethnicity are gender and occupation, among the elderly, attachment to religion and place of residence is very significant. It is worth noting here that perhaps, to the elderly, ethnicity is – relatively – less significant, since religion is its equivalent – in the case of persons of Ukrainian origin, it is strongly correlated with ethnic origin, while, as for young people „being Ukrainian” is a sufficient description, not dependent on their religious affiliation and the fact that they attend the Greek Catholic or Orthodox church. This may also be due to the fact that because of historic transformations, the elderly have had less opportunity to cultivate their ethnic identity openly in comparison with today’s youth.

The respondents were also asked about significance of various traits associated with Ukraine, its traditions, language or political institutions. The question pertained to prerequisites to be satisfied in order to “truly feel one is Ukrainian”.

For a decisive majority of respondents, the sole feeling of being Ukrainian (71.1%) and having Ukrainian ancestors (64.7%) was very significant. 58.2% respondents also declared the importance of the possibility of communicating in their mother tongue. For less than 1/3 of the examined group, living in accordance with religious beliefs of their ancestors was also of great significance. A much smaller group believed such traits as Ukrainian citizenship, respect for Ukrainian laws and authorities to be significant, treating the fact of being born on the eastern side of the border or living for most of one’s life in Ukraine as marginal.

Table 2. How important do you think each of the following is to...

Answers "Very important"		Total	have been born in [SENDING COUNTRY]	have [NATIONALITY OF SENDING COUNTRY] citizenship	have lived in [SENDING COUNTRY] for most of one's life	be able to speak [LANGUAGE OF SENDING COUNTRY]	be a [religion]	respect [NATIONALITY OF SENDING COUNTRY] political institutions and laws	feel [NATIONALITY OF SENDING COUNTRY]	have [NATIONALITY OF SENDING COUNTRY] ancestry
Total		392	16,6%	15,8%	7,7%	58,2%	32,4%	13,4%	71,1%	64,7%
Sex of respondent	Male	164	11,0%	11,0%	5,0%	58,4%	29,4%	12,1%	71,6%	66,3%
	Female	228	20,6%	19,2%	9,6%	58,1%	34,5%	14,3%	70,7%	63,6%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	26,9%	21,6%	13,7%	62,7%	30,0%	15,7%	72,5%	64,7%
	30-49	151	15,2%	14,5%	8,1%	51,0%	26,7%	10,3%	69,3%	56,0%
	50 and more	178	14,0%	15,1%	5,1%	64,4%	38,8%	16,0%	73,7%	73,2%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	12,0%	16,7%	8,3%	54,2%	29,2%	12,5%	62,5%	54,2%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	8,8%	10,7%	5,5%	55,4%	23,6%	7,4%	78,6%	64,3%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	77	13,0%	10,3%	3,9%	63,2%	35,5%	16,2%	71,4%	73,1%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	40,7%	25,9%	18,5%	70,4%	30,8%	18,5%	81,5%	74,1%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	94	19,1%	16,7%	9,6%	48,4%	28,4%	12,1%	63,8%	51,1%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	101	14,9%	18,8%	5,9%	65,3%	41,2%	15,8%	75,5%	73,3%
Education Levels	Primary	74	5,4%	6,6%	,0%	48,6%	29,7%	13,7%	66,7%	67,1%
	Secondary	200	17,5%	17,6%	8,7%	59,6%	34,8%	11,8%	69,3%	65,5%
	Tertiary	118	22,0%	18,8%	11,0%	61,9%	29,9%	15,9%	76,9%	61,9%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	105	22,9%	22,3%	9,7%	55,3%	22,5%	18,4%	68,0%	54,9%
	1	59	20,3%	14,8%	8,3%	45,0%	31,7%	8,8%	51,7%	54,1%
	2	128	15,6%	15,0%	7,9%	59,4%	39,1%	15,2%	73,4%	66,4%
	3 or more	99	9,1%	11,0%	5,1%	68,4%	34,7%	8,4%	83,8%	79,8%

Ethnic origin, having Ukrainian ancestors and the ability to communicate in Ukrainian language were listed as most significant by persons having more than two children. As expected, attachment to religion was mentioned most often by the oldest group, particularly women.

It seems that the most significant factor is auto-definition; as it can be seen, it may be correlated with attachment to homeland, but it does not have to be. Of course, having Ukrainian ancestors or speaking Ukrainian language is also very significant; however, it is worth noting that these are sort of „external” traits – one is unable to influence the origin of their ancestors, while speaking Ukrainian – unless initiated consciously at older age, which happens rarely – is also a part of heritage, acquired regardless of one’s will.

The hierarchy of values is very similar, when it comes to traits associated with Poland, specifically, factors that make a given person „really feel they are Polish”.

A decisive majority of respondents believe that it is significant to feel that one is a Pole (60.1%), to be able to communicate in Polish language (57.2%) and to have Polish ancestors (52.6%). Less often, the respondents listed compliance with Polish laws and respecting the Polish authorities or having Polish citizenship (both these traits were mentioned by about 1/5 of respondents).

Most respondents are definitely proud of being Ukrainian (61.2%) and belonging to an ethnic minority (50.1%). A much lower percentage declares being proud of being Polish (29.6%). When we take into account the broader category: I’m definitely proud + I’m rather proud, the percentages become equal: 88.4% respondents declare being proud of being Ukrainian, 87.5% – being proud of being Polish, 88.8% – belonging to an ethnic minority. A similar situation is observed when it comes to pride of being European: 23.8% respondents declare they are definitely proud of being inhabitants of Eastern Europe, and 31.2% - of being European; on the other hand, analysis of answers “I am definitely proud + I am rather proud” indicates that 75.9% respondents declare pride of being inhabitants of Eastern Europe, and 84.3% - of being European.


Lack of pride or little pride of being Ukrainian is most often declared by persons with elementary education (20.3% in this group in comparison with 11.6% among all respondents) and young men (16.7%), while little or no pride of their ethnic origin is declared by middle-aged women (17.9% in comparison with 11.2% in total), which may be associated with the fact that many female Ukrainians work in Poland illegally as domestic helps³⁵.

2.2.2 Ethnic auto-categorization

Most respondents refer to themselves as „Ukrainian living in Poland” (65.9%). Other answers were selected much less often: Only 17.3% respondents describe themselves as Poles of Ukrainian origin, and 15.5% - simply as Ukrainians. Only 1.3% respondents declared they felt being Polish.

³⁵ According to research conducted in year 2009, there are at least 100 thousand women like this in Poland (source: "Occupational integration of female Ukrainians working in the sector of domestic help in Warsaw", Anna Kordasiewicz; seminar: To be a female immigrant. Gender and integration, December 14th, 2009, Institute of Social Affairs, Warsaw.)

Chart 4. Out of the following list, please select the formula that best describes your ethnic status




As for Ukrainians living in Poland, this answer was chosen most often by persons having three or more children (70.3%) and women above 50 years of age (71.6%). Those referring to themselves as being “Poles of Ukrainian origin” most often had elementary education (27.3%, which is 10% more than in the entire sample). Young people are most eager to declare “being Ukrainian” (19.2% of them selected this category). On the other hand, there is no clear pattern associating education and self-identity: it is true that we find the least number of persons referring to themselves as “Ukrainians living in Poland” among those with the lowest education (59.7%); however, this is not a significant difference in relation to the entire sample or to other categories of education.

2.2.3 Coexistence of cultures

There is a visible polarization of views with regard to „melting” of national minorities in the dominant culture and preservation of specific customs and traditions. In general, 23.6% respondents generally agree with the view that Ukrainians should adapt and simply become a part of the Polish society. Polarization is visible in terms of age analysis: while among persons above 50 years of age as many as 33% accept this view, this percentage is more than three times lower among the youngest respondents (9.8%).

Chart 5. Could you please tell me, how much do you agree with...:



It seems that this state of affairs may be due to the Polish-Ukrainian postwar history – the memory of Operation Vistula is probably more lively among the older generation, which may believe that admitting to belong to an ethnic minority is associated with a threat – thus they tend more to assimilate with the dominant culture. The analyses presented above also show that for elderly persons, their place of residence is more significant than their ethnic origin; from this perspective, it is easier to understand the origin of these views. On the other hand, young people communicate their identity and attachment to Ukraine very clearly, and thus they are rather willing to cultivate their ethnic identity.

Statements concerning adaptation to the Polish customs are not differentiated by education: all groups examined showed a similar level of acceptance of the views quoted.

2.2.4 Cultivation of tradition

As many as 69% of all respondents definitely agreed with the statements that Ukrainians in Poland should preserve their customs and traditions. It is interesting that this view was accepted most often by the oldest respondents, who at the same time declared the need for adaptation! The cumulative analysis shows that the respondents do not perceive these two statements as opposing one another: almost 20% of respondents believe that Ukrainians should undergo cultural adaptation and become a part of the Polish society, and at the same time they agree definitely with the statement that this minority should cultivate its own traditions. It is obvious that for the respondents, these two categories are not mutually exclusive: it is possible to preserve one's traditions and adapt to the dominant culture at the same time. In the case of these respondents, we can thus speak of a double ethnic and national identity.

Table 3. Could you please tell me, how much do you agree with:

		Total	It is better if [ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP] adapt and blend into the larger society				It is better if [ETHNIC MINORITY GROUP] preserve their own customs and traditions			
			Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather do not agree	Do not agree at all	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather do not agree	Do not agree at all
Total		386	23,6%	37,3%	26,2%	13,0%	69,0%	25,6%	4,4%	1,0%
Sex of respondent	Male	162	20,4%	32,7%	31,5%	15,4%	71,9%	22,5%	5,0%	,6%
	Female	224	25,9%	40,6%	22,3%	11,2%	67,0%	27,8%	4,0%	1,3%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	51	9,8%	49,0%	23,5%	17,6%	61,5%	36,5%	1,9%	,0%
	30-49	150	18,0%	38,0%	32,0%	12,0%	68,9%	27,2%	4,0%	,0%
	50 and more	176	33,0%	33,5%	21,0%	12,5%	72,0%	21,7%	4,0%	2,3%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	24	8,3%	41,7%	37,5%	12,5%	68,0%	28,0%	4,0%	,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	12,3%	33,3%	38,6%	15,8%	69,6%	26,8%	3,6%	,0%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	77	31,2%	29,9%	22,1%	16,9%	76,0%	18,7%	4,0%	1,3%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	11,1%	55,6%	11,1%	22,2%	55,6%	44,4%	,0%	,0%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	93	21,5%	40,9%	28,0%	9,7%	68,4%	27,4%	4,2%	,0%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	99	34,3%	36,4%	20,2%	9,1%	69,0%	24,0%	4,0%	3,0%
Education Levels	Primary	74	24,3%	43,2%	21,6%	10,8%	59,5%	31,1%	8,1%	1,4%
	Secondary	195	23,6%	40,5%	24,6%	11,3%	68,2%	26,7%	3,6%	1,5%
	Tertiary	117	23,1%	28,2%	31,6%	17,1%	76,3%	20,3%	3,4%	,0%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	101	20,8%	38,6%	24,8%	15,8%	68,0%	26,0%	5,0%	1,0%
	1	59	23,7%	40,7%	22,0%	13,6%	61,7%	26,7%	8,3%	3,3%
	2	125	21,6%	36,0%	28,0%	14,4%	72,2%	23,0%	4,0%	,8%
	3 or more	100	28,0%	36,0%	28,0%	8,0%	70,0%	28,0%	2,0%	,0%

For 62.5% respondents, the possibility of preserving Ukrainian customs and traditions is very significant. A lesser, but still large percentage (52.1%) stated that the possibility of teaching children about the history and culture of Ukraine was very important, while 51.6% respondents said it was very important to use Ukrainian language every day. For a smaller percentage, it is significant to have their representatives in the parliament (48.4%), to provide their children with a possibility of learning in Ukrainian or reading newspapers in their mother tongue (46.2%).

Cultivation of customs and traditions is most significant for persons from families with many children (75% referred to this as very significant), while activities aimed at actual preservation of Ukrainian culture are most important for persons with university education (learning in mother tongue: 56.9%; teaching children at school about the culture and customs: 62.6%; reading newspapers and periodicals in Ukrainian: 56.7%).

2.2.5 Ukrainian language

In total, 66% respondents were educated in Ukrainian language. Most respondents learned the language as early as in elementary school (59.8%), for another 44.3% respondents, their first encounter with the language took place in secondary school. Only 17.4% respondents were taught in Ukrainian during university, which, of course, is associated with the percentage of persons with university education, included in the research sample.

Table 4. Have you obtained education in Ukrainian language in...

Answers "Yes"		Total	primary education	secondary education	higher education
Total		391	59,8%	44,3%	17,4%
Sex of respondent	Male	163	54,0%	32,4%	14,5%
	Female	228	64,0%	52,3%	19,4%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	75,0%	76,9%	21,7%
	30-49	151	62,3%	53,7%	20,4%
	50 and more	179	53,1%	23,8%	12,9%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	72,0%	68,0%	9,1%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	55	54,5%	35,2%	21,2%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	78	47,4%	14,1%	10,2%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	77,8%	85,2%	33,3%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	96	66,7%	64,5%	20,0%
Education Levels	Female, 50 and more y.o.	101	57,4%	30,2%	14,8%
	Primary	76	50,0%	,0%	,0%
	Secondary	197	61,9%	48,2%	5,4%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	Tertiary	118	62,7%	59,5%	43,5%
	No children	104	63,5%	57,8%	20,7%
	1	59	66,1%	57,6%	22,2%
	2	127	61,4%	43,7%	20,5%
	3 or more	100	50,0%	20,7%	6,3%

30.3% respondents encountered Ukrainian language during two levels of education (e.g. elementary and secondary school), while 12.3% respondents used their mother tongue throughout the entire education period. Men encountered this language at school much less often (56.4%) than women (72.6%). Also the oldest respondents rarely learned Ukrainian during any stage of their education (55.2%).

2.2.6 The media

Most respondents are able to maintain their relations with their homeland thanks to the Polish media: 70.9% respondents have access to newspapers in Ukrainian language, 67.4% are able to send their children to schools, in which Ukrainian is the language of instruction, 66% can listen to radio stations in their language, while 51.5% - to watch Polish TV programmes in Ukrainian language.

The actual media consumption, however, is much poorer: while 62.2% respondents admit reading Polish newspapers regularly, only 26.4% browse through Ukrainian newspapers among those, who have access to them. Newspapers of the Ukrainian minority, published in Poland,

have a little more readers; however, they are chosen only by one in three respondents having access to press of this kind.

The situation is similar with the remaining media: 86.3% respondents watch Polish TV regularly, while Ukrainian channels or broadcast of the Ukrainian minority in the Polish TV are much less popular (chosen by 29% and 30.1%, respectively, of those, who have access to such media).

A similar tendency is observed in the case of radio (71.6% listen to Polish radio channels; 25.5% - to Ukrainian channels, and 31.6% - to minority broadcasts emitted in Poland) or the Internet (Polish Web pages are visited by 68.3% those surfing the Internet, while 37.5% respondents regularly brose through Ukrainian Web pages; portals of the Ukrainian minority are visited by 31.3% of those respondents, who have Internet access).

It is thus visible that the Polish media are much more popular. It might seem that this is due to availability of Ukrainian and Ukrainian language media; however, the above results refer to those persons, who admitted being able to benefit from these media.

It is difficult to determine the cause of this situation. It seems, however, that the Polish media probably propose entertainment, which is easier to grasp than the materials broadcasted by the regional media. Moreover, it should be noted that the Polish television mostly delivers information on everyday reality in the country, and thus, it is a more useful source of knowledge. Another issue is the cultural code – regardless of assessment of the quality of Polish news programmes, TV series and movies, they enjoy great popularity; watching them, in the end, makes it easier to find one's place in the Polish cultural code.

Table 5. How often do you...

Answers "Regularly / often" % if respondent has such an opportunity		read printed or electronic Polish newspa- pers	watch tv Polish programs?	listen on the radio Polish programs?	on the Polish websites?
Total		62,2%	86,3%	71,6%	68,3%
Sex of respondent	Male	57,9%	91,4%	73,6%	61,6%
	Female	65,2%	82,6%	70,2%	73,0%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	63,5%	73,1%	72,5%	85,7%
	30-49	67,3%	88,7%	75,7%	72,9%
	50 and more	59,0%	89,4%	70,1%	46,3%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	64,0%	84,0%	72,0%	87,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	60,7%	92,7%	76,8%	67,4%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	55,1%	93,6%	74,0%	33,3%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	63,0%	63,0%	73,1%	84,6%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	71,1%	86,3%	75,0%	76,0%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	62,0%	86,3%	67,3%	56,8%
Education Levels	Primary	48,6%	88,2%	66,7%	28,6%
	Secondary	61,2%	85,4%	71,0%	63,4%
	Tertiary	72,3%	86,4%	75,6%	79,6%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	56,7%	74,5%	59,2%	78,1%
	1	64,5%	91,8%	80,3%	80,4%
	2	65,6%	88,4%	71,8%	63,0%
	3 or more	62,6%	92,0%	79,6%	50,0%

Table 5. How often do you... (continued)

Answers "Regularly / often" % if respondent has such an opportunity		read printed or electronic Ukrainian newspapers	watch tv Ukrainian programs?	listen on the radio Ukrainian pro- grams?	on the Ukrainian websites?
Total		26,4%	29,0%	25,5%	37,5%
Sex of respondent	Male	23,1%	31,8%	24,2%	36,4%
	Female	28,7%	27,3%	26,3%	38,3%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	12,2%	20,0%	18,2%	52,1%
	30-49	30,4%	29,8%	29,2%	37,5%
	50 and more	28,3%	34,0%	25,9%	24,2%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	5,3%	22,2%	20,0%	47,8%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	32,5%	34,3%	24,3%	37,2%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	24,5%	38,7%	27,9%	26,7%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	18,2%	17,6%	16,7%	56,0%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	29,2%	27,1%	31,9%	37,7%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	31,1%	31,7%	24,6%	22,2%
Education Levels	Primary	15,7%	24,3%	14,3%	21,4%
	Secondary	21,7%	29,6%	24,6%	32,2%
	Tertiary	38,4%	30,4%	33,3%	46,4%
How many children all in all do you have, includ- ing the adopted ones?	No children	16,5%	18,8%	17,6%	47,1%
	1	26,0%	20,9%	17,0%	40,0%
	2	34,4%	32,0%	36,0%	36,6%
	3 or more	27,4%	45,8%	26,3%	21,7%


Answers "Regularly / often" % if respondent has such an opportunity		read printed or electronic Ukrai- nian minority newspapers?	watch tv Ukrainian minority programs?	listen on the radio Ukrainian minority pro- grams?	on the websites of the Ukrainian minority?
Total		36,4%	30,1%	31,6%	31,3%
Sex of respondent	Male	35,1%	25,8%	31,0%	33,0%
	Female	37,4%	32,7%	32,0%	30,1%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	25,6%	18,8%	16,1%	33,3%
	30-49	36,1%	33,0%	32,1%	35,0%
	50 and more	40,8%	33,0%	35,3%	25,0%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	20,0%	7,1%	18,2%	33,3%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	40,4%	32,4%	28,9%	43,6%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	38,1%	29,7%	37,7%	21,4%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	30,4%	27,8%	15,0%	33,3%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	33,3%	33,3%	34,3%	29,5%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	42,9%	34,8%	33,8%	27,8%
Education Levels	Primary	26,6%	21,7%	25,4%	15,4%
	Secondary	34,2%	29,7%	32,8%	22,0%
	Tertiary	46,0%	35,4%	34,1%	44,9%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted	No children	27,1%	20,0%	16,4%	31,7%
	1	30,4%	31,6%	20,5%	36,8%
	2	41,6%	28,6%	39,8%	31,7%

ones?	3 or more	43,4%	41,7%	41,6%	25,5%
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2.2.7 Religion

When asked about their religious beliefs, most respondents (70%) admitted being Greek Catholic; 18.7% respondents declared to be of Orthodox faith, this is a reference to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 8.7% admitted being Roman Catholic and only 1.8% respondents declared being atheists. Most of believers attend the church once a week (51.5%), one out of ten – more often than once a week. 21.7% respondents admit they visit a church less often than once a month.

Chart 6. Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination?



2.2.8 Relations with Ukraine

As for relations with modern Ukraine, these are based on family and social ties – 70.3% respondents have relatives in Ukraine, 48% have established cross-border friendships, while 13.8% respondents simply maintain relations with someone on the other side of the border. In total, as many as 76.3% respondents declare keeping in touch with their relatives or friends living in Ukraine.

As for the modes of communication, state-of-the-art technologies are in the lead: 38.6% contact their relatives using telephones or SMS messages, and 25.3% write e-mails. Traditional methods, such as letters or face-to-face meetings are used much less often – this type of contact is established regularly by about 2% respondents. Relations with friends are maintained in a similar manner – if it is regular, the means of communication used are telephone and the Internet and not personal meetings or traditional mail. The small percentage of those able to maintain regular personal contact is also caused by difficulties encountered when applying for visas.

Table 6. Do you have...?

