

# The battle for the bid: Chicago 2016, No Games Chicago, and the lessons to be learned



Amy Rundio<sup>a,\*</sup>, Bob Heere<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> East Carolina University, 151 Minges Coliseum, Mail Stop 559, Greenville, NC 27858-4353, USA

<sup>b</sup> The University of South Carolina, Carolina Coliseum, Room 2026-L, Columbia, SC 29201, USA

## ARTICLE INFO

### Article history:

Received 25 August 2015

Received in revised form 22 May 2016

Accepted 2 June 2016

Available online 19 July 2016

### Keywords:

Olympics

Event bidding

Event planning

Social responsibility

Community development

## ABSTRACT

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smr.2016.06.001>

This case provides information on the Chicago 2016 bid process and the efforts by No Games Chicago to prevent the city of Chicago from hosting the 2016 Olympics, and allows students to consider the bid process through a community development lens. After learning about the Chicago 2016 bid, students are asked to apply this information to a hypothetical bid organization, Houston 2028, and consider how to work with community organizations to maximize the chances of success for this bid. In 2009, Chicago lost the vote to host the 2016 Olympics, and after years of planning and campaigning, the loss came as a surprise and disappointment to many. One group that was not disappointed, though, was No Games Chicago, a vocal opposition group to the bid. No Games Chicago organized protests, public forums, media efforts and more in an effort to prevent the bid from being successful. After learning about the Chicago 2016 bid, students are asked to apply this information to a hypothetical bid organization, Houston 2028, and consider how to work with community organizations to maximize the chances of success for this bid.

Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Sport Management Association of Australia and New Zealand.

## Teaching note

This case provides information on the Chicago 2016 bid and No Games Chicago, a vocal opposition group, and allows undergraduate students to consider a mega-event bid from a community development perspective by having them apply the lessons from the Chicago 2016 bid to a hypothetical bid by Houston for the 2028 Olympics ("Houston 2028"). Instructors can use this case when covering social responsibility, community development, or event bidding topics in event management or sport development classes. More information on these key theoretical points is provided. Additionally, students will be able to review information from a past bid to develop strategies for working with communities during an event bid. Suggestions for further reading and sample discussion questions and activities for undergraduate students are provided.

The case first presents a hypothetical situation about an intern for a hypothetical bid by Houston for the 2028 Olympics. In presenting this situation, a brief background of the history of the failed Boston 2024 bid to develop an understanding of the difficulty of gaining public support is provided. The intern is tasked with researching the Chicago 2016 bid because Chicago was officially a candidate city for 2016, whereas the Boston bid was withdrawn before being announced by the International

\* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 252 737 2395.

E-mail addresses: [rundioa14@ecu.edu](mailto:rundioa14@ecu.edu) (A. Rundio), [bheere@hrsm.sc.edu](mailto:bheere@hrsm.sc.edu) (B. Heere).

Olympic Committee (IOC) as a candidate city. Information about the Chicago 2016 Bid and the Organizing Committee, especially the controversial issues surrounding the bid, is presented next. Next, information is offered on the background of the No Games Chicago organization and the steps this organization took to increase awareness of the bid and reasons for opposing the bid; both in the Chicago community and to the City, Chicago 2016 and IOC officials. Finally, a brief evaluation of No Games Chicago's efforts is offered, from the No Games Chicago perspective.

When discussing the case and its application, students should first identify the various stakeholders and stakeholder perspectives of the Chicago 2016 bid. Although the case focuses on two main groups of stakeholders—Chicago 2016 and No Games Chicago—students should be able to identify other stakeholders such as the City of Chicago, potential investors and sponsors, and other community members. Finally, as future sport managers, students should be able to apply these concepts to situations that they may face in a work environment. As such, students are charged with considering how they can apply the lessons learned from the Chicago 2016 bid to a hypothetical Houston bid for the 2028 Olympics. As the bidding process for the 2028 Games will officially start in 2019, and there is increased pressure around the world to produce a socially responsible Olympic Games, a potential Houston 2028 bid would need to apply the lessons learned from Chicago 2016.

## 1. Event management concepts

Social responsibility, community development, and the event bidding process are all interrelated concepts. With increasing pressure for sport organizations to be socially responsible and the impact of events on local communities, the sport organization must plan for these during the bidding process. More information on each concept is provided below and a Further Reading list for each concept is provided at the end of the Teaching Note.

Social responsibility refers to “respecting the rights of others, being a responsible citizen and avoiding violent and destructive behaviors” (Ford, Wentzel, Wood, Stevens, & Siesfield, 1989, pp. 406–407). In sport, this is often applied to an organizational setting through corporate social responsibility, which can be defined as a “company’s commitment to minimizing or eliminating any harmful effects and maximizing its long-run beneficial impact on society” (Mohr, Webb, & Harris, 2001, p. 47). For the IOC, this has become particularly important as it has faced increasing scrutiny regarding the legacy and financial impact of hosting the Olympic Games.

Students should consider what social responsibility is and how it applies to the case. One activity that students could undertake to learn more about social responsibility is to find and present examples of social responsibility in sport, either as part of an online discussion board or in class. Small group or class discussion questions about social responsibility should include:

- How would you define social responsibility?
- How can sport organizations be socially responsible?
- Identify examples of social responsibility in sport. How do these examples impact your view of the organization?
- Why do you think there is increased pressure to be socially responsible?
- In what ways was Chicago 2016 acting in a socially responsible manner? In what ways could Chicago 2016 have improved their overall social responsibility?

Students should also consider the community development perspective. Community development refers to the process of improving the quality of a community, where a community can be a place, a set of relationships, or a collective political power (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990). In the past, mega-events such as the Olympics have developed a poor reputation when it comes to community development. The Games has been a mechanism used to prompt large-scale urban improvements to transportation, utilities, landscaping, hotels, and more (Chalkley & Essex, 1999). These efforts to improve infrastructure, however, often come at a cost to many members of those communities. As one example, in Atlanta, the implementation of the 1996 Olympics resulted in frustrated residents as low-income residents were relocated and revitalization efforts failed in other neighborhoods (Newman, 1999). Additionally, Olympic hosts, including Atlanta, have been left with under-utilized facilities and major debts (Chalkley & Essex, 1999). The history of the Olympics’ impact on a city’s development draws attention to the need for more thorough dialog with all stakeholders. For example, both the city of Chicago and No Games Chicago were stakeholders with an interest in improving the quality of the community, but had different tactics to go about improving the community. No Games Chicago felt its needs were not being met by Chicago 2016’s plan in part because Chicago 2016 did not initiate community discussion until after No Games Chicago’s efforts had become problematic for Chicago 2016.

