

**In Defense of Historical Facts – An Open Letter Correcting B.Tromly's  
Stalinist Revisionism of the Russian Diaspora (DRAFT) ©**

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In\_Defense\_of\_Historical\_Facts\_Correcting\_B\_Tromly\_s\_Stalinist\_Revisionism\_of\_Russian\_Diaspora\_

May, 2025

RE: The University of Puget Sound / Benjamin Tromly. **The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study**—In *Quaestio Rossica*. Vol. 10, № 2. P. 515–530. DOI 10.15826 / qr.2022.2.685 (2022). Publisher: Ural Federal University, Russia

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[The\\_Stalinist\\_Political\\_Culture\\_of\\_the\\_Second\\_Wave\\_of\\_the\\_Russian\\_Diaspora\\_A\\_Case\\_Study](#)

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## CONTENTS

Introduction: Analyses of Tromly's Historical Stalinist Disinformation .....	2
I. Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was shaped by a Stalinist political culture .....	8
II. Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was arrested due to class origins and foreign relatives ..	9
III. Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was a socially mobile and well-connected member of Stalin's elite .....	15
IV. Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was a "war criminal", "head of camp police", and "torturer of fellow-POWs" .....	17
V. Tromly's KGB disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was a "war criminal", "head of camp police", and "torturer of fellow-POWs" .....	19
VI. Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov starved his fellow-POWs to death .....	23
VII. Tromly's disinformation that the "fictional ROA" committed "war crimes" .....	25
VIII. Tromly's KGB disinformation about Col. Pozdniakov's alleged "activities in Nazi Intelligence" .....	35
IX. Tromly's KGB disinformation about Col. Pozdniakov's being a "henchman of the Gestapo" .....	39
X. Tromly's disinformation about the CIA and Col. Pozdniakov's work in the CIA .....	54
XI. Tromly's false conclusions based on KGB sources .....	71
Conclusion .....	73
Footnotes & Bibliography .....	79
APPENDIX 1 – Records of Stalin's Supreme Court's indictment of V.V. Pozdniakov for "treason" .....	88

**Keywords:** Vlasov, Vladimir V. Pozdniakov, Disinformation, Historical Misinformation, CIA, Stalinism, World War II Second Wave Emigration, Russian Diaspora, Russian Liberation Army, repatriation, collective memory, KGB, GRU, FSK, SVR, FSB, Soviet intelligence services, Foreign Agents Registration Act, US Official Secrets Act , University of Puget Sound

## INTRODUCTION

This “open letter” identifies and analyzes Tromly’s factual errors, disinformation, mistranslations, unsubstantiated assertions, and errors of logic; corrects fabrications of historical truth; demonstrates lapses in ethical historical research methods; and examines Tromly’s motivations for assembling a virulent paper fifty years after the death of its principal subject.

Tromly’s basic thesis, as illustrated by the title of his “case study,” is that one individual can exemplify the political and cultural characteristics of an entire group. There are two logical fallacies of group attribution error (GAE) and fundamental attribution error (FAE) in this thesis, confounding groups with individuals or individuals with groups. These are the very arguments used in spreading disinformation to stoke prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and to marginalize, cement control, and exclude specific groups from the larger body politic. In addition, when dealing with “memory studies”, one should take care to note that there is a fine line between researching them and creating a memory that did not exist. It is remarkably easy to cross this line, something that Tromly has managed to accomplish in his “case study”, instead of historical veracity.

The University of Puget Sound Professor Benjamin Tromly’s diaspora “case study” distorts the history of Russian Liberation Army (ROA) Colonel V.V. Pozdniakov. Tromly tries to link a fictitious “Stalinist political culture” to an entire generation of hundreds of thousands of post-WWII political refugees fleeing Stalin’s tyranny. Tromly paints these political refugees with the same “Stalinist political culture” brush to disparage and dismiss them as mere “opportunists” and “Nazi collaborators”. Tromly’s objective appears to convince his readers that he has developed a ***“new approach to the study of the political culture of the second wave of Russian emigration”***.<sup>1</sup> Tromly’s “new approach” is characterized by crudely stereotyping the entire “Second Wave” of the Russian Diaspora as ***“a generation of Russian émigrés shaped by Stalinism, genocide, and Nazi collaboration”***<sup>2</sup> in their support of the post-war anti-Stalin organizations. This has been the same approach long used in political propaganda campaigns spread by the Soviet Union since WWII. Tromly invents this “Stalinist political culture” label for a generation of people, without any oral history sources, relying instead on Tromly’s ***“newly discovered”*** online 1945 records of Stalin’s secret police. These records consist exclusively of forced interrogation protocols of rendered anti-Stalin ROA members (some of whom were later executed), placed strategically on the Internet by Putin’s security service, FSB,<sup>3</sup> to support Russia’s ongoing revision of WWII history.

To establish his misplaced theory about the “second wavers”, Tromly, taking information directly from FSB/KGB Central Archives, first defames Pozdniakov himself as ***“a politically-toxic, opportunistic, suspicious, dogmatic Stalinist; seeing entire political ideologies through the prism of threat and treachery; seeking to peddle fraudulent information for material gain; being a Nazi collaborator, war criminal, Gestapo henchman; and a torturer of his***

***fellow-POWs who poured cold water over them in winter.***” Second, without having access to any relevant classified US government records, Tromly published condemnations of the CIA and speculations about alleged failures of early CIA operations against the Soviet Union.

Tromly does not provide any evidence of how he acquired knowledge about such details of still classified US Army and CIA intelligence collection programs. Tromly cannot factually generalize about the actual outcomes of these secret operations from over 75 years ago.

This review is based on the private papers of Col. V.V. Pozdniakov’s archive. Col. Pozdniakov’s descendants were part of the “Second Wave” (**not** imbued with a Stalinist political culture) and are well acquainted with its actual **“anti-Stalinist political culture”**. Nick Pozdniakov, served for over 26 years with the US Government, as an LRRP-Ranger patrol leader in Vietnam, and later as a career Soviet counterintelligence officer in the Clandestine Service of the Central Intelligence Agency — primarily focused abroad against the noxious activities of the KGB, GRU, FSK, SVR, and FSB. He also worked as Liaison Officer to the FBI, monitoring covert Russian Intelligence activities inside the US. His official work involved studying the uninterrupted **one-hundred-year record** of well-documented hostile espionage actions by the Soviet (and its successor) security services against the USA. Nick established how the new SVR (*Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki*, the new KGB) and its domestic counterpart, the FSB, operate to shape and execute Russia’s current *Active Measures* global disinformation campaigns, propaganda that plays such a scurrilous hidden part in Tromly’s paper.

The subject of Tromly’s “case study” is Colonel V.V. Pozdniakov, a former Soviet Red Army officer, German POW in WWII, anti-Stalin Russian Liberation Army (ROA) commander in Germany, US Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative engaged against the NKVD / KGB; anti-Stalin political activist, historian, archivist, writer, instructor of the US Air Force, and tenured professor at Syracuse University in the United States of America. At the end of WWII, from 1945 to 1951, Col. Pozdniakov risked his life in the service of the US Government by organizing the CIC/CIA’s first intelligence gathering operations against the Soviet Union and its secret police, as well as assembling historical documents of the anti-Stalin Russian Liberation Army that had been handed over by force by the Allies to the Soviet side. When later attempts by the KGB in Munich to abduct Pozdniakov failed, he fled to America for his life with his family in 1957 as a political refugee. He continued to confront the KGB through his publications. This earned him the KGB’s unrelenting attention to denounce him as a “traitor” and “war criminal,” to continue years after his death in 1973.

Tromly intentionally brushes aside documented facts that his chosen subject, Col. Pozdniakov, had been himself arrested, tortured for seventeen months, and almost executed by the NKVD, Stalin’s secret police during 1937-39. Not a Stalinist, Pozdniakov, at that time, was a technical specialist and Chemistry teacher in the Soviet military, and innocent of the crimes fabricated against him. Instead, Tromly continues to drum up Pozdniakov’s alleged “Stalinist political culture” that enveloped his entire life, asserting that Pozdniakov, himself, was the torturer!<sup>4</sup>

To support his allegations, Tromly continues his compromised research method of **omitting**

historical facts. For example, Pozdniakov was also arrested and nearly executed for “anti-German” activities by the Nazi secret police, the Gestapo, on 24 June 1944. Tromly concocts instead that Pozdniakov was a “direct henchman” of the Gestapo. Tromly asserts that Pozdniakov was also an agent of the Nazi SD *Sicherheitsdienst*, while simultaneously working for the *Abwehr* military-intelligence service as well. This is total fabrication given that Pozdniakov was incarcerated, at that time, for several years behind barbed wire in a German POW camp. More importantly, Tromly disregards the many years of valuable service that Colonel Pozdniakov provided **after** the war in the interest of the United States Government, working for the US Army CIC, SSU-CIG, the CIA, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and later for the US Air Force; not to mention Professor Pozdniakov’s more than a decade long reputable tenure at Syracuse University in New York State.

On 10 September 2024, we sent a detailed analysis to the University of Puget Sound (UPS) history department, enumerating the inconsistencies found in Professor Tromly’s research and sourcing methods, requesting a retraction and review of his paper and correction of errors. Four months later, we received the curt “three-sentence” results of UPS Provost Drew Kerkhoff’s review, who did not provide a veritable study:<sup>5</sup>

1. Provost Kerkhoff summarizes his review of Tromly’s paper with: “I found **no** evidence supporting any of these complaints. His (Tromly’s) work **appears** to conform with the scholarly standards of his field, including **carefully documenting** his sources and treating the historical evidence with appropriate levels of care, skepticism, and nuance.”<sup>5</sup>

A historian can document his sources only two ways: accurately or invalidly. If Professor Tromly only **appears** to have carefully documented his sources, then Tromly’s sources have dubious accuracy.

2. Provost Kerkhoff states further: “I also found that the article was published after appropriate peer review.”<sup>5</sup> However, the Provost does not disclose that Professor Tromly’s paper did not undergo **any peer review** by qualified scholars in the United States. Indeed, it was destined for and was actually reviewed by the *Quaestio Rossica* journal editors in Russia,<sup>6</sup> a country well-known for its rigidly state-controlled media, historical revisionism, and disdain for Western democracies and values. Tromly’s “case study” underwent a review by a Russian editorial team, not peers, who screened the content before publication approval, and added a preface<sup>7</sup> in Russian, to paint a false, malignant image of Col. Pozdniakov. Tromly’s “Russian paper” from the Ural Federal University is now cited by him and other US publications as “history”.<sup>8</sup>

We are not questioning Provost Kerkhoff’s UPS-stated qualifications of being a “*renowned quantitative ecologist whose research focuses on the ecology and evolution of plant biodiversity and the functional role of Earth’s vegetation in the global carbon cycle*”. We are not very sanguine about his review of purportedly scholarly historical research focused on a complex period of WWII, much of it in the Russian language.

3. Most noteworthy, Provost Kerkhoff neglects to address a key issue of our objections: in an

unsubstantiated reference, Tromly links an anonymous personal “Russian electronic source E.Efimenko” to the libel of Pozdniakov’s son.<sup>9</sup> Tromly **states** that his anonymous personal source, E.Efimenko, asserted that Col. V.V. Pozdniakov was involved in unsuccessful CIA recruitment operations, and that confirmation of this classified information was provided by Pozdniakov’s son (himself a career CIA Soviet counterintelligence officer). Tromly publishes the following: “**Confirmation of Col. Pozdniakov’s involvement in this (failed CIA) operation – documentation of which is still classified – comes from Pozdniakov’s son, Nicholas.**”<sup>10</sup> This statement by Tromly / Efimenko / UPS is an outright invention.

By specifically publishing Pozdniakov’s son’s name in the public domain without cause, Tromly inserts this author into the false narrative that his father was also a “**Gestapo henchman and torturer.**”<sup>11</sup> Provost Kerkhoff defends Tromly as **carefully documenting his sources** even though this author had emphatically refuted to UPS of ever knowing Tromly’s *Efimenko*, or sharing any unauthorized still classified CIA operation results with him. This implies that the University Provost concludes Nick to be the **fabricator** regarding the invented statements made by Tromly and his anonymous personal electronic source, about him, his father, and the CIA. This points to two possible outcomes: either Pozdniakov’s son is violating the US Official Secrets Act, a criminal offense, or it is Tromly who is circumventing the Foreign Agents Registration Act 22 U.S.C. Ch. 11, Subch. II § 611, which may also be a criminal offense committed by Tromly.<sup>12</sup>

It should be noted that in 2000-2001, a younger Tromly had spent one year in Russia as an exchange teacher. This was an especially vulnerable time when the Russian security services typically targeted visitors and foreign academic candidates, if not for outright recruitment, then to strengthen their ideological sympathies for Soviet / Russian political goals. For decades, the NKVD/KGB has celebrated successes in its recruitment operations of foreign scholars, notably the Cambridge University Five spy network.

From this author’s personal experience during the 1970s in the CIA, extensively debriefing Soviet sources passing through the SE Division Defector Branch, SE Division Soviet Émigré Branch, and CIA Counterintelligence Staff, the following was documented: Earlier in 1967, the KGB had set up a new department, the Fifth Directorate, whose Third Section was solely concerned with the surveillance of students and teachers in **all** higher education institutions of the Soviet Union. Each university and research institute had its own covert KGB “*stukachy*” (informers / minders) network whose job was to monitor the overall student mood, as well as to become “friends” with any foreign exchange scholar colleagues and report to the KGB on their personalities, outlook, and vulnerabilities.

Later, when Tromly arrived in St. Petersburg, the KGB’s successor service, FSB, had already taken over the same functions to monitor foreign exchange scholars for their suitability as recruited agents, or just for use as unwitting collaborators to further Russian propaganda objectives. At present, the major universities in Russia all have FSB officers attached to them, but not listed as such on any staff rosters or websites.<sup>13</sup>

Before going to Russia, Tromly had worked for the CIA-founded Radio Liberty in Prague that

broadcasts to Russia, where he wrote daily synopses on current affairs in Russia and worked with research staff to support journalists reporting on Russia. This would make him a **high-priority** recruitment target of the FSB. A typical strategic objective for Russian Intelligence was for its *minders* to maintain contact with their Western academic targets to continue monitoring their outlook and personal situations long into the future.

There is no doubt that the FSB would have closely monitored Tromly while he was working in Russia and kept continued interest focused on him after he had left the country. After returning to the US, Tromly wrote a book that did not escape FSB scrutiny, condemning the early CIA operations against the Soviet Union, in which Col. Pozdniakov played a crucial part.

Col. Pozdniakov's Russian-speaking son has been well known to the KGB and FSB for over two decades and was himself listed in a KGB *Active Measures* disinformation media placement operation of 1985 as being associated with so-called "*CIA plotting in the Third World*" campaigns. It would not be surprising then if Efimenko's fabrications about Col. Pozdniakov, his son, and "CIA failures" were later intentionally made available to Tromly by the FSB. Any formal investigation of Tromly's sourcing would focus on his "personal electronic correspondence" with Efimenko of 2 May 2021 to confirm this.

Tromly cited in his paper that he submitted the case study to the Russian journal on 13 May 2021 — just 11 days after receiving the Efimenko electronic correspondence about the Pozdniakovs and the CIA. It is noteworthy to point out that Tromly's paper was then published by the Ural Federal University in Russia, as well as immediately cited by the Scientific Electronic Library of Russia.<sup>14</sup> The question thus arises, is it Tromly who is using the anonymous Efimenko in his research to "write history," or is it Efimenko and/or other undisclosed Russian entities that are using Tromly instead for their own calculated purposes?

Tromly describes himself<sup>15</sup> as a "Distinguished Professor of History" at the University of Puget Sound, although we have not seen publication of this title by UPS. A Distinguished Professor of History clearly documents his sources according to the American Historical

Association's principle of "**leaving a clear trail for subsequent historians to follow.**"<sup>16</sup>

Thus far, Tromly is leaving a trail of dubious historical narrative for researchers, university students, and faculty alike. The University of Puget Sound has declined to disclose any information about the anonymous source of Tromly's libel of Pozdniakov's son, regarding unauthorized disclosure of classified CIA materials clearly cited in the "case study", or any details about other questionable research materials from anonymous sources in Russia. This is because UPS cannot **substantiate** the fabrications contained in its paper.

4. UPS Provost Kerkhoff sums up his review by stating that the American Historical Association's Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct explains that "*disagreements and uncertainties enrich our discipline and are the source of its liveliness and its scholarly improvement.*"<sup>17</sup> This leaves us to ponder how exactly allegations against a retired CIA officer violating the Official Secrets Act made by an anonymous Russian source to an US history

professor, or the contradiction of Col. Pozdniakov being both a “Stalinist” and a “Gestapo henchman” enriches discipline and scholarly improvement in historical clarity at the University of Puget Sound?

5. It is estimated that a total of at least ten to twenty million (Gorbachev Glasnost’ publication 4 February 1989, New York Times) innocent victims fell to the Soviet security services during Stalin’s time who were either executed or sent to forced labor camps, destined to suffer a slow death. There were more than 750,000 innocent people alone executed during Stalin’s Red Terror of 1937–38 on falsified charges of being traitors, counterrevolutionaries, enemies of the people, Trotskyite revisionists, spies, saboteurs, class enemies, terrorists.”<sup>18</sup> Based on V.V. Pozdniakov’s personal traumatic experience in the NKVD’s Saratov prison during 1937, the typical “enemy of the people”, arrested on fabricated charges, was first ordered to admit to the reason for his arrest, then beaten until he signed a falsified interrogation protocol confirming his guilt, which then resulted in the “legal” basis for conviction, execution, or imprisonment. After seventeen months’ incarceration, V.V. Pozdniakov withstood all his beatings without signing or “confessing” to any charges, barely managing to survive. He was released to be reinstated in the army with an “apology” from the Party — when war with Germany was already on the horizon. Many hundreds of thousands of his innocent “fellow-traitor” detainees did not survive, breaking under torture and signing their own death warrants.

Taking this optic into account, Tromly’s use of the Central Archive of the NKVD / KGB / FSB is a flagrant example of flaws in sourcing methods, as well as in the conclusion of the UPS review that Tromly is “*treating the historical evidence with appropriate levels of care and skepticism.*” Is it reasonable to expect Pozdniakov’s rendered POW fellow officers to state anything credible about him during a hostile interrogation while being threatened or beaten by their SMERSH inquisitors?<sup>19</sup> Such use of biased and suspect sourcing implicates Tromly himself equally in continuing the **falsification** of the historical record of WWII.

6. Moreover, UPS Provost Kerkhoff glosses over the ethics of Tromly’s brazen use of **hearsay** to make fraudulent statements masquerading as historical fact, *i.e.*, “*according to Soviet authorities (NKVD) ... and hearsay had it that Pozdniakov tortured POWs, pouring cold water over them in the winter.*”<sup>20</sup> Tromly dismisses, in violation of any professional historian’s code, crucial biographical data that the same NKVD had knocked out all of Pozdniakov’s teeth during his earlier incarceration at the Saratov and Kuybyshev NKVD prisons.<sup>21</sup> This is yet another example of the University of Puget Sound Provost’s flawed review in justifying Tromly’s outright use of **hearsay** as “uncertainties that enrich our (UPS) discipline and are the source of its liveliness and its scholarly improvement”.

In summary, Tromly’s basic thesis, as illustrated by the title of his “case study,” is that one individual can exemplify the political and cultural characteristics of an entire group. There are two logical fallacies of group attribution error (GAE) and fundamental attribution error (FAE) in this thesis, confounding groups with individuals or individuals with groups. These are the very arguments used in spreading disinformation to stoke prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and to marginalize, cement control, and exclude specific groups from the larger body politic. In

addition, when dealing with “memory studies”, one should take care to note that there is a fine line between researching them and creating a memory that did not exist. It is remarkably easy to cross this line, something that Tromly has managed to accomplish in his “case study”, instead of historical veracity.

Tromly’s articles, published in the Russian language and in journals, compiled works issued in the Russian Federation, have themselves become part of the historical myth being constructed by the Putin regime. References to Tromly’s publications are actively circulated in the Telegram universe, particularly by such odious channels as the anonymous Russian-controlled media outlet “*Zametki Istorika*” (Comments of a Historian), clearly implying that they fit well with the views propounded by official Russian sources.<sup>22</sup> It is apparent that Tromly did not randomly choose Col. Pozdniakov as a subject to contribute an impartial historical biography, but to create an artificial vilified example of a strawman. Tromly promulgates a “new approach” to historical disinformation, by labeling the entire “Second Wave” of the Russian Diaspora as possessing an analogous so-called “Stalinist political culture”, exemplified in the distorted fictional biography of one man.

In his rationale of presenting himself as an “objective expert” on Soviet history, Tromly might claim that he finds himself currently sanctioned by Russia (presumably for his conflicting stance on the war in Ukraine). But this can be attested to by the Putin regime’s embrace of Lenin’s two word characterization of the Great October Socialist Revolution’s foreign ideological sympathizers who were useful in supporting the propaganda goals of the Bolsheviks at that time. Tromly’s Stalinist pro-Putin historical outlook makes him a “*полезный идиот*” for Russia, while his differences with Russian actions in Ukraine make him just an “*идиот*” to be sanctioned.<sup>23</sup>

## ANALYSES OF TROMLY’S HISTORICAL STALINIST DISINFORMATION

### I. Re: Tromly’s disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was shaped by a Stalinist political culture

Tromly begins his narrative by labeling Col. Pozdniakov as shaped by a “Stalinist political culture” and being an “opportunistic, suspicious, and dogmatic member of the Soviet elite” that embodied his later “collaboration with the Nazis”, and his subsequent career with US Intelligence.<sup>24</sup>

What emerges is a striking trend. Pozdniakov’s actions across the 1940s and into the 1950s underscore the formative influence of his past as a member of the Soviet elite (specifically, the officer corps of the 1930s). Pozdniakov was opportunistic, suspicious, and dogmatic – all qualities that were crucial for advancement and even mere survival in the Soviet elite in the 1930s. Stalinist political culture shaped Pozdniakov’s actions outside

24

Tromly appears to ignore the well-documented history of the early Soviet Union. In 1919, when V.V. Pozdniakov joined the Red Army as a naive fifteen-year-old schoolboy to help support his starving, repressed family, there was **no** “Stalinist political culture”. Stalin, the one-time bank

robber, was instead himself censured by Lenin's Party for his failures in military operations during the Russian Civil War. Leon Trotsky, the founder of the Red Army, and its leader, was the actual national hero then. Stalin became the supreme leader of the party, military, and state only in 1929, after orchestrating the expulsion of his arch-rival Trotsky from the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Union and later ordering his assassination in Mexico.

That same year, in 1929, Soviet military records show that the 25-year-old Lieutenant V.V. Pozdniakov was first arrested by Stalin's secret police, OGPU, on trumped-up charges of "sabotage", and sentenced to one year imprisonment. The sentence became conditional as Pozdniakov's skills as a Chemist were deemed more important to the military than wasted in prison. The fact remains that during his entire first decade of service in the Red Army, Pozdniakov had no opportunity to acquire a "Stalinist political culture", simply because **no** such culture existed at that time.

In 1937, Pozdniakov was arrested and imprisoned for "treason", a second time by Stalin's secret police, the NKVD. According to Tromly's allegations, it follows that Pozdniakov suddenly acquired his supposed "Stalinist political culture" and membership in "Stalin's elite" after his first arrest, and during the seven-year period before his second arrest, while working as a Chemistry specialist lieutenant in the military. Or perhaps Pozdniakov acquired his Stalinist political culture after being tortured by Stalin's secret police during 1937-39? Tromly broadly smears Pozdniakov's character with Stalinism for the rest of his life after he was actually himself physically abused by Stalin's henchmen! During his arrest, Pozdniakov was posted at the remote Saratov Armor School, a thousand kilometers from Moscow, far away from the center of Stalin's nomenklatura and elite, his supposed provenance as touted by Tromly.

## II. Re: Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was arrested due to class origins and foreign relatives

Tromly outright invents that Pozdniakov was arrested in 1937 for "*suspicious due to his **class origins** and the **fact that he was related to Russians living abroad***".<sup>25</sup> This statement was **falsely** sourced by Tromly to Professor K.M. Aleksandrov's 2011 biography of key members of the Russian Liberation Army.<sup>26</sup> Tromly acknowledges that he "...*benefit(ed) from a previous effort to write Pozdniakov's biography, albeit one from a **very different perspective***".<sup>27</sup> In his other writings Tromly unprofessionally dismisses Aleksandrov as being an "*apologist historian—associated with a semi-fascistic, collaborationist, anti-Semitic pro-Nazi émigré organization (NTS) which served in German intelligence and propaganda structures during the Second World War*".<sup>28</sup>

Despite libeling Professor Aleksandrov of the Russian Academy of Sciences as an "apologist pro-Nazi" historian, Tromly cites him writing the following about Pozdniakov:

Then everything came crashing down, as often happened for members of the Soviet elite under Stalin. In 1937, Pozdniakov was arrested on falsified charges of counter-revolutionary activities, perhaps coming under suspicion due to his class origins and the fact that he was related to Russians living abroad [Александров, 2011, с. 158]. In his Harvard 29

The document shown below is Aleksandrov's actual page 158, which has **no** mention (or anywhere else in his writings) of Pozdniakov's class origins or "*perhaps having relatives*" living abroad. Tromly presents fraudulent facts about the reasons for Pozdniakov's arrest. This is no casual error in Tromly's reference of Aleksandrov but an apparent deliberate effort to distort Pozdniakov's biography to support his false hypothetical "case study". To emphasize that Pozdniakov had actually not been arrested exclusively on charges of anti-Stalin treason, Tromly impresses on his readers that Pozdniakov had relatives abroad, was arrested for class origins, and instead worked diligently to become a member of Stalin's elite, imbued with a permanent "Stalinist political culture". The historical fact remains that Pozdniakov had no relatives living abroad and was specifically arrested on fabricated charges of "**espionage and anti-Stalin treason**", per Article 58-1b.<sup>30</sup>

Aleksandrov K.M. *People and Fates of the Russian diaspora*, 2011, page 158.<sup>30</sup>

(No mention anywhere by Aleksandrov of Pozdnyakov's "class origins" or "having relatives" living abroad, cited by Tromly as being the reason for his arrest.)

17 мая 1932 г. приказом № 0241-1932 РВС СССР Поздняков был назначен начальником химической службы Ульяновской бронетанковой школы. После переезда из Саратова в Ульяновск он по совместительству преподавал специальные дисциплины в Сельскохозяйственном, Автодорожном и Педагогическом институтах, а также в некоторых местных техникумах. После введения в РККА персональных воинских званий 13 января 1936 г. приказом № 0016 наркома обороны СССР Поздняков по результатам аттестации получил звание капитан.

Немного нам известно о семейной жизни Владимира Васильевича в Советском Союзе. Впервые он женился рано, в 1920-е годы, но жена умерла еще до 1930 г.<sup>16</sup> По-видимому, именно в этом несчастливом браке родилась дочь Елена (Ляля), которая после смерти матери воспитывалась у родственников или некоторое время – в новой семье отца. Она в 1944 г. (1945?) вышла замуж и с начала 1950-х гг. жила с мужем в Ленинграде. Следующий брак Позднякова состоялся в 1930-е годы, вторую жену звали Антонина Александровна<sup>17</sup>. Семья осталась в Ульяновске. Пока нам не удалось достоверно установить и судьбу родителей. Мы знаем лишь, что мать Позднякова, Елизавета Петровна, в 1956 г. была еще жива, и, по всей видимости, в преклонном возрасте проживала в Ленинграде в старой квартире на улице Рубинштейна. Об отце Василии Ивановиче сведений нет.

В конце 1936 г. в штате Саратовской бронетанковой школы открылись новые вакансии в связи с формированием дополнительных подразделений (химических батальонов). 27 декабря в соответствии с приказом № 00697 наркома обороны Поздняков получил назначение преподавателем техники средств противохимической обороны и вернулся из Ульяновска в Саратовскую бронетанковую школу, где читал курсы аналитической и общей химии. 1 февраля 1937 г. приказом № 537 наркома обороны Позднякову было досрочно присвоено воинское звание майор<sup>18</sup> (командир носил две «шпалы» в петлицах). По обычной выслуге, это высокое звание ему бы присвоили лишь в январе 1940 г. Теперь же, будучи майором, Поздняков вполне мог рассчитывать на то, что зимой 1941 г., всего в возрасте 36 лет станет полковником РККА – звания «подполковник» в 1937 г. в армии еще не существовало.

Но благополучная командирская карьера не состоялась.

В декабре 1937 г. майор Поздняков неожиданно был арестован органами НКВД по обвинению в совершении целого букета контрреволюционных преступлений, предусмотренных статьями 58-й УК РСФСР: 58-16 («Измена Родине военнослужащим»), 58-6 («Шпионаж»), 58-7 («Подрыв государственной промышленности»), 58-8

While referring to himself as an *expert and distinguished historian of WWII*, in his case study, Tromly cavalierly dismisses ROA Colonel Pozdniakov as being “*the amateur historian*”. Despite that stereotype, Pozdniakov served in combat during WWII and was involved on a daily basis in the creation of the Russian Liberation Army until long after its rendition and personally interacted with all its principals. He collected and preserved voluminous documents on the organization. Pozdniakov was General Vlasov’s senior operational adjutant,<sup>31</sup> and responsible for all Russian Liberation Army officer candidate selection (eight thousand men), as well as their training and promotion at the ROA Dabendorf Officer Academy. He was present at all significant ROA meetings and negotiations, in the company of General Vlasov. Pozdniakov was Vlasov’s designated Plenipotentiary to negotiate the surrender of the ROA to the Americans in May 1945.<sup>32</sup> He certainly had more precise qualifications, than exhibited by Professor Tromly, to write about the history of the ROA and the subsequent **anti-Stalinist** Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora. History and war are not witnessed decades later from inside the library.

ROA Colonel V.V. Pozdniakov (standing left) and General Vlasov (sitting bottom right) (Personal Archive, ROA Colonel Pozdniakov)





31


Col. Pozdniakov leading class of Russian Liberation Army (ROA) officers, 1944, asserted by Tromly to be *fictional*  
(Personal Archive, ROA Colonel Pozdniakov)



(Personal Archive, ROA Colonel Pozdniakov)



Tromly had also read Aleksandrov's documentation<sup>21</sup> from Soviet archives that Col. Pozdniakov had never been a member of the Communist Party, but fails to disclose this critical historical fact in his writings. This is **intentional omission** of material evidence that Pozdniakov could not possibly have been part of the Soviet Stalinist elite where Communist Party membership was obligatory.



Aleksandrov K.M. *People and Fates of the Russian Diaspora*, 2011, page 155 <sup>30-32</sup>

Claiming to be a distinguished historian, Tromly deliberately makes this key omission that puts to rest his claim that Pozdniakov was a member of Stalin's elite. Both the Central Archives of the Soviet Ministry of Defense (ЦАМО) and the Russian Government Military Archives (РГБА) reflect that Col. Pozdniakov had **never** been a member of the РКСМ—ВЛКСМ, aka the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League / Komsomol, nor a member of the ВКП(б), aka the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, which later became the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It is well known, among Sovietologists, that being an active party member, as well as a dedicated party functionary, was a cardinal prerequisite for anyone striving to be promoted in the party and military or especially considered as a candidate for "Stalin's elite". Pozdniakov was neither a member of the Communist Party, nor one of its functionaries, nor a military commander, and was thus not even remotely qualified to be selected to join "Stalin's party-state and military elite".

**Appendix 1**, of this paper, presents a Soviet government archive document, "**РГАСПИ дело 419**", dated 29 September 1938:

Список от 29.09.1938

РГАСПИ, ф.17, оп.171, дело 419, лист 216

This is a list of arrested "enemies of the people" signed by both Stalin and Molotov, ratifying the Category I indictment (a death sentence) for treason of V.V. Pozdniakov.<sup>32</sup> There were **884 fellow Red Army officers** indicted on the same charge, on that day alone, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. This makes preposterous Tromly's allegation that, years later, Pozdniakov continued to be steeped in a "Stalinist political culture", especially as he took up arms against the very same Stalin soon thereafter.



NKVD Saratov Prison where V.V. Pozdniakov was tortured in 1937

### III. Re: Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was a socially mobile and well-connected member of Stalin's elite

Tromly continues to write opinionated speculation,<sup>33</sup> instead of factually verified history. Tromly states that Pozdniakov:

lived in an apartment with his "own kitchen and bathroom" [HPSSS. Schedule A. Vol. 22. Case 433. P. 4-5]. In short, Pozdniakov was a socially mobile and well-connected member of Stalin's elite.

33

On the very same page of this quote, taken 75 years ago from the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System digital collection of interviews and manuals, 1950-1953,<sup>34</sup> Tromly ignores Pozdniakov's clearly stated lack of Communist Party membership or **any** military command responsibilities. Tromly omits Pozdniakov's lengthy explanation of why for two decades he remained a military Chemistry technology specialist and could not advance in the ranks of Red Army's *command*. Soviet Ministry of Defense official records clearly document Soviet Peoples Defense Commissar Order No. 0016, dated 13 January 1936, stating that Pozdniakov was promoted to the **rank of Captain** on that day, only after **seventeen years'** service in the Red Army, which was followed by a promotion to major and immediate arrest for "treason" the

following year! Tromly misuses Pozdniakov's own words describing the limits to his military career, lasting for two decades, until the actual outbreak of WWII when Stalin was faced with the adverse consequences of his brutal purges of the Red Army's officer corps. Instead, Tromly advances his bizarre theory that, during the 1930s, the young non-political Red Army chemist-lieutenant Pozdniakov had succeeded to "climb a career ladder" right up into Stalin's "military elite".

HPSSS. Schedule A. Vol. 22. Case 433, p.4. <sup>34</sup>

No. 433 BH HARVARD UNIVERSITY REFUGEE INTERVIEW PROJECT -4-

Work Section

and occasionally work at the intelligence school in Regensburg. During all these years, from 1922 to 1941 I was a lieutenant colonel. I could not advance in rank because I was not a member of the Party. (R-1 T-1)

5 (2) (a) Does not apply.

(b) I gave courses in chemical warfare I was also part of the commanding staff of the school.

(3) I liked my work very much. I was with the chemical service from the very beginning of its development and I enjoyed working with it. My wages were good by Soviet standards. At the end I received fourteen hundred rubles a month. I was also able to earn extra money from lectures. In addition I received my uniform and had an apartment with its own kitchen and bathroom, which was by Soviet standards very good.

10 There was no real chance of advancement for me until 1940. As a general rule it is necessary to be a member of the Party in order to command a unit such as a brigade or higher. In the military schools and in the special services the percentage of non-Party officers is much higher than in the line. As long as I remained with the military school, I had no chance of

20 raising above the rank of lieutenant colonel. It was only in 1940 when I was transferred to the line, that there was some chance of further advancement. But I knew that I could not go very high. There were a few generals who did not belong to the Party but they were rare. (How about General Ignatiev?) Yes, he was one of those exceptions. He did not be

25 long to the Party. He was used mainly as a propaganda figure. He was never given a command. His work consisted largely of giving lectures.

Tromly fails to mention what Pozdniakov had clearly stated in his Harvard interview:

*"I could not advance in rank because I was not a member of the Party ... there was no real chance of advancement for me until 1940 ... as a general rule it is necessary to be a member of the Party in order to command ... as long as I remained with the military school, I had no chance ... I knew that I could not go very high".<sup>34</sup>*

Instead, from Pozdniakov's extensive hours-long Harvard interviews, Tromly picks out only two words, "kitchen" and "bathroom", to label Pozdniakov as a "*socially mobile well-connected member of Stalin's party-state and military elite*".

#### **IV. Re: Tromly's disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was a "war criminal", "head of camp police", and "torturer of fellow-POWs"**

In his earlier writing of 2019,<sup>35</sup> also referenced many times in his case study of Colonel V.V. Pozdniakov, Tromly labeled Pozdniakov as a Nazi "war criminal", "head of camp police", and "torturer of fellow-POWs", sourced to a Chuikov V.I. from Georgetown University Archives.<sup>36</sup>

*Chuikov V. I. List of War Criminals and Persons Who Collaborated with the Enemy in the US Zone of Occupation in Germany. 13 May 1949 // Georgetown University Archives and Special Collections. Robert F. Kelley Papers. Box 5. Folder 6.*

36

Tromly claims to derive these characterizations of Pozdniakov from "Chuikov V.I.", found in the Robert F. Kelley Papers in the Georgetown University Archives. He does not give a specific page number where Pozdniakov is associated with any specific war crimes or torture. Box 5 Folder 6 pertains to materials about the CIA's "*Radio Liberty Formation, 1948-51*" and not to any war crimes. Tromly again provides a misleading source. The fact remains that Kelley never stated anything derogatory about Pozdniakov. Instead, Kelley was directly involved in the CIA's creation of Radio Liberation, later to become Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). Kelley and Pozdniakov collaborated closely while working for the CIA through Radio Liberty, providing scripts for broadcast to the Soviet Union. It appears that Tromly, digging somewhere through Kelley's Box 5 on Radio Liberty, fished out a list of war criminals with Pozdniakov's name on it — a list, authored by Chuikov and not Kelley. Chuikov was a prominent personage in the Soviet Red Army's senior hierarchy and a *genuine* member of Stalin's military elite. Tromly casually hides the actual identity and background of General Vasily I. Chuikov, later Marshal of the Soviet Union, who can hardly be considered a reliable unbiased source on Pozdniakov.

Red Army General Chuikov and Red Army POW Pozdniakov were no strangers in 1945. On 1 May 1945, General Chuikov spearheaded the Red Army's drive to Berlin and personally accepted the German surrender. On 8 May 1945, the commander of the American 11th Armored Division, General H.D. Dager, notified ROA Colonel Pozdniakov to surrender the Russian Liberation Army to General Chuikov. Instead, Pozdniakov ordered his men to flee to the US Zone of Occupation where the army could be interned safely in American POW camps. Chuikov then demanded the forced rendition of these POWs, including Col. Pozdniakov, to the Soviet side. Failing to capture the Russian Liberation Army and many of its officers directly, General Chuikov's military tribunal sentenced Pozdniakov in absentia to death by firing squad for treason on 9 October 1945, per Article 58-1b of the Soviet penal code,<sup>37</sup> also cited by Tromly in his paper.<sup>38</sup> This was the exact same charge levied against Pozdniakov in 1937 by the NKVD and contravenes, yet again, Tromly's claims that Pozdniakov was permanently imbued with a "Stalinist political culture" and that "*while attacking Soviet rule, then, Pozdniakov continued to support many aspects of it*".<sup>39</sup> While Pozdniakov lauded Soviet education in sciences and math, there is no historical evidence that he ever supported the political, economic, or social policies of Stalin's regime.

Escaping extradition to the Soviet Union (unlike most victims of *Operation Keelhaul*), Pozdniakov was recruited by the US Army in 1945. During the next five years, he headed the United States' covert CIC/CIG/CIA programs with his fellow-disbanded Russian Liberation Army military mates. They covertly recruited or openly approached and encouraged the defection of Red Army personnel stationed in the Soviet Eastern Occupation Zone where General Chuikov now commanded Soviet occupation forces under Soviet military governor Marshal Zhukov. At the same time, these CIC/CIG/CIA projects also focused on NKVD/SMERSH efforts to target US military personnel stationed in occupied Germany. On 13 May 1949, it was General Chuikov who apparently put together this "**List of War Criminals and Persons Who Collaborated with the Enemy in the US Zone of Occupation in Germany**".<sup>40</sup> Not surprisingly, Soviet demands to surrender and turn over these so-called "war criminals" were ignored by US military authorities. Chuikov's military counterintelligence SMERSH teams reacted by covertly deploying to the US Zone to find and abduct Pozdniakov and other former ROA officers by force (later to include Pozdniakov's operations deputy Volodya Kivi in Berlin).

More than 70 years later, Tromly refers to the same Soviet *Chuikov List* as his go-to source to denounce Pozdniakov as a war criminal, and references only this adversarial Soviet general, without disclosing Chuikov's antagonistic history with Pozdniakov. Tromly omits clarifying that Stalin, and especially his own General and later Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chuikov, considered all captured Red Army POWs of the Germans as **traitors**.

Likewise, Tromly omits the historical fact that the same General Chuikov, in May 1945, was responsible in helping the NKVD/SMERSH setting up its ten special *filtration* camps in occupied Germany to process “traitor” Russian prisoners for repatriation, confinement, and execution. Of 150,000 Russian prisoners detained in these camps, more than 40,000 died or were executed there. The 1945 memoirs<sup>50</sup> of a ROA POW survivor of SMERSH Filtration Camp No. 237 near Zerbst describe him sleeping in a damp hole dug in the ground covered with evergreen branches, with fellow-prisoners dying of starvation — conditions many times more deplorable than he had experienced in the previous German POW camps. This opens the question if Chuikov himself is the actual war criminal in Tromly’s presentation, instead of Pozdniakov who escaped his fate of rendition to SMERSH. In all, 4 million captured and former Soviet citizens were interrogated in the German and SMERSH filtration camps in the other occupation zones, including the NKVD prisons in Russia.

This white paper emphatically refutes the results of the UPS provost quantitative plant ecologist’s perfunctory and cavalier review of Tromly’s “case study” — clearly presenting factual evidence that Tromly did **not** “*treat the historical evidence with appropriate levels of care, skepticism, and nuance*”. University of Puget Sound support for continued prescriptive historiography, the distortion of human history, affecting past and future generations, is an obvious infraction of the Faculty Integrity Code and academic freedom. Intentional Misinformation or Disinformation is not synonymous with academic freedom. Academic freedom is informed speech, not free speech, firmly grounded in establishing and disseminating legitimate and independently verifiable scholarship to expand knowledge. This open letter provides verifiable material facts that demonstrate Tromly’s historical disinformation about the Russian Diaspora and his fictional biography of Col. V.V. Pozdniakov.

#### **V. Re: More Tromly and KGB disinformation that Col. Pozdniakov was a “war criminal”, “head of camp police”, and “torturer of fellow-POWs”**

Tromly’s next go-to-source<sup>41</sup> on the “war criminal / head of camp police / torturer” Pozdniakov, that is mentioned more than a half dozen times in his paper,<sup>42</sup> is none other than the Central Archive of the FSB / KGB / NKVD. Tromly chose the official KGB records to quote the hostile interrogations of several Col. Pozdniakov’s former ROA military mates in 1945. These same ROA soldiers were rendered after the war by force to the same NKVD whose interrogators had knocked out all Pozdniakov’s teeth, using a broken-off wooden chair leg just a few years earlier. They tried to force him to sign a false confession that he was a “spy” during seventeen months of torture at the Saratov and Kuybyshev NKVD prisons. Tromly fails “*to honor the integrity of the historical record*” with his deliberate use of the FSB / KGB / NKVD as sources to accuse Pozdniakov himself of “torture”. The University of Puget Sound’s Provost and distinguished

history professor, Tromly, casually disregard the basic principles of academic integrity and impartiality that are every true historian's research tool and convention.