Answers "Yes"		Total	relatives living in [sending country]	friends living in [sending country]	other acquaintances or business partners living in [sending country]
Total		400	70,3%	48,0%	13,8%
Sex of respondent	Male	166	68,7%	43,4%	12,0%
	Female	234	71,4%	51,3%	15,0%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	75,0%	76,9%	17,3%
	30-49	154	74,0%	54,5%	15,6%
	50 and more	183	65,0%	33,9%	10,9%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	80,0%	80,0%	8,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	66,7%	52,6%	12,3%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	79	65,8%	25,3%	13,9%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	70,4%	74,1%	25,9%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	97	78,4%	55,7%	17,5%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	104	64,4%	40,4%	8,7%
Education Levels	Primary	77	50,6%	13,0%	5,2%
	Secondary	203	73,4%	48,8%	13,8%
	Tertiary	120	77,5%	69,2%	19,2%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	106	74,5%	63,2%	16,0%
	1	62	72,6%	58,1%	21,0%
	2	130	77,7%	50,8%	13,8%
	3 or more	101	54,5%	22,8%	6,9%

2.2.9 Summary

Self-categorization seems to be of the greatest importance for preservation of minority identity. Being an Ukrainian in Poland refers mainly to the internal sense of identity. The respondents are proud of belonging to an ethnic minority; however, it is not defined as separated from their place of residence – most respondents selected the category “an Ukrainian living in Poland” as the most adequate one. It also seems that there is no dichotomy, which would force the respondents to choose between full assimilation or preservation of their traditions and customs. For a significant percentage of the entire group, both are possible at the same time.

While the percentage of those declaring a demand for preservation of tradition and culture is high, it is quite surprising that the actual use of the Ukrainian media and Ukrainian language broadcasts is rather low. It is difficult to tell whether this is due to weakness of the local media or to strength of the nationwide media. Perhaps personal relations with other minority representatives, as well as the most popular meeting place, which is the Greek Catholic Church, is of greater importance to the respondents.

Most respondents maintain relations with persons living on the other side of the border. Most often, these contacts are maintained using the modern media – it can be expected that the visas introduced hinder personal meetings.

The broad geographic categories seem to be of little importance for the identity of the respondents. Few of them feel attached to Europe or Eastern Europe – particularly the older respondents tended to reject these categories; on the other hand, the significance of little homelands, associated with the present place of residence or the place of origin, seems to be increasing.

2.3 Family, households and related ethnic aspects

2.3.1 Households

Most respondents are married (67.1%), few of them live in informal relationships (3.8%). In total, 29.1% have no spouse or partner.

The largest group among the households examined are families of two to three persons (in total, 44.8% of all households examined). Single-person households constitute 16.3%. Households with 5-6 members constitute 30.3%; very sporadically, the number of inhabitants exceeds 5 persons (8.8%).

62.5% respondents live with their partners, in 52% households, there are children as well. Only 11.3% respondents live with their parents or parents in law. Of course, there are certain differences among age groups: for instance, as many as 48.1% of persons aged 29 or less live with their parents in law/parents.

Table 7. What is your marital status?

		Total	What is your marital status?				
			Single	Cohabiting / living with partner	Married	Divorced	Widowed
Total		395	15,7%	3,8%	67,1%	5,3%	8,1%
Sex of respondent	Male	164	18,3%	3,7%	72,0%	4,3%	1,8%
	Female	231	13,9%	3,9%	63,6%	6,1%	12,6%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	67,3%	9,6%	21,2%	1,9%	,0%
	30-49	153	9,8%	3,9%	78,4%	5,9%	2,0%
	50 and more	179	5,6%	2,2%	70,4%	5,6%	16,2%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	76,0%	8,0%	12,0%	4,0%	,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	8,8%	1,8%	87,7%	1,8%	,0%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	77	6,5%	3,9%	80,5%	5,2%	3,9%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	59,3%	11,1%	29,6%	,0%	,0%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	96	10,4%	5,2%	72,9%	8,3%	3,1%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	102	4,9%	1,0%	62,7%	5,9%	25,5%
Education Levels	Primary	75	6,7%	,0%	66,7%	5,3%	21,3%
	Secondary	201	15,9%	5,0%	68,2%	6,0%	5,0%
	Tertiary	119	21,0%	4,2%	65,5%	4,2%	5,0%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	105	57,1%	7,6%	27,6%	3,8%	3,8%
	1	60	1,7%	6,7%	78,3%	8,3%	5,0%
	2	128	,0%	2,3%	83,6%	4,7%	9,4%
	3 or more	101	1,0%	,0%	80,2%	5,9%	12,9%

2.3.2 Ethnic composition

The respondents were asked about the ethnic origin of their household members. In the case of partners, the largest group is of Ukrainian origin (37,2%), and the Poles constitute only a slightly smaller percentage (32.8%), while 30% respondents declared their parents were Ukrainians living in Poland.

The situation is somewhat different when it comes to children: in 37.5% cases, the children are referred to as being of Ukrainian origin, and in another 32.7% - as Ukrainians living in Poland, while only in 29.8% - as being Polish. Analyses were also conducted for the parents/ parents in law living together with the respondents; in this case, the number of persons declaring themselves to be Polish amounted only to 11.1%. Other persons were declared to be Ukrainians or Ukrainians living in Poland (44.4% each). For the remaining persons living with the respondents, no analysis was conducted with regard to their ethnic origin due to their small number.

As for citizenship, 90.4% partners of respondents have Polish citizenship and only 9.6% have Ukrainian citizenship. Similar percentages were recorded for the children - 91% having Polish and 9% having Ukrainian citizenship. Parents in law or parents living with the respondent also have the Polish citizenship more often (69.8%) than Ukrainian (30.2%), however, the disproportion in this case is greater.


2.3.3 Ethnic homogeneity

An analysis of ethnic homogeneity of respondents and their partners was also carried out. In total, 246 persons (61.5%), who had a partner, qualified for the analysis – in their case, it was possible to determine two variables: their ethnic self-categorization and the ethnic categorization of their partners. Most persons declared themselves as being „Ukrainians in Poland” (65.9%). Among those, 43% declared the Ukrainian origin of their partner, 30% – their Polish origin, and 27% - the category of „Ukrainian in Poland”. The second most numerous group in terms of self-categorization declared themselves to be the “Poles with Ukrainian roots” (19.9%). In this group, most referred to their partners as being Polish (43%), then Ukrainians (29%), and thirdly – Ukrainians in Poland (24%).

Self-categorization “I’m Ukrainian” and “I’m Polish” was observed rarely. In the former category, we recorded 13% answers, in the latter – only 2%.

Comparing the two middle self-categorizations, it can be stated clearly that a shift in selection of partners is taking place. Persons referring to themselves as Ukrainians in Poland tend rather to choose partners coming from Ukraine; persons referring to themselves as Poles of Ukrainian origin are more eager to marry persons of Polish origin. It is difficult to tell how this analysis should be interpreted: the sole fact of establishing a relationship with a person of specific origin may indirectly influence the categorization of one’s own ethnic identity; on the other hand, ethnicity usually determines the choice of partners to quite a significant extent. It can be stated, however, that there is a correlation between the partner’s origin and ethnic self-categorization, it is the ethnicity that usually determines the choice of partner to a great extent. However, it can be stated that there is a correlation between the partner’s origin and ethnic self-categorization among the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

Chart 7. Ethnic homogeneity



2.3.4 Summary

Households of the ethnicity examined in most cases consist of the respondent, their partner (usually husband/wife; informal relationships are very rare) and at least one child. The composition of the households examined is mixed: there is no clear partner selection code: Ukrainians and Poles can be found just as often. However, if we examine the choice of partners among individual categories of respondents, it is visible that persons referring to themselves as “Ukrainians in Poland” tend more to choose Ukrainian partners, while those describing themselves as being “Poles of Ukrainian origin” choose Polish partners more often. It is difficult to state, however, whether it is the choice of partner that influences the ethnic self-categorization or vice versa.

2.4 Xenophobia, conflicts, discrimination

2.4.1 Attitude towards other nations

The respondents were asked about their attitude towards various nations, which they had the opportunity to meet. In the case of Poland, the respondents were asked about their attitudes towards the Poles, Ukrainians, Germans and the Romani. They were asked about their level of acceptance of persons of these nationalities in various contexts: as family members, friends, neighbors and colleagues from work.

In general, the respondents were willing to accept the Poles and Ukrainians in all four contexts: the percentage of positive answers did not drop below 98% in any case. No negative stereotypes were observed in the case of Germans, although the level of acceptance was lower here: from 84.9% in the case of a German as a family member to 94.9% as a colleague from work.

Visibly lower percentages of respondents indicated acceptance of the Romani minority: 81.2% of them were willing to accept them as colleagues from work, 80.2% - as neighbors, 71.9% - as friends, but only 57.6% as a family member.

Table 8. How would you feel about having a member of the following as a family member?

... as a family member?		Total	Polish	Ukrainian	German	Romani
Total		394	98,0%	99,7%	84,9%	57,6%
Sex of respondent	Male	165	97,0%	100,0%	86,1%	58,8%
	Female	229	98,7%	99,6%	84,1%	56,8%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	51	98,0%	100,0%	78,6%	41,5%
	30-49	151	98,7%	99,3%	86,5%	58,5%
	50 and more	181	97,2%	100,0%	85,5%	60,6%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	96,0%	100,0%	70,0%	30,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	98,2%	100,0%	90,0%	61,7%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	78	96,2%	100,0%	87,1%	64,6%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	26	100,0%	100,0%	86,4%	52,4%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	94	98,9%	98,9%	84,6%	56,6%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	103	98,1%	100,0%	84,3%	57,8%
Education Levels	Primary	77	98,7%	100,0%	87,7%	64,1%
	Secondary	202	97,5%	100,0%	83,6%	54,8%
	Tertiary	115	98,3%	99,2%	85,3%	58,3%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	105	98,1%	100,0%	86,5%	57,1%
	1	61	98,4%	100,0%	82,0%	58,3%
	2	129	97,7%	99,2%	81,7%	56,7%
	3 or more	98	98,0%	100,0%	88,8%	58,3%

2.4.2 Tensions

According to the respondents, tensions between individual ethnic groups in Poland are not a big problem: only 5.2% respondents stated that there was substantial tension between Ukrainians and Poles in Poland. A greater tension can be observed, in their opinion, between the rich and the poor (14.2%) or between the young and the old (6.8%). According to respondents, there is a much greater tension between the Poles and the Romani (14.6% referred to it as serious). No visible differences can be observed between individual groups of respondents with regard to their assessment of tensions between the Poles and the Ukrainians.

Table 9. In your opinion, how much tension is there between each...?

Answers "a lot of tension"		Total	the poor and rich people?	the old people and young people?	the Ukrainians in Poland and Polish	the Romani and Polish	the different religious groups
Total		367	14,2%	6,8%	5,2%	4,5%	7,1%
Sex of respondent	Male	155	10,3%	3,7%	5,6%	5,1%	6,7%
	Female	212	17,0%	9,0%	4,9%	4,1%	7,5%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	50	4,0%	12,0%	6,0%	10,2%	11,6%
	30-49	142	20,4%	7,6%	4,8%	3,1%	8,8%
	50 and more	164	12,2%	4,5%	5,1%	2,8%	3,1%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	24	,0%	12,0%	4,0%	12,0%	13,6%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	55	12,7%	1,9%	5,5%	2,3%	5,9%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	71	12,7%	2,6%	6,5%	4,8%	4,2%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	26	7,7%	12,0%	8,0%	8,3%	9,5%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	87	25,3%	11,1%	4,3%	3,6%	10,5%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	93	11,8%	5,9%	4,0%	1,2%	2,3%
Education Levels	Primary	70	14,3%	5,4%	2,7%	3,1%	5,5%
	Secondary	185	13,0%	6,6%	5,6%	5,5%	9,8%
	Tertiary	112	16,1%	8,0%	6,0%	3,9%	3,8%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	101	9,9%	10,7%	6,7%	7,1%	9,8%
	1	54	11,1%	1,8%	3,4%	6,3%	6,0%
	2	121	17,4%	7,9%	4,8%	1,9%	7,6%
	3 or more	90	16,7%	4,1%	5,1%	3,8%	4,4%

2.4.3 Discrimination

As many as 17.6% respondents declared having been discriminated against in the last 12 months due to their ethnic origin, and 6.6% - due to their religious beliefs. Most frequently, discrimination due to ethnic origin is encountered at work (also in the case of searching for a job) and from neighbors. It is difficult to say if any group of respondents is particularly prone to ethnic discrimination, since only 69 persons answered this question positively. It can be stated, though, that women and young people feel discriminated against more often. Perhaps, in their case, the sense of ethnic discrimination was associated with negative experience in searching for a job.

2.4.4 Summary

According to declarations of respondents, they have no problems with acceptance of Ukrainians and Poles as neighbors, family members or colleagues. Moreover, only one out of twenty respondents declared there was a strong tension between Poles and Ukrainians in Poland. On the other hand, discrimination due to ethnic origin turned out to occur quite often. Within the last year, one out of six respondents was discriminated against due to their ethnic origin. These issues are raised most often by young people. It is worth noting, though, that most respondents encountered no situations in the previous year, in which they would be discriminated against due to their origin or religious beliefs.

2.5 Social and political capital, participation, attitudes toward EU

2.5.1 Trust

The respondents declare a slightly higher level of trusts towards persons of the same nationality, regardless of whether they referred to persons from Ukraine or living permanently in Poland, in comparison with trust towards the Poles or people in general. The differences are rather small: while 20.8% respondents declare absolute trust towards the Ukrainian minority, 19.4% make the same statement about Ukrainians; absolute trust towards the Poles is indicated by 14.1% respondents, while 15.6% declare their absolute trust in people as such. It seems that there is no group among the respondents, which would declare much more or much less trust towards these categories of people. A much lower trust was recorded towards the Polish institutions, such as the parliament, the media, the police, the government or the courts. The lowest level of trust is declared towards the government and the parliament – absolute trust is declared by 2.4% and 2.5% respondents. The Polish media do not enjoy much trust either – 3.5% respondents declared their absolute trust towards them. The position of courts and the police is slightly better – 4.6% and 5.9% respondents, respectively, declare their absolute trust towards these institutions. It seems that in this regard, the Ukrainian minority in Poland holds similar opinions to those of the Poles, who also tend to declare lack of trust toward the legislative authorities, while their opinion of the judiciary is more favorable, and – traditionally – do not trust the media.

Table 10. Could you tell me how much do you trust...?

Answers "trust them completely "		Total	people in general	Ukrainians in Poland	Polish people	Ukrainian people
Total		392	15,6%	20,8%	14,1%	19,4%
Sex of respondent	Male	163	18,4%	24,5%	19,9%	22,2%
	Female	229	13,5%	18,2%	10,1%	17,4%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	15,4%	23,1%	15,4%	23,5%
	30-49	150	16,0%	20,3%	12,7%	17,0%
	50 and more	179	16,2%	21,8%	15,9%	21,3%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	24,0%	28,0%	20,0%	29,2%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	56	19,6%	25,5%	19,6%	19,6%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	77	16,9%	24,3%	21,3%	23,3%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	7,4%	18,5%	11,1%	18,5%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	94	13,8%	17,2%	8,5%	15,4%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	102	15,7%	20,0%	11,9%	19,8%
Education Levels	Primary	76	18,4%	24,3%	17,8%	23,6%
	Secondary	197	14,2%	19,9%	12,6%	17,5%
	Tertiary	119	16,0%	20,2%	14,4%	19,8%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	105	17,1%	22,1%	14,3%	20,4%
	1	60	16,7%	20,3%	13,3%	23,3%
	2	127	11,8%	20,2%	12,8%	18,0%
	3 or more	99	18,2%	20,8%	16,3%	17,7%

2.5.2 Interest in politics

Respondents show a similar level of interest in Polish (21.6%) and Ukrainian (21.4%) politics, paying only a little more attention to the policy towards the Ukrainian minority in Poland (22.9%). Similar levels of interest in various kinds of politics are not surprising: in fact, there is a quite large group of persons interested in all three issues at the same time (25.7%), and a large minority of those, who are not interested in any of them (53.7%). Other persons (20.6%) are interested only in some fields of politics.

Among those interested in all three dimensions of politics, a large group has university education; among these, as many as 65.8% follow regularly the issues of all three areas of politics. On the other hand, as many as 55% of all respondents with elementary education are not interested in Polish or Ukrainian politics or anything that is associated with the policy towards the Ukrainian minority.

Table 11. How interested would you say you are in...?

Answers "very interested"		Total	politics in Poland?	politics in Ukraine?	politics in about your ethnic minority group?
Total		399	21,6%	21,4%	22,9%
Sex of respondent	Male	166	25,3%	23,5%	23,8%
	Female	233	18,9%	19,8%	22,3%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	15,4%	15,4%	21,6%
	30-49	154	23,4%	24,8%	27,0%
	50 and more	182	23,1%	21,4%	21,1%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	16,0%	16,0%	16,7%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	28,1%	24,6%	29,8%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	79	27,8%	26,6%	23,1%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	14,8%	14,8%	25,9%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	97	20,6%	25,0%	25,3%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	103	19,4%	17,5%	19,6%
Education Levels	Primary	76	17,1%	17,1%	13,2%
	Secondary	203	18,2%	18,3%	19,8%
	Tertiary	120	30,0%	29,2%	34,2%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	106	18,9%	20,0%	24,8%
	1	62	29,0%	25,8%	24,6%
	2	129	25,6%	27,9%	24,8%
	3 or more	101	14,9%	11,9%	16,8%

Despite the relatively low interest in the Polish politics, as many as 61% respondents, who have voting rights in Poland, attended the last election, which is a much higher result than the overall attendance level in the country amounting to less than 54%. The youngest respondents were the least eager to participate in the election – only 41.2% of them voted in the Polish election. The highest percentage of voters was found among those with university education – 71.7% of those with voting rights in this group participated in the election.


Among the voters, the most popular party was Civic Platform (70.1% votes), which outstripped the rivals very significantly; Law and Justice, listed as the second most popular party, gained the support of only 13% voters. The highest support for Civic Platform was declared by persons aged 30-49; as many as 81% of them voted for this party. Law and Justice was selected mainly by voters with elementary education – out of these, 37.5% voted for this party.

Also the election for the European Parliament attracted more respondents in comparison with the population of Poland. While 49.4% respondents with voting rights participated in this election, in Poland, overall attendance was two times lower, reaching the level of 24.5% only. During this election, the respondents also voted mainly for Civic Platform (68.4%), and – much less often – for Law and Justice (14%), the coalition of Democratic Left Alliance and the Labor Union (7%) or the Polish People's Party (also 7%). It is worth noting, however, that above we are comparing hard data on real attendance with declarations of the respondents – therefore, the results presented should be approached with some care.

2.5.3 The European Union

The respondents show careful optimism towards the European Union and its impact on Poland. Most of them are not eager to express a definitely positive opinion of the EU (21.7%), assessing it as „rather positive” instead (48.4%), and their views of Poland's benefits from membership in the Community are also “rather positive” (56.2%). On the other hand, a very small percentage of respondents assess the Union rather or definitely negatively (6.1%). A few state that membership in the EU is not profitable for Poland – only 4.2% of respondents agree with this statements.

Chart 8. Generally speaking, would you say that Poland benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the European Union?



Most Euro-skeptics can be found among persons having three or more children and older men. The positive impact of the EU on Poland is most often disregarded by persons with elementary education, as well as those having three or more children. It seems that the proportions presented may be natural as they reflect the proportions of Euro-skeptics among the Poles – usually, per-

sons with the lowest education and the oldest are considered to be more skeptical towards the European integration; usually, they express the most traditional views in research and they are against the integration process.

According to the respondents, the situation of Ukrainians in Poland did not change significantly after the latter joined the EU. For 68.7% respondents, the ability of Ukrainians to exert impact on political decisions in Poland remained the same. Appreciation of Ukrainian culture did not change, either: according to 62.1% respondents, it remained the same as before the accession. In the case of both of the statements examined, the attitudes of respondents are rather good; while changes for better are recognized by 28.2% (the impact of Ukrainians on politics) and 36.5% (appreciation of Ukrainian culture), critical voices appear sporadically (3.1%; 1.4%).

2.5.4 Threat to tradition and culture

Few people declare a personal sense of threat of losing their identity and culture (12%), although it has to be noted that there are significant differences between respondents in this regard; this threat is recognized mainly by young people (27.5%), particularly young women (29.6%). High percentages in this group can usually be explained by stronger attachment of women to tradition, which plays key importance, when they cannot (or are not willing to) find an Ukrainian partner.

It seems, however, that this is not the most significant one on the list of threats: as many as 42.7% respondents are afraid of organized crime and drugs (42.7%), the second largest group – of loss of social benefits (16.5%). Few respondents are afraid of worsening of the situation of minorities in Poland (10%) or loss of Polish identity or culture (9.3%). Among those, who are most afraid of worsening of the situation of minorities in Poland are young people (20.8%), particularly young women (28%).

The declared lack of threat is translated to lack of willingness to leave Poland: only 15.6% respondents declared their definite willingness to leave the country. Another 13.8% would rather hesitate to do that, while 70.7% respondents feel good in our country and would not like to leave. There are differences between these categories of respondents: persons declaring themselves to be Ukrainian are most willing to leave, and those, who declare to be Polish, are least willing to do that; however, the low percentage bases should be taken into account.

In the case of this question, significant differences between groups of respondents can also be observed: traditionally, young people, who declared most often their willingness to leave Poland, are most mobile – 38.9% of them would not hesitate to leave, if they had a warranty of decent conditions of stay abroad. On the other end of the spectrum, there are the elderly (81.7%), who are generally unwilling to leave Poland. This is also associated with their strong attachment to place of residence, mentioned above.

Table 12. You - personally - are currently afraid of the loss of...?

Answers "afraid of it"	Total	Ukrainian identity and culture	Increase in drug trafficking and international organized crime	social benefits	Polish national identity and culture	more difficulties for ethnic and national minorities	
Total	375	12,0%	42,7%	16,5%	9,3%	10,0%	
Sex of respondent	Male	160	8,1%	34,0%	12,1%	8,8%	7,7%
	Female	215	14,9%	49,2%	20,1%	9,7%	11,7%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	51	27,5%	42,9%	15,9%	21,6%	20,8%
	30-49	147	7,5%	39,8%	11,5%	7,2%	8,5%
	50 and more	168	11,3%	46,2%	22,0%	7,8%	8,1%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	24	25,0%	37,5%	4,5%	16,0%	13,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	7,0%	26,9%	11,1%	9,1%	5,5%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	75	4,0%	38,6%	15,9%	6,7%	8,2%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	29,6%	48,0%	27,3%	26,9%	28,0%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	90	7,8%	48,1%	11,8%	6,0%	10,5%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	93	17,2%	52,3%	27,2%	8,8%	8,0%
Education Levels	Primary	65	10,8%	43,5%	22,0%	7,7%	6,3%
	Secondary	193	11,9%	42,3%	16,3%	9,7%	10,8%
	Tertiary	117	12,8%	42,9%	13,7%	9,5%	10,7%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	101	16,8%	35,8%	14,9%	14,3%	14,4%
	1	56	10,7%	40,4%	16,0%	8,9%	11,1%
	2	120	15,0%	49,1%	18,2%	10,1%	10,2%
	3 or more	97	4,1%	43,7%	16,5%	3,3%	4,4%

2.5.5 Summary

At the declarative level, the respondents easily expressed their trust towards different nations. The level of trust towards institutions, particularly the Polish government and parliament, was much lower; however, it seems that opinions expressed by the respondents are quite similar to those of an average Pole.

The respondents assess membership in the European Union as positive for Poland; at the same time, they see no differences in treatment of Ukrainians or in their own impact on reality after Poland's accession to the Community.

Only one out of ten respondents is afraid of losing their tradition and culture, and slightly more than 15% respondents would consider leaving Poland, provided that they would get a good standard of living elsewhere. However, it cannot be stated definitely that they would migrate east.

2.6 Annexes: Tables

How would you feel about having a member of the following..?

... as a friend?		Total	Polish	Ukrainian	German	Romani
Total		399	99,0%	99,5%	89,2%	71,9%
Sex of respondent	Male	166	98,8%	99,4%	90,8%	74,6%
	Female	233	99,1%	99,6%	88,0%	70,0%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	100,0%	100,0%	82,6%	62,5%
	30-49	153	100,0%	99,3%	91,0%	75,0%
	50 and more	183	97,8%	99,5%	89,8%	71,7%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	100,0%	100,0%	72,7%	50,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	100,0%	100,0%	96,2%	82,7%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	79	97,5%	98,7%	91,7%	74,6%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	100,0%	100,0%	91,7%	72,7%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	96	100,0%	99,0%	88,0%	70,0%
Education Levels	Primary	77	98,7%	100,0%	90,9%	75,4%
	Secondary	203	99,5%	100,0%	87,2%	70,1%
	Tertiary	119	98,3%	98,3%	91,3%	72,8%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	106	100,0%	100,0%	88,2%	69,9%
	1	62	98,4%	98,4%	92,5%	77,6%
	2	130	99,2%	99,2%	86,8%	67,9%
	3 or more	100	98,0%	100,0%	91,3%	75,9%

... as a neighbor on your street?		Total	Polish	Ukrainian	German	Romani
Total		399	99,2%	99,2%	94,6%	80,2%
Sex of respondent	Male	166	98,2%	98,8%	96,1%	82,0%
	Female	233	100,0%	99,6%	93,6%	78,9%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	98,1%	98,1%	93,6%	74,5%
	30-49	153	99,3%	99,3%	95,9%	81,8%
	50 and more	183	99,5%	99,5%	94,7%	81,1%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	96,0%	96,0%	86,4%	66,7%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	98,2%	100,0%	100,0%	85,2%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	79	98,7%	98,7%	95,9%	84,3%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	80,8%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	96	100,0%	99,0%	93,5%	79,5%
Education Levels	Primary	77	100,0%	100,0%	95,5%	81,5%
	Secondary	203	99,0%	99,5%	93,7%	79,2%
	Tertiary	119	99,2%	98,3%	95,7%	81,1%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	106	99,1%	99,1%	94,1%	76,8%
	1	62	98,4%	98,4%	94,5%	84,6%
	2	130	99,2%	79,5%	94,3%	79,5
	3 or more	100	100,0%	100,0%	95,7%	82,2%

... as a working colleague?		Total	Polish	Ukrainian	German	Romani
Total		399	99,7%	99,5%	94,9%	81,2%
Sex of respondent	Male	166	99,4%	99,4%	95,4%	82,6%
	Female	233	100,0%	99,6%	94,5%	80,2%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	100,0%	100,0%	93,6%	78,7%
	30-49	153	100,0%	99,3%	95,8%	83,1%
	50 and more	183	99,5%	99,5%	94,7%	80,9%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	100,0%	100,0%	86,4%	71,4%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	86,8%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	79	98,7%	98,7%	94,5%	82,9%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	84,6%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	96	100,0%	99,0%	93,4%	80,7%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	104	100,0%	100,0%	94,8%	79,3%
Education Levels	Primary	77	100,0%	100,0%	95,5%	79,4%
	Secondary	203	100,0%	100,0%	94,7%	80,3%
	Tertiary	119	99,2%	98,3%	94,8%	83,6%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	106	100,0%	100,0%	95,0%	78,8%
	1	62	98,4%	98,4%	94,5%	86,5%
	2	130	100,0%	99,2%	95,0%	80,2%
	3 or more	100	100,0%	100,0%	94,6%	81,8%

In the past 12 months have you personally felt discriminated against or harassed in Poland on the basis of one or more of the following grounds?

Answers "Yes"		Total	Ethnic or national origin	Gender	Age	Religion
Total		397	17,6%	3,3%	4,8%	6,6%
Sex of respondent	Male	166	13,3%	1,8%	3,7%	5,6%
	Female	231	20,8%	4,3%	5,6%	7,4%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	30,8%	3,9%	2,0%	11,8%
	30-49	151	17,9%	2,6%	4,0%	8,6%
	50 and more	183	13,1%	3,8%	6,6%	3,9%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	25	28,0%	,0%	4,2%	8,3%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	57	8,8%	1,8%	1,8%	8,8%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	79	11,4%	2,5%	5,1%	2,6%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	27	33,3%	7,4%	,0%	14,8%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	94	23,4%	3,2%	5,3%	8,5%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	104	14,4%	4,9%	7,7%	4,9%
Education Levels	Primary	76	15,8%	1,3%	3,9%	2,7%
	Secondary	201	19,4%	4,5%	7,0%	7,6%
	Tertiary	120	15,8%	2,5%	1,7%	7,6%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	106	27,4%	1,9%	1,0%	8,6%
	1	61	11,5%	,0%	,0%	3,3%
	2	129	17,1%	3,1%	6,2%	8,6%
	3 or more	100	12,0%	7,1%	10,1%	4,1%

Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination? if yes, which one?

		Total	Greco-catholic	Orthodox	Roman Catholic	Jew	Other	Do not belong to a denomination
Total		390	70,0%	18,7%	8,7%	,5%	,3%	1,8%
Sex of respondent	Male	157	73,2%	19,7%	6,4%	,0%	,0%	,6%
	Female	233	67,8%	18,0%	10,3%	,9%	,4%	2,6%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	52	57,7%	23,1%	15,4%	,0%	,0%	3,8%
	30-49	153	66,0%	23,5%	6,5%	,7%	,7%	2,6%
	50 and more	179	76,5%	14,0%	8,4%	,6%	,0%	,6%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	23	60,9%	30,4%	8,7%	,0%	,0%	,0%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	55	69,1%	23,6%	5,5%	,0%	,0%	1,8%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	76	78,9%	14,5%	6,6%	,0%	,0%	,0%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	29	55,2%	17,2%	20,7%	,0%	,0%	6,9%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	98	64,3%	23,5%	7,1%	1,0%	1,0%	3,1%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	103	74,8%	13,6%	9,7%	1,0%	,0%	1,0%
Education Levels	Primary	75	84,0%	8,0%	6,7%	,0%	1,3%	,0%
	Secondary	198	69,2%	19,2%	9,1%	,5%	,0%	2,0%
	Tertiary	116	62,1%	25,0%	9,5%	,9%	,0%	2,6%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	102	59,8%	25,5%	10,8%	1,0%	,0%	2,9%
	1	60	65,0%	21,7%	10,0%	,0%	,0%	3,3%
	2	125	72,8%	17,6%	8,0%	,8%	,8%	,0%
	3 or more	101	79,2%	11,9%	6,9%	,0%	,0%	2,0%

Apart from funerals, christenings and weddings, how often do you practice your religion for example by attending religious gatherings, servings?

		Total	Every day	Several times a week	Once a week	Once a month	Several times a year	Once a year or less often	Never
Total		373	2,9%	8,6%	51,5%	13,9%	16,1%	5,6%	1,3%
Sex of respondent	Male	152	2,6%	5,9%	47,4%	17,8%	22,4%	2,6%	1,3%
	Female	221	3,2%	10,4%	54,3%	11,3%	11,8%	7,7%	1,4%
Age of respondent - 3 categories	Up to 29	49	2,0%	4,1%	40,8%	28,6%	12,2%	10,2%	2,0%
	30-49	142	3,5%	9,2%	44,4%	14,1%	20,4%	5,6%	2,8%
	50 and more	175	2,9%	9,7%	60,0%	9,7%	13,1%	4,6%	0,0%
Age + Sex	Male, up to 29 y.o.	23	0,0%	4,3%	30,4%	34,8%	17,4%	8,7%	4,3%
	Male, 30-49 y.o.	51	5,9%	7,8%	35,3%	19,6%	29,4%	0,0%	2,0%
	Male, 50 and more y.o.	74	1,4%	5,4%	60,8%	12,2%	17,6%	2,7%	0,0%
	Female, up to 29 y.o.	26	3,8%	3,8%	50,0%	23,1%	7,7%	11,5%	0,0%
	Female, 30-49 y.o.	91	2,2%	9,9%	49,5%	11,0%	15,4%	8,8%	3,3%
	Female, 50 and more y.o.	101	4,0%	12,9%	59,4%	7,9%	9,9%	5,9%	0,0%
Education Levels	Primary	73	4,1%	8,2%	60,3%	9,6%	12,3%	5,5%	0,0%
	Secondary	189	1,6%	9,0%	48,7%	16,4%	16,9%	6,3%	1,1%
	Tertiary	111	4,5%	8,1%	50,5%	12,6%	17,1%	4,5%	2,7%
How many children all in all do you have, including the adopted ones?	No children	100	4,0%	6,0%	44,0%	22,0%	11,0%	10,0%	3,0%
	1	54	0,0%	7,4%	50,0%	9,3%	29,6%	1,9%	1,9%
	2	120	3,3%	10,8%	51,7%	14,2%	16,7%	3,3%	0,0%
	3 or more	98	3,1%	9,2%	59,2%	8,2%	13,3%	6,1%	1,0%

3 MAIN FINDINGS OF BIOGRAPHICAL INTERVIEWS (ENRI-BIO)

Anna Domaradzka / Ilona Matysiak

3.1 Methodology and sample

For the sake of the project, eleven individual in-depth interviews were conducted with members of Ukrainian minority in Poland. Respondents represented three generations of people of Ukrainian origin who were born and live on the Polish post-WW II territory. All interviewees declared Ukrainian national identity, but all had Polish citizenship. Young generation is represented by three respondents: two women aged 21 and 25 and one man aged 21. Medium generation consists of the interviewees aged between 40 and 50 (three women aged 46, 47 and 50 and two men aged 46). The oldest generation is represented by three respondents (two women aged 91 and 63 and one man aged 80), who were most experienced during the times of Vistula Operation resettlement.

The interviewees differ in terms of gender, level of education and type of the place they come from. Seven out of eleven respondents are women and four are men. One of the interviewed men from older generation has elementary level of completed education and one woman has secondary, while two of the youngest interviewees graduated from secondary schools, but they continue their education at the university. The rest of respondents (7) received a university education and in case of four of them it was Ukrainian Language studies. In most cases our respondents' educational path was strongly connected with ethnicity and Ukrainian language – most of them spent some time in school with Ukrainian as a second language. In case of the oldest respondents, there were gaps between secondary school and university due to the war or necessity to work.

As for the family status, the youngest respondents were single and the oldest were married or widowers. Middle generation consisted of either married (3) or single/divorced (2). In only one case the spouse was Polish, all others were Ukrainians born in Poland. All respondents declared connection with Orthodox Church of a Greek Catholic denomination.

All respondents speak Polish fluently and use it in everyday life (school, studies, work etc.), but for many Ukrainian is the first language – the one they learned at home and still use among family members.

The respondents' life stories differ mostly according to age. The youngest interviewees experienced gradual development of their national identity through contacts with Ukrainian minority and also periods of ambivalence related to these issues. They discover their roots mainly due to the influence of their grandparents and involvement in minority organizations, i.e. student or folkloric groups. Also, participation in religious life had a positive influence on the development of their Ukrainian identity.

Life of the oldest generation was strongly influenced by the II WW and the experience of resettlement or exile (Operation Vistula). Their Ukrainian identity is therefore connected to some traumatic events on one hand and with regional patriotism on the other. They feel very much embedded in local community – their little homeland as they call it – and they usually cherish both Ukrainian and Polish culture.

For the middle generation, communists' politics towards Ukrainian minority had a great impact on their families' life and therefore on the process of their identity building. While possibilities of open expression of the Ukrainian tradition and religious activity was limited during the times of

Polish People Republic, their sense of identity is either severely weakened or really intense as a reaction to the times of repression. One of them, “Olga”, declares for example that she can’t imagine establishing a family with somebody else than a Ukrainian and perceives mixed marriages as a threat to Ukrainian minority. The other, “Piotr”, is married to a Polish women and feels that in everyday life his Ukrainian identity is somewhat forgotten. What is common for respondents aged 40-50, is that they have a big sentiment towards the region were they were born and where their elders live and their identity is very much rooted and visible there.

For example respondent “Anna” learned Ukrainian and Ukrainian customs at home and in church:

my mom’s [parents], they talked to each other in Ukrainian. My grandma wouldn’t always reply, when we talked or asked her about something in Polish. On one hand, this was like forcing us to, on the other hand, it was good, because I learned Ukrainian, I learned it on my own. I was learning at the Orthodox Church, talking to my grandma, my family and so on [ua(PL)_8].

Story of the respondent “Michal” is very similar. This is how he described influence of the older generation on his identity:

My adventure with Ukrainian language started thanks to my grandparents. First of all, there were my mom’s parents, and then – my dad’s parents. I think I started learning Ukrainian thanks to them. At first, we lived together with my grandparents. As long as I remember, my grandparents always spoke Ukrainian to me. My parents did, too, from time to time, but most of the time we spoke Polish. And I think it was thanks to my grandparents that my mom got me registered at our school [ua(PL)_11].

In case of most respondents, the identity building process was facilitated by the presence of Ukrainian peers in the neighborhood or at school. In contact with Polish majority, group of Ukrainian kids or students integrated and created emotional ties that strengthened their Ukrainian identity. Later, in adult life, it was more connected with family and religious activity. The example of respondents from big cities shows that city lifestyle makes it harder to cultivate minority’s identity than it is in case of smaller towns in regions inhabited by Ukrainians minority.

When asked about their origin (where do they come from), most of the interviewees replied that what defines their roots is not where they were born, but where their grandparents lived before the war. So what defines the identity of modern Ukrainians in Poland is the prewar homeland of their ancestors, who were later scattered over Polish and Ukrainian territory.

History of grandparents’ and parents’ generation that was forced to move during or after the II WW is crucial for the identity of today adult Ukrainians in Poland. In most cases the family is rooted in the south-eastern part of Poland, close to Ukrainian border, and although only half of the respondents actually grew up in this region, all of them see it as their place of origin.

To be more specific, most of the respondents’ families originate from the region of Podcarpathia, which is located in southeastern part of post-WW II Poland and close to the Ukrainian border. Before Vistula Operation this region was widely populated by Ukrainians and other micro-ethnic groups (Boyko and Lemko). For centuries the mountains of the southeast corner of present-day Poland were inhabited by people who spoke an East Slavic language, used a Cyrillic Alphabet, and who belonged to the Eastern branch of Christianity (Byzantine Rite). They inhabited a territory between Oslawa River and Dunajec River, southeast of Krakow. This region, located on the north slope of the Carpathians, includes Beskid Sadecki, Beskid Niski and the Bieszczady mountain ranges.

In 1944-1946 a large part of the population was "evacuated" to the Soviet Ukraine (part of the Soviet Union) and later, in 1947, the whole region was depopulated during Operation Vistula. The repatriation of Ukrainians from Poland to the Soviet Union in 1944-1946 was part of the World War II evacuation and expulsion that sought ethnic consolidation of Polish and Ukrainian territories. About 480,000 people were affected by this repatriation.

Operation Vistula was codename for the 1947 forced resettlement of post-war Poland's Ukrainian minority (including Boykos and Lemkos) to northern and western regions, carried out by the Polish Communist authorities in order to remove the support base for the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the aftermath of the 1943-1944 ethnic cleansing in Galicia and Volhynia by Poles and Ukrainians. About 200,000 civilians from the territory of Bieszczady and Low Beskids were resettled by force to formerly German territories ceded to Poland at Yalta Conference in the end of World War II.

Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Operation Vistula has been described by many Ukrainians as ethnic cleansing. The area itself was devastated in order to deprive the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was fighting against the Polish People's Army, of whatever support it had in that region. After 1956 some of the original inhabitants were able to return to the region, which in the meantime had been given over mainly to Polish settlers. This situation generated many conflicts around land and ownership, which last till today. Many of the resettled people, however, never returned to this region, which symbolized for them a traumatic experience of the exile. Operation Vistula resulted in creating Ukrainian "islands" in Mazuria region, northeast of Poland, on the territory populated by Germans before the II World War.

Great majority of the interviewees originate from villages (older respondents still live there) or small towns in Mazuria or Podcarpathia region, which are characterized by the dominant or significant population of people of Ukrainian origin. Four respondents migrated to the capital city of Warsaw due to work or studies, while seven live in the southeast region. Migration to Warsaw seems to be characteristic for Ukrainians coming from the north (Mazuria region), while inhabitants of the Carpathian region are less willing to move. All respondents have contact with their native region, where their families usually still live. Interviewees often mentioned a similar migration pattern – their grandparents spent their life in a village and the next generation (middle-aged respondents or parents of the younger interviewees) usually moved to town or city in order to improve life quality.

The fieldwork was conducted by dr Anna Domaradzka and Ilona Matysiak, the Robert B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw.

3.2 European identity

Majority of interviewees doesn't seem to have developed a European identity or doesn't attach much importance to the fact that they live in the European Union. As one of the older respondents, "Maria", stated it:

whether the border is here or there, it doesn't matter. What matters is the culture in which you are raised [ua(PL)_7].

Being a Ukrainian and a local is much more important and tactile than being a European. Other respondent "Natalia" describes it: T

o be honest, I wasn't really touched by that. I don't need to travel around Europe and all that. I don't feel the need to [ua(PL)_10].

Having a Ukrainian identity means that they feel much more at home in the eastern countries than in Western Europe, so they tend to travel to the east (Ukraine, Slovakia, Estonia, Bulgaria etc.). As “Marta” stated, only the recent enlargement made EU more easy to identify with:

As for the Union, I don't know, it's hard for me to identify with it, as I am attached to the East, I go West very rarely. (...) So, I identify myself with the new Union more. I mean, I'm glad when I can go to Slovakia without a passport or last year I drove to Estonia, or I flew to Bulgaria. That's our bloc. I don't feel too attached to the West [ua(PL)_5].

Also, it's mostly younger generation that knows English well enough to feel comfortable in western countries. As one of the older respondents “Irena” said:

I would have to invest in myself, in learning Western languages and then I would feel European [ua(PL)_2].

For most interviewees Europe equals European Union. From their point of view, main consequence of Polish accession to the EU is introduction of visas for Ukrainians, which has a negative impact on relations with family members or friends living in the Ukraine. As one of the respondents „Elena“ said, the introduction of visas resulted in creating a barrier between West and East:

And now, well, we're separating ourselves from this artificially. They can only go to the Union with visas, it's a nightmare. They are perceived as some inferior people. Unfortunately [ua(PL)_9].

Apart from that, Polish membership in EU equals freedom of travel, which they seldom use. Three of the respondents, “Piotr”, “Marek” and “Marta” also pointed out that European legislation guarantees the minorities' rights, which helps Ukrainians' interests in Poland. Also, most respondents mentioned positive impact of the EU funds in Poland.

From the point of view of the oldest interviewees, European integration is a positive process that should help prevent ethnic conflicts in the future, so that history would not repeat itself. Practically none of the respondents supported the view that Ukraine should soon be admitted to European Union. Main reason for that is the fact that Ukraine lags behind Europe in terms of infrastructure and organizational culture and doesn't seem to be ready to fit into EU. For some it will never be ready, others thought it possible, but not very soon.

To sum up, respondents had a rather positive, but not enthusiastic attitude towards Europe. Either the issue of European integration wasn't very important in their life, or they tended to see both advantages and disadvantages of it. For example „Piotr“ stated:

For now, I get whatever's beneficial for me from Europe. The ability to travel around Europe, taking advantage of the EU funds, it's a driving force of development. So, I count on this wisdom of people of the process, and I can see how strong are those local, not necessarily national, but local sentiments, for culture, for language [ua(PL)_1].

Most see Europe as a force of development in the region. As „Michal“ puts it:

I think it's been a turnaround. Borders got opened up. There are more employment opportunities, more ways to make money. Surely, these changes are occurring all the time. And I hope they will be progressing in the same direction, for the better. Even looking at universities. And development of small communities, it's all been developing thanks to the European Union. If it wasn't for the Union, I think we would still be in the same place as in the nineties, the late nineties. [ua(PL)_11]

Only some respondent shared deeper reflection concerning impact of European integration on mentality of the people. For example „Elena“ stated, that the opportunity to travel is a mind-opening experience, which makes people more tolerant and aware of differences:

And another thing that has changed is that the Poles have started to travel abroad, in Europe, they started to encounter other nations, they are the minority and their view of what's happening in the country, here, in Poland, is changing. And their opinions are changing. Well, it's also been a lot of, when the border was open, there were no visas, there were numerous Polish-Ukrainian economic relations, to the advantage of both sides. And this also changed mutual attitudes. They learned to trade together, to cooperate, to open companies together. It was a stage of getting to know Ukrainians in the borderland and shaping a different opinion of them [ua(PL)_9].

In other words, the advantage of the open border is that you open up to other nationalities and cultures, which helps to prevent the stereotypical perception of others. That's why closing the Polish-Ukrainian border is potentially so harmful for the relations of both nations.

For younger interviewees the issue of European identity was related to the cultural area of South-Eastern Europe, mostly in context of the Orthodox faith and Slavic languages. In addition, especially younger respondents highlighted their general interest and the subjective feeling of being close and familiar with other countries of Eastern Europe or "bloc" as one of them puts it.

In general, reflexive opinions related to the abstract idea of European identity were much less frequent than more practical remarks about Polish membership in the European Union and consequences for its development. When asked if they feel that they are European, respondents would usually answer that they are primarily Ukrainian. Only the youngest interviewees would treat the fact that they are EU citizens as something obvious, nothing to really think about.

3.3 National identity – relationship to country of residence

Our respondents show different attitudes when referring to the issue of Polish national identity. Most common is a declaration of Ukrainian nationality somehow enriched by Polish upbringing and it can be explained as a sentiment toward Polish culture and customs. Those respondents often declared they had a mixed identity – they feel Ukrainian, but also have a very strong feeling that they are true Polish citizens. Some of them even feel that they are better Polish citizens than some of the Poles, because they are active in elections, interested in the country and local matters.

This type of attitude is represented by the older interviewees "Maria", "Stefan" and "Irena" who suggested that having double identity means that they are more aware of the Polish culture and feel more responsible as citizens, than some "true" Poles. As "Piotr" puts it:

the emotional bond with Poland, where my family has always lived, as far as I remember, within the borders of Poland, and this ordinary, well, because of being brought up in a certain way, because of culture, friends, it's such that I am always happy, when the Poles and the Ukrainians support each other. There are many conflicts, which haven't been solved [ua(PL)_1].

Respondent "Irena" stressed the importance of her parents' attitude for creating this sense of belonging to Polish culture:

my mom, who is Ukrainian, she's taught me songs of the Polish legions. My mom sang in Polish, she sang beautifully. And Christmas carols! So, we were raised, in our home, there were two cultures. And they were equivalent. It was not like, we were not taught Polish songs just to use them, just in case, to keep our identity secret. Absolutely, it was something natural. We were raised in two cultures [ua(PL)_2].

Main result of this open type of upbringing is a lack of inferiority or superiority complex in relation to majority:

So, that's one thing that I'm very grateful to my parents, to my neighbors in the village in which I was brought up. There was no fear and there was no sense of inferiority. We didn't have such feelings. We were proud of being Ukrainian... [ua(PL)_2].

The rest of respondents felt less attached to Polish culture or nationality, because they live and work in Ukrainian community and Polish issues are rather marginal from their emotional point of view. "Natalia" would describe their situation as schizophrenic:

I'm realizing now that it was sort of like schizophrenia, on one hand, there was this entire Polish world, and on the other hand, well, we pretended we were Polish, and on the other hand, there was this totally different home life, going to the club and to USKT for classes. And I think that I really felt at home and naturally at the club and at home. I was much more eager to go there than to go to school [ua(PL)_10].

What mostly distinguishes Ukrainian minority in Poland is language and faith. "Maria" pointed out the importance of Orthodox Church in defining Ukrainian identity despite Polish upbringing. Although Orthodox tradition is dominant in their life, many interviewees also celebrate Polish holidays and customs

we would always celebrate holidays twice and that was nice, it was double. We used to say, Polish holidays and Ukrainian holidays [ua(PL)_1].

The image of Poles depends strongly on personal experience – either positive – with Polish friends, teachers and soldiers – or negative – of hostility or aggression during the war and after. What is also crucial for attitude toward Poland and Poles is the experience of the older generation that was resettled or prosecuted because of their Ukrainian roots. Stories told by grandparents and parents stay vivid in respondents' memory and sometimes create a feeling of insecurity or grudge. However, many of them were "balanced stories" which described both bad and good deeds of Polish neighbors, soldiers, etc. Tagline of those stories was usually that there was too much violence and bloodshed on both sides and that at least some hostility between Ukrainians and Poles was provoked by the Soviet Union to weaken both nations. Also, responsibility for resettlement is mainly ascribed to the communists. That is probably the reason why, taking into account a rather dramatic history of resettled families, level of distrust or criticism toward Poles is really low among the respondents. Main tagline of those stories can be summarized by respondent's "Irena" narrative:

[My grandmother] she started each and every one of her stories like this: You know, children, we [the Poles and the Ukrainians] lived in friendship, and they came, and they embroiled us [ua(PL)_2].

Interviewees often describe Polish language and culture as a dominant context of their everyday's life. It's different only in cases of respondents working for and with Ukrainian minority (e.g. in Association of Ukrainians in Poland or Ukrainian publishing houses). Since Polish is the official language in all public institutions³⁶ (especially schools) and also in most respondents' workplace, it naturally becomes the first language of communication.

It seems that Ukrainians living in Poland, although they have a strong ethnic minority identity, usually feel they have more in common with people living in Poland (especially locals), than Ukrainians behind eastern border.

³⁶ According to the Act of 6 January 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and on Regional Languages, communes where at least 20% of inhabitants belong to national or ethnic minority have a right to introduce the minority's language as second, auxiliary language to be used in official contexts.

Declarations of relationship with Poland in terms of homeland and/or citizenship turned out to be the most popular ones among the interviewees of all age groups. Two respondents “Stefan” and “Marek” mentioned the importance of the citizens’ obligation toward their state, such as voting or paying taxes. To be more specific, they stressed the fact that they put some effort into being “good Polish citizens”.

According to the interviewees’ experiences and opinions, process of Polonization of Ukrainian minority is progressing because of the mixed marriages. Half of the respondents mentioned examples of mixed marriages, which drove the Ukrainian spouse away from his/her tradition. In most cases, despite all the best intentions of the pair getting married and the fact wedding usually takes place in Orthodox Church, after some time Polish spouse tends to pull the other and their children away from their roots. That’s why one of the respondents declared that she would never marry outside Ukrainian community

I am Ukrainian, so, you think like, there are traditions, there are roots and so on. And I would have to give something up. Something that was a part of the way I was raised. The language. I couldn’t. So, I guess it’s a certain conscious choice, a question of certain life decisions. To tell you the truth, there were various situations that I encountered at university, there were some friends, and to me it was just natural to reject relationships like that. The language, the nationality, it was always of significance. This was the basic rule [ua(PL)_6].

Summarizing, it can be stated that most of the interviewed Ukrainians living in Poland feel connected to Poland and it’s tradition, speak Polish very well and in most cases treat their obligations as Polish citizens seriously. At the same time, none of the respondents seemed to forget their Ukrainian identity or be “Polonized”. It seems that there is no internal conflict – Polish roots are less important but coexist with their Ukrainian roots.

All respondents identify themselves as Ukrainians and describe their relationship to Poland in terms of homeland and/or citizenship. They point out processes and tendencies which weaken Ukrainian tradition in face of dominant Polish culture and language – lack of good media coverage and mixed marriages. It seems that middle generation is in the most difficult situation, because they were raised in times when Ukrainian identity was the reason for prosecution and in some situations it was better to hide it. For younger generation being a Ukrainian is a reason to be proud and they have a chance to cherish their heritage much more. The older generation, on the other hand, was much more rooted in Ukrainian community, and has much less doubts about their identity.

3.4 National identity - relationship to mother country

According to our respondents, many people of Ukrainian descent for whom Polish is a mother tongue, see their faith as a main identity-defining factor. Also, importance of the Ukrainian part of their identity becomes stronger in certain contexts – while visiting relatives in home village or travelling to Ukraine, as well as while participating in Ukrainian festivals or religious activities. As one of the respondents, “Olga”, stated:

I live in Poland, I work in Poland, I feel Ukrainian, but I have this spiritual bond with Ukraine [ua(PL)_6].

As for the relation with modern Ukraine, in case of most interviewees it seems to be rather a sentimental bond with a legendary homeland, known from stories and literature. This idealized image doesn’t bear comparison with reality, which in some cases can lead to bitter disappointment. It is mostly because modern Ukraine differs very much from the one described in poetry and

songs. Especially during communistic times and slightly after, it wasn't the Ukraine from grandparents' stories or Shevchenko poems – majority of inhabitants spoke Russian, not Ukrainian, and the country was definitely underdeveloped comparing to Poland.

The relationship with Ukraine as a mother country was described by our respondents either in terms of sentiment or in terms of visible bond with this country. According to experiences of the youngest interviewees, Ukraine is, first of all, a country of warm, open people, with whom you can feel much more connected than with inhabitants of western countries. Contact with Ukraine seems to be important for all respondents – as one of them mentioned, trips to Ukraine gives one chance to “recharge batteries” and makes it easier to sustain minority identity while living in Poland.

In case of some respondents, bonds with Ukraine are also strengthened by contacts with family members. Also, Ukrainian organizations and schools tend to organize trips to Ukraine for teenagers, which all young respondents remember as a very positive experience. Those quasi-ethnographic camps were for many an exciting and inspiring adventure, which allowed them to bond with peers of the same identity.

Apart from that, Ukraine is a source of music inspirations and artistic ideas, which are translated into different artistic activities organized in local communities, during Ukrainian festivals or orthodox holidays. It can be said that love toward Ukraine is channeled through promotion of folkloric art – singing and dancing, which attracts children and younger people. Although the tradition is not visible in everyday life, it is expressed during religious holidays and ceremonies. Often, practicing of Ukrainian traditional art and folklore (singing, dancing, icon painting etc.) becomes an important hobby.

However, none of the interviewees expressed the will to live in Ukraine permanently. Such opinions didn't depend on the age group or the fact of having or not having family in Ukraine. What makes it difficult to identify with Ukraine is the fact that it's a rather poor country, underdeveloped comparing to Poland, highly divided and under strong Russian influence, especially in the eastern part. As one of the respondents “Stefan” puts it

I'd never go in this direction. I'm always looking towards the West, not the East. Culture comes from the West, and only poverty comes from the East [ua(PL)_3].

Also, Ukrainian identity is very much dependent on the presence of older generation in life of our respondents – quite often, when grandparents die, nobody organizes traditional holidays anymore and family ties with Ukraine become weaker. The fact that Ukrainian diaspora is rather scattered makes it hard to keep this bond alive. As “Stefan” puts it:

If there was a large group, more people, they would get to know each other, and as it is, they are scattered, they get lost [ua(PL)_3].

In relation with Ukrainian national identity, crucial elements are: language (literary language or local dialects) and religion (usually Greek Catholic). As it was already mentioned in the previous chapter, the importance of both factors usually differs depending on respondents' age. As for language, childhood experience shared by all older respondents is learning Ukrainian local dialect at home, as the first language, although they were usually able to understand Polish due to contacts with Polish children from the neighborhood. On the other hand, younger respondents usually stated that Polish was their first language, although they were able to understand Ukrainian dialect perfectly, thanks to their grandparents, parents or “church” experience. It has to be

stressed that the possibility of regular contact with grandparents is crucial in terms of direct transfer of main elements of Ukrainian identity.

Religion is, according to the interviewees, an even more crucial element of Ukrainian identity. More so, taking into account the fact that Greek Catholic church in Poland is in fact Ukrainian church, with Ukrainian language used during ceremonies. It's therefore not surprising that church is one of the main meeting places for Ukrainian minority. Church is also responsible for organizing many social events – from every Sunday after-mass meetings to parish fairs in villages. From what our respondents reported, these events are the main opportunity to meet new and old friends as well as future spouses.

Together with language or dialect, faith is also a basic feature of differentiation between Ukrainian minority and Polish majority that is Roman Catholic. As “Anna” states, it would be easier for her to give up her national identity than her faith and it's the faith that has a decisive role in building a Ukrainian identity.

Most respondents cherish their Ukrainian identity, either through contacts with other Ukrainians or through art (dances, choirs) and religious practices. Some interviewees work in Ukrainian community, which enables them to maintain permanent contact with language. Others have spouses or families of the same origin, which strengthens their Ukrainian identity. Only one respondent, “Piotr”, whose wife is Polish, had the feeling that he was not doing enough to sustain his bond with mother country:

I am not doing much for my Ukrainian identity right now. Sometimes they ask me, when Polish and Ukrainian teams are playing soccer against each other, they ask whom I support. Well, it was like that once, the Poles were eliminated and the Ukrainians stayed, so I could support Ukraine. But there's no emotional bond with Ukraine. It's all close, it's, let's say, I am concerned about what is going on in Ukraine, I'm not an expert probably, but I'm concerned. I don't keep in touch with the Ukrainian community, which could somehow strengthen all this inside me, maintain and preserve this bond [ua(PL)_1].

As for the modern Ukraine, it is often described as being too close to Russia for its own good. As “Piotr” has put it:

I wish Ukraine didn't turn away from the West, didn't turn in the direction of Russia. Unfortunately, time has shown that Russia needs Ukraine for its own benefit, but it also loses its [Ukrainian] identity this way [ua(PL)_1].

Interestingly, although it seems further in terms of cultural circle, Western Europe is perceived as a better chance of sustaining Ukrainian identity:

I think that with Western Europe, it has a better chance of preserving its identity. It's a young state, with little experience, with huge conflicts. They look at Poland with envy, seeing how fast Poles have managed to get it all in order. It's been really, really fast, in fact. So, I wish the Union developed in this direction, giving us new strength of stabilization and order [ua(PL)_1].

The interviewees often mentioned their spiritual bond with Ukraine, which is a place to visit, to feel the connection with language and tradition, very important in terms of identity. As one respondent, “Irena”, puts it:

I've been to Ukraine many times. I need Ukraine. I go there not only to work on my accent, because I have a heavy Polish accent, and I even use a different syntax as well, but to breathe in this Ukraine, you know, metaphorically. Particularly now as Ukraine is becoming more and more Ukrainian, when all qualities of Ukraine are beginning to show [ua(PL)_2].

However, for some, trips to Ukraine may have a different focus – more typical for Polish tourists, looking for Polish places. As “Piotr” described it:

I travelled twice like this lately, with my family. My wife and daughters. We got into a car, we went to S., to my aunt, then we went to the country, that's in tarnopolskie, to my other aunt, then we'd go to Karpaty and we went to Kamieniec Podolski together. So, it was like, as I went there with my family, I guess that's why we visited mostly Polish places [ua(PL)_1].

In his case accents were moved, and the whole trip was more Polish than Ukrainian experience. This shows that depending on the visited part of Ukraine it can be perceived both as a source of Ukrainian or Polish identity.

As some respondents remark, Ukraine is changing for the better – becoming more self conscious and independent and therefore more Ukrainian and less Russian. This process makes it more attractive from the point of view of our respondents, who hope for a better future for their mother country.

Bond with Ukraine is weakened by the fact that respondents' families are usually tied to a territory that belongs to Poland. This connection is often expressed in reference to the graves of their great grandparents, which are best indicator of the true place of origin. One of the interviewees, “Stefan”, expressed his bond with land of his ancestors:

I'm thankful that we stayed here. Why leave? This is my place, my roots, my great grandparents [ua(PL)_3].

In this context, Ukraine is more of a symbolic motherland, with all the culture and religious tradition, but Poland is the tangible one, where the roots are. As “Irena” describes it:

I guess Ukraine is that cultural background, this base, where you can go, work on your language, bring back the culture. I think so, but my place is here, my roots are here. My place is where graves of my ancestors are [ua(PL)_2].

To sum up, Ukrainian national identity within this minority in Poland is based primarily on language, Orthodox religion and sentimental bonds with Ukraine. Reference to Ukraine as the mother country is more symbolic than real. Due to current economical and political circumstances Ukraine is not perceived as a good place to live.

3.5 Regional identity

Our interviewees' expressed various levels of attachment to their region. Some have shown strong identification with local community and “the locals” or “own people”, and for them regional identification was a main self-defining factor. Asked about who they feel they are, they would declare their feeling of belonging to the land, village and local area. This type of strong regional identity is characteristic for older generation and for people living in rural areas, especially among those who, after resettlement, were able to come back to the place where they were born, like “Irena” and “Stefan”.

Second group of respondents expressed emotional identification with “their” city or village. This local patriotism is not necessarily connected with family bonds, but rather with a feeling of familiarity and belief that it's the best place to live. In this case the bond can be explained by positive experiences of school time and existence of some important Ukrainian institutions or activities. This attitude was more characteristic for our youngest respondents, like “Anna” and “Michal” especially those living in the “capital” of Ukrainian region on the south-east of Poland.

The remainder of respondents expressed little or no attachment to the place where they live and work. This attitude is typical for those who live in Warsaw. Not knowing their neighbors or the city itself, they experience alienation typical for inhabitants of big metropolis.

In case of older generations, the base local identity later developed into more broad “Ukrainian living in Poland” one. It means that in their case, regional identity came first and more significant than national or ethnic identification.

Regional identification is also related with language and its local variations – dialects. In most cases our respondents’ first language was a local dialect, spoken by closest family members. Only later the respondents learned literary language. Some types of Ukrainian dialect are in fact the mixture of Ukrainian and Polish expressions, which could make issues of identity even more complex. As “Piotr” puts it:

my father’s parents, they didn’t speak the language too well, they spoke Polish to each other. Well, you can hardly say it’s Ukrainian, it was a village dialect, from their region, a local language, surely not a literary language. So, my grandfather used to say he was Ruthenian [ua(PL)_1].

Strong regional identification seems to be a solution to mixed background identity struggle. While it is hard to say that you are a true Ukrainian when you were born in Poland and you’re not of Polish background, it’s easier to claim “your land” as a main reference point. More so, if it is a territory inhabited by other people in similar situation. One of our respondents – “Irena” – describes this process of identity seeking

And I had a problem with my identity, with my little homeland, because that’s what I started with, where I come from? I had a problem when I was nineteen and after one year of work I went to this Ukrainian language course to Kiev University. (...) Great conditions, I was happy to go, you know, here it was always like, Ukrainian, Ukrainian, I wasn’t at home. So, I went there, so happy, I thought I’d spend some time at home, finally. And I go there, and they welcome us beautifully with flowers at the railway station, and [they say], “welcome, Poles”. And that made me wonder where my place on Earth was. God, where would I finally feel at home? And then, and I was in U. already, my mom had collected eggs for the whole year to sell them and get money for the ticket. And we would be sent here, to my aunt, because my father’s sister lived here. There was a place to go. And I said, God, I do have my own place on Earth, it’s this U., burnt down, plundered, because it wasn’t as beautiful as it is today, with the asphalt road. And this U. became my place for the rest of my life [ua(PL)_2].

Feeling of connection with a place is what gives our respondents peace of mind after looking for their own place on earth. In case of the older generation, their “little homeland” became a base for next generations, who therefore do not have to suffer the same fate as those experienced by resettlement. “Irena” expressed her gratitude for being able to build this true home for her family:

I feel very happy today, because my son, representing second generation that grew up there, after resettlement, that he also loves this place. Because my son worked hard (...) and he has built this house, and I’m really glad, because my children come here, my sisters, and siblings. This is destiny, really, that it’s become a base for my family, and they can come to their little homeland, and nobody can question that, because that’s where our roots are [ua(PL)_2].