Using stakeholder theory, students can analyze the various stakeholders’ affected by Chicago 2016’s plans. Stakeholders are the organization itself (in this case Chicago 2016) and any group or person that might be affected by that organization’s decisions (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder analysis is the formal process of identifying the various groups affected, identifying their potential impact, and developing strategies appropriate to anticipated stakeholder impact (Thoma & Chalip, 1996). In planning an event, organizing committees, such as Chicago 2016, must first identify specific stakeholder groups. This can be done through identifying generic categories (such as employees, clients, and competitors) or examining past Olympic bid campaigns. Organizing committees must then consider the power, legitimacy, and urgency of the stakeholder groups (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997; Parent, 2008). Power refers to the ability of the stakeholder to affect the outcome, legitimacy refers to the validity of the relationship between the organization and stakeholder, and urgency refers to the magnitude of

the stakeholder's claim on the issue (Mitchell et al., 1997). Finally, a strategy must be developed to work with each stakeholder group. Strategies might include defensive tactics, seeking an alliance, holding the status quo or demonstrating common interests (Thoma & Chalip, 1996). This case allows students to analyze and examine the power, legitimacy, and urgency of No Games Chicago, as well as analyze and apply these characteristics to other stakeholders. Additionally, this case allows students to comprehend the changes in relationships between the stakeholder groups throughout the bidding and planning processes.

Students should consider why the stakeholders' viewpoints and characteristics are different, and strategize how to ensure that all communities' and stakeholders' views have been heard for the Houston 2028 bid. In particular, they should consider how the bid could be used to develop the community in terms of physical environment, services and social conditions. An out of class activity for students could include reading the 2013 Olympic Legacy document published by the IOC, and researching how previous host cities have leveraged the Olympics for community development outcomes (such as physical environment, services, and social conditions). In-class discussions, in small or large groups, could then include the following questions:

- Analyze the stakeholders of the Chicago 2016 bid process using the following criteria of Mitchell et al. (1997): Power, legitimacy and urgency.
- Who do you think would be the stakeholders of the Houston 2028 bid? Analyze these stakeholders and develop a strategy for Houston 2028 to work with each stakeholder.
- How do you conceptualize "community development"?
- Think of examples of community development in your community. Describe any areas where more community development might be needed.
- Identify the demographics of your community (e.g. age, gender, race, income, employment industries). Discuss how different community members might have different community development needs.
- Identify the community development efforts of Chicago 2016 presented in the case study. Discuss why No Games Chicago felt Chicago 2016's efforts were not in the best interest of the citizens of Chicago.

Finally, the event bidding process is a long one with considerable background preparation required, especially in the case of the Olympic bid process. Before any bid begins, feasibility must be assessed in terms of benefits and costs for all potential stakeholders. As described above, students should be able to identify all potential stakeholders in an event and evaluate the potential benefits and costs. In the case of the Olympic bid process, in addition to a feasibility study, National Olympic Committees select a city approximately 10 years before the actual event. Nominated cities are then classified as applicant cities and must answer a questionnaire addressing motivation, concept, public opinion, political support, finance, venues, accommodation, transport infrastructure, and general conditions, logistics and experience. The IOC then evaluates the questionnaire and applicant cities before designating candidate cities that move on to the next round of the bid process. Those cities accepted as candidate cities must complete a candidature file and endure an evaluative visit from a commission composed of members from International Federations, National Olympic Committees, athlete representatives and IOC experts. Finally, each bidding city makes a presentation of their bid to the IOC, and IOC members vote. In total, the process takes approximately six years from National Olympic Committee nomination to election by the IOC (Masterman, 2014). For more information on the bidding process see: <http://www.olympic.org/content/the-ioc/bidding-for-the-games/all-about-the-bid-process/>.

Throughout this process, there are several key factors in developing the bid and winning the election including, but not limited to, building support from stakeholders, analyzing the political risk, recruiting key management, and communications. This case is especially suited to help students consider how to build support from key stakeholders, especially the local community (Masterman, 2014). The event organizers need to emphasize that benefits outweigh the costs, and in the case of Chicago (and potentially Houston) this was an uphill battle against a vocal opposition group. Typically, organizers communicate with the community through media, public forums, and websites.

In all, the social responsibility, community development, stakeholder theory and event bidding perspectives go hand in hand. When considering various stakeholders, students should consider what actions would be considered socially responsible and how those actions affect the community at large. The Chicago 2016 and No Games Chicago case outlines a failed bid and the opponents who loudly voiced their opinions. Students should consider this case when answering the discussion questions provided and considering how to gain community support for the Houston 2028 bid.

## 2. Chicago 2016 bid discussion

The Chicago Bid for the 2016 Olympics and No Games Chicago's actions provide some important lessons for community organizers and for cities or organizations hoping to host major sporting events or build new sports facilities.

Tom Tresser, organizer for No Games Chicago, presented his thoughts on what individuals or organizations working for social change should take away from the whole "Battle for the Bid." He believed that targeting the decision makers, having a tight message, including a diverse group of social justice activists, and mixed tactics were important for the success of No Games Chicago (Tresser, 2012). The decision to target the IOC was important for community organizers to consider, as IOC leaders had the final decision on where the 2016 Olympic Games would be held. No Games Chicago's message was consistent throughout the process: the Games was the wrong project for the wrong place at the wrong time. Tresser and others

presented this to the IOC, to the citizens of Chicago, to the press, and to anyone they spoke with. The leaders of No Games Chicago used their diverse connections and trained them well to present the message. Both consistent messaging and diversity in connections gave No Games Chicago more power, and those in community organizing could take these lessons to build their own organization's power. No Games Chicago's mixed tactics—the book of evidence, the bold tactics to go overseas to meet with the IOC, the use of media and the internet, street rallies, and attending community meetings—allowed the organization to keep its message in the mind of the public, catch the attention of the press and other organizations, and allowed it to reach more people.

Tresser does not discount the hardships of community organizing. Indeed, No Games Chicago found it difficult to get support from traditional nonprofits, elected leaders, and academic centers. There was also the difficulty of raising money to achieve its goals, and the personal sacrifices of the organizers. For other community organizers, these lessons could be important. First, passionate people are needed to keep the organization going and getting the community involved. With support and funding difficulties and the personal sacrifices, passionate people would be more likely to stay involved, as they did in No Games Chicago. Raising funds is always difficult, so community organizers need to be creative in fundraising and in cutting costs. Also, it is very important to get support from people with power and credibility as it increases the community organization's clout and authority. No Games Chicago did not get support from those in power and traditional nonprofits, and while it was successful in reaching its goals of having Chicago not be considered as a viable candidate by the IOC, it was unable to convince the City to retract its bid. Perhaps No Games Chicago would have been more successful with the City if it had been able to build its credibility and power.

For sport organizations or city officials working toward bringing mega-sport events or building new facilities, there are also some important lessons to be learned. The first lesson is to be proactive and not reactive throughout the process. Chicago 2016 had many issues with public perception throughout its bid. The funding of the bid was a major issue for the public and for the IOC. The impact on the neighborhoods was also significant. No Games Chicago was not afraid to make waves to get its point across and sway public opinion. If Chicago 2016 had been proactive and worked with various community organizations from the beginning, it perhaps would not have seen public perception sway so much or heard so much criticism about the bid. It is not easy to open this dialog, and based on No Games Chicago's assertions of corruption, the community may have had trouble believing in the bid committee's efforts to reach out to the community, even if it had been proactive instead of reactive. The recently retracted Boston Olympic bid in 2015, for the 2024 Olympics, is further evidence of the importance of working with community organizations when preparing an Olympic bid.

The impact of mega-sports events on communities needs to be addressed during the bidding process for hosting an event. The IOC has taken steps to include community concerns in its process, yet these events still cause a lot of controversy. The events surrounding the Chicago 2016 bid appear to indicate this. In all, the battle of the bid between Chicago 2016 and No Games Chicago was interesting, but most importantly the overall impacts and outcomes on the community need to be considered.

### 3. Case discussion questions

Students should read the case before completing the following questions, which can be used to help guide in-class discussions, or as an individual written assignment. They are designed to help with examination and application of the concepts described above (social responsibility, community development, and event planning).

1. Identify the stakeholders for the 2016 Chicago Bid, including those that may not have been listed in the bid. Describe their main positions and what concerns each group of stakeholders might have had.
2. No Games Chicago employed many different strategies and tactics to spread its message of opposition. Describe how the Chicago 2016 committee could have responded to each strategy (protest rallies, visits to IOC headquarters, public forums, attending "50 Wards in 50 Days" meetings, and website/media efforts) to limit damage to the bid and improve relations with the public.
3. Identify the potential stakeholders for a Houston 2028 bid. Describe their main positions and what concerns each group of stakeholders might have.
4. What lessons can the Houston 2028 organizers take from the Chicago 2016 bid? How might the Houston 2028 organizers use this to gain support from the potential stakeholders you described in the question above?
5. Consider what it means to be socially responsible. Describe areas where the Chicago 2016 bid succeeded at presenting a socially responsible image, and where it failed. Identify how Houston 2028 can ensure that it is a socially responsible organization.
6. Brainstorm ideas on how the Houston 2028 bid committee can work with the local community to minimize the negative impact and maximize the positive impact of the bid.
7. As an employee of Houston 2028, identify the major hurdles to overcome before the election of the 2028 host city. Develop goals and an action plan for gaining public support and successfully becoming a candidate city for the 2028 Olympics.

## References

- Chalkley, B., & Essex, S. (1999). Urban development through hosting international events: A history of the Olympic Games. *Planning Perspectives*, 14(4), 369–394.
- Chavis, D. M., & Wandersman, A. (1990). Sense of community in the urban environment: A catalyst for participation and community development. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 18(1), 55–81.
- Ford, M. E., Wentzel, K. R., Wood, D., Stevens, E., & Siesfield, G. A. (1989). Processes associated with integrative social competence: Emotional and contextual influences on adolescent social responsibility. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 4(4), 405–425.
- Freeman, R. E. (1984). *Strategic management: A stakeholder approach*. Boston: Pitman.
- Masterman, G. (2014). The bidding process. In *Strategic sports event management* (3rd ed., pp. 183–219). New York: Routledge.
- Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. T. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principles of who and what really counts. *The Academy of Management Review*, 22(4), 853–886.
- Mohr, L. A., Webb, D. J., & Harris, K. E. (2001). Do consumers expect companies to be socially responsible? The impact of corporate social responsibility on buying behavior. *Journal of Consumer Affairs*, 35, 45–72.
- Newman, H. K. (1999). Neighborhood impacts of Atlanta's Olympic Games. *Community Development Journal*, 34(2), 151–159.
- Parent, M. M. (2008). Evolution and issue patterns for major-sport-event organizing committees and their stakeholders. *Journal of Sport Management*, 22, 135–164.
- Thoma, J. E., & Chalip, L. H. (1996). Policy analysis for international sport governance. In *Sport governance in the global community* (pp. 7–20). Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology.
- Tresser, T. (2012, February 14). *The battle for the bid–2012 update*. [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from <http://www.slideshare.net/tomtee/battle-for-the-bid-2012-update>

## Further reading<sup>1</sup>

### Social responsibility

- Babiak, K., & Wolfe, R. (2006). More than just a game? Corporate social responsibility and Super Bowl XL. *Sport Marketing Quarterly*, 15(4), 214.
- Godfrey, P. C. (2009). Corporate social responsibility in sport: An overview and key issues. *Journal of sport management*, 23(6), 698–716.
- Walker, M., Heere, B., Parent, M. M., & Drane, D. (2010). Social responsibility and the Olympic Games: The mediating role of consumer attributions. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 95(4), 659–680.
- Walker, M., & Kent, A. (2009). Do fans care? Assessing the influence of corporate social responsibility on consumer attitudes in the sport industry. *Journal of Sport Management*, 23(6), 743.

### Community development

- International Olympic Committee (2013). *Olympic Legacy*. Retrieved from [http://www.olympic.org/documents/olympism\\_in\\_action/legacy/2013\\_booklet\\_legacy.pdf](http://www.olympic.org/documents/olympism_in_action/legacy/2013_booklet_legacy.pdf), March.
- Misener, L., & Mason, D. S. (2009). Fostering community development through sporting events strategies: An examination of urban regime perceptions. *Journal of Sport Management*, 23, 770–794.

### Event bid process

- International Olympic Committee. (n.d.). All about the candidature process. Retrieved from <http://www.olympic.org/all-about-the-candidature-process>
- Paule-Koba, A. L. (2016). Bidding and planning for different events. In T. J. Aicher, A. L. Paule-Koba, & B. L. Newland (Eds.), *Sport facility and event management* (pp. 83–102). Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning.

### Stakeholder theory

- Heere, B., Van der Manden, P., & Van Hemert, P. (2015). The South Africa World Cup: The ability of small and medium firms to profit from increased tourism surrounding mega-events. *Tourism Analysis*, 20, 39–52.
- Thoma, J. E., & Chalip, L. H. (1996). Policy analysis for international sport governance. In *Sport governance in the global community* (pp. 7–20). Morgantown, WV: Fitness Information Technology.

