

The 35th Regiment of Foot and the British Artillery at the Siege of Fort William Henry and the Role of Lord Loudoun, John Campbell, in North America, August 1757.

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From *The Last of the Mohicans*, James Fenimore Cooper, Major Duncan Heyward conversing with Colonel George Munro:

"Our decision should be speedy," said Duncan, gladly availing himself of this change of humor to press more the important objects of this interview; "I cannot conceal from you, sir, that the camp will not be much longer tenable; and I am sorry to add that things appear no better in the fort; more than half the guns are bursted."

"And how should it be otherwise? Some were fished from the bottom of the lake; some have been rusting in the woods since the discovery of this country; and some were never guns at all – mere privateersmen's playthings! Do you think, sir, you can have Woolwich Warren in the midst of a wilderness, three thousand miles from Great Britain! (Munro speaking; Woolwich Warren references the Royal Arsenal in London, England)."

Fort William Henry was small. Built in Fall 1755, the fort was near the minimum textbook size for a four-sided bastion, averaging 315 feet per side, the recognized minimum being 300 feet per side. Only when you reached this 300-foot minimum did you generate enough barrack and storehouse space to support a garrison large enough to defend the walls against a siege with artillery. Any smaller, the functionality would fail, common knowledge among military engineers. Captain William Eyre of the 44th Regiment of Foot was the designer. Eyre was both a battalion company captain and an engineer, very much a rarity at the time. In all dimensional aspects, Eyre followed standard design protocols. No shortcuts or deviations were taken, as the French did at Fort Carillon, known to the British as Ticonderoga (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, 1858, Page 720). Starting in August 1756, there was a second phase of construction to complete the buildings seen in Figure 1.

Against Fort William Henry, enemy artillery was expected to be arrayed along the western and the southern walls. In anticipation, these wall widths were sized to temporarily resist artillery, up to 12-pound cannon, but not 18-pounders or heavy siege guns. The bastions supported 15- to 18-foot-wide parapets. The western and southern curtain walls were topped with 30-foot-wide ramparts — 12- to 15-foot-wide parapets plus a 15- to 18-foot-wide terreplein (gun platform elevation). This distinction is visible in the lower half of Figure 1. To save interior space for buildings, the northern and eastern curtain walls were narrower, only 15-20 feet wide, and lacked gun embrasures. Removing all the interior buildings from consideration, the parade ground of a square bastion fort would need to approach a minimum of 135 feet by 135 feet (interior rampart edge to interior rampart edge), or if rectangular, a minimum of 18,225 square feet (0.42 acres). If it did not, geometry dictates that the barrack space and/or storehouse space would be problematic. Using Figure 1, the parade ground measures about 18,200 square feet (182 x 100 feet). An As-Built Plan (Figure 2), developed by Eyre himself, shows a larger fort with the east wall much more square and

now equal to the length of the west, and the south wall some 20 feet longer than in Figure 1. The shortest wall was now about 280 feet long (north wall) and the longest was near 345 feet. The full parade ground increases to about 25,300 square feet ($\approx 220 \times 115$ feet). Adding barracks and storehouses massively reduced this square footage. With the fourth barracks, the open parade ground would have been something on the order of 10,725 square feet or a quarter-acre, barely enough room to exercise a single company (about 165×65 feet).

A smaller fort would have added several defensive deficiencies, including loss of gun embrasures in each of the individual bastions and blind spots along the curtain wall — the thickness of the parapet obstructing the view directly below. Following established protocols, gun embrasures needed to be set a minimum of 18 feet apart on-center to allow the gun crews room to service the cannon, but the chief problem with a smaller fort would have been in the logistics. Logistics need space. A larger fort would have been welcomed as both barrack space and warehouse space would have been more efficient and easier to manage. As the curtain wall widths would remain unchanged, an increase in the wall length from 300 to 375 feet (a 25 percent increase) would result in a 35 percent increase in interior building space and the open parade ground doubles in size.

With Fort William Henry at minimum dimensions, space and logistics were still an issue. To ease crowding, a large two-story storehouse was built in the saddle of the north curtain wall, just outside the Bastion. This warehouse is not shown in Figure 2 and was built by the Winslow Expedition in Fall 1756. At the other extreme, any larger than 450-500 feet per side introduces problems with providing defensive musket fire along the curtain walls — the covering range needed is beyond the effective range of a smoothbore musket. Pentagon forts of the same wall length have a huge advantage in terms of space and logistics. Before any buildings, a pentagon fort of 300 feet per side with 30-foot-wide ramparts has 2.5 times the interior space as a four-sided fort of the same wall lengths and rampart widths, over 46,000 square feet compared to some 18,200 square feet. At these dimensions, the internal pentagon would be ≈ 165 feet per side. Fort McHenry in Baltimore, Maryland is a pentagon fort, a near-perfect 300 feet per side. Castillo de San Marcos in Florida is square, again a near-perfect 300 feet per side. In 1756 and 1757, field reviews by officers and engineers suggested improvements to the Bastion, particularly raising the wall heights on some orientations, but to Eyre's credit, none of those identified deficiencies were ever exploited during the Siege (*Remarks on Forts William Henry and Edward* by Harry Gordon, in *Military Affairs in North America* —MANA, Page 177; The Montresor Journals, Pages 24 and 37; and Burton, LO 1599). A few days before the Siege, John Montresor, Webb's Chief Engineer, ordered the advance work (a lunette) to the south razed and the ground leveled. The roofs of the magazines were sandbagged. As a precaution against fire, the northern storehouse was also razed.

William Eyre was truly an outstanding and talented officer. He served at Culloden (1746) and in Flanders (1747), presumably in the role of a Practitioner Engineer ("Ensign"). Instead of marching on the Monongahela, Edward Braddock assigned Eyre to serve as Engineer to General William Johnson in New York. He also served as Deputy Quartermaster General to Johnson. Eyre commanded the artillery at the Battle of Lake George (September 8, 1755) and was subsequently promoted from England to the rank of Major over more or equally senior officers in the 44th. Besides Fort William Henry, Eyre designed the much larger Fort Edward, 12 miles to the south of Fort William Henry. In March 1757, he commanded Fort William Henry and defeated Rigaud's Winter Assault. During the failed Ticonderoga Campaign in 1758, Abercromby and Eyre clashed




Figure 1. Plan for Fort William Henry, 1757. *A Set of Plans and Forts in America. Reduced from Actual Surveys, 1765.* Mary Ann Rocque, Topographer. North orientation is to the bottom; Southern Barracks is to the top. Gun embrasures are missing from the right-side curtain wall (west wall). Most of the other embrasures are positioned wrong (see Figure 2). East and north curtain walls did not mount cannon and had a smaller overall width. The East and West Barracks were built in Late Summer/Fall 1756 under Winslow. By Early Summer 1756, the hospital was in either the North or South Barracks (see LO 1583). French artillery approached from the West (Right Side). This plan best dates to 1757, not 1755; the barrack section shows a casement.

over conflicting duties of regimental command and the engineering needs of the campaign. Eyre was confident that he could perform both duties, but Abercromby insisted that Eyre choose a single role. Eyre chose his regimental duties over engineering responsibilities. Less experienced engineers then advised Abercromby. Immediately following the Ticonderoga disaster, Eyre was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in the 55th regiment, but he transferred back to the 44th as Lieutenant Colonel (October 29, 1759). Under Amherst, Eyre continued his engineering duties and led the successful siege operations against Ticonderoga in 1759 and Fort Levis on the St. Lawrence River in 1760. Amherst trusted and valued Eyre (Cubbison 2014, Page 176). Eyre designed the fortification at Crown Point. After the war, Eyre became the Chief Engineer in America but drowned returning to Ireland in 1765.

On March 19, 1757, a French force of sixteen hundred men attempted a surprise assault on Fort William Henry. The assault failed. On March 27, 1757, the four companies of 44th then garrisoning Fort William Henry were relieved by five companies of Otway's 35th Foot led by Lieutenant Colonel George Monro (Eyre's Letter of April 6, 1757; Final Letter Appendix). Some histories have one company of the 35th, one company of the 42nd Highlanders, two new companies of the 44th, and two companies of the 48th reaching Fort William Henry, but this is wrong (see Brown 1963, Page 18). Elements of these other regiments did march in relief but then turned back when Rigaud's Raid was driven off (Loudoun to Pitt, April 25, 1757, in Kimball 1906, Page 37).

In August 1757, Fort William Henry fell to the French under Montcalm. Although surrounded by huge tracts of forest, the Siege of Fort William Henry (FWH) can accurately be described as a traditional European artillery duel. The French adopted standard zigzag trenching to establish their gun batteries, while the British conducted defensive fire attempting to retard the French earthwork. The British occupied two distinct positions. Only about 20% of the British strength was positioned in the Fort or Bastion, some 350 - 400 men. The remaining 1,900 men were sheltered within the Entrenched Camp on a hillock 660 yards to the southeast of the Bastion. During the Siege, the Bastion was first commanded by Captain John Ormsby of the 35th. John Ormsby was an experienced officer having attained the rank of Captain on November 20, 1747, but he was relatively new to the 35th. Ormsby first appears on the rolls of the 35th in 1756. In 1755, Ormsby was on half-pay as a captain in Colonel Pole's 10th Regiment of Foot (Irish Establishment). Only a single company of the 35th was positioned in the Bastion, about 60 - 70 fit Rank & File. Besides Ormsby, the 35th's officers assigned to the Bastion included Lt. Charles Gore and Lt. William Widdrington (LO 6660). A single unidentified subaltern officer of the Royal Americans was posted to the Bastion. Two additional subaltern officers from the 35th may or may not have been posted to the Bastion, the language is vague (LO 4479; LO = Loudoun Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California).

The 35th Regiment of Foot was part of the Irish Establishment and was only authorized to a strength of 374 with an annual budget of £8,847 (1755). Under the British Establishment, a foot regiment had a "garrison" strength of 814 and an annual budget of £15,217 (Steward 2015, Page 168). Just before leaving Ireland, the 35th drafted about 150 rank & file from other regiments in the Irish Establishment, bringing the regimental strength up to around 525 men. In all likelihood, these transferred troops were the bottom quality from each of the parent regiments (See Brumwell 2002, Page 67). With the difficulties encountered in recruiting by Braddock and the poor performance



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Transcription of the Notes found in Figure 2 (November 1755):

Small River which divides itself into different channels in running thru this Swamp, w^{ch}. (which) may easily be collected into one, and brought close to the Fort.

L. The Grand Magazine. M. the Passage (Passage) to it; this Work is raised with double Timbers 18 (?) Inches square, and covered in a like manner, being strongly shored and braced within. N. the Little Magazine after the same Fashion. O. A Casement bomb Proof, that will contain upwards of 100 Men. P. A Designed Work where men lie in Safety in time of a Siege. Observe in Section D. this proposed Work is to be raised with Trees heaved on Two Sides, supported at Bottom on a Beam and Pinned Fast at Top. Q. two other Casements that will hold 100 men of the Same Strength. R. Barracks. S. Storehouses. T. A Barrack not finished. V. An outwork to defend. (Note: There are two Qs. The intent of the second "Q" on top of the South Curtain Wall is obscure as "S" does not fully fit the definition of a casement. Casements with a middle centerline suggest an internal pitched roof with supporting columns, not necessarily two rooms. There is a small Storehouse next to the North Barracks).

The Side of the Bank, and the Passage of the Swamp to the Southward of the Fort, Field Pieces may be used here advantageously. The three Piles of Barracks when compleated will contain 450 men, and the Storehouses near 3,000 barrels of Provisions. The Ramparts and Parapets of this Fort is cased with Trees heaved on two sides, both within and without, and braced together by Crofs (Cross) Timbers dovetailed into them, but for strength and conveniency, there is an other Range of logs in the Middle which the Crofs (Cross) Pieces are fasten'd into. There are no Palisades as yet planted around the Fort or detached Work.

Of all the historical drawings, the building layout in Figure 1 is probably the most representative of the time of the Siege (Rocque Drawing). In Figure 2, a long aboveground storage "building" is located between the South Barracks and the south curtain wall. This storage area is depicted in both the aerial plan view and the profile section; it is referenced in Note S. As the south curtain wall could be attacked, Eyre chose to have the full width of the earth-filled curtain wall at this location. Between 1755 and 1757, the building configuration slowly changed. The East Barracks, West Barracks, and the North Wall Storehouse were not constructed until Fall 1756. To allow access and ventilation of the aboveground casement rooms built into the east curtain wall, the East Barracks may have been shifted away from the curtain wall several feet. The east curtain casement was intended as a bomb-proof shelter for the garrison, not storage. The barracks, storehouse, and southern rampart were a single mass. Evidence suggests a hospital was established outside the east wall in Fall 1755, but the building may never have been used in that capacity (Eyre, March 24th, 1757; Letter Appendix). In Fall 1755, this hospital was likely unsecured without a protective stockade. In July 1757, Montresor had both the North Wall Storehouse and the advanced work razed and leveled. The footprint of the north wall warehouse is shown in Figure 1, but the footprint of the razed advanced work is not shown. The orientation of Figure 1 is awkward with north to the bottom of the page. The gun embrasures along the west curtain wall are missing. Compared to Figure 1, the east wall is longer by approximately 80 feet, some 340 feet; it is now equal to the west. The south wall is longer by about 20 feet, some 300 feet. The north wall is now the shortest wall, 280 feet. Only the southeast corner stake needs to be moved to account for most of the differences seen between the outside dimensions of Figures 1 and 2. With four exceptions, the locations for the gun embrasures at the reconstructed Fort William Henry conform with Figure 2 — this includes two deletions from the south bastion and one deletion from the east bastion which are smaller than the original construction, over 90% of the embrasures match.

of the colonial-led expeditions in 1755, London had decided to send both the 35th and 42nd Regiments to America at near full strength. The 35th arrived at Plymouth in March 1757 (England). Recruiting continued and prisons were scoured looking for men willing to serve in the 35th for life in exchange for release (Pargellis 1933, Page 68). Impressment of the unemployed was authorized (Hughes 2011, Page 3; and Brumwell 2002, Page 64). At Plymouth, the 35th was immediately transferred to the British Establishment and authorized by a "sign manual" to full campaign strength under the signature of the Secretary of War. The "Irish" segment of the 35th, Monro and about 466 men, set sail for New York in mid-April, arriving in mid-June (LO 4749). Major Fletcher, 120 "Irish", 407 impressed men, and much of the baggage of the 35th sailed in mid-June and did not reach North America until August 1756 (LO 2774). Sailing time from England to North America was typically between six and eight weeks.

In early September, the 35th was reunited outside of Albany, but its strength had been reduced by sickness and further culling of the unfit. The Monthly Return for January 1757 lists a total of 916 men, including officers and staff (LO 6751). Of the 818 Rank & File, only 654 Rank & File were deemed fit for duty or about 80% of the men. A full third to half of the Rank & File were new to the Army, raw and undisciplined. For Summer 1757, Brumwell (2002, Page 317) estimates that 41% of the British regulars in North America had one or fewer years in Service. Only 40% had three or more years of Service. The surge in "recruiting" in England dramatically changed the ethnic mix of the 35th. With the arrival of the 35th in America, fully half of the Rank & File (51%) were now English, 35% were Irish, and 10% Scots; but only 17% of the officers were English, 63% of the officers were Irish, and 13% Scots (Brumwell 2002, Page 318). At least in the early years of the War, "English" and "Irish" regiments arriving from Britain were trying to recruit at least two or three hundred Americans into their ranks. The January 1757 Return lists 222 men as wanting to fill out the Rank & File. After 1757, the effectiveness of recruiting in America was severely reduced (Brumwell 2002, Page 19).

In October 1756, Loudoun considered the 35th fit for no more than garrison duty or work detachments and rejected all thoughts of using them as part of any campaign. Loudoun had considerably more faith in the 44th, 48th, and the newly arrived 42nd Highland Regiment. The six months the 35th spent near Albany organizing and in drill is best explained in Hughes (2011; Chapter 2). By March 1757, the 35th was deemed much more capable. It still did not have the full confidence of Loudoun, but it had markedly improved in his eyes.

When moving from a peacetime footing to a war footing, the number of lieutenants in a foot regiment was typically doubled by the addition of a lieutenant to each company in the battalion. The number of sergeants per company would increase from three to four. In peacetime, the nine battalion companies, "tricorn hats", would be led by a Captain, one Lieutenant, and one Ensign; in wartime, there would be a Captain, two Lieutenants, and one Ensign. Ensigns would not be assigned to the single grenadier company. The additional officer and the additional sergeant(s) assigned to each company were needed as the Rank & File also ballooned, more than doubling, if not tripling in size. Regardless of origin, there needed to be a rash of promotions or new blood added to the regiment to staff the ten or so "new" lieutenant vacancies in each battalion. In the four weeks before the Battle of the Monongahela, Braddock authorized at least thirty promotions among the officers, gentlemen volunteers, and possibly sergeants of the 44th and 48th Regiments (rankers); minting both new ensigns and new lieutenants (Steward 2015, Page 204). Under

wartime conditions with a "sign manual", a full-strength battalion of ten companies would be officered by: 1 Colonel, often remaining in the British Isles, as did Otway of the 35th, or detached for other service; 1 Lieutenant Colonel; 1 Major; 7 Captains; 1 Captain Lieutenant; 20 Lieutenants; 9 Ensigns; 40 Sergeants; and 20 Drummers with an increased target of 1,040 Rank & File (40 Corporals plus 1,000 Privates), but achieving more than 800 Rank & File was atypical; the regimental budget now approached £20,175 (Pargellis 1933, Page 122). Though under-strength, fifty-man companies remained effective. At least on paper, the officers appointed as the Adjutant and the Quartermaster would also serve in an existing line company (double duty); these two positions were not additional officer slots. There would be additional staff officers — chaplain, surgeon, and surgeon mates. Math and logic would dictate that the wartime grenadier company would then carry a Captain and two Lieutenants. Yet this was not the case here. In 1757, the 35th was carrying 20 Lieutenants, but consistently a third lieutenant in the grenadier company. This is shown in the Monthly Returns for the 35th (LO 6751 — January; March; and September through December; the other Returns were lost in the Siege). In March 1757, there were 832 rank & file enrolled in the 35th (pre-Siege); in September 1757, there were 817 enrolled (post-Siege; September 1757 Monthly Return, Appendix Pages 244-245). Filling in the vacant officer slots was done in a way that the Army was able to direct an underperforming regiment, such as the 35th:

"As to the Corps Col. Monro does what he can to keep that Regiment right, but they must have Examples made before it will do. None of them have ever been in Service. These Men are large Bodied but the most unruly I have ever met, and I think by next Campaign I shall make the pressed Men better than the old ones; and the Officers want full as much to be reclaimed as the Men, and I have not hitherto been able to bring them to act like other Troops. They have overdrawn their Provisions; they have lost the Live Stock I delivered to them, and they have taken others in their Place; all which I have ordered to be paid to the last Shilling, which I hope will do them good as it will amount to above one hundred Pound." (Loudoun to Cumberland, October 2, 1756; LO 1948 and MANA, Page 235).

"Your Royal Highness will be surprised, I have chose to take the Royal Americans (60th), rather than Lieutenant General Otways (35th); this last are entirely Raw Officers and Soldiers, and every thing new to them; the prest men I dare not trust so near the Enemy; I had Six of them deserted together, to go to the French: two of them, after losing themselves in the Woods, and being Starving with Hunger, Surrendered to some of the Parties above; those I tried and hanged directly;" (Loudoun to Cumberland, October 3, 1756; LO 1968 and MANA, Page 239; the 60th reference is to 4th battalion of the 60th, James Prevost, and 1757's Louisbourg Expedition).

"As to Otway's Regiment, I am not surprised at the scandalous Account you give me of them. They have never seen any manner of Service; & I am afraid, your Letter convinces me of that I feared before, that it was composed of a Set of ignorant, undisciplined Officers & 'till you make Examples of the officers, you will never make a Regiment of it." (Cumberland to Loudoun, October 22, 1756; MANA, Page 254).

Loudoun then writes: *"and I hope, by their doing duty along with the officers and Men of the 44th and 48th Regiments, we may by the next Campaign Improve both their Officers and Men; and I do assure You, there has been no pains Spared: They are a fine body of Men, and will be a good Regiment; and in order to forward that, I am now picking out some good Officers, to fill up the*

Lieutenancies that are left vacant in it." (Loudoun to Cumberland, November 22, 1756; LO 2262 and MANA, Page 264).

These vacancies were often filled via personal recommendations from the well-connected, but it did allow for merit promotions and those most senior. The suggestion here is that these officer slots were treated more like "free vacancies" than "purchased vacancies". In the correspondence between Loudoun and Cumberland, Loudoun spends considerable time explaining the reasoning and justifying the promotions he granted for both lieutenants and ensigns. Loudoun's focus in his letters was on personal recommendations and experience, but vacancies resulting from an officer leaving service typically involved purchase, the leaving officer's retirement fund (List of Commissions; MANA, Pages 281, 330, and 362). At least two of these vacancies were filled with officers recently placed on Half-Pay. Following the debacle at Oswego, the 50th and the 51st Regiments were disbanded, and Loudoun used a few of those officers to fill vacancies, but not all.

Only a single company of the 35th was in the Bastion. Lt. Colonel Monro and the other five companies of the 35th were positioned within the Entrenched Camp. All the senior officers were with Monro. On August 4th, Lt. Col. Young writes of a Bastion garrison of 330 men (Dodge 2007, Page 102). Approximately 30 sailors and 25 members of the Royal Artillery were available to service the guns in the Bastion, but some of these men were likely in the Entrenched Camp. The remaining garrison were provincials, about 230 men from Massachusetts (Captains William Arbuthnot and Joseph Ingersoll) and New Hampshire (LO 4367 and Frye Journal). The sailors were brought to Fort William Henry to crew the Lake George "navy." Thirty carpenters were available to repair any damage. Within the Bastion, the artillery was commanded by Lieutenant Thomas Collins of the Royal Artillery (2nd Lieutenant) assisted by Ensign Adam Williamson (6th Foot and Practitioner Engineer, lowest engineer rank). Both Lieutenant Collins and Williamson leave short written accounts of the Siege. Unfortunately, the last page of Williamson's account was torn from his diary and appears lost (Williamson Family Papers; National Archives Canada Microfilm A 573; Fully transcribed in Final Letter Appendix). Williamson's account extends only till dawn on the 8th but also includes highly informative entries for July.

On August 7th, Ormsby was severely wounded by an exploding shell from a howitzer or mortar, and Captain Thomas Collins then assumed command of the Bastion — yes, the same name. This "other" Thomas Collins had been a Captain in the 35th since March 12, 1754. The identities of the other 35th Captains are muddled by a clerical error. In the document "*A Return of Officers to the Detachments from several Corps, who are included in the Capitulation*" (Lt. Colonel John Young of the 60th Regiment; LO 4170, August 9, 1757), the 35th Captains listed are Thomas Collins, John Ormsby, Charles Ince (Grenadiers), Luke Gardiner, and Captain Lieutenant Richard Baillie. There is no mention of Captain John Conyngham in this return, but he is specifically identified in a letter by Monro on August 3rd (LO 4040) — "*Captain Cunningham of the 35th Regiment is wounded in the arm, and a corporal of the same regiment has had his arm cutt off, and a few men wounded.*" Conyngham also appears on the 35th's Monthly Returns (LO 6751), in Monro's report on casualties (LO 4313A), and in the Hays Journal. Clearly, John Conyngham needs to be added to the list of company captains. Although Captain Conyngham was wounded in the arm here, he had been much more severely wounded at the Monongahela (assuming he was there — reference Kopperman 1977, Page 204; and Preston 2015, Page 403). Other Monongahela survivors at the Siege included the Engineer Adam Williamson and Captain Lieutenant William MacLeod of the



Figure 3B. The location of the Entrenched Camp is roughly depicted here, but the figure is more representative of 1755 than 1757. Battle references are to the Battle of Lake George in September 1755. Details on the Fort Construction are in Legend. In the last week of July 1757, the Camp moved from A and the vicinity of the compass symbol to D. The three small-red rectangles inside the Bastion are casements built under the bastions. A fourth casement is under the east curtain wall, not shown. The two northern casements served as powder magazines. The casement positions depicted here completely conform to Figure 2. In 1756, the East and West Barracks were built/completed; these barracks also included underground casements. The North and South Barracks did not include casements. In 1757, the French artillery positions would be to the left of the Bastion. Library of Congress.

Royal Artillery. MacLeod arrives with the Young/Fyre Column and then commands the artillery in the Entrenched Camp. James Furnis of the Board of Ordnance was at both actions and leaves short accounts for each (Reference Kopperman 1977, Page 189). Conyngham is the only person who seems to have been wounded at both Fort William Henry and the Battle of the Monongahela (LO 4245A).

Examining the regimental lists and promotion dates kept in England, Luke Gardiner would have held the rank of Captain Lieutenant and Richard Baillie the rank of Lieutenant through 1757; both their promotions to higher rank show 1758, January 24 and June 24, respectively. In the Monthly Returns for the 35th, Luke Gardiner is not shown as being a "full" Captain in any month from September to December 1757 (LO 6751, see Pages 244 and 245). Two years earlier, Richard Baillie was a newly minted Lieutenant in the grenadier company. Going by strict protocols but verified by battalion rolls, the company captains were (1) Lt. Colonel Monroe, (2) Captain Thomas Collins, (3) Captain John Conyngham, (4) Captain John Ormsby, (5) Captain Charles Ince (grenadiers), and (6) Captain Lieutenant Luke Gardiner. The mix-up around Baillie suggests he was acting in the role of a "second" Captain Lieutenant for Monroe's company which confused the clerk preparing LO 4170. In 1756, Baillie served as the Regimental Adjutant. The 35th's Major Henry Fletcher, Captain John Manusell, Captain George Fletcher, and Captain William Bellew remained at Fort Edward as part of the garrison under Major General Daniel Webb. In late July, Monroe had requested that these four companies be sent to Fort William Henry, but Webb refused to release any more of the 35th from Fort Edward (LO 4479). All told, about 340 members of the 35th were at Fort Edward at the time of the Siege and were outside any restrictions placed because of the capitulation. The numbers subject to the capitulation and/or those not subject to the capitulation are highlighted in the Monthly Returns throughout the remainder of the year. The most complete summaries are included in the November and December Returns (LO 6751).