This feeling of belonging, “being at home”, gives them a sense of security and eases Ukrainian-Polish identity struggle. Knowing their place on earth makes it easier to declare to be of Ukrainian origin, but also “from here”, not from Ukraine.

Good relations with Polish neighbors and presence of Orthodox church or/and Ukrainian school are also important factors of regional identity. One of the respondents “Stefan” described satisfaction of living where you belong:

So, I am very happy that we have come back. I feel so good here, at home. We are here with our neighbors, everyone knows us here, we go to Orthodox church, they go to Catholic church. During holidays, they even wish us happy holidays [ua(PL)_3].

What's important for building this regional identity is that community size is small enough to get to know your neighbors and to be recognized as a local.

This comfort is reserved for those of our respondents who live in rural areas or in the region with strong Ukrainian minority. The rest usually suffers bigger identity conflicts and more often declares feelings of isolation or loneliness. As "Marta" puts it:

So, when they ask me, where are you from, it's quite hard for me to tell, because, in fact, every generation, sometimes half a generation, this location just changes [ua(PL)_5].

Other interviewees describe their regional identity also in terms of specificity of the region, which is much more ethnically heterogeneous in comparison with central part of Poland. According to "Natalia" or "Olga" it is comfortable to live in a place, where minority reaches "critical mass" and has influence on local level. It results in an ability to create Ukrainian institutions such as schools or artistic institutions.

Especially in Podcarpathia region, people are aware of existence of Ukrainian and other minorities. This awareness has its disadvantages, because Polish majority feels threatened and is more resistant in granting the minority more influence. This threat is a result of conflicts around land or buildings ownership, as they belonged to resettled Ukrainians and were given to or taken by Polish settlers or confiscated by Polish authorities. Also, these are territories where blood was shed between these two ethnic groups and there is a lot of resentment towards Ukrainian Insurgent Army among Polish population, which is sometimes transferred onto entire Ukrainian population. On the other hand, history of banishment and loss of family heritage makes it hard for some Ukrainians to come to terms with present situation. From middle generation's, e.g. "Olga", point of view, this problem will disappear in time:

There's two or three people among the elderly left in the village now, we are a generation born in Recovered Territories. So, we will not pass on this hatred, which was to some extent passed on to us. We live in different times now [ua(PL)_6].

However, it can be stated that the analysis of youngest generation's experience doesn't confirm that belief. Some of our young respondents reported that they experienced discrimination because of being Ukrainian, which they connect with deeply rooted resentment.

In general, the interviewees share an opinion that region of Podcarpathia is a historic homeland of their national minority. However, middle generation often referred to post-resettlement recovered territories (Mazuria region) as their homeland. Sense of attachment to local community was often used to explain reasons to stay in Poland.

3.6 Civic participation and ethnic organization.

After 1990 about a dozen organizations emerged in order to promote Ukrainian language and culture; before 1990, there was just one organization - Social and Cultural Ukrainian Society, founded in 1956. Since 1990 it is known as Association of Ukrainians in Poland (Związek Ukraińców w Polsce), has 10,000 members and represents Ukrainian rights. Practically all respondents (nine out of eleven) were at some point members of Association of Ukrainians in Poland.

The Association of Ukrainians in Poland is an organizer and animator of social and cultural life of the Ukrainian community, aiming at development of Ukrainian identity, including cultural as well as religious one. The activity consists of creating Ukrainian language schools, children and youth artistic ensembles (dance ensembles, student theatre groups etc.), Ukrainian libraries, summer camps for children and youth. It also organizes annual Ukrainian Culture Days. According to the interviewees' life experiences, it is the most important minority's organization. Most of them took part in cultural events organized by AUP, among which trips and camps related to searching for Ukrainian origins were the most memorable. For many, participation in events organized by AUP indicated the moment of awakening of their Ukrainian identity.

Ukrainian minority in Poland regularly organizes following cultural events: Festival of Ukrainian Culture in Sopot, Lemkish Campfires and the annual Ukrainian Youth Fair in Gdansk and Bytow. St. Wladimir the Baptist foundation in Krakow also contributes to promotion of Ukrainian culture. However, it has to be remarked that cultural activities of Ukrainians are very restricted due to their geographic dispersal.

As for Ukrainian media in Poland, there are no daily newspapers in Ukrainian, but since 1956 Ukrainian weekly *Nasche Slowo* is published, with children's insert *Switanok*. In Podlaskie province the Ukrainian periodical *Nad Buhom i Narwoju* is issued every other week. Also, public Radio Rzeszow (in Podcarpathia region) broadcasts programs for Ukrainian minority in Poland (30 minutes every week). Also, some regional public radio stations broadcast programs in Ukrainian. Since 1995, TV program *Telenowyny* (TV news) broadcasts through regional stations. Most of radio stations can also be received via internet and Ukrainian minority is represented through websites *Harazd* and *Domiwka*.

According to the respondents, Polish Ukrainian minority is rather well organized, mostly through church-related and artistic activities. The bigger the size of Ukrainian minority, the bigger activism and civic participation on a local level. Also, establishing of Ukrainian schools and churches is very much a mainspring of different forms of social mobilization.

A common feeling of our respondents is that the Ukrainian national minority in Poland was never very influential on political level, even in local communities. Nowadays, we can observe some more engagement and mobilization of resources, which allows Ukrainian candidates to win a place in parliament or local council. Still, very few activists have a chance to participate in political life in Poland.

As for the details of interviewees' life stories, older respondents were usually active within minority's organizational structures established by the state during Polish Peoples' Republic or/and activities organized by Orthodox parishes.

As for younger interviewees, majority of them were or are now involved in activities of three main types in minority's organizations: Orthodox youth groups, student association and folkloric music and/or dance groups. Student activism played a significant role in case of respondent "Piotr", whose identification as the Ukrainian was rather hidden before:

because I was a chairman of this research association of historians, I organized Historian Days. And it was all around Kresy theme ["Outskirts", "Borderland" – eastern area of Poland before the Second World War, today belonging to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania – translator's annotation], not Ukraine, but Kresy, that's how I called it [ua(PL)_1].

The third type of minority's organizations which were quite frequently mentioned in respondents' life stories, are Ukrainians music and/or dance groups. Two younger interviewees, "Mi-

chal” and “Anna” pointed out that this kind of activities were organized at schools in order to attract children to Ukrainian language and culture, which it did with a considerable success. As it has already been mentioned, in case of the youngest interviewee “Michal”, such activity was crucial for subjective and conscious recognition of his Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainian folkloric groups also operate within structures of AUP.

Other types of Ukrainian minority organizations reflected in the interviewees’ life stories were small, local groups related to Ukrainian culture and tradition, most of them local branches of AUP as in the case of “Anna”:

„Kropywa”. It’s a room. It means „Nettle” (...) [We have been granted one room] as Ukrainian youth. We talk, we sing, sometimes we play some games, we play cards. These are casual meetings. Sometimes we have a beer [ua(PL)_8].

Great majority of the respondents’ previous and actual social activity is performed within Ukrainian or Orthodox structures. “Irena” would be an exception here. Her civic engagement was much broader and included many national and regional organizations:

I am a member of a management board of the Main Council of Ukrainian Association, I’ve been in the management board for twenty years now, in the main structures, (...) I am a chairwoman of the council, and a member of the management board of the Association of Ukrainians in Lubuskie province. As for other social activity... Yes, I am in the Women’s Council of Ms. Sroda [Polish feminist]. I support this movement wholeheartedly and I’m active, too. Two times I was a candidate, a candidate for Polish Parliament, for many years I was a woman councilor at the commune, I was a chairwoman of the Commission for Education and Culture. I have got some awards for working in scouting movement. My family says I’m crazy. I’m more crazy than any of my four sisters, I always come up with something or I go somewhere or I have something to do. (...) I teach Ukrainian in two schools (...) Besides, I work at the Honorary Consulate of Ukraine [ua(PL)_2].

Among our respondents there were very active as well as rather passive ones, so the level of engagement seems to have nothing to do with identity and is rather connected with personality and individual history. In general, oldest and youngest respondents seemed to be more active than the middle generation, which doesn’t have time due to work and family obligations. However, even the least active seem to be more socially engaged than average Poles. This can be explained by the fact that the life of Ukrainian minority focuses around different social events that allows them to cherish their own culture.

Also, all respondents declared that they do participate in national and local elections, although they hardly see the latter one as a way to establish representation of Ukrainian minority’s interest in terms of local politics. Also, Ukrainians in Poland are not organized as a political force, neither on the local nor national level.

The purpose of this activity is sometimes openly egoistic – as in case of youth groups or camps, which are a way of having good time with your friends. Other respondents report more altruistic motives for engagement – they see it as a duty toward local community, children, minority group as such. In case of the most active respondent “Irena” it’s a very idealistic vision of building friendship between Poles and Ukrainians that explains her engagement:

So, this is my purpose in life, this is my activity. I want to do something, in fact, I dreamed for a very long time about showing connections between these two nations, and they had a lot in common and not too much divided them. Unfortunately, things that divided them are strangely embittered and popularized. And whatever the two nations had in common, well, little is known about it both in Polish and in Ukrainian community [ua(PL)_2].

From one point of view activism of the minority is a very positive phenomenon, which enables the older ones to strengthen their identity and teach the youngest to appreciate their heritage. On the other hand however, strong integrations bring risk of ghettoization and closing of minority community, which leads to radicalization of their beliefs and attitude towards majority. As “Irena” remarked:

I wasn't committed as strongly as some of the Ukrainians I got to know, who, well, preserved their Ukrainian character so much. Sometimes, it also took the form of, well, building barriers separating them from the Poles [ua(PL)_2].

3.7 Ethnic conflicts and discrimination experiences.

In the first years of Polish Peoples' Republic, there was a firm state policy related to the image of Poland as a country, which is homogenous in terms of ethnicity. Such political strategy had much to do with control of different groups within the society. For example, “Irena” describes her experience with Security Service Agents

Of course, I was invited many times to meetings with those handsome gentlemen, I got various proposals, I was being threatened, they searched out my various minor sins, and I approached it, well, without confession I felt I was very pure [ua(PL)_2].

To complicate matters more, from Soviet Union point of view it was important to sustain animosities between the two nations to weaken opposition.

According to the interviewees, “times have changed” and there are no open conflicts between Ukrainians and Poles. However, there are local tensions connected with the process of recovering Ukrainian land and houses.

As for broadly understood discrimination experiences, most striking and tragic examples are related mostly with the times of the II World War and Vistula Operation. Traumas of the II World War are related to violence of the Polish Army toward Ukrainians, who often were seen as “natural” supporters of Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Shared memories of these events are reflected e.g. in statements of “Irena”:

My parents were expelled. Our village was burnt down in two hours, and my parents had to, nobody asked them if they wanted to. [It was] year 1947. My oldest sister, who is very sick today, when she wonders why her legs hurt so much, she remembers the day when they were expelled to the neighboring Polish village of B., and they stood there for the whole night in the open, it was very cold, and she recalls how girls her age gathered together, and they would pee – to get their legs warm, because it was the only way, otherwise their legs would freeze fast to the ground. Well, and today she suffers from effects of this. And later, after two weeks of being rushed to S., they were loaded, let's say, to freight cars, more than ten families in each, someone with a goat, my parents had nothing, because [their belongings were] taken away. Both of them would take stuff away [the Polish Army and Ukrainian Insurgent Army], cows, horses, for the army, for military purposes. And so they were resettled to Masuria [ua(PL)_2].

Other interviewee, middle-aged “Olga”, mentioned traumatic experiences of her family, which was very much affected by the tragic events:

my father was in Jaworzno [labor camp for Ukrainians suspected of cooperation with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army], and I found out about that much, much later, my mom told us a lot, because her sister, her brother, they had gone to prison, so it surely had some impact on my family. My mom's sister was murdered when she was 21, so this all had some impact [ua(PL)_6].

In this case memories were too painful to allow going back to the territories which the family was forced to leave:

So, those stories and all, that's something you can't just forget about. My mom was deeply affected by it, in fact, she never went back to her village, the one from which she had been resettled. She never went there. Never. She suffered too much, she experienced too much evil. Besides, everything was taken away from her, so she went to my dad's village, she visited his village, but she had no courage to visit her own. She never went there. But she told us everything... [ua(PL)_6].

Apart from these traumatic, complex and violent conflicts, the coexistence of Ukrainians and Poles before the war and Polish Peoples' Republic was described by the interviewees as rather peaceful and friendly, especially between Polish and Ukrainian neighbors in concrete local communities. However, the trauma connected with Operation Vistula, and Jaworzno labour camp remained, says "Marek":

There is a sense of being hurt, the older generations, witnesses of resettlements, prisoners [ua(PL)_4].

Middle-aged respondents mentioned also the Poles' negative reactions towards Orthodox faith and church. Basically, interviewees were insulted with disrespectful remarks related to irrational stereotypes. As "Natalia" describes her childhood experience:

other students, children, my friends, well, they treated me as if I was a bit inferior. They never called me "Ukrainian", I can't recall anything like that, but I've often heard "Communist", "Russian". Being different, well, it meant being inferior, unfortunately [ua(PL)_10].

The feeling of being treated as inferior because of Ukrainian origin was also mentioned by "Olga":

to tell you the truth, it was visible that Ukrainians were somewhat worse. It was like that at the university, too. So, I was this sort of person, who tended to keep close with her own group [ua(PL)_6].

However, this type of harassment seems to have reverse effect and made children work harder to prove their worth:

We were worse, because we were perceived as people of a lower category. We were called names, shouted at and so on. So, to show how good we were, we worked more. We studied to be good, to go on, to go to school, to university [ua(PL)_6].

This often resulted in a situation where children from minority were the best students, even though Polish was not their first language.

Although most of these mentioned incidents weren't described by respondents in terms of ethnic discrimination, it is visible that some members of Ukrainian minority decided that the lack of open identity manifestations, especially in terms of language, would be a wiser life strategy.

In reference to the actual times, great majority of respondents declared that they have never personally experienced any ethnic discrimination because of their Ukrainian identity. However, they still face "the incidents", especially insults, which are related with Orthodox faith. Such experiences were mentioned also by "Anna". She pointed out examples of certain discrimination, which she experienced:

in secondary school, I didn't go [to religious classes], because I encountered some lack of tolerance and I decided I wouldn't go and I got exempted, I was attending my own religion classes at that time. (...) In secondary school in J., it was like a big thing, me, being Ukrainian, for instance,

when they examined me, they'd give me a lower grade, this is strange, in fact. Sometimes, they wouldn't let me improve my art marks, because they didn't like Ukrainians and all that [ua(PL)_8].

Similar problem at school were encountered by "Elena", who mentions difficulties her parents had with enrolling her to school after coming back from the exile:

Finally, my parents went there to complain and we got enrolled and I graduated with good marks, as I've said, I studied a lot. It was like an informal regulation, here, in P., we couldn't get registered, because we were returning, and it was known that people coming from the north were Ukrainian. It was not formal. But it existed [ua(PL)_9].

Moreover, three respondents mentioned discrimination on labor market. In one case it concerned communistic party participation – as "Maria" remembers:

when they selected people to be promoted from time to time, I knew I deserved to be promoted, but I wasn't. Because of that unit. [They'd say], why don't you become a party member. I would say, wait a minute, it's the Polish United Workers' Party. I could always use this excuse, of the Polish Workers' Party. If I became a member, then they'd say, hey, what are you doing here [ua(PL)_9].

The other respondent, "Elena" reported problems with finding a job:

It was difficult to get a job. Although jobs were there. My father was unemployed for one year. It was terrible to him, he had children, the children were going to school and he couldn't work. My mom found a job. After some time, too. Our savings were running out. This was unpleasant [ua(PL)_9].

Third one, "Anna" described the most obvious case of discrimination on labor market:

My employer, I won't mention his name here, he dismissed me when he found out I was Ukrainian. It's a pity. Nobody chooses this. In fact, it was sort of enforced upon me, but I'd never change my religion. I am in this, I want to continue. Even more so, if I'm into this culture, religion and all those customs [ua(PL)_8].

Even these respondents who never experienced discrimination or hostility, still may feel the fear, which was passed on to them by older generations. Especially older generation was socializing their children to blend in, so the middle generation was usually not very forthcoming about their identity in their youth. That's why big Ukrainian events were so important for them, because they were big and official and made people proud of being Ukrainian. That's how one of the respondents, "Piotr" describes this experience:

The first, early appearances of this, well, breakthrough, overcoming this fear, it was thanks to this Ukrainian culture festival, of song and dance, I think that's what it was called, in Sopot. And it was my first visit, which was sort of like an intimate experience to me. Everyone spoke Ukrainian there, but they also spoke Polish and it wasn't a problem at all. This beautiful music, dancing, and I felt this bond with others, and, of course, that fear.... (...) At the university, in Toruń, when I was reading history of Ukraine in the library, I still felt this fear somehow – when a friend came in, I would cover the book. It was irrational, but it was somewhere deep inside me. And I don't remember when that was, but it was at least in my mid-university years, when I started to reveal myself. I don't mean ostentatiously, but with close colleagues, or friends, I started to speak to them openly. (...) So, I think that Greek Catholic church and meetings in a larger community, all this helped me in overcoming my fear, and the same pertained to my parents, they tried to overcome it, too [ua(PL)_1].

In general, respondents perceive Poland as a country which is basically safe and comfortable to live in. However, according to "Irena", Polish state is not really interested in strengthening its national and ethnic minorities because of financial and ideological reasons. In other words, mi-

norities are surely not oppressed, their rights are guaranteed and respected but it would be better if they didn't get too strong:

There's a negative attitude of the authorities, and despite all efforts, various activities to change this situation, we can't manage to do that [ua(PL)_2].

According to the opinions expressed by the interviewees, Poland is not a country of open or aggressive discrimination towards Ukrainian minority. Minority's rights are guaranteed and respected; also some of the minority's activities are financially supported, although in an insufficient degree. However, there is no clear and systematic state policy or programs, which would focus on increasing awareness of minority's issues in Polish society on one side, and decreasing the stereotypes on the other. Problems between Ukrainian minority and Polish majority usually have a form of personal insults or negative reactions, which are based on stereotypes and the distorted historical knowledge.

3.8 Summarizing matrix

Table presenting individual respondents in rows and a description of key variables in separate columns

Respondent	Sex	Age	Education	Occupation	European identity	National identity (PL)	National identity (UA)	Regional identity	Organisation	Languages
UA(PL)_01 "Piotr"	Male	46	Tertiary	Insurance agent	Strongly supports European integration, sees benefits from open borders and EU funds.	Feels Ukrainian, but was raised in Poland and has Polish citizenship.	Feels no emotional bond with Ukraine.	Identifies with the region where he was born, and would like to come back to the family house one day.	Used to be socially active during studies, but now is too busy.	Polish is definitely his first language. His Ukrainian is rather poor, and rarely used.
UA(PL)_02 "Irena"	Female	63	Secondary	Retired teacher	Communication problems (doesn't speak western languages) makes it hard for her to feel the connection with western Europe.	Feels Ukrainian and proud of it, but was raised in both cultures and has Polish citizenship.	For her Ukraine is the cultural background, "the base", place to go, work on the language, bring back the culture.	Feels that her place is "here" in her "little homeland", where the graves of her ancestors are.	She's a social activist, active in Association of Ukrainians in Poland; Women's Council; local council; scouting movement.	Learned Ukrainian at home, and Polish at school, she's fluent in both. She's a Ukrainian language teacher.
UA(PL)_03 "Stefan"	Male	80	Primary	Retired miner	EU makes unnecessary reservations that prevent people outside EU from traveling and visiting families.	Sometimes feels that he is a better citizen of Poland than some, who are Polish. Has a grudge toward people, who wouldn't allow him to buy his family land back.	He feels Ukrainian, but never wanted to live in the east.	Feels very happy about returning to his place of birth, where his roots are.	Local branch of Association of Ukrainians in Poland	Learned Ukrainian at home, and Polish at school, he's fluent in both.
UA(PL)_04 "Marek"	Male	46	Tertiary	Journalist/ editor	Feels European "as everyone else". He thinks that for the minorities, EU is an advantage, because Poland has committed itself to abide by certain conventions concerning the minorities.	He is "loyal citizen" of Poland and a descendant of those, who were resettled during Operation Vistula. He feels he is one of the native people of southeastern Poland. He prefers to live in Poland, because his land and heritage is here.	He feels Ukrainian, because his grandparents, on both sides, and parents are Ukrainian and Ukrainian is his first language. For him Ukraine is a spiritual homeland.	Lives in Warsaw for 22 years, but is not rooted there. Feels more attached to the region from where his grandparents were resettled.	Member of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland. He works for the largest Ukrainian weekly in Poland.	Ukrainian is his first language; he learned it at home, and in elementary school, he also studied Ukrainian philology. He learned Polish from other children and at primary school.

Respondent	Sex	Age	Education	Occupation	European identity	National identity (PL)	National identity (UA)	Regional identity	Organisation	Languages
UA(PL)_05 "Marta"	Female	25	Tertiary	Student/ NGO worker/ translator	She identifies more with the new EU (including eastern countries), then with the western part. EU integration is all well except for the visas.	She declares herself as Ukrainian from Poland, with Polish passport. She feels quite strongly that she is a citizen of Poland.	Her Ukrainian identity is strongly connected with religion (orthodox). She has a big family in Ukraine and try to stay in touch with. She sees a big difference between Ukrainians from Poland and from Ukraine.	She feels at home in Warsaw, where she lives, but is attracted by many places – region where she was born, the house of her grandma, and Kiev, where she went for scholarship.	She works in two NGOs working with eastern countries. Member of Association of Ukrainians in Poland.	Fluent in both languages, in her family they are often mixed. She learned Polish and Ukrainian dialect, then she started to learn literary Ukrainian.
UA(PL)_06 "Olga"	Female	46	Tertiary	Clerc in ukrainian publishing house	She puts her Ukrainian identity first, so it doesn't make a difference whether she's European.	She has double identity. She's a citizen of Poland, but feels Ukrainian. She lives and works in Poland, but has this spiritual bond with Ukraine	Ukraine is an unachievable dream. Maintaining the Ukrainian identity is crucial for her, it's connected with a strong bond with Orthodox church.	She feels sentimental about the village and the house where she was born and often visits the family that lives there.	She used to work for Association of Ukrainians in Poland, but now have no time to be socially active.	Ukrainian as a first language – Ukrainian dialect at home, then literary Ukrainian at school and university. She's fluent in both.
UA(PL)_07 "Maria"	Female	91	Tertiary	Retired (steel-work manager)	She feels that whether the border is here or there, it doesn't matter. What matters is the culture, in which you were raised.	She feels connection with the Polish culture, because she was raised and learned to appreciate it.	She feels Ukrainian, but doesn't know Ukraine as it was during her youth (her family was evacuated from Ukraine to Romania), she only got to know it after the war.	She changed places where she lived very often, so doesn't seem to have a very strong regional identity.	No data.	Ukrainian was her first language, learned at home. She learned Polish from other children and used in her professional life.
UA(PL)_08 "Anna"	Female	21	Secondary	Art student	She feel European, but the question seems hard to her.	She has polish citizenship so she feels ten percent Polish.	She feels ninety percent Ukrainian, because she lives in Poland, and takes part in this culture. Her Ukrainian identity is connected with religion and orthodox holidays. Feels that Ukraine is a bit "backward".	She really likes the city she lives in, because a lot of things connected with Ukrainian culture happens there and she has a group of Ukrainian friends.	Informal youth group „Kropywa". She sings in the Orthodox church choir.	Polish is her first language and spoken at home. She learned Ukrainian from grandmother and in Orthodox church.

Respondent	Sex	Age	Education	Occupation	European identity	National identity (PL)	National identity (UA)	Regional identity	Organisation	Languages
UA(PL)_09 "Elena"	Female	50	Tertiary	Teacher	She doesn't feel European, but Ukrainian. Closing of Polish-Ukrainian border due to Polish accession to EU, was harmful for bilateral contacts.	She was raised in Poland, but feels Ukrainian. From her point of view Ukrainians are treated worse than Poles.	She visits the Ukraine often, to really get to know it.	Feels connected to her city, because she spent her childhood and working years there. Is very active in all organizing events in her city.	Ukrainian Social and Cultural Society, Ukrainian Teachers Association. local branch of Association of Ukrainians in Poland.	She's fluent in both languages. She learned Ukrainian dialect at home and then some literary Ukrainian during studies.
UA(PL)_10 "Natalia"	Female	47	Tertiary	Teacher	She's not attracted by Europe and Western countries, and not affected by EU integration.	Feels more at home in P. than in any other place in Poland, because P. is so Ukrainian.	She loves to go to Ukraine and been there many times. She feels she understand their mentality and she need that, to feel she's Ukrainian. Most of all, she feels she's Ukrainian, and an inhabitant of P.	Feels connected to the local community. Regional identity is rather strong. She's greatly attached to P., and cannot imagine living anywhere else on Earth. this is my childhood, my parents, the graves of my grandparents	Local branch of Association of Ukrainians in Poland	She's fluent in both languages. She uses Ukrainian at home and Polish at work (she teaches Polish).
UA(PL)_11 "Michal"	Male	21	Secondary	Student	European identity is not very important to him although he has a positive approach to EU.	He lives in Poland but feels Ukrainian and is proud of it.	He has strong Ukrainian identity. Visited Ukraine couple of times, but doesn't have a strong connection with it.	He feels very connected to his home town, and identifies with the people who live there.	Informal local youth group	He learned Ukrainian from his grandparents and later at school, but Polish is his first language.

4 MAIN FINDINGS OF EXPERT INTERVIEWS (ENRI-EXI)

Anna Domaradzka / Ilona Matysiak

4.1 Brief description of people interviewed and which districts/settlements they came from.

As was required, among three interviewed experts there was one representative of Ukrainian minority's structures, one representative of Polish state institution (Ministry of Internal Affairs) as well as one activist from Polish NGO. As a consequence, we can compare three different perspectives from various institutional levels.

All in all, such sample provides a very good overview on the current and also past situation of the Ukrainian minority and other minorities in Poland. The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (A, exi_pl(UA)_01) is one of the most well-known and important NGOs in Poland, which also witnessed and supported the process of forming minority organizations after 1989. This organization participates a lot in international networks and EU bodies. It gave our respondent a very wide perspective on the issues of minorities' situation in Poland.

It was also important to find a respondent from the Ministry of the Interior and Administration (A, exi_pl(UA)_03), which is responsible for the national and ethnic minority issues. What is more, the Department of Religious Beliefs and National and Ethnic Minorities is crucial in terms of state financial support for the minority organizations, because it manages the budget distributed through grants awarded to minority organizations.

The Association of Ukrainians in Poland (B, exi_pl(UA)_02) is the largest, most influential and also nation-wide organization of Ukrainian minority in Poland. A centre in Przemyśl seemed to be a very interesting case, as Przemyśl itself used to be and still is a multicultural city, where Ukrainian and Romani minorities (and Jewish community before the Second World War) live together with Poles. There also used to be some local tensions between Polish majority and Ukrainian minority, e.g. related to the ownership of the Ukrainian National House.

The level of Polish state regional institutions is represented by the executive official in the Unit for National and Ethnic Minorities at the Department of Religious Beliefs and National and Ethnic Minorities [exi_pl(UA)_03]. His main role is to raise the awareness of minorities in Poland, through supporting the cultural awareness of minorities, their civic integration and cultural activity by state donations.

The category of Polish non-governmental organizations, which direct their activities to, among others, Ukrainian minority is represented by an activist working in „Minority Rights” Program and a project coordinator in Helsinki Foundation of Human Rights [exi_pl(UA)_01]. She described her responsibilities as preparing reports on the situation of national and ethnic minorities in Poland, legal consulting, organizing a meeting platform for minorities (more in the past) and monitoring minorities' rights (present).

The minority perspective was given by a female executive of the Przemyśl Association of Ukrainians in Poland [exi_pl(UA)_02]. Her main responsibilities include representing the organization in the city of Przemyśl and in Podkarpackie province, dealing with administrative aspects, financial matters, coordination of cultural and educational activities, talking to partners, organization of social and cultural life in the organization. The Association addresses youth through the popu-

larization of modern minority's culture, e.g. music, dance and singing. Our respondent is a teacher in local Ukrainian school and a local activist.

As for main socio-demographic characteristics, the group of experts consisted of two women and one man, who all had a university degree. Both women were in their thirties, while the man was in his fifties. Both representatives of Polish institutions were from Warsaw, while the representative of Ukrainian was from Przemyśl, city close to the Ukrainian border in Podkarpacie region.

The fieldwork was conducted by Ilona Matysiak, the Robert B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw.

4.2 Description of the interviewees' organizations

Association of Ukrainians in Poland

The Association was founded in February 1990 and continues the works of Ukrainian Social-Cultural Association established in 1956. The main goal of the association is to preserve cultural identity of Ukrainians in Poland and to develop the partnership between Poland and Ukraine. Association carries out many educational programmes, such as summer camps for youth and children, manages the "Tyrsa" publishing house, which releases publications on history of the Ukrainians in Poland and about Polish-Ukrainian relations.³⁷

The Association of Ukrainians in Poland was established primarily to bring together all smaller organizations that operate in Ukrainian community in Poland. Therefore it's a kind of a "mother organization", which cooperates with local organizations in implementing many events, cultural or otherwise. All in all, the Association's regional structures consist of 10 branches and 90 area circles. The branch in Przemyśl is about six hundred people paying membership fees and attending most of the meetings. Their activism is strongly connected with a local school, where Ukrainian is the language of instruction, and "Our Home" building (Ukrainian National House), as well as nearby parishes in Przemyśl.

As our respondent stated, one of the main successes of the AUP is the change in the way Ukrainians are perceived in the local context:

As for the association, we have managed to eliminate certain stereotypes and we are really glad about that. We organize many cultural and educational events, meetings, presentations in Przemyśl, and this somehow changes the local community. One of the best examples is the Ivan Kupala Day, the Feast of St. John the Baptist, which, historically, well, in Przemyśl it started in the early twentieth century, and after some time we decided we'd get back to this tradition and organize this again. Of course, we decided we wanted to organize it together with the authorities of the city, and not on our own [exi_pl(UA)_02]

Local branch in Przemyśl is mostly managed by women and there is quite a lot of young people active in the management board. Representatives of the youngest generation, secondary school and university students, meet a lot in the National House and organize various events for themselves.

³⁷ http://www.zup.ukraina.com.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1&Itemid=2

Unit for National and Ethnic Minorities

The Unit for National and Ethnic Minorities in Department of Religious Beliefs and National and Ethnic Minorities was created in 2000 in a structure of Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its tasks include conducting the issues of national minorities, which from legislative point of view means preparing the proposals to the states policy concerning national minorities (in agreement with the representatives of other ministries), providing assistance (tasks and technical organisation) to The Team on National Minorities, including the preparation of materials for the Team's meetings and the minutes from these meetings.

Another important role of the unit is constant co-operation with the governmental and self-governmental administrative units in considering the local needs of national minorities, as well as providing national minorities social organisations with assistance so they could implement their statutory objectives.

One of the goals of the unit is also conducting activities to respect the rights of the national minorities, and to solve problems of the national minorities. The unit is also responsible for preparing materials concerning honouring of the national minorities rights, linked to the internal law and international obligations of Poland.

Main legal base for the unit activity is the Regional Language, National and Ethnic Minorities Act from 6th January 2005 (Dziennik Ustaw No. 17, item. 141, with the amendment of 2005, No. 62, item 550). The Act regulates issues connected with preservation and development of the cultural identity of national and ethnic minorities, the preservation and development of the regional language, as well as ways to implement the principle of equal treatment irrespective of a person's ethnic origin. It also specifies the tasks and responsibilities of governmental administration bodies and territorial self-government units regarding these issues.

As for recent support of Ukrainian minority, in 2010 among all 46 minority-connected bodies that were granted financial support, the highest grant for operation was awarded to Association of Ukrainians in Poland (PLN 180 thousand). In 2009, Association of Ukrainians in Poland was granted PLN 1 130 thousand for specific purposes; among other things, for modernization of the Centre of Ukrainian Culture in Zielona Góra, publication of a weekly *Nasze Słowo* and an annual volume of *Almanach Ukraiński 2011*, publication of an album-type song-book and educational programmes for children and teenagers.³⁸

Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights

The category of Polish NGOs is represented by the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, which was established in 1989 by members of the Helsinki Committee in Poland. In 1993, the Foundation set up the Human Rights House in Warsaw. Its mission is the development of human liberties and rights culture, both domestically and abroad. Since 2007 the Foundation has Consultative Status with the United Nation's Economic and Social Council.

The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights is an independent institute for research and education. It is one of the most experienced and professional non-governmental organisations in Europe concerned with human rights. Currently, the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR) is one of the most experienced and professional non-governmental organizations involved in the protection of human rights in Europe. It is active both in Poland and abroad, mostly

³⁸ http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/en/1/647/Aid_for_national_and_ethnic_minorities.html

in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus and Central Asia. HFHR conducts national and international trainings, organizes conferences and seminars. It provides expert consultation in the sphere of human rights and freedoms to individuals as well as to non-governmental organizations and to state institutions (such as parliamentary committees, police, the judiciary, the prison service, the border guard, public health service).

Since its very beginnings, it has implemented joint programs with international organizations such as the U.N., UNHCR, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), Amnesty International, Minority Rights Group International etc.

One of the programs conducted by the Foundation is “The rights of minorities”. Its main tasks include conducting research on the situation of individuals belonging to national, ethnic and religious minorities, preparing reports and opinions in this area and undertaking interventions in cases of discrimination.

Since September 2003, as the National Focal Point of the RAXEN network, the Foundation cooperates with the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency. RAXEN is a project established in 2000 by EUMC – European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. As National Focal Point, the Foundation collects information on the subject matter of racism and xenophobia in their countries and prepares various types of reports and analyses. Their studies are used to prepare comparative (benchmarking) publications presenting and describing phenomena and trends appearing in all European Union Member States. Based on the collected data, the Foundation prepares a National Annual Report, covering the issues of legislation, education, housing, employment and race-related crime as well as health and social welfare.³⁹

4.3 Main issues associated with Ukrainian minority in Poland.

Interviews show that main issues associated with Ukrainian minority in Poland are the stereotypical perception of Ukrainians in Polish society as well as the painful legacy of historical events such as Vistula Operation or actions of UPA. Basically, most of the problems are caused by the stereotypical presentation of Ukrainians in media and the insufficient awareness of historical events on both sides. Apart from that, respondents have raised the problem of tensions between Ukrainians and Poles in Podkarpacie region, where some of the Ukrainians resettled during the Vistula Operation have returned, claiming their old property. The representative of the Ministry summarised those tensions:

I think that historic issues are of the greatest significance here. It's the issue of activity of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Poland, or in Polish territories before year 1945. This is the issue of commemoration, more or less, in the region of Opole, of some groups to a lesser extent. But then there's also the issue of the Polish activity, the activity of the Polish nationalist underground in the region of Podlasie. This is also a painful issue. Situations like that really emerge. They require a far-reaching subtlety and a peace of mind. We are only one of the partners. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

Difficult history between Poles and Ukrainians results in the stereotypical perception of the minority. First, there is still a very strong stereotype of an Ukrainian peasant, uneducated and ordinary. Secondly, Ukrainian minority is sometimes perceived through the actions of UPA, which included killing civilians on territories of southern Poland. That's why [exi_pl(UA)_02] de-

³⁹ <http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/Nprogram-18-en.html>

scribed the need to change the situation when Polish media strengthen this stereotype focusing only on the information on Ukrainian folklore or acts of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA):

For instance, there's Stepan Bandera and the UPA. The way that a modern Ukrainian, in many various programs, in journalism and in other contexts, is shown from a perspective of a primitive man, who comes over only to earn money, or to sell himself cheap, well, this looks quite different and we cannot give our consent to this. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

Both of those problematic issues are connected with the participation in the media, as [exi_pl(UA)_01] mentioned in the recent years, the most visible thing is that the public media has not met its obligations resulting from the Act on Radiophony and Television, minority programs are scarce, the broadcasting time is bad, they disappear, there is no money and so on. [exi_pl(UA)_01] One of the specific problems in this area is that the minority broadcasting time is counted in a way that limits already scarce opportunities to broadcast programmes for Ukrainian minority:

the broadcasting time is often counted, that it is not a program for a specific minority, but it's a program about minorities, ethnography, folklore, everything that concerns Poles or foreigners, things like that. [exi_pl(UA)_01]

The representative of the human rights organizations described main issues concerning Ukrainians as rooted in history and difficulties in regaining property

There is the Operation Vistula, the Ukrainians point to some historic issues, historic assessments that they disapprove of. (...) like the home in Przemyśl... but finally they got it, so sometimes it's a local thing. [exi_pl(UA)_01].

Moreover, the fact that some conflicts or problems are important only on the local level means that they are rarely visible in the public discourse:

Sometimes, when I read newspapers, I find something g, but these are not headlines, not front page news, not even the second or third page. [exi_pl(UA)_01]

However, these issues are still very important for the minority, as [exi_pl(UA)_01] explained:

the most emphasized matter, and the most difficult one from their perspective, is the issue of history. Sometimes they get into historical details, which, in fact, for most Poles are not significant at all. (...) this stigma of history, which gets so much into relationships between people, it's more like that with the Ukrainians, and they function in two worlds, here and as Ukrainians (...) the unsolved historic issues, they are very strong and they are always raised by the minorities. (...) there's this historic memory, which to me, it's an interesting question, to what extent this is more painful to minorities, and to what extent it is really, there is a chance that the existence of the conflict will persist, because you will always find someone to argue about history. [exi_pl(UA)_01]

Good example of this type of conflict is the issue of Ukrainian National House in Przemyśl mentioned both by [exi_pl(UA)_01] and [exi_pl(UA)_02]. The ethnic conflict between Poles and Ukrainians in the area of Podkarpacie has a very long history involving huge bloodshed of Polish civilians by UPA on one side, and the banishment and loss of property of many Ukrainians during the Vistula Operation on the other. Therefore, both sides hold a grudge toward each other, and it was strengthened even further by Soviet Russian politics towards minorities, which was aiming at sustaining the conflict. The result nowadays is the mixture of stereotypes and goodwill. It's mostly visible on Podkarpacie as [exi_pl(UA)_02] described:

We're now past the time, when in Przemyśl, just passing over, you could see graffiti on many buildings, like "Ukrainians – go away from Przemyśl", „let the Russians hang", and vegetables and other things were thrown at the school with Ukrainian language of instruction. Parents had to walk child-

ren to and from school, because they were afraid of some unpleasant reactions on the way. There are no situations like that anymore. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

In case of Przemyśl main change is in strengthening of Ukrainian community on the local level and raising the awareness of the multicultural heritage of the region, which results in better cooperation with local authorities and community itself:

There are various groups, various people. Przemyśl has always been a very controversial place, on one hand it's been multicultural for generations. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

Part of the problem with Ukrainian minority also results in the tension between state's attempts for integration and the minority's unwillingness to blend in with the wider society. As [exi_pl(UA)_02] put it:

There's also the question of readiness and willingness of minorities to integrate more closely, as they always perceive a threat in these relationships, because there is the threat of losing one's identity. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

Relationship to Ukraine as a mother country also has a strong influence on the strategy and situation of Ukrainian minority in Poland. For Polish Ukrainians it seems to be difficult to relate to their mother country for two reasons. Firstly, because they sometimes have no connection with the Ukrainian territory, because they were born on the Polish land and their roots are connected with the territory of modern Poland. Secondly, because of the problems faced by the modern Ukraine. The respondent representing AUP pointed to this fact:

Ukraine, as a post-communist state, which suffered for many years as a Soviet Republic (...) it is now divided into two parts, the east and the west. And awareness of this nation, which has been divided, it is completely different in these two parts. And the clutches of the Soviet Union, unfortunately, they had been very long, very long. And the transformation will surely take some time. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

As [exi_pl(UA)_02] and [exi_pl(UA)_03] mentioned, Orange Revolution raised hopes for creating a new Ukraine, which would also improve the situation of Ukrainian minority outside of the Ukrainians borders. As the representative of polish government pointed out:

In fact, in the case of Ukraine, Orange Revolution was surely very significant for this activity and awareness. Now, the situation has changed for worse. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

As [exi_pl(UA)_02] recalled, for a short time Orange Revolution did bring a positive change, also in respect of Polish-Ukrainians cooperation, but its effects didn't last long:

It's too bad that whatever was created during the Orange Revolution has been destroyed. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

What hinders the efforts of Ukrainian minority in Poland is mainly the lack of stable support from the side of Ukrainian government. As the representative of the Ministry described:

I think there's no such support. There is, when it comes to nationality issues in Ukraine, there is a complete chaos. (...) It's fully spontaneous. There was a period, during which there was quite substantial political support from the Ukrainian state. During the previous president's [Yushchenko] term of office], the Ambassador of Ukraine used to attend various meetings, events, they were eager to cooperate, there's still some contact with the embassy. And president Yushchenko used to attend various Ukrainian meetings and events. So, there was really some political support. Financial, to a lesser extent, because the state is not very wealthy. But you could really see the political presence. On both sides [exi_pl(UA)_03]

The sentiment was shared by the representative of AUP:

When Viktor Yushchenko was elected as president of Ukraine, and his political option won, we felt that there was someone there, who understood us and wanted to talk to us. And he was very sensitive to minority issues, to his minorities outside Ukraine. The fact that he visited Przemyśl four times, we felt very much appreciated. And that's why the issue of the building progressed somehow, too. In the diplomatic protocol, well, some things do not happen, and here they did.
[exi_pl(UA)_02]

After the fall of Yushchenko government, the support was withdrawn and there is no visible cooperation on political level concerning issues of Ukrainian minority in Poland.

