IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JERALD HAMMANN,

:

Plaintiff,

: C. A. No. : 2021-0506-PAF

ADAMIS PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION, : DENNIS J. CARLO, RICHARD C. WILLIAMS, : HOWARD C. BIRNDORF, ROSHAWN A. BLUNT, : and DAVID J. MARGUGLIO, :

:

Defendants.

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Chancery Court Chambers
Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
500 North King Street
Wilmington, Delaware
Thursday, June 17, 2021
11:30 a.m.

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BEFORE: HON. PAUL A. FIORAVANTI, JR., Vice Chancellor

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TELEPHONIC RULINGS OF THE COURT ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND MOTION TO
EXPEDITE PROCEEDINGS

CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS
Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
500 North King Street - Suite 11400
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
(302) 255-0533

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THE COURT: Good morning. Vice
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    Chancellor joining. Can we have a roll call, starting
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    with the plaintiff?
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                    MR. HAMMANN: Your Honor, this is
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    Jerald Hammann for the plaintiff.
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                    THE COURT: Good morning.
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                    And for the defendants?
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                    MR. YOCH: Good morning, Your Honor.
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    James Yoch from Young Conaway. With me on the line is
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    Robert Ritchie from Vinson & Elkins on behalf of
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    defendants.
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                    THE COURT: Good morning. Thank you
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    for getting on the line with me this morning.
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    going to give you my ruling on the pending motions for
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    a temporary restraining order and to expedite in this
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    matter.
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                    On June 9, 2021, plaintiff Jerald
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    Hammann filed a complaint in this Court alleging
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    several claims against defendant Adamis
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    Pharmaceuticals Corporation and members of its board
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    of directors. The complaint largely focuses on the
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    Company's selection of July 16, 2021, as the date for
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    the Company's 2021 annual meeting of stockholders,
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which triggered the Company's advance notice bylaw,

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and the Company's subsequent rejection of

Mr. Hammann's director nominations and stockholder

proposals as being untimely.

The salient facts are as follows: The Company's bylaws require, among other things, that any stockholder proposals or director nominations must be made by a record holder. The bylaws also have an advance notice provision which generally provides in pertinent part that in the event the date of the annual meeting of stockholders is changed by more than 30 days before the date on which it was held in the prior year, to be timely, any stockholder proposals must be received not later than the 90th day prior to the date of such annual meeting or the 10th day following the day on which public announcement of the date of such meeting is first made.

On or about February 2021, plaintiff contacted the Company about enacting changes within the Company that he believed would benefit stockholders. At that time, the plaintiff was not a stockholder of the Company. The Company declined the plaintiff's offer. On March of 2021, the plaintiff purchased stock of the Company, and on March 18, 2021, sent a demand to inspect books and records of the

1 | Company.

The demand specifically stated: "My investigation is directed ultimately to the waging of a proxy contest, to the formulation of a stockholder proposal or proposals for consideration at the next annual meeting, and/or to the preparation of a lawsuit against corporate leadership."

The Company's version of events is a bit different and, if believed, strongly suggests that the plaintiff engaged in what might be called an old-fashioned shakedown.

The Company contends that plaintiff sought a consulting agreement, accompanied by a large fee, and if the Company refused, the plaintiff would buy shares and distract the Company with a costly proxy contest. According to the defendants, this action is plaintiff's followthrough on his threat.

The Company responded to the books and records demand on March 25, 2021. Thereafter, the Company provided some documents to the plaintiff, including some stockholder list materials.

On April 15, 2021, the Company filed with the SEC the Company's annual report on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2020. In the 10-K,

Adamis disclosed that the board had determined that
the 2021 annual meeting of stockholders would be held
on July 16, 2021.

The July 16, 2021, meeting date was more than 30 days prior to the 2020 annual meting date, thus triggering the Company's advance notice bylaw. Under the Company's advance notice bylaw, stockholder proposals and director nominations would be due no later than 10 days after the April 15, 2021, announcement of the meeting date. The 10-K expressly stated that any stockholder proposals or director nominations must be received at the Company's offices by April 25, 2021.

In letters to the Company dated May 6 and 7, plaintiff notified the Company of his intention to nominate four individuals, including himself, for election to the Adamis board. Plaintiff submitted a solicitation notice, stockholder proposals, and completed director questionnaires for his nominees.

On May 18, 2021, the Company advised plaintiff that his solicitation notice, stockholder proposals, and director nominations were untimely and would not be accepted.

The Company filed with the SEC a

preliminary proxy statement for the July 16, 2021,
annual meeting on June 1, 2021. Plaintiff filed
definitive additional materials on Schedule 14A on
June 2nd, 2021. He filed his complaint in this action
on June 9, 2021, and a motion for a temporary
restraining order and for expedited proceedings on

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June 11.

The defendants oppose both motions. I heard argument yesterday, June 16th.

Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order seeks an order as to three things:

One, enjoining the Company from printing its proxy statement; two, enjoining the Company from disseminating the proxy statement; and, three, enjoining the Company from convening the annual meeting on July 16.

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy. It is a specialized remedy of short duration designed primarily to prevent imminent irreparable injury.

A party seeking a TRO must establish a colorable claim, a threat of imminent irreparable harm, and a balancing of hardships favoring the moving party. This Court has routinely refrained from

granting interim injunctive relief that amounts to final relief.

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Similarly, to obtain expedited proceedings, the plaintiff must establish a sufficiently colorable claim and a sufficient possibility of threatened irreparable injury that would justify the extra costs of an expedited injunction proceeding.

I now turn to the claims in the complaint. Counts I and II are similar. Count I alleges violation of Rule 14a-5(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Count II alleges violation of Rule 14a-9(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.

This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider these claims. Under 15 USC Section 78aa, "The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder."

Vice Chancellor Lamb also acknowledged in the *Accipiter* case that this Court lacks

jurisdiction to hear claims under the Exchange Act.
Therefore, Counts I and II are not colorable.

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Count III alleges violation of Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. The plaintiff's TRO brief does not seek relief in the form of immediate production of books and records. Books and records actions are summary proceedings in this Court. Because they are summary proceedings, the general rule is that they should be litigated in distinct proceedings. That's from MHS Capital LLC v. Goggin, 2018 WL 2149718 at *15 from this Court on May 20, 2018, and Travel Centers of America v. Brog, 2008 WL 868107 at *1 from this Court on March 31, 2008.

If the plaintiff wishes to pursue a books and records action, he may do so in a separate proceeding. For purposes of the pending motions today, the motion to expedite the books and records claim asserted in this complaint is denied.

Count VI alleges claims for breach of the duty of disclosure against the individual defendants based on representations and omissions in the proxy statement. The gravamen of the claim is that the proxy's disclosure that the plaintiff's

director nominations were untimely, without further disclosure that the board authorized an advancement of the annual meeting date, misled stockholders that plaintiff and his slate were inept, and impugned the plaintiff's reputation.

The plaintiff also claims that the failure to disclose the board's motivation in setting a meeting date that triggered the advance notice bylaw is a material omission that bears on the character of the Company's slate of directors.

I do not find these claims to be colorable. The proxy disclosure merely states that plaintiff's nominations and stockholder proposals were untimely. They do not say anything along the lines that plaintiff is inept, and even if it did, that is not, at least in my view, a claim for a breach of the duty of disclosure that would support enjoining the meeting.

The plaintiff also alleges the proxy does not disclose the motivation for setting the annual meeting which triggered the advance notice bylaw, which plaintiff alleges would allow stockholders to assess the integrity of the current board.

I do not find this claim to be colorable. This is the type of "tell me more" that does not require additional disclosure. Delaware law does not require that a fiduciary disclose its underlying reasons for acting. That's from the Sauer Danfoss case.

Furthermore, the fact that the board set the annual meeting date that triggered the advance notice provision did not prevent the plaintiff from making stockholder proposals and director nominations. The plaintiff could have read the disclosure in the 10-K and submitted his materials in compliance with the bylaw if he had become a record holder.

To the extent that the plaintiff seeks disclosure that the directors breached their fiduciary duties, this Court has clearly held that directors are not required to disclose the plaintiff's characterization of the facts or engage in "self -- flagellation."

The plaintiff's reliance on Sherwood

v. Ngon for the proposition that the board's motives

must be disclosed is misplaced. In that case, the

proxy statement gave reasons for the Company's removal

of a director from its slate after having previously

nominated him. The proxy statement gave several reasons for the removal, but the removed director argued that the real reason was a self-interested one and that the plaintiff had stated a colorable claim that the proxy may be materially misleading in describing its motivations for its decision.

Here, however, there is no representation in the proxy about the defendants' motivations for selecting July 16, 2021, as the annual meeting date, nor is there any such representation in the 10-K that is being mailed with the proxy statement. Therefore, this is not like *Sherwood* where the proxy described the board's motivations and the plaintiff alleged the disclosure was misleading and incomplete.

Count V is a claim for a breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure for burying the announcement of the 2021 annual meeting date in the Company's SEC Form 10-K under a nondescript heading, which the plaintiff asserts prevented him from presenting and the stockholders from voting on the plaintiff's stockholder proposals and director nominees.

This is not a claim for breach of

fiduciary duty of disclosure with respect to the proxy statement and the annual meeting. This claim, as I understand it, focuses on the way in which the annual meeting date was disclosed in the 10-K. It is not a claim alleging false or misleading disclosure in the proxy statement in connection with the request for stockholder action, and it is not a colorable disclosure claim with respect to the proxy statement. Therefore, it is not colorable.

Count VI is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Fairly read, this claim alleges the Board breached its fiduciary duties by taking action that was intended to prevent the plaintiff from running a proxy contest. This falls within the Schnell v. Chris-Craft line of cases which holds that inequitable conduct does not become permissible merely because it is legally possible.

Based on the facts alleged in the complaint and the low threshold of colorability, I conclude at this very preliminary stage that the plaintiff has alleged a *Schnell* claim based on the board's selecting an annual meeting date that triggered the advance notice bylaw after the plaintiff had made the Company aware in his March 18, 2021,

books and records demand that his investigation was

"directed ultimately to the waging of a proxy contest"

and "formulation of a stockholder proposal or

proposals for consideration at the next annual

meeting."

Those facts distinguish this case from the Accipiter case, which both parties cited in their papers and addressed at argument yesterday. In Accipiter, the company not aware of any threatened proxy contest at the time it scheduled the annual meeting in a way that triggered the advance notice bylaw. In addition, Accipiter was decided on summary judgment following discovery. The applicable standard on the motions before me today is colorability, a much lower standard than what is needed to prevail on summary judgment.

I now turn to irreparable harm.

To obtain a TRO, a party must allege an imminent threat of irreparable harm. The plaintiff seeks relief in the form of an order preventing the Company from printing and disseminating the annual meeting proxy statement and from holding the annual meting on July 16, 2021.

First, the requested relief in the

form of preventing the printing and dissemination of a proxy statement may very well be moot because the definitive proxy statement has already been filed and, according to counsel for defendants, mailing is occurring this week. Second, preventing the dissemination of the Company's proxy statement would effectively provide the plaintiff with final relief in delaying the annual meeting.

In my view, a TRO is not the appropriate vehicle here. Perhaps a preliminary injunction hearing could be scheduled in advance of the meeting to allow for discovery and an expedited hearing. But after careful consideration of the issues, there are several reasons for denial of the motion.

The first reason concerns the plaintiff's unreasonable delay in seeking interim relief. The plaintiff was on notice of his *Schnell* claim no later than May 18, 2021, which is when he received the Company's response to his solicitation notice. He waited to file his complaint on June 9, 2021, more than three weeks later, and he did not file a brief in support of a motion for a temporary restraining order and expedited proceedings until

1 | early in the morning of June 11.

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The meeting is scheduled for July 16.

The plaintiff's delay wasted over one-third of the time available to prepare, hear, and adjudicate an injunction motion before the meeting. I am not denying the motions solely on the basis of unreasonable delay, but it is a factor in my decision.

Second, it is not apparent to me that the plaintiff is unable to solicit proxies or run a proxy contest. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that he spoke with the SEC on June 2nd and 3rd, 2021, and on June 3rd the plaintiff says the SEC told him that "The SEC staff determined their preference that Hammann demonstrate that he was seriously prepared to use all legal avenues to have a proxy contest for them to approve for dissemination to stockholders his proxy statement."

Third, in his TRO motion papers, the plaintiff is not seeking an order compelling the Company to waive the advance notice bylaw.

Fourth, under the circumstances here, an adequate remedy can be fashioned after trial if the plaintiff ultimately prevails. The Court could order a new meeting for the election of directors or could

order the Company to allow plaintiff to run an opposing slate at next year's annual meeting.

Oliver Press. That case involved a challenge to triggering of an advance notice bylaw in a company with a classified board. The Court denied a motion to expedite both as to a trial and a preliminary injunction hearing prior to the meeting. The Court observed that it could fashion an equitable remedy after the fact by requiring after trial that two classes of directors stand for election at the next annual meeting.

Similarly, in Millenco v. meVC Draper from 2002, the Court ordered that a class of directors elected to three-year terms should stand for reelection at the next annual meeting due to a false and misleading proxy statement. More recently, Chief Judge Stark from our federal district court in Delaware concluded in Immunomedics v. Venbio Select that the plaintiff had not met its burden of irreparable harm sufficient to enjoin an annual meeting, noting that the Court could exercise its equitable power to void the results of the annual meeting should it be warranted based on a full record.

Finally, there is Accipiter, which is a case that was ultimately decided on summary judgment after the annual meeting. In that case, the Court had previously denied a preliminary injunction motion seeking to enjoin the annual meeting over a challenge to the triggering of an advance notice bylaw.

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In denying the motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff had not established irreparable harm because if the Court were to agree with the plaintiff after an expedited trial, the Court could order a new election or order two classes of directors to stand for election the following year.

At argument, the plaintiff here speculated that if he must wait until after a post-meeting trial for a new election, there is a risk that the Company could issue additional shares to management-friendly stockholders. That risk is entirely speculative, and if it were to occur, the plaintiff could raise it at an appropriate time.

Though not necessary for my ruling, the balance of harms tips in favor the Company, at least at this stage. Granting a TRO as requested would effectively grant final relief because the

Company would not have been able to hold a meeting on
July 16 if it prevails in defeating the plaintiff's
preliminary injunction motion.

The Company has expended resources on meeting preparation, and enjoining the meeting would not provide any immediate benefit to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff would still have to await the results of a vote to seat its directors until a new meeting is held.

In contrast, granting relief after trial saves both on election-related expenses and judicial resources if the defendants prevail. If not, then a second election can be held.

For these reasons, I am denying the motion for a temporary restraining order. On the other hand, I am granting the motion to expedite in part. The parties should confer on a schedule for a prompt trial on the *Schnell* claim, perhaps with an eye to a September trial date.

Although I am denying the motion for a TRO, I am also ordering that the Company preserve any ballots, proxies, or voting records for the July 16 annual meeting, and that includes any ballots, proxies, or voting records pertaining to votes in

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favor of the plaintiff's nominees or the plaintiff's
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    stockholder proposals.
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                    Mr. Hammann, Counsel, that is my
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    ruling on the pending motions. I am not asking for a
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    reargument, but are there any questions as to my
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    ruling?
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                    And let me first turn to counsel for
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    the defendants.
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                    MR. YOCH: No, Your Honor.
                                                 Thank you.
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                    THE COURT: Mr. Hammann?
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                    MR. HAMMANN: Just one quick question.
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    When I communicate with the Securities Exchange
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    Commission, is there ever going to be -- other than my
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    personal notes here of what I took down relating to
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    this oral ruling, is there ever going to be any sort
    of documentation that I can send them a copy of?
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                    THE COURT: There is a transcript that
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    was made of this bench ruling, and it will be
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    available on the docket in relatively short order.
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    don't know whether it will be today. But there will
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    be a transcript that will be placed on the docket.
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                    MR. HAMMANN: All right.
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                    No further questions. Thank you.
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                    THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hammann.
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Thank you, Counsel. That is my ruling, and the Court stands in recess. Have a good day. MR. YOCH: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. HAMMANN: Thank you, Your Honor. (Proceedings concluded at 11:50 a.m.)

CERTIFICATE

Reporter for the Court of Chancery for the State of Delaware, Registered Diplomate Reporter, and Certified Realtime Reporter, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages numbered 3 through 21 contain a true and correct transcription of the rulings as stenographically reported by me at the hearing in the above cause before the Vice Chancellor of the State of Delaware, on the date therein indicated, except as revised by the Vice Chancellor.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I hereunto set my hand at Wilmington, this 17th day of June, 2021.

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/s/Karen L. Siedlecki

Karen L. Siedlecki Official Court Reporter Registered Diplomate Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter