

Today's Panelists





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Why Are We Here?

Awareness Eludes Us



Roles

- Chief Information Officer (CIO)
- Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)
- Chief Technology Officer (CTO)

Risk

- Cyber Entropy → IT → ICS/SCADA (OT) → IoT
- Threats → Vulnerabilities → Consequences
- "Digital" Risk, "Cyber" Risk, "Operational" Risk

Risk Management Discipline

- Quest to Bring Order to Chaos
- Information Security / Cyber Security Program
- Security and Safety of Operational Environments and Critical Infrastructure
- Comprehensive, Contextual Awareness

CIO & CISO Scope & Expectations



| | People | | | | |
|------------|------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| | Processes | | | | |
| ent | Information | | | | |
| Management | Applications, Apps, services | | | | |
| Ma | Virtual Infrastructure | | | | |
| | "Hyper" Infrastructure | | | | |
| | Physical Infrastructure | | | | |

Expansion, Complexity, Dependency



| | People | ••• | |
|------------|----------------------------------|-----|----------|
| | Processes | | |
| ent | Information | | Security |
| Management | Applications, Apps, services | | |
| | Virtual Infrastructure | ••• | |
| | "Hyper" Infrastructure | | |
| | Physical Infrastructure | | |

OT

Traditional IT

IoT



Risk?



The "Risk Formula" (model)



Fundamental **Elements** of Risk

T = Threat

V = Vulnerability

C = Consequence

Contextual Situational Awareness Informs Decisions





$$Risk = \sum f \{ T \times V \times C \}$$

Threat Awareness

Mission Awareness

Fundamental Elements of Situational Awareness


Threat Awareness – MITRE's ATT&CK for ICS



| Initi | al Access | Execution | Persistence | Privilege Escalation | Evasion | Discovery | Lateral Movement | Collection | Command and Control | Inhibit Response Function | Impair Process Control | Impact |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--|--|------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Drive-by | · Compromise | Change Operating Mode | Modify Program | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Change Operating Mode | Network Connection Enumeration | Default Credentials | Automated Collection | Commonly Used Port | Activate Firmware Update Mode | Brute Force I/O | Damage to Property |
| Exploit P Applicat | Public-Facing ion | Command-Line Interface | Module Firmware | Hooking | Exploitation for Evasion | Network Sniffing | Exploitation of Remote Services | Data from Information Repositories | Connection Proxy | Alarm Suppression | Modify Parameter | Denial of Control |
| Exploitat Remote | tion of Services | Execution through API | Project File Infection | 7 | Indicator Removal on Host | Remote System Discovery | Lateral Tool Transfer | Detect Operating Mode | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Block Command Message | Module Firmware | Denial of View |
| External Services | | Graphical User Interface | System Firmware | | Masquerading | Remote System Information Discovery | Program Download | I/O Image | | Block Reporting Message | Spoof Reporting Message | Loss of Availability |
| Internet Device | Accessible | Hooking | Valid Accounts | | Rootkit | Wireless Sniffing | Remote Services | Man in the Middle | | Block Serial COM | Unauthorized Command Message | Loss of Control |
| Remote | Services | Modify Controller Tasking | | | Spoof Reporting Message | | Valid Accounts | Monitor Process State | | Data Destruction | V | Loss of Productivity and Revenue |
| | ion Through ble Media | Native API | 700 | | | The same | | Point & Tag Identification | | Denial of Service | 1 | Loss of Protection |
| Rogue M | laster (| Scripting | | | | | HART CHARTE MAN | Program Upload | | Device Restart/Shutdown | | Loss of Safety |
| Spearph Attachm | - | User Execution | | | WHAT COM | Later Market | | Screen Capture | | Manipulate I/O Image | | Loss of View |
| Supply C Compro | | | | | | Aprilling " | | Wireless Sniffing | | Modify Alarm Settings | | Manipulation of Control |
| Transien | nt Cyber Asset | | of the second se | | | | a THE | | | Rootkit | | Manipulation of View |
| Wireless | s Compromise | | | | | | | | | Service Stop | | Theft of Operational Information |
| | | | | | | | | | | System Firmware | | |

Network Awareness – Nozomi Networks





Mission Awareness – Investing in Resiliency







Thank You to Our Panelists





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