What makes it even more difficult is the fact that Ukraine is a young state, which gathered independence only 19 years ago, which, as [exi_pl(UA)_02] stated, means that its international position is quite different [than Germany or Israel] and the myths, which have emerged in history, which have not always been analyzed thoroughly and objectively, if they have been analyzed at all, they are translated to a somewhat distorted image, which is then shown by the Polish mass media.
[exi_pl(UA)_02]

Nevertheless, AUP is working to support a bond between the minority and Ukraine

we organize various trips for these young people. We do our best to show them Ukraine as it is. We organize meetings, student exchange programs. This is great, this brings really good effects. The youth integrate. Here, in Przemyśl, they also meet as scouts, in Ukrainian it's „plastonata”.
[exi_pl(UA)_02]

Maintaining the connection with the mother country is an important goal of the Association, because it nurtures bond to the tradition, language and religion. As [exi_pl(UA)_02] metaphorically described it:

this Ukraine, to us, it's like breast milk for a baby, the baby keeps crying and crying to be breastfed. And Poland means stability, it's the point of reference to reality, to everyday life.
[exi_pl(UA)_02]

4.4 Description of policies introduced and their problems

From the interviewees' point of view, existing state policy towards ethnic minorities is regulated mainly by the Regional Language, National and Ethnic Minorities Act. The Act secures minorities' right to use a minority's language or dialect as the additional official language and grants them some airtime in public media. What is even more important from NGOs point of view, it defines the framework of the state's financial support for minorities' organizations and institutions. As the representative of Polish government stated

The main legal instrument is the Regional Language, National and Ethnic Minorities Act, of the 6th of January, 2005. This provides several fields of activity for us. The first and the simplest covers donations, which we assign each year for activities that support cultural activity of minorities. Of course, these are assigned mainly to minority organizations, to organizations which are significant from the perspective of minorities. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

The legislative process was long – it took 15 years to finally approve the Act and as [exi_pl(UA)_03] stated, long-term work on the Act on Minorities was, I think, caused by the lack of readiness of the politicians, but of the society too, to approve such act. [exi_pl(UA)_03] Moreover, from what the government representative said, it seems that there was a lot of doubts whether the Act should be in any way amended:

There's also the issue, which concerns mostly people who participated in works on the legal act, of whether it should be amended, out of fear of worsening the situation, instead of improving it. This fear is there, somewhere. If something is working quite well, why change it. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

According to all three interviewees, the Act on national and ethnic minorities is enough to regulate minorities' rights. It corresponds with the vision of Poland as a country with multicultural heritage that should be protected and strengthened. As [exi_pl(UA)_03] explained it:

the Act says that Polish state will support the cultural identity of its citizens, who belong to minority groups. The Polish state has put it this way. For us, the fact that we have national and ethnic minorities in Poland is a value we want to protect. This is a clear positive statement. In my opinion, it is much more definite that the provision in the constitution (...) we are going one step further. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

Also, passing of the Act translated into better environment for minority efforts to strengthen the ethnic identity

The climate has changed a bit, the climate that allows us to work, to do things and to create modern history, to build the future. Yes, the climate has changed. I guess this cannot be compared with the nineties, to make no mention of operation „Vistula” and what our community has gone through and the seal of suffering born by the oldest generation. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

However, the AUP representative assessment of the Act is a bit ambivalent:

As of today, it's true that, in the first place, there's the Act, which regulates the rights and obligations of the Ukrainian minority, and not only the minority, but, in our case, the Ukrainian minority and the Polish government and state. In many aspects, this is something that helps, but not always. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

Therefore, what is important when discussing the minority rights, are not the issues of legal provisions, which seem to be satisfactory, but the practices of the institutions that have influence on minority's situation. As AUP representative complained:

The Association, as an organization, is not always listened to, either. By the government or other institutions. Although we are a nationwide association, there are many problems that, well, make it impossible for us to get through the procedures that emerge. The biggest problems are observed, when it comes to discrimination, here, in the media. This is very apparent today, there's this escalation, whether we like it or not, whether others like it or not, well, we don't give our consent to it. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

The practical realization of legal regulations seems to be a problem especially in context of media appearance, which was mentioned earlier. As [exi_pl(UA)_01] described it:

What Ukrainians mainly care about is the issue of access to the media. This is related to the Act on Radiophony, and the act on minorities, each time they have to struggle to get this access, they are constantly under some sort of a threat. [exi_pl(UA)_01]

For example, the length of airtime is too short for any serious production and hours of broadcast are usually late at night. Also, media tend to present a stereotypical view of Ukrainians and Ukrainian minority. This was strongly underlined by AUP representative

The biggest problems are observed, when it comes to discrimination, here, in the media. This is very apparent today, there's this escalation, whether we like it or not, whether others like it or not, well, we don't give our consent to it. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

As for the state's financial support, it is the competence of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, Department for Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities. The Department is responsible for allocating the budget to NGOs, who apply for funds for projects directed

to minorities. Taking into account the needs of all minorities in Poland, the budget is rather small, and it does not allow financing everyday functioning of minority structures, but can be only spent on specific projects. It also means that it's not possible to secure stable financing for annual events and NGOs have to apply annually to receive state support.

The Association of Ukrainians is very active in applying for money, it's also a main beneficiary of the money allocated by the Department. However, financial mechanisms create competition for financial resources between different minorities, which hinders the cooperation between them.

There is no systematic policy toward Ukrainian minority due to the limitations in terms of funds and institutional tools – Ukrainian minority is treated as any other minority. However, due to strong lobbying for bigger presence in media, some changes have been made. Influence of Ukrainian minority on policy making is mostly visible on the local level, where representatives of the minority run in local elections and gets into local government. As for the central level, as [exi_pl(UA)_03] stated,

there's something in the Polish legislation, which is missing from most European legislative systems, the election preferential rights for minority organizations. For practical reasons, only the Germans take advantage of these. But it's good, I mean, it's not good that it's only Germans, but it's good that there are preferential rights like this, because for the state, it is significant that the minorities participate in public life. It is too bad that other minorities fail to take advantage of this opportunity, due to being scattered and due to other reasons. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

Among provisions for minorities there is also a regulation that allows them to use names of towns and villages in minority language in communes with a significant minority representation. As [exi_pl(UA)_03] underlined, the provision stated that additional names of towns and villages in minority languages can be introduced not only in these communes, where 20% of persons belong to a minority group, but also in communes, where the threshold has not been reached, but where social consultations have been conducted with a positive result. From the government point of view it is a very important development that has been brought by the Act:

A significant component, which supports the national and ethnic identity, is the possibility of using minority languages in public life. It's both the possibility of using the language of minority as the auxiliary language, and here the register of communes is maintained by the Minister of the Interior and Administration, and use of additional names in minority languages, where the register is also kept by the Minister of the Interior and Administration, providing funds for information boards with additional names. This has a symbolic effect, but when you enter a village or a town and besides the Polish name, there is a name in the language of the minority, this surely has an advantage of establishing the national identity and strengthening awareness. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

In practice, however, this regulation is very seldom used because of the high 20% threshold, which was a matter of many discussion on the parliament level:

We, as the government representatives, proposed a somewhat lower threshold for those communes, in which additional names are used in the minority languages and an auxiliary language. Finally, it was established at the level 20%. This threshold could, in fact, be lowered. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

At present, within the framework of the Government and National and Ethnic Minorities Joint Commission, there is a working group which has been established to deal with cultural institutions of national and ethnic groups. Also, the National Minority Unit participates in creation of a strategy for development of education for individual minorities, and such documents are established thanks to cooperation between the Minister of the Interior and Administration and the Mi-

nister of National Education and minority organizations. As the Ministry representative states there are now two important instruments for implementation of minority rights:

we are almost done with the Ukrainian strategy (...). This is another instrument that we have at our disposal. The Minister of the Interior and Administration, through supervision of provincial governors, has established the institution of a proxy to the provincial governor, and they will soon be available in every province. [exi_pl(UA)_03]⁴⁰

Last mentioned legal issue is connected with Poland accession to EU and Schengen area, which resulted in introduction of visas in Polish-Ukrainian border. This is perceived as a big obstacle for international cooperation and mobility, which influences mainly Ukrainians and Ukrainian minority in Poland. As [exi_pl(UA)_02] stated:

persons, who come here, with university education, to search for jobs, they are forced, by various diplomatic agencies, to change their roots, their origin, because otherwise they would not get a visa. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

Although much was done in the area of securing minority rights in Poland, it can be stated, that the minority groups are not strong enough to really influence the politics on the central level and minorities' issues in Poland are still a rather marginal subject in public debate. On the local level, however, the presence of Ukrainian minority representatives is growing, which should result in bigger visibility of this minority's problems and struggles. Also, the wide network of active regional units of Association of Ukrainians in Poland creates a good potential for further promotion of Ukrainian minority rights in Poland.

4.5 Relationships to European events and organizations

The interviewees didn't mention any specific relationships to European events or organizations. Only the European Commission was mentioned as a warrant of the minorities' rights in Poland, but there seems to be little need of cooperation on the European level or participation in European organizations and networks from the side of Polish minority organizations and institutions. Only one respondent [exi_pl(UA)_02] mentioned the European connection, but rather briefly:

We, as the Ukrainian community, here, together with the World Congress of Ukrainians, which operates in all member states of the European Union and in America. We are active, we write petitions to the president of Ukraine, and we will keep doing that [exi_pl(UA)_02].

In this case there is a cooperation of the minority organizations on the world level, which also influences the European level.

It is probably because of the specific national character of the minority movement and its strong embeddedness in the local context that those issues are rarely taken to the European level.

However, it seems that from the minority perspective the European Union is the warranty of the minorities' rights and also possible additional source of funds for NGOs. Polish Ukrainians, although they usually don't relate strongly to the EU, still see the positive impact of European funds on the development of Poland, especially in rural areas.

On the negative side, EU is perceived through the Schengen area restrictions on the eastern Polish border. As one of the respondents summarized this problem:

⁴⁰ According to the information on the Ministry web page the Strategy for development of Ukrainian minority education in Poland (Strategia rozwoju oświaty mniejszości ukraińskiej w Polsce) was accepted in June 2011. http://www.mswia.gov.pl/portal/pl/2/9211/Strategia_owiaty_dla_mniejszosci_ukrainskiej_w_Polsce_przyjeta.html

So, the Schengen area has also brought many barriers, incomparable with those that existed before, and many requirements. This hinders things, this is a blockade. [exi_pl(UA)_02]

As the Ministry representative stated, the impact of EU on minority situation is weak because there's no such thing as EU minority policy. On one hand, there's the policy of Poland, Hungary, Sweden, which is definitely to support minorities. (...) In general, of course, the EU solutions are favorable for a certain level of tolerance, democracy and so on, so, in this sense, yes. But this impact is very, very indirect. [exi_pl(UA)_03.]

Also the financial EU support is available only for selected minorities (eg. Romani), so most of the minority organizations in Poland are dependent on the funds from the ministry, from the state budget. [exi_pl(UA)_03]

5 MAIN FINDINGS OF WEB-ANALYSIS (ENRI-BLOG)

Hans-Georg Heinrich / Olga Alekseeva

5.1 Methodology

ENRI-East is an interdisciplinary project which employs different methodological approaches. In the framework of the project, Content Analysis of Internet Resources uses internet websites attributable to ethnic minorities in order to analyse the identity-related cultural, social and political activity of minorities. The study analyses the situation of twelve minorities: Russians in Latvia and Lithuania, Ukrainians in Poland and Hungary, Belarusians in Poland and Lithuania, Poles in Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania, Hungarians in Ukraine, Hungarians in Slovakia, and Slovaks in Hungary. Lithuanians in Russia, who were polled in the ENRI survey, were excluded due to linguistic problems. Instead, Ukrainians in Hungary were included.

Internet can be assumed to provide valid sources of information, because it is a modern and flexible means of communication. Analyzing the presence of minorities in the internet, the study can be expected to yield insights into actual concepts of identity. The internet research helps to understand not only special opinions and media activities of minorities, but also how the concept of ethnic identity evolves within new media like internet. Internet provides a forum for the democratic exchange of information, a free and unrestricted domain to escape the limits of political participation in real politics. The World Wide Web can be the communication medium of groups which are politically underrepresented. Among flows of information in the internet, such new patterns of social communication are observable as forums, live journals, or blogs that have an authentic nature and help to restore the public discourse in the most objective way.

The data base of the content analysis consists of online resources attributable to ethnic minorities, such as periodicals, organisations, blogs, forums, personal websites, and commentaries to articles. Collection of empirical resources from the internet has been carried out in two steps: selection of online resources and selection of text fragments within the online resources. Internet resources were identified by employing search engines like www.google.com for different languages and countries using key-words combinations, or checking websites which contain catalogues of resources like <http://kamunikat.org/>. Individual text fragments within a resource were selected for processing according to the criterion of theoretical relevance.

The research discovered a large number of different resources of ethnic minorities. In the study, 154 online resources were randomly identified, from which 350 text fragments⁴¹ were collected and analyzed. Qualitative and quantitative content analysis of the text fragments was conducted using *simstat/wordstat6.2.1*. The data analysis consisted of the description of a resource or a text fragment according to formal criteria like “title”, “author”, or “intention”, as well as according to the content of text fragments. The former data were ordered and coded in a *simstat* data base. The data of the qualitative content analysis were generated by assigning single cases (usually combination of words or parts of sentences) to categories (keywords) which constituted the *wordstat*

⁴¹ The notion “text fragment” in this study indicates a unit of analysis in the *simstat/wordstat* program. These can be single texts like articles from websites of periodicals, blogs or organisations without postings of readers or with readers’ postings. Apart from that, a “text fragment” can be called a number of single short texts under particular title as represented by dialogues on internet forums.

dictionary. On the basis of simstat/wordstat data, research results were generated in form of figures which in turn have been qualitatively interpreted.

During the analysis, 69 categories could be created. 8 categories among them belong to the main categories: “cultural heritage”, “images of Europe”, “history”, “cultural encounter”, “minority rights”, “style”, “politics”, and “socio-economic situation”. These main categories include further categories (sub-categories). The following data presentation describes however only those categories, which represent the majority of coded cases within text fragments, measured in %. All other categories, which cover less than 5% of cases were left out in the presented study.

5.2 Description of internet resources

According to the amount of available internet resources (14), Ukrainian minorities in Poland take the 6th place under 12 ethnic minorities. The resources include 3 periodicals, 2 news/broadcasting portals, 4 organizations, 4 forums, and 1 resource containing an article/blog with postings. Leading periodicals are “Nad Buhom i Narvoyu”, “Nashe Slovo”, and “Ridna Mova”. Ukrainians in Poland emphasize close connections of Poles and Ukrainians and point out importance of integration of two ethnicities and their communication. Resources of Ukrainians in Poland receive sponsoring from the Polish government.

“Harazd” (<http://www.harazd.net/>) is the first Ukrainian news portal in Poland with a start in 2002, covering the regions like Przemysł, Wrocław, Kraków, and Olsztyn. Its mission is to create a communication space within Ukrainian virtual life for the exchange of cultural, political, scientific, and intellectual information. “Harazd” hosts the forum with a similar name and information on Ukrainian resources in Poland. The founder and supervisor of the cultural Internet project is the programmer Bogdan Sidor. The portal covers information from current politics and authors comments to the news on cultural life. Related to politics in Ukraine and Poland, and in neighbor states like Russia or Belarus, critical views are predominant. “Harazd” represents a colorful design with national symbols, it displays traditional and patriotic context and appeals to the audience with similar interests.

The periodical “Nad Buhom in Narvoyu” (<http://nadbuhom.free.ngo.pl/>) has been edited since 1991 under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage of the Republic of Poland. Its electronic form appeared in 1999. This periodical is published two times per month in the Polish and Ukrainian languages by the Union of Ukrainians (Bielsk Podlaski). It reports on Podlasie region which illustrates the “local character” of the periodical. The purpose of the edition is to preserve the local atmosphere in its uniqueness and to prevent it from assimilation. Typical symbols of this culture as depicted on the website are the Ukrainian peasant house, the national church, and Ukrainians in national costumes. While reporting on cultural, historical and political events, the periodical suggests a kind of mythical image speaking about legends, traditions, mentioning heroic biographies. The periodical contains links to other resources like the Ukrainian-Polish internet journal (www.ukraine-poland.com).

“Ridna Mova” (http://www.interklasa.pl/portal/dokumenty/r_mowa/) is edited in Wałcz by the Union of Ukrainians and by the Ukrainian Teachers’ Association in Poland. It is devoted to matters of the Ukrainian culture and to issues of education in the native language. The assumption is that through language cultural, historical and traditional values are handed over. The periodical discusses linguistic as well as pedagogical problems how to bring the native language closer to the public, especially to children. The website is currently updated with lots of material, which suggests of a high esteem for culture and ethnicity in Poland.

“Nasze Slovo” (<http://nslowo.pl/>) is a traditional Ukrainian language periodical which is issued in Warsaw by the Socio-Cultural Ukrainian Association. The first edition of the periodical appeared in 1956 as a weekly of the Ukrainian minority which retained its status until now. In order to foster identity, the front page of the periodical website appeals to the members of the ethnic community to vote as Ukrainians in the upcoming census. Central rubrics comprise journalistic articles, essays and analysis on ethnical problems how to preserve ethnicity in a multicultural society. As in many other Ukrainian resources, the history and its tragic events like the deportation of the Ukrainian population as a part of “Akcja Wisła” constitute the historical discourse. The periodical pays attention to the Polish-Ukrainian relations and to issues of migration.

The Union of Ukrainians in Poland (<http://www.oup.ukraina.com.pl/>) has a wide network in different parts of the host country, like Szczecin, Przemyśl and other cities, with headquarters in Warsaw. The Union is financed by the Polish Ministry of Interior and Administration and has a membership of 7, 000. The mission of the Union is the organization of cultural programs, seminars, and events, popularizing the Ukrainian culture and contributing to the development of the Ukrainian community in Poland. Besides the organization of folklore and cultural events, the organization carries out seminars on historical topics; it contributes therefore to information exchange concerning tragic historical events between historians and national politicians. Union of Poles is situated in ten regions and it represents itself like organization of Ukrainians, descendants of those Ukrainians who were forcefully deported during “Akcja Wisła” 1947. The Union contributes to the development of the national schools and it supports the connection with the international Ukrainian organizations. Having celebrated its 50th anniversary, the Union tries to cooperate with governments of both countries, Poland and Ukraine, especially concerning mutual understanding between the two nationalities.

The Association “Ukrainian Peoples’ House” (<http://www.narodnyidim.org/>) is registered in the city of Przemyśl. Its social activities cover the territory of Poland after the so-called “Curzon Line”, the region which is densely populated by ethnic Ukrainians, especially as a result of deportations of Ukrainians in the post war period. The Association is a non-profit organization which depends on donations of its members. The roots of this organization reach back to the “Narodny Dom” (Peoples’ House) initiated by Teofil’ Kormosh at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century that focused on providing self-help to the members of the Ukrainian community culturally and economically. Today, these aims have remained, the Association supports especially talented Ukrainian children in the sphere of education. The website of the Association informs about different cultural events and missions concerning the life of community and issues journalistic reports.

5.3 Results of content analysis of internet resources

5.3.1 Dictionary

The highest frequency in the text fragments attributable to the Ukrainians in Poland have the following categories (keywords), here in the alphabetic order:

Civil Activity

The category “civil activity” refers to political engagement and involvement of the representatives of ethnic minorities in non-governmental organizations and unions regarding different socio-political matters and human rights issues. This category examines the development of deliberative democracy and the ability of the members of ethnic minorities to influence the political

process concerning the matters of their own community and to take part in the negotiation process at the local and regional level of governance.

Conservatism

“Conservatism” is an aspect of the traditionally oriented culture. Conservative views on the nature of family and community together with the provincially shaped culture are typical for the intellectual discourse of ethnic minorities.

Criticism representatives

The term “criticism representatives” denotes the relation of conflict and criticism between the members of the same ethnic minority, especially based on different political interests.

Cultural Heritage

The category “cultural heritage” refers to concepts like art, architecture and folklore of an ethnicity and its ethic-moral and educational values, democratic and political contents of ethnic art, experiment art, esthetic reception and perception of the authentic ethnic culture. The category “cultural heritage” summarizes the cultural tradition of a minority as part of history and recent experience and relates to the narratives about national poets, writers, musicians and scientists.

Discrimination

“Discrimination” concerns the violation of political rights of minorities in the host country. Discrimination becomes explicit in the violation of the freedom of speech and association, unequal distribution of the prime time on TV, and in the lack of translations of the official names into the minority language. One of the cases of discrimination is a complicated process to receive citizenship for the members of minorities who have been living in the host country since birth, like in the case of the Russians in Latvia. A result of discrimination can be the retarded development of national identity and of ethnic culture.

Historical memory positive

The context of “historical memory positive” are politics and actions to preserve the historical heritage, in particular, the names of personalities, memorials, memorable dates, literature, and works of art which constitute the cultural achievements of the nation. “Historical memory positive” implies the criticism toward the phenomena like destruction of cultural tradition and historical heritage as result of the lack of national consciousness during the communist regime and in the neoliberal epoch. Addressing historical memory is not ideologically neutral: it refers to the restoration of “historical justice”, persecution of the “guilty” and rehabilitation of the “victims”.

Language

“Language” constitutes a central part of the culture and national mentality. Without language no national development is possible. Ethnic minorities pay high attention to the development of schools in the national language which constitutes the central discourse between the minority and the host nation.

National consciousness negative

“National consciousness” means the ability of individuals to share feelings of belonging to a particular cultural tradition, historical and cultural heritage, to a group for which particular value

system is typical. A political debate goes on between those who apparently share the values of belonging to a collective body and those whose collective identity is not sufficiently developed. “National consciousness negative” means low consciousness of national rights, inability to protect own national rights.

National Renaissance

The category “national renaissance” describes in general terms the historical process of constitution of the national state and the formation of the national identity. In practice, this refers to the opening of the national schools and education in the national language during the process of the nation building. In the transition period from the Communist regime, it can also mean the development of the national cultural and political life in the legal or quasi-legal conditions of the ancien régime.

Native Country Critical/ Native Country Supportive

The category “native country critical/ native country supportive” studies the views of an ethnic minority towards the development in its mother country, mutual activities and projects between the mother country and the ethnic community. It is important to see how the self-identification of the members of an ethnic group is formed and supported by the communication with the native country and how much they identify themselves as part of the community of their mother nation. The relation to the mother country can have different aspects. On the one hand, the minority can be closely connected to the mother country and receive a positive support from it. On the other hand, this relation can be an alienated one when the minority criticizes the native country for its politics. The representatives of minorities, who understand themselves as part of the national opposition in their mother country like the Belarusians in Poland, demonstrate critical attitudes if human rights in the mother country are violated.


War Genocide

Historical traumas “war” or “genocide” is one of the central categories of ethnic/national identity. Historical traumas experienced by the representatives of ethnic minorities in the host countries are, on the one hand, the subject of the consolidation of ethnicity – around the mutual collective victim discourse – and the subject of the conflict between the minority and the host country on the other.

5.3.2 Practical Realization

Figure 1 demonstrates keywords/categories distribution according to the % of coded cases for the Ukrainian minorities in Poland.

Figure 1: Keyword Frequency, % of Cases



The content analysis of text fragments from the resources of the Ukrainian in Poland suggested that the Ukrainians pay high attention to the preservation of their cultural traditions and language. The majority of cases, 21%, was attributed to the categories CULTURAL HERITAGE as well as LANGUAGE. In context of the cultural heritage, the Ukrainian language and linguistic problems of the Ukrainian language are discussed in the traditionally designed journal “Ridna Mova”. Forgetting the national language, the Ukrainians associate with the loss of identity.

From the Ukrainian sources in Poland follows that the building of cathedrals and churches together with community life devoted to religion are very distinctive for the Ukrainian social and cultural activities. The Ukrainians in Poland interpret the meaning of ethnic identity from the point of view of religious and moral problems as well as traditional values. For the explanation of social phenomena, they tend to look into past (CONSERVATISM, 11% of cases).

In the sources of the Ukrainians in Poland, religious and moral values appear to be constitutive parts of ethnic identity and consciousness. A distinction is often made between the representatives of the ethnic minorities with sincere religious beliefs behind the actual religious ceremonial and formal tradition, and those who misunderstand the notion of religion and substitute it by the adherence to the formal religious attributes (CRITICISM REPRESENTATIVES, 11%). Imperialism, war crimes and genocide became possible because of the lack of personal dignity, self-identification and respectable moral standing. Also, modern politics has an unpopular character because it fell to the influence of business and consumerist culture (NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS NEG, 16%).

In comparison to other ethnicities, commentaries on the economic situation or the politics of the European Union are under the Ukrainians in Poland less present here. On the one hand, the

Ukrainians in Poland express critical attitudes toward the “pro-Russian” government in the Ukraine (NATIVE COUNTRY CRITICAL, 6%). On the other, they see the development of the national consciousness only in connection with the contacts with the mother country, 6% of cases could precisely explain the category NATIVE COUNTRY SUPPORTIVE during the analysis. The content of the collected web-addresses provides a picture on a rather developed political organization of the Ukrainians in Poland on the local level like in Szczecin or Przemyśl, especially within the Union of Ukrainians in Poland as the main “federal” body (CIVIL ACTIVITY, 6%). For the local ethnic groups of the Ukrainians, the European parliament elections is a chance to get into the European parliament and to represent the interests of the voters from their ethnic constituency.

In comparison to the Russian national ideal and principles of a quite integrated nation and exclusive and overwhelming Russian nationalism, the Ukrainian national belonging is not homogenous but ethnically and politically divided. The Ukrainian online resources suggest that the Ukrainian identity developed on the basis of the Slavic-Orthodox culture. For example, different Carpathian ethnic groups, which developed their own dialects, could consolidate in the framework of the Ukrainian state and develop according to the ethnonym “Ukrainian” the national language (NATIONAL RENAISSANCE/HISTORICAL MEMORY POS, 11%). For the Ukrainian minorities in Poland, the rhetoric of “justification of origins” is typical which helps to promote the national idea. According to this rhetoric, the Ukrainian ethnicity has deep cultural roots and historic tradition on the territory of Poland which goes back to the ancient Slavic settlements. Ukrainians were settling here even before the Poles came.

As follows from the results of the content analysis of the online resources, Poland and Ukraine had tense relations in the past. The Ukrainians in Poland dwell upon their tragic history and the Soviet regime. In their opinion, the Ukrainian minorities are scarcely spread over the Polish territory and they are weakly politically organized (DISCRIMINATION, 6%). The Ukrainian resources see the reason for this, among others, the tragic destiny of the ethnic Ukrainians who were exposed to repressions and deportations during Communism and the Polish regime (WAR GENOCIDE, 6%). The members of organizations like the Union of Ukrainians in Poland are the descendants of Ukrainians who were deported during the “Akcja Wisła” in 1947. Ethnic Ukrainians can become a political power only if Ukraine becomes the member of the European Union.

About the difficulties of reconciliation process between Poland and Ukraine suggest the following lead quotations:

- But the word GENOCIDE is so easily and often used, that it becomes compromised, the notions are getting vague. Mutual apologies were already made by Kuchma-Kvas'nevs'ki and Jushchenko-Kachins'ki. Who is next?
Translation from Russian: Але, слово ГЕНОЦИД вживається так легко і часто, що слово компромітується, поняття розмиваються. Вибачання один перед одним вже робили і Кучма-Квасьневський і Ющенко-Качинський. Хто будуть наступниками ?⁴²
- And when during the World War I a perspective for the revival of national statehood of Ukraine and Poland opened, /these countries/ appeared to be a kind of “Siam sisters” – merged territories which the Ukrainian and Polish elites regarded as their own.

⁴² Source: Priadman (nickname) (2009) «Чому ніхто не реагує на ухвалу Сейму?» (Why does nobody react on the decision of the Seim?), Harazd (forum), 30 July, internet WWW-Site at URL: <http://forum.harazd.net/read.php?5,14716,14726>.

Translation from Russian: Отже коли у ході І світової війни з'явилася перспектива відродження національної державності Україні і Польщі, показалися свого роду «сіамськими сестрами» - зрослими територіями, які українські та польські еліти уважали своїми.

- ...apart from such symbolical actions as mutual declarations and the prayers of the Polish and Ukrainian hierarchs, also practical steps are needed which would allow to re-compensate the harm caused to the Ukrainians in 1947.

Translation from Russian: ...окрім дійств із сфери символів, до яких належать спільні заяви та молитви польських і українських ієрархів, потрібні є практичні кроки, які дозволили б рекомпенсувати втрати завдані українцям у 1947 році.

- Exactly in case the problems would find their positive solution on the state and local level we would have a real criterion to ascertain if the process of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation and mutual understanding has left the realm of the state elite which in the international relations orientate themselves first of all toward the principle of pragmatism and political convenience, and made inroads into society, where the "ideological" animosity still dominates.

Translation from Russian: Саме це, чи ці проблеми знайдуть своє позитивне вирішення на державному та місцевому рівні стане справжнім критерієм визначення, чи процес польсько-українського примирення та взаємозрозуміння вийшов поза державну еліту, яка в міжнародних взаєминах керується передусім прагматизмом і політичною доцільністю та проник у суспільство, у якому ще дуже багато важить "ідейна" злопам'ятність.⁴³

⁴³ Havrilyuk, J. (2008) «Прагматизм добросусідства проти історичної злопам'ятності» (Pragmatism of the partnership against historical enmity), Nad Buhom I Narvoju (periodical) (2), internet WWW-Site at URL: http://nadbuhom.free.ngo.pl/art_1304.html.

6 CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Research conclusions

The research consisted of three main parts – ENRI-VIS using quantitative questionnaire, ENRI-BIO based on biographical interviews with members of Ukrainian minority and ENRI-EXI based on expert interviews.

All three parts included issues concerning ethnicity, ethnic and national identity; xenophobia, conflicts and discrimination; ethnic minority social and political capital, as well as their social and political participation and attitudes towards European Union.

Summarizing the results of the quantitative research it can be stated that what's most important for preservation of minority identity is self-categorization. All the respondents were proud of their belonging to an ethnic minority and most respondents selected the category "an Ukrainian living in Poland" as the most adequate one to describe themselves. It seems that there is no dichotomy, which would force the respondents to choose between full assimilation or preservation of their traditions and customs – for a significant percentage of the respondents, it's possible to live in Poland and have a Polish nationality while still supporting the Ukrainian identity. The broad geographic categories seem to be of little importance for the identity of the respondents. Few of them feel attached to Europe or Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the significance of little homelands, associated with the present place of residence or the place of origin, seems to be increasing. The respondents assess membership in the European Union as positive for Poland; at the same time, they see no differences in treatment of Ukrainians or in their own impact on reality after Poland's accession to the Community.

While the percentage of those declaring a demand for preservation of tradition and culture is high, the actual use of the Ukrainian media and Ukrainian language broadcasts is rather low. It is probably due to weak position of the local or minority-oriented media comparing to the national mass media. Therefore, what seems to be very important in terms of maintaining the ethnic identity, are personal relations with other minority representatives, often sustained through regular attendance to the Greek Catholic Church mass. Also, most of the respondents maintain relations with friends and family living on the other side of the Polish-Ukrainian border, although the introduction of visas for Ukrainians makes it difficult to meet personally as often as they would like to.

According to our respondents, they have no problems with acceptance of Ukrainians and Poles as neighbors, family members or colleagues. However, if we examine the choice of partners among individual categories of respondents, it is visible that persons referring to themselves as "Ukrainians in Poland" tend more to choose Ukrainian partners, while those describing themselves as being "Poles of Ukrainian origin" choose Polish partners more often. On the other hand, only one out of twenty respondents declared there was a strong tension between Poles and Ukrainians in Poland. Still, some of the respondents reported the cases of discrimination due to ethnic origin, and young people raised these issues most often then the rest. Despite those experiences, only one out of ten respondents is afraid of losing their tradition and culture, and slightly more than 15% respondents would consider leaving Poland, provided that they would get a good standard of living elsewhere.

As for the biographical interviews, their results are usually in accordance with quantitative research. First of all, the respondents had a rather positive, but not enthusiastic attitude towards

Europe. Either the issue of European integration wasn't very important in their life, or they tended to see both advantages and disadvantages of it. In general, reflexive opinions related to the abstract idea of European identity were much less frequent than more practical remarks about Polish membership in the European Union and consequences for its development. When asked if they feel that they are European, respondents would usually answer that they are primarily Ukrainian. Only the youngest interviewees would treat the fact that they are EU citizens as something obvious, nothing to really think about.

Most of the interviewed Ukrainians living in Poland feel connected to Poland and its tradition, speak Polish very well and in most cases treat their obligations as Polish citizens seriously. At the same time, none of the respondents seemed to forget their Ukrainian identity or be "Polonized". Again, it seems that there is no internal conflict – Polish roots are less important but coexist with their Ukrainian roots.

All respondents identify themselves as Ukrainians and describe their relationship to Poland in terms of homeland and/or citizenship. They point out processes and tendencies, which weaken Ukrainian tradition in face of dominant Polish culture and language – lack of good media coverage and mixed marriages are the most important ones. It seems that middle generation is in the most difficult situation concerning identity building, because they were raised in times when Ukrainian identity was the reason for prosecution and in some situations it was better to hide it. For younger generation – to the contrary – being a Ukrainian is a reason to be proud and they have a chance to cherish their heritage much more. The older generation, on the other hand, was much more rooted in Ukrainian community, and has much less doubts about their identity.

Together with language or dialect, a basic feature of differentiation between Ukrainian minority and Polish majority is faith. In many cases it has a decisive role in building a Ukrainian identity, because it is what makes an Ukrainian different from the majority of Polish Roman Catholics.

Most respondents cherish their Ukrainian identity, either through contacts with other Ukrainians or through dances, choirs and religious practices. Some interviewees work in Ukrainian community, which enables them to maintain permanent contact with language. Others have spouses or families of the same origin, which strengthens their Ukrainian identity. Ukrainian national identity within this minority in Poland is therefore primarily based on language, Orthodox religion and sentimental bonds with Ukraine. Reference to Ukraine as the mother country is more symbolic than real. Due to current economical and political circumstances Ukraine is not perceived as a good place to live.

As for the local patriotism, our interviewees' expressed various levels of attachment to their region. Some have shown strong identification with local community and "the locals" or "own people", and for them regional identification was a main self-defining factor. Asked about who they feel they are, they would declare their feeling of belonging to the land, village and local area. In general, the interviewees share an opinion that region of Podcarpathia is a historic homeland of their national minority. However, middle generation often referred to post-resettlement recovered territories (Mazuria region) as their homeland. What's important is that sense of attachment to local community was often used to explain reasons to stay in Poland instead of moving to Ukraine.

In reference to the actual times, great majority of respondents declared that they have never personally experienced any ethnic discrimination because of their Ukrainian identity. However, they still face "the incidents" – problems between Ukrainian minority and Polish majority usually have a form of personal insults or negative reactions, which are based on stereotypes and the

distorted historical knowledge. Despite that, according to the opinions expressed by the interviewees, Poland is not a country of open or aggressive discrimination towards Ukrainian minority. Minority's rights are guaranteed and respected; also some of the minority's activities are financially supported, although in an insufficient degree. However, there is no clear and systematic state policy or programs, which would focus on increasing awareness of minority's issues in Polish society on one side, and decreasing the stereotypes on the other.

The results of the expert interviews enable us to gain a broader perspective concerning the political and social context of changing situation of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. Among three interviewed experts there was one representative of Ukrainian minority's structures (Association of Ukrainians in Poland), one representative of Polish state institution (Ministry of Internal Affairs) as well as one activist from Polish NGO (Helsinki Foundation). As a consequence, we can compare three different perspectives from various institutional levels.

Expert interviews show that main issues associated with Ukrainian minority in Poland are the stereotypical perception of Ukrainians in Polish society as well as the painful legacy of historical events such as Vistula Operation or actions of UPA. Basically, most of the problems are caused by the stereotypical presentation of Ukrainians in media and the insufficient awareness of historical events on both sides. Apart from that, respondents have raised the problem of tensions between Ukrainians and Poles in Podkarpacie region, where some of the Ukrainians resettled during the Vistula Operation have returned, claiming their old property.

From the interviewees' point of view, existing state policy towards ethnic minorities is regulated mainly by the Regional Language, National and Ethnic Minorities Act. The Act secures minorities' right to use a minority's language or dialect as the additional official language and grants them some airtime in public media. What is even more important from NGOs point of view, it defines the framework of the state's financial support for minorities' organizations and institutions. Still, it seems that there is no systematic policy toward Ukrainian minority due to the limitations in terms of funds and institutional tools – Ukrainian minority is treated as any other minority. However, due to strong lobbying for bigger presence of minority issues in media, some changes have been made.

Although much was done in the area of securing minority rights in Poland, it can be stated, that the minority groups are not strong enough to really influence the politics on the central level and minorities' issues in Poland are still a rather marginal subject in public debate. On the local level, however, the presence of Ukrainian minority representatives is growing, which should result in bigger visibility of this minority's problems and struggles. Also, the wide network of active regional units of Association of Ukrainians in Poland creates a good potential for further promotion of Ukrainian minority rights in Poland.

The interviewees didn't mention any specific relationships to European events or organizations. Only the European Commission was mentioned as a warrant of the minorities' rights in Poland, but there seems to be little need of cooperation on the European level or participation in European organizations and networks from the side of Polish minority organizations and institutions. On the negative side, EU is perceived through the Schengen area restrictions on the eastern Polish border, which hinders the contacts between Ukrainian citizens and Ukrainian minority in Poland.

6.2 Practical recommendations

Our research shows that, the main issue associated with the Ukrainian minority in Poland is the weak media coverage of minority issues, which marginalizes those topics in public debate. The lack of open discourse may lead to more stereotypes on both sides and hinder the good Polish-Ukrainian relations. Especially in media, but also in education, more focus should be on the issues that are common ground for bilateral contacts and less on the historical heritage and accusations.

Nowadays, the state policy acts toward supporting ethnic minorities through creation of “niches” that enable the minority to cultivation its culture and tradition. However, there is not enough support for promoting of minority heritage, which would enrich the mainstream culture and help mutual recognition between Ukrainians and Poles. It seems that to build good relations between Polish majority and Ukrainian minority, the cultural events and cooperation would be a best medium.

Apart from that, it seems that Ukrainian minority is one of the strongest in Poland, and quite successful in lobbying for its own rights as well as resources for cultural events and renovation of Ukrainian buildings and places connected with Orthodox tradition. Still, there is a need for more financial support for local initiatives from one side and big national events promoting Ukrainian culture from the other.

6.2.1 Recommendations for civil society organizations

What would strengthen the position of Ukrainian minority organizations in Poland is opening up more for cooperation with Polish third sector. For now, it seems that NGOs acting on behalf of the Ukrainian minority are keeping mostly to themselves, which greatly limits their influence on the social issues. There is also very little cooperation with NGOs and institutions in Ukraine. Therefore, different types of joint projects of both national and ethnic minorities NGOs should be promoted and treated as priority both by the grant issuing institutions and political actors.

The method of state grants distributions should be also discussed by the third sector organizations, because now it “discriminates” organizations that prepare bigger and better projects, by limiting their funding if they apply for more projects for one minority. Some joint projects including different minority groups may help to remove this obstacle. There are also no mechanisms that would ensure the realization of long-term projects, because organizations must apply for the fund each year without any guarantee for continuation. Therefore, NGOs should lobby for additional long-term funding possibility for the projects that are annual and of a bigger scale (like annual festival of Ukrainian culture).

6.2.2 Recommendations for governmental bodies and officials at local, regional, national and supra-national levels

According to the respondents, existing legal provisions are sufficient; it's rather the implementation that needs changing. Especially the issue of media coverage and broadcasting time for minorities should be better implemented, allowing the issues of minorities to become a part of the mainstream public debate. Also, the right to introduce the minority's language as the second, auxiliary language to be used in official contexts in communes where at least 20% is from minority should be widely promoted and seen as a strengthening of the local traditions and diversity.

At the regional level, especially in Podkarpacie, there should be implemented a long-term and systematic policy toward Ukrainian minorities, that would help to overcome local conflicts con-

nected with historical heritage. The more tension there is, the more important the issue should be and some additional measures (funds, institutions, events) supporting ethnic diversity should be implemented. Promotion of local and regional mixed cultural and historical heritage should be one of the priorities of the regional government, especially in such difficult areas as Podkarpacie.

The method of state grants distributions should be also revised so it promotes the projects focused on overcoming ethnic problems and aiming at multicultural integration. Also, some additional financial mechanisms that would ensure the realization of long-term projects should be set in place, because otherwise organizations must apply for the fund each year without any guarantee for continuation.

Both national and regional institutions should create platforms for better cooperation with minority groups and NGOs – but not limit themselves only to the formally registered associations but also allowing for informal, grassroots groups to participate in debates and joint projects. More cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian organizations should be also promoted, for example through giving additional points to projects submitted by this type of partnerships.

In general, it seems that the long term and systematic policy form empowerment and mainstreaming of ethnic minority issues should be implemented in Poland. Higher awareness and understanding should be promoted among Poles of all ages, but especially children and teenagers. Taking into account the still present stereotypical opinions about Ukrainians in Poland, there is a need of implementing some changes to polish education system, that should put more stress on the issues of cultural diversity, especially in terms of polish ethnic minorities. More focus on this subject would be especially important in the primary schools. Maybe some cooperation between homogenous and heterogeneous communes in Poland should be implemented, allowing children to meet with a different culture in their own country.

6.2.3 Suggestion for future research and follow-up studies

In context of respondents' stories it seems to be relevant to study more closely the issues of losing Ukrainian identity through mixed marriages and weakening of the importance of religion in everyday life. It would be interesting to see if the ethnic identity can survive without the Orthodox Church or in heterogeneous families.

More insight into the religious practices of the members of minority would be also valuable, while it would enable to show the mechanism of integration and preservation of identity and culture. It would be interesting to see how the Orthodox Church perceives its role in the life of the minority members and what new ways of using this social capital could be used to improve the minority situation and recognition.

While some of the younger respondents shown higher level of ethnic awareness then older it would be also interesting to make a follow-up research, to check how it changes in their life course, if they decide to stay in Poland.

Also, the issue of the support social network connected with ethnic background should be further researched to establish it's positive (mutual support) as well as negative consequences (keeping to themselves, alienation) in context of Polish society.

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