The combined garrison of both the Bastion and the Entrenched Camp was about 2,400 total; fit for duty would be much less. The British regulars included six companies of the 35th – around 633 men (Lt. Colonel George Monroe); 138 members of the 60th (Royal Americans, Lt. Colonel Jonathan Young, Capt. Rodolp Faesch); 112 members of the New York Independent Companies, Capt. Charles Cruikshank, these were not colonial troops; and 26 members of the Royal Artillery (LO 4309 - Webb, Return of August 25th). In addition, Lieutenant Noah Johnson led a company of about 101 Rogers' Rangers, paid directly by the British Army (*His Majesty's Independent Company of Rangers*). Reasonable estimates for the provincial troops are found in *The Bougainville Journal* (Page 177). The French detailed the numbers by battalion and formation, but only half of the 40 or so provincial soldiers that were killed during the Siege can be assigned. The provincials included some 823 men from Massachusetts (Colonel Joseph Fyre), 302 New Jersey Blues (Colonel Jonathan Parker), 231 men from New Hampshire (Lt. Colonel Jonathan Goffe), and 57 men from New York. These 57 New Yorkers were likely a conglomeration of two separate companies, most being New York provincial rangers under Captain Jonathan Ogden plus the remnants of Captain Robert McGinnis' New York provincial company (Steele 1990, Pages 98 and 135). McGinnis was one of those captured during the Parker Scout on Lake Champlain, but he subsequently died from his wounds while in care of the French (Sabbath Point; July 23, 1757). There were also about 30 sailors and 30 carpenters (LO 4367); these were not categories of those captured in Bougainville's Journal and may be doubled counted here. Monroe's list includes only 2,140 men, but it fails to contain any entries for the Royal Artillery and the corresponding numbers



Figure 4. Lake George and a small segment of the larger Lake Champlain, 1762. From Fort Anne on the bottom of the map, the road leads southwest to Fort Edward. French were positioned at Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) at the top of the map. The French had the option of moving south against Fort Edward either via Lake George or Wood Creek. In 1755, Fort Anne was an old, abandoned post from previous conflicts. From Fort Carillon to Fort William Henry is 33 miles. From Carillon to Fort Edward is 41 miles (off map). From *A Survey of Lake Champlain including Lake George, Crown Point and St. John*, prepared for General Jeffery Amherst (1762).

for the listed units are consistently lower: 540 from the 35th, 100 from the 60th, 100 from the New York Independent Companies, and only 200 from the New Jersey Blues (LO 4367). Monro's number of 140 rangers may simply be a combination of Johnson's Rogers' Rangers and Ogden's provincial rangers. Most of Monro's numbers seem to be better matches for the Fit for Duty or simply just broad stroke estimates. Monro's count dates from November 1st, three months after the Siege. Civilians and clerks are not included in these counts. Hospital numbers are lacking.

In European Siege Warfare, the chief hope of the besieged laid in holding out until rescued by an allied force, not in directly defeating the attacker. Such was the case at Fort William Henry — General Webb at Fort Edward marching out to the rescue of Lieutenant Colonel Monro. Webb never marched. Webb is often characterized as paralyzed by fear of marching out against Montcalm, offering only false hope, or simply ignoring the pleas for aid from Monro. Admittedly, Webb was weak and uninspired in his leadership. At the start of the Siege, Webb at Fort Edward had at least 700 fewer men than Monro had at Fort William Henry, around 1,600 fit for duty (LO 4081). Nothing in any of Monro's letters suggests any appreciation for Webb's weak position at Fort Edward. Webb had been at Fort William Henry the week before the start of the Siege and had ample time to confer with Monro (The Montresor Journals, Page 24). Monro's views and recollections of the statements made are contained in LO 3994. Following that visit, Webb sent a 1,200-man column under Lt. Colonel John Young (60th) and Colonel Joseph Fyre of the Massachusetts provincials to reinforce Monro. This column arrived August 2nd, the day before the start of the Siege with six additional cannon, including two light brass 12-pounders. From both Young and Fyre, Monro had to realize that Webb would not be marching until a large number of militia first arrived at Fort Edward.

Three days into the Siege, an officer conference was held by Webb at Fort Edward (August 5th, The Montresor Journals, Page 37). There does not seem to be any support among the senior officers for marching on Fort William Henry, at least until enough militia arrived to augment the garrison at Fort Edward. Even Major Fletcher of the 35th, who was at Fort Edward, does not seem to support the idea of marching on Fort William Henry, but that conclusion may be misleading. The Montresor Journals are never critical of Webb or offer an insight into the nature and intensity of the discussions — just the subject and the conclusion with a brief rationale. The 1,600 or so men then at Fort Edward were simply too few to relieve the Siege and their advancement may very well have led to a repeat of the Monongahela debacle. Montcalm had positioned 2,500 Indian warriors and Canadian militia to the south of Fort William Henry blocking the road connecting Fort William Henry to Fort Edward. Any relief column would first have to fight their way through this gauntlet and then a second position of French grenadiers and regulars under the command of the very able Chevalier de Levis.

The Montresor Journals are critical to understanding the events around the Siege, but the internal structure of the Journals is disorganized and confusing. Frequently, entry dates are provided out of sequence, and some narratives were apparently written on loose sheets and then incorporated into the Journals. This suggests Montresor did not always carry the actual Journal, but he eventually got back to making the entries or adding loose papers after they were written. To clarify, Webb held two officer conferences, one on July 27th/July 28th at Fort William Henry (before the Siege) and one on August 5th at Fort Edward (during the Siege). Some officers attended both, some only one of the conferences. The Montresor Journal reports the July 27th (Pages 24 and 37) and August 5th

discussions (Page 38). The discussion from July 28th is related in LO 3974 and LO 4479 (Monro to Loudoun, November 1, 1757; Final Letter Appendix). Because of the chaotic nature of The Montresor Journals, it is possible to confuse the conferences or even meld the conferences into a single event. Hughes (2011, Page 143) presents a particularly good account of Webb's last inspection of Fort William Henry; Webb arrived the afternoon of July 25th and left on the morning of the 29th. Webb is often criticized for waiting two additional days before sending out letters directing militia to Fort Edward, but factoring in travel time back to Fort Edward, the delay was minimal (Letters of Capt. George Bartman (44th), Aide-de-Camp to Webb, Page 418). The New York militia was called up on the 30th (CO 5/18 Part 1 040); the Massachusetts militia on the 31st (CO 5/18 Part 1 036; CO = Colonial Office Papers, National Archives London).

Fort William Henry was only constructed at the insistence of William Johnson, who led the 1755 New York Expedition. In this, Eyre is supportive of Johnson. Following Braddock's Defeat at the Monongahela in July and the Battle of Lake George in September, the provincials assembled at Lake George were very reluctant to advance against Ticonderoga and Fort St. Frederic. To demonstrate at least something tangible, Fort William Henry was built in Fall 1755. The construction was not scheduled or blessed by the British hierarchy. On September 30th, the Bastion's dimensions were established at the recognized minimums, but without violating any standards. The Bastion was completed in middle November, but only two of the larger barracks were finished in the first year. The East and West Barracks were built in 1756, but this time with underground storage casements. Eyre likely felt compelled to adhere to the minimum dimensions for a bastion as the remaining campaign season was only about 45 days. After mid-November, there would be no way to keep the bulk of the colonials from returning home; the Army headed south on November 27th. At the same time, Eyre also refused to "dumb down" the design. During the first winter, the garrison was limited to about 220 colonial troops under Colonel Jonathan Bagley of Massachusetts. It was recognized from the very beginning that the Bastion was not built at the best location in the immediate area. The Entrenched Camp was obviously the better site, but as Johnson's Army was already camped there, the thought of moving the already reluctant colonials off their established camp was too onerous, and the Bastion was constructed on the smaller hillock to the northwest. The most comprehensive discussions of the construction of Fort William Henry are found in Bellico (2001) and Bellico (2010) with additional drawings not depicted here.

The design itself was textbook. The quality of the construction resulted in a reasonably sound structure; but entering the first winter, the interior remained largely unfinished (LO 1583, Appendix Documents). The New Englanders had little enthusiasm for the concept or the work. This attitude was shared by their officers, some of whom had developed a deep dislike for Johnson. The dislike was especially sharp between Johnson and his second in command, Major General Phineas Lyman of Connecticut (Hamilton 1963). The needed tools were in short supply. By mid-September, most provincials simply wanted to return home. Many refused to work, and any completed work was rushed. Regardless of the provincial's frustration, it was made defensible within two months.

The French counterpart to Fort William Henry was Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga). Unquestionably, the Ticonderoga Peninsula offers an exceedingly difficult position to defend. The ground to the west is higher and then slowly, but steadily, drops as one moves east across the plateau toward Lake Champlain, but only the east ground allows for an artillery envelope on the Lake. The quandary

becomes where to site the fort, the strongest defensive position or the position better for commanding the Lake, plus there were additional considerations. To the southwest, there are the heights of Mount Defiance (Mt. Rattlesnake or Sugar Hill). From Defiance, the range to the position that was eventually chosen for the Bastion is near the maximum distance for even the larger cannon and mortars, between 1,500 – 2,000 yards. The advantage in elevation would have added yardage to the shot but without accuracy. Simply put, there is no perfect single location for a fortification anywhere on the Peninsula. Moving the Bastion 900 yards to the northeast from the selected location was an option, but then any supporting troops and secondary buildings would be positioned between the attacking force and the Bastion. Moving the Bastion to the position occupied by Montcalm in 1758 solves the problem of the plateau's higher ground but decreases the distance from Defiance, and it would have been much farther from the Lake. Wherever the architect for Carillon positioned the Bastion, he was open to severe criticism (Figure 5, Page 189). The architect, Lotbiniere, chose an intermediate position and satisfied no one — the cleared ground of the western plateau, being more than 40 feet higher in elevation, would allow for any siege batteries position there to have a distinct advantage over any defenders in the fort. Sometime after September 1757, two 12-inch mortars, pieces that could reach Defiance, were added to the French stores.

Starting in Fall 1755, Fort Carillon took at least three years to complete. At about 315 feet by 250 feet, the Bastion was timber on a stone foundation. The gun embrasures and parapets were oak. Carillon did not conform to the standard methodology for laying out the trace of a bastion. At Carillon, the curtain walls were recessed only about 75% of the typical value for the associated wall length. This established the curtain walls 10-12 feet closer to the outer perimeter than normal on all sides, more on the east. The change resulted in a much bigger parade ground and a larger footprint for warehouses and barracks. The location, position, and lengths of the bastion faces follow the standard protocol, but the adjacent flanks were necessarily shorter. Under the standard methodology, the length of the flanks should be just under 11% of the bastion tip to bastion tip distance (outside flank measurement), not the seen 8.5%. All the angles of the various elements conform to the standard methodology. To add interior space, the ramparts on the curtain walls were only about 25 feet wide, too narrow to support both a 15-foot-wide parapet and a 15-foot-wide terreplein, leading to complaints of crowding and too short gun runs.

Following the conventional methodology for tracing out a bastion and assuming a 30-foot rampart, Carillon's total parade ground would have been about 12,800 square feet (169 ft x 76 ft), far below the minimum requirement of 18,000 square feet (no buildings). Predictable adjustments, including 25-foot-wide ramparts to the north and west and 20-foot ramparts to the east and south, would have increased the parade ground to around 17,020 square feet (185 ft x 92 ft). In the end, the full parade ground of the reconstruction had the same shape and square footage as Fort William Henry, around 23,000 square feet (210 ft x 110 ft). This needed increase came at the cost of considerable defensive character, much of it taken from shortening the flanks of the individual bastions and the narrow ramparts. The building layout was quite different at Carillon. Barracks were constructed on the western and southern walls, plus there was a large three-story storehouse on the east wall. An Engineer's Headquarters occupied the eastern part of the "parade ground". The north wall may have been used for open storage sheds or barns. To compensate for the lost space, the barracks were 30 feet wide, 10 feet wider than at William Henry, but far too tall for the wall heights — any cannon shot impacting the tall stone walls of the barracks would have showered stone shards on the defenders below. This defect was readily apparent to any professional officer and nearly

guaranteed that the Bastion would be abandoned. From a letter written by M. de Pontleroy, Montcalm's Chief Engineer (O'Callaghan, Vol. X; letter dated July 8, 1758):

"The shot and shell directed against these buildings would prevent, by their explosion, the appearance of the garrison either on the place of arms (parade ground) or the rampart." Reference Figure 1 and Figure 2: Section F-G, where the roof heights are correct for the wall heights.

Not fully appreciated until after the fort was laid out and the ground cleared, the orientation of the Bastion mandated the construction of two ravelins; these were essential to cover the high ground northwest of the Bastion (Bougainville Journal, Page 33). These stone ravelins would not have suffered from undersized gun runs. By September 1756, the French had at least twenty cannon at Carillon, 9-pounders or larger (Keagle 2018, Page 9; and personal communication). At the same time, the ravelins blocked the use of nearly all the gun embrasures mounted on the north and west curtain walls. Mostly built in 1757, the ravelins may not have been completed until the fourth season (1758). Additional gun batteries outside the Bastion were constructed to cover movement on Lake Champlain. To the south, numerous outbuildings served in support. Other elements of Carillon proved awkward (Laramie 2012, Page 385). The stonework suffered from poor quality mortar, needing near-constant maintenance. Although drainage systems had been devised for the flats of the terrepleins and bastion floors, water seeped into the packed earth above and eventually into the casements and magazines. These casements were cramped with extremely low ceilings. Ventilation was poor and the casements remained damp throughout much of the year. Dry storage was key. In the damp, foods and goods were quickly lost (See Figure 16A, Page 197).

None of the French European officers were impressed with Carillon and railed against the political corruption and monetary kickbacks associated with the construction, particularly the wine concession (Bougainville, Page 55). The French professionals were quick to sharply criticize the inexperienced Lotbiniere (Nester 2008, Page 111). In 1759, the French tenaciously defended Carillon for four days against Amherst, firing nearly 600 shot and shell while the British constructed their entrenchments. Then the French wisely abandoned the defense just before Amherst's first artillery batteries were about to be opened. Charges were set in the ammunition magazines and the French rowed north to Fort St. Frederic. The British at Fort William Henry suffered three full days of bombardment before the surrender, the French at Carillon — none.

The British Army viewed Fort William Henry as very poorly positioned and a drain on resources. Fort Edward was only 12 miles distant, about 16 miles by road. Fort Edward was needed to protect the approach to Albany, but Fort William Henry was not needed. Both Loudoun and Shirley thought a French advance down Lake Champlain and then Wood Creek that targeted Fort Edward was more logical than an attack on Fort William Henry via Lake George (Figure 5A; Dieskau's Route in 1755). Such an approach would bypass Lake George and isolate Fort William Henry from all communication and supply. If the French first took Fort Edward, Fort William Henry would fall with minimal or even no effort. Loudoun's strategy for the 1757 Expedition against Canada mirrors this view of by-passing. Loudoun planned for the British fleet to sail directly to Quebec; only at the insistence of Secretary of State William Pitt was the expedition first to target Louisbourg, Nova Scotia and only then Quebec. Loudoun would have happily bypassed Louisbourg. The thinking was that if the British attacked Quebec by late June, or preferably late May, the French would be forced on the defensive and would be unable to move against New

York. Unfortunately for the British, Loudoun's Army was "beached" at Halifax; and he was unable to attack Louisbourg in 1757. Montcalm was then free to move south. This logic tree frames the fundamental reason that the British were unprepared for the assault on Fort William Henry. Simply put, there was no perceived need for such preparations: Being committed to defending both Louisbourg and Quebec, the French would not have the opportunity to advance south against Webb — so why prepare? Loudoun to Daniel Webb; June 20, 1757; MANA, Page 370:

"I am this morning informed, that there is a Serjeant of Captain Rogers Company, returned from Montreal with Eight Men, who brings an Account, that the Enemy have Changed their disposition, of sending their Forces up to the Forts, and that they are now drawing their whole Force to Quebec, for the Defence of their Capital; by which means, You will have nothing to oppose You at Tienderoga & Crown Point, but the Garrisons, and, I imagine, very few more for Scouting. This intelligence only confirms me in my former Opinion, that they would keep their whole Force, to defend their Capital, as their whole depends upon it; for when once that is taken, there is an end of all their Forts to the Northward, and of Course, of their Influence and Command over the Indians."

Although logical, this strategy was not a certainty and was dependent on the French reacting to the British advance as predicted. They did not. The threat to just Louisbourg was insufficient and Montcalm was too distant to lend aid to Louisbourg. Unless Quebec was actually threatened, Montcalm was not as limited in his actions as the British were gaming on, and he was moving south. Fort William Henry's chief attribute was as an offensive staging area, not as a defensive linchpin. It was too small to serve that role — again, it was the minimum textbook size, and it was too poorly armed, at least in 1757. But unlike simple palisade forts, unless total stealth was achieved, large raiding parties would fail against Fort William Henry — Rigaud's Raid in March 1757. Light artillery would fail. Outside of isolation and starvation, only a formal siege with heavy artillery would succeed. The design of Fort William Henry forced the French to go through the logistic nightmare of gathering heavy artillery and moving that artillery in wilderness. The French had a similar idea with Fort Chambly on the Richelieu River north of Lake Champlain. To take Chambly, artillery would be needed; the stone walls were far too high (nearly 30 feet), and there was too much defensive artillery in place for a raiding party to be successful. Yet against larger cannon, Chambly was markedly weak. In the wilderness of Lake George and Lake Champlain, the challenge for the attacker was not in conducting the siege, but in getting to the siege and the associated logistics of moving an army with artillery through forests devoid of roads. Managing to construct a 120-mile road starting at Fort Cumberland through the wilderness was the genius of Braddock's ill-fated expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1755 (Preston 2015).

The geography favored the French. If the British attacked north from either Fort Edward or Fort William Henry, the logical target would be Fort Carillon; so the main French defense needed to be positioned there, a single location. But if the French attacked south from Carillon, either Fort Edward or Fort William Henry could be the target, forcing the British to heavily garrison both positions and bear the costs for doing so. This situation proved especially irksome to the British Army, whose higher command never authorized the construction of Fort William Henry. Lord Loudoun seems to have found nearly everything about Fort William Henry to be an irritant, an unwanted child. From a defensive standpoint, Fort William Henry was very dependent on Fort Edward, but the reverse was not true. Fort William Henry was a distinct asset to the British, but only if it was strongly supported from Fort Edward. As an offensive staging area, it was the only



Figure 5A. Ticonderoga to Albany (1778). Fort George is built on the hillock southeast of Fort William Henry. Supplying British troops north of Saratoga was not easy. To reach Fort Edward, at least three portages were required at the various Falls; plus, there were rapids. The portage at Fort Miller was between three and six miles long depending on the water volume in the Hudson. Any Saratoga references in the text are to Saratoga on the Hudson (just south of present-day Schuylerville, not Saratoga Springs). Scorticoke is at the confluence of the Hudson and Hossic Rivers, it is not a reference to Schaghticoke, New York. Thomas Kitchin, Sr., Hydrographer.




Figure 5B. Siege of Fort William Henry, National Archives of Canada. South Bastion is the only bastion not subject to direct fire from the French batteries. French fire targeted the West Wall, North Wall, and the Wharves (Bougainville Journal, Aug. 6th). This figure dates to \approx 1789-1791 and works well with the French narratives found in O'Callaghan, Vol. X, 1858, Pages 604-651.

British position within the Saint Lawrence Basin (1757); and it was secure enough to withstand any attack, except for an army with an artillery train. Lacking that support, it was a trap for the British. The British had fallen into a similar trap when Montcalm took Oswego in 1756. As regards the artillery, the inventory of needed shot and shell would be exhausted within six days.

Abercromby's ill-fated expedition against Ticonderoga demonstrated that Fort William Henry was not needed. Abercromby marshaled his forces at Fort Edward, subsequently reached Ticonderoga and was defeated on July 8, 1758. That June, the British were able to move north from Fort Edward, establish a base very close to the ashes of Fort William Henry, and transport 900 flat-bottomed bateaux and 135 keeled whaleboats to Lake George. To transport the artillery, rafts were fashioned from paired bateaux. Three floating artillery platforms each mounting two 4-pounders served as protection. Yet with all the effort required, Abercromby still reaches Ticonderoga by early July (Bellico 2001, Page 63). If he had been successful at Ticonderoga, Fort Saint-Frédéric would have fallen by the end of July. In this light, Loudoun's annoyance at being saddled with an exposed and unwanted fort is very understandable. It also illustrates the severe handicap indicative of the late starting provincial campaigns whose momentum was exhausted by mid-September.

a. Artillery at Fort William Henry

Marquis Louis-Joseph de Montcalm arrived at Fort William Henry on the morning of August 3rd with an army of around 7,600 men and an artillery train of about thirty-one cannon, two mortars, three howitzers, and ten grenade mortars (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 629 and 643; modified by adding a second mortar). The largest cannon were French naval 18-pounders, at least 8 feet 11 inches long. The French relied on captured British howitzers and mortars from the Monongahela (1755) and Oswego (1756) to supply the needed shell pieces. The howitzers were brass and British. The larger mortar was likely British, a near certainty. The smaller mortar was a 6-inch iron mortar cast at the Saint-Maurice Foundry in Quebec (1748). With a shell size of 6.1 inches, the performance would be closer to a British royal mortar (5 1/2-inch shell) than an 8-inch mortar (Samson 1998, Page 266; and Appendix Page 164). As regards the British guns, no British or provincial narrative is both complete and correct. Among the different narratives, the number and type of artillery pieces present on the British side varies widely; there is little agreement between accounts. Inaccuracies are mixed with omissions. No published history or narrative offers a complete inventory. Partial lists highlighting the four large cannon are standard, but the summary numbers and descriptions disagree. Do the summary numbers include the cannon in the Entrenched Camp or just the Bastion? Do the estimates of cannon include howitzers and mortars? The number of mortars is a source of at least part of the confusion, but not the only source. The sequence and dates for gun losses are equally jumbled and inaccurate.

In 1755, a four-prong attack on New France was conceived: Braddock to the Monongahela and then Niagara from the south (Preston 2015, Page 78); the combined British advance on Acadia (Fort Beauséjour); Governor Shirley of Massachusetts against Niagara from the east; and Johnson's advance on Lake Champlain. The plan was for the three northern expeditions to draw their large-bore cannon from stores in New York Harbor (De Lancey to Robinson; August 7, 1755; O'Callaghan, Vol. VI, Page 991). At the beginning of the war, the ordnance stores at Albany and in Nova Scotia were notoriously old and in poor condition; however, the cannon at

New York Harbor was a mix of new and old guns (William Johnson Papers, Volume 1, January 27, 1755, Page 443). This old : new distinction is without definition — it may be a reference to the chronological age or the gun pattern. Just among the "new" guns, there were fifteen 32-pounders, eight 18-pounders, twenty-one 12-pounders, and twenty-nine 9-pounders. All these "new" guns were iron. There were additional "old" guns: thirty-nine 32-pounders, twenty-two 12-pounders, and fourteen 9-pounders. The large-bore brass guns were limited to two 18-pounders and six 12-pounders (Final Letter Appendix, Page 262). Although each expedition wanted guns from New York Harbor, there were limits. New York Harbor needed to retain enough guns for its own defense plus the Harbor Inventory only contained half the number of 18-pounders "requested" by the three expeditions. The Acadia Expedition was assigned all the "new" iron 18-pounders. The large-bore brass guns were assigned to Shirley and Niagara. At first, little help was given to Johnson. Johnson's Expedition was firmly at the bottom of the pecking order.

The first appearance of British artillery on Lake George was with the arrival of Johnson's Expedition in 1755. Previous British expeditions had focused on South Bay and Wood Creek as the way to reach Lake Champlain. In late 1745, Governor Clinton "moves" six 18-pounders north from New York Harbor to Albany (King George's War; O'Callaghan, Volume VI, Page 306). For ten years, these guns remained at Albany. These were Johnson's 18-pounders. While on his way to join Johnson at Albany, Eyre meets with James De Lancey, the Lt. Governor of New York. Independent of Johnson or Shirley, Eyre requests additional guns (Johnson Papers, Vol 1, Page 557). From De Lancey, Eyre was able to add two 32-pounders and two 12-pounders from New York Harbor to Johnson's artillery train, but not the two brass 18-pounders he asks for. This accounts for all the large-bore iron cannon lost at the Siege, 12-pounders and up. The paper trail here is convoluted and often requires the pairing of multiple letters; partial letter transcriptions and further connecting details are found in the Artillery Appendix starting on Page 122.

An honest appraisal of the artillery inventory in New York would have concluded that there were suitable guns for a single expedition, either Lake Champlain or Niagara, but not for both. The bulk of the available large-bore cannon were iron pieces, too heavy for transport in the wilderness on non-existent roads. Shirley was keenly aware and insisted that all the large-bore brass cannon be assigned to his Niagara Campaign, leaving Johnson to haul Clinton's iron 18-pounders. Shirley's plans in New York were too grandiose without attention to detail. Shirley was the overall commander of the provincial forces in New York with Johnson subordinate to Shirley. However, Johnson remains the Crown's Agent to the Iroquois and does not acquiesce this post to Shirley. An enmity soon develops between Shirley and Johnson over logistics, supplies, and the role of the Iroquois (September 3, 1755; Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 2).

By late July, Johnson's artillery train is described as two 32-pounders, six 18-pounders, eight 6-pounders, one 13-inch mortar, and two 8-inch mortars (Letter from Captain William Eyre 20 to Robert Napier, Camp near Albany, July 27, 1755; in *Military Affairs in North America — MANA*, Page 128). Eyre then adds a reference to the two 12-pounders on July 29th (Johnson Papers, Vo. I, Page 789). These 18-pounders were truly massive, weighing about 5,800 pounds with a length of 11 feet, a full thousand pounds heavier than the much shorter 32-pounders. Simply from their size, Eyre would have immediately recognized these guns as an old pattern, either garrison or naval guns, likely middle deck. After the 1720s, 11-foot-long 18-pounders no

longer appear on the official establishment lists (McConnell 1988, Page 77) — these guns were at least 25 years old at the time of the Siege and could have been much older.

Although Eyre states "all our artillery are Iron", four of the 6-pounders were likely brass, a better fit for later inventories. Other guns would arrive including a howitzer and two additional mortars. By November 1755, most of these pieces were fitted into Fort William Henry: two iron 32-pounders, two iron 18-pounders, two iron 12-pounders, four iron 6-pounders, four brass 6-pounders, one 13-inch iron mortar, two 9-inch brass mortars (better described as 8-inch), and two 7-inch iron mortars (better described as 8-inch) — a total of 19 pieces (William Johnson Papers, Volume II, Pages 277 and 278).

Four of the 18-pounders remain at Albany and were not moved north until 1756. As the army assembled on Lake George, the need to move provisions forward became more pressing than moving cannon or bateaux. More than anything else, logistical shortcomings had defeated Johnson's Expedition. From the Johnson Papers, Volume II; Major General Lyman, October 20, 1755; Page 214:

"Several Cannon necessary for the Expedition yet at Albany, Shells, Shot, Powder & upwards of Four hundred Battoes at Fort Edward yet to bring forward, which before this time could not be got here (Fort William Henry) without Exposing the Army to suffer the want of Provisions & still to bring forward, will stop such a proportion of Carriage for Provisions as will be employed for the Service."

From the Johnson Papers, Volume II; October 22, 1755, Page 229:

Sir,

I have yours of the 18th Inst. If sending the Shot from Half Moon will take Waggons W^{ch} would otherwise be bringing Bread, pray to speak with Sr. Charles (Hardy) & I believe he will withdraw his Order.

The 18 pounders are to remain at Albany till further Orders. I am

Sir.

Your hum. Serv^t

W.J. (William Johnson)

The number of guns would increase in 1756. The next appearance of the artillery is a year later, the correspondence of Loudoun to Cumberland – Albany, October 3, 1756 (LO 1968 and MANA, Page 239; See Appendix, Page 168). At Fort William Henry, there were two iron 32-pounders, eight iron 18-pounders, two iron 12-pounders, four iron 6-pounders, four iron 4-pounders, four brass 6-pounders, two (brass) 8-inch mortars, one 13-inch mortar, two 10-inch mortars, two 8-inch "hautsbitzers" (howitzers), one 7-inch "hautsbitzer" (howitzer), and three 7-inch mortars with "a great Quantity of Ammunition" — a total of 35 pieces plus 14 swivel guns. This artillery was Winslow's 1756 Expedition against Carillon and Fort St. Frederic, aborted after the fall of Fort Oswego. At Fort Edward, there were a further two 18-pounders, four 9-pounders, five 6-pounders, and one 4-pounder. The American provincials surrounding Fort Edward were supported by six 6-pounders (field carriages). At Albany, the 60th Regiment had two 6-pounders and a 3-pounder (field carriages). These inventory numbers are likely referenced to the

inspections of both forts ordered by Loudoun in July 1756 (LO 1424). As regards the artillery at Fort William Henry, Loudoun writes: *"This is what they had amassed for the Attack they proposed on Tiederoe, a great part of which I proposed to have brought back, but could not get Horses to Transport it, and if I had them now, the Provincials would desert if I took it."*

Loudoun's chief concern was for Fort Edward, not Fort William Henry. There is one overlooked source of information that sheds considerable light on the artillery allocations. These events happened 10 months before the Siege. Lord Loudoun, escorted by 100 of the 44th and 42 Iroquois, arrived at Fort Edward on October 5, 1756 (Journals of the Hon. William Hervey, Page 43; Lieutenant in the 44th Foot). On October 12th, Lord Loudoun moves north to Fort William Henry under the protection of three companies of grenadiers, 80 rangers, and 36 Iroquois. General Winslow's colonial army was still at Fort William Henry, checking any possible French advance south. It was during this period that the new barracks and the northern warehouse were built. Lord Loudoun returned to Fort Edward on October 16th and subsequently left for Albany on November 1st. Entry for October 24 (Fort Edward): *"This morning 6 iron eighteen pounders, 3 iron howitts, one thirteen inch mortar and 2 brass royals (5 1/2-inch mortars) arrived from Fort William Henry, which made up our artillery at the Fort to eight 18 pounders, four 9 pounders and six 6 pounder."* Hervey's descriptions of the howitzers and mortars do not match the other inventories. It is more likely two howitzers and five mortars were moved to Fort Edward, not the six pieces detailed by Hervey. In stark contrast to his letter dated earlier in October, Lord Loudoun has successfully managed to reduce the artillery at Fort William Henry from 35 pieces to 22 and increase the Bastion's guns at Fort Edward from 13 to approximately 24 pieces (4-pounders or larger). The artillery at Fort Edward on September 6th, one month after the Siege, is described as 35 pieces including eight iron 18-pounders, two iron 9-pounders, two iron 10-inch mortars, two brass 8-inch mortars, two iron 8-inch howitzers, six iron 6-pounders, ten iron 4-pounders, and three iron 1½-pounders (LO 6686). Much of the increase is explained by the addition of nine 4-pounders to Fort Edward's inventory. These 4-pounders were guns arriving in Spring 1757 with the returning provincial regiments or militia guns brought with Webb's summons that August. Later that September, four more 9-pounders had arrived from Albany, a total of 39 pieces (Pargellis 1933, Page 322; and LO 6686, end note). These last inventories do not include the massive 13-inch mortar which had been sent to Albany, the six pieces sent to Fort William Henry in August, or four additional light brass 12-pounders that Loudoun assigned to Webb that may well have remained in Albany (MANA, Page 350).

To Loudoun, a French advancement including an artillery train via South Bay against Fort Edward was viewed as a distinct possibility — something that never occurs. If this had happened, any British troops at Fort William Henry would be bypassed, isolated, and then likely lost. Loudoun's strategy for 1757 is decidedly aggressive as regards Maritime Canada and Quebec. In the New York Theater, Loudoun's thinking has a distinctly defensive tone, but there is no doubt, Loudoun has left Fort William Henry considerably weaker than it was in Summer 1756. In Loudoun's defense, he was a strong advocate of rebuilding the ships burnt during Rigaud's Raid in March as a defensive measure against any French advancement on Lake George. However, the work proved slow and the ships were unready when needed. Again, with no French advance expected on New York, there was no perceived need for haste in rebuilding the fleet. The year before, a British "navy" on Lake George had been established (LO 2242; LO 1599; LO1710; Bellico 2001, Pages 38 and 337; and Bellico 2010, Page 89). The British had two small

20-ton sloops (lighters) and a 30-ton sloop (*Earl of Loudoun*). Colonel Nathaniel Meserve or Captain Ezekiel Worthen, accomplished shipwrights from Portsmouth in New Hampshire, may have directed their construction. In Fall 1756, this 3-sloop force could conduct patrols over the entire length of Lake George, 30 miles. In early September, Winslow sailed to the north end of Lake George. From LO 1710 (Winslow to Loudoun, September 5, 1756): "*made a Tour round the Lake, Sett out with Col^{os}. Gridley Thatcher &c: On the Second and Returned Yesterday afternoon, Our Party Consisting of One Sloop with two Six pounders, One Seven Inch Morter and Eight Swivels fifty men, One Sloop four swivels forty men, One Ditto two Swivels and thirty five men, and Seven Whale Boats Eleven men each.*"

Entering 1757, Loudoun was basing the true defense of the exposed Fort William Henry on this "navy", not on the artillery present at Fort William Henry. The French had no boats capable of opposing them on Lake George. An even larger 40-ton sloop (*George*) was in the stocks under construction and not far from completion. Finally, the British had several scows, flat-bottomed sailing vessels designed to transport artillery for Winslow's aborted attack on Carillon. These scows or "gundolas" were unarmed (Montresor Journals, Page 37), but there was a shortage of swivel guns, and this might have been the real reason that they were unarmed. Although Rigaud's Raid failed to take the Bastion itself, the value of burning *the Earl of Loudoun*, the *George*, more than 200 bateaux, and possibly two of the scows was considerable (March 1757). The French falsely believe they had successfully burnt all four sloops; the two smaller sloops survived (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 572). If the fleet had remained intact, Montcalm's mass of 247 bateaux may not have been able to advance on Fort William Henry. Both Webb and Monro could have done more to rebuild the fleet. Getting the "navy" ready was a central theme of the July 27th officer conference (The Montresor Journals, Page 37). Webb then ordered "*a great many more Hands at work on the Galliot*" and all twelve ship carpenters were assigned to the task, but the attention was too late to be useful (Steele 1990, Page 97; and LO 4020). The time to reestablish the "navy" had been there, but it was needlessly squandered.

In 1757, Fort William Henry was an offensive staging point without any offense to support. The previous two summers, Fort William Henry was the center of two attempts to push north on Lake Champlain by thousands of soldiers. Now, the British would have been more than content with a quiet front. If the French were forced to retreat to protect Quebec, Loudoun left Webb with six light brass 12-pounders at Albany, mortars, and some older brass 6-pounders (\approx 8-foot long), guns mounted on field carriages (*Loudoun to Cumberland, concluded June 3rd, 1757*; MANA, Pages 350 and 372). These guns would enable Webb to advance on Ticonderoga or Fort St. Frederic, but Webb was to advance only if the French proved to be very weak, having been forced to withdraw the bulk of those garrisons to Quebec. With the addition of these light brass 12-pounders, the sources for all the artillery at Fort William Henry can now be accounted for.

The best single inventory of the British Artillery at the time of the Siege is the short narrative written by Lieutenant Collins of the Royal Artillery, who was positioned in the Bastion. More precisely, it is the only inventory. Collins' List includes 24 pieces, not 26 pieces as reported in other narratives. But there is a caveat, the 24 pieces listed in the Collins Narrative are limited to those "touched" by Collins. Those guns not "touched" by Collins are not included. Even after the shipment of the dozen artillery pieces to Fort Edward and without exception, for every piece of artillery reported in the Collins Inventory, there is a corresponding piece in the Loudoun

Inventory in the needed number. The Collins Inventory with the complete narrative and spelling as in the original (LO 4395):

Albany Septem. 3rd __ 1757

A Return of Ordonance fitt for Service in Fort William Henry at the time of Capitulation Sir

<i>Iron</i>	<i>Twelve Pounders</i>	<i>1</i>
	<i>Six D^o</i>	<i>4</i>
	<i>Nine D^o</i>	<i>2</i>
	<i>Four D^o</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Brass</i>	<i>Six Pounders</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Iron</i>	<i>7 3/4 Howitzer</i>	<i>1</i>
	<i>D^o Mortar</i>	<i>1</i>

Unfit for Service

<i>Iron</i>	<i>Thirty two pound</i>	<i>2</i>
	<i>Eighteen D^o</i>	<i>2</i>
	<i>Twelve D^o</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Brass</i>	<i>Six Pounders</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Iron</i>	<i>7 3/4 Mortar</i>	<i>2</i>

Thomas Collins, Lieutenant Royal Artillery

Turn Over

The Timbers of the Face of the East Bastion knocked over two or three Foot.

The Timbers many of them of the Northwest Curtain knocked into the Parapet three or four foot.

A thirteen Inch Shell knocked in the passage of the Magazine under the North Bastion.

A thirteen Inch Shell knocked in four or five Timbers of the Casement where the Laboratory was.

Thirteen of the Artillery and Additional killed & wounded by one of the Mortars bursting.

A Ten Inch shell fell on the Ammunition box on the north Bastion by which were blown up killed and wounded sixteen, One of which was a provincial Officer that never was heard of but part of this coat was found.

When a Shot would strike any Timbers of the Fort or a Shell burst within Twenty of Thirty Yards it would shake like an Earth Quake.

"Laboratory" refers to the room under a bastion or other protected location where the shells and gunpowder were prepared ("M" in Figure 2, top cross-section). Collins' thirteen-inch shell references are not correct — the largest shells that the French fired were from their single 10-inch mortar (British nomenclature). Smaller shells would have been fired from the two howitzers and their second mortar (6-inch). There was only one 13-inch mortar in the Lake Champlain Corridor, it was British. Such large mortars were greatly feared (Loudoun to Webb, June 20, 1757; MANA, Page 372): *"Your Brass Guns and Your large Mortar, are I presume still at Albany: the Guns easily moved, and two Ox Carts brought down the Mortar: the moment you*

move that, the Enemy will be informed of your Intentions, therefore I would leave that, to be among the last things I did." The fear was fire. On the 4th, Williamson had the roofs of the buildings stripped as a precaution against fire. The French did the same at Ticonderoga in 1758. Notably, the narrative indicates the walls were damaged but does not suggest any breach.

Because Collins provided the initial two brass 6-pounders to the Entrenched Camp, those guns are included within the Collins Inventory. As the six cannon that arrived with Young's column on August 2nd were subsequently divided between the Bastion and the Entrenched Camp, two of those guns also appear on Collins' list, but four guns do not appear. All guns positioned in the Bastion are on the list. A comparison of the cannon reported by Loudoun on October 3, 1756, with Collins' list illustrates extreme consistency. Again, six of the 18-pounders were moved to Fort Edward in late October 1756, as were seven mortars and howitzers. The Loudoun Inventory (LO 1968 and MANA, Page 239) confirms the validity of the Collins Inventory (LO 4395).

Lieutenant Colonel Young's Reinforcement Column, which arrived the day before the Siege, brought six cannon from Fort Edward — two light brass 12-pounders, two 9-pounders (iron), and two brass 6-pounders. These two 9-pounders were intended to be ship guns once the "navy" was refitted. The two 9-pounders required garrison carriages and were positioned in the Bastion, so these guns are included in the Collins' Inventory. The two brass 6-pounders and the two brass 12-pounders were on field carriages and positioned in the Entrenchment Camp and were never "touched" by Collins and do not appear in his Inventory. There can be no confusion between the brass and iron 12-pounders. The two 12-pounders in the Bastion are both iron guns and have been there since 1755. The two brass 12-pounders are referenced in the Montresor Journals (Page 37), the Fyre Journal, and several of the letters written by Monro during the Siege.

Fort William Henry Artillery Inventories

Collins Inventory: September 3, 1757

Two 32-pounders (Iron)
Two 18-pounders (Iron)
Two 12-pounders (Iron)
Two 9-pounders (Iron)
Four 6-pounders (Brass)
Four 6-pounders (Iron)
Four 4-pounders (Iron)
One 7 3/4-Inch Howitzer (Iron)
Three 7 3/4-Inch Mortars (Iron)

Loudoun: October 3, 1756

Two 32-pounders (Iron)
Eight 18-pounders (Iron)
Two 12-pounders (Iron)

Four 6-pounders (Brass)
Four 6-pounders (Iron)
Four 4-pounders (Iron)
Three Howitzers
Eight Mortars

Each of the individual bastions would have a mix of different gun calibers, the idea being that the smallest gun capable of doing the "job" would be utilized, thereby conserving gunpowder. Particularly for the besieged, stretching gunpowder stores was key; one could fire a 4-pounder six

times for the gunpowder cost of firing a 32-pounder just once. At the same time, larger caliber guns would have a distinct range advantage. Unfortunately, there is no 1757 correspondence listing the ammunition stores at Fort William Henry.

The only mention of a 24-pounder being present is found in the Hays Journal, a single gun (Hays 1898). As no other source reports the presence of any 24-pounder either at Fort Edward or Fort William Henry before Abercromby's Campaign in 1758, this reference is being discounted. Abercromby's ordnance in 1758 were fresh artillery pieces from England, mostly brass guns, not poorly maintained American relics (Nester 2008, Page 77; Pitt to Abercromby, CO_5_213_006).

A review of the O'Callaghan Paris Documents is very useful and answers a few annoying questions. The French report a total of eight brass cannon being captured, two from the Bastion and six from the Entrenched Camp. Where these brass guns were captured is as important as their identities and numbers, two brass 12-pounders and four brass 5-pounders (British 6-pounders) were listed as being captured from the "Intrenchment".

From O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 626 (Complete Transcription, Appendix, Page 118):

Artillery of the Intrenchments.

6 brass guns, viz., 2 of 12, and 4 of 5^{lbs}.

4 iron swivels.

214 shot.

75 barrels of powder, 25^{lbs}. (=) 1835.

80 gun charges, in caissons.

600 lbs. ball.

50 lbs. match.

This corresponds exactly to Fyre's description of the ordnance in the Entrenched Camp. On the 6th, two of Monro's letters to Webb state that because of the loss of cannon in the Bastion, they were required to move the two brass 12-pounders from the Entrenched Camp to the Bastion and asks for a fresh artillery train. But moving this artillery is never mentioned in any other accounts. There is no question on whether there were two light brass 12-pounders, simply where the guns were at the time of the surrender. The positioning of the brass guns in the French account suggests that this movement never happened. The brass 12-pounders remained in the Entrenched Camp and "untouched" by Collins; they are not included in his inventory. The French documents also dictate that the two brass 6-pounders brought by Young/Fyre cannot be included as part of Collins' Inventory – the math will not allow this. A total of eight brass cannon were reported captured, not six; the two other brass 6-pounders came from the Bastion. Most importantly, the locations of these brass cannons as reported by the French are logical and as expected, agreeing with both the Fyre Journal and the Collins Inventory. There is nothing in either the Fyre or Hays Journals suggesting that the brass 12-pounders were moved into the Bastion; if they were moved, it is hard to believe this would not be keenly protested in those narratives.

There is no evidence that the British had any cohorn mortars at the Siege, small grenade mortars, 4 2/5-inches. The French had nine or ten small grenade mortars in their artillery train. None were reported as being captured in the exhaustive lists compiled by the French. Braddock had fifteen coehorns as part of his siege train at Monongahela (MANA, Page 97). Abercromby had



Figure 6A. Fort William Henry, 1755; Thomas Johnston, Boston. William Johnson Campaign. The East and West Barracks were not finished until Fall 1756. Details concerning the North and South Barracks are badly jumbled. East Casement "Storehouse" is too large. The three "huts" on the west wall are — *no lodgings for Officers except a few Sheds built against the North west Curtine not habitable* (LO 1583, Burton and Montresor, August 25th, 1756). In 1757, the French approach was from the upper right at 2 o'clock. Small labels inside the Bastion include "a Dungeon, Store House (2x), Barracks (2x), Guard House, and Magazine (2x)". Outside the Bastion, labels include "The Gate and Bridge (3x)". The west curtain wall gun embrasures are correctly illustrated. By standard practice, gun embrasures should be a minimum of 18 feet apart, center to center. Map Engraved and Printed, April 1756. American Antiquarian Society.




Figure 6B. Fort William Henry with the Attacks of the French, 1757. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York: Procured in Holland, England and France; Vol. X, 1858; Page 603. Weed Parsons and Company, Printers, Albany; 1858. Map Note Reads: Copied from the Original Sketch in American Military Plans: Maps; Vol. IV. in N.Y. State Library, Albany, N.Y.

Key to Figure 6B. Fort William Henry with the Attacks of the French, 1757.

- A. The wharf where the Enemy landed their Artillery &c.
- A. B. The Enemy's first Line 260 Yards.
- B. C. Their first Battery length 70 Yards. Breadth 20ft; Height 7 ft; Embras^{rs} .. 9.
- D. E. The second Line 318 Yards.
- E. F. The second Battery length 74 yds. Breadth 26 ft; Height 8 ft; Embras^{rs} ..10.
- G. H. The grand Line of approach 320 Yds.
- H. I. An intended Battery length 67 yds.
- H. K. A Line down the side of a hill, and over a mirey Slough, where the En^y had laid a few Fascines to pass dry on foot to the point of a hill dug down at **K** 64 Yards.
- K. L. The en^{ys}. Path thro' the hollow at the end of the garden 60 Yds.
- L. M. The en^{ys}. Line up the hill 120 Yds.
- N. O. The en^{ys}. Line in the garden 191 Yds.
- P. The Garden (Map Note: 235 Yds).
- Q. The place of the English Encamp't before the Siege until ord^d to the Retrench^t **T**.
- R. The Swamp S^o of the Fort.
- S. The place of Encamp^t 1755. (Comment: This location is unique to this map).
- T. The Rocky eminence where the English were Encamp^d. during the Siege.
- V. The Redout. (Comment: This location is unique to this map).
- W. The East Swamp.
- X. The range of the Mountains East of the Lake.
- Y. The foot of the West Mountain.

Notes on the Plan: 10 Can, 1 Mort; 10 Can, 1 Mort, A Howitz.; 622yds; 376 yds; and 700 yds. The two small artillery notes on the map seem to imply both batteries were about 550 yards from the tip of the north bastion.

Among the maps depicting the Siege, there is considerable variation in the positions and distances of the French batteries. On most maps, the first battery is further away from the fort with the first battery some 700 yards distant and the second battery anywhere from 500 - 750 yards distant. A few maps have the second battery further away. Figure 5B has the first battery at about 725 yards and second at 550 yards. There is no definitive map, but Figure 5B seems the best; oldest and based on French narratives. Comparing the ordnance, the 9-inch mortar in the first battery would have had greater range than the 7-inch howitzers and 6-inch mortar placed in the second battery. However, available ammunition stores may have been the deciding factor in developing the batteries, not range.

twenty coehorns at Ticonderoga (1758), so their absence at Fort William Henry is unexpected. Nor were there any Royal Mortars, 5 1/2-inches that were common to most campaigns. The British Inventory included seventeen swivel guns. These swivel guns were used to arm the 1756 "navy". Swivel guns had a much longer range than a musket, but were awkward to aim and inaccurate at distance, exposing the user to sniper fire. Used effectively, swivel guns could be used to drive a line of snipers back. In the Bougainville Journal for August 5th, Montcalm laments the loss of several Indian Allies for engaging in unnecessary sniper duels.

The British first began firing on the French shortly after the appearance of Montcalm's bateaux fleet on the 3rd. These opening shots fell short on the water. The French then began their trench and sap works. On August 6th, the French opened their first battery at or just beyond the recognized effective range of the British 6-pounders, some 700 yards – *"which consists of eight cannon, three of which are eighteen-pounders, and a nine inch mortar"*. On August 7th from a position further to the southwest, a second French battery was opened at about 550 yards: *"which consists of two eighteen-pounders, five twelves, one eight, two seven inch howitzers and a six inch mortar, commenced to fire. It fired obliquely on the front attacked and by ricochet on the entrenched camp."* (Bougainville Journals, Pages 165 and 166). The distances are measured to the north bastion. At this range and once completed, the British 4-pounders and 6-pounders would have been near useless against this first phase of the French earthwork and batteries, forcing a reliance on the heavier guns. The cannonade was readily audible as far distant as Fort Edward.

As regards the British artillery pieces present at the Siege, there is a quite simple logic path to determine their size and number — add the Collins Inventory and the Fyre Column ordnance together but limit the 9-pounders to two pieces. The 9-pounders came from the Young/Fyre Column but were positioned in the Bastion, so they are already in Collins' Inventory. The total is 28 pieces of artillery. There were 22 pieces of artillery in the Bastion and 6 pieces at the Entrenched Camp, not counting the thirteen swivel guns positioned in the Bastion and four swivel guns in the Entrenched Camp. Of the 28 pieces, 14 pieces were small-bore cannon: ten 6-pounders and four 4-pounders.

At the time of the surrender, the only cannon that remained within the effective range of the first two French batteries and that could realistically "hurt" these batteries were a single iron 12-pounder and the two 9-pounders, but in all likelihood, the supply of shot for these guns was near exhaustion, if not actually exhausted. The store for the 12-pound shot was only developed for two guns, not the four that were present. No 9-pounders were ever positioned at Fort William Henry until the day before the Siege. None were reported as being there in 1755 or 1756. Since 1755, all the 9-pounders available to the British were positioned at Fort Edward; all the iron 12-pounders were at Fort William Henry. All the evidence suggests that the entire stock of 9-pound shot came with the Young/Fyre Column on August 2nd — none was in "storage". From the Fyre Journal: *"Captain Ingersoll having been ordered there before with a small train of artillery, commanded by captain McCleod (William MacLeod), consisting of two brass 12-pounders, two brass 6-pounders on their carriages, and two iron 9-pounders in carts, with shot, powder & C. for them."* Knowing the limitation of the available shot, the 9-pounders were likely used sparingly. Neither of the 9-pounders burst and both guns were surrendered to the French.

The French report 2,522 solid shot captured, but do not specify shot by size. Logic suggests that the quantities of solid shot in reserve would be in proportion to the positioned guns, but adjustments would be made based on the need for a specific caliber. Knowing that there would be a distinctly higher need for long-range shot, especially at the beginning of a siege when the earthwork would be furthest away, shot reserves would have reflected that need. In November 1755, the stores at Fort William Henry held 689 round shot for the 18-pounders, 201 shot for the then two 12-pounders, but only 69 shot for the two 32-pounders (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 277). Sometime after 1755, at least 150 additional shot for the 32-pounders and 100 shot for 12-pounders were moved from Fort Edward to Fort William Henry (reference LO 6686 and Ordnance Table, Page 116). Stores of grapeshot were also moved north. Under Winslow, there were eight 18-pounders positioned at Fort William Henry. In October 1756, Loudoun had this reduced to two 18-pounders, one bursting on the 4th and one bursting on the 5th. As such, there is a good chance that much of this captured shot was then "useless" 18-pound shot. British ordnance clerks in the Bastion were paying cash for any "savaged" cannon shot.

The supply of small-bore shot was not critical. James Furnis held the position of Commissary of Stores and Paymaster to the Royal Artillery for New York, but he was present in the Bastion during the Siege. Furnis wrote: *"In the Evening as we discovered their Intention of opening another battery near the Fort, as the Guns and Mortars in the Fort except some 6 and 4 Pounds were rendered useless, our Shot and Shells expended, no Assistance to be expected from Fort Edward, the Fort was not able to hold out, and our Retreat cut off, in this Scituation it was proposed to hold a Consultation of Officers early the next Morning to propose a Capitulation."* (Furnis Letter, Page 312 of the source journal).

The single howitzer and the single remaining mortar would also have been able to reach the French batteries. Yet inventory numbers suggest that very few usable shells remained. The French report capturing 545 shells (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Pages 626 and 629), but many, if not nearly all these shells, were also "useless". There were 185 shells for the withdrawn 13-inch mortar and 360 other shells, the vast majority of these being shells for the two 10-inch mortars withdrawn the previous October (Table 2, Page 118 plus Furnis' statement). In October 1756, Loudoun managed to redistribute the guns between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, but not all the ammunition stores. Gunpowder stores were ample with the French reporting 35,835 pounds of powder captured; musket shot quantities were marginal at $\approx 19,600$ rounds. None of the 1755 inventories or the French inventories at the time of the surrender conflict with the contention that the "needed shot and needed shell" for the larger guns was exhausted.

Of the 28 artillery pieces in the British Inventory, seven or eight burst, and a single gun was destroyed by artillery fire. A combination of Royal Artillery and sailors serviced the guns, but there has never been any criticism of either for overcharging or overheating the guns (excessive firing rates); suggesting common knowledge that the guns were old, the barrels rusted out and poorly maintained. In the 1750s, the full-service gunpowder charge on heavy and medium guns was between $2/5$ and $1/2$ the shot weight (40-50%); it would not be reduced to $1/3$ the shot weight until 1764 (McConnell 1988, Pages 281, 411, and 412; Caruana 1992, vi). Pargellis (1933, Page 322) suggests a firing rate of only three rounds per hour for iron siege guns — some 30 rounds per day. With the Entrenched Camp being 1,400 - 1,500 yards from the first French batteries, the temptation for overcharging the six brass guns positioned there would have been extreme — one

of these brass guns may have burst. The French captured 19 or 20 "fit" pieces: one iron 12-pounder, two light brass 12-pounders, two iron 9-pounders, four or five brass 6-pounders, four iron 6-pounders, four iron 4-pounders, one 7 3/4-inch howitzer, and one 7 3/4-inch mortar. This corresponds to Collins' Inventory at the time of the surrender plus the addition of two light 12-pounders and one or two brass 6-pounders coming from the Entrenched Camp via the Frye Column. The Bougainville Journal (Page 177) reports 26 pieces as being "Found in the Fort", but only two mortars. The missing third mortar was found in the north bastion as part of the archaeological investigations conducted in the 1950s (Bradfield 2001, Page 99). The final missing gun is an iron 12-pounder or larger gun that had burst; this gun was never found by the French and it is absent from all French Inventories (Appendix Table 2, Page 118, careful review).

The pieces "lost" during the Siege are shown in the right column. Dates are less certain:

British Artillery at Fort William Henry: Bastion Plus Entrenched Camp (August 3, 1757)

Two Iron 32-pounders - Bastion	Two Burst – Late 6th/7th; 7th/8th; Late 6th/8th
Two Iron 18-pounders - Bastion	Two Burst – 4th; 5th
Two Iron 12-pounders - Bastion	One Burst – 5th or Very Early 6th
Two Brass Light 12-pounders - Entrenched Camp (Young/Fyre Column)	Poor Evidence for One Gun Bursting, Fyre
Two Iron 9-pounders - Bastion (Young/Fyre Column)	

Six Brass 6-pounders (Older guns \approx 8.0 ft. long guns; **not** Light 6-pounders)

Subtotals:

Two Brass 6-pounders - Bastion	One Destroyed – 6th
Two Brass 6-pounder - Entrenched Camp (From the Bastion/Collins Inventory)	
Two Brass 6-pounders - Entrenched Camp (Young/Fyre Column)	One Burst – 7th – Tenuous, Fyre (or Simply Lost or “Ghost” by the French)
Four Iron 6-pounders - Bastion	
Four Iron 4-pounders - Bastion	
One Iron 7 3/4-Inch Howitzer - Bastion	
Three Iron 7 3/4-Inch Mortars - Bastion	Two Burst – 4th; Early 9th

b. Transactions

The Suppressed Official British Report of the Siege and "Massacre" at Fort William Henry, 1757 provides considerable insight into the Siege, but it must be viewed with disappointment as regards the artillery present (Steele 1992; LO 6660). Following Steele, the shorthand "*Transactions*" will be used as a reference to this manuscript. The word "suppressed" is a reference to Loudoun leaving "*Transactions*" in his private papers and not forwarding a copy to Secretary of State Henry Fox, which would have been the standard protocol. "*Transactions*" is similar to Collins' letter, as no guns in the Entrenched Camp appear to be referenced anywhere in the narrative. This characteristic allows a "confirmation" of where the 6-pounder losses occurred and the cause of those losses.

The first problem with "*Transactions*" is the disappearance of three 9-pounders within the narrative without any explanation (Steele 1992, Pages 346 and 351). Here the solution is simple, there is a transcription error in Steele 1992:

"Likewise Two 18 Pounders & One 12 Pounder Burst & One Brass Six Pounder broke by a shot from the Enemy: so that, we had but One Twelve Pounder, Five Nine Pounders and Four Four Pounders; with One Howitz and One Mortar, (which later Burst the next Morning) left to expostulate,"

The Original LO 6660 Document reads: "*Likewise Two 18 Pounders & One 12 Pounder Burst & One Brass Six Pounder broke by a shot from the Enemy: so that, we had but One Twelve Pounder, Two Nine Pounders and Four Four Pounders; with One Howitz and One Mortar, (which later Burst the next Morning) left to expostulate,"*

The handwriting in the original LO 6660 is very clear and precise. From start to end, it is a handsome script, free of confusion. As regards the 9-pounders, the Collins Inventory and the presented list agree with LO 6660; only two 9-pounders, not five. Although far from conclusive, the number of the 9-pounders in "*Transactions*" is more than the Loudoun Inventory for both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. Alone this should have drawn attention to this text – Loudoun had reported only a total of four 9-pounders in late 1756. It was not until a month after the Siege that four additional 9- pounders were moved north from Albany (Pargellis 1933, Page 322; and LO 6686). Any reference to six 9-pounders being at Fort Edward is post-Siege. The Montresor Journals entry for July 27th (Page 37) offers a much stronger hint that something is not correct with the number of 9-pounders described in "*Transactions*". If at least three 9-pounders were already at Fort William Henry, it would be pointless ordering 6-pounders to be equipped in the galliots while waiting on two 9-pounders to arrive from Fort Edward. This same passage contains a fundamental omission error in the original text. The most common gun at Fort William Henry was the 6-pounder, a total of ten guns — six brass and four iron. Of the ten 6-pounders, only two brass 6-pounders were lost during the Siege. In all of "*Transactions*", there are only two references to any 6-pounder in the text; the broken one above and the gun "returned" to Monro by Montcalm as a sign of honor. Collins lists seven serviceable 6-pounders at the time of surrender (four iron 6-pounders and three brass 6-pounders), plus there was an eighth "fit" gun at the Entrenched Camp. Under "Unfit for Service", Collins lists only a single brass 6-pounder. In a minor discrepancy, "*Transactions*" reports four mortars, whereas Collins lists only three. In "*Transactions*", all the mortars are lost to bursting. Under Collins, one fit mortar is surrendered.

From "*Transactions*", Page 351: "*They got, One Twelve Pound Cannon, Two Nine Pounders, and Four Four Pounders: and One Seven Inch Howitz. They got but very few Shells; and for Amunition the quantity was not very considerable.*"

The French report the capture of 35,835 pounds of gunpowder; 2,522 solid shot; and 1,400 pounds of ball (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 626). The French artillery train had arrived with "*70 thousand weight of powder, shells and shot in proportion*" (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 643).

There are two well-known "Journals" from the Siege — The Fyre Journal and the Hays Journal. It is uncertain if these journals represent actual daily entries or subsequent recollections but being




Figure 7. Page from "Transactions at Fort William Henry during its Siege in August 1757"; LO 6660. The error in the transcription is in the sixth line from the bottom of the page; the "best Terms" passage is near the top of the page. Cover Page reads: *Endorsed as follows in the handwriting of the Earl of Loudoun: "An Account of the Siege of Fort William Henry by one of the Contractors for Provisions Clarks. Received by Mr. Kilby, Albany, Nov. 2^d, 1757."* Huntington Library Manuscript. Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

recollections or a mix seems the more likely. We know that the Fyre Journal was presented to Governor Pownall of Massachusetts on September 4, 1757 — less than a month after the Siege (CO 5/18 Part 1 038). The Fyre Journal was written from the position of the Entrenched Camp. The Hays Journal may have been published first on September 12, 1757, in the *Boston Evening Post* (reference Bellico 1995, Page 70). Much of the Hays Journal seems to have been written from the position of the Bastion, but the first elements better match the Camp. The value of the Journals is in the narratives and the addition of human detail. The Fyre Journal is much better at describing gun losses over time than the beginning inventory numbers or what guns were surrendered. The focus of conversation between the senior officers gathered around Monro would understandably be centered on gun losses. This is what is reflected in the Fyre Journal. The Hays Journal is not accurate as regards either the inventory or dates, but is an excellent source as regards batteries and distances. Determining dates for the gun losses is awkward as the Fyre, Hays, and Williamson Journals conflict. Narratives lean toward Fyre's account simply because it is the most complete and accessible source. The Fyre Journal has both 32-pounders and an 18-pounder bursting on the 5th with the second 18-pounder and the first 12-pounder bursting on the 6th. However, Williamson's reference to a 32-pounder on the 6th is impossible to ignore: "*We fired two shells & one thirty two pounder before the Enemy fired from their Battery*". The first French battery did not open until the 6th, so the dates for the bursting of the 32-pounders, as given in the Fyre Journal, must be rejected. The Hays Journal has both 32-pounders bursting on the 6th. Williamson's Journal lacks any reference to artillery losses after the 5th; there is no mention of the loss of the brass 6-pounder on the 6th or the bursting of the 32-pounders. Williamson's last diary entry is for the morning of the 8th. Monro's two letters of August 6th are further evidence that the first 32-pounder burst no earlier than late on the 6th; the 32-pounders are not mentioned in either of Monro's letters (LO 4041 and Dodge 2007, Page 70). Unlike the earlier letters, Monro's letters of the 6th gave Webb critical information — things were not going well for Monro. Monro to Webb, Morning of August 6th (LO 4041, received on the 6th):

Sir.

As a Proof of the Insufficiency of the Artillery, We have had within 24 hours, two 18 pounders, one 12 pounder and one Mortar burst, from which you will see the necessity of sending up a fresh supply of Artillery as soon as possible. We have been obliged to give two 12 pounders from the Camp, which we cou'd very ill spare. In case my Letter of this Morning shou'd not have reached you, I am to repeat to you, that the Enemy are plaging upon us from a Battery of Nine pieces of Cannon mostly 18 & 12 pounders.

I am &c: Geo: Monro

Monro to Webb, Evening of August 6th (LO 4041):

Sir.

This is the third Letter I wrote to You today: In my two former I acquainted you with the situation We were then in; Since that time, there is another gun in the Fort rendered uselefs by the Enemys' fire: and We have discovered New Works carrying on, Which we believe will be Completed this evening or tomorrow morning, which will bear equally the Fort and upon the Camp. I beg pardon for Saying, that if reinforcement, We had reason to Expect from your Letter, the only one I have ever received from You, which bears the date of Aug^l. 3^d/ had arrived in time, our situation would probably have been better. About two o'clock this day I received from you a Verbal

Message from two Rangers, mentioning an Expectation You had of being Joined by Sir W^m. Johnson and some Indians; as they delivered it in so Confused a Manner, I really cou'd not rightly understand it. I have as frequently as possible acquainted You with every Circumstance that has passed since the Enemy's appearance, and therefore Submit the Whole to your better Judgement. In my former Letters of this day, I told you there were four Cannon burst in the Fort within 24 hours and likewise that I had made a request of a fresh supply of Artillery having sent into the Fort two 12 pounders which We cou'd spare very ill from this Camp.

I am &c: Geo: Monro

Although Monro sent at least three letters out on the 6th, only these two appear to have reached Webb. The second letter reports the further loss of a brass 6-pounder in the Bastion. Again, this is the only gun lost to direct fire.

On the 4th, Williamson informs Monro in writing of his decision to remove one of the 18-pounders from the east bastion due to bursting — more accurately, the muzzle had split, and the barrel was honeycombed from metal loss (LO 4061; Final Letter Appendix). The Fyre Journal has the first 18-pounders bursting on the 5th and the other on the 6th, but Williamson's statement seems conclusive that one 18-pounder was lost on the 4th. The Williamson Journal has the second 18-pounder bursting on the 5th, wounding several men. Hays has one of the 18-pounders bursting on the 7th. Monro's letter of the evening of the 6th establishes that both 18-pounders burst before the 6th and only then did the 32-pounders burst. Nothing in the Williamson Journal or LO 4061 conflicts with this conclusion. There are no conflicts between Monro and Williamson. These differences and others between the Monro letters of the 6th and the Fyre Journal further suggest that the Fyre Journal is recollection with too many contradictions and discrepancies to be a daily diary of the events. Fyre writes on August 16th that the French batteries were opened on the 4th and 5th (Final Letter Appendix; CO 5/18 Part 1 039); they were in fact opened on the 6th and 7th (Bougainville Journals). The same logic applies to the Hays Journal.

Following the dates of gun losses in "*Transactions*" is often done more via inference than statement. Both losses of the 32-pounders appear in the text after the opening of the first French Battery. As regards the loss of the first 32-pounder (*Transactions*, Page 345):

"And on the 6th day, it was opened; consisting of Eight Pieces of Cannon 12 & 18 Pounds; & Two 10 inch Mortars; at the distance of Seven hundred yards from the Fort. From this Battery, they began Playing about Six O'Clock; and continued so the whole Day, tho' with Little success: On out Part we had the Mortification, of Bursting One of our Thirty two Pounds. The Bombardment continued on both sides, the whole succeeding night, at about a quarter of an Hours time, between the Throwing of each Shell."

The loss of the second 32-pounder is referenced to the 7th, the delivery of Monro's letter by Montcalm (LO 6660; "*Transactions*" text corrected for the number of 9-pounders):

"Before the Appearance of this Letter, we were constantly animated with the Thoughts of the Generals speedy arrival, and a Large body of Troops to our assistance; yet, when undeceived; not a single man seem'd daunted, nor was there the least mention made of our Capitulating; until it was impossible to defend the Fort, Twenty four hours longer: for on this and the day following our other 32 Pounder, Likewise Two 18 Pounds & One 12 Pounder Burst & One Brass Six

Pounder broke by a shot from the Enemy: so that, we had but One Twelve Pounder, Two Nine Pounders and Four Four Pounders; with One Howitz and One Mortar, (which later Burst the next Morning) left to expostulate,". Note: One fit mortar was surrendered to the French; the text should read “*and Two Mortars, (which one later Burst the next Morning) left to expostulate,*”.

Excluding the omission of the five remaining 6-pounders, this description of the artillery found in "*Transactions*" is entirely accurate as it relates to the Bastion, both in terms of cannon losses and cannon remaining. Guns from the encampment are not included here. The absence of any mention of the 32-pounders in Monro's two letters of the 6th suggests the loss of the first 32-pounder occurred no earlier than the late afternoon or early evening of the 6th. The language in "*Transactions*" is decidedly obtuse, but it strongly suggests the two 32-pounders burst on different days. Cobbling all the sources together, the first 32-pounder burst late on the 6th; the second 32-pounder likely burst on the 7th. However, the first loss could have been on the 7th with the second loss occurring on the 8th — this would be a better fit for some of the language in *Transactions* and the Williamson Diary which abruptly ends the morning of the 8th without any mention whatsoever of the second 32-pounder (See Final Letter Appendix). The sequence and dates for the gun losses in "*Transactions*" are a much better match for Monro's letters than the Fyre narrative. Excluding the Hays Journal, there is a general agreement that a mortar located in the north bastion burst on the 4th; and that the second mortar burst much later in the Siege on the morning of the 9th, causing thirteen casualties including at least one death (reference Collins' Narrative). These mortars were the first and last pieces to be lost. The best dates for the artillery losses are shown in the table on Page 34.

The lack of detail in the Williamson Journal concerning artillery losses during the Siege is understandable as Williamson was reporting those losses to Monro under separate correspondence. In LO 4061, Williamson relates losses and events of August 4th directly to Monro, but few of these events were subsequently included in his Journal.

Loudoun's removal of twelve artillery pieces from Fort William Henry in late 1757 was not just a simple reduction of a third in the number of artillery pieces present. Fully half the long-range cannon were removed and nearly two-thirds of the larger mortars and howitzers were taken to Fort Edward; only four out of the eleven howitzers and mortars remained to be counted in Collins' Inventory. Small-bore cannon, lacking the needed range, now formed fully half of the artillery. When the long-range pieces were lost to bursting, they could not be replaced with comparable pieces.

Seven of the letters written by Monro to Webb during the Siege were successfully delivered. At least one letter written by Monro on the 6th was lost and may never have been delivered. Before the surrender, only two letters from Webb had reached Monro — one via a ranger dated the 3rd and the second delivered by Montcalm (LO 5275; Final Letter Appendix). The second letter was dated the 4th but intercepted by the French and then presented to Monro on the 7th. Misinformation at the time of the surrender was exasperated by the physical separation of the Bastion and Entrenched Camp and made worse as all the senior officers were positioned in the Entrenched Camp. From the Furnis Letter, we know Captain Lieutenant MacLeod of the Royal Artillery spent considerable time at both the Bastion and the Entrenched Camp. MacLeod would have kept Monro informed of the conditions within the Bastion.

Fyre Journal (The Port Folio, Volume 7, 1819, Page 362; Tuesday, August 9th): "*Early this morning we had the misfortune to burst another mortar, so that we had only left in the fort, fit for use, two 6-pounders, one 9-pounder, two 4-pounders, one 7-inch mortar and one 7-inch howitz, with very few shot and shells that were fit for them.*"

Hays Journal (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Volume XXXVII, No. 157, Page 143): "*Col. Munro, after a Council of War had been convened, wherein the Officers were of the Opinion that the Loss of our heavy Cannon viz. 2, 32 pounders, 1, 24 pounders, two 18 pounders, one 9 pounder & 3 Mortars would render it impossible to defend the Fort much longer.*"

Neither of these last two entries is accurate. The accuracy of any narrative as regards the artillery is best judged by comparison to the Collins' Inventory, easily the best source, with allowance for the Entrenched Camp. Little in either of these statements conforms with Collins. Fully half of the artillery at Fort William Henry were 6-pounders or the even smaller 4-pounders. The lack of detail concerning the 6-pounders is annoying, especially as regards "*Transactions*" which seems to have entirely "forgotten" about these guns. The "*Transactions*" omission occurs in two locations, midway in the narrative describing the losses to bursting and the remaining artillery left to defend the position and then several pages later describing what artillery was surrendered to the French. Dates for gun losses must be compared to Monro's two letters of the 6th, best source. As regards the dates for the gun losses, the Fyre Journal and the Monro's letters are not a good match and are at odds over the dates for the losses of the 32-pounders and 18-pounders. Seemingly, the Fyre Journal jumbles the dates of the individual losses, but the identities and number of the cannon lost are near correct. The Fyre Journal also places 300 of the Massachusetts provincials in the Bastion, but the number and rank of the officers assigned strongly suggest only some 200 men were from Massachusetts.

The first brass 6-pounder that was lost was hit by French fire on the 6th: "*Since that time, there is another gun in the fort rendered useless by the Enemys' fire*" (LO 4041; Monro to Webb, Evening of the 6th). Unfortunately, Monro's single letter after the morning of the 6th does not discuss artillery and "*Transactions*" completely ignores the artillery positioned in the Entrenched Camp. After the 6th, the only British account that seems to have been written from the perspective of the Camp is the Frye Journal — the bulk of the entries for the Hays Journal best fit the Bastion. The Fyre Journal has a 12-pounder and a 6-pounder being lost on the 6th and again on the 7th:

Saturday, 6th August.

..... The whole of this day we kept constant fire upon the enemy from the fort; in doing which we were so unlucky as to burst one 18-pounder and one 12-pounder, and had one of our brass 6-pounders ruined by shot from the enemy.

This entry is a combination of events that occurred on the 5th and the 6th. Bellico notes a similar problem in the Hays Journal (Bellico 1995, Page 71, bottom footnotes). However, the Fyre Journal entry for the 7th injects considerable uncertainty into any accounting of the ordnance. The question becomes whether to accept this entry, reject the entry, or accept only a single gun bursting.

Sunday, 7th August.

..... The whole of this day a constant and very warm fire was kept up from the fort on the enemy's works, during which we burst one 12 and one 6-pounder.

If true and a second pair of guns burst on the 7th, the math mandates that the second pair were brass and from the Entrenched Camp. Regardless of the location or cause, the first lost brass 6-pounder was from the Collins Inventory; the second gun would be from the Young/Fyre Column.

Note: Subsequent French inventories allow the loss of a second brass 6-pounder on the 7th, but not a light 12-pounder. The French inventory of captured ordnance lists two brass pieces as being unfit, both from the Bastion, but the Collins Inventory shows the loss of only one brass piece. As it involves the brass guns, either the Collins Inventory, written a full month after the Siege, or the French Inventory is correct, not both (Table 2, Page 118). **For ease of discussion, the Collins Inventory is accepted.** As a further check, there is "room" in the French Inventories for bursting a brass 6-pounder on the 7th. That October, there were three older brass 6-pdrs at Fort St. Jean; one 6-pdr was lost to enemy fire; and one 6-pdr was given to Monro. This accounts for only five 6-pdrs, not six, the number of brass 6-pdrs known to be present. Between the Monongahela and Fort William Henry, six light 12-pdrs were lost to the French. The Fall 1757 Inventories from Carillon and Fort St. Jean show two and four light 12-pdrs, respectively; none are missing. This strongly argues that neither of the brass light 12-pdrs burst (See Figure 14A, Page 149). British Inventories of captured ordnance from 1760 hint that all the ordnance surrendered in the Camp were fit guns; there is no burst 6-pounder, only the gun lost to French fire (See Page 159).

"Fit" British Artillery Surrendered at Fort William Henry (Aug 9, 1757); 19 or 20 Pieces

One Iron 12-pounder – Bastion
Two Brass Light 12-pounds - Entrenched Camp
Two Iron 9-pounds - Bastion
Four Iron 6-pounds – Bastion
One Brass 6-pounds – Bastion (Collins Inventory)
Three or Four Brass 6-pounds - Entrenched Camp (Two Guns are from the Collins Inventory)
Four Iron 4-pounds – Bastion
One Iron 7 3/4-inch Howitzer – Bastion
One Iron 7 3/4-inch Mortar - Bastion

The accuracy of the French documents relating to the British artillery at Fort William Henry is high but greatly unappreciated. When compared to most British narratives and reports, the French documents appear to be wildly overstating the artillery and provisions surrendered, so they are often wrongly dismissed. In truth, the French documents are solid but widely misquoted and terribly jumbled by histories. The French report of the captured ordnance is near correct, but considerable care must be taken in analyzing the document and language (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 626; and Appendix Table 2, Page 118): List 1 = Bastion Inventory; List 2 = Entrenched Camp Inventory; and List 3 = Items brought to Carillon. However, all the List 3 Inventory also appears somewhere on List 1 or List 2 — not List 1 + List 2 + List 3, as so often done, double-counting nearly everything captured. Bellico (2010, Page 129) and Keagle (2018, Page 12) have

this correct. Among the British documents, only the Collins' Inventory is accurate as to the ordnance surrendered and only as regards the Bastion. Outside of the two brass 6-pounders sent from the Bastion to the Camp, which he carefully tracks and accounts for at the time of the surrender, Collins completely ignores the Entrenched Camp. A French Staff Journal lists "36 pieces of ordnance" being found (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 604 — this is the only French reference to the total fit captured). This matches to 19 pieces of artillery plus 17 swivels. How and where to account for the 6-pounder given to Monro by Montcalm is uncertain and likely a source of confusion in the French documents and writings.

From "*Transactions*": "*The Garrison of the Fort consisted at this time, of a Captain, Two Subalterns, and Sixty Regulars; with about One hundred and Fifty Sailors and Carpenters, but was afterwards augmented with Provincials, to about Four hundred.*" No other source suggests more than sixty sailors and carpenters (LO 4479 and LO 4367).

Steele concludes that "*Transactions*" may have been written by a civilian ordnance clerk positioned in the Bastion, James Nash. The Bougainville Journals (Page 177) lists four artillery clerks present, which would include Furnis, Nash, and Edward White. The annotated description of the source matches — "*by one of the Contractors for Provision Clerks.*" Verifying that a transcription error did occur removes one of the problems against an ordnance clerk being the author. However, the double omission around the 6-pounders (by far the most common gun in the inventory) does not help the argument that it was Nash, but neither does it bury the contention that was written by Nash. Nash worked for Furnis of the Board of Ordnance, who was known to be in the Bastion. It seems unlikely that if it was written by Nash, it would not have been first submitted and reviewed by Furnis, but then two ordnance "accountants" would have had to make the same missteps. Unfortunately, there is no logic path or breadcrumb trail that can be followed — eight 6-pounders just disappear. "*Transactions*" is entirely silent on the two brass 12-pounders, no mention whatsoever. The extra mortar is a minor problem, but unexpected. By withholding any consideration for the Entrenched Camp and "dropping" the 6-pounders, the "fit" artillery surrendered, as reported in "*Transactions*", is just 8 pieces. The Fyre Journal lists 7 fit pieces being surrendered from the "*fort*" without any comment or distinction of the Camp — only one gun difference between these two documents. This "7" is the number of many histories and narratives. Yet, when "*Transactions*" and the Fyre Journal are compared, the lists of fit guns surrendered are poor matches for each other. The correct number is at least 19 "fit" pieces surrendered — 14 in the Bastion and 5 or 6 in the Camp. As it was a report being submitted to the Army, "*Transactions*" not including an ordnance inventory at the start of the Siege is both unfortunate and a tad illogical. Without any additional records or narratives, the accounting discrepancies in "*Transactions*" appear to be simple human errors, even though their exclusion makes the better case for surrender — at least 10 fewer "fit" guns remaining than there were. As regards the size of the French Army, "*Transactions*" (Page 351) adopts the heavily inflated numbers that Webb is so often criticized as believing (12,000 versus the actual number of around 7,600 men). This strongly suggests a prior review by Webb's staff, if not more than a review.

Notably, "*Transactions*" validates Eyre's Design. At the time of surrender and following three days of bombardment, there were no breaches in the walls. There was damage to the top of several parapets, but in the evening before the surrender "*an Engineer was sent, to examine the Condition of the Fort; who found, (tho' the Fabrick was very little injured) from the state of the*

Artillery, Amunition & other Stores; it was no Longer Tenable; besides, the men had been without rest five nights, and were almost Stupefied." ("Transactions", Page 346). The Bastion was still relatively solid and had performed better than anticipated by some. Chief Engineer Montresor's opinion on July 27th had been *"it could not hold out twenty-four hours, if the French brought cannon against it"* (LO 4479). Then again, Loudoun did not have a high opinion of Montresor's abilities: *"But the Point I am weakest in is Engineers; Mr. Montresor, I dare not trust a Siege to"* (Loudoun to Cumberland, November 1756; MANA, Page 277 and Page 265). Following the surrender, Bougainville writes August 11-13: *"They (French) continued the demolition with much difficulty, the fort having been solidly built."*

The Bastion had been constructed of an inner and outer wall primarily of eastern white pine with some hemlock, fronting a broad core of earth backfill (Steele 1990, Pages 59 and 66). A third middle set of beams was added for additional strength (Figure 2). When mature, this pine can be truly massive both in height and girth. The resulting lower half of the rampart approached thirty feet in width, logs plus earth. Fronting the cannon, the upper parapet walls were fifteen feet thick. Although a soft wood and subject to quick rot, the characteristic wood structure of the eastern white pine promoted shot penetration with limited lateral splitting or fracturing of the logs that would have happened with a harder wood, like oak. The wood might be pulverized on impact, but the damage from any single shot impact was limited to a small area. There is some irony here, as Loudoun complained about the construction and materials used in the building of the Bastion with the choice of wood and poor caulking promoting rot — *"and from what I can yet Judge, will not last long before they are rotten and decayed: my opinion is, not above five or Six years, and I can see none, that imagine they will last above Seven Years."* (Loudoun to Cumberland, November 26, 1756; MANA, Page 266). From the narratives of both Williamson and Collins, damage from exploding shells and not solid shot was more feared and caused many more casualties. This is not unexpected. As regards Fort Carillon, Montcalm's Engineer-in-Chief, M. de Pontleroy, writes *"were I entrusted to the siege of it, I should only require six mortars and two cannon."* (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 720). Pontleroy's letter is short but includes a detailed description and critique of Carillon. In a similar vein, M. d'Hugues writes Marshal de Belle-Isle, Minister of War in Paris. Although a junior officer, d'Hugues assessment may reflect his experience during the Siege (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, May 1, 1758, Page 708):

"The forts in this country are ordinarily constructed only of pieces of timber one over another, in which cannon effects a practicable breach with more difficulty than in stone; therefore the forts such as they are now in Canada have been, and will be taken only by the force of shell; this would not be the case had not the bad habit prevailed of building forts too small at points where a place capable of resistance was required."

As an ordnance accounting, "Transactions" both educates and misinforms. Yet the main intent of "Transactions" is not the role of the artillery present, but the writing of a document that removes all avenues of criticism against any British officer or their leadership. The reason for the surrender is put squarely on the "bursting" of the ordnance and remaining low ammunition stores — simply described as *"not very considerable."* The number of artillery pieces that had both the range and hitting power to damage the first two French batteries has been reduced to no more than five: one 12-pounder, two 9-pounders, one 7 3/4-inch mortar, and one 7 3/4-inch howitzer. The two remaining light 12-pounders remained in the Entrenched Camp. The Bastion was not yet

critically damaged, but that was likely to change with the anticipated opening of an additional battery some 150 yards away, close enough to be considered a breaching battery (not 50 or 100 yards as in some documents, *e.g.*, LO 4198A). By the evening of the 8th, the French had completed a corduroy road across the fronting marsh and their trenchwork was now inside the garden where a new parallel was being dug. The orientation of this new parallel blocked any direct view or direct fire from the Bastion into the interior of the trench. This parallel “safely” reduced the distance to the Fort. Ideally, any French battery established in the garden would have been able to pound against the base of the Fort’s walls, forming a breach. The first two French batteries were beyond the range of any grapeshot. But once in the garden, the French would have been within grapeshot range of even the Fort’s small-bore cannon. Grapeshot could be especially effective against partially completed works or where men would be exposed. At the same time, the French were near finishing the construction of a third battery some 375 yards from the Fort (See G in Figure 5B, and H-I in Figure 6B). Any 18-pounders positioned here would have had the ability to wreck either the north or western parapets of the Bastion. Nearly everything about these “last” French batteries is badly mauled and jumbled in American and British histories, often combining and mixing elements of the third battery and the trenching in the garden. The source of the confusion is the Fyre Journal. No French cannon were ever positioned in the garden.

Note: Although the garden is not shown, Figure 5B offers a good representation of the final phase of trench work. Based on French narratives, this parallel closes the distance to the fort’s walls (O’Callaghan, Vol. X, 1858, Pages 604-651). The map is European and the authorship is credited to Lieutenant Therbu, Engineer. This map was published in *Les Plans De la guerre de Sept ans, Folgetitel contenant les Batailles, Combats, Prises de Villes, Camps*, an atlas illustrating key locales and battles of the Seven Years’ War, issued in parts between 1789-1791. There is no narrative describing the garden itself, particularly the distance to the western boundary, but it is featured on many maps. The French narratives offer nothing that is descriptive of the garden or its location. As it relates to the last stages of the French trenching, the mapping presented in the more recent histories does not join well with the accompanying narratives.

Bougainville Journal, Evening of Aug 7th: *“This night the workers continued the trench started the previous night, which they carried to within about 100 toises (\approx 215 yards) of the fort. They also started at the end of this trench another parallel for a battery and for musket men who will fire at the parapets on the front being attacked.”* The French have reached the garden’s edge.

Bougainville Journal, Evening of Aug 8th: *“This night they worked up out of the marsh by a trench giving communication to a parallel which was opened on the crest of a slope which borders this marsh. It is from this parallel, about 150 toises long (320 yds), that they should take off to establish the breaching batteries. The work was well advanced the same night, despite the fort’s fire which had never before been so lively.”* Construction of a parallel inside the garden.

O’Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 642, no credited author, French summary document: *“On the night of the 7th @ 8th, our working party was occupied constructing a road with a quantity of fascines across a swamp 30 toises in width (\approx 65 yards), which a hill protected from the guns of the fort.”*

The works on the night following were advanced to within about sixty toises of the fort (\approx 130 yards)."

Fascine = a bundle of wooden branches, compressed, and tightly tied. The French trenching reduced the distance to the fort and was now deep into the garden.

Hays Journal, Evening of August 8th: *“This night we could hear the Enemy at Work in our Garden, on which some Grape Shot was sent in amongst them, which had good Effect as it drove them off, however they had their 3rd Battery almost finished by Day Light.”* Two entirely different locations are discussed here, the garden and the third battery.

Bougainville to Paulmy, Department of War, Paris, O’Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 614: *“On the night of the 8th @ 9th we issued from the swamp by a boyau communicating with the second parallel which was opened on the crest of the acclivity. This parallel was to be the starting point to establish the batteries for effecting a breach, and by its prolongation to encompass the fort and cut off its communication with the intrenched camp which had been open until then. This work was considerably advanced that night, although the fire from the fort had never yet been so brisk.”* If needed, the French trenching will swing to the south, isolating the camp from the fort.

O’Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 650, no credited author, French summary document: *“In the night of the 8th and 9th the men issued from the swamp by a boyau communicating with the second parallel which was opened towards the crest of the hill, and pushed considerably forward in the night. This parallel was to form the starting point whence the breach batteries were to be set up, and, by prolonging it, the fort was to be enveloped and its communication with the intrenchment cut off which up to that time had been open. The besieged did not give time to carry this plan out. They hoisted the White flag at eight o’clock in the morning.”* In Bougainville’s Journal, this planned parallel is *“about 150 toises long”* (320 yds), information **not** found in O’Callaghan.

Bougainville Journal, Morning of August 9th: *“Two hundred workers were ordered to improve the work during the night. At seven in the morning the fort raised a white flag and asked to capitulate.”* The French remained secure in their trenches.

O’Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 604, no credited author, French summary document: *9th. At day-break the men of the working party found themselves sheltered by the lodgment established in the gardens and have been relieved by 300 who have completed it. Two soldiers were wounded during the night. Our artillery continued firing as usual; at 7 o’clock the fort hoisted the white flag, and the Commandant sent to demand permission to capitulate, which has been granted on the following conditions, to wit:* **Comment:** There is no mention of any breaching battery.

The Fyre Journal, this entry is inaccurate and the source of much confusion (Page 362):

Monday, 8th August

At day-break we found the enemy had been very industrious in their work the last night, having made a line of intrenchment from the west end of their first battery, extending about south near two hundred and fifty yards, to the garden, at the back of which they opened a third intrenchment of nine embrasures, but were constantly annoyed all day by the shot and shell from the fort, which they returned, and which did us great damage both in the fort and camp.

Tuesday, 9th August

With the day we discovered that the enemy had completed their work at the back of the garden, which had it begun to play on us would have been more serviceable to them than both their others, as it would certainly have obliged us to quit both the fort and the retrenched camp; this

last battery being within about one hundred and forty yards, or a little more, of the fort.” The construction of the third battery and the work in the garden are thoroughly confused and muddled — there is no battery in the garden. The phrase “*back of the garden*” is a near plague on histories.

Hays Journal, Tuesday 9th: *This Day, the Enemies Lines were finished, parallel to our West Curtain in the Garden, Distance about 150 Yards.* **Comment:** Here, a segment of the French earthwork was now developed in parallel to the west curtain wall.

Often the most recent histories will “map and keep” this last parallel at the back of the garden, some 200-250 yards from the fort. Outside of Frye, no narrative suggests the parallel was built on the garden’s edge. Conversely, nearly all the French and British narratives, including Fyre’s account, require that the French trenching enter the garden to close the distance to the fort’s walls. The distance of this new parallel from the fort is not well defined, but the Hays Journal and the oblique reference in O’Callaghan (Vol. X, May 1, 1758, Page 642) suggest the nearest trenching reached some 130-150 yards outside the Bastion. Bougainville is silent on this point. With Figure 5B, the option of adding a side-trench leading toward the center of the garden remains, but it is not explicit in the French narratives, so it is absent from Figure 5B. However, the breaching battery that is common to nearly all histories was not even begun; the French were still developing the garden trenching. None of the French narratives contain any mention of the actual construction of a breaching battery. The building of these batteries would have followed established methods and protocols; this work would not have been sloppy (See Cubbison 2014, Page 122). The construction of these batteries would have been extremely hazardous duty for any of the French troops, but the trenchwork clearly implied these batteries would be constructed soon. As important, the garden batteries would have moved the French mortar and shell fire to within a much more desirable distance of the Entrenched Camp — about 800 yards. Even without beginning the breaching batteries, the sheer amount of earthwork, roadbuilding, and trenching completed by the French on the 7th, 8th, and early on the 9th is beyond impressive.

The theme throughout “*Transactions*” is the British fought bravely with skill and resolve until forced to surrender by the lack of ordnance. By European standards, the British chose the appropriate time to surrender with full honors — the French had successfully developed a lodgment just outside the fort’s walls, the “capture” of the covered way. **Without exposing or risking his troops,** Montcalm did everything he could to convince the British it was time to surrender. The French could be generous in terms — the French did not suffer the casualties that would have occurred if compelled to construct breaching batteries or waste precious ammunition stores. To form these batteries, the French would have to move their 18-pounders forward and cross over the marsh (\approx 5,000 pounds British, barrels only). The third battery (\approx 375 yards) would have to have been opened to help protect the men building the breaching battery. Construction of a breaching battery would probably have taken an additional day, if not two days. From Duffy (1975, Page 116): “*It could take eighty men up to forty-eight hours to build a battery and lay down the platforms. Their final task was to mask the mouth of the embrasures with gabions or stout wooden boards, which were removed only when the order came to open fire.*”

In “*Transactions*”, there is no criticism of Webb or Monro, neither during the Siege nor for their poor preparation; the slow rebuilding of the fleet is not mentioned. Overall, the casualties during




Figure 8A. A Plan of Fort William Henry and the French Attaque Thereupon; National Archives of Canada. The scale at the bottom of the figure is to 600 yards. The garden extends some 250-270 yards beyond the fort's walls. The trenching in the garden is labeled e. This trenching only fronts the north and west bastions.

Upper Left Notes: A. Fort. B. Intrenchment. C. Garden. D. Bridge.

Upper Right Notes: Explanation for the Attack.

a. Where the French Landed. b. Battrie of 9 Canⁿ & 2 Mortars. c. Battrie of 10 Canⁿ & 3 Mort^s.

d. Intended for a Mortar Battrie. e. Beginning of an Approach of Gabions.

f. Generall Montcalms Camp w the main body.

g. Mon^r de la Corne & S^r Lukes (Lévis?) ____ With the Indians & Canadians.




Figure 8B, Modified Drawing. A Plan of Fort William Henry and the French Attaque Thereupon; National Archives Canada. The scale at the bottom of the figure is to 600 yards. The garden extends some 250-270 yards beyond the fort, but the garden's dimensions are sketchy, the western boundary may have been closer to the fort. In the original, the trenching in the garden is labeled "e" with the nearest French trenching being about 225 yards from the fort. Nearly all narratives, including those of the French, suggest the "e" trenching was considerably closer to the fort's walls with the Hays Journal having a French trench running roughly parallel to the west curtain. The "circle" in the center of the garden is a good measure of 150 yards from the fort's walls. The modification aligns with Bougainville Journal's entry for the evening of the 8th, but this interpretation only works with the careful use of "take off to establish". The segment of the trenching reaching the circle is a "take off to establish", not a parallel; it is **much less certain** and relies solely on British narratives. The red trenching near the lower "e" is needed to stage the excavation. Within the garden itself, much of this red trenching was still very narrow, 3-4 feet wide, better referenced as a sap. French narratives have the planned parallel arcing around to the south, effectively isolating the Bastion from the Camp. If a side-trench is added to Figure 5B, 5B will roughly conform with this interpretation. Green is the planned parallel extension, if needed. This is Bougainville's 320-yard parallel (Bougainville Journal, Evening of 8th); \approx the distance to the fort (215 yards) plus the fort's length itself (100 yards). The goal is to isolate the Fort from the Camp.

the actual siege were light — "*the number killed during the Siege did not exceed Eighty; of which Ten were killed in the Fort (Bastion)*" (*Transactions*, Page 351). Most of those killed were provincial troops lost in sorties launched from the Entrenched Camp, particularly on the 4th and on the 7th following the conclusion of the parley. Bougainville describes this last clash as a "*useless affair*" (*Bougainville Journal*, Page 167). The British regulars had only four officers wounded with none being killed (LO 4313A) — Young, Ormsby, Conyngham, and Lt. Gillin of the New York Independents. Young was a protégé and close friend to Loudoun; he would be captured outside of Quebec at the Battle of Sainte-Foy, the last French victory in North America (April 1760). About 630 members of the 35th were at the Siege, the remainder were at Fort Edward. Within the 35th, 15 rank & file were killed; 2 officers and 7 rank & file wounded; and 1 sergeant, 2 drummers, and 60 rank & file were listed as missing on August 25th (LO 4313A and LO 4309). The 60th had 4 rank & file killed, 1 officer and 4 rank & file wounded with 31 rank & file missing on August 25th. As regards the Siege, casualties among the provincials were estimated at four officers and about forty men killed with about the same number wounded, half each from Massachusetts. However, the numbers here are not fully comparable as Monro's provincial estimate seems limited to events before the surrender and is not referenced to August 25th. The French list 112 British casualties as it relates to the Siege — 41 killed and 71 wounded (Steele 1990, Pages 134 and 227). The French estimate does not include the later attacks on the hospital or the retreating British column.

After the surrender, the best estimate of those killed is between 69 and 184 individuals including civilians (Steele 1990, Page 144). Between September and December, some 220 of the missing returned — many boarding ship in Quebec and landing at Halifax (LO 6795). Another 120 - 240 people were taken as captives to Canada and not immediately returned. At the end of the year, Steele (1990, Page 139) estimates that the killed and still missing at 308 individuals, post-surrender. Forty of these individuals are thought to have been subsequently returned and another 40 dying in captivity. About 50 of the remaining people were last known to be with the French. The fates of this last group and the others remain unknown, about 230 individuals. In November, 26 soldiers of the 35th are "joined" to the regiment — these men returning from capture (LO 6751). Unfortunately, the earlier Returns from September and October leave this column blank. During the march to Fort Edward, both the 60th and the Independent Regular Companies suffered much more so in proportion to their numbers than did the 35th. Post-surrender, Steele (1990, Page 135) lists the killed and missing for the 60th at 23 men and 19 men for the Independents. These numbers are very close to the number lost from the much larger 35th with only 27 men (these numbers being for the end of December). Although armed when leaving Fort William Henry, the British marched without powder or lead. Interestingly, twenty percent of the British regulars managed to reach Fort Edward still carrying their muskets, but only four percent still carrying their bayonets (LO 4309). The blame for the subsequent massacre is squarely placed on the French and "*Montcalms wilful neglect, of sending a sufficient Guard.*" Jennings (1988, Page 316) is brutally critical of Montcalm.

Although a whitewash of British leadership, "*Transactions*" is accurate in that the condition of the remaining ordnance fully and completely justified the surrender. All or nearly all shot and shell for any serviceable artillery larger than a 6-pounder had been expended. Webb is first referenced in the sixth line of the original text as the "*General*", once with reference to "*Thoughts*

of the Generals speedy arrival", and then next in the last sentence of the thirteen-page document: "And as General Webb, never had it in his Power, to send a number sufficient for our relief; he shwe'd great wisdom in not sending any." Notably, "Transactions" includes the exact same language as the infamous letter of the 4th that is frequently used to condemn Webb: "The General thought proper to give you this Intelligence that in case he should be so unfortunate from delays of the Militia not to have it in his Power to give you timely assistance you might be able to make the best Terms left in your Power". The inclusion of these two passages further suggests editing or actual authorship of "Transactions" by Webb's staff. This last passage was evidently seen as benign and reasonable by the person writing "Transactions", not the intensely volatile statement suggesting surrender it became. Webb's Aide-de-Camp, Captain Bartman would seem to be the logical candidate. Bartman was at Fort William Henry as part of Webb's inspection in late July (LO 3994; Final Letter Appendix). As Steele argues, someone familiar with the Bastion's artillery likely helped. A viable path of authorship would be either Furnis, Nash, and/or Williamson being "interviewed" by Bartman and then Bartman authoring the letter without a subsequent review by anyone, too many errors involving the artillery. Notably, the casualty estimate for the Siege itself is accurate. The letter was scribed from a draft to a final document but then proofed. The penmanship in "Transactions" is stellar, it is not in Bartman's hand. Nash may have well delivered the letter. If it was authored by Webb's staff and as it relieves Webb of any blame or fault, there is logic in deliberately obscuring authorship. The errors involving the 6-pounders remain frustratingly unresolved without progress. Wisely, Loudoun chose not to publish or distribute "Transactions"; it lingered in his private papers until published by Ian Steele in 1992 – any distribution would have only inflamed the colonial resentment building against the British Army, particularly Webb. In Webb's view, "Transactions" was a vindication of his efforts. After receiving Webb's letter of August 5th where Webb faults Loudoun's overall strategy (LO 4081), Loudoun had no intention of trying to formally blame Webb for the debacle, but neither was he going to provide any cover or support to Webb by releasing *Transactions*.

Copies of other correspondences scribed beautifully include LO 4041 (Siege Letters of Monro to Webb/Bartman, August 3rd - 8th) and LO 4170 (A Return of the Officers who are Included in the Capitulation, August 9th). The scripts in LO 4041 and LO 4170 are similar to "Transactions" (LO 6660). Altogether, the evidence suggests the same person may have scribed all three documents and that person was on Webb's staff as a clerk.

Except for Williams (2017), recent histories have relied too heavily on the Fyre Journal for both ordnance and various timelines. This is somewhat understandable as the Fyre Journal provides nearly "everything" needed. Parkman (1914) does not adopt this approach, offering only a brief description of the actual siege events. Williams (2017) ignores both Fyre's and Hays' timelines. The strength of the Fyre and Hays Journals lies in the narrative and color provided. The lack of authority given to Collins and Williamson is somewhat puzzling, but it may be related to their being housed at the Huntington Library and Canadian Archives without publication. Where there is conflict between sources, the Collins and Williamson Journals are much more solid and cannot be dismissed or ignored. Monro's letters of the 6th support Williamson's account and negates Fyre's timeline of the artillery losses. No "errors" are associated with Collins' or Williamson's writings, just long and frustrating omissions. Correcting the inventory and dates of the artillery losses would not change the larger narrative and events in any appreciable way but removing the inconsistencies and conflicts over the smaller details would be most welcome.

c. Loudoun's Expedition

As Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America, Loudoun had the authority to suggest a theater-wide strategy and had the protection and support of the Duke of Cumberland, the youngest son of King George. With the rise of Pitt, Cumberland's influence was markedly reduced, and Loudoun's independence curtailed. The determination of strategy and campaign priorities would now lie solely with London. Under Pitt, London would dictate strategy and troop allocations; the theater commanders would be responsible for the execution, but it was not until after the failures of 1757 that Pitt managed to gather that level of control. In Winter 1756-1757, Loudoun had more influence, but he was not independent of London. There was considerable oversight, but in response to Loudoun's own proposals, not in driving or developing those proposals. Soon after reaching America, Loudoun became convinced that Quebec itself should be the primary goal of the next Campaign (Loudoun to Cumberland, October 2 and October 3, 1756; MANA, Pages 233 and 239). Much of Loudoun's mindset is easiest seen in these two letters. These ideas were fixed. Both these letters are fully transcribed, Final Letter Appendix.

Loudoun's plans were approved at the highest levels including his battalion and regimental assignments for New York, where he would be leaving only two regiments of regulars under Webb. When developing the theater plans for 1757, Loudoun thought compelled to use only those troops he knew he had command over; he did not develop plans based on troops he did not have or assume additional regiments would be forthcoming. Authored by Loudoun himself, this approach was limiting, burdensome, and fatally flawed. He should have secured his defensive needs and then took whatever remaining resources to the offense; and if those were found lacking on offense, make his case for reinforcements. Instead, he secured his offensive needs first and whatever was leftover had to form the defense, however thin. Loudoun fully knew of the risks.

Loudoun's battalion assignments had assumed that the British would have firm control of Lake George with the 4-sloop "navy" intact, but Loudoun did have the authority to reduce the regiments assigned to the Expedition and leave additional troops in New York under Webb (Pargellis 1933, Page 235). Loudoun chose not to do so. Against Quebec - Louisbourg, Loudoun was taking the recently arrived 22nd, the 42nd, the 44th, the 48th, the 2nd battalion of the 60th, and the 4th battalion of the 60th. These troops embarked from New York in mid-June and arrived at Halifax at the end of June. The 40th, 45th, and 47th were already in Nova Scotia but understrength (LO 4394). In the early planning stages, these nine battalions were the only regiments Loudoun had available for the 1757 campaign against Louisbourg and Quebec with around 5,800 men. For scouting and reconnaissance, Loudoun was bringing three companies of Rogers' Rangers, but he was seriously short of engineers and men of the Royal Artillery. The single remaining company of Rogers' Rangers would serve under Monro.

Cumberland and Secretary of State Henry Fox worked on Loudoun's behalf. In early November 1756, thirteen transports carrying more of the 22nd Regiment and drafts (transfers) from other regiments left Ireland for Halifax (LO 3004, Loudoun to Pitt, March 10, 1757, and MANA, Page 292). Storms in transit separated the fleet. Eight of the transports arrived directly at New York, not Halifax. Three transports docked at Philadelphia and one transport reached port in Antigua before heading north to South Carolina. The final transport was captured by the French, some crew and men were taken off and the transport was allowed to proceed to Philadelphia after

signing capitulation papers. Mid-winter, somewhere around 2,000 regulars were brought to North America in these transports. These men were slated to fill out the newly arrived 22nd, the understrength 40th, 45th, and 47th regiments long based in Nova Scotia, and two battalions of the newly created 60th. Where Pitt refers to 2,000 men being sent to North America in his various letters, it is these men (LO 3004, Final Letter Appendix). From Loudoun to Cumberland, January 5, 1757 (LO 2637 and MANA, Page 290):

"I have received M^r. Fox's Letter, Acquainting me, with Major General O'Farrell's Regiment, and the twenty-four additional Companies from Ireland, being ordered here. I shall immediately compleat Major General O'Farrells Regiment, out of the additional Companies."

Loudoun was unsure of his transports (Pargellis 1933, Pages 236 and 265). These men may have continued to Halifax; the ships returning to New York being retained for use in the spring. Whether in New York or Halifax, Loudoun needed to ensure these 2,000 men were placed in winter quarters and properly fed. With the arrival of the 2,000 men, Loudoun had at least 7,800 men already in North America and slated for the Expedition.

Throughout the winter, Loudoun would have been in contentious negotiations with the various colonial governments concerning the quartering of troops, future commitments, and various provincial quotas (Pargellis 1933; Chapter VI: The Temper of Colonial Assemblies). The provincial bodies hammered back under the guise of perceived rights, especially as it relates to quartering troops, and with regards to London funding all costs. In England, the quartering of troops was restricted by law to Public Houses. This worked as there were enough Public Houses in England to accommodate any need. However, there were not enough Public Houses in Scotland, and the law there allowed for quartering in Private Houses. The number of Public Houses available in America to house troops was far below the need, similar to the situation in Scotland; yet the provincial assemblies wanted English law to be applied. In Loudoun's opinion, much of the friction he faced was the direct consequence of William Shirley acquiescing the King's authority to the colonial legislatures — Shirley being the previous Commander in Chief, but also Governor of Massachusetts. Loudoun held strict views on authorities and despised the slow intricacies of the provincial governments.

On December 4, 1756, Pitt becomes Secretary of State of the Southern Department which included responsibilities for the American Colonies and relations with Catholic and Muslim Europe. Southern England, Ireland, and Wales were also under the Southern Department. The Northern Department included Northern England, Scotland, and the Protestant European Countries. Pitt had replaced Henry Fox and had excluded the still very influential Newcastle from the Government. Pitt kept Cumberland at arm's length, but Cumberland remained Commander in Chief of the Army. For the 1757 Campaign, it was Pitt's routine to write Loudoun and each of the relevant Governors on the same day with Loudoun's letters being longer and containing more detailed information. The Final Appendix contains the full transcription of ten or so letters from Loudoun, Pitt, and Cumberland that relate to the 1757 Louisbourg Campaign.

From LO 2383, Pitt to Loudoun, December 22, 1756:

The King having taken into His Most serious Consideration, the Dangers to which His Majesty's Colonies stand exposed from Our late Losses in those Parts, and the Supplies of Forces,

Artillery, Stores, and Provisions, which the French have sent, and are sending to North America, His Majesty thinks it absolutely necessary to cause a Plan of vigorous and offensive Operations to be concerted, without Loss of Time, and executed under your Lordship's Direction, as early as possible, in the ensuing critical and important Campaign. For this Purpose, Orders will be shortly given for an Expedition of Weight consisting, if possible, of 8000 Land Forces with a sufficient Squadron of Ships of War; 2000 of the said Forces will be forthwith sent to Halifax, without waiting for the Remainder, which will follow with the utmost Dispatch: Your Lordship therefore cannot be too early in taking such Steps, as may effectively enable you to supply this Body of Troops, upon their Arrival, with Provisions, and all other Requisites, incident to the Expedition of this Importance and Extent, upon which I shall, probably, very soon receive His Majesty's Commands to send you fuller Explanations and Instructions, as to Its' immediate Object, and Execution:"

The early March receipt of this letter is known from LO 3004 (Loudoun to Pitt, March 10, 1757): *"I had the honor of receiving your Letters of December 7th and 22nd, on the road from Boston."*

Quietly, Cumberland had lobbied for additional reinforcements. Pitt held a similar view. Cumberland knew Pitt's initial letter lacked the specifics necessary to prepare a campaign and felt compelled to provide Loudoun with more information. From Cumberland to Loudoun, December 23, 1756 (MANA, Page 262):

most private,

St James Dec^r 23^d, 1756.

"my Lord Loudoun, I write this private Letter to you to assure you of the thorough Satisfaction your Conduct has given me & will not fail to support you to the utmost, of my Power through the many difficulties you find in the executing of your orders & in opposition to the public Service.

Nothing can be worst that our Situation here at home, without any Plan, or even a Desire to have one. great Numbers talked of to be Sent you, but without any Consideration of how, & whence, without considering what they Should carry with them. But, that you may know what can be done for you, I write in my own Hand, trusting to your Honour that you will burn this as Soon as read.

The King will Spare you five old Battalions from Europe & two thousand new raised Highlanders, which will make 6,000: men, officers included: & I will Send a proper Train of Artillery with them. Prepare your own Plan for one army up the S^t Lawrence River, & for the other to keep your enemy in check, from where your army now is. I will Send you my Thoughts more fully with a Plan of mine for your operations, which you Shall be left at Liberty, either to adopt, in part, or not at all, as you Shall find it proper, from your better Information. I don't doubt a moment of your burning this Letter. So don't answer it; but Send your Plan & Thoughts without taking any Notice of this most private Letter. I remain very Sincerely your most affectionate Friend."

Loudoun would not have received this all-important letter until sometime in March or April when he would have been deep into the details of moving the regiments already in America to Halifax, but it did give Loudoun the impression that the core of this plan for an attack on Quebec had been

approved in London. Adding the troops then in North America, the numbers now available to Loudoun suggest a Campaign of 12,000 men. Throughout March and April, Loudoun was still working under the idea that he was free to attack Quebec. Loudoun's letter to Pitt, dated March 10th, still has Quebec as the focus of the Campaign without any mention of Louisbourg. The letter also illustrates Loudoun's intentions for New York under Webb (LO 3004; Loudoun to Pitt, New York, March 10, 1757. The complete letter is part of the Final Letter Appendix):

"I have formed this Plan, on the Information you have given me, of His Majesty's Intentions, of sending out 8000 Men, with a sufficient Squadron of Ships of War; And that the Plan I formally proposed, in a great Measure, Coincides with the Intentions of His Majesty's Ministers; from where I have no doubt, that these Intentions are, an attack on Quebec, by the River St. Lawrence; in which case I propose, for the Security of this Country, under the Command of M^r. Webb, first, for the Defence of Fort William Henry & Fort Edward, and the Security of the Magazines at Albany, the 35th. Regiment, Commanded by Lieutenant Gen^l Otway, and a Battalion of the Royal American Regiment with the Provincial Troops; And the four Independent Companies on the Mohawk River; And I have provided Carriages for their Provisions, and I think, every thing necessary for their Support."

Political persuasion was not a strength often exhibited by Loudoun. Unlike Shirley, colonial assemblies viewed Loudoun as fundamentally unsympathetic to colonial sensitivities. Yet, as Commander in Chief in North America, he did have considerable authority and could not be dismissed or ignored by the assemblies. The individual governors walked a fine line, appointed by London, but now having to work with their colonial assemblies daily. In Loudoun's view, he did not have the power to open the Treasury; something Loudoun would accuse Shirley of doing on behalf of the colonial assemblies. Pitt would use this power of the Treasury to ease relations. His own writings suggest Loudoun lacked an appreciation of those issues that were trivial and those issues that demanded a firmer hand. Although contentious, Loudoun was able to finish the bulk of the negotiations as regards the provincial regiments and their numbers by mid-March. He was then free to focus on the specifics of the upcoming campaign (LO 3004).

Rear Admiral Francis Holburne was given the task of protecting and escorting the British Expedition to Louisbourg. His first charge was to transport 6,000 additional British regulars from Europe to Halifax. Bad weather now began to plague the British. Holburne's Fleet was trapped in Liverpool by headwinds for eight weeks from February 17 to April 16th (59 days). Mail from Europe to America was delayed as well, but the mail delivery from America to Europe would not have been delayed. Even in agreeable weather, because of the nature of the currents in the Atlantic, the time for mail to travel from America to Europe was weeks shorter than the reverse; but the now critical communications were nearly all in the direction of Europe to America. No letters of importance seemed to have been written that January; Pitt's burst of communications starts in early February. For at least two months, March and April, Loudoun was waiting on directions from London without receiving any correspondence. The delay in the mail was critical to Loudoun, forcing him to work with what scant orders he had in his possession. In a letter started April 25, 1757 (MANA, Page 343), Loudoun states:

"The last Packet bringing nothing but Duplicates of Letters of December was a very great Disappointment to me, as they contain only a Promise of a Plan which I am to prepare for before

it arrives or before where I am to meet the Reinforcements, so that I do not see a Possibility of moving till the next Letters arrive and the Season is advanced."

The month of May would prove pivotal to Loudoun. After months with little direction from London, orders from Pitt would arrive both for Loudoun and the various Governors.

From LO 2765 (Pitt to Loudoun, February 4, 1757, See the Final Appendix for complete letter):

My Lord,

Whitehall 4th. Febry 1757.,

By my former Dispatch of 22^d December your Lordship will have been informed of The King's Intentions, to send, early in the Year, an Embarkation of Land Forces, consisting, if possible, of 8,000 Men, and a strong Squadron of Ships of War, to N. America.

I am now commanded by His Majesty, to acquaint your Lordship, that the Preparations for this Expedition are making with all Diligence, and that It is hoped, that the Second Battalion of the Royals (2nd Battalion of 1st Foot), augmented to the Number 1,000 Men, and the Six Regiments mentioned in the Margin, consisting Each of 815 Men, Officers included, all which are ordered for Embarkation together with a Train of Artillery, Ordnance, Stores, Six Engineers, and Four Companies of the Regiment of Artillery, will sail from Cork the last Days of this Month, for Halifax. Two Battalions, now raising in the Highlands, consisting of 1000 Men Each, under the Command of Lieut. Colonel Montgomery, and Lieut. Col. Fraser. It is also hoped, will be ready to follow, by the very beginning of April.....

As there is the greatest Reason to believe, that the several Corps already under your Lordship's Command, are, or may be very soon, compleat: and that, together with the above Reinforcement, from Ireland, of Seven Battalions, they will form, early in the Spring, an Army of near 17,000 Men, His Majesty doubts not, but with such a Force, supplied with Artillery, and supported with a strong Squadron, your Lordship will find yourself in a Condition to push, with the utmost Vigor, and offensive War, and to effectuate some great and essential Impresions on the Enemy. The King is of Opinion, that the taking of Louisbourg, and Quebeck, can alone prove decisive; but as the Success of both Enterprises may depend on Circumstance, not to be known here, His Majesty is pleased to leave some Latitude to your Lordship's Discretion and Judgement, to decide on the Time and Manner of Carrying these Attempts into Execution: Nevertheless, I am to acquaint your Lordship, that The King depending on your known Ability, and great Zeal for His Service, expects the utmost Activity & Vigour in this critical, & important Campaign: It is therefore His Majesty's pleasure, that your Lordship should forthwith so dispose the Forces, now in America; and make all such necessary Preparations of Victuals, and Transports, and all other Requisites, for the same; as well as obtain, by all possible Means, the best Intelligences, & Informations, relative to Louisbourg, and to the Navigation of the River S^t. Lawrence to Quebeck, as may enable your Lordship, on the Arrival of the Reinforcement from Ireland, immediately to attack Louisbourg with such a Force, by Sea & Land, as may be judged sufficient to carry that important Fortres;

This letter arrived on May 1st, nearly a full three months after it was written — 86 days in transit (MANA, Page 349). At the beginning of May, there were three concentrations of British troops involved in the Campaign. Three battalions were in Halifax (40th, 45th, and 47th), a half dozen

battalions in New York or Albany (22nd, 42nd, 44th, 48th, and two battalions of the 60th), and the seven battalions still in Ireland.

The size of the forces slated for the Campaign has now "officially" grown, some 13,000 men in 16 battalions. Pitt now mandates that Louisbourg be taken first before proceeding to Quebec. Loudoun has no option but to acquiesce and redirect his plans. When this letter arrived in early May, Loudoun's total focus was on the logistics of moving the regiments he had in New York to Halifax; all the while, providing the assembled regiments in Halifax the food, ordnance, and equipment that would be needed. Loudoun realized he had no time or means to protest Pitt's orders and accepted that Louisbourg would be the first operation of the 1757 Campaign. Loudoun threw himself totally into solving the logistical problems. He had less than a month before the true start of the campaign season.

From Britain and Ireland, Pitt was sending the 2nd Battalion of the 1st, 17th, 27th, 28th, 43rd, 46th, and 55th Foot to Halifax (Pargellis 1933: Page 109). Instead of sending five older regiments and two new Highlander regiments per Cumberland's letter of December, Pitt was sending seven older regiments with the two new Highlander regiments arriving in late summer. At least Loudoun now knows the identities of seven of the regiments being sent. No specific information is provided on when these battalions would be arriving at Halifax, but if leaving Cork in late February as the letter of February 4th suggests, these battalions were slated to arrive sometime in early or mid-May. There is no mention of any of these reinforcing regiments in MANA until after Loudoun arrives at Halifax in late June.

From Pitt to Loudoun, LO 2859, February 19, 1757. Received by Loudoun, May 11, 1757 (reference MANA, Page 349; and Final Letter Appendix):

My Lord,

Whitehall Feb^y 19th: 1757.

Your Lordship's Letters of the 22^d of November, and 26th December, and the 4th past, were received the 11th instant, and immediately laid before the King.

Your Lordship is, I hope, already informed, by the Letter of the 4th. instant (of which I send a Triplicate by this Conveyance) of the Reinforcement, His Majesty has been pleased to send to North America, in order to enable your Lordship to act offensively, in Consequence of your Lordship's Representations, concerning the Difficulty and Inutility of a Defensive War in those Parts; And the King's Views and Intentions are so fully explained in my Letter above mentioned, that I have Nothing to add on that Subject, but to inform your Lordship that Major Gen^l Hopson has been ordered to command the Battalion, and Six Regiments to be embarked at Cork, during their Passage to America, where he is to act under your Lordship, as Major General. I am also to transmit to your Lordship the inclosed additional Instructions, which His Majesty has been pleased to sign, for your Conduct, in the Execution of the joint Operations to be carried on between the Land and Sea Forces, and Distribution of such Booty as may be taken from the Enemy, in this Expedition: all which have been prepared conformable to what has been the practice on like Occasions. Rear Admiral Holburne, whom the King has been pleased to appoint to command the Fleet in North America, has also similar Instructions; and His Majesty's does not doubt, but there will be that entire Harmony, between your Lordship and the Admiral, as cannot but have the best Effect in the Execution of your joint Commissions.

Your Lordship will see, by the inclosed List of the Artillery, and Ordnance Stores, embarked for this Expedition, that Care has been already taken, for sending a Number of Brafs Cannon of 24 Pounders and 13 Inch Mortars, which your Lordship, in your Letter represents as absolutely necessary: One Bomb Ketch, which was prepared before your Letters were received will proceed with the Fleet; And as your Lordship represents the great Utility of those Vefels, two more Sloops were immediately ordered to be fitted for that purpose, and will follow, as soon as they can be got ready; And as these are the only Vefels, in the King's Service, it is hoped, no material Inconvenience will arise from the Number being one short of what your Lordship desired: And Rear Admiral Holburne being empowered to retain, or discharge, the Transports from England, as he shall in Conjunction with your Lordship, think most expedient, it is hoped, no Delay will arise, tho' you should not be able to procure a sufficient Number of Vefels in America.

The Fleet being so near sailing does not allow me to answer, particularly, some Points contained in your Lordship's Dispatches; but I would not delay giving your Lordship the Satisfaction of knowing, that the King entirely approves your Conduct in the Execution of your extensive Command. The Ranging Companies, your Lordship proposes to keep up, must certainly be of great Use; and His Majesty is pleased to allow your Lordship to raise such a Number of them, as you shall judge necessary for the Service.

This letter of February 19th reached Loudoun on May 11th (MANA, Page 349). Loudoun now knew the reinforcements being sent from Europe would arrive at Halifax no sooner than early June, buying Loudoun a few weeks more time to focus on the logistics, but at the cost of losing weeks of the Campaign window. In the end, this was a decidedly poor trade. Loudoun now learns for the first time that Holburne would be leading the Fleet. This February 19th letter represented the last chance to provide any useful details that Loudoun could act upon regarding the nature of the support being sent from Europe and avoid duplicating efforts. Outside of vague reference to the inclusion of 13-inch mortars and 24-pounders, Pargellis argues that Loudoun had no idea of the nature of the siege train being sent from Europe and that the Board of Ordnance did not send any itemized list, even though the letter itself states otherwise (Pargellis 1933, Page 233).

Likewise, Loudoun only knew of a single additional senior officer that was being sent to augment his small staff — Major General Peregrine Hopson. Hopson had ten years of experience in Nova Scotia having served as the colonel of the 29th Foot and as Governor (1752-1755), but he had to resign the governorship because of severe eye problems. Hopson had served in the Army for at least forty-five years and was near seventy years of age. In 1703, he served as a lieutenant in the Marines. Unknown to Loudoun, Pitt would also be sending Lord Charles Hay (Pargellis 1933, Page 234). Hay was both aggressive and difficult. If he had known that both these officers were being sent to Halifax, there is a good chance Loudoun would have left James Abercromby at Albany (Loudoun to Cumberland, March 8, 1757; MANA, Page 317).

In late February 1757, Pitt was on shaky ground and not in total control of all aspects of the Government. Outside the Government, Newcastle and Cumberland still held considerable sway. Several weeks later, Cumberland forced Pitt to relent some authority. Pitt appended his orders to Loudoun on March 17th, but the wording of the letter still makes clear Pitt's strong preference for the attack on Louisbourg (LO 3076). March 17th is also the date of Rigaud's Winter Raid and the loss of the Lake George "navy". As it was, Holburne reached St. Helens (Liverpool) in February.




Figure 9. From *The History of the Late War in North America* by Thomas Mante (1772). The British Dilemma: From Ticonderoga (Carillon), the French can advance via Lake George attacking Fort William Henry; or south via Wood Creek attacking Fort Edward. Fort Edward is key to defending Albany, not Fort William Henry. The French need only to defend Ticonderoga. Bateaux can navigate about halfway up Shone Creek (Halfway Brook) to Fort Anne (not shown). The trail from Fort Edward to Fort Anne is shown — the trail immediately west of the large swamp. The path taken by Dieskau (1755) is shown. Trails to the east and west of Lake George and Wood Creek do not exist in 1757 or are Indian trails, such as that taken by Levis' Column, starting south on July 30th. Crown Point is Fort Saint-Frédéric.

By February 17th, he was fully prepared to sail for Cork (Pargellis 1933: Page 236). Headwinds stopped his sailing for Ireland until April 16th. Holburne arrived at Cork on April 25th, embarked the regiments, and then set sail on May 8th for Halifax. After seventy-two days at sea, these seven battalions arrived at Halifax on July 9th. A full two months were lost. The last orders received by Loudoun arrived with Holburne that day, 114 days in transit.

From LO 3076 (Pitt to Loudoun, March 17, 1757; received by Loudoun, July 9, 1757):

My Lord,

Whitehall 17th: March 1757.

I have the King's Commands to explain, in this letter, some Parts of the Instructions, that have been lately sent to your Lordship, for your Conduct, in the next Campaign.

By my Letter of the 4th: past, your Lordship is directed to begin with an Attack upon Louisburgh, and to proceed, in the next Place, to Quebeck; The King still thinks those two Places the great Objects of Offensive Operations for the Ensuing Campaign in America, and judges that Taking Louisburgh to be the more practicable Enterprize: His Majesty, nevertheless, is pleased to leave it to your Lordship to use your Discretion, with regard to which of the Two abovementioned Attempts, you shall judge it most Advisable first to proceed..... (Final Letter Appendix).

Loudoun now had the authority to choose either Quebec or Louisbourg as the first target of the Campaign. With half the Campaign season already lost and fully prepared to move on Louisbourg, any last-minute shift back to Quebec seems unrealistic.

In Spring 1757, Pitt's political troubles worsened and his relations with the King were exhausted. Pitt then lost his office as Southern Secretary in early April 1757. He regained his office in July 1757, but this time in a coalition with Newcastle that would last until 1761. Pitt directed foreign policy and military matters. Newcastle would manage the treasury, finances, and patronage. Pitt was absent for three months — April, May, and June, but all the subsequent events related to the Campaign had already been put into motion; there is little that Pitt could have done to change things, even if he still held the office. From July to mid-September, Loudoun is working and corresponding under the assumption that the Earl of Holderness is Southern Secretary, not Pitt.

Pitt had kept his word to Loudoun, the reinforcements and men being sent fully matched his letter of December 22nd (LO 2383), if not more. With Holburne's arrival at Halifax, the full promise of 8,000 regulars had been achieved. Four companies of the Royal Artillery (some 320 men) would serve the artillery train. The ordnance delivered was appreciable and deep in brass guns — eighteen heavy brass 24-pounders, twelve heavy brass 12-pounders, four light brass 6-pounders, four royal 5 1/2-inch howitzers, two 13-inch mortars, two 10-inch mortars, four 8-inch mortars, and thirty coehorns (4 2/5-inch mortars) (Pargellis 1933, Page 233).

By mid-July 1757, there were 16 battalions of British regulars gathered in Nova Scotia. There were only three other battalions of regulars anywhere in North America, the 1st and 3rd of the 60th, and the 35th Foot, all of which were dispersed and assigned to multiple postings. On August 24th, the 78th (Fraser's Highlanders) arrived at Halifax from the British Isles, several weeks after the expedition had been canceled. The 77th (Montgomery's Highlanders) leaves Ireland on June 30 and sails directly to South Carolina, arriving on September 3rd (Cubbison 2010: Page 19). Nine battalions were new to North America. All told, some 11,500 men had

been sent to North America in 1757. This would include 3,600 drafts (transfers) to reinforce the existing regiments, including the 35th Foot. After August 1757, there was a change in policy. Transfers would be recent recruits to their parent regiments and not veteran soldiers or the regimental castoffs (Ligonier to Cumberland; August 3, 1757; MANA, Page 386).

By directly attacking Quebec in Summer 1757, Loudoun hoped to curtail the possibility of the French conducting any offensive campaign. Montcalm would be limited to defending Quebec City. This is the foundation for all of Loudoun's plans. Following Pitt's order to Loudoun to first take Louisbourg before advancing on Quebec, no one in the British command structure seems to have reevaluated the basic assumption that the French in Quebec would be still prevented from taking the offensive. Loudoun was ready to sail to Halifax on June 5th.

Because of rumors of a French Fleet off North America, Loudoun does not leave the Sandy Hook anchorage off New York until June 20th and does not arrive at Halifax until June 30th, four weeks later than he originally planned. Loudoun was not actually late; the British Fleet from Europe would not arrive in Halifax until nine days later on July 9th. Loudoun's strategy of shielding New York from a French advance depended on demonstrating a true threat to Quebec by mid-July. Loudoun's timetable was now in shambles and Montcalm was free to advance south. In this sense, Webb's less-than-subtle criticism of Loudoun's overall strategy was valid (LO 4081; Final Letter Appendix).

From Loudoun to Henry Fox, Secretary of State Southern Department, November 22 - December 26, 1756 (CO 5/48 001):

The next consideration will be a Fleet sufficient to protect those troops in the Transports, for without that, they would probably never arrive at Quebeck: and if they did, and Succeeded in the Siege, they might be blockt up there without a possibility of returning; And if that Fleet is not ready at Halifax early to proceed, the opportunity probably will be lost, and all this Country thrown open to the Ravages of the Enemy. What I call early is the first of May, in order to set out the moment the River St. Laurence is free from Ice. From all I can learn from the People who have lived in Canada, altho' it is some Years, June, before the Ice is all gone off, it often happens that there is little Ice in it; and this Year, Mo^r. Montcalm Landed at Quebeck on the 16th. of June. If we are to go, we ought to be there the moment the Ice will permit, otherwise the Lakes will open, and that happens, the Enemy will be at Liberty to pour in their Force into this Country, when we are gone from it; And I will venture to Afsure You, that whenever it appears the Enemy will be informed of it from this Country.

Undoubtedly, Loudoun understood that he was gambling (MANA, Page 236). If successful, the war might have ended in 1757 or 1758. He was equally cognizant that there was an appreciable risk if the schedule failed. In this letter to Fox, he does not claim that Webb can maintain his positions if the French advance. His repeated use of the word "Ice" reinforced the need to reach Quebec early in the season, something that could not be misinterpreted in London.

With the 5,000 provincial troops plus two regiments of regulars and four independent companies of regulars, it was hoped that Webb could secure the New York frontier; but this assessment was predicated on the British controlling Lake George (Figure 9). With Lake George under British control, Montcalm's only option would be an advance via the Wood Creek Corridor — facing the

difficult logistic challenge of moving in the narrows of Wood Creek and then transporting cannon and powder the 15 miles from the vicinity of old Fort Anne to Fort Edward. Although there was a trail connecting Fort Anne to Fort Edward, wagons or draft animals would be few or nonexistent (Figure 5A, Page 19). With the "navy" largely destroyed or wanting repair, Lake George was now open to advance.

By mid-June, Loudoun had to realize that he might be trading the destruction of Fort William Henry for the capture of Louisbourg. The geography and logistics decreed that it would have been impossible for the French to permanently occupy Fort William Henry and the French would have been forced to withdraw north to Ticonderoga. From the British perspective, this exchange would have been well worth the cost, but only if the British then held at Fort Edward. Loudoun would have 16 battalions at Halifax by mid-July plus marines. A year later, Amherst took only 14 battalions and 500 marines to Louisbourg. In 1759, Wolfe would field 10 battalions, 600 marines, and three additional companies of grenadiers at Quebec. Based on need, Loudoun's positioned regiments were now widely unbalanced. Time was now working hard against Loudoun. Wolfe would first land troops at Quebec on June 27th (Brumwell 2006). For Loudoun, there was no possibility of securing both Louisbourg and Quebec in the remaining campaign season. By late July, it was recognized that it was far too late in the season to move on Quebec. The consensus of the officers gathered at Halifax was to move on Louisbourg (Pargellis 1933, Page 241).

During the critical months of May and June, Loudoun remained firmly married to his strategy and offered no flexibility. Even at this late date, opportunities were missed. Although there is a long discussion of troop allocations in his letter to Cumberland, there is no evidence that Loudoun seriously considered the possibility of augmenting Webb (Loudoun to Cumberland, April 25 - June 3, 1757, MANA, Page 345). In his June 20th letter to Webb, Loudoun adheres to his strategy without regard to the delay (Loudoun to Webb, June 20, 1757, MANA, Page 370 and Final Letter Appendix). Loudoun could have easily reinforced Webb as late as mid-May by leaving two or three additional regiments in New York, but he chose not to. At the beginning of May, the 42nd, 44th, and 48th were still at or north of Albany waiting on the arrival of the provincial regiments (LO 3590). They would not be in New York (City) ready to embark until May 23rd and would not sail for Halifax until June 20th. The logistical and supply problems associated with leaving or turning back several regiments would have had to be overcome, and there would have been awkward implications on how to manage the provincials then heading to Fort Edward. Webb would have been hard-pressed to cope alone, but with the help of Lt. Colonel Gage (44th) and/or Lt. Colonel Burton (48th), it could have been done. Both these officers had been with Braddock two years earlier and knew North America. Abercromby did not have the needed experience in North America, but he would have the rank needed to deal with the provincial officers. If given full authority over the carpenters, the hard-driving John Bradstreet or Nathaniel Meserve would have been able to resurrect the Lake George "navy". Still, it is extremely doubtful that Loudoun would have left either Bradstreet or Meserve in New York; their skills managing logistics, supplies, and ever-needed carpentry were too great not to take them to Louisbourg. What Loudoun needed was a competent and experienced "full" Colonel, who he could make into a Brigadier, but he had none to choose from.

The lack of foreknowledge and detail concerning reinforcements arriving from Europe proved pivotal. The scant information contained in Pitt's letters of February 4th and the 19th represented the bulk of the information and direction that Loudoun had from London as it relates to finalizing the Campaign. By early March, Loudoun was working under the premise that 8,000 reinforcements were being sent. Alone this reinforcement was more men than he had originally proposed for the Campaign. Yet London would write to Cumberland that if only 6,000 of the reinforcements would arrive that would be more than enough men. Loudoun writes Cumberland (MANA, Page 317; New York, March 8, 1757):

"On this calculation of the Troops here & M^r Pitt's Information of the 8000: to be sent out, I have formed my Plan, which leaves 12,800 for the Expedition, independent of what may be got from Nova Scotia. But, as I have seen Ministers Promises come short, I have made, in my own Mind, allowances for accidents, though I stick to the 8000: in my public Letter; and think if you really send out 6000: good men, we will be able to accomplish what is expected by the Expedition, if no new Succors are thrown in, to the Enemy; and, if you send a Man to command the Fleet that is practicable in Business."

Besides being Johnson's Chief Engineer and Quartermaster General, William Eyre served as the "Director of the Artillery" (Johnson Papers, Volume 1, Page 860). With the bursting of the howitzer during the Battle of Lake George, the poor condition of Johnson's artillery was reinforced. Under the Winslow Campaign (1756), Eyre's participation was withdrawn, but there were no further battles to judge the soundness of the guns. At the direction of Loudoun, Captain MacLeod (Royal Artillery) conducted a field inspection and inventory of the artillery at both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. Unfortunately, MacLeod's inspections have become separated from their parent documents and appear lost (LO 1619 and LO 1583, August 1756; full transcriptions in the appendices). From these reports and the critical tone of the parent documents, Loudoun must have been cognizant of the poor condition of the artillery at both forts. In a twist of fate, Eyre suffered no gun losses in March 1757 that might have demonstrated the true condition of the guns. If Loudoun knew of the miserable state of the artillery stores, the question becomes: Why did not Loudoun replace or reinforce the old pieces? Dozens of "new" guns could have been sent from New York Harbor to augment Webb, guns Loudoun did not want for his Louisbourg Expedition (Johnson Papers, Volume 1, Page 443; and Final Letter Appendix, Page 262). The same reoccurring explanation looms — as Montcalm was not expected to attack, there was no need for heavy guns at either of the forts. Without need, any explanation for hauling a train of "new" heavy cannon would have proved awkward, if not thoroughly illogical, to the provincial troops and their governments. Loudoun only reinforced Webb with a few light brass cannon so that he could move north against Ticonderoga, but Webb was to move north only if the French withdrew to reinforce Quebec.

In the end, Loudoun refused to reinforce Webb without knowing if and when the Louisbourg reinforcements would actually arrive. Loudoun fully knew of the destruction of the Lake George "navy"; but he does little beyond "suggesting" four galliots be built without issuing the needed orders to ensure that the carpenters and artificers available to Webb were assigned to that role and only that role. This effort needed the maximum possible support, something it did not receive. As with the construction of barracks, Loudoun had already complained about Montresor's lack of ability to remain focused and his strong per chance for pulling men away for new work without

regard to need. Sitting in New York Harbor, Loudoun had to realize that he had already lost half the Campaign Season and that Quebec was beyond his reach, leaving only Louisbourg. Against Louisbourg, Loudoun had several thousand troops more than the Campaign would require or could even utilize. By early June, Loudoun knew he was in violation of his own plan and the associated risks were now in full play. The failure to substantially reinforce Webb is a key shortcoming that is the sole responsibility of Loudoun.

Outside of Pitt's letters, little was forwarded to Loudoun concerning the logistics and supply. As a result, Loudoun was forced to make several major assumptions about the forces that would be made available to him and about the logistics of supplying those forces. Due to the lack of details and no direction from the Board of Ordnance or the Board of Trade, the logistics were poorly managed. Loudoun, working closely with Governors Lawrence of Nova Scotia and Hardy of New York, was sending stores to Halifax as directed by Pitt; all the while, various London contractors were doing the same. Regrettably, there was no chance to coordinate the efforts. John St. Clair was the Deputy Quartermaster General for North America. In 1755, he served in that position under Braddock, but he had been severely wounded at the Monongahela, shot through the lung and arm. It is thought he was incapacitated during the Winter of 1756-1757 (See Cubbison 2015, Page 112). With St. Clair's absence, Loudoun was effectively acting as his own Quartermaster General, assisted by John Bradstreet and Major James Robinson of the 2nd battalion, 60th Foot. The work that needed to be done was considerable. Enough ships had to be hired to transport all the regiments then in New York to Halifax in a single effort. In addition, Loudoun still had to deal with the independent Board of Ordnance, headquartered in Boston, and arrange for those stores to be shipped to Halifax as well. In the end, there were such great quantities of supplies delivered to Halifax that much of it went unused and spoiled. Needed communications had seriously failed.

The French were well aware of the British preparations. That spring, three French naval squadrons broke the British blockade of France and arrived at Louisbourg. On June 20th, eighteen ships of the line and five frigates were harbored at Louisbourg (Boscawen 2011: Page 40). Holburne's Fleet was reinforced to sixteen ships of the line, four frigates, and four sloops, but the reinforcements were deemed insufficient to force the harbor (Holburne to Holderness; August 4, 1757; MANA, Page 389). Holburne's view was strict: as long as the French Fleet was present, Louisbourg was secure. Now "beached" in Halifax, Loudoun had little choice but to wait, the Navy was cautious. Lord Hay and Bradstreet argued against delay. The protracted discussions turned bitterly ugly. On August 4th, with the regiments now embarked on the ships and fully intending on heading to Louisbourg, additional news came concerning the strength of the French fleet. On the advice of both Admiral Holburne and Admiral Hardy, the Expedition was then canceled — the strength of the French Fleet coupled to insufficient time to conduct the operations before the arrival hurricane season (Holburne to Loudoun, August 4, 1757, and Hardy to Loudoun, August 6, 1757, Letter Appendix). Loudoun writes the ministries on the same date, received in London on August 30th; reports of the surrender of Fort William Henry reach Pitt on September 18th (Williams 1915, Page 348).

Moving into Winter 1757/1758, Loudoun was forced to scatter his assembled army to winter quarters much further south. Subsequently, the army had to be reformed at Halifax in Spring 1758, but this time under Jeffrey Amherst. Instead of returning to Halifax in 1758, six of the battalions were assigned to the Ticonderoga Campaign under Abercromby — 27th, 42nd, 44th,

46th, 55th, and 4th of the 60th Foot. Only the 1st of the 60th and the 80th Light Foot would need to be added to the list of British regulars at Ticonderoga. After suffering in near-absent winter quarters, the 77th would form the bulk of the regulars for Forbes' successful 1758 Campaign against Fort Duquesne in Pennsylvania. The 35th and the 3rd of the 60th Foot would be sent north to Halifax to serve under Amherst. In mid-April 1758, the 15th Foot arrived at Halifax from Britain with the 58th Foot arriving from Ireland on May 17th. As part of this 1758 expedition, four companies from each of two other regiments (4th and 24th) were assigned as marines to Boscawen's Fleet. In April 1758, these marines were then designated as part of the newly raised 62nd and 69th Foot. These were the final four regiments involved in the conquest of Canada. Finally, small detachments of "marines" from other army regiments would be pressed into sea-service on ships sent against Louisbourg and Quebec, including elements of the newly established 73rd and 75th Regiments of Foot. These "marines" were not Royal Marines, but regular soldiers serving in the role of marines on warships, sea-service.

With the logistics difficulties and distances involved in North America, late-starting campaigns suffered much more so than in Europe and there was little to no appreciation of this fact at the beginning of the war. It was a learning experience for the British, but under Pitt, the British learned — campaigns needed to start in May, not late June. Often, the lessons inherent to a specific war are not learned or corrected until after that war is over, but that was not the case here. In 1758, the British would leave Halifax for Louisbourg on May 28th.

Pargellis's assessment of Loudoun, Pitt, and the performance and maturation of the British Army remains very solid (Pargellis 1936, Pages ix - xxi, online). More of an editorial than a history, the language here is blunt, opinionated, and judgmental — a dedicated historian relieving his frustrations. The analysis of Loudoun is more critical than in his 1933 volume and less so of Pitt. Pargellis identifies two entirely different types of campaigns, those interior to North America and those of sea-land. Under Pitt, the British excelled at the sea-land campaigns and were aggressive in their use. At the same time, London continued to mismanage the interior campaigns and never developed any true mastery of those expeditions. Brumwell (2006, Page 140) credits the policy changes made by Sir John Ligonier, replacing Cumberland as Commander in Chief, as the source for the improvement that would be seen in the fortunes of the British Army. Although seventy-eight years of age, Ligonier favored the appointments of much younger officers to lead campaigns, such as Amherst (41), Howe (33), and Wolfe (31).

Loudoun's failed Louisbourg Campaign did drive home key lessons (MANA, Pages 294-312). Sea-land campaigns, such as Louisbourg and Quebec, had to be coordinated and authored from Europe with the driving authorities careful to ensure schedules and timing commitments were all met. Logistics would be key. By Fall 1757, this reality was made very clear to Pitt. The overall plan and the regimental assignments would be made in Europe and then endorsed by theater commanders, not the reverse order. The command structure would change with the appointments of brigadiers to command regimental corps. Regiments would be sent forward months earlier to a secure staging location, such as Halifax, but only in mass allowing for the practice of regimental scale maneuvers and amphibious assaults. More senior staff officers would be sent forward earlier to organize the logistics and secondary shipping; but the overall commanding officer could remain in Europe until much later, waiting on final orders. Arriving three weeks before Amherst, Admiral Boscawen was key to the amphibious preparations, a concept new to most soldiers and

sailors. Amherst coming from Europe would join the Fleet sailing from Halifax en route on May 28th; there would be no delay in sailing by waiting on his arrival.

Strong naval elements would be pushed forward. Naval forces needed to be on station early to secure passage for the transports; it could not be made into a race to see who would get there first in the spring, the British Navy or the French Navy. Naval squadrons would winter away from Britain. With the British Navy possessing overwhelming strength in comparison to the French and the long distances involved, these sea-land campaigns did not rely on secrecy to the extent typical of many military campaigns. Only in rare circumstances, could the French project naval power that might interfere with the British plans. The French would have full foreknowledge of the British plans, but not the ability to react decisively on that knowledge. As such, the need to mask intent was not there and the British could adopt a brazen approach to the preparations.

Until 1762 and Havanna, the role of the colonials would be restricted. The American colonies might provide a few specialized troops — rangers, carpenters, and boatmen; but as correctly recognized by Loudoun, provincial regiments were poorly suited for sea-land campaigns. Provincial regiments simply formed too late in the season. Supplying merchant shipping and bateaux was something the colonials could do well, and it was embraced as a source of income.

In no way did Loudoun appreciate the difficulties of coordinating a campaign from North America that relied so much on communication and cooperation that only could be directed from Britain itself. If plans went terribly off-track, as they did in 1757, orders could be amended, but time and distance made such changes difficult to implement. In the end, the regimental assignments were badly mauled. Loudoun had created the illusion that his defense in New York was solid. Although the Duke of Cumberland had secured Loudoun some latitude in choosing either Louisbourg or Quebec as the expedition's first target, Pitt's strong preference for first taking Louisbourg was made abundantly clear (LO 2859; February 14, 1757; received May 11th). How much flexibility Loudoun had in adopting his orders was mute; time was now arguing hard against adopting Quebec. Prior to abandoning Louisbourg, there is no correspondence suggesting that changing the target of the expedition caused any additional problems or delays. In this sense, the British as a whole were naive, but especially Loudoun. It was here that Loudoun failed, and Pitt learned, but only Pitt was blessed with time. Pitt had enough influence and will to make sea-land campaigns happen, but that will was not applied until a year later in 1758. Besides ensuring cooperation between the Army and Navy, the stifling and numbing bureaucracy of the Treasury had to be driven. This was one of Pitt's great strengths and he excelled at the planning of these sea-land campaigns. Another of Pitt's strengths was his unwavering ability to see and act toward a grand national and global strategy for Britain. In this, he had few equals.

In the face of the overwhelming strength of the British Navy, Paris adopted a simple, reasonable, and straightforward strategy — win the ground war in Europe and then negotiate the status of colonial possessions. The war in Canada was best fought with a strong defensive tenor. Montcalm embraced this reasoning. Marquis de Vaudreuil, the Governor General of Canada, did not and remained emphatically aggressive. Where Montcalm and Vaudreuil would agree was that more resources were needed to counter the overwhelming strength of the British in North America. This Paris rejected, largely because of the expense. The French Treasury was near exhaustion.

As regards the interior campaigns, Pargellis (1933, Page 231) is extremely critical of Pitt's interference in forming strategy from far off Britain. Dealing with the logistical difficulties was still routinely underappreciated, but now there were additional complications — colonial politics and sensibilities. Interior campaigns required an entirely different approach and there was a steep learning curve attached. Colonial resources had great value, if used properly in scouting and supporting roles, but were time-consuming and cumbersome, often late in assembling and logistic sponges. Pargellis argues that for these campaigns, the theater commanders should have been tasked with the planning, especially as how best to utilize colonial resources and manpower, not London.

In Pargellis's assessment, he concludes that it took a theater commander two full campaign seasons in the interior to appreciate and master the difficulties of interior campaigns. This only describes Amherst. Pargellis then argues that neither London nor Pitt ever fully appreciated these constraints and consistently misdirected and mismanaged the interior campaigns since the very beginning of the hostilities, starting with Braddock's expedition in 1755 and continuing through 1759. The struggle against delays was constant. Besides the provincial's strong tendency to gather late, needed supplies being shipped from Europe would often arrive equally late. The British Army could only "request", but not drive the Board of Ordnance or the Board of Trade. Pitt drove these offices hard as regards the sea-land campaigns, less so on the interior campaigns. Although the interior campaigns made progress in both 1758 and 1759 (the capture of Duquesne, Carillon, and Niagara), Pargellis contends progress was not proportionate to the effort, expense, or true objective. The British columns were both slow and more than bloated.

Although Braddock's defeat at the Monongahela and the Battle of Lake George are often cited as the reason why Johnson did not advance further north, the underlying lack of logistics was the core reason why the expedition failed. A year later on August 20th, Loudoun learns of the fall of Oswego and immediately orders Winslow not to proceed against Carillon (Bellico 2010, Page 89; CO 5/47 Part 2, 014#, Final Letter Appendix). Winslow's Expedition suffered the same logistic shortcoming (See Anderson 1984, Pages 179-185). Even without Loudoun's order, Lt. Colonel Burton (48th Foot) believed the provincials incapable of advancing on Carillon; a belief possibly shared by Winslow himself (LO 1599). The staging for both these campaigns needed to be done primarily at Fort Edward, which could be supplied mostly by water, not the massing of men at Fort William Henry, which only could be supplied by wagon. Wagons required horse or oxen, feed and fodder. Moving troops to Lake George had to be done to secure a staging area, but the number of troops moved north had to be based solely on need. The "parking" of troops at Lake George resulted in a massive logistic nightmare — they all had to be fed and sheltered. Under both Johnson and then Winslow, moving necessary ordnance north became secondary to moving food. Excess troops needed to remain at Fort Edward, Saratoga, or even further south until they could be usefully used (reference LO 3590). Laramie (2012, Page 247) is highly critical of the decision to cancel Winslow's Expedition arguing that the French were then too weak at Carillon to successfully resist any advance.

There were at least three portages on the Hudson River between Albany and Fort Edward, so the ease of supplying Fort Edward should not be overstated (Abercromby to Pitt, May 22, 1758; Kimball 1906, Vol. I). Two of the portages were less than a mile. The portage at Fort Miller, the "Little Carrying Place", was between three and six miles, weather dependent (Figure 5A, Page

19). In 1755 and 1756, a great deal of effort was put into road building between Albany and Fort Edward, about 56 miles (MANA, Page 449). Even the road network between New York and Albany was poor; the commercial traffic connection to Albany was via the Hudson River, not road: *"This brings me to mention Sir John St Clair. He recovered so as to desire to go with the 55th Regt who I had ordered to clear the Road thro' the Highlands in their way to Albany. There are very few Inhabitants in that part of the Country, so that I could not get it done by them, and by opening this Road I shall have a Communication the whole Winter between New York and Albany for Troops and Carriages, which, while we had only a Communication by Water, was shut up for four Months every Winter."* (Loudoun to Cumberland, October 17, 1757; LO 4642 and MANA, Page 403). The often-maligned Abercromby recognized this reality; logistics were Abercromby's strength. Abercromby would reach Ticonderoga a full two weeks earlier than Amherst.

To Pargellis, Lake Champlain and Lake Ontario were the true keys — Braddock should have mounted his 1755 Campaign against Fort Saint-Frédéric on Lake Champlain and secured what would eventually be known as Crown Point (Pargellis 1936, Page xvii). Outside of Acadia (Nova Scotia/New Brunswick), only this single expedition would be mounted in 1755. Braddock would have assumed Johnson's Expedition; Shirley's Expedition would have been canceled with any effort focused on strengthening Oswego on Lake Ontario. If this strategy were adopted, it would have been far from easy as four regiments of French regulars (La Reine, Languedoc, Guyenne, and Bearn) plus the Compagnies Franches de la Marine and Canadian militia would have been in position to contest the advance. Unlike Braddock's March in Pennsylvania, Vaudreuil would likely have strongly contested the advance, but without committing his regulars. Although hundreds of bateaux would have been needed, the numbers of wagons and draft horses would likely have been the more limiting resource, as it was for Johnson. Lack of fodder would be an ever-present concern. Fort Edward would have to be established and a good road leading to Wood Creek or Lake George would have to be built. The logistical challenge would parallel that of constructing Braddock's Road through Maryland and Pennsylvania. Only the talented, nevertheless difficult, John Bradstreet would have the deftness needed to organize the bateaux fleet and their transport to Lake George or Lake Champlain, but he would have had to been allowed to adopt his own methods, free of interference from the equally difficult St. Clair. Alternatively, Braddock might have constructed a road from Saratoga on the Hudson to Fort Saint-Frédéric, a distance of 90-100 miles. In comparison, Braddock's route between Fort Cumberland and Fort Duquesne was 125 miles. The work might have proved equally daunting. Saratoga could be supplied by water from Albany. Fort Chambly was a further 100 miles to the north.

After taking Fort Saint-Frédéric, Pargellis fails to fully explain the next phase. Braddock would either withdraw back to the Hudson or attempt to establish one or two additional forts north of the Hudson — at Fort Anne on Wood Creek or at the south end of Lake George (another Fort William Henry). Any fort would have to be sizable and secure against winter assault. Establishing and then holding a fortification at Ticonderoga or Crown Point does not seem possible. Provincial troops would be limited to garrison roles and to those tasks in which their performance exceeded that of the regulars — scouting, boatmen, carpentry, road building, construction, and logistical support. Within the compressed window of a single campaign season, navigating the provincial sensibilities of the New Englanders would seem to be a near

impossibility in itself. In 1756, after formal war was declared, a second front would then be opened on Lake Ontario that would target Fort Frontenac on the upper reaches of the Saint Lawrence River. In this instance, Pargellis's judgment seems overly ambitious, if not wildly so. Much more is being asked here than asked of Abercromby in 1758 or Amherst in 1759.

Outside of Braddock's Expedition in 1755 and Bradstreet's sacking of Fort Frontenac on the Upper St. Lawrence River in 1758, British interior campaigns can be characterized as careful and deliberate. As a result, if matched to the temperament of the commanding officer, measured and methodical progress resulted as illustrated by both Forbes and Amherst. It would take Forbes until November 25 to reach Duquesne. Braddock was one day away from Duquesne by early July. Regardless of whether the final objective of a campaign was reached, the British "front line" was moved forward, but only very slowly. With the season getting extremely late, Wolfe threw caution away at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, but here the British victory was much more the fault of the foolhardiness displayed by Montcalm than anything else.

Amherst's "education" with interior campaigns did not start until the Lake Champlain Campaign in 1759 — the capture of Fort Carillon and Fort Saint-Frédéric (15 miles to the north of Ticonderoga). The capture of Fort Saint-Frédéric had taken the British four years to accomplish. In this light, Pargellis's criticisms do not appear overly harsh. It was not until 1760 that Amherst was able to coordinate the three-prong assault on Montreal and force the capitulation of the French. Wisely, Amherst chose to mount his prong of the attack from Oswego, journey across Lake Ontario, and then down the St. Lawrence to Montreal — the single arm he had not previously developed and the arm that needed the most preparation and administrative skill.

Although Loudoun's Expedition intended to preclude any advancement by the French, the preparations needed to stage the attack on Fort William Henry strongly argue that the French in Quebec were not reacting as anticipated. Loudoun never truly accounts for the extremely aggressive nature of Vaudreuil. Unless Quebec was directly threatened, Montcalm would move south on Fort William Henry regardless of the events in Louisbourg, particularly in the light of persistent pressure to attack from Vaudreuil. In this sense, Montcalm and Vaudreuil remained flexible. Mildly stated, Montcalm and Vaudreuil often bitterly clashed and there was considerable personal animosity between the two leaders (Parkman 1922). By the end of 1756, the dislike grew to the extent that Montcalm wanted to shift his regulars away from Montreal and Quebec, east to the Acadian Peninsula, but Vaudreuil would not allow it (O'Callaghan, Vol. X; November 1, 1756, Page 490). Vaudreuil would have authority over Montcalm until sometime in early 1759 (Steele 1994, Page 206; and Andrews 2015, Page 96). Regardless of the strategic muddle imposed on the British by the British, Montcalm had the distinct advantage of knowing that a French fleet was blocking the approaches to Louisbourg, thus further freeing the French to move south. Webb and Monro could not have known this with any surety, only rumor. In late July and the first week in August, Loudoun was in Halifax still gathering intelligence and debating options. Loudoun did not abandon the Louisbourg Expedition until August 4th, the same day that the French opened the Siege at Fort William Henry (Pargellis 1933, Page 242).

d. Webb

Webb was tasked with guarding the northern frontier of the British colonies. His primary role was defensive and tied to already established garrisons. There was a string of posts connecting

Albany and Fort Edward to the north, and from Albany leading west to Schenectady and the Mohawk Valley (Laramie 2012, Page 499). Most posts were small, just a handful of men behind crude stockades along the logistic chains. With the fall of Oswego, the Colonial Assembly in New York authorized a provincial regiment to be fielded that winter (1756-1757). Among their duties, these provincial troops manned the smaller posts along the Upper Hudson, not British regulars. In 1758, Abercromby posted 200 men each at Half Moon, Stillwater (Fort Winslow), Saratoga (Fort Hardy), and Fort Miller all on the Upper Hudson. British regulars from the 4th/60th were initially assigned to these posts, but they were replaced by newly arriving provincials in mid-June (Abercromby to Pitt, June 29, 1758; Kimball 1906, Vol. I). Had these provincial troops not been available the winter of 1756-1757, Loudoun might have been forced to commit additional regulars to Webb. Nearly a full regiment of troops was needed just to secure the supply route from Albany to Fort Edward.

Webb would have had to make similar commitments to keep the supply chain functioning. Normally, the militias would not play a role in manning these posts. When reading original correspondence or histories, there may or may not be a distinction between "provincials" and "militia". If called up as part of a campaign and authorized by the provincial assemblies, these troops would be referenced as "provincials" — about an 8-month commitment. Other colonial troops called up on an emergency or short-term basis would be "militia". Webb makes this distinction (LO 4245A), as does Pargellis (1933). Several of Pargellis's statements and arguments are only understood following this subtle difference; otherwise, the supporting numbers will be confusing. Any discussion of troop ceilings available to Webb does not include the militia, just the British regulars and colonial provincials.

Webb has often been treated as a shallow caricature of the unworthy British officer, deserving of rank only by birth and political connections. At the same time, particularly in his correspondence with Loudoun, there is the suggestion of a competent officer. Although Webb's behavior and lack of leadership have been routinely criticized and condemned, Webb not advancing on Fort William Henry was likely the best military outcome for the British. The 2,300 British regulars under Webb's command were badly split in an attempt to man all these garrisons. Webb only had two regiments of regulars — the 35th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 60th Regiment. In addition, there were four New York Independent Companies of Regulars, a handful of Royal Artillery, and over two hundred sick from the various regiments that had embarked on the Louisbourg Expedition (Pargellis 1933, Pages 235 and 245, and MANA, Page 318).

Each of these Independent Companies of Regulars was poorly paid, equipped, and manned — an average of fewer than 65 men per company (LO 4394 and LO 6616). Two of these Independent Companies had been part of Braddock's Expedition. At the Siege, Captain Cruikshank was apparently leading elements of two Independent Companies. At least through Fall 1756, Loudoun wanted to keep these Independent Companies outside of New York to avoid interference from the Governor of New York, who traditionally had the authority to direct these four Companies (MANA, Page 265, November 1756). With the manpower commitments to the Louisbourg Expedition firm, all the Independent Companies returned to New York.

Finally, Webb had one company of Rogers' Rangers under him positioned at Fort William Henry. Disease, battle losses, and men failing to renew because of a drop in pay forced the rebuilding of

Rogers' Rangers in Fall 1756. Recruiting in New Hampshire was aggressive. By the time of the Siege, the number of Rogers' Rangers had reached about 101 men; the authorized strength was 108 men (Loescher 1946, Page 354). Though American by birth, these rangers were paid directly by the British Army; these men would be better grouped with the regulars. Yet other ranger companies were colonially funded — Captain Israel Putnam of Connecticut posted to Fort Edward and Jonathan Ogden of New York. Of the 2,300 regulars available to Webb, nearly a thousand were at Fort William Henry when the French arrived on August 3rd.

During the winter of 1756-1757, Loudoun had laboriously negotiated with the various colonial assemblies the provincial quotas for the following summer. All told, about 5,500 provincials from New England, New York, and New Jersey were available to Webb, at least on paper (Pargellis 1933, Page 245). Five hundred of the Connecticut provincials under Lt. Col. Nathan Whiting would be assigned to Fort Number 4 on the Connecticut River in New Hampshire, some 65 miles due east of Fort William Henry. By July and typical of provincial forces, another 500 were absent from the colonial rolls. The remainder were available for duty in New York. At the end of June, some eight hundred provincials would be serving at Fort William Henry. Together with the 2,300 or so British regulars, Webb had a total force available for duty in New York of about 7,000 men, very comparable to the numbers Montcalm fielded against Fort William Henry. On August 3rd, the quandary was simple: between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, Webb and Monro could only field about 4,000 men total, several thousand less the Montcalm — about 2,200 men at Fort William Henry and 1,600 men at Fort Edward (reference LO 4081). The other 3,000 regulars and provincials under Webb had been scattered to a dozen postings across New York and southern New England building bridges, roads, storehouses, and tending the various supply depots. Time would be needed to assemble those troops (Laramie 2012, Page 291). Because of all these postings and the distances involved, Webb could not quickly concentrate his forces and had to rely on the colonial militia for numbers which took time to gather (CO 5/18 Part 1 040, Letter Appendix, August 27, 1757). Monro was intimately familiar with this reality (reference LO 4041, Webb to Monro, August 4th). With strong opinion, Pargellis contends that it was Webb's own disposition of the troops that created the problem — *"if Webb could muster at the two forts but 3700 men on August 3, he must have left 2,500 men elsewhere in New York, either at Albany, the posts up the Hudson, or along the Mohawk. Such a division of forces was unnecessary and inexcusable."* (Pargellis 1933, Page 244).

Regardless of Pargellis' argument, the need to guard the western approaches to Albany was real and not imaginary. This aggression was driven solely by Vaudreuil. Fort Bull, a stockade at the east end of Lake Oneida, fell to the French in March 1756, and then Fort Oswego fell on Lake Ontario the following August. In 1757, the small stockade at German Flatts on the Mohawk River was then the most western British military outpost (Fort Herkimer). The settlement of German Flatts was burned by the French on November 12, 1757 (Loudoun to Pitt, February 14, 1758; Kimball 1906, Vol. 1). In 1758, Vaudreuil was organizing a deeper raid into the Mohawk Valley by the way of Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario and Oswego. Vaudreuil had gathered some 3,000 men for this expedition — 400 French regulars, 400 Troupes de la Marine, 800 Canadian militia, and somewhere between 600 and 1,000 Indian warriors (O'Callaghan 1858, Pages 717 and 719). The uncompromising Vaudreuil viewed Montcalm as far too timid to lead such an expedition (Nester 2008, Page 107). Instead, Levis would command. Another 3,000 men, mostly French regulars under Montcalm, were positioned at Carillon in a purely defensive role.

Reluctantly and after repeated petitions by Levis, Vaudreuil allowed Levis and the last of the French regulars to head to Ticonderoga. After a series of forced marches, Levis and five hundred regulars reached Ticonderoga the night before and the morning of the Battle of Carillon (July 8, 1758). Vaudreuil then abandons the offensive expedition against the Mohawk Valley but makes a major misstep and fails to secure Fort Frontenac — a simple task considering the number of men then uncommitted and available. The western door to Albany would not be secured until the building of the very substantial Fort Stanwix on the Mohawk River in late 1758 (Figure 10, Page 113).

By mid-summer, a reallocation of the troops in response to the gathered intelligence of the French intentions was more than warranted. Detachments of regulars were likely at Albany, Schenectady, German Flatts, and Saratoga (3rd/60th Foot and Independent Companies). Webb's Monthly Provincial Returns suggest he sent some 550 Massachusetts provincials south from Fort Edward in mid-July probably to posts on the Hudson River (LO 4004). This may have been an attempt by Webb to gather more regulars at Fort Edward and Fort William Henry or simple road building, but it was not a decisive change. Some 430 of these provincials then return to Fort Edward in response to Webb's summoning for reinforcements (LO 6751, August 30th Return).

Pitt assigning both elements of the 60th (1st Battalion) and 77th Regiment to the Carolinas to combat the Cherokee was unwelcome by Loudoun (Loudoun to Cumberland, October 17, 1757; MANA, Page 407). The debate is more limited, as the 77th was delayed in Ireland until the end of June and did not arrive at Charlestown, South Carolina until September 3rd. But it did strip Webb of five companies of the 1st/60th, some 500 regulars (Campbell 2010, Page 88). The 1st/60th achieved little to nothing while in the Carolinas. In 1758, these troops would form the bulk of the regulars for the successful Forbes Expedition in Pennsylvania. Had the competent and experienced Henri Bouquet of the 1st/60th been assigned to Fort William Henry in Spring 1757, the subsequent events might have taken a quite different course.

Montcalm's chief advantage over Webb was his decision to concentrate his regulars at Carillon (Ticonderoga). The number of French regulars and marines at Fort William Henry did not exceed 2,900; comparable to the number of British regulars and rangers under Webb, but Webb's regulars were scattered. Neither the 35th nor the 3rd/60th was whole, both were assigned to multiple posts. Yet, if poorly placed or timed, concentration comes with a cost. Within two months of the disastrous defeat at Ticonderoga in 1758, John Bradstreet sacks Fort Frontenac, the key French post at the confluence of the Saint Lawrence River and Lake Ontario. This loss severed the French supply chain and threatened the French position in the Ohio Valley. Bradstreet had been at Ticonderoga, but he was astute enough to realize that if the British moved fast enough, they might find the French out of position to respond at the then weakly defended post. French dominance over Lake Ontario ended with the burning of five sloops and the capture of two others (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 831). Eighty cannon had been lost. The loss of Frontenac was a much greater strategic blow to the French than the British loss of Fort William Henry. The failure to secure Fort Frontenac was the fault of Vaudreuil, not Montcalm.

About 12 miles east of Fort William Henry, the Wood Creek Corridor from Lake Champlain allowed raiding parties to reach Fort Edward (Figures 4, 5A, and 9). On July 23rd, less than two weeks before the start of the Siege, a mixed raiding party of 150 men led by Joseph Marin del La

Malgue (French Colonial Marines) advanced on Fort Edward. Marin ambushed a woodcutting party and their guard, killing thirteen and wounding four. Marin then advanced to the wood line just outside of Fort Edward before withdrawing after losing only one man. Hughes (2011, Pages 126 -131) offers a detailed description of this raid.

Bougainville emphasizes that this raid confirmed that the British were not concentrating on moving north via old Fort Anne and Wood Creek (Chicot River to the French). During earlier conflicts, the principal attack route for both the French and English was the Lake Champlain/Wood Creek Corridor, bypassing Lake George. Four separate times, the English planned "army" sized expeditions based out of Albany: twice during the Queen Anne's War (The War of Spanish Succession, 1702-1713) and twice during the King George's War (1744-1748). Each time, the plans were aborted before the final push to reach Lake Champlain, but not because of the lack of men. Disorganization and ever-mounting logistical problems plagued each expedition. In 1755, Johnson again chooses the Wood Creek corridor for the British advance (Johnson Papers, Vol. 1, August 18, Page 860), but it was again proving to be a logistics nightmare. The forward movement of the supplies to South Bay and the necessary staging areas on Wood Creek was very slow. The available horses and wagons were too few and were nearly exhausted by the work schedule. Most of the supplies being hauled were simply used to keep the wagon freight moving. Parallels to the logistic difficulties faced by Braddock are evident. By August 24th, Johnson had moved the focus to Lake George (Johnson Papers, Vol. 1, Page 880). Johnson's column reaches Lake George on August 28th. Knowing that the British were not advancing on their flank reassured the French. Bougainville Journals (Page 142):

"We know now through this reconnaissance of M. Marin that the end of the bay (South Bay) is unoccupied, that the enemy has no fort there nor any defensive works nor fixed post, but that they send scouts there from time to time to hide and watch our movements in this region, that the Chicot River is navigable, except for a very short rapid, as far as Fort Anne, now abandoned, and that from this fort to Fort Lydius (Fort Edward) is an excellent road five leagues long."

This intelligence fitted well with Montcalm's plans. At the same time, the raid was further confirmation to Webb that Fort William Henry could be bypassed, and Fort Edward directly attacked. The fact that there was a decent road connecting Wood Creek to Fort Edward was no comfort to Webb. If Montcalm had chosen to advance on that route, the road would only make things much easier. Fort Edward was a much more difficult position to isolate and assault than Fort William Henry. Fort Edward had nearly twice the artillery and was twice the size of Fort William Henry with direct access to the Hudson River. Yet, if Montcalm chose to advance and unless significantly reinforced, Webb had little faith in his ability to hold at Fort Edward. To Webb, Montcalm advancing on Fort Edward was the next logical step in the French Campaign.

Histories and narratives paint Webb as being deeply alarmed and unnerved that the raiding party had so easily reached Fort Edward on July 23rd. This may have been true. Webb is often depicted as being a coward but finding an original source for that accusation dating from 1757, even among the Johnson Papers or Lucier, proved fruitless. Those recriminations abound in secondary sources lacking citations that can be traced to a source document. The coward tag is made in Buell's *Sir William Johnson* (1903, Page 166). This is a report of a conversation between Col. Peter Schuyler and Johnson, sometime after Schuyler's release by the French, but without

citation or any hint of date. Peter Schuyler was the colonel of the New Jersey Blues at the fall of Oswego in 1756 and then made prisoner. When this conversation occurred is fogged as Schuyler was paroled in October 1757, recalled from parole in June 1758, and then released a second time in November 1758 as part of a large prisoner exchange of British captured at Oswego and French captured at Frontenac (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 879). At the time of the Siege, Schuyler would have been a French prisoner in Quebec (Steele 1990, Page 133). Buell is a legendary fabricator of events and correspondence (Hamilton 1956). This story is one of Buell's many lies.

A second source of this charge is Rufus Putnam. Rufus Putnam was a cousin to Israel Putnam and was present at Fort Edward as part of the Massachusetts provincials. During the American Revolution, Rufus Putnam would reach the rank of Brigadier General under Washington. The entry appears to be compiled well after the American Revolution was concluded, in the late 1790s or early 1800s (Rowana Buell 1903, Page 14):

"It was the opinion of many officers that he might have releaved the Fort, and that he was much to blame for not attempting it, the general idea amongst us soldiers was that he was a coward, nor did he express more humanity than courage, for he took no care to bury the men butchered in the maner mentioned above, or to Seek after the wounded should there be any lying among the dead — I was on the ground a short time after, and Saw the dead bodies lying as neglected if they had ben wild bests."

Yet Rufus Putnam had kept a daily journal that can be easily referenced (Dawes 1886), but there is no judgment of Webb in that journal. Even Pargellis fails to give a citation as regards the colonial militia then gathered at Fort Edward:

"They relieved their spirits by cursing Webb, and some went so far as to advocate hanging him as he deserved; when they returned home under a cloud not of their own devising, having lost money and time themselves, and having cost their provinces a thousand pounds a day, they aroused resentment of the whole countryside. first against Webb, and then, by an easy transition, against Loudoun and the British Army." (Pargellis 1933, Page 248).

Webb's health posed a problem for Loudoun, it was not good. That winter, Loudoun had intended to post Webb in Philadelphia to supervise troops and recruiting, but his physical condition was so poor that he seemingly remained at Albany (Loudoun to Fox, January 4, 1757, CO 5/48 013). Loudoun debated leaving Major General Abercromby in New York and taking Webb with him to Halifax. At the same time, Loudoun became convinced that Webb was incapable of performing the required duties at Louisbourg or Quebec (Loudoun to Cumberland, March 8, 1757; MANA, Page 317). Webb was known to suffer from a form of palsy (paralysis, uncontrolled shaking) and at times unable to bear noise or disruption. Loudoun to Cumberland, January 1757 (MANA, Page 293 and see Pargellis 1933, Page 234):

"I mentioned M^r Webb being Ill; he was about a fortnight ago, attacked with a very Slight fit of the Palsy, which did not last a Minute, and to another Man, would have been of very little Consequence; but all his People have died of that Disease and his is still low and down, and I cannot get his Spirits up; I am very much afraid that he will not soon be able to do much business and that I am still of the same opinion, that any Man that were to come, that did not do us good, would do us a great deale of mischief."

For an operation as large and complex as Louisbourg, a competent second-in-command was mandatory. Abercromby would have to follow Loudoun to Halifax. Webb would command in New York. Unknown to Loudoun, at least two Major Generals would arrive with the Fleet off Halifax on July 9th. Abercromby could have safely stayed in New York.

Webb's own correspondences to Loudoun were informative, reasoned, cautious, but always exceedingly protective of himself: LO 4020 (August 1st); LO 4081 (August 5th); LO 4198 (August 11th); and LO 4245 (August 17th). Each of these letters is transcribed in the Final Letter Appendix. Unfortunately, Monro leaves nothing comparable to these letters. Webb was very precise and strict in his chronologies of the events. Resolve is missing from all these correspondences. The two previous letters of Webb to Loudoun were from June 19th and 22nd (reference LO 4020), so there is no correspondence from July. Unfortunately, these June letters appear lost. Throughout the spring and early summer, Webb remains in Albany. Webb does not leave Albany until late June arriving at Fort Edward on June 25th. On June 24th, a prisoner at Saratoga had told Webb both of the concentration of the French at Ticonderoga and that the French were planning to move against Fort William Henry:

"The Principle part of his information had a large number of boats at Tienderoga, which they talked on putting into Lake George, by carrying them across the Portage, and laying Planks across two of them to transport their artillery, to Attack Forte William Henry; that their troops were very healthy & that they had a great number of cannon there;" (LO 4020; reference Montresor Journals, Page 17).

The document LO 4020 is very revealing of the events throughout all of July, including the interrogations of several other French deserters and prisoners (July 2nd and July 10th). It was these interrogations that provided the bulk of the intelligence on the French plans and preparations. All the interrogations yielded similar intelligence and intent. Webb eventually concluded that what he was being told was true — five regiments of French regulars were at Fort Ticonderoga and a sixth regiment was at Fort St. Frederic (Crown Point); and that the French were preparing a bateaux fleet to carry artillery south via Lake George to invest Fort William Henry, not south on Lake Champlain leading to Wood Creek and Fort Edward. Webb was fully aware that Montcalm was expected at Ticonderoga in mid-July; Montcalm arrived on the 18th.

On the morning of August 3rd, the French fleet of bateaux landed just north and west of Fort William Henry. Later that day, Lt. Jacques Vaudry of the Canadian militia was captured by some of Israel Putnam's scouts out of Fort Edward and returned there for interrogation. From Vaudry, the purported size of Montcalm's Army was thought to be 11,000 men (Webb to Monro; Fort Edward, August 4th, Noon): *"The number of the Enemy is very considerable, the Prisr. says eleven Thousand and have a large Train of Artillery with Mortars and were to open their Batteries this day."* (Letters of George Bartman, Page 421; LO 4041 and CO 5/48 055, Final Letter Appendix). This estimate of the size of the French Army gravely concerned Webb and set the stage for Webb's officer conference on the 5th. As outlined in this officer conference, if advanced on by the French and his command did not receive reinforcements, Webb planned on retreating from Fort Edward (Montresor Journals, Page 39). Webb's letter to Loudoun does not offer this level of resignation (August 5th, LO 4081). If Montcalm advanced on Fort Edward, Webb anticipated that Fort Edward would fall and lacks any confidence in his ability to defend

the position unless massively reinforced by the militias. The true size of Montcalm's Army at the Siege was much less, around 7,600 men including the Indian Allies (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 625). A total of about 300 French soldiers had been left to secure both Fort Carillon and the Portage. Some 200 Indian Allies headed home following the destruction of Parker's Party in late July. Notably, the "eleven Thousand" is as in the original document and Schutz (1948-1949; Letters of George Bartman), and not "seven Thousand" as sometimes erroneously reported as being the estimate contained in the letter. Again, Pargellis (1933, Page 244) estimates Webb's total command at 7,400 men, regulars plus provincials, very comparable to Montcalm's strength, but Webb's men were dispersed and not collected together.

The following day, August 6th, the mood changes at Fort Edward. Regulars from outlying posts had been arriving and Webb's garrison had increased to 2,500 men. William Johnson appeared at Fort Edward with 500 militia and 150 Mohawk Allies (reference Montresor Journals, Page 26; LO 4245A). Another 1,000 or so militia had arrived in the previous few days or were added to Johnson's column on the march to Fort Edward (Montresor Journals, Page 27). Even with the purported size of Montcalm's Army ballooning to 12,000 men, Webb now plans to march to aid Monro. From LO 4041; Webb to Monro, August 6th and Letters of George Bartman, Page 422; received by Monro from a British ranger courier on the evening of the 9th, after the surrender:

Sir.

Your's of this Morning 6 O'clock, we have received, and I am directed by General Webb to acquaint You, that as we have now got together by the March of the Militia in the highest Spirits, three Armies of five thousand men in different parts of the Woods, we shall vet out in the Night with the Whole Join'd together and Make no doubt of cutting the Enemy entirely off.

*I am &c: G. Bartman
Aide de Camp*

We shall bring a Field Train.

The Bearer if pursued, is order'd to make away with the Letter.

In many ways, this letter of August 6th is more deserving of Monro's anger toward Webb than that of the infamous August 4th letter. By this letter, Webb would have left Fort Edward on the night of the 6th and engaged the French no later than the afternoon of the 7th. Webb would have expected Monro to sortie to the south to meet his column. Had this letter been received on the 6th or the 7th as intended, Monro would have had to make extensive preparations to aid Webb's advance. Monro could not have kept this knowledge solely to himself; it would have to be shared among the senior regular and provincial officers. Soon, rumor would spread throughout the entire camp — a relief column was coming, and it would arrive on the 7th. Subsequently, the failure of Webb to march might have proved impossible to justify and a "quiet" resolution regarding the future of Webb within the British Army doubtful. In this one aspect, Webb was fortunate that the letter was not delivered until after the surrender.

There is an episode that remains debated as to whether it is factual or fiction. Bellico (2010, Page 117) best explains this minor controversy. On either the 6th or the 8th (date dependent on the source material), Johnson started for Fort William Henry, but after marching a few miles was ordered back to Fort Edward by Webb. Johnson was furious with Webb (The Bougainville Journals, Page 333; a near-comical description of the confrontation). No new intelligence had

been obtained later that would force Webb to reconsider his decision to march on Fort William Henry, but Webb does change his decision. Webb would be waiting on even further reinforcements before marching. Steele considers this episode between Webb and Johnson to be a total myth fostered by Israel Putnam (Steele 1992, Page 173). There is no corresponding entry in the Johnson Papers suggesting that this event actually occurred. At the same time, Johnson leaves any aspect of opinion or recommendation out of his writings as regards what actions the British should be adopting. Beyond reporting militia numbers gathered at Fort Edward, there is nothing concerning the events around the Siege in the Johnson Papers. It is as if Johnson deliberately decided to avoid any involvement. Yet, there may be at least a small kernel of truth in this narrative. On August 28th, a conference was held between Johnson and the leaders of the Iroquois. From LO 4482, Mohawk Leader speaking to Johnson:

"Little Abraham of the Mohawk Castle, Speaker

Brother Warraghiyagey (Johnson - One who does Much Business)

When you acquainted us the Warriors of both Castles of the Enemys approach towards Fort William Henry and desired our joining you, and marching to the Relief thereof, we did not deliberate long on your Desire, but immediately rose up in Expectation not to stop until we arrived at that Place, but when we came to Fort Edward a Stop was put to our Proceeding further, which we understood was order by the Great Man commanding at that Place, so that we could not blame you for it. You then desired us to send Scouts to Lake George, and if possible to bring in a prisoner from the French. We accordingly went, but when our young men came within Sight of the Fort, they saw that their attempt was in vain, for they discovered that the Fort to be surrendered and in the Enemys hands and so they returned. Immediately after this we had unlucky news, that Moses a head man of ours was taken in attempting to Spie the situation at Lake George, and that he was made a Sacrifice to the Enemy."

Clearly, Webb orders Johnson not to march on Fort William Henry. Yet this passage does not rule out the possibility that Webb gave the order not to march at Fort Edward only after Johnson's column had already traveled three miles further north. Beyond this point, everything else is conjecture. The above passage hints the date of the alleged confrontation between Webb and Johnson may have been on the 8th, not the 6th. If sent out on the 6th, the Indian warriors on the scout would likely have returned well before the 9th, the date of the surrender; but even that is not certain. Hughes (2011, Page 204) has the date as the 8th. Suggesting that this march did happen is the entry from The Bougainville Journal for August 8th:

"At four o'clock Indian scouts reported that a considerable body of the enemy were coming on the road from Lydius (Fort Edward). The Chevalier de Levis at once went there with the largest part of the Canadians and Indians. The Marquis de Montcalm followed him with the brigades of La Sarre and Royal Roussillon..... Unfortunately the news of the march of the enemy was false. An Indian took fright and thought he saw it."

There may or may not have been an incident between Johnson and Webb, but there is no concrete evidence that there was. Neither Johnson himself nor Webb offers any direct criticism of each other. If Webb was bitter to Johnson, it was not for long. Webb then praises Johnson to Loudoun on his efforts to retain the militia that had assembled at Fort Edward (Webb to Loudoun, LO 4245A, August 17th), but the militia leaves regardless.

In defense of Webb, Webb's famous and often condemned "seek terms letter" is abused in histories and narratives (Reference Figure 7, Page 36). The letter is dated August 4th, Noon (LO 4041), but given to Monro by Montcalm on the 7th: *"The General thought proper to give you this intelligence, that in the case he should be so unfortunate from the delays of the Militia not to have it in his power to give you timely Assistance, you might be able to make the best Terms were left in your power."*

This letter directs Monro to seek terms, **but only if** Webb is not able to march to his aid. Much of the content in the letter of the 4th is simple common sense that should have been made clear during Webb's three-day inspection of Fort William Henry, but it should not have been communicated in a letter subject to interception by the French. Unfortunately for the British, the letter was intercepted. The real immediate harm in the letter was that it confirmed that Fort Edward was itself poorly manned and incapable of reinforcing or aiding Monro. Webb's letter of the 6th cannot be so easily dismissed, but the letter of the 6th was not received by Monro until after the surrender (LO 5275). Monro surrendered on the morning of August 9th. Captains Collins and Conyngham of the 35th were among the very first officers reaching Fort Edward on August 10th.

e. Webb and Monro

At the same time, Monro's performance was far from stellar. Monro had been in command at Fort William Henry since late March. With Pitt's direction to first attack Louisbourg and the delay, neither Webb nor Monro believed that Montcalm was pinned to Quebec. Loudoun had made this clear to Webb that there was now the distinct possibility that Montcalm would move south against him (MANA, Page 372; Loudoun to Webb, June 20, 1757). Unknown to either Webb or Monro, Loudoun remained "beached" in Nova Scotia. In late June and early July, both Webb and Monro were seeking "confirmed" intelligence about the French intentions at Carillon. The protective screening around Fort Carillon was very tight and any intelligence obtained from Indians allied to the British was discounted. Nonetheless, the scouting reports and interviews with French deserters and escaped British prisoners suggested five or six battalions of French regulars at Carillon. Pargellis (1933, Pages 246-247) reasons that by July 3rd, Webb had the needed intelligence to call for colonial reinforcements and gather the British regulars. On July 10th additional intelligence confirming that Montcalm was moving south was obtained from a prisoner captured by Indian Allies at Fort St. Frederic. To Pargellis, reinforcements summoned later than about July 24th were unlikely to arrive soon enough and in large enough numbers to relieve Monro. A summoning date of July 15th seems more realistic but only if self-supplied. Independent of Webb, Monro had his own prisoners. On July 2nd, four French deserters arrive at Fort William Henry and willingly talk; Monro was well aware of the overall intention of the French (LO 4020). Although neither Webb nor Monro wanted to believe those reports, neither could they be dismissed. Especially as regards Webb, any intelligence not confirmed by a British officer was viewed with suspicion, but no British officer managed to get close to Fort Carillon that summer and return with useful intelligence. Loudoun had warned Webb not to trust:

"I think you ought to send with them an Officer, on whose Accounts you can depend, to reconnoitre the place and Avenues to it, and to bring You an account of the Numbers they have; then You will Act of a certainty;" (Loudoun to Webb, June 20, 1757; MANA, Page 371).

Unfortunately, Monro's chief ranger, Captain Richard Rogers, died from smallpox on June 22nd. Rogers might have been the only man in position and with enough influence to have convinced Webb and Monro into acting earlier in the summer. Even with the need for "confirmed" intelligence, neither Webb nor Monro risked large scouting parties of regulars. Lieutenant Noah Johnson was then leading the single company of Rogers' Rangers. Several times in July, Johnson tried to penetrate the screen surrounding Carillon. Johnson was unsuccessful and failed to return with any prisoners. Webb subsequently accused Johnson's rangers of abandoning their scouting duties and simply camping out on a secluded island on Lake George (Loescher 1946, Page 176; but the citation given here does not trace to LO 4020). Israel Putnam of the Connecticut provincial rangers was trusted by Webb, but his chief responsibility seems to have been scouting South Bay and the Wood Creek Corridor, not Carillon.

Nevertheless, Monro forced the issue and commits a full quarter of his garrison to scouting. Monro's approach was extremely aggressive, but it was entirely dependent on the provincials. Despite subsequent suggestions by Webb, Webb was fully aware of the aggressive scouting adopted by Monro (Montresor Journals, Page 21). A scouting party of 150 men returned from Wood Creek and South Bay on July 13th, reporting no enemy seen. On the 16th, a scout of 200 men under Lt. Colonel Jonathan Goffe of New Hampshire moved down the Lake in boats. From this group, a party of about nine men advanced toward Ticonderoga, reporting little beyond that *"they have a large number of Troops there"* (Williamson Family Papers; National Archives Canada Microfilm A 573). A day later, on July 17th, Captain Robert McGinnis (New York provincials) with 115 men scout north toward Ticonderoga but encounter a party of French near Sabbath Point. There was a short exchange of fire with both sides taking casualties. Now detected, McGinnis then retreats without venturing further north; he does not reach Ticonderoga. After the return of these last two scouts, Monro sends even more men north to Ticonderoga. On July 23rd, a large party of some 350 men under the command of Colonel John Parker of the New Jersey Blues was ambushed at the northern end of Lake George, near Sabbath Point. Out of 22 boats, only four returned. Near 100 were killed and 160 were captured. Captain McGinnis was among those captured, but he dies from his wounds. Less than 70 men escaped including Parker and Captain Ogden of the New York rangers. This scout-raid was unsanctioned by Webb and was very much a stab in the dark by Monro. There were far more British casualties in this failed raid than during the actual Siege. From LO 4020 (Webb to Loudoun, August 1st), Webb was not kind to Monro's decision to send Parker on this raid:

"The same Evening Col. Parker set out from Forte William Henry, without my Knowing any Thing of the matter, till too late to prevent it, with 300 Men and 27 Boats of different Kinds, to what purpose I really cannot tell; all the reason they give for it was to take some Prisoners, and at Day Break next Morning fell into an Ambuscade of French & Indians at a place called Sabbath Day Pointe, about 26 Miles from Forte William Henry; They were fired upon by a large Party of the Enemy on each Side of the Lake, and at the Same Time Attacked by a great number of Indian Canoes, in which the Enemy shewed such great Resolution, and even to board and overset our Boats, giving to Quarters the Men from their being scatter'd became separately and easy Conquest."

Monro returns the rebuke. From LO 5309 (Monro to Loudoun, November 1st):

"Gen^l: Webb concealing from me, the March of the French, to Attack Fort W^m: Henry, was thought an extraordinary thing, As likewise the reinforcement, that was to have been with Us, the Saturday, Not coming till dark, Tuesday night."

It may be that the results of the interrogations of the French deserters and prisoners were not fully shared with Monro — some of these interrogations took place at Fort Edward. Or that the observations of the scout by Israel Putnam and Noah Johnson on July 28th, where the enemy was thought to be positioned on both shores of the nearest narrow to the Fort, were not communicated to Monro (LO 4020). Still, neither seems likely. All the information gathered from any prisoners by either Webb or Monro would have been thoroughly reconsidered during Webb's inspection of Fort William Henry in late July — this would have been a key focus of the Officer Conferences on the 27th and the 28th. The Williamson Journal is clear in that the events happening in and around Fort Edward throughout July were rapidly communicated to Fort William Henry. More telling, both the interrogation of the prisoners and Putnam's scout are fully reported in Adam Williamson's Journal. Williamson was assigned to Monro's staff (Final Letter Appendix).

Early on the morning of the 28th, smoke columns were seen on the Lake. Putnam was then sent out and reports that the enemy was gathering on the Lake, north of the narrows. Toward evening, Putnam was sent out a second time to confirm his initial scout (LO 6660). Putnam again reports the presence of the French. From the Williamson Journal (July 29th): *"from intelligence received by Capt. Putnam of a very large Body of the Enemy being up North West Bay & great numbers of boats."* Northwest Bay is 12 miles north of Fort William Henry and a logical gathering point. At the Narrows, three enemy canoes were spotted that quickly retreated and there may have been movement on the opposite shore. Traveling north of this point, one must thread numerous islands for a distance of seven miles. Fearing yet another trap, Putnam decided to return to Fort William Henry. Lt. Noah Johnson accompanied Putnam. Johnson was part of Monro's command and garrison, leading the Rogers' Rangers at Fort William Henry.

Putnam was one of the very few men valued by Webb (LO 4020). Webb would finally act on his report. In reality, this report of the 28th was largely erroneous. There was no French gathering at Northwest Bay, at least not yet. The canoe flotilla does not depart from the far northern end of Lake Champlain until the 31st. The French artillery does not start heading south on the Lake until August 1st.

Between the Williamson Journal and the presence of Johnson, it is difficult to validate the nature of Monro's complaint. It is hard to see how keeping Monro in the dark about both of Putnam's scouts seems even physically possible. Yet this curious statement remains — *"Gen^l: Webb concealing from me, the March of the French"*. Webb may not have personally told Monro of the results of the scouts, but the claim of concealment is distorted and overblown. Any suggestion that Putnam was ordered by Webb to keep the observations of his scout secret and unreported is likely fable but persists (reference Pargellis 1933, Page 249; and LO 4642, Loudoun to Cumberland, October 17th).

In an odd way, the actions of both Webb and Monro throughout June and July suggest that although seriously alarmed, they were both unwilling to act constructively on the intelligence.

Winslow suffered from the same doubts and inactions the year previously (Travers 2015, Page 80). What level of confidence was needed to reach "confirmed" is obscure. Prisoners and deserters were prized, but then not fully believed, regardless of how many told similar stories. Any reaction to the intelligence by either Webb or Monro seems to be limited to sending out more scouting parties, but little else beyond Webb's dispatching some 550 Massachusetts provincials south from Fort Edward, presumably to "trade" for regular troops or augment his supply lines was done (LO 4004). The position of the encampment could have been moved weeks earlier rather than in a rush starting on July 28th. Loudoun may or may not have suggested this be done months earlier, but the language is uncertain (LO 4020, Webb to Loudoun):

"The (July) 25th. I went to Fort William Henry, with L^t. Col^o Young, M^r. Montresor, and Capt. Ord, who upon considering the Situations of Affairs and reconnoitring the Ground, were of Opinion that the Troops encamped on the N.W. Side of the Fort, agreeable to Your Lordship's former Instructions should be removed to the Rocky Eminence on the S:E: where a Redoubt shou'd be raised, and some small Pieces of Cannon mounted on it, under the Fire of which they might encamp without being subject to a surprise from the Enemy, which for the Nearnefs of the Wood, and the Distance of the Fort from the former Encampment they were always liable to. Neither of the Galliot's were yet lanch'd but one was to be ready in a few Days."

The advance work could have been strengthened, as advocated by Eyre (LO 3728, May 29, 1757; see Figure 2). Instead, it was razed at the last minute. Eyre had wanted several field guns placed there. Long-range cannon and mortars could have been brought forward from Fort Edward. Both Webb and Monro knew that Montcalm was likely to move against Fort William Henry a full month before the actual Siege.

After August 3rd, the correspondence between Webb and Monro is not only limited to a few successfully transmitted letters, but only two letters by Monro to Webb (both from the 6th) contain any real intelligence that would be useful to Webb. The letters to Monro from Webb are likewise vague, except for the 6th where Webb indicates he will be marching with 5,000 men. This letter of the 6th was delivered (LO 4041), but not until the evening of the 9th, several hours after the actual surrender (LO 5275; and Steele 1990, Page 105).

When the lines of communication were still open on the 3rd and the morning of the 4th, Monro did not have a good feeling about the strength of Montcalm and provided nothing on the subject to Webb. Seemingly, both Monro and Webb feared putting specifics into the letters in case of interception by the French. On the 3rd, Webb asks for information on the strength and dispositions of the French, not on the obvious needs of Monro. This letter was received by Monro that night (LO 5275). Monro provides the first useful information to Webb in two similar letters on the 6th, but these letters are equally silent on the strength of Montcalm. The letters of the 6th simply provided Webb with a good understanding of the condition of the British artillery, little else. Considering the possibility of interception, Monro placed far too much information about his position and limitations in the letters of the 6th; but by this time, Monro felt the need to give Webb specifics to better his case for quick support. Previous letters simply called for reinforcements. In terms of providing intelligence, Monro's letters can only be viewed as seriously lacking.

From Monro to Webb, Morning dated August 6th (received by Webb):

"Sir:

As a proof of the insufficiency of the artillery, we have had within 24 hours, two 18-pounders, one 12-pounder and one mortar burst, from which you will see the necessity of sending up a fresh supply of artillery as soon as possible...."

We have the letters of Webb to Monro (George Bartman Letters, Schutz 1992) and at least some of the letters from Monro to Webb (LO 4040, LO 4041, and Dodge 2007). Monro was careful to document which of Webb's letters were received and when they were received (LO 5275). There were four letters received by Monro from Webb, but only two were delivered before the surrender. The first letter from Webb was dated August 3rd and received on August 3rd. The infamous letter was dated August 4th and presented by Montcalm to Webb on August 7th (not August 6th as referenced in LO 5275, Monro to Loudoun). Following the capitulation, two more letters from Webb were delivered on the evening of the 9th. The letter of August 6th was given directly to Monro by a ranger courier. Montcalm then gives the August 8th letter to Monro.

From the French perspective, the content of the intercepted infamous communication of August 4th was an intelligence boon. More than anything else, it proved Webb to be weak at Fort Edward, too weak to immediately march out. This knowledge bought Montcalm the time needed to conduct an orderly siege. Webb's failure to advance will always be dressed in fear, as opposed to a sound military decision. But that decision was very poorly framed, orchestrated, and communicated. Steele (1990, Page 107) describes the idea of Webb marching out to the rescue of Monro as being foolhardy, "*if not suicidal*". Webb to Monro, August 4th; delivered to Monro on August 7th by Montcalm (LO 4041):

Sir,

I am directed by general Webb to acknowledge the Receipt of three of your Letters, two bearing date about Nine yesterday Morning, and one about six in the Evening by two Rangers, which are the only Men that have got in here, except two yesterday with your first, acquainting him of the Enemy in Sight. He has order'd Me to acquaint you, he does not think it prudent (As you know his Strength at this place