After 2015, the FSB made its KGB/NKVD archives of **“Власов: история предательства”** searchable online (in Russian).<sup>42</sup> The public can access the certified interrogation protocols of listed Stalin's “traitors” directly. These archives are described as: *“General Vlasov: a Story of Betrayal, which presents documents from the Court's investigative case of A. A. Vlasov and his accomplices (interrogation protocols, transcripts of confrontations, extracts from interrogation reports), stored in the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation.”*<sup>42</sup>

Without referring to any torture by Pozdniakov, but fishing for a “Nazi connection”, Tromly writes<sup>20</sup> that: *“Under interrogation by the Soviet secret police, Vlasovite A.A. Rtishchev commented that Pozdniakov often praised the German command, saying that the Red Army will be defeated”*. Although we could not find the wording of this quote, it appears to be derived by Tromly from the *“Protocol of Interrogation of A.A. Rtishchev. May 21, 1945 // Central Archive of the FSB (KGB/NKVD) of Russia. F. 40. Op. 25. D. 509. L. 207215, Interrogator SMERSH Captain Novikov”*.<sup>43</sup> Note that SMERSH (*Death to Spies!*), seconded from the NKVD in April 1943, in fact, was Stalin's tool for eliminating “subversion” and collaboration in territories recaptured from the Nazis. After the war, it was primarily engaged in interrogating and executing returning Soviet prisoners of war. Rtishchev is on record mentioning knowing several Pozdniakovs but none appear that state anything about praise of the German command or defeat of the Red Army. In any case, Col. Pozdniakov is entitled to his personal opinions about the same Red Army he had served in for 22 years, and the reasons for the German capture of 5 million of its members. But Professor Tromly's brazen documentation of the official interrogation protocols by Stalin's secret police of Col. Pozdniakov's former military mates, statements made under duress by them against him, adds to the dubious research and pseudo-historical scholarship Tromly has conducted for this paper.

To pile more calumny on Pozdniakov, Tromly continues to refer to the forced interrogations of his other rendered ROA colleagues by SMERSH. Tromly states that “Pozdniakov accused (his fellow officer, ROA Colonel) A.I. Tavantsev, in KONR, of having worked for the Gestapo, an allegation that led to the latter's arrest”.<sup>44</sup> We have thoroughly examined all three documented interrogation protocols of Tavantsev<sup>45</sup> by SMERSH but could not find any mention of Pozdniakov's name in these official NKVD records. We did, however, find the real account of Tavantsev's disclosed alleged association with the Gestapo in an entirely separate interrogation protocol of ROA General G.A. Zverev: *“Протокол допроса Г. А. Зверева. 30 мая 1945 г. // ЦА ФСБ России. № Н-18766. Т. 26. Л. 40-43. Подлинник”*. However, no mention of Pozdniakov's name appears in that protocol either.<sup>46</sup>

Tromly continues to use additional defamatory information about Pozdniakov made by his fellow-ROA officer, Major A.F. Chikalov, in 1945.<sup>47</sup> At the same time, Tromly does not disclose Major Chikalov's prior well-known hostility toward Colonel Pozdniakov when both served together in the Russian Liberation Army. Pozdniakov never trusted Chikalov given Chikalov's previous two-decade-long career service in Stalin's secret police, NKVD, and membership in the Bolshevik Party. Chikalov was captured by the Germans and detailed to the Russian Liberation Army just three years after Pozdniakov's own torture by the same NKVD. In August 1945, Chikalov, like Pozdniakov, escaped rendition from the American camp. He was later arrested in 1947 by the US Army CIC in Munich on suspicions of working for the NKVD, but was released. Chikalov blamed the arrest on Pozdniakov. Two years later, he was again arrested by the CIC in Munich on the same grounds, interned in US Repatriation Camp No. 226, and extradited to the Soviet Union. Chikalov was tried in Moscow in 1950, convicted of treason, and executed. Tromly's choice of Chikalov as a reliable source on Pozdniakov is manifest intentional disinformation.

In addition to referring to Chuikov and Chikalov, painting a dark picture of Pozdniakov, Tromly further sources his claim that Pozdniakov was the "head of camp police" and a "torturer", by irresponsibly quoting the following unidentified hearsay:<sup>48</sup>

*"According to both Soviet authorities and some fellow postwar displaced persons ... **hearsay** in Vlasovite circles later in the war had it that Pozdniakov tortured POWs, pouring cold water over them in the winter". (Note – Tromly's 'Soviet authorities' being Stalin's secret police)<sup>48</sup>*

Without revealing the details of where he had obtained his hearsay material, it can nonetheless be traced to the "Certified Copy of the Protocol of Interrogation of A. G. Ershov. July 4, 1945 // Central Archives of the FSB (KGB/NKVD) of Russia. No. N-18766. T. 11. L. 141-146, Interrogator SMERSH Captain Bibarsov, pg. 63" — found in the KGB archive.<sup>49</sup>

По частным слухам, а также слов полковника СОЛОГУБА, ПОЗДНЯКОВ был в каком-то из лагерей военнопленных начальником полиции, издевался над военнопленными, провинившихся военнопленных, несмотря на их болезненное состояние, зимой обливали холодной водой. Мы категорически требовали и у ТРУХИНА и у МЕАНДРОВА убрать такого мерзавца, но ничего не достигли. ПОЗДНЯКОВА почти все ненавидели. В работе с ним я не сталкивался.

49

(translation from Russian: "I have never personally encountered Col. Pozdniakov in my actual duties with the ROA, but almost everyone in the ROA hated that despicable person because according to **private rumors**, and the words of Colonel

*Sologub, he had mocked and doused ailing prisoners with cold water in **some** POW camp in winter where he was head of camp police”).*

We could not identify this Sologub further in the same NKVD interrogation records. Apart from this vague hearsay (obtained under duress), not a single other source cited by Tromly, is on record stating anywhere that he was actually himself tortured by Pozdniakov or had seen anyone specifically being doused by him with cold water in winter or could just name someone else who had been. Pozdniakov was well known to many thousands of fellow Red Army POWs in the German camps, as they elected him to be their commander and representative to camp authorities (but not exercising any “head of camp police” security functions).<sup>50</sup> For decades after the war, no one in the Russian Diaspora, has ever come out claiming to have been tortured by Pozdniakov.

Tromly’s allegations about Pozdniakov’s torture of fellow-POWs prevaricate the following: does someone, who was systematically tortured during seventeen months, had all his teeth knocked out, could himself then become a torturer of his fellow military mates? These allegations are especially dubious since not a single accuser has ever come forward with any actual details of torture by Pozdniakov in the entire 1945 NKVD / SMERSH / KGB’s comprehensive records of interrogations of **many hundreds of thousands** of ROA POWs. From those numbers, Pozdniakov was known to 8,000 former prisoners alone whom he had later selected, trained, and promoted at the ROA Officer Academy, and who had suffered abuse together with him in the same German POW camps.

Nevertheless, Tromly cites the 1945 NKVD / KGB records, directly quoting Soviet authorities and hearsay, citing protocols of forced interrogations by Stalin’s secret police as factual historical evidence to falsely attempt corroboration of his disinformation. It is noteworthy to mention that it was only three years later, in 1948, when Soviet authorities started to focus more closely on Pozdniakov because of his recruitment efforts against the Soviet military for the CIC and CIA in Germany. Only then did the NKVD / KGB disinformation campaigns against him start, accusing him of “war crimes”, “torture”, and “collusion with the Nazis”. But this was too late to modify the original 1945 official NKVD / SMERSH interrogation protocols that **did not contain** any such information. Interested readers can access these extensive online records of the FSB / KGB.<sup>41</sup> These KGB records contain many thousands of interrogations of Pozdniakov’s fellow-POW inmates, obtained during the 1945-1946 legal case in Moscow against Vlasov. They do not disclose any “torture” by Pozdniakov other than Tromly’s “**hearsay** *had it that Pozdniakov tortured POWs, pouring cold water over them in the winter*”.

## VI. Re: More disinformation by Tromly that Col. Pozdniakov starved his fellow-POWs to death

Regarding Tromly's ambiguous statement that Pozdniakov's fellow POW and old friend, M.M. Samygin "**claimed** that Pozdniakov had been in a position to decide which of the starving POWs would survive or perish", Tromly concludes, "**in fact**, Pozdniakov himself **admitted as much** by mentioning in a letter that he saved Samygin's life twice in this period."<sup>51</sup> Tromly is disingenuously playing with words in his Russian translations of both sources used by him. Samygin neither "claimed" such an allegation, nor did Pozdniakov "*in fact, admit*" to the same.

A closer look at Petrov's biography of Samygin, referenced by Tromly, shows that Petrov clearly details the early friendship between the two men.<sup>52</sup> Both were Chemists, serving together in the same Red Army unit (where Samygin was promoted in rank by his senior officer Pozdniakov); then both were captured and met up again in the same German POW camp. Pozdniakov saved his friend's life and later worked closely together in the Russian Liberation Army. Things changed dramatically after the war when Samygin was ill, destitute, bitter, and wrote some harsh words about his Russian Liberation Army colleagues. This resulted in his exclusion from the WWII émigré community in Munich. Pozdniakov tried to help his old friend Samygin by lending him money to open a chemistry institute in Munich, which failed. Samygin had spent the money, and did not return his loan to Pozdniakov, except for some discarded laboratory equipment. Petrov writes that they eventually came to insults and even physical threats.

Tromly cites Petrov as an authoritative source on Samygin in an attempt to implicate Pozdniakov in deciding whether his fellow POWs would survive starvation. Tromly, however, does not mention the later acute disagreements between the two men described by Petrov. This again demonstrates Tromly's ubiquitous practice of omitting and distorting material facts (often from the same source) and the lack of ethical impartiality in his academic research reporting methods. It is clear that Samygin cannot be relied upon as a disinterested source on Pozdniakov.


Further obfuscation has Tromly misinterpreting the Russian language in reporting what his source, Samygin, actually said about Pozdniakov. Compared to Tromly's statements, below is what Petrov wrote that Samygin had actually "*отмечал*" (commented, not claimed) about Pozdniakov in the camp:


Самыгин отмечал: «все свои усилия [Поздняков] сосредоточил на вытягивании из плена людей, в какой-либо области одаренных, людей с интеллектом выше среднего. Такая точка зрения не может быть признана справедливой в отношении большинства, но, вместе с тем, она привела в РОА ряд способных людей, которые иначе погибли бы в плену»<sup>46</sup>.

Translation from Russian: “Samygin commented that Pozdniakov concentrated all his efforts in **pulling out of captivity** people in any kind of gifted field, who had competence, anyone with an above average intellect. This kind of point of view cannot be recognized as being fair in relation to the collective majority, however it resulted in the ROA receiving a range of competent people, who would otherwise have perished in the camp”. (Note - including Samygin himself!)

Likewise, Pozdniakov did not “admit” to any guilt when he was allegedly in a position of deciding which of the starving POWs would perish. Instead, in his public and private writings, Pozdniakov simply stated that he had saved lives in the camp, notably, Samygin’s twice. Tromly distorts and misuses both Samygin’s and Pozdniakov’s words, many decades later, to falsely implicate Pozdniakov in the abuse of his fellow-POWs. *Pulling people out of captivity* is not the same as Tromly’s definition of starving them to death!

The reference below from Tromly’s own citation<sup>21</sup> of “Александров К. М., *Жизнь и судьба полковника Владимира Васильевича Позднякова, архивиста и собирателя второй волны русской эмиграции // Люди и судьбы русского зарубежья (pages 165-66)*”, published by the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow in 2011, presents an emotional farewell poem written on 26 July 1942 to Pozdniakov and Samygin by a group of their fellow POWs as they were transferring to another camp, Stalag III D. It briefly presents a segment of prison camp life actually shared between Pozdniakov, Samygin, and their fellow POWs (and does not remotely sound like Pozdniakov acted as the hated “head of camp police” – pouring cold water over them):





(Personal Archive, ROA Colonel Pozdniakov)

Nine months later, on 31 May 1943, both Pozdniakov and Samygin were released from Stalag III to help construct the Vlasov enterprise during the following two years, with no allegations of starving fellow POWs surfacing between the two.

In another 1941–1943 memoir<sup>53</sup> recorded by a survivor of Stalag III, Sergei Dubrovski (aka Sergei Sverchkov, later an employee of Radio Liberty who was murdered by the KGB in Munich in 1955), the author describes the day-to-day life in the same camp, together with Pozdniakov, and the activities and identities of the hated “camp police”. At the same time, Sergei writes how he himself had been denounced by the same camp police to be harshly interrogated by the Gestapo about “anti-German” activities. Sergei talks positively about Pozdniakov in his 1943 diary, and mentions nothing about him being implicated with the “camp police” nor in any abuse of fellow POWs. This makes us categorically reject Tromly’s disingenuously constructed sentence that instead of *pulling people out of captivity*, Samygin had it that Pozdniakov was responsible for starving his fellow-prisoners to death!

## VII. Re: Tromly’s disinformation that the “fictional ROA” committed “war crimes”

Not only does Tromly falsely paint Pozdniakov personally as a “*torturer*” and “*war criminal*”, but he pins the same war crimes to the entire Russian Liberation Army, even though he describes the ROA to be **fictional** in his “case study” of Pozdniakov.<sup>54</sup>

As many as 5 million Soviet Army soldiers were captured by the Germans during the war. The Russian source referenced by Tromly himself, Martynov A.V. (Мартынов А. В., Старая Басманная, 2017),<sup>62</sup> stated that out of these figures, plus other Soviet civilians under German occupation: “*voluntary helpers of the Wermacht numbered 900,000. According to data from the German General Staff, in 1943, about 500,000 Russian collaborators served the Wermacht with weapons in hand, not including many others who served in different paramilitary and police capacities*”.

No army in the history of the world has had so many documented “*traitors and collaborators*” who turned with weapons against their very own leaders, regardless of their motivations. Thus, it was in the interest of Stalin’s regime after WWII to demonstrate that this enormous armed opposition was instead *insignificant* — hence the labeling of the ROA as being semi-fictional, or fictional in name only — as Tromly advances in keeping with Stalin’s propaganda.

The historical fact remains that the ROA certainly existed physically as a significant force and acted as a potent threat to the discipline and esprit-de-corps of the Red Army (being exclusively composed of former fellow Red Army soldiers, NCOs, many hundreds of Stalin’s own officers, including almost a dozen generals). The mere existence of this sizable armed opposition seriously put in doubt the prestige and repute of Stalin as the indisputable “*Father of Nations*” — even if its actual participation in combat operations against the Red Army was limited only to the last months of the war. Because of Hitler’s mistrust of Vlasov’s personal objectives about a future independent Russia, the ROA was allowed by the Germans to start its formation only in mid-1943. Throughout 1944, the ROA grew to over 100,000 enrolled registered combat-experienced officers and men, gradually being armed with 44 aircraft, 25 tanks and armored vehicles, 230 artillery pieces, 570 mortars, and 2,100 machine guns, enumerated in German military records.<sup>55</sup>

By early 1945, ROA consisted of one complete heavy-weapons infantry division with more than 30,000 combat-experienced and fully armed men, plus tens of thousands additionally trained men waiting for arms, being formed into two other infantry divisions. The ROA’s 1<sup>st</sup> Division was initially deployed in battle against the Red Army in early April 1945, near Frankfurt-an-der-Oder. After several engagements of hard fighting against a vastly superior enemy force, however, it was ordered to redeploy east toward Prague.



ROA 1<sup>st</sup> Division's order of battle, April 1945  
(ROA Colonel Pozdniakov's private archive)

On 5 May 1945, the ROA 1<sup>st</sup> Division, armed with its heavy weaponry, turned on the Germans and fended off the relentless Waffen SS assault to suppress a Czech uprising in the capital. Together with the Czech insurgents, the ROA 1<sup>st</sup> Division succeeded in liberating and preserving Prague from destruction.<sup>56</sup> With the imminent capitulation of Germany in sight, Vlasov then ordered the 1<sup>st</sup> Division to withdraw and surrender to the Americans, before the arrival of the Red Army in Prague to claim victory in “liberating” the capital instead.



Mass grave of two generals and 187 unknown ROA soldiers, Olšany Cemetery in Prague, Czech Republic

56

Tromly's labeling of the ROA as *fictional* is not accurate. Neither is his claim for a fictional army somehow to be also involved in war crimes. Tromly states:

*"Pozdniakov's work of Vlasovite history was a propagandistic endeavor. Rather than depicting the unvarnished past, he attempted to embellish, distort, and otherwise shape it to fit a predetermined image: that of a virtuous national movement that was largely independent of German influence and **wholly disconnected** from the crimes committed by the Axis side on the Eastern front".<sup>57</sup>*

Tromly fails to provide documentation of any actual war crimes that were committed by the ROA during its one month of actual combat action and deployment in the field (early April to early May 1945). Nothing was listed by Tromly about any war crimes committed by ROA against the Red Army on the Oder, nor against the Nazis in Prague, nor against any Czech civilians. Tromly's ambiguous wording for these alleged ROA war crimes, "*not wholly disconnected from the crimes committed by the Axis*", could equally be interpreted as also "*not wholly **connected** to the war crimes of Mussolini and Hirohito*", as he suggests. Tromly presents no documented cases of any "war crimes" committed by any ROA soldiers, under

the direct command of ROA officers or through the control of General Vlasov. Since Tromly does not specify any war crimes, his writings are void of historical fact but contribute to the manipulation and changing of historical memory.

Tromly persists further in distorting the history of WWII with his claims that the ROA **was** implicated in war crimes on Wikipedia's presentation<sup>58</sup> of General Vlasov:

*"Tromly **believes** that the works of Catherine Andreyev and Kirill Aleksandrov [ru] keep the "essential contours" of Nicolaevsky's narrative, and that Andreyev "bypasses controversial questions about the context in which Vlasov troops were recruited, the émigrés employed in Nazi security agencies, and the deep internal hostilities within the KONR's ranks", as well as **the war crimes committed by the soldiers of the ROA**[28]."*<sup>58</sup> [28]

<https://journals.flvc.org/UFJUR/article/download/130757/136333/240252>

Tromly criticizes historian Catherine Andreyev's writings for "bypassing the ROA's war crimes" by providing a sophomoric source for this odious claim (28) above: the undergraduate paper of Julia Shapiro, University of Florida, that cites a number of "new Soviet sources" for her erroneous conclusions, including Stalin's secret police, the same improbable reference used by Tromly.<sup>59</sup> In her paper, Shapiro also falsely attributes the reference for these war crimes allegation to noted Russian historian Marc Raeff, 1988<sup>60</sup> <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2498861>). Examination of this reference, a review of Andreyev's writings by Raeff, contains absolutely **no** mention of the words "war crimes" or any other crimes committed by the ROA. Shapiro, thus, makes **bogus statements** of alleged war crimes committed by the ROA, citing Raeff's 1988 review of Andreyev's book that is a favorable evaluation of her research, and not glossing over any war crimes:

Andreyev's valuable monograph not only throws much light on an interesting aspect of World War II, but it also dramatically illustrates the consequences of the political

p132

Reviews

133

infantilism induced by the Soviet regime. Has this situation changed much since Stalin? I wonder.

MARC RAEFF  
Columbia University

Since no actual war crimes are specified by either Andreyev, Shapiro, Raeff, or Tromly, it is futile to attempt establishing who exactly is "glossing over" what.

Neither Tromly nor Shapiro served in the military of WWII or saw any actual war themselves, thus, their competence in evaluating the various complex military command structures and combat responsibilities on the multiple fronts of WWII (including the war crimes committed), is unreliable. With regard to allegations of war crimes, Tromly / Shapiro appear to be confused about the different roles played by the ex-Red Army soldiers (and civilian recruits) who were exclusively under the command and control of the German Wehrmacht and *Waffen SS* with other ex-Red Army soldiers who instead were confined in German POW camps. These latter Soviet POWs in German camps were being recruited into the Russian Liberation Army and were under the entirely **separate** direct command and control of General Vlasov. Tromly conveniently glosses over the fact that the several hundred thousand former Red Army men and volunteer Cossacks, who had joined or were directly recruited **by the Wehrmacht** and SS instead and actively fought against the Red Army on the Eastern Front, or acted as occupation forces by the Germans, were **never** under any control of the (fictional) ROA. However, Tromly casually uses the term “soldiers of the ROA” committing war crimes on the Eastern Front. The commander in chief of the Russian Liberation Army, General Vlasov, was himself a prisoner in Germany, and not in command of any troops serving on the Eastern Front, where Tromly insists that his “ROA soldiers” were committing crimes. That General Vlasov **never** commanded any ROA troops on the Eastern Front is a well-known historical fact — which disputes Tromly’s fiction about the ROA. While citing Tromly’s “*ROA war crime beliefs*”, the same Wikipedia article<sup>58</sup> also clearly states: “**Several hundred thousand former Soviet citizens served in the German army wearing this (ROA) patch, but never under Vlasov's own command**”.

Tromly and Shapiro appear together in yet another disingenuous contribution to Wikipedia on the Russian Liberation Army<sup>61</sup> and its so-called “war crimes”, which requires a correction. Tromly cites the same Shapiro as a reference of ROA soldiers’ war crimes: “*Other scholars (Tromly) criticize the views of Conquest and Soviet dissidents, noting that anti-communist literature on Vlasov **glosses over documented** Nazi sympathies and **crimes of ROA soldiers***”. Julia Shapiro also highlights that “*Vlasov could have avoided working with the Germans; **in Soviet interrogation transcripts**, Vlasov and fellow collaborators recall meeting several high-ranking Red Army captives who faced no punishment for refusing to cooperate.*”<sup>61</sup>


This naive and preposterous claim by the undergraduate Shapiro, citing the hostile interrogations of the later-executed General Vlasov himself, and his rendered ROA high-ranking officers, is not based on any historical facts — other than on the deceptive records of Stalin’s secret police (**i.e. its forced interrogation transcripts of ROA members**). Shapiro does not specifically identify any of those surviving “*high-ranking Red Army captives*” who had provided such counsel to General Vlasov — himself the highest-ranking prisoner in the camp. Instead, those same “high-ranking Red Army captives” in Tromly’s sourcing of Shapiro, in reality,

themselves ended up being interrogated, and many sent to the Gulag upon their voluntary repatriation or forced rendition home.

Perhaps Vlasov, and his fellow prisoners, could have “*avoided working with the Germans*”, had they not all been abandoned in the German death camps by Stalin as “traitors”, for allowing themselves to be captured after fighting for the very same Stalin. Instead, Shapiro is naively speculating what **millions** of Soviet POWs “*should have done*” while they were daily facing imprisonment, abuse, starvation, sickness, and death in the camps. Shapiro has no basis, scholarly or morally, to examine and opine about incarcerated POWs’ personal motivations and decisions during those desperate life and death circumstances. It is unclear how a purportedly distinguished historian, like Tromly, can cite an undergraduate student, who is quoting from old NKVD interrogation protocols of the executed General Vlasov, as a reliable historical source on the ROA in WWII?

One has only to look at Stalin’s own concern for his captured POWs in the German camps by examining Molotov’s handwritten signed response “***Do Not Answer Anything***” to the International Red Cross telegram of 6 January 1942, presented below, offering to distribute a little sugar to the Red Army captives held there!

“Do Not Answer Anything” – Molotov, 1942



Note that Tromly's other cited supportive Russian historical source in his "case study" of Pozdniakov — Martynov, A.V. — on the other hand, presents the much more plausible historical outcome of the Soviet POW renditions: "*only a **hand-full** of the (2.4 million post-World War II) Soviet returnees escaped execution, prison, or the camps once returning home.*"<sup>62</sup>

The same Wikipedia article<sup>61</sup> about the ROA contains the citation of another important documented material historical fact — describing prominent Nazi ministry official Eberhard Taubert quoting in 1944 that the ROA "**neither praised the Nazis**" nor addressed the "Nazi's Jewish Question":

The Nazis were suspicious of Vlasov, his organisation and his ideological position, and the Gestapo warned about the possibility of the Vlasovites betraying the Reich. The suspicions and criticism of the Vlasovites from the Reich officials was summarised in a document by the Ministry of Propaganda official Eberhard Taubert who described his concerns about the movement being "not National Socialist": "It is significant that it does not fight Jewry, that the Jewish Question is not recognized as such at all"; instead it presented "a watered-down infusion of liberal and Bolshevik ideologies", and Taubert described the concern with "strong Anglophile sympathies" and it "toying with the idea of a possible change of course" while not "feel[ing] bound to Germany".<sup>[15][16][17]</sup>

61

But on the very same page,<sup>61</sup> Tromly, contradictorily cites **himself as the source** for the ROA's *supposed* "**praise of the Nazis**", quoting the exact **opposite** of a documented historical fact that is presented in actual official German records:




Benjamin Tromly writes that "Vlasovite-run press organs and camps to train Russian propagandists praised National Socialism and spread Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda", and the "democratic veneer" seen in the declarations of ROA was only made in attempt to make the movement palatable to the Western powers.<sup>[14]</sup>

14. ^ Tromly, Benjamin (2021). "Beyond Betrayal: Recent Russian Scholarship on Vlasov and Russian Collaboration" . *The Russian Review*. **80** (2). University of Puget Sound: 294–301. doi:10.1111/russ.12312 .

For his above-mentioned paper, "*Recent Russian Scholarship on Vlasov*", Tromly misleadingly cites his reference for "*The Vlasov Case: History of a Betrayal*" as being the "*Federal Archival Agency of Russia*" (<http://government.ru/en/departments/336/>), without disclosing its actual sourcing, coming not from **any recent scholarship**, but from the 1945 SMERSH interrogation protocols previously cited by Tromly:

- The Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation

Tromly's statement above that "*Vlasovite-run press organs and camps to train Russian propagandists praised National Socialism, etc.*" is totally false because he **cannot** provide a single example of a ROA publication that praised the Nazis<sup>64</sup> — which instead focused on the abuses of Stalin's totalitarian system, the political future of Russia, and on the guidelines of the ROA soldier's ethics, behavior, and vision. Actual published ROA documents were obviously never examined by Tromly in detail:



The historical documentation<sup>61</sup> of Hitler's own prominent ideologist, Eberhard Taubert, complaining in a 1944 report that the Vlasov Movement was "**not National Socialist**" (i.e not Nazi), belies Tromly's use of his "*recent Russian scholarship*" FSB/KGB sourcing to claim the contrary about the ROA. The historical fact remains that the same secret police used force to interrogate millions of rendered Soviet POWs after the war to obtain written protocols of "confessions" about their "treason" in the ROA that are now being posted online and claimed as new "history" by the *Federal Archival Agency of Russia* and the FSB. This conforms to Putin's program of reconstructing collective memory to inculcate his ideological agenda.

The question can thus be directly posed to the University of Puget Sound's History Department — did "*the university follow its process to **appropriately review** whether Professor Tromly adhered to professional standards in conducting and publishing his **scholarly research**, and conclude that he did*"?<sup>91</sup>

### VIII. Re: Tromly's disinformation about Pozdniakov's alleged "**activities in Nazi Intelligence**"

Tromly's "research" on Pozdniakov's alleged "activities in Nazi intelligence" is ambiguous at best.<sup>63</sup>


*"While the details of Pozdniakov's intelligence work **is lacking**—and Pozdniakov **always denied** spying for the Germans—it **seems almost certain** that he was active in this sphere, **perhaps working** as an agent of the Abwehr. Moreover, it is **plausible to suggest** that Pozdniakov's activities in Nazi intelligence were instrumental for his appointment in the Vlasov enterprise".<sup>7</sup>*

<sup>7</sup> [Власов: история предательства, т. 2, кн. 1, с. 209].


Tromly, uses the words **denied spying, lacking details, almost certain, perhaps working, plausible to suggest** but does not explain exactly how Pozdniakov had the time or opportunity to spy for the Gestapo, the Nazi SD *Sicherheitsdienst*, the Abwehr military intelligence, and later charge of also working for the SS *Schutzstaffel* — all at the same time — while being incarcerated from 14 August 1941 to 31 May 1943 in a POW camp. At that time, he was surrounded by barbed wire, where the Vlasov enterprise was actually being created. Not surprisingly, Tromly sources this false defamatory information through his **footnote 7** above, yet again, directly to the Central Archives of Stalin's secret police, the NKVD and KGB. While Tromly presents himself as an expert on 'Intelligence',<sup>15</sup> he dismisses the well-grounded precept that it is highly unlikely for any intelligence service to share exclusive control and tasking of its agents with other competitor security services. Only the KGB is capable of

promoting that Col. Pozdniakov simultaneously worked for the Gestapo, Abwehr, SD, and SS — all during his captivity!

In V.V. Pozdniakov's *Rozhdeniye ROA* (Birth of the ROA), Syracuse, 1972, he describes<sup>50</sup> how he himself worked against the Abwehr's activities to root out “anti-German” sentiments in the camps and its efforts to encourage cooperation with the Nazis. Tromly is creating false history. It is much more *plausible to suggest* that Pozdniakov's efforts inside the camp, selecting and vetting candidates for recruitment into the future Russian Liberation Army, earned him his later appointments in the Vlasov Movement — and not any invented collaboration with the Nazis. While Pozdniakov was released as a POW, he was not free to go wherever he liked. Instead, he was detailed to the ROA's Dabendorf training facility, located in the midst of a remote forest reserve, only a few kilometers away from his former prison camp at Luckenwalde. Not an ideal location to operate effectively as an intelligence agent for **all four** Nazi security services.



Location ROA training camp in Dabendorf forest (2024 map)



Col. Pozdniakov's release from German POW camp, 5 May 1943, after his capture and incarceration at the age of 37 on 14 August 1941 (Personal Archive ROA Col. V.V. Pozdniakov)

It is noteworthy that Tromly does not disclose that just months later, after his release from behind barbed wire to be detailed to the newly-established nearby ROA school (and the start of his so-called “*alleged work*” for Nazi Intelligence), Pozdniakov was himself pulled in several times for questioning by both the Gestapo<sup>64</sup> and the SD on denunciations made against him by several camp informers, accusing him of “anti-German” activities. On 15 June 1944, the Gestapo further arrested Pozdniakov's deputies at the ROA's Dabendorf school, Major M. Zykov, and Lieutenant V. Nozhyn. They were charged with “anti-German activities” and both executed within days. A week later, 24 June 1944, the Gestapo ordered the actual arrest of Pozdniakov himself and twenty of his instructors at the Dabendorf Officer school on similar charges. Pozdniakov went through a hostile interrogation by the Gestapo, but the charges were dropped at the intervention of German High Command Staff officer, Colonel Freytag von Loringhoven.<sup>65</sup> Pozdniakov was released. A month later, 26 July 1944, Loringhoven, himself, committed suicide for his involvement in the provision of explosives for the assassination

attempt made against Hitler on 20 July 1944. This was hardly a good recommendation for Pozdniakov becoming a Nazi henchman of the Gestapo, the SD *Sicherheitsdienst*, the SS, or the *Abwehr* military intelligence service — contrary to Tromly's paltry historiographical research.

Tromly presents no documentation to substantiate his assertion that Pozdniakov worked for Nazi Intelligence, only his vague "it is plausible to suggest" insinuations and improbable references to the KGB. Instead, documentation by German Intelligence itself (records found in the Bundesarchiv archive) shows that from the very start, Pozdniakov was hardly acting as an *Abwehr* collaborator. Directly after his capture, on 24 August 1941, Pozdniakov was himself beaten and interrogated by the German intelligence services, where he consistently answered *Nein!* during extensive questioning, as his documented interrogation protocol records show:

4

Generalkommando XIII. A.K. O.U. , den 24. August 1941.  
Io.

Protokoll.  
 über  
 die Vernehmung des Oberleutnants Wladimir Possednjakow, geb. 1902 in  
 Leningrad.

Im die Rote Armee Dez. 1919 eingetreten, Leiter des Chemischen Dienstes des LXXVII. russ. Schtz. Korps. Vor Kriegsbeginn 18 Jahre. Lehrer an der Kriegsakademie in Peltawa.

Der Vernehmung wurde der Fragebogen des G.K.H. v. 14.8.1941 über russ. Gaskriegsvorbereitungen zugrunde gelegt.

1.) Ist die Gasschutzausrüstung der Truppe in der letzten Zeit auf den Sollbestand ergänzt oder der vorhandene Sollbestand besonders sorgfältig überprüft worden?  
Antwort: Die Gasschutzausrüstung wurde laufend ergänzt, soweit es die Kampfhandlungen zuließen. Eine besonders sorgfältige Überprüfung hat nicht stattgefunden.

2.) Sind den Frontabschnitt selbständige Gasregimenter, Gasbtl. oder Gaskompanien zugeführt worden ( aus der Reserve der Obersten Heeresleitung) ?  
Antwort: Nein!

3.) Wurde der Artl. Gasmunition zugeführt oder sonstige Munition mit russischer Kennzeichnung, deren Bedeutung unbekannt war?  
Antwort: Nein!

4.) Wurden im Zusammenhang mit Pz.-Kampfwagen CH T 26 und CH T 130 (Flammenwerfer, der auch zum Versprühen von Kampfstoffen dienen kann) Pflaser mit Kampfstoff zugeführt? Kennzeichnung dieser Pflaser mit farbigen Ringen, siehe in einzelnen Mitteilungen über Gaskriegsvorbereitungen im Ausland XX Nr. 10 (I/3).  
Antwort: Nein!

5.) Haben Luftwaffenverbände in letzter Zeit Kommandos zu stellen gehabt, die im event. Einsatz chemischer Kampfstoffe ausgebildet werden sollen?  
Antwort: Das Korps hatte nur Aufkl.-Flugzeuge. Von Stellung irgendwelcher Kommandos zur Ausbildung in chem. Krieg ist ihm nichts bekannt.

Kopie aus dem Bundesarchiv

## IX. Re: Tromly's disinformation about Pozdniakov's being a "henchman of the Gestapo"

Tromly's next allegation that Pozdniakov was a ставленник / "direct henchman" of the Gestapo and the Nazi SD *Sicherheitsdienst* is sourced to A.G. Nerianin, along with Major Chikalov, the ex-NKVD nemesis of Pozdniakov. Chikalov acted as the main accuser against Pozdniakov in the American prison camp in July 1945.<sup>66</sup> Tromly's sourcing above is patently false. First of all, in his previous 2019 work,<sup>67</sup> Tromly had labeled the same A.G. Nerianin in an opprobrious manner to be a Nazi collaborator **himself** — "*eagerly taking up work for the Wehrmacht and the Abwehr intelligence agency*" — as well as being a Nazi war criminal to boot:

Tromly's *Cold War Exiles and the CIA : Plotting to Free Russia* describing Nerianin as "eagerly" working for the Wehrmacht and Abwehr, while also being listed as a war criminal and collaborator (pg.23).

### 1

## A Fissile National Community

### The Political World of Russian Émigrés

Andrei Georgievich Nerianin-Aldan was a product of the sharp historical turns of twentieth-century Eastern Europe. Born into a working-class family in the Ural region, Nerianin fought in the Civil War as a Red Army soldier and rose up the military ranks in the interwar years, reaching the position of Chief of Staff in the 22nd Army in 1941. After being captured by German forces in November 1941 during the chaos of Operation Barbarossa, Nerianin eagerly took up work for the Germans, doing analytical work for the Wehrmacht and later for the Abwehr intelligence agency.<sup>1</sup> After the war, Nerianin came to the attention of Soviet repatriation officials while in a displaced-persons camp in Germany. To evade extradition to the Soviet authorities, he forged his birth certificate to adopt the identity of M. A. Aldan, a Polish farmer, and went undercover. Within a few years, Nerianin-Aldan had taken up work for "U. S. intelligence agencies in [the] capacity of instructor, researcher, and consultant on questions pertaining to the Armed Forces of the USSR."<sup>2</sup>

The dramatic twists in Nerianin's story reflected the chaotic history that forged the post-Second-World-War Russian diaspora. Regardless of when and why they had left the homeland, Russian exiles were products of war, revolution, and upheaval in Russia during the first half of the twentieth century. Having come of age either in revolutionary Russia or in the fully developed Stalinist state, the émigrés were then transplanted abroad—sometimes voluntarily and sometimes not—and forced to adapt to trying conditions in foreign lands which were themselves undergoing great instability in the period. Nerianin's experience of serving the Soviet, Nazi, and American military government regimes in the course of a mere decade was only one variant of the ways conflicts within and outside

<sup>1</sup> See the published interrogations of Nerianin by the Germans in Igor' Petrov and Oleg Beyda, "Pervyi god plena polkovnika Nerianina," pts. 1–2, *Live Journal*, March 1, 2015, at <http://labas.livejournal.com/1097511.html>, accessed July 1, 2017. See also the list of war criminals and persons who collaborated with the enemy in the US zone of occupation in Germany, translated note from General Chuikov, May 13, 1949, 9, in Georgetown University Archives and Special Collections, Robert F. Kelley Papers (hereinafter Kelley Papers), box 5, fol. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Charles T. O'Connell, "The Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR: Origin and Social Composition," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies*, no. 808., Pittsburgh, 1992, 18–19.

*Cold War Exiles and the CIA: Plotting to Free Russia*. Benjamin Tromly, Oxford University Press (2019). © Benjamin Tromly.  
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198840404.001.0001

Tromly then used this same Nerianin again, this time to accuse Pozdniakov, his former ROA colleague, of the same crimes, derived from Tromly's sourcing of Nerianin's 1945 Diary and records of the KGB. Detailed examination of this document and others have not found **any** entry where its author stated that *he* in fact "*eagerly took up work with the Abwehr*".

*Нерянин А. Г. Выписка из дневника полковника Нерянина. 1945 // ВА-МА. MSG 149–156.*

Tromly cites the same Nerianin again<sup>68</sup> in the Pozdniakov case study, allegedly describing: "Nevertheless, Pozdniakov's career in intelligence benefitted from what **one fellow Vlasovite** called his "masterful" ability to "enter the confidence" of those he served – surely, a skill he had developed when he was **climbing a dangerous career ladder** under Stalinism and then demonstrated in his relations with the Nazis during the war [*Нерянин, с. 27*]" This derogatory statement is not found in Nerianin's diary either. Tromly does not disclose the material fact that in 1939, while the non-Communist Pozdniakov was being tortured in an NKVD prison, Bolshevik Party-member Nerianin actually graduated top of his class at the prestigious Academy of the Soviet General Staff, getting a senior *command* promotion to Colonel in the Red Army, and being a much better qualified candidate for *climbing a career ladder* to Stalin's military elite than Tromly's choice of Pozdniakov.

In Nerianin's same 1945 diary and memoirs, published later as "The Army of the Damned", this is what Nerianin actually stated about himself on pages 118-120 — that was read but **not** cited anywhere by Tromly:

Под воздействием систематического политического воспитания я постепенно становился убежденным коммунистом-идеалистом, уверовавшим в теоретическую часть коммунистического учения, как самого справедливого социально-общественного учения несущего всеобщее счастье, равенство и братство.

Идея всеобщего счастья, равенства и братства

— 118 —

Честно говоря, я всегда старался найти оправдание действиям советской власти, считая, что все это — временное преходящее, что новое без жертв не строится и т. д., но тем не менее червь сомнения точил меня, хотя я и старался подавлять его. Я старался покрыть всё это покрывалом „социально

— 120 —

Translated from Russian, Nerianin writes: *“Under the influence of my systematic political education, I gradually became a convinced Communist-idealist, believing this social system to be the most just in bringing happiness, equality, brotherhood to society ... Honestly speaking, I always tried to justify and cover up the acts of Soviet rule as a transitional event, considering that a new future cannot be constructed without victims”.*

Pozdniakov is mentioned numerous times in Nerianin's diary but never referred to as a “*stavlennik*-henchman”. Tromly again shows his deliberate distortions in translating Russian text. Russian dictionaries show the meaning of *ставленник* (*stavlennik*) as placeman or protégé but not as “direct henchman”. Thus, Tromly garbles the Russian language to specifically vilify Pozdniakov, since Nerianin never used the word direct henchman in his Russian writings. A direct henchman perhaps can be a *stavlennik* — but a *stavlennik* does not consequently become a direct henchman! For two years, starting in 1943, Colonels Nerianin and Pozdniakov worked **daily** together as General Vlasov's aides-de-camp, without any existing evidence that Nerianin during that time accused his fellow-adjutant of being a direct henchman of the Gestapo!

Per Tromly's writing, Nerianin, like Pozdniakov, ended up being placed on Chuikov's List of "Nazi War Criminals". Inclusion in the List was likely due to Nerianin and Pozdniakov, after putting aside their quarrels in 1945, setting up together a new anti-Stalin military organization, *Union of Combatants of the Liberation Movement (SVOD)* in 1948.<sup>69</sup> This very hostile anti-Soviet act was undoubtedly considered by General Chuikov when compiling his list, one year later, in 1949, to include both of SVOD's founders as "war criminals".

Thus, it follows, that Tromly is citing one "*Nazi war criminal*" denouncing another "*Nazi war criminal*" for the *same* crimes – taken from the *same* odious source (Stalin's secret police) that was hostile to *both*! Only the KGB could rationalize such "**doublethink**" propaganda that is being advanced by Tromly!


More importantly, Tromly fails to mention the fact that ROA Colonel Pozdniakov and ROA Colonel Nerianin were well-known for their recurrent rivalry and disagreements in the Russian Liberation Army, where both acted as the two senior aide-de-camps to General Vlasov. One discordant issue was that Nerianin was a member of the Bolshevik Party and self-admitted former ideologically convinced Communist, while Pozdniakov was neither. The other issue was that Nerianin held a more senior rank than Pozdniakov previously in the Red Army and considered himself to be the more qualified and senior adjutant. He resented being Vlasov's *administrative* adjutant, while Pozdniakov held the more desirable *operational* adjutant's position. At the same time, both men were unfailingly loyal to as well as staunch supporters of General Vlasov and his ideals.

Tromly deliberately omits that after the war, V.V. Pozdniakov assisted both Samygin and Nerianin financially, as well as helping Nerianin, and ex-ROA General S.K. Borodin, to establish SVOD. Later, on 24 July 1948, at the meeting of the Central Collegium of the "*Anti-communist Center of the Russian Peoples' Liberation Movement*" (АЦОДНП) in Munich, Colonel Nerianin, and a number of other previous accusers, publicly retracted their earlier allegations of Pozdniakov's "Nazi connections" and presented their apologies to him<sup>70</sup> — another consequential historical fact deliberately excluded and omitted by Tromly.

Tromly was remarkably familiar with Russian historian K.M. Aleksandrov's citation in his work about both Nerianin's accusation and retraction. However, Tromly mentions only the accusation<sup>71</sup> without disclosing Nerianin's subsequent public retraction. Tromly obtained Nerianin's 18 July 1945 accusations of Pozdniakov and later apology from the same German Bundesarchiv source<sup>72</sup> used by Aleksandrov. Tromly deliberately fails to disclose the material historical fact of Nerianin's public retraction and apology, labeling Pozdniakov allegedly as a Gestapo "henchman".

These original “Nazi” allegations against Pozdniakov by Nerianin stemmed specifically from the period 4 – 12 May 1945, when Colonel Nerianin’s final orders from General Vlasov had been to organize the retreat of ROA forces (the yet unarmed 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Divisions) on the ground<sup>73</sup> to safe assembly areas. Colonel Pozdniakov, on the other hand, was ordered to negotiate the ROA surrender terms with the Americans and identify these assembly areas for Nerianin. On 6 May 1945, Pozdniakov returned to General Trukhin and Nerianin’s camp to report that the commander of the US 11th Armored Division, General H.D. Dager, had agreed to accept the surrender of the ROA forces until the war formally ended, without surrender to the Red Army. Assembly areas for the surrender of ROA’s 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Divisions in the American Zone were designated to Pozdniakov. After the surrender, according to Dager, the future of the ROA prisoners would be decided at a government level and not by the US military. An agreement was drafted to be signed by Vlasov, who was in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. Vlasov, at that time, was trying to negotiate the surrender of the ROA’s 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division to the Americans - soon to be captured himself by the Red Army

On 8 May 1945, Pozdniakov returned to continue the negotiations with Dager and was issued a safe conduct pass by the US 11<sup>th</sup> Armored Division. The document designated assembly areas in the American Zone for the surrender of ROA’s 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Infantry Divisions. That same day, Pozdniakov was notified by the Americans that the terms had been radically changed. ROA was now ordered to surrender unconditionally to Red Army General Vasiliy I. Chuikov in the Soviet Zone instead, where Chuikov had captured and was occupying Berlin



(Personal archive of ROA Colonel V.V. Pozdniakov)

On 9 May 1945, the day of Germany's capitulation to the Soviet Union, Russian Liberation Army parliamentarians, General Asberg and Colonel Pozdniakov, rushed to reach the surrendering German High Command, General Ernst Köstring. General Asberg and Pozdniakov needed to get a certification of the ROA's status as an "independent" military force and therefore not included along with the Wehrmacht in the surrender agreement. In the ensuing chaos, Asberg and Pozdniakov failed to find Nerianin to coordinate this move and lost contact with him for several days. A confused and furious Nerianin, not knowing about Pozdniakov and Asberg intentions to save the ROA from a surrender to the Soviet Army, openly accused<sup>74</sup> both senior ROA officers of "premeditated desertion" and "complicity with the Nazis" on 11 May 1945.

Nerianin repeated these charges a short time later,<sup>75</sup> after all three were incarcerated together in a US POW camp. Nerianin, Asberg, and Pozdniakov all facing imminent rendition – with Nerianin disputing Pozdniakov's account about what had exactly been promised by the Americans. (See also Nerianin's published Diary 'Army of the Damned', 1969, pages 28-29). Nerianin personally blamed Pozdniakov for not negotiating safe surrender terms for the ROA into the American Zone. He challenged Pozdniakov's statement that he had correctly briefed ROA General Trukhin about the specific conditions set by the Americans for communication to Vlasov, and the non-rendition of the ROA to the Soviets. Trukhin was captured by Red partisans on his way to meet Vlasov.

## Surrender of the ROA (private archive ROA Col. Pozdniakov)

КОМИТЕТ  
ОСВОБОЖДЕНИЯ НАРОДОВ

в РОССИИ

4 мая 1945 г.

№4/7 5/45

Генерал-майор Русской Освободительной Армии АСБЕРГ Владимир Гаврилович и Полковник ПОЗДНЯКОВ Владимир Васильевич, в сопровождении Адъютанта Генерала АСБЕРГ - Подпоручика БУДКОВА Павла, переводчицы СМЕРНОВОЙ Елены Сергеевны и шофера ТРУТНЕВА Сергея следуют в распоряжение Американских и Английских Вооруженных Сил с полномочиями от Комитета Освобождения Народов России.

Генерал-майор АСБЕРГ и Полковник ПОЗДНЯКОВ уполномачиваются Комитетом Освобождения Народов России, сообщить Англо-Американскому Командованию о целях и задачах Русского Освободительного Движения, возглавляемого Комитетом Освобождения Народов России - под руководством Председателя Комитета и ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩЕГО Вооруженными Силами Генерал-лейтенанта В Л А С О В А.

Комитет Освобождения Народов России уполномачивает Генерал-майора АСБЕРГ и Полковника ПОЗДНЯКОВА на ведение переговоров и считает необходимым заявить, что Русская Освободительная Армия ни в какие вооруженные конфликты с Англо-Американскими Вооруженными Силами вступать не будет.



ЧЛЕН ПРЕЗИДИУМА  
Комитета Освобождения Народов России и  
НАЧАЛЬНИК ПЕЧАТА

Вооруженных Сил  
ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР

ЧЛЕНЫ КОМИТЕТА :

ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР

ГЕНЕРАЛ-МАЙОР

МАЙОР

ДОЦЕНТ

/ТРУХИН/

/БОЯРСКИЙ/

/МЕАНДРОВ/


/МУЗЫЧЕНКО/

/ГРЕЧКО/

*В. Поздняков*  
*В. Асберг*  
*М. Андреев*  
*М. Музыченко*  
*В. Гречко*

Thus, on 18 July 1945, Nerianin presented a letter,<sup>76</sup> that spearheaded the “Nazi” allegations against Pozdniakov by the (ex-NKVD) ROA Major A.F. Chikalov, to US Army Lt. Colonel Vasiliev, the commandant of the US POW camp. This letter (blaming Pozdniakov for the renditions) was signed by a number of other ROA officers who were all slated for extradition to the Soviet side and presumably needed quickly to prove their “new” allegiance to Stalin’s regime. It can be safely stated that those were the darkest days of despair for the Russian Liberation Army prisoners in the American camps, arguing about the reasons for the defeat, placing blame on each other for their failures, and facing the grim prospects for their imminent forced repatriation to Stalin’s death camps.

Despite Nerianin’s accusations, when Pozdniakov was also interned in the same US POW camp at Ganaker, Bavaria, he actually helped Nerianin escape rendition from the camp by arranging false identity documents for both Nerianin and himself. At that time, Pozdniakov’s wife, Nina Smirnova, née Golubeva and the authors’ mother, acted as the ROA interpreter during the surrender negotiations. Her younger sister, Irina Golubeva (then a former engineering student), drafted and mapped the ROA marching route for Colonel Nerianin during ROA’s retreat. When both Pozdniakov and Nerianin were subsequently interned, Pozdniakov, through his wife’s visits to the camp, tasked Irina Golubeva to help organize the escape of those ROA members in the camp who did not want to be “voluntarily” repatriated to the Soviet Union. Irina Golubeva forged birth certificates for them showing that they were not citizens of Russia. Irina Golubeva, born in Estonia and not under internment herself, was still a member of the remaining ROA’s administrative field office, had appropriate drafting materials, and presented a fabricated ROA “attestation” pretending that she was the “wife” of Colonel Nerianin to US military authorities to secure regular “family visits” to the camp.



(Personal archive of ROA Col. V.V. Pozdniakov)

During subsequent visits, Irina Golubeva successfully smuggled forged Polish identity documents in the name of "Andrei Georgievich Aldan" to Nerianin, concealed in a loaf of bread. Another similar loaf with a "Vladimir Anderson" identity, born in Harbin, was passed to Pozdniakov. This enabled Nerianin and Pozdniakov to escape forced rendition to the USSR and avoid-assured execution.

Irina Golubeva was the maternal aunt of Pozdniakov's two children. Golubeva shared her past military role in the ROA with her family, working as Colonel Nerianin's subordinate at that time. She recounted her role in effecting the escape of Pozdniakov and Nerianin from the American camp — both of whom, for years, remained her close ROA military colleagues from the war. Irina's sister, Nina, and wife of V.V. Pozdniakov, also continued to maintain good relations with Nerianin during his last years in New York, despite the continued personal friction between him and Pozdniakov for leadership of the post-war Vlasovite political organizations. Neither Nina nor Irina Golubeva had ever heard of Nerianin describe his fellow-Colonel V.V. Pozdniakov, as a "direct henchman of the Gestapo", contrary to Tromly's groundless assertions. Tromly does

note that after the victory of the Red Army, and the execution of General Vlasov, his senior officers, who had all previously worked closely together, now became bitter rivals to decide who would continue to lead this movement. However, their actions and squabbles amongst each other were not based on any inherited “Stalinist political culture” but mainly because each one had his own separate ideas on how best to continue the political struggle against Stalin.



ROA veteran friend Andrei Nerianin and German spouse to the right of Irina Golubeva's husband, former ROA Lieutenant Andrey Klimoff, who served together with Irina under Col. Nerianin in 1945; New York, 1955, a few years before Nerianin passed away; (Personal archive of ROA Col. V.V. Pozdniakov)





АНДРЕЙ ГЕОРГИЕВИЧ  
АЛДАН

ТРУДЫ АРХИВА РУССКОЙ ОСВОБОДИТЕЛЬНОЙ  
АРМИИ

Том 3

А. Г. Алдан  
Ген. штаба полковник

## АРМИЯ ОБРЕЧЕННЫХ

ВОСПОМИНАНИЯ  
ЗАМ. НАЧ. ШТАБА РОА

Под редакцией М. В. Шагова


Нью Йорк  
1969

При переговорах с нашей делегацией, генерал Дегер, якобы, сказал (как о том рассказывал полковник П[оздняков], что он, в соответствии с ука-

— 28 —

заниями штаба 3-ей армии, гарантирует невыдачу частей РОА в руки советских властей только пока длится война. Окончательное же решение вопроса о частях РОА, сдающихся в плен, зависит не от военного командования, а от правительства. После войны на основе мирных соглашений и договоров и определится судьба войск РОА. О подобном заявлении генерала Дегера полковник П[оздняков] информировал генерала Трухина и впоследствии ген. Меандрова. В свете этого (нынешнего) свидетельства, полковник П[оздняков] в ином освещении видит роль ген. Меандрова. Странно, что ген. Меандров, зная о подобном заявлении ген. Дегера, никогда и нигде о нем не говорил, наоборот, он всегда и неизменно подчеркивал, что части РОА никогда не могут быть выданы, что ни один из американских офицеров не сделал даже подобного предположения. Странно и то, что генерал Трухин, выезжая 6-го мая на поиски ген. Власова, также никому ни слова не сказал, что части РОА должны сдаться в плен без гарантии, что их не выдают после окончания войны.

At the same time, Tromly had also read and cited the reference of Col. Pozdniakov's own book, published after Nerianin's diary, *Rozhdeniye ROA* (Birth of the ROA), Syracuse, 1972. Pozdniakov, in turn (pages 254-55), accused Nerianin of failing to provide a security detail for Trukhin's travel to meet General Vlasov near Prague to obtain his signature on Pozdniakov's surrender negotiations. The lack of security precautions undertaken by Nerianin resulted in Trukhin's capture by the Red Army and subsequent execution, along with Vlasov, a year later in Moscow.



(вместе с Шаповаловым). К утру 7-го мая Боярский не вернулся...  
Связи с Власовым, несмотря на наличие радиостанций, не было —  
по вине начальника оперативного отдела штаба полковника А. Не-  
рянина. Трухин решил поехать к Власову и убедить его не вмеши-

254 —

ваться в чешские дела\*). Кроме того, Трухин хотел доложить  
А. Власову о соглашении с командованием 3-й американской армии  
о сдаче в плен всех частей ВС КОНР. Вместе с майором Оттенор-  
фом — немецким офицером связи при Штабе ВС КОНР, взяв с  
собой только своего адъютанта А. Ромашкина, Трухин выехал без  
всякой охраны. Полковник Нерянин мог бы выделить из штабной  
роты взвод автоматчиков, но почему-то этого не сделал... По до-  
роге, у города Пшибрам, Трухин попал в руки партизан-парашю-  
тистов и начальник их капитан Смирнов немедленно же вывез  
Трухина на самолете в распоряжение советских войск. 2-го августа  
1946 года, Федор Иванович, вместе с генералом А. Власовым и  
другими старшими офицерами, был повешен в Москве во дворе  
внутренней Таганской тюрьмы...

p255

*Rozhdeniye ROA* (Birth of the ROA), Syracuse, 1972, pages 254-255;  
(Personal archive of ROA Col. V.V.Pozdniakov)

Tromly had clearly read the published accounts of both Nerianin and Pozdniakov (which he cites in his case study) where each side puts blame on the other for the failures and outcome of the ROA surrender negotiations of 1945, and the tragic results of the subsequent renditions. But Tromly deliberately omits the material fact of the **existence** of this major dispute between Nerianin and Pozdniakov at that time, and the mutual accusations exchanged. This calculated omission makes Tromly's use of Nerianin preposterous as a disinterested source to accuse Pozdniakov in 1945 of being a "Gestapo henchman" and "torturer".

Likewise, Tromly freely documents<sup>77</sup> the well-known German archivist and historian, Joachim Hoffmann on Pozdniakov, who also recorded Nerianin's 1945 "Nazi" allegations against Pozdniakov — including Nerianin's subsequent public retraction and apology to Pozdniakov. However, Tromly only reiterates the negative allegations made by Nerianin, referenced by Hoffmann. Tromly deliberately omits the following key facts about Nerianin's dispute with Pozdniakov, quoted below, from his listed citations<sup>78</sup> of the Hoffmann source, casually dismissing him (like Professor Aleksandrov) as a "*right-wing historian sympathetic to the Vlasov Movement*":

*Гофман И. Власов против Сталина: трагедия русской освободительной армии. М. : АСТ : Астрель. 2006. 544 с.*

*"Этот аргумент подхватила в особенности советская пропаганда, стремясь дискредитировать Позднякова, антипатичного из-за его публицистской и политической деятельности, как орудие СД, гестапо и СС, и приписать ему все возможные злодеяния. Насколько бессмысленны спекуляции, представляющие Власова и руководящих офицеров Освободительной армии как заложников гестаповского агента, видно уже по служебным функциям Позднякова, обусловившим его контакты со штабом генерала добровольческих частей, но не с какими-либо инстанциями гестапо или СД. На то, что такое сотрудничество было бы совершенно невозможно уже по организационным причинам, указали как генерал добровольческих частей в ОКХ, генерал кавалерии Кёстринг, так и — особенно подчеркнуто — бывший начальник отделения в отделе военной пропаганды ОКВ, полковник Мартин, который, как он пишет, очень близко познакомился с Поздняковым в ходе своей предыдущей деятельности. Кроме того, как полковник Мартин, так и генерал Кёстринг и его бывший адъютант, ротмистр запаса Герварт фон Биттенфельд, после войны — статс-секретарь и шеф канцелярии федерального президента ФРГ, дали самую высокую оценку личной честности, патриотическому духу и организаторским способностям Позднякова [94]. Иначе он вряд ли стал оперативным адъютантом Власова и не был бы назначен на ответственный пост шефа офицерских кадров РОА.*

**Это подозрение, основанное на незнании подлинных обстоятельств, было впервые высказано полковником Неряниным в письме, направленном подполковнику Васильеву в лагерь военнопленных 18.7.1945 г., которое подписал ряд высокопоставленных офицеров РОА (полковник Корбуков, подполковник Коровин, полковник Денисов, майор Шейко, майор Чикалов, подполковник Грачёв, подполковник Сараев, подполковник Михельсон, полковник Кобзев, подполковник Панкевич, полковник Койда и майор Легостаев). Однако на заседании центральной коллегии организации «Антикоммунистический центр освободительного движения народов России» 24.7.1948 г. полковник Нерянин публично признал беспочвенность такого утверждения. От своей подписи дистанцировались и другие офицеры. Поздняков, обвинивший советскую пропаганду в открытом письме в январе 1956 г. в клеветнической кампании против него, высказывает в этой связи предположение, что полковник Нерянин попался на ложную информацию майора Чикалова. На дальнейших разногласиях Позднякова с Неряниным здесь нет необходимости останавливаться».<sup>77</sup>**

It is evident that Tromly's use of Nerianin, as a hostile source attributing "Nazi traits" to Pozdniakov, is worthless. Tromly cites the same Soviet authorities that defame both Nerianin and Pozdniakov for presenting his conclusions as such. Tromly's deliberate outright disinformation is yet another example of his fallacious historiography arguments — like his use of Chuikov, Rtishchev, Tavantsev, Chikalov, Samygin, Ershov, in addition to Nerianin, mentioned above, as so-called *impartial* sources on Pozdniakov — as well as misquoting other recognized historians on Pozdniakov, i.e., German archivist Joachim Hoffmann and Professor K.M. Aleksandrov.

This brings us to analyze the real purpose of Tromly's misuse of Nerianin as a principal derogatory source on Pozdniakov — who actually is **not** the main target of Tromly's "new" approach to the study of the Vlasovites and the Second Wave. Tromly's new approach (no different from the same old one that has always been advanced by the KGB / FSB) is to vilify and "document" General Andrey Vlasov, the head of this anti-Stalin movement, himself to be the principal "turncoat-traitor", "opportunist", "war criminal", and "Nazi collaborationist" — to paint the ROA / Vlasov Movement with the same pejorative brush — followed by condemning the entire Second Wave after the war of corresponding alleged culpability.

Tromly uses the personal quarrels between Vlasov's two senior adjutants, both loyal supporters of General Vlasov, to denounce one against the other, implying that both were henchmen of the Nazis and war criminals — as a sideshow, to create a bogus historical memory for other researchers. If both Vlasov's senior adjutants were themselves "Nazi war criminals", then obviously, by extension, their leader must also be one and the same. This is what Tromly is in fact aiming for by attacking Col. Pozdniakov in his preparatory "case study", and what is

expected to surface next in his writings about the ROA and General Vlasov himself. Tromly must first “*create and document*” his own compliant “*population of sources*” to be able to quote them later when presenting FSB disinformation and his personal convictions in writing the “new history” of the Vlasov Movement — as he has suggested needs to be done.<sup>79</sup>

#### **X. Re. Tromly’s disinformation about the CIA and Col. Pozdniakov’s work in the CIA**

Without documenting any actual historical sources, Tromly again publishes misplaced personal opinions<sup>80</sup> of his “case study” that:

*“In all fairness, Pozdniakov’s espionage record was hardly an exception for postwar exiles in West Germany, where destitute displaced persons sought to peddle often fraudulent information for material gain” and that “Pozdniakov had more success as an analyst than as an intelligence operative”<sup>80</sup> for the CIA.*

This is outright disinformation since Tromly has no access to any relevant US Government documents to judge anything about Pozdniakov’s “espionage record” for the CIA, either as an operator or analyst — or to insinuate him of “*in all fairness ... peddling fraudulent information for gain*”.

Colonel Pozdniakov’s private archive, entitled “*Razvedka*” (Intelligence), notes that during the period 1945–1951, apart from other CIA counterintelligence projects to safeguard US military personnel stationed in occupied Germany from the hostile targeting of the NKVD, he personally handled eight principal CIC/CIA agents, each of whom directed his own separate network of Russian collection sources, totaling over **two hundred** clandestine FI reporters on the Soviet Union working for the US Government. By arbitrarily declaring that “*this enterprise failed*”, and that “*Pozdniakov had more success as an analyst than as an intelligence operative*” — Tromly is engaging in pure speculation, not facts.

**СХЕМА АГЕНТУРНОЙ СЕТКИ**  
НА 15<sup>е</sup> МАЯ 1947<sup>е</sup> ГОДА.

АГЕНТУРНАЯ СЕТКА			ДЛИНА	ВСТАВКА	КАРТА
I	II	III			
R.D. MÜNCHEN	AG.G. DESSAU	AG.E. HALLE	1000km	10	1
AG.W. HALLE	AG.F. DRESDEN	AG.Z. COTTBUS	500	-	-
AG.H. - KUPP	AG.21. BERLIN	AG.22. GOTTBUS	500	-	-
AG.23. EBERSWALDE	AG.20. BERLIN		500	-	-
R.S. LEIPZIG	AG.B. BERLIN	AG.C. HALLE	1000km	10	1
AG.T. OBERWESENTHAL	AG.24. OBER WESENTHAL	AG.25. OBER WESENTHAL	2000km	10	-
AG.26. OBER WESENTHAL	AG.27. OBERWESENTHAL		500	-	-
R.WL. MÜNCHEN	AG.V. WEINAR		500	5	-
R.W. MÜNCHEN	AG.SCH. GERA	AG.K. BERLIN	750	10	-
AG.G. BERLIN	AG.28. REICHENBACH	AG.29. REICHENBACH	500	-	-
AG.R. SCHWERIN	AG.E. HALLE	AG.J. JENA	500	-	-
R.KW. HANNOVER	AG.30. HANNOVER	AG.31. HANNOVER	750	-	-
AG.WF. GOSLAR (Amaz)	AG.RD. FÜRSTENFELD-BRUCK (Amaz)	AG.NP. FÜRSTENFELD-BRUCK (Amaz)	500	-	-
AG.21. NÜRNBERG	AG.SCH. NÜRNBERG	AG.TH. NÜRNBERG	500	-	-
R.KE. HOF	AG.5. THURNITZ	AG.FR. DRESDEN	750	10	1

1500km 20km 1km  
1000km 20km 1km  
1500km 20km 1km

Col. Pozdniakov's records of payments to his CIC agents in 1947  
(Private archive of ROA Col. V.V.Pozdniakov)

Tromly's unproven disparaging coverage of Colonel Pozdniakov's operations for the CIA is yet another example of how he summarizes his selective "research" on Pozdniakov. In his "case study,"<sup>81</sup> Tromly opines about Pozdniakov's ego and character by quoting Pozdniakov's own writings, which Tromly disingenuously sourced to Pozdniakov's CIA director at Radio Liberation, R.F. Kelley.<sup>82</sup> Tromly writes:

In 1952, he authored a major study on wartime German counter-intelligence for the US Army Historical Research Institute [Pozdniakov]. To be sure, Pozdniakov's ego outstripped objective reality on occasion, such as when he sent an elaborate proposal to the US intelligence establishment on how to fight the Cold War (it went unanswered) [Поздняков, 11 апреля 1950 г.].

Поздняков В. В. Некоторые вопросы проблемы борьбы с большевизмом. 11 апреля 1950 г. // Georgetown University Archives and Special Collections. Robert F. Kelley Papers. Box 5. Folder 6.