<sup>1</sup> The following list is provided for further background reading for instructors.

# The battle for the bid: Chicago 2016, No Games Chicago, and the lessons to be learned

## Case study

### 1. Introduction

Olivia had been interning for Houston 2028 for only a few months, and had learned a lot in her time with the organization. The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) selected Houston as its candidate city for the 2028 Olympics, yet the competition had not been as fierce as for previous Summer Olympics. It seemed that many cities lost their appetite for the Olympic adventure after the debacles in [Chicago \(2016\)](#) and Boston (2024). For Houston, the next few years would be devoted to preparing the bid for the International Olympic Committee (IOC), before the final election of the host city. During this time, Houston 2028 had to prepare a bid that addressed infrastructure, finances, facility construction and renovation, legacy, sustainability, risk assessment, and more. Another task was creating public support for the bid; and well before Houston was awarded the North American bid, Houston 2028 knew that would be its biggest challenge. For her internship, Olivia knew she would need to learn more about the previous US bids, so that she could assist her supervisors with building public support for Houston 2028.

Recently, Olivia had seen that Boston had bid for the 2024 Olympics. The Boston 2024 bid was ultimately withdrawn as opponents had criticized the bid, focusing on the negative economic effects, expense overruns and taxpayer dollars, and the opportunity costs of hosting the Olympics. There were two major groups opposing the bid: No Boston Olympics and No Boston 2024. Both groups wrote letters to the USOC, called for transparency from Boston 2024, attended public meetings on Boston 2024's bid, and encouraged citizens to contact and inform local, USOC, and IOC officials of their opposition to the bid. Additionally, the Boston 2024 bid faced a lack of public support: a June 2015 poll showed that 49% of Massachusetts's voters opposed the bid and 39% supported the bid. Larry Probst, USOC Chairman had expressed concern about these numbers and wanted to see them improve before formally nominating Boston as the USOC's bid city to the IOC in September. Ultimately, when an increase in public support did not occur, Boston 2024 and the USOC agreed to end the campaign for the City of Boston to host the 2024 Olympics.

Olivia's supervisors were very concerned about working with the public and generating support for the bid. They knew that the previous two US bids—Boston 2024 and Chicago 2016—faced great public opposition, and in particular they wanted to know more about how Chicago 2016 handled the opposition groups. While Boston had retracted its bid quite early on, Chicago did end up competing for the 2016 Olympics and had attempted to work with the community groups in an effort to build public support. Olivia was tasked with researching the Chicago 2016 bid and making recommendations to the Houston 2028 organizing committee about how to work with the community groups and build support for the bid. Olivia knew she had plenty of work to do, and got started right away looking at the Chicago 2016 bid.

### 2. Chicago 2016 bid overview

In May 2006, the USOC unveiled a list of potential cities it would evaluate for the 2016 Olympic Games bid ([Zinser & Cardwell, 2006](#)). Thirteen months later, Chicago beat out Los Angeles to win the United States bid, and over the next two years built a campaign to host the 2016 Olympics ([Michaelis, 2007](#)). The campaign process was billed as “an extraordinary opportunity to accelerate the sustainable redevelopment of Chicago's South and West sides—two of the city's key long-term urban-renewal priorities—leaving a lasting Olympic legacy” ([Bennett, Bennett, & Alexander, 2008](#), p. 19). Beyond the urban-renewal priorities, “Chicago's key motivation in bidding for the Games is [was] to reach out and welcome the world to America with open arms and to renew the bonds of friendship around the globe through sport” ([Chicago, 2016](#), p. 10), with the hopes that the Olympics would have a positive economic impact on the city.

While the Chicago 2016 committee cited that seventy-seven percent of Chicago residents supported the bid, there were several vocal groups of citizens who opposed the bid, including No Games Chicago, Communities for an Equitable Olympics, and Chicagoans for Rio ([Chicago 2016](#)). The main issues of contention were over displaced community members, facility construction, cost, and competence of officials. These groups took action by holding protests, attending community meetings, informing the public through various communication outlets, traveling overseas to speak to the IOC, and holding public forums. There were also organizations that worked with Chicago 2016 to try to ensure that the bidding and hosting processes would do more good than harm for the community.

In the end, Rio de Janeiro was announced as the host of the 2016 Olympics, while Chicago was eliminated in the first round of bidding ([Macur, 2009b](#)). There were many reasons for the loss of the bid, including bias against the USOC due to a dispute over television and marketing revenue sharing, the historical significance of a South American host, and voting politics. Yet the efforts of the bid opposition did not go unnoticed by the IOC or the City of Chicago ([Macur, 2009b](#)). In particular, the efforts of one group, No Games Chicago, garnered much national attention and provided a platform for community residents to speak out against actions that could have potentially harmed the community. The dispute between



the IOC and USOC was resolved in 2012 ([Associated Press, 2012](#)), and the Houston 2028 committee felt it could do little about potential competitor cities (and the historical geo-political motivations they could bring to the table). However, Houston 2028 did feel that it could do more to address the criticism of local protest groups.

Olivia realized that any evaluation of the Olympic bid should start by reviewing the most important stakeholders within the bid process. For instance, the strategies and efforts of No Games Chicago and the consequent responses of the organizing committee to No Games Chicago ranged from effective and successful to confusing and unproductive. The dynamics between the organizations involved was a useful starting point to see what Houston 2028 could do better.

### 2.1. Chicago 2016 organizing committee background

Chicago 2016, the City of Chicago, and the United States Olympic Committee had five major goals that can be summarized as (1) delivering an extraordinary experience for all stakeholders, (2) inspiring youth, (3) strengthening the Olympic Movement in the US, (4) promoting world harmony and (5) transforming Chicago's urban landscape ([Tootelian & Varshney, 2007](#)). It was this last goal that caused the greatest controversy. Proposed landscape transformations centered around the parks and the Bronzeville neighborhood, but another transformation included transportation and infrastructure. The community impacts and the funding of these transformations motivated citizens and community organizations to voice their opinions and fight for their beliefs.

The cost of the Olympics spurred many of the conversations, concerns, and actions by citizens. In Chicago, the total expected impact was approximately \$13.7 billion with over 172,000 job-years created, according to the City's calculations ([Tootelian & Varshney, 2007](#)). It also projected costs of \$4.25 billion to \$4.7 billion, but many scrutinized this figure as previous host cities were dealing with overruns on costs ([Associated Press, 2008](#); [Smith, 2009](#)). For example, London's cost for the 2012 Games was around 8.77 billion pounds (approximately 13.5 billion US dollars), almost four times the original projection in 2005 ([BBC, 2013](#)). The Chicago bid alone was costing the city \$100 million, but it was privately financed. Originally, the Olympics were sold to the public as being privately financed. However, this stance was reversed by the City under pressure from the USOC and IOC, and the City put up \$500 million as insurance if the Games exceeded the budget. City aldermen were assured that the reversal was only to be insurance if the private money fell short ([Joravsky, 2009](#)). The State would provide another \$250 million and the addition of private insurance and a contingency fundraised the amount to \$1.2 billion ([Macur, 2009a](#)). The broken promises, politics, and lack of trust created a lot of controversy. Public support for the Olympics also declined significantly after the host city contract was signed in 2009, in which full financial responsibility for any losses would be assumed by the host city ([Baron, 2010](#)).

The Olympic Village had a price tag of at least \$1 billion, but a large part of the controversy surrounded the impacts on the Bronzeville neighborhood. This neighborhood was designated to be the site of the Olympic Village, which would include 21 residential buildings, a lakefront park recreational zone, and private beach for 16,800 athletes during the Games. After the Olympics, the Village was intended to be turned into mixed-income, multi-use housing, and at least 20% of the residences would be deemed "affordable housing." According to the bid, there would be no displacement of residents, but several community organizations voiced their concerns to the 2016 IOC Evaluation Commission about gentrification and its impacts ([International Olympic Committee, n.d.](#)). The price tag of the Village was nearly one billion dollars, which raised concerns from residents, especially after the city purchased the Michael Reese Hospital in 2009 for \$85 million ([Baron, 2010](#)). Because of the costs and the potential community impact, several community organizations produced proposals to increase affordable housing and minimize displacement related to the development occurring around the Olympics.

These proposals became part of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by Chicago 2016 and the Chicago 2016 Advisory Council (comprised of representatives from the local community and neighborhood organizations). Specific to the Olympic Village, it stated that "30 percent of Olympic Village housing would be converted into affordable housing after the Games" ([Baron, 2010](#), p. 60). More broadly, it called for thirty percent of Olympic contracts to go to minority-owned firms and ten percent be given to women-owned companies, with an independent committee monitoring the fulfillment of the agreement ([Baron, 2010](#)). While this MOU was significant because community organizations and leaders were included in the conversation surrounding Olympic development, there was still some disagreement and unhappiness on behalf of the community. Some community members believed that the numbers were too low and more minorities and affordable housing should be included. Others were angered that the Michael Reese Hospital would be demolished because of its architectural and historical significance ([Baron, 2010](#)).

Another issue that sparked controversy and community conversation was the infrastructure and transportation currently in the city and proposed for the Olympics. On the South Side of Chicago (including the Bronzeville neighborhood), several organizations discussed the already inadequate transit, resulting in a proposal presented by the Southsiders Organizing for Unity and Liberation (SOUL) to increase Metra trains to the South Side. SOUL actually allied with Chicago 2016—which saw this as an opportunity to gain public support—and the end result was the development of the Gold Line ([Baron, 2010](#)).

In addition to the Olympic Village and transportation issues, the city parks sparked a great deal of controversy and outrage. Twenty-two new competition venues would need to be built for the Olympic Games, and the use of Washington, Douglas, Jackson, and Lincoln Parks was handed over to the city without a public meeting or approval ([Baron, 2010](#); [International Olympic Committee, n.d.](#)). The impact would have been enormous as it would have closed the parks before, during, and after the Games, and would have dramatically altered the nature of the parks. Indeed, many citizens saw a future of park destruction while some believed the facilities and alterations left behind could be potential gems of history and

culture. The conversation between the City and community organizations really began from a push by Friends of the Park who wanted Chicago 2016 and City officials to recognize and incorporate public input into the overall bid (Baron, 2010).

In response to the skepticism shown by community organizations, neighborhood organizations, and City aldermen, the Chicago 2016 bid team held meetings in each of Chicago's wards to pitch the Olympics to citizens in a last ditch effort. Dubbed the "50 Wards in 50 Days Initiative," the meetings enabled Chicago 2016 to communicate the details of the bid to Chicagoans and allowed them to answer questions and voice reactions. Beginning July 15, 2009, the meetings were tailored to each ward's benefits and concerns, but all contained three central themes—"only private money will be used for the Games; No residents will be displaced; And local residents—especially minorities—will benefit from new jobs" (Bradley, 2009, para. 8). Some Chicagoans remained unconvinced, despite the presentations and meetings, arguing that there were more pressing issues to be dealt with before the Olympics should be considered—issues such as the state of public education and violence in the city (Baron, 2010).

Throughout the bidding process, Olivia thought, Chicago 2016 seemed much more reactive than proactive in working with the community and addressing their concerns. While it did take actions to support the community's concerns, there were still many skeptics and many angered at the City and Chicago 2016.

### 3. No Games Chicago background

No Games Chicago was one group particularly outraged with the City's decision to pursue hosting the 2016 Olympics. A group of social activists involved in "building affordable housing, fighting for environmental justice, working on human rights issues, litigating against police torture, pressing for good government reform and organizing independent politics" (Tresser, 2009b, para. 2), created the organization to oppose the Games because there was no one other organization doing so. They believed through community activism they could let everyone know "that seeking and hosting the 2016 Summer Olympic Games is a terrible waste of precious civic resources and treasure" (Tresser, 2009b, para. 1).

No Games Chicago, and other community groups and citizens, believed that Chicago had more important issues, and that bidding for, and potentially hosting, the 2016 Olympics would detract from other much needed areas, such as transportation, education, hospitals, and housing. Fundamentally, they believed that there were four major reasons for not awarding Chicago the 2016 Olympics: a lack of finances, lack of competence, lack of infrastructure, and lack of public support. These reasons were well documented in a "Book of Evidence" that was presented to the IOC during visits to Europe.

In this book, No Games Chicago charged that the City of Chicago, the State of Illinois, and the United States were all running massive deficits and had no way to guarantee the funding needed for the Games (No Games Chicago, 2009). The City was cutting jobs and running a \$300 million deficit, and the school district budget was \$475 million in the red (No Games Chicago, 2009). The flip-flopping on the private-public funding of the Games also drew ire from No Games Chicago, who pointed out that there would most likely be overruns and citizens would be forced to pay.

No Games Chicago also accused local and State government officials of being corrupt and not acting in the public's best interests, often resulting in delayed, over-budget construction projects (No Games Chicago, 2009). Previous projects such as Millennium Park, public housing projects, and train and transportation projects, were all delayed and over budget, and the "Book of Evidence" documented insider deals, mishandling of funds, nepotism, and other controversial actions taken by the City that caused public outcry (No Games Chicago, 2009).

Other organizations were concerned with the current state of infrastructure in the City, as documented above. No Games Chicago reiterated many concerns and argued that the mass transit system was in need of repair and upgrading, and the roads were full of potholes that citizens sometimes fixed themselves. Included in the "Book of Evidence" were many articles that showed the Olympic Bid had sparked discussions and complaints about the pressing needs of the infrastructure system across the city (No Games Chicago, 2009).

Finally, in the "Book of Evidence," No Games Chicago argued that citizens were largely uninformed of the consequences of the bid, but those who were informed overwhelmingly opposed the Games. Informed citizens did not approve of using tax revenues to cover potential shortfalls, park users were afraid the parks would be destroyed by Olympic-related development, minority business owners were concerned about inclusion, displacement concerned many residents, and conservationists cited the impact on the environment and the species living in the parks (No Games Chicago, 2009).

#### 3.1. The efforts of No Games Chicago to stop Chicago 2016

Overall, No Games Chicago believed that the money being spent should go instead toward making the city a better place to live; however the bid was privately funded, so the organization focused its efforts on preventing Chicago from hosting the Games (rather than on stopping the bid). Its goal was to "convince the International Olympic Committee that the 2016 Olympics for Chicago is the wrong project for the wrong city at the wrong time" (No Games Chicago, 2009), and it relied primarily on donations to fund its actions.

Since Chicago 2016 would not be making the decision regarding the host city, No Games Chicago decided to target its efforts at the IOC. Its strategy was to influence and inform the IOC about why Chicago should not host the Games, just as Chicago 2016 was trying to influence and inform the IOC that Chicago should host the Games. Of the many tactics used by No Games Chicago, protest rallies, visits to Europe, and daily e-mails sent to the IOC were all directed at informing the IOC of No Games Chicago's stance. However, No Games Chicago had to get the community organized to help protect its interests. It held a public forum, attended many of the "50 Wards in 50 Days" Initiative meetings (organized by Chicago 2016), and used



its website and connections with media to inform the public of the effects that the Olympics would have on the city ([No Games Chicago, 2009](#)).

No Games Chicago's first public forum was held on January 31, 2009 at the University of Illinois, Chicago. The meeting was held to inform the public about all the negative effects that hosting the Games could have on the City, such as "massive city debt, destruction of public parks, insider deals favoring real estate developers and a full frontal assault on civil liberties" ([Tresser, 2009a](#)). Panelists included Deborah Taylor of Southside Together Organizing for Power (STOP) and Lake Park East Tenants Association, Karen Lewis of the Caucus of Rank and File Educators (CORE), and Willie J. R. Fleming of the Coalition to Protect Public Housing and the Chicago Independent Human Rights Council. The keynote speaker, though, was Dr. Chris Shaw, leader of the Vancouver Olympic Opposition, who spoke about all the problems and difficulties that Vancouver was experiencing and what he thought the impact on Chicago would be ([Tresser, 2009a](#)). Nearly 175 people attended, and some were community activists who hoped to use the Olympic bid to raise awareness of and support for their causes ([WLS-TV/DT Chicago, 2009](#)).

No Games Chicago's next actions were in April when it held a protest rally to shut down the Olympic Bid. This rally coincided with the IOC's evaluation of Chicago's bid. Several hundred people marched in support of No Games Chicago in front of the Chicago 2016 office and the hotel where the IOC members were staying. Speakers from many community organizations also spoke to the crowd; STOP, CORE, Food Not Bombs were all represented ([Rix, 2009](#)). No Games Chicago also passed out fliers to citizens, chanted, encouraged passersby to take action, and displayed its concerns over the history of "debt, corruption and gentrification of minority and low-income communities" according to Bob Quellos, co-founder of No Games Chicago ([Rix, 2009](#)). This rally not only allowed citizens to voice their concerns, but displayed to the IOC that not everyone wanted the Olympics to come to Chicago. No Games Chicago also held a protest rally in September at City Hall reiterating its claims that the city of Chicago should spend the money where it was needed—particularly on schools, housing and transportation—and that taxpayers might have to pay for cost overruns ([WLS-TV/DT Chicago, 2009](#)).

The "50 Wards in 50 Days Initiative" became another way for No Games Chicago to inform citizens and display its opposition to the Olympic bid. The "50 Wards in 50 Days" was a last-ditch effort on the part of the City to connect with citizens, and it did not sit well with some. While the meetings were designed to allow citizens to ask questions and voice their concerns, No Games Chicago felt unwelcome so it often picketed outside of the meetings. No Games Chicago, however, did encourage citizens to participate in the meetings and ask the tough questions. It also posted reports of the meetings on its website ([No Games Chicago, 2009](#)).

Perhaps the least effective tactic for involving the community, but very effective at informing the IOC, was the delivering of the "Book of Evidence" to IOC headquarters in Switzerland and again at a meeting in Copenhagen. A delegation composed of three members of No Games Chicago (Tom Tresser, Rhoda Whitehorse, and Martin Macias) went to the IOC headquarters in June to inform the IOC about why Chicago should not be awarded the 2016 Olympics. These volunteers, including an educator and activist, a neighborhood resident and former public school teacher, and a youth organizer for the environment and immigration rights, sought to meet with the IOC. They ended up talking to the press, occasional IOC delegates, other city delegations, but did not actually meet with any delegates. They did meet with the IOC Communications Director who promised to deliver copies of the "Book of Evidence" to the IOC members ([Tresser, 2009c](#)). The same team went to Copenhagen in September just before the election with the same goal—to convince the IOC that Chicago should not host the 2016 Olympics. This trip also included talking to the press, handing out more copies of the "Book of Evidence" and other evidence, and another unsuccessful attempt to set up a meeting with the IOC ([Tresser, 2009d](#)). Throughout both trips, the team was constantly trying to ensure press coverage and help spread the word to citizens back in Chicago.

Postcards and e-mails were also sent to all members of the IOC updating the members about the bid in Chicago, No Games Chicago's efforts and thoughts, and the Chicago citizens' sentiments toward the Games. Some members opened all 70 of the e-mails sent by No Games Chicago. The e-mails were sent every day during the 70 days leading up to the vote, and were seen as very successful at informing the IOC that not everyone in Chicago wanted the Games ([Tresser, 2010](#)). No Games Chicago also used traditional media and the Internet in its arsenal of tactics to keep the public informed and aware of its opinions and actions. No Games Chicago received airtime on several major local and national stations, and coverage in such papers as *The Chicago Tribune*, *USA Today*, *The New York Times*, and the *Chicago Sun-Times*.

#### 4. Evaluation

Now that Olivia had reviewed the key stakeholders, she felt she was able to conduct a full evaluation of the bid. No Games Chicago's actions and strategies seemed to be fairly successful in achieving its goal of showing the IOC that Chicago did not want or need to host the 2016 Olympics. It clearly had an impact on shifting public perception, yet the impact on the IOC's decision was much murkier.

Through its public rallies, attendance at community meetings, and presence in the press and on the Internet, No Games Chicago was able to empower individuals in the community. [Speer and Hughey \(2008\)](#) believe that "the ability of community organizations to . . . control what gets talked about in public debate and shape how residents and public officials think about their communities" (p. 205), represents their empowerment. No Games Chicago was clearly very successful at introducing the voice of the opposition to the conversation around the 2016 Chicago Olympics bid. According to a poll conducted by the *Chicago Tribune*, Chicagoan support for the bid dropped from 61% in February to 47% in September ([Lighty & Bergen, 2009](#)). While No Games Chicago's actions were not the only influences on public opinion they certainly had a big impact. Using

many tactics and avenues, it tried to inform as many people as it could about the negative impacts of the Olympics. These actions also spoke to public officials, such as the Chicago 2016 officials and IOC officials. The officials had to pay attention to the public actions like the rallies because of the press coverage and where the rallies were held. Having a No Games Chicago presence at many of the community meetings also forced officials to acknowledge the negative impacts and what they would do to try to prevent them from happening.

No Games Chicago also encouraged citizens to take action for themselves through participation in their events, by signing a petition, contacting City, State, and national government officials with its concerns, sending a letter directly to the IOC, donating to the cause, displaying No Games Chicago materials, and inviting No Games Chicago to speak at other events and community forums (No Games Chicago, 2009). Part of individual empowerment is built through action and reflection. No Games Chicago definitely encouraged and allowed for action by citizens who believed the 2016 Olympics would harm Chicago. Reflection on participation in the organization allows for community members to process their empowerment (Speer & Hughey, 2008). The combination of the action and reflection dialectic present in No Games Chicago allowed for empowerment on the part of the individuals, which helped the organization in its key strategy for preventing Chicago from hosting the Games.

Another key piece of its strategy was to target those with power. Rather than work with Chicago 2016 or directly oppose them, No Games Chicago took steps to inform and influence the IOC throughout the process, as the IOC would be deciding who would host the 2016 Olympics. It held rallies when the IOC visited, went overseas to attempt to meet with the organization, and contacted them directly via mail. It first empowered community members to grow its cause, and then used this power to challenge the power of Chicago 2016 by reaching out to the organization that truly had the power, the IOC. Through its power, No Games Chicago was able to voice its concerns and to go overseas directly to the source of power in the situation. While it was not able to meet directly with IOC officials, it was able to be seen and heard at entrances and exits, and to inform those members of Chicago's citizens' opinions. While impossible to clearly determine the impact of No Games Chicago, the group did decide to take on those in power by directly targeting them. This part of the strategy made a lot of sense in achieving its goal, as going to Chicago 2016 would not have done anything to stop the Games from occurring.

Some groups did work with Chicago 2016 to secure Community Benefits Agreements, Memorandums of Understanding, and other forms of protection for their community. However, No Games Chicago did not work directly with these groups, as its goals did not align with No Games Chicago's own goal. It did, however, work with several groups to increase its own power. Groups such as CORE, STOP, and the Coalition to Protect Public Housing, aligned with No Games Chicago to prevent the Games from coming to Chicago. These groups added diversity and power to the organization because they represented such diverse interests. No Games Chicago may have been able to accumulate more power, though, if it had been able to work with other community organizations. Some of this was because other organizations did not want to change their position and take more action. Other organizations wanted to work with Chicago 2016 and protect their neighborhood or their interests; they saw the benefits and drawbacks of hosting and were willing to work within the framework, unlike No Games Chicago.

Finally, No Games Chicago was successful at informing and influencing the public and the IOC, but beyond the Chicago 2016 bid the group did not survive. Despite its efforts to find if there was support for No Games Chicago beyond the bid (and there was), the organization pretty much fell apart. Some of the reasons it wanted to stop the bid still existed, such as the lack of finances, competence, and infrastructure within the City. It seems highly plausible that the organization could have continued on and fought to improve the infrastructure in the City, to serve as a watchdog to keep officials honest, or to fight for financial stability. This seems like the biggest missed opportunity for No Games Chicago to continue helping Chicagoans.


Overall its strategy was successful, and while there were other factors that influenced the final decision, No Games Chicago certainly contributed to the final decision. Through empowering individuals and partnering with other organizations, it was able to attempt to bring its concerns to the decision-making body that is the IOC. The IOC had all the power in this decision, and while No Games Chicago could not meet directly with that group, it was able to affect public perception and indirectly inform and influence the IOC in its decision-making process. Olivia knew that Houston 2028 had an enormous amount of work to do to generate public support. She was sure there was a way to learn from the Chicago 2016 bid to improve the Houston 2028 bid and gain community support. Now she needed to start figuring out what that plan would include. (Tresser, 2012)

## Appendix A. Chicago 2016 bid timeline

- April 14, 2007      The USOC selects Chicago as its 2016 candidate city over Houston, Los Angeles, and San Francisco
- September 13, 2007      National Olympic Committees submit their bids for the 2016 Olympics; these cities included Chicago, Baku, Prague, Doha, Tokyo, Madrid, and Rio de Janeiro
- June 4, 2008      The IOC accepts Chicago, Tokyo, Rio de Janeiro and Madrid as Candidate Cities
- January 31, 2009      No Games Chicago goes public and holds its first public forum
- February 12, 2009      All Candidature Files are due to IOC

- April 4–7, 2009 The IOC Evaluation Commission visits Chicago
- April 2009 No Games Chicago holds a protest that coincides with the IOC evaluation of the US bid
- May 2009 All Candidate Cities attend a technical briefing for IOC members at IOC Headquarters
- June 2009 Delegates from No Games Chicago visit IOC headquarters in Switzerland and deliver the “Book of Evidence” to the IOC Communication Director
- July 15, 2009 50 Wards in 50 Days initiative begins
- July 2009 No Games Chicago begins its e-mail and mail campaign to all members of the IOC updating them about the citizen's sentiments toward the Games
- September 2009 No Games Chicago holds a protest rally at City Hall
- September 2009 Delegates from No Games Chicago make another trip to IOC headquarters
- October 2, 2009 Chicago is the first bid city eliminated by the IOC; Rio de Janeiro is awarded the bid

Associated Press (2009, February 13). 2016 Chicago, Tokyo, Rio and Madrid Olympic bids released. *USA Today*. Retrieved from [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2009-02-13-chicago-2016-bid\\_N.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2009-02-13-chicago-2016-bid_N.htm)



## References

- Associated Press (2008, December 11). *Chicago Olympics would be a deal at \$4.7 billion*. From USA Today: [http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-12-11-chicago-bid-price\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-12-11-chicago-bid-price_N.htm)
- Associated Press (2012, May 24). IOC, USOC finalize revenue deal. *ESPN* Retrieved from [http://espn.go.com/olympics/story/\\_id/7967000/ioc-usoc-resolve-differences-revenues](http://espn.go.com/olympics/story/_id/7967000/ioc-usoc-resolve-differences-revenues)
- Baron, D. (2010). *From slum clearance and public housing high rises to the Olympic Village: The history of housing in Bronzeville and the Chicago 2016 Olympic Bid*. Retrieved from [http://americanstudies.nd.edu/assets/61877/denise\\_baron\\_senior\\_thesis.pdf](http://americanstudies.nd.edu/assets/61877/denise_baron_senior_thesis.pdf)
- BBC (2013, July 19). London 2012: Olympics and Paralympics £528 under budget. *BBC Sport* Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/sport/0/olympics/20041426>
- Bennett, L., Bennett, M., & Alexander, S. (2008). *Chicago and the 2016 Olympics: Why host the Games? How should we host the Games? What should we accomplish by hosting the Games?*. Retrieved from [http://euc.depaul.edu/docs/eucDocs/CHICAGO\\_2016-OLYMPIC\\_REPORT.pdf](http://euc.depaul.edu/docs/eucDocs/CHICAGO_2016-OLYMPIC_REPORT.pdf)

- Bradley, B. (2009, July 7). *Olympic Sales Pitch: 50 Wards in just a few weeks*. Retrieved from <http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=6902709>
- Chicago 2016. (n.d.). The bid book. Retrieved from <http://www.chicago2016.org/bidbook/bidbook.html>
- International Olympic Committee. (n.d.). Report of the 2016 International Olympic Committee Evaluation Commission. Retrieved from [http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en\\_report\\_1469.pdf](http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Reports/EN/en_report_1469.pdf)
- Joravsky, B. (2009, July 2). On the hook: Did Mayor Daley ever really believe the public wouldn't have to pay for the Olympics? *Chicago Reader* Retrieved from <http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/on-the-hook/Content?oid=1141465>
- Lighty, T., & Bergen, K. (2009, September 3). Tribune poll: Olympic opposition getting second wind as support in Chicago fades. *The Chicago Tribune* Retrieved from [http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout\\_st/2009/09/tribune-poll-olympic-opposition-getting-second-wind-as-support-in-chicago-fades.html](http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2009/09/tribune-poll-olympic-opposition-getting-second-wind-as-support-in-chicago-fades.html)
- Macur, J. (2009, April 8). Chicago 2016 offers the I.O.C. a compact Games plan. *The New York Times* Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/09/sports/09olympics.html?pagewanted=all>
- Macur, J. (2009b). Rio wins 2016 Olympics in a first for South America. *The New York Times*.
- Michaelis, V. (2007, April 14). Chicago tops L.A. as USOC choice for 2016 Games bid. *USA Today* Retrieved from [http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2007-04-14-usoc-bid\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2007-04-14-usoc-bid_N.htm)
- No Games Chicago (2009, June). *No Games Chicago book of evidence for the International Olympic Committee: Why Chicago should NOT be awarded the 2016 Olympic Games*. Retrieved from [http://nogames.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/book\\_of\\_evidence.pdf](http://nogames.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/book_of_evidence.pdf)
- No Games Chicago (2009b). *No Games Chicago: Citizens against the 2016 Olympic bid*. Retrieved from [nogames.wordpress.com](http://nogames.wordpress.com).
- Rix, K. (2009, April 6). Not playing games: Groups protest Olympic bid as game officials visit Chicago. *The Columbia Chronicle* Retrieved from <http://columbiachronicle.com/groups-protest-olympic-bid-as-game-officials-visit-chicago/>
- Smith, A. (2009, September 30). Chicago's Olympic bid: An expensive proposition. *CNN Money* Retrieved from [http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/30/news/economy/chicago\\_olympics\\_economics/index.htm](http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/30/news/economy/chicago_olympics_economics/index.htm)
- Speer, P. W., & Hughey, J. (2008). Community organizing: An ecological route to empowerment and power. In J. DeFilippis & S. Saegert (Eds.), *The community development reader* (pp. 204–213). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Tootellian, D. H., & Varshney, S. B. (2007). Chicago 2016 economic impact analysis: The expected incremental economic impact of Chicago hosting the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games. *No Games Chicago* Retrieved from <http://nogames.files.wordpress.com/2009/06/chicago-2016-economic-impact-analysis.pdf>
- Tresser, T. (2009, January 30). No Games Chicago" hosts Olympic skeptic at public forum. *The Huffington Post* Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/no-games-chicago-hosts-ol\\_b\\_162587.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/no-games-chicago-hosts-ol_b_162587.html)
- Tresser, T. (2009, March 25). No Games Chicago rallies April 2nd. *The Huffington Post* Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/no-games-chicago-rallies\\_b\\_178372.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/no-games-chicago-rallies_b_178372.html)
- Tresser, T. (2009, August 30). What happened in Switzerland (When we met the IOC). *The Huffington Post* Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/what-happened-in-switzerl\\_b\\_266190.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/what-happened-in-switzerl_b_266190.html)
- Tresser, T. (2009, October 12). What happened in Copenhagen (When we went to influence the IOC—Again). *The Huffington Post* Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/what-happened-in-copenhag\\_b\\_316371.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-tresser/what-happened-in-copenhag_b_316371.html)
- Tresser, T. (2010, February 27). *The battle for the bid—The untold story—Part 2* [PowerPoint slides] Retrieved from <http://www.slideshare.net/tomtee/battle-for-bid-part-2>
- Tresser, T. (2012, February 14). *The battle for the bid—2012 update* [PowerPoint slides] Retrieved from <http://www.slideshare.net/tomtee/battle-for-the-bid-2012-update>
- WLS-TV/DT Chicago (2009, February 1). Group argues against Chicago's Olympic bid. *ABC 7 News* Retrieved from <http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=6635069>
- WLS-TV/DT Chicago (2009, September 29). Olympics protestors arrested. *ABC 7 News* Retrieved from <http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=7039457>
- Zinser, L., & Cardwell, D. (2006, May 4). U.S.O.C. to visit 5 cities, seeking bids to 2016 Games. *New York Times* Retrieved from [http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2007-04-14-usoc-bid\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2007-04-14-usoc-bid_N.htm)