# Catastrophic Events and Human Error:

A Few "Rotten Apples" or Organizational Dysfunction?


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# **Greater Assurance Demanded** (International Oil and Gas Industry)



## Why Catastrophic Events continue to occur:


- 1. Prioritizing Occupational Injury Prevention vs. Major Operating Risks
- 2. Blaming Human Error on Front Line Workers vs. Dysfunctional Operating Culture

3. Misuse of Performance Metrics to determine overall performance picture

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
# 1. Prioritizing Occupational Injury Prevention VS. **Major Operating Risks**





We don't measure this in the same way

### Relative risk rankings of Safe Work Execution vs. Work on "Barriers"



Work that can result in a serious Occupational Injury

**Safe Work Execution** 


Work on "Barriers"
(to manage the Major Operating / HSE risks)

Work QA / QC

# 2. Blaming Human Error on Front Line Workers vs.

**Dysfunctional Operating Culture** 





- "We always seem very quick to blame the individuals involved"
- "We like to send messages that not following procedures are unacceptable"
- "We're very good at using discipline to punish people, but the same kind of things continue to happen so how effective are we really being?"

Work resulting in a serious unplanned event

(Outputs and Results)

All Other Work Performed (Actions and Behaviors)

#### 9

### The 2 x 2 Matrix

Non-Compliant Actions and Behaviors (Human Error) can be distilled down to one or more of four main underlying causes:

- **Isolated Ability**
- **Isolated Motivation**
- **Systemic Ability**
- **Systemic Motivation**

#### TYPE of Non-Compliant Rehavior


		I YPE of Non-Compliant Behavior		
		Ability	Motivation	
SCOPE of Non-Compliant Behavior	Isolated	Unintentional Individual Errors, Slips, Lapses or Mistakes	Deliberate Individual Deviations from Operating Practices and Systems of Work	
	Systemic	Deficiencies with Operating Standards Competence Programs, Resources and / or Systems of Work	Operating Culture defaults towards Normalized Deviance and supports "Casual Compliance"	

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#### **Perceived** underlying reasons for non-compliant actions and behaviors


**TYPE** of Non-Compliant Behavior

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
#### **Actual** underlying reasons for non-compliant actions and behaviors

**TYPE** of Non-Compliant Behavior



Note: Where the **SCOPE** of non-compliance is systemic, solutions will likely reside within the top-half (rather than the bottom-half) of the organization

#### "Swiss-Cheese" Model



#### **Barrier Hole #1:** Ineffective Learning -

An incident happens but the underlying causes are frequently not established

#### **Barrier Hole #2 Dysfunctional Culture -**

Operating procedures are not strictly adhered to and deviations are commonplace

#### **Barrier Hole #3 Systems of Work -**

e.g. Permit to Work (PtW) System does not always effectively remove ignition sources from flammables

#### Ineffective Safeguards -Alarms Systems, Pressure

Relief Valves (PRV's) and other critical safeguards do not function as designed

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# 3. Misuse of Performance Metrics to determine overall performance picture

## Metrics to determine future likelihood of Catastrophic Events:

#### Requirements for Key Performance Indicators (KPI's):

- 1. Must reflect Major Operating Risks and Barrier Assurance;
- 2. Establish compliance levels (via actions and behaviors) of work on Barriers;
- 3. Determine the **TYPE** and **SCOPE** of all non-compliant work on Barriers;

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# Procedural Compliance for work on Barriers Q2-Q3 by Asset and Company



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# TYPE and SCOPE of Non-Compliant Behaviors for work on Barriers Q2-Q3 by Asset and Company



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	Past management of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE)	Future management of Major Operating Risk
Performance Determination	Outputs and Results	Actions and Behaviors
Metrics	LTIR, TRIR, Near Misses Unplanned Spills / Discharges etc.	Barrier Status (availability and integrity)
Data Source of Metric	Work Execution: - Manage against unplanned negative outcomes (e.g. an injury) while doing the work	Work Performance: - Perform the work to the correct standard, so that Barriers always function as designed
Why Bad Things Happen	Perceived to be isolated, procedural violations and / or individual slips, lapses and mistakes (A Few "Rotten Apples")	Recognition that non-compliance may be systemic and that the operating culture routinely defaults to "normalized deviance" (Organizational Dysfunction)
Corrective Actions	Solutions mostly reside close to the worksite (bottom-half of the organization)	Solutions mostly reside close to the corner office (top-half of the organization)



#### **More Information:**

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