In a previous work,<sup>83</sup> Tromly does not reveal anything about what the same CIA director at Radio Liberation (later renamed RFE/RL), R.F. Kelley, actually had to say about the quality of his colleague Pozdniakov's work for the CIA during the late 1940s to 1951. Instead, Tromly brazenly offers his own suggestions about how Kelley **might have doubted** or **should have considered** dealing with Pozdniakov decades ago. Introduction of doubt into a narrative is a well-known use of language by propagandists to create false facts, a fabricated history, and manipulation of public opinion. Tromly asserts with confidence.<sup>83</sup>

*“One **might doubt** how effective émigré input could have been in shaping the policies of the young CIA. In particular, Kelley **might have cast doubt** on a memorandum from Pozdniakov, a divisive figure among the Vlasovites, an alleged **war criminal**, and an intelligence operative” (for the Nazis).*

What could Tromly possibly profess to know about Pozdniakov's classified operations for the US Government, 80 years ago, or his personal relationship with Kelley? Instead, Tromly again, disingenuously tries to “attach” the above “*war criminal*” label on Pozdniakov from a previous purported reference to Pozdniakov's close colleague R.F. Kelley in the CIA. However, Tromly pulls this label again directly from another source — the same belligerent Soviet Red Army General Chuikov<sup>84</sup> mentioned earlier in this paper.

At that time, General Chuikov worked closely with Marshal Vasiliy Sokolovsky, supreme commander of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, responsible for implementing Stalin's post-war strategy and policies in occupied Germany — diametrically different from those of the United States. Consequently, the CIC/CIG/CIA engaged Pozdniakov and members of the former Russian Liberation Army in Germany to obtain intelligence on Chuikov's activities and plans, as well as encourage defections of his military personnel to bolster such vital collection efforts. After four years of targeting General Chuikov, the CIA (and Kelley) knew perfectly well why ex-Red Army POW Pozdniakov was labeled by Chuikov to be a traitor and war criminal. Thus, Tromly's **concern**, 70 years later, that Pozdniakov's close CIA colleague R.F. Kelley “**might have cast doubt**” on his character, suggesting that Pozdniakov was a war criminal and intelligence operative of the Nazis, rings ludicrous.

Professor Tromly is *creating new history* by putting his own words into the mouths and minds of his long-deceased voiceless sources.

## Col. Pozdniakov's work with the US Army CIC (1945 – 1949)

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH  
APO 757, US ARMYIn reply  
refer to: 281

21 November 1946.

SUBJECT: Request for Retention of Apartment.  
TO : Whom It May Concern.

1. Mr. Wladimir POSENIJAKOW is connected with this headquarters and is in charge of a special project in the interest of the US. While carrying out his mission he is living at his private apartment at Oettingerstrasse 10, MUNICH.
2. It is requested that Mr. POSENIJAKOW be permitted to retain his apartment and that no additional persons be billeted there. The requisitioning of his apartment in part or in whole will seriously interfere with the accomplishment of his mission.
3. If any questions concerning this matter should arise they should be referred to the undersigned officer.



*Richard R. Clark*  
RICHARD R. CLARK  
Lt. Col., FA

Tel: FRANKFURT 23470.

DETACHMENT "R" ID GSUSA  
REGENSBURG SUB POST  
APO 225 US ARMY

30 September 1949

SUBJECT: Pozdnejakoff, Vladimir V.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to inform you that the Subject is employed part-time doing special work for this Detachment. The work is of a special nature which requires a great deal of research on Subject's part. In addition, it requires his having in his possession numerous materials which may assist him in this activity.

It is requested that prior to your causing Subject either to vacate his living quarters or to confiscate any of his materials, you notify this Detachment or the CIC Detachment in Munich. Effective until 31 December 1949.

*T. F. Hoffman*  
T. F. HOFFMAN  
Lt. Col. GAC  
Commanding

Tel: Regensburg 7-220  
7-221MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY  
MILITÄRREGIERUNG BEFREIUNG  
MILITARY GOVERNMENT EXEMPTION

A 252804 \*

Datum der Ausstellung: 20. September 1946  
Date issued: 20. Sept. 46  
Name: Vladimir POSENIJAKOW  
Name: Vladimir POSENIJAKOW  
Anschrift: äußere Prinzregentenstrasse 10 München-Bogenhausen  
Address: tenstre 77 new  
Ausweis-Karte Klasse: Reg. Schein Nr. 1  
Identity Card Type: No. 1  
Unterschrift des Inhabers: *Pozdnejakoff*  
Signature of Holder: *Pozdnejakoff*

ANWISUNGEN: Diese Befreiung ist im Namen der Militärregierung ausgestellt worden. Sie ist nicht übertragbar, darf nicht abgetrennt oder verändert werden; sie ist zwingend in Verbindung mit der Ausweis-Karte des Inhabers. Der Verlust dieser Karte muß der Polizei gemeldet werden. Gefundene oder ausgetauschte Karten müssen an die ausstellende Behörde zurückgegeben werden.

INSTRUCTIONS: This exemption is issued by Military Government. It is not transferable, shall not be altered or destroyed, and is only valid when used in conjunction with the holder's identity card. The loss of this card must be reported to the police. If found, or on expiration of validity, this card must be returned to the issuing authority.

ORDNUNG, EINZELHEITEN UND AMTLICHE UNTERSCHRIFT: Die vorstehend benannte Person ist, wie unten angegeben, von Beschränkungen befreit: AUSGANG - REISE - VERBOTENE GEGENSTÄNDE - SPERRGEBIET (nicht Zutrittliches ist durchgestrichen).  
REASONS, SPECIFICATIONS AND ENDORSEMENTS: The person named on the reverse thereof is granted exemption, only as specified below, from restrictions respecting: CURFEW - TRAVEL - PROHIBITED ARTICLES (delete where applicable).

Einzelheiten der Befreiung: Exempt from all four (4)  
Particulars of exemption: restrictions

Gründe: Engaged in scientific work.

Personen: *thurey W. Land*  
Ausweis-Karte Klasse: *Reg. Schein*  
Name (Deutsch): *thurey W. Land*  
Name (Englisch): *thurey W. Land*  
Unterschrift: *thurey W. Land*  
Signature: *thurey W. Land*  
Stamm-Nr. 0-468516  
Serial No.



(Personal archive of ROA Col. Pozdniakov)

Training agents in "scientific work" (1947)

In his case study describing Colonel Pozdniakov's operations for the CIA, Tromly's two authoritative go-to sources are the memoirs of the peace-activist Reverend William Sloane Coffin and the anonymous personal "*electronic Efimenko*". Coffin's book,<sup>85</sup> cited by Tromly, is not about the CIA, nor does it mention Col. Pozdniakov anywhere. Instead, it is about the Reverend's regret and guilt for his role after WWII in the forcible repatriation of Russians who had been taken prisoner, followed by a discourse on the morality of the subsequent Vietnam War. When Pozdniakov was handling actual operations for the CIA in Germany during the late 1940s, Coffin was still a theology student in the US and had no direct knowledge about them. Afterwards, Coffin did serve a short stint with the CIA in Germany, but his book describes no **direct** information about the specific terminated Vlasovite operations that previously had all been betrayed by the Cambridge Five spies and NKVD agent "Sasha" Kopatzky by 1950.

Tromly revises the accepted documented history of the Soviet Union during World War II, and thereafter. He omits the reasons for, as well as maligns the conduct and "ethics" of the CIA's operations with its Russian agents during 1949/1950. These operations countered the real Soviet threat posed to the United States at that time, which Tromly described in his previous 2019 writings as being merely the CIA's fatuous efforts at "*Plotting to Free Russia*".<sup>86</sup>

Interested readers and researchers can examine the fresh CIA's 8 April 1948 comprehensive report (pages 18-103) by its Berlin Operations Base (BOB) describing the chaotic post-war working conditions in bombed-out Berlin, as well as the complicated competing relationships between the numerous US military commands, to establish the CIA's intelligence collection and counterintelligence programs. Note that specifics of BOB's liaison exchanges on the Soviets with British Intelligence are deleted, and still not declassified. This was **prior** to Pozdniakov's start with the CIA to support its Soviet operations in Berlin, where there was only a single Russian-speaking case officer assigned at BOB, and the consequences of the compromises of the hostile NKVD/MGB Cambridge Five / Kopatzky penetrations not yet realized. This puts in question Tromly's casual conclusion that the CIA's early operations against the Soviets failed mainly because of "*inabilities*" exhibited by Col. Pozdniakov with his ex-ROA agents.

<https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/04312517a1c094beb4e00f68b65a9d2f/On-the-Front-Lines-of-the-Cold-War-1-Preface-Intro-Part1-web.pdf>

Tromly's personal interpretations about such decades-old CIA operations appear to be based mainly on materials of CIA paramilitary / covert action programs, declassified by the CIA as no longer deemed being sensitive or important - that highlight only a very minor part of the CIA's overall primary collection focus on the Soviet Union, the well-known hostile adversary of the United States. After Stalin had taken over Eastern Europe, he continued with his previous

*Comintern* strategy to covertly strengthen the Communist parties of the other Western European countries to subvert their new democratic governments, which became the focus of serious attention by the CIA during the next decade.

Tromly's derogatory account of CIA "failures", which does not reflect the actual key responsibilities and overall mission of the CIA, only furthers the interests of Putin's revision of the history of WWII and his hostile security service, the FSB. Tromly ignores the work of hundreds of CIA case officers and Non-Official Cover officers (NOC)s, assigned worldwide, who collected intelligence on the threat posed by the Soviet Union (and Russia now), the many CIA-recruited agents and confidential sources who continue to risk their lives daily in providing this crucial data, as well as the thousands of CIA analysts at Langley who verify and process the raw information into finished actionable intelligence for use by our government and its allies.

Historically, Tromly also ignores the previous entire ***one-hundred-year record*** of well-documented hostile actions by the Soviet and successor Russian security services (**CHEKA, OGPU, GUGB, NKVD, SMERSCH, NKGB, MGB, MVD, KGB, GRU, SVR, FSK, FSB**) focused against the United States! Tromly mentions nothing in his writings about the famous Soviet spy rings in the 1920s and 1930s operating unopposed in the US, much less about the more damaging espionage attacks of the five NKVD *Sudoplatov spy* networks to subvert the US later during WWII — all at a time when the United States was actually enabling the survival of Stalin's regime — and years before the creation of the CIA. Nor does Tromly say anything about the Soviets' subsequent destructive *Rosenberg spy* conspiracy which helped them build their own nuclear weapons to aim at the US. Likewise, Tromly is silent about the ***next six decades*** of Soviet / Russian subversive espionage activities, including deep-cover sleeper-agent penetrations, directed against the United States, and what has been prompting the CIA's actions to uncover, counter, and neutralize such a continued real and present danger. At the same time, Tromly bases his scholarly research and conclusions on sourcing taken directly from the same adversarial FSB / KGB / NKVD.

In his condemnation of the CIA, what does Tromly profess to know about the success or failure of the CIA's covert operations decades ago? Typically, the CIA does not boast about its successes — which can often be *masked* as "failures" to protect sources and methods. Instead, Tromly focuses primarily on the CIA's "poor understanding" of the Soviet Union, its culture, people, politics — resulting in the CIA's consequent operational "failures" by the misuse of its "*pro-Nazi semi-fascistic Russian collaborator*" agents. It is true, as Tromly writes, that the CIA supported many anti-Communist groups abroad. But that was never its primary goal. The CIA's paramount purpose has always been to obtain timely intelligence of the hostile plans and intentions of the military, and security threats posed by the Soviet Union (now Russia) to the United States. Since the early 1950s, Russia's nuclear arsenal has always been pointed

primarily on US targets, including the major civilian population centers. At the same time, the CIA's priority is also to counter the well-documented subversive activities of the numerous still-existing foreign "pro-Soviet" security services operating worldwide, collaborating together against the interests of the US and its citizens.

In his paper, Tromly conveniently attributes the "failures" of the CIA's early operations against the Soviet Union to Col. Pozdniakov's and the ROA's *inability* to recruit suitable agents for the CIA — which he sources to the Reverend Coffin. He does not disclose that the major well-documented role in this **betrayal** (not operational failure) was actually played by the Cambridge Five NKVD espionage network during 1950. In his previous book, *Cold War Exiles and the CIA - Plotting to Free Russia*, Tromly recognized that the early CIA operations in Germany were also compromised by NKVD double agent Aleksandr "Sasha" Kopatzky, however, in his case study of Pozdniakov, Tromly, curiously makes no mention of this agent Sasha's actual direct involvement in Pozdniakov's "failed CIA operations" — only that the ROA was somehow at fault.

For the record, in 1941, Sasha Kopatzky, was a teen-aged NKVD agent parachuted behind German lines with a radio, who had been immediately captured, *turned* by the Germans, and later detailed to the Russian Liberation Army, where Pozdniakov first met him. After the war, Kopatzky worked as an agent targeted against Chuikov's military for the US Army's CIC in Frankfurt, until he was fired in 1947 by Pozdniakov (then also assigned with the CIC) for falsifying intelligence reports. Kopatzky later managed to get himself hired by the newly created CIA's Berlin Operations Base to which the CIC had transferred many of its Soviet operational assets. Working for both the CIA and NKVD at the same time, over one decade, Koptazky then gave up the identities of more than a hundred CIA case officers and all their Russian agents to Soviet state security. Most of the agents were then captured, imprisoned, or executed.

In 1961, KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn would point suspicions on a "Sasha" within the CIA as being responsible for these deadly compromises. Only four years later, the FBI's investigation finally determined that Kopatzky (aka Orlov, then retired from the CIA) was the prime suspect. This resulted in the FBI interviewing Pozdniakov in 1965 about his past dealings with Kopatzky.

In the end, however, Sasha could never be prosecuted or convicted in US court because all the compromising evidence remained in the Soviet Union! It became available only in 1992, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unlocking of some of the KGB's Cold War records. By that time, KGB agent Sasha had already comfortably lived out his last remaining retirement years in the US.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY FROM:  
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
DATE 08-25-2018 BY: [redacted]  
FBI INFORMATION ONLY

b6  
b7C

3/3/65

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]  
FROM: SAC, WFO [redacted] (P)  
SUBJECT: KGB Agent Known As "SASHA"  
(OO: WFO)

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above and classified "Secret" in [redacted] b3

One copy of this LHM is being forwarded the Albany and Richmond Divisions inasmuch as the principals mentioned therein reside within the respective divisions.

From the interview with Mr. VLADIMIR POZENJAKOV at Syracuse, New York, it would appear that his recollections of ORLOV's activities in Munich, Germany, in 1946-1948 follow rather closely the facts as furnished by ORLOV [redacted] b3

However, from POZENJAKOV's comments it would appear that ORLOV did have some association with the French Intelligence Service while in Germany in the 1946-1949 period. [redacted] b3

[redacted]

On page 55 of [redacted] data mention is made of ORLOV under the name ALEKSANDR KOPATSKI. It is mentioned on this page that "In circa May-June 1948 Subject established contact with the French in Lindau (French Zone) and began working for the French, keeping this new contact secret from the Americans with whom he had been in contact." b6 b7C

3 - Bureau (Enc. 5)  
1 - Albany [redacted] (Enc. 1) (RM)  
1 - Richmond [redacted] (Enc. 1) (RM)  
② - WFO

AWN:kjl  
(6)  
AIRTEL

SEARCHED INDEXED  
SERIALIZED FILED  
APR 3 1965  
FBI - NEW YORK

SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FILED

FBI records of KGB Agent Sasha Investigation; page 1 of many

After the early CIA agent betrayals and compromises of 1949-1950 by Sasha Kopatzky and the Cambridge Five, in May 1951, its British spies Donald McLean and Guy Burgess fled to the Soviet Union, warned by their cohort conspirator Kim Philby, who was then serving as chief of British Intelligence in Washington liaising with the CIA on its covert Soviet operations in Germany! Months later, on 7 November 1951, Russian-Estonian former ROA officer, Volodya Kivi, disappeared in an abduction from West to East Berlin that was executed by the NKVD/MGB, and was later pinned again to the betrayal by the same Kopatzky mole working in the CIA's Berlin Operations Base. Kivi had been an old classmate of Pozdniakov's wife, Nina Golubeva, in Estonia, later joining the ROA, and then recruited for the CIA by Pozdniakov. Kivi had valuable information about the CIA's operations behind the Iron Curtain, and Pozdniakov's activities for the US military, important for the Soviet security services to obtain as a result of his capture. No one knows the fate that was bestowed on Kivi after his betrayal.

Nina Golubeva (Pozdniakova)

Volodya Kivi

before the war in Tallin, Estonia, 1940



(Private archive ROA Col. V.V. Pozdniakov)

As a consequence, this prompted Pozdniakov to withdraw from any further active intelligence work and concentrate on his writings instead, to continue his life-long commitment as an anti-Stalinist political activist. Thus, in 1952, he and his wife Nina started a new life together at Radio Liberation that was being formed by the CIA in Munich, preparing scripts of programs broadcasted to the Soviet Union.

Also in 1952, Moscow Center sent NKVD/MGB Captain Nikolay Khokhlov to its station in East Berlin to plan the assassination of a number of anti-Stalin political activists in West Germany, including Georgiy Okolovich, Chairman of the *National Alliance of Russian Solidarists*, who resided in Frankfurt. Previously in 1949, Khokhlov had been tasked on Stalin's orders to assassinate prominent Russian anti-Bolshevik leader, Alexander Kerensky, in Paris, using a Parker fountain pen converted into a single-shot pistol, but this NKVD/MGB operation was never actually implemented. A few years later, Kerensky played an important role in the creation of the CIA's Radio Liberation in Munich.





CIA Radio Liberation's Sergei Dubrovsky and family (left). Alexander Kerensky (far right). Munich 1954, just before Sergei's poisoning<sup>53</sup> by the KGB in October 1955 (private archive of Andrey Dubrovsky)

A year after Stalin's death in 1953 — on 13 March 1954, a new KGB was organized from the former ruthless Stalin's secret police services NKVD/NKGB/MGB/MVD, but which continued to maintain the exact same ruthless strategy to employ against the growing political activities of the anti-Soviet opposition movements based in West Germany. Less than a month before, Khokhlov ignored Moscow Center's orders to assassinate Okolovich in Frankfurt. His conscience protesting, Khokhlov went directly to Okolovich's flat and told him: "*Georgiy Sergeyevich, I have come to you from Moscow. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has ordered your assassination. The murder is entrusted to my group... I can't let this murder happen*". On 19 February 1954, Khokhlov was in contact with the CIA, seeking asylum, and presenting the weapons he had been trained with to kill his targets: a three single-shot pistol, fitted with individual .25 caliber barrels loaded with hollow point bullets filled with potassium cyanide, each containing 100 times the quantity of poison needed to kill one man. In May 1954, Kohkhlov appeared at a press conference, showing his weapons, and telling the world that the new KGB was just as heinous as the former Stalin's secret police.



Another more exotic silent potassium cyanide weapon concealed in a cigarette pack was also demonstrated by Khokhlov:



Just weeks before, on 13 April 1954, the newly-established KGB, had sent a team of twelve armed men into West Berlin to kidnap from his apartment, Dr. Alexander S. Trushnovich, an anti-Stalin political activist of the *National Labor Union (NTS)*. After he had struggled with his KGB captors and choked to death, on a rag stuffed into his mouth, his body was spirited back from Germany to the Soviet Union and secretly buried. The “fact” that the KGB never really meant to kill Dr. Trushnovich was not revealed by the Russian government until the dismantlement of the KGB in 1992, and publication of some of its records.

Approved For Release 2007/09/20 : CIA-RDP80-00810A004800370007-5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**INFORMATION REPORT**

REPORT    
CD NO.  

COUNTRY East Germany  
SUBJECT The Trushnovich Kidnapping 619286  
DATE DISTR. 17 September 1954  
NO. OF PAGES 1  
PLACE ACQUIRED    
NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)  
DATE OF INFO.    
SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.  

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U. S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

1. The Alexander Trushnovich kidnapping allegedly involved twelve armed men, with two automobiles.
2. The abductors took their captive out of the West Sector by car, it is said, by way of Dreilinden, because that appeared the most secure route into the East Zone. The story current in West Berlin to the effect that Trushnovich was kidnapped by way of a West Berlin freight railroad station is completely untrue.
3. Trushnovich was allegedly first brought to Karlshorst. After the kidnapping was made public, however, it was realized that this was inexpedient. Since his transfer to the SSD prison in Hohenschonhausen was out of the question, he was brought to Gruensu (southeastern Berlin) to Bruno Stahlmann's villa which is especially set up for just such purposes.
4. A press conference has been impossible up to now because Trushnovich still suffers from head wounds. Two doctors are attending him constantly.

Comment: Probably refers to Richard Stahlmann.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	NSRB	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	DISTRIBUTION	
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X	FBI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> X		

Approved For Release 2007/09/20 : CIA-RDP80-00810A004800370007-5


During a short period between September 1954 to October 1955, the new KGB then **murdered** three of Pozdniakov's close co-workers at Radio Liberty in Munich: Leonid Karas, Abo Fatalibey, and Sergei Dubrovsky. (See also Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989. Richard H. Cummings, 2009).

That same October 1955, a squad of KGB goons, next, tried to break into Pozdniakov's apartment in Munich to abduct him alive, rolled up in a rug — with his children hiding under the bed, witnessing their father, pistol in hand, barely succeeding in fighting off his assailants.

In 1956, Pozdniakov was summoned to a meeting with the German federal security police, which had just arrested two Soviet agents in Munich—sent out to capture him for a second time! They had been tasked to follow Pozdniakov discreetly when he took the public bus all alone on his weekend fishing trips to Dachau, find a secluded spot where he could be ambushed, sedated, abducted, and driven into the Eastern Zone. They were promised a ten-thousand-Deutschmark reward for a successful capture. The KGB team was now cooperating with the German police because none of its members wanted to return to East Berlin empty-handed. If the KGB had wanted to kill Pozdniakov, he surely would be dead already. Pozdniakov knew many things and thus was much more valuable alive than dead—so that Soviet security could interrogate him about his secret work for the Americans. As a consequence, in February 1957, V.V. Pozdniakov and his family fled to the United States as political refugees and “*stateless aliens*”.

On 15 September 1957, the KGB Thirteenth Department then unsuccessfully tried to kill its 1954 defector, Nikolay Khokhlov, in Frankfurt with a thallium-laced poisoned cup of coffee. The attack on Khokhlov was followed several weeks thereafter, in October 1957, when another KGB agent, Bogdan Stashynsky, used a covert spray gun, concealed in a rolled-up newspaper, that fired a jet of cyanide poison gas to assassinate anti-Stalin political activist Lev Rebet of the *National Labor Union (NTS)* in Munich.

Two years later, in October 1959, another murder was repeated by Stashynsky of anti-Stalin activist, Stepan Bandera, of the same anti-Soviet organization in Munich, using the same cyanide weapon. When Stashynsky subsequently was ordered by the KGB in 1960 to assassinate yet another anti-Soviet political activist in Munich, Yaroslav Stetsko, of the *Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations*, he defected instead in 1961 to the West.



Interesting to note that many years later in 1979, the KGB-trained Bulgarian security service used a ricin-poison tipped umbrella to kill dissident Georgi Markov in London where he worked as a journalist for BBC and Radio Free Europe. The new Russian Federation SVR, FSB, GRU successor services have not shied away from using even more exotic poisons to assassinate their defectors, dissidents, and political opponents later: Alexander Litvinenko in 2006 with a cup of tea laced with polonium-210, and who died slowly from radiation poisoning; Sergei Skripal in 2018 with a nerve agent-laced doorknob, but who managed to survive unlike an innocent bystander who died from the poison; Alexei Navalny in 2020 with a cup of nerve agent-laced tea, and a pair of specially treated underwear, who also managed to survive — later to die at the age of 48 in 2024 in a Russian prison camp. Who knows how many other political activists were actually discreetly assassinated, using poison, by the Soviet/Russian security services in all since the 1950s? Even Pozdniakov's son, in 1983, received a polite reminder to watch his diplomatic behavior with a "laced sea-shell dinner entrée" surprise at a KGB *Rezident's* house overseas that took him to the military hospital in Frankfurt for a few days to conduct liver function tests!

However, back to the time of the 1950s KGB political assassination campaigns in Munich, and V.V. Pozdniakov's flight to the United States, the KGB, in 1961, never stopped to monitor and target operations against V.V. Pozdniakov from Moscow, as well as from its diplomatic safe-havens in the US:

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:  
 FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE  
 DATE 08-20-2018 BY: [REDACTED]  
 FBI INFORMATION ONLY

b6  
 b7c



In Reply, Please Refer to  
 File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

APR 11 1965

~~SECRET~~

Re: Wladimir Pozdnjakoff

NY T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised during the latter part of 1961, that Valentin I. Tsurkan, Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Mission to the United Nations, expressed an interest in the Russian School at Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, and desired to know who was teaching at this University.

Source identified Vladimir Pozdniakov as an instructor in the Russian School at Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.

NY T-2, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Valentin I. Tsurkan is a member of the KGB (Committee of State Security).

Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, (INS), 20 West Broadway, New York, New York, as reviewed on May 2, 1957, reflected the following information concerning Wladimir (Vladimir) Pozdnjakoff:

A. Birth Records

Pozdnjakoff was born May 17, 1904, in Petersburg, Russia. This information was supported by affidavit.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

Searched.....  
 Serialized.....  
 Indexed.....  
 Filed.....

Group I  
 Excluded From Automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

b3

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

## Memorandum

TO : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] (8)

DATE: 9/28/62

b3

FROM : SA [redacted] (#341)

b6  
b7CSUBJECT: VLADIMIR POZDNIAKOV  
IS-R

ReNYmemo of SA PAUL F. GARRITY, 5/31/62.

Re memo stated that subject was one of several individuals whom KGB had expressed an interest.

The following information is a result of the review of the file and investigation conducted at Albany, NY:

1. Name: VLADIMIR POZDNIAKOV aka Mayer, Wolshanin, Wostokow, and Wolgin.
2. DOB: 5/17/04, Petersburg, Russia
3. Arrived in the US: 2/5/57, at NY, NY
4. Present Residence: As of July, 1962, 120 East Borden Avenue, Syracuse, NY.
5. Former residences in the US: February, 1957, Reed Farm, Valley Cottage, NY; August, 1957, 35 Hamilton Place, NY, NY; 1957, 603 West 140th St., NY, NY; 1957, 3456 Broadway.
6. Residences prior to coming to the US: 1919, Petersburg, Russia; 1945-52, Munich, Germany.
7. Date departed from native country and reason for departure: Subject deserted or was captured by the Germans in 1941. At that time he was Chief of Chemical Services of the Soviet 67th Infantry Corp.

1- [redacted]

b3

FVB:csp

pg(2)

*See my file re closing case on this memo!*  
*8/31*

Chief Clerk  
 Post 9/28/62  
*341*

SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....  
 SERIALIZED.....FILED.....  
 SEP 28 1962  
 FBI - NEW YORK

b6  
b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

TO : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 8/30/62 b3

FROM : SAC, ALBANY [redacted] (RUC)

SUBJECT: VLADIMIR POZDNIKOV  
IS-R  
OO: New York

Re New York letter to Albany 7/19/62.

The following investigation was conducted by  
SA [redacted] at Syracuse, N.Y.:

A review of the Syracuse University Directory for 1961-62, on 8/14/62, disclosed that VLADIMIR POZDNIKOFF was listed as an instructor in the East European Language Program, M-2, Skytop, which is the location of the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology. This directory listed his residence as 120 East Borden Ave., Syracuse, N.Y., telephone number GRanite 6-3758.

A review of the Syracuse, N.Y. Telephone Directory disclosed that his present number was GRanite 8-1367 and that telephone GRanite 6-3758 had previously been listed at [redacted] Syracuse, N.Y. to [redacted] wife [redacted] was listed as [redacted] [redacted] was listed as [redacted] Syracuse University and [redacted] The Syracuse Telephone Directory disclosed that [redacted] had moved to [redacted] Syracuse, N.Y. b6 b7C

On 8/14/62, Miss SHIRLEY MC DONALD, Syracuse Credit Bureau, Syracuse, N.Y., advised that her records show that VLADIMIR POZDNIKOFF, residing at 120 E. Borden Ave., had been in their files since July, 1960 and was employed at Syracuse University at that time. He was listed as married, having [redacted] name of wife [redacted] not given and there was a report in their files dated September, 1960, which showed that he had previously resided at 603 W. 140th St., NYC and had an account at Montgomery Ward, NYC, prior to that time. These records b6 b7C

2 - New York (RM)  
1 - Albany  
RSR:jdp  
(3)

SEP 1 1962  
[redacted]  
[redacted] b3



Instructor with the US Air Force / Syracuse University, New York, 1958



(Personal archive of ROA Col. V.V.Pozdniakov)

The above-described lethal historical decade is just an example of the life V.V. Pozdniakov and his fellow anti-Stalin political activists had to deal with in post-war Munich, constantly engaging and hiding from the NKVD and KGB assassins. This exceptional anti-Stalinist political life of the Russian Diaspora's Second Wave has also personally touched the authors, Irina and Nick Pozdniakov, who grew up in starving bombed-out Munich directly after the war. At the time, they could not understand their parents' constant anxiety and precautions, why their children had to be taken from their home to be separated and placed in various remote boarding schools, or why their names were changed ... But one thing became very clear to them — none of their stateless fellow-refugee and Displaced Person (DP) family acquaintances possessed any “Stalinist political culture”.



# **XI. Re. Tromly's false conclusions, repeating KGB's disinformation about Col. Pozdniakov, and its use to defame him**

Tromly's spurious words<sup>87</sup> that Colonel Pozdniakov's "*espionage record was hardly an exception for postwar exiles in West Germany, where destitute displaced persons sought to peddle often fraudulent information for material gain*", and his failures with CIA operations aside — the KGB never forgot about Pozdniakov.

Pozdniakov was a central figure in the 1950s Munich post WWII anti-Stalin movement. Thus, the KGB launched a media disinformation campaign defaming V.V. Pozdniakov's character and accusing him of various crimes. After serving seven years in the Gulag, a forcibly repatriated former ROA officer and colleague of Pozdniakov, Senior Lieutenant Y. Khmyrov, became part of this Soviet disinformation campaign to continue to discredit the Vlasov Movement to which he had previously belonged. In 1952, Khmyrov was quoted in the Soviet disinformation weekly "*Golos Rodiny*" claiming that ex-ROA Major A.F. Chikalov (Pozdniakov's old Gestapo accuser and nemesis), was killed in Munich in 1946, falsely linking Pozdniakov with his murder. The historical fact remains that Chikalov was actually rendered to the Soviets by the US Army CIC

in 1949 and tried and executed in Moscow by the NKVD in 1950. In 1955, the same Soviet publication “*Golos Rodiny*” published an article<sup>88</sup> “implicating” Pozdniakov in the abuse of POWs in the German camps, as well as working for the Nazi SD *Sicherheitsdienst* and SS *Schutzstaffel* (a new invention by the KGB). Other articles followed over the years. Interesting to note, that in 1965, the very same *word-for-word* allegations of “*Nazi Gestapo, SS, and SD connections*” that were allegedly made in writing against Pozdniakov by Nerianin/Chikalov in 1945 were repeated once more in Soviet KGB disinformation press articles<sup>89</sup> focused on the Russian émigré communities abroad — exactly as Tromly has done again in his paper, more than fifty years later!

In 1969, the Soviet Committee of Cultural Ties published a propaganda brochure entitled: “*Они среди вас! Сборник статей о предателях и изменниках Родины*” 1969. (*They are amongst you! Collection of Articles about Traitors of the Motherland*) which was not published in the USSR or abroad but specifically mailed by the KGB to the addresses of thousands of individual emigres residing outside the Soviet Union, and contained derogatory information about the Vlasov Movement as well as V.V. Pozdniakov. The anonymous author of this brochure, G. Korinetz, without presenting any sourcing, labeled V.V. Pozdniakov again as “head of camp police”.

Another article<sup>90</sup> published in Moscow in 1972, by the same Yuriy Khmyrov above (now aka Dolgorukiy), accused V.V. Pozdniakov of the murder of senior Orthodox clergyman Archbishop Sergey Vosnesenskiy in Lithuania on 29 April 1944 (that was actually tied to an NKVD partisan unit). A year later, in 1973, another Soviet writer, N. Zorin, published the same unfounded NKVD / KGB accusations of this murder against V.V. Pozdniakov in the same Soviet “*Golos Rodiny*” publication. This was after Pozdniakov had already passed away, at the age of 69, from complications to his health resulting from his POW camp deprivations and repeated torture by the NKVD. Thus, it does not surprise that Russian propaganda is continuing this disinformation campaign by spewing out the same KGB lies that are now again being sourced by Tromly. But in today’s volatile conflict between two countries of the Former Soviet Union there is a new twist in the propaganda advanced by Tromly — that the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora is an entire “*generation of émigrés shaped by war, genocide and Nazi collaboration*”, as exemplified by V.V. Pozdniakov. This is a useful label for promotion today by the FSB to stifle any dissent or rebellion inside the Russian military and to promote consensus within the population to support Putin’s touted mission to “*denazify*” Ukraine.

Despite the University of Puget Sound’s endorsement that Tromly’s “*work appears to conform with the scholarly standards of his field, including carefully documenting his sources and treating the historical evidence with appropriate levels of care, skepticism, and nuance*”, here are a few examples of its professor’s **carefully** attempting to **document his sources** in the

case study of Pozdniakov that show no documentation whatsoever - but are only examples of his suppositions or repetition of old KGB disinformation:

*“Pozdniakov’s suspiciousness and willingness to denounce his political opponents” and “willing to follow any orders and to destroy others” (pg. 520). “Pozdniakov’s political toxicity, as well as his Soviet-style political habits, were especially clear in his holding of grudges. One can posit a pattern – so reminiscent of Stalinism – of grudges and fears of “liquidation” leading to mutual denunciation” and “whether such recourse to psychology is valid or not, Pozdniakov’s hyper-suspicion was clearly characteristic of Stalinist political culture” (pg. 522). Pozdniakov was “seeing entire political ideologies through the prism of threat and treachery” (pg. 523).*

Tromly’s hardly accurate or impartial historical university research methods were thus explained<sup>91</sup> to us by Puget Sound University Provost Kerkhoff, General Counsel Cleveland, and President Dr. Issiah Crawford, as *“the university followed its process to appropriately review whether Professor Tromly adhered to professional standards in conducting and publishing his **scholarly research**, and concluded that he did”* ... while offering us the University’s final homily that *“disagreements and uncertainties enrich our discipline and are the source of its liveliness and its scholarly improvement”*. This deficient response, conducted by the Provost, while a plant ecologist, but apparently not speaking or reading any Russian that is needed to verify the UPS sourcing, and indifferent to historical factual evidence, calls for a defense of historical truth, that is objectively verifiable and independently reproducible. This is a core element of scholarship and academic freedom to conduct an in-depth analysis of Tromly’s research and writings on Col. Pozdniakov and the ROA, that were reviewed positively only by UPS — and by Tromly’s **academic peers in Russia**.

## CONCLUSION

Tromly’s “biography” of Colonel Pozdniakov is *not* a coherent, accurate, or historically reliable account about a man’s life. Instead, it is fiction, a pejorative defamation of his subject that fraudulently incriminates Pozdniakov as being responsible for violent acts, imaginary crimes, and possessing a virulent personality.

In his suggestive all-embracing title, **“The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora”**, and in attacking the life of **one** man, Tromly commits the logical fallacy of a faulty generalization extended to the lives and motivations of many hundreds of thousands of other Russian refugees and political exiles who had escaped from Stalin’s tyranny. The authors, and the few remaining survivors of the Second Wave generation, can safely state that during the past 80 years of being closely integrated into the Second Wave, we have **never**

encountered anyone possessing a “Stalinist political culture.” Had Tromly actually known anyone personally from this Diaspora, he might have discovered this for himself. No one knows exactly how many Russians were displaced by World War II and how many survived to return to the Soviet Union, or how many sought refuge abroad. Tromly himself states in his later paper<sup>92</sup>: *“At the end of the war, roughly five million Soviet citizens found themselves outside the country, having exited as prisoners of war, slave laborers in the Third Reich, or refugees who had fled with the German forces. While most of the Soviet displaced persons (DP) repatriated to the USSR after the war, perhaps 500,000 of them refused to return to their homeland and eked out an existence in displaced persons camps in Germany, Austria, or Italy in the postwar years.”*

Tromly’s statement above that most DPs “repatriated” themselves to the USSR glosses over the fact that instead, they had actually been “**forcibly rendered**” to the USSR, as vividly described by witnesses in “Victims of Yalta” [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victims\\_of\\_Yalta](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victims_of_Yalta); Tolstoy, Nikolai. *Victims of Yalta*, originally published in London, 1977. [ISBN 0-552-11030-2](https://www.isbn-international.org/view/title/11030-2)) and “Operation Keelhaul” [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Keelhaul](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Keelhaul), Epstein, Julius. *Operation Keelhaul*, Devin-Adair, 1973. [ISBN 978-0-8159-6407-0](https://www.isbn-international.org/view/title/978-0-8159-6407-0); Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers (1974). *“Operation Keelhaul—Exposed”*. *San Jose State University ScholarWorks*: 4–9. Retrieved 28 January 2020.).

It is safe to say that the 500,000 or more Soviet citizens who took up arms against their own Stalinist masters during WWII, plus the masses of displaced persons of the Second Wave of the later Russian diaspora, were not shaped by any “Stalinist culture” since they all *voted with their feet after the war* and chose not to return to their native homeland under the celebrations of the victorious Stalin. In contrast to many books and memoirs on the topic, Tromly does not explain how the refugees’ so-called “Stalinist political culture” shaped their later motivations to actually fight and oppose Stalin, to support the anti-Stalin Russian Liberation Army, and their final decision not to return home to Stalin’s totalitarian regime? Instead of returning, those who were not forcibly repatriated to Russia after the war, known as the Russian Diaspora’s Second Wave, sought political refuge and asylum in *any* foreign country of the world that would take them. Their true *culture* in their new homes and countries never changed, forming the widespread basis of a continuing anti-communist and permanent “**anti-Stalinist political culture**”.

Tromly’s conclusion in his “case study” of Pozdniakov that the sizable Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora was “*a generation of Russian émigrés shaped by Stalinism, genocide, and Nazi collaboration*”<sup>2</sup> is bizarre speculation rather than historical fact. This generation of emigrants, has been burdened with *gaslighting* and cultural racism by historians like Tromly, who construct and disseminate stereotypes, brainwash students and prevent emigrants from

fully participating in the intellectual life of America: <https://www.historians.org/group/committee-on-racial-and-ethnic-equity/>; <https://iehs.org/>

While Tromly's account of the history of the Russian Liberation Army and the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora holds little interest in our country today, it is a topic of current concern and important propaganda thrust in Putin's Russia. This is the reason why this "case study" was published by Tromly first in Russia.

During his jubilant appearance at his campaign headquarters on 17 March 2024 to celebrate his uncontested 5th term election victory, Putin warned *what* had happened to the long-executed "*turncoat-traitor*" General Vlasov and his followers — a direct threat addressed to suppress his developing political opposition and military critics. A few months after "*Putin's chef's*" (mutineer Prigozhin's) untimely demise from a grenade detonating mid-air in his plane, Russian TV reinforced Putin's message by showing its nationwide audience a graphic 1946 photo of the mass hanging in Moscow of Vlasov and his eleven rendered generals:

***"Here they are! This is how they ended up. Enough with half-measures. Traitors have to be dealt with in a radical way".***



NKVD Taganka Prison, Moscow, 1 August 1946

This is why General Vlasov and his anti-Stalin movement continues to be a hot topic for denunciation in Russia today, and “*anti-Vlasov / anti-CIA*” articles like Tromly’s are published and well-received there. This is the reason, also, why after 80 years, the FSB is releasing on the Internet the extensive forced interrogation reports by Stalin’s secret police of the anti-Stalin Vlasov movement members after the war. The FSB’s objective is to encourage a “**new approach**” in the West to the study of WWII and the entire post-war Russian Second Wave “*traitor/ collaborationist generation*” to rewrite history to suit the current pro-Stalinist propaganda purposes of Putin’s regime. Likewise, by promoting articles in Russia about the history of the past failure of a million Soviet citizens who had turned against their own Stalinist regime, and much of their subsequent “failed” use by the CIA, the FSB is also working on its separate objective to dampen any eagerness of Russians considering collaboration with the CIA in defiance of the disastrous directions taken by Putin’s regime.



Moscow Metro, 2025

<https://apnews.com/article/stalin-statue-russia-ussr-putin-moscow-metro-7a5a425f9b1c6a7120b6345b5d150de3>

No one disputes Professor Tromly’s entitlement to voice his point of view or choose the directions of his historical research, within the confines of furthering historical accuracy, integrity, and veracity. However, his impaired, unethical, *ad hominem* disinformation, libel, bogus source citations, and harsh denunciations of other historians and organizations, who do not share his political perspectives, have no place in the university community of published scholars. Tromly’s false labeling of them as “*dogmatic historical revisionists, etc.*” needs to be

challenged and examined closely by the academic research community that is studying the history of WWII. Such peer review of his disinformation campaign would do much to clarify Tromly's competence as a biased historian, as well as to evaluate his prejudices and motivations.

Also important to examine, are the biases that many of Tromly's own students at the University of Puget Sound have been pointing out about him since 2010 in a description of their history professor: <https://www.ratemyprofessors.com/professor/1443122>

Professor Tromly: *"Being a Stalinist ... offering a varied look at Russia and Eastern Europe" ... "there are obvious and glaring contradictions in his syllabus" ... "insecure and begrudging ... he lets his own beliefs affect his grading when it comes to controversial topics" ... "he gets extremely emotional if you don't agree with his ideologies" and ... "he can babble"!*

While spoken words of slander might not be remembered for long — Tromly's fallacious words of libel rewrite a comparatively little known period of WWII history into a permanent record that can exert influence on history students and teachers alike. These students who become teachers, in turn, may repeat and believe the libel to be historical fact and continue disseminating historical disinformation, ethnic and cultural stereotyping. Professor Tromly's libel, revisionism, and **Stalinist pro-Putin** disinformation, thus, spreads repeated harm to many of his defenseless and incognizant victims, as well as to current and future generations of scholars.

In conclusion, Tromly defiles V.V. Pozdniakov's memory as a survivor of Stalin's torture and totalitarian political repression, as well as his efforts as an advocate to render justice to the millions of Stalin's innocent victims. Tromly dishonors Pozdniakov's years of hazardous service on behalf of the United States Government, as well as the lives of the many CIA agents he worked with, that were betrayed and lost in the line of duty to defend the security of Tromly's own country of birth, education, and work. He further discredits V.V. Pozdniakov as a historian, archivist, published author, and his decade-long contribution in mentoring hundreds of students at Syracuse University. Likewise, Tromly libels an entire generation of anti-Soviet immigrants with the publication of this article. He disseminates ethnic and cultural racism, stereotyping, and exposes the Russian Diaspora to public scorn, disgrace, and influences his audience to mar people's reputation with falsehoods.

By association, Tromly also mars the reputation of the CIA for its "operational failures" against the Soviet Union and its malevolent security services, due to the CIA's dealings with its so-called *"collaborationist, Nazi henchmen, war criminal, and torturer"* agents. Such a representation by Tromly closely supports the interests and goals of Russia's security service, FSB, while at the same time, deprecating the valuable intelligence work conducted by US Government agencies in their pursuit of US national security objectives, as well as safeguarding the defense of the US Homeland. The **US National Defense Strategy of 2022**

*clearly* defines Putin's Russia as an “adversary” and an “acute threat” to the United States.

This white paper strives to correct historical facts by identifying and analyzing Tromly's factual errors, mistranslations, unsubstantiated assumptions, and errors of logic. By specifically documenting his own “*scholarly research*” and basing his conclusions on the records of Stalin's secret police, which was responsible for the ruthless murders of millions of innocent people, Tromly undeniably dishonors historical truth and the historian's profession.

<https://2021-2025.state.gov/russias-pillars-of-disinformation-and-propaganda-report/>

<https://2021-2025.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/vladimir-putins-historical-disinformation/>

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## FOOTNOTES

**1** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 515**

**2** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 527**

**3** by Putin's regime and FSB CENTRAL ARCHIVES: Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study (**pg. 520**) "Власов: история предательства, Central Archives of the FSB/KGB; т. 2" - <https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/170003>

**4** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 519**

**5** UPS President's Issiah Crawford and Provost Kerkhoff's correspondence with Irina and Nick Pozdniakov, 8 January 2025

**6** Peer review in Russia from editorial process from *Quaestio Rossica*:  
<https://qr.ufu.ru/ojs/index.php/qr/peerReviewProcess>

Before being accepted for publication, every article undergoes a number of procedures:

First, the article is considered by the managing editor, who determines whether the article complies with the general requirements of the journal (its thematic scope, presence of the required metadata, formatting, and the quality of illustrations). If the article fails to meet these requirements, it is not considered further. All articles are checked for plagiarism on submission (parts of text appropriated from other authors or self-plagiarism). To identify plagiarism, the following resources are used: [AntiPlagiat](#) and [iThenticate](#). The results are carefully analysed whereupon the editors take a decision about the absence or presence of plagiarism in the article.

Second, the article is examined by the editor-in-chief before it is submitted to the reviewer. All articles sent to the journal are subject to double-blind peer review, which means that the reviewers have no knowledge of the author's personal information, and vice versa. The article is reviewed by a specialist in the corresponding field who is either a member of the Editorial Board or Editorial Council of the journal. Whenever needed, the Editorial Board may contact other specialists in the field.

**7** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 516**. *Quaestio Rossica* / Ural Federal University's own additions in Russian to Tromly's paper:

*"Статья посвящена жизни и деятельности Владимира Васильевича Позднякова в годы Второй мировой войны и начала холодной войны. Подполковник Красной армии, арестованный во время Большого террора, Поздняков попал в плен на Восточном фронте в октябре 1941 г. Он сотрудничал с немцами: сначала занимал пост начальника лагерной полиции в 1942 г., потом стал пропагандистом системы лагерей для военнопленных и, наконец, служил высокопоставленным офицером под командованием генерала А. А. Власова. После войны он избежал репатриации в СССР и работал агентом разведки в организации «Гелена» и ЦРУ, а также принимал участие в антикоммунистических организациях в Западной Германии. Поздняков также был активным*

*историком власовского движения в послевоенные годы. Его карьера дает возможность проследить действия одного человека в период войны, оккупации и холодной войны. На основе источников можно утверждать, что Поздняков был человеком амбициозным, подозрительным и догматичным – все качества, которые отражали его прошлое в элитах сталинской системы 1930-х гг. Сосредоточив внимание на политической культуре 1930-х гг., можно осмыслить действия Позднякова в данный период: его готовность к коллаборации с нацистами, а затем и с западными завоевателями Германии, его постоянные склоки в кругах коллаборационистов и послевоенной русской диаспоры, а также его усилия обелить историю власовского движения в послевоенные годы. Пример Позднякова предлагает новый подход к изучению политической культуры второй волны русской эмиграции. Из-за исторического контекста формирования второй волны – пленение на Восточном фронте, жизнь и иногда коллаборация при нацистской оккупации, бегство от репатриации – у ее членов не было другого источника общественной идентичности, кроме демонстрации преданности олувымышленной Русской освободительной армии Власова. Ключевые слова: Вторая мировая война, русская эмиграция, Русская освободительная армия, генерал Власов, коллаборация, шпионаж”.*

8 e.g. KRITIKA.....In 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin established the [Valdai International Discussion Club](#) as a Western-style think tank and academic forum. Its purpose was to cultivate friendly scholars who could potentially influence foreign policy and garner goodwill for Russia, particularly among Western intellectuals.....

9 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **pages 523, 528, 529**. Coffin, W.S. Once to Every Man: A Memoir. N.Y.: Atheneum, 1977, 344p. **Footnote 9** “Confirmation of Pozdniakov’s involvement in this operation – documentation of which is still classified – comes from Pozdniakov’s son Nicholas (Efimenko). A CIA case officer involved in this project states that the Vlasovites did not have a solid organization and failed to recruit agents [Coffin, p.94-100].” And Efimenko, E. Electronic Correspondence. 2 May 2021 // Personal Archive of Author).

10 [Efimenko E. Electronic Correspondence. 2 May 2021 // Personal Archive of Author.](#)

11 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 519** – sources Chuikov, Nerianin, Samygin, and hearsay

12 The FARA Act. <https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara>  
<https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2020/09/01/protecting-us-covert-foreign-influence.pdf>

13 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/what-fsb-is-doing-in-russian-universities/>

14 Электронный научный архив УрФУ (URFU) <https://jah.su/index.php/index> and [https://inion.ru/site/assets/files/6023/11\\_2022\\_istoriia.pdf](https://inion.ru/site/assets/files/6023/11_2022_istoriia.pdf)

15 <https://www.linkedin.com/in/benjamin-tromly-727a2a4b/>

- 16** The American Historical Association's citation principle of "*leaving a clear trail for subsequent historians to follow*: STATEMENT ON STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (updated 2023) - <https://www.historians.org/resource/statement-on-standards-of-professional-conduct/>
- 17** UPS President's Issiah Crawford and Provost Kerkhoff's correspondence with Irina and Nick Pozdniakov, 8 January 2025: "*I understand and appreciate that you disagree with the article and Professor Tromly's interpretation of the historical facts; however, the ongoing study of history relies on ongoing interpretation and scholarly analysis of all available information. Differences of opinion are to be expected. Indeed, the American Historical Association's Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct explains that, "disagreements and uncertainties enrich our discipline and are the source of its liveliness and its scholarly improvement."*"
- 18** <https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2015/03/remembering-the-victims-of-stalins-great-terror?lang=en>
- 19** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, pages **519, 520, 522, 527, 529**; The FSB / KGB / NKVD / SMERSH Archives: <https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/170003>
- 20** especially the direct quotations of interrogation protocols of Col. Pozdniakov's former military mates who were rendered by force, e.g.: "*Under interrogation by the Soviet secret police, Vlasovite A.A. Rtishchev commented that Pozdniakov often praised the German command ...etc.*" Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 520**
- 21** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011, / (Александров К. М. Жизнь и судьба полковника Владимира Васильевича Позднякова, архивиста и собирателя второй волны русской эмиграции // Люди и судьбы русского зарубежья). **Pages 159**
- 22** Russian Telegram Channel "*Zametki Istorika*" (*Comments of a Historian*), [t.me/historiansnotes](https://t.me/historiansnotes) searches on Tromly show numerous reviews of his books and articles, with praise - "*vydaiushchiisia trud*" – outstanding work.
- 23** "*полезный идиот*" = useful idiot. See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Useful\\_idiot](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Useful_idiot)
- 24** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 517**
- 25** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011, / (Александров К. М. Жизнь и судьба полковника Владимира Васильевича Позднякова, архивиста и собирателя второй волны русской эмиграции // Люди и судьбы русского зарубежья). **Page 158, page 156** describes his previous arrest in 1929
- 26** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 518**

- 27** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 517** footnote
- 28** Tromly B. Reinventing Collaboration - The Vlasov Movement in the Postwar Russian Emigration (2017), **page 109**
- 29** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 518**
- 30** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011, **page 158** and Stalin Records showing Soviet Supreme Court's indictment of V.V. Pozdniakov for "treason"  
<https://stalin.memo.ru/> and <https://stalin.memo.ru/lists/list405/>
- 31** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011, **page 174**
- 32** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011, **pages 174-175**  
<https://stalin.memo.ru/> and <https://stalin.memo.ru/lists/list405/>
- 33** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 518**
- 34** The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study. (**page 518**) and HPSSS Schedule A. Vol. 22. Case 433. **P. 4–5.**
- 35** Tromly B. (2019). Cold War Exiles and the CIA - Plotting to Free Russia. Oxford University Press (**pg. 113**) <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840404.001.0001>
- 36** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study (**pg. 528**). Chuikov, V. I. (1949). List of War Criminals and Persons Who Collaborated with the Enemy in the US Zone of Occupation in Germany. 13 May. In Georgetown University Archives and Special Collections. Robert F. Kelley Papers. Box 5. Folder 6. (**pg. 528** - Pozdniakov 11 April 1950 / Kelley / Chuikov; **pg. 529** - Chuikov / Pozdniakov VV (1950d) / Kelley; **pg. 529** - Chuikov; **pg. 530** - Pozdniakov VV (1950) / Kelley.
- 37** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011, **page 178**
- 38** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 521**
- 39** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 517**

- 40 Tromly references Pozdniakov's "war crimes" to the Robert F. Kelley Papers in the Georgetown University Archives, Box 5 Folder 6, that pertains specifically to materials about the CIA's "Radio Liberty Formation, 1948-51". Both Pozdniakov and Kelley worked together at Radio Liberty and were not involved in any war crimes.
- 41 Central Archives of the FSB/KGB - "Власов: история предательства"  
<https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/170003>
- 42 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 520**.
- 43 See also the direct transcripts of Rtishchev's interrogation by SMERSH:  
<https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/182811> and  
<https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/182811#mode/grid/page/1/zoom/3>
- 44 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 520**
- 45 See also the direct transcripts of Tavantsev's interrogations by SMERSH:  
[https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/search?search\\_id=7715916&query=%22%D0%A2%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%B2%22&commit=%D0%9D%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%82%D0%B8&node\\_id=&search\\_in\\_metadata=off&search\\_in\\_metadata=on&search\\_in\\_texts=off&search\\_in\\_texts=on](https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/search?search_id=7715916&query=%22%D0%A2%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%86%D0%B5%D0%B2%22&commit=%D0%9D%D0%B0%D0%B9%D1%82%D0%B8&node_id=&search_in_metadata=off&search_in_metadata=on&search_in_texts=off&search_in_texts=on)
- 46 SMERSH Interrogation Protocol of Zverev re. Tavantsev:  
<https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/182644#mode/inspect/page/3/zoom/4>
- 47 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **pgs. 519, 528, 529**
- 48 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 519**
- 49 Central Archives of FSB/KGB. "Власов: история предательства". Interrogation Protocol of E.G. Ershov: <https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/170003> and  
<https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/182824#mode/inspect/page/12/zoom/4>
- 50 Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 162**). In Rozhdeniye ROA (Birth of the ROA), Syracuse, 1972 (**pgs. 33, 36, 37**), Col. Pozdniakov describes how he himself was dealing against the activities of the *Abwehr* to keep Nazi influence out of the ROA. **Page 172** describes the deplorable conditions in SMERSH Filtration Camp No. 237 near Zerbst.
- 51 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 519**. And Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 163**).

- 52** Петров И. Быть услышанным и правильно понятым: письмо М. Самыгина в редакцию «Нового журнала». Мюнхен, 21 июня 1949 г. // LiveJournal : [сайт]. 2013. 1 дек.  
[URL:https://labas.livejournal.com/1048974.html](https://labas.livejournal.com/1048974.html). <https://www.svoboda.org/a/pervyy-vlasovskiy-letopisets-sudjba-mihaila-samygina-/32127962.html>.
- 53** Untitled memoirs of 'Sergei Nikolayevich Sverchkov' / S.N. Dubrovskii-Orlovskii's participation in the Vlasov movement, Boris Nicolaevsky collection, box 258, folder 19 (microfilm reel 219), Hoover Institution Library & Archives. See also "Battle of the RL Voices: Dubrovsky vs. Vinogradov", Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe, 1950-1989. Richard H. Cummings (2009)
- 54** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 515**
- 55** Russkaya Osvobodit'elnaya Armia (ROA / POA), 26 January 2011.  
<http://www.old.axishistory.com/axis-nations/137-germany-military-other/foreign-olunteers/2117-russkaya-osvoboditelnaya-armiya-roapoa>
- 56** <https://www.armedconflicts.com/651-Vlasov-and-Russian-Liberation-Army-in-Czechoslovakia> and <https://english.radio.cz/repyrje-build-memorial-honouring-vlasov-troops-who-helped-liberation-prague-8113168>
- 57** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 524**
- 58** WIKIPEDIA – Andrey Vlasov: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrey\\_Vlasov](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrey_Vlasov)
- 59** Julia Shapiro. Nazi Conspirator, Russian Patriot: Judging General Andrei Vlasov, 2022  
<https://journals.flvc.org/UFJUR/article/download/130757/136333/240252>
- 60** Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement: Soviet Reality and Émigré Theories by Catherine Andreyev. Review by: Marc Raeff. Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring, 1988), pp. 131-133. Published by: Cambridge University Press. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2498861>
- 61** WIKIPEDIA – Russian Liberation Army: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian\\_Liberation\\_Army](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Liberation_Army)
- 62** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 529**
- 63** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study (**pgs. 520, 529**). And: Central Archives of the FSB/KGB - <https://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/170003sbbbb>
- 64** Colonel V.V. Pozdniakov. Rozhdeniye ROA (Birth of the ROA), Syracuse, 1972 (**pgs. 110, 125, 205-245**)

- 65 Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011. **Pgs 172-173**
- 66 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study (pgs. 520, 529). And:  
*Нерянин А. Г. Выписка из дневника полковника Нерянина. 1945 // BA-MA. MSG 149-156.*
- 67 Tromly B. (2019). Cold War Exiles and the CIA - Plotting to Free Russia. Oxford University Press (pg. 113) <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840404.001.0001>
- 68 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 523**
- 69 Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 181**). And BA-MA.Msg. 149/29. Korrespondenzenuber die Befreiungsbewegung der Volker Russlands (ONDR). BI 86; MSg. 149/56. BI 31, 230-231
- 70 Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 163**)
- 71 Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 162**)
- 72 Bundesarchiv BA-MA. MSG 149-156 (**Blatt 27**) and Bundesarchiv BA-MA. MSG 149-156 (**Blatt 32**)
- 73 Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pgs. 175-177**)
- 74 Aleksandrov K.M.- People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**page 177**). And Bundesarchiv BA-MA. Msg 149/56 Nerianin
- 75 Bundesarchiv BA-MA. MSG 149-156 (**Blatt 27**)
- 76 Hoffmann, J. Wlassow gegen Stalin. Die Tragödie der Russischen Befreiungsarmeeß1944/45 / Goffman, I. Vlasov protiv Stalina: tragediya russkoi osvoboditel'noi armii, (**pg. 218**)
- 77 Bundesarchiv BA-MA. Msg 149/56
- 78 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **pages 526, 527, 529**
- 79 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **pages 515, 527**
- 80 Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **pages 521, 523**

- 81** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study, **page 523**
- 82** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study (**pgs. 523, 528, 530**). Поздняков В. В. Некоторые вопросы проблемы 46 борьбы с большевизмом. 11 апреля 1950 г. // Georgetown University Archives and Special Collections. Robert F. Kelley Papers. Box 5. Folder 6.
- 83** Tromly B. Cold War Exiles and the CIA – Plotting to Free Russia (2019), **page 113**
- 84** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study (**pg. 528**). Chuikov, V. I. (1949). List of War Criminals and Persons Who Collaborated with the Enemy in the US Zone of Occupation in Germany. 13 May. In Georgetown University Archives and Special Collections. Robert F. Kelley Papers. Box 5. Folder 6. (**pg. 528** - Pozdniakov 11 April 1950 / Kelley / Chuikov; **pg. 529** - Chuikov / Pozdniakov VV (1950d) / Kelley; **pg. 529** - Chuikov; **pg. 530** - Pozdniakov VV (1950) / Kelley.
- 85** Coffin, W.S. Once to Every Man: A Memoir. N.Y.: Atheneum, 1977
- 86** Tromly B. (2019). Cold War Exiles and the CIA - Plotting to Free Russia. Oxford University Press <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840404.001.0001>
- 87** Tromly B. The Stalinist Political Culture of the Second Wave of the Russian Diaspora: A Case Study **page 521**
- 88** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 163**); The Soviet Committee of Cultural Ties, “Они среди вас! Сборник статей о предателях и изменниках Родины” 1969; «Голос Родины» (Москва). 1972. Март. № 24(1596); «Голос Родины» (Москва). Март. № 27(1703). Moscow.
- 89** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 163**) and  
<sup>39</sup> Коринец Г. Указ. соч. С. 19.
- 90** Aleksandrov K.M. People and Fates of the Russian diaspora, 2011 (**pg. 173**) and  
<sup>62</sup> Хмыров (Долгорукий) Ю.П. Указ соч.; Зорин Н. Указ. соч.  
<sup>63</sup> ВА-МА. MSg. 149/56. Письмо от 10 апр. 1972 Н. Голубевой – В.В. Позднякову. Bl. 114–116.  
<sup>64</sup> Подробнее, см.: Александров К.М. Офицерский корпус... С. 687–688.  
<sup>65</sup> См.: Коринец Г. Указ. соч.

**91**      UPS General Counsel correspondence of 10 February 2025:

<p><b>Office of General Counsel</b> &lt;generalcounsel@pugetsound.edu&gt;          To: dr.ivm.campbel</p> <p>Dear Dr. McKeehan</p> <p>On behalf of the university, I am responding to your two most recent communications that seek information from the university about Professor Benjamin Trombly's research and assert that he has defamed your father in an article related to that research.</p> <p>The university did not sponsor or exert control over Professor Trombly in his work associated with the particular article in question, and does not have possession of or access to the materials you seek. In response to your initial complaints last fall, the university followed its process to appropriately review whether Professor Trombly adhered to professional standards in conducting and publishing his scholarly research, and concluded that he did. As a result, the university considers this matter resolved from an institutional perspective.</p> <p>We are sorry you continue to feel as though this article misrepresents your father, but your complaints to the university about this scholarly work are misplaced. We will not be responding to any further inquiries on this topic.</p> <p>Sincerely,          Joanna</p>	<p>Mon, Feb 10, 2025 at 6:59 PM</p>
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**92**      B. Trombly. Homo Sovieticus Washed Ashore: A Research Agenda for Studying the Second Wave of the Russian Emigration, 2024

## APPENDIX 1 – Records of Soviet Supreme Court’s indictment of V.V. Pozdniakov for “treason”

<https://stalin.memo.ru/> <https://stalin.memo.ru/lists/list405/>

### ПОЗДНЯКОВ Владимир Васильевич

б.нач.химслужбы, в 1936г. переведен в Саратов. бронетанковую школу капитан РККА, б.царский офицер, арестован как уч.к/р повстанческой орг-ции и военно-фаш.заговора...

\* Список от 29 сентября 1938г. [Куйбышевская область] - 1-я категория - РГАСПИ, ф.17, оп.171, дело 419, лист 245


**Список от 29.09.1938**

РГАСПИ, ф.17, оп.171, дело 419, лист 216

СПИСКИ  
ЛИЦ, ПОДЛЕЖАЩИХ СУДУ ВОЕННОЙ  
КОЛЛЕГИИ ВЕРХОВНОГО СУДА  
СОЮЗА ССР

от 29 сентября 1938 года

Сталин, Молотов



207

С П Р А В К А

	<u>1-я кат.</u>	<u>2-я кат.</u>	<u>ВСЕГО</u>	<u>№№ страниц</u>
Москва-центр	61	25	86 ✓	1-5
Московская область	108	20	128	6-14
Алтайский край	89	10	99	15-19
Буйбышевск. область	163	25	188	20-28
Татарская АССР	5	1	6	29
Омская область	7	-	7	30
Украинская ССР	68	-	68	31-34
Харьковская обл.	25	-	25	35-36
Дагестанская АССР	54	-	54	37-39
Калмыцкая АССР	2	-	2	40
Крымская "	14	-	14	41
Краснодарский край	136	28	164	42-49
Ивановская область	20	3	23	50-52
Ростов-н/Д -Во- рошиловск. ж.д.	13	8	21	53-55
ИТОГО:	<u>765</u>	120	885	

<https://stalin.memo.ru/lists/list405/>

**Список от 29.09.1938 [Куйбышевская область]**

РГАСПИ, ф.17, оп.171, дело 419, лист 245

- 100. МУСИНСКИЙ Александр Григорьевич
- 101. НИКИТИН Игнат Кондратьевич
- 102. НОВИЧКОВ Александр Ефимович
- 103. ПАВЛОВ Александр Иванович
- 104. ПАВЛОВ Георгий Васильевич
- 105. ПАРШУТОВ Павел Николаевич
- 106. ПЕТРОВА Раиса Исааковна
- 107. ПИНЕС Анна Яковлевна
- 108. ПИСАРЕВ Андрей Ефимович
- 109. ПИЩАЛЬНИКОВ Николай Ильич
- 110. ПЛОДУХИН Андрей Иванович
- 111. ПОДКОВЫРОВА Федора Евсеевна
- 112. ПОЗДНЯКОВ Владимир Васильевич



*No. 112. POZDNIAKOV, Vladimir Vassil'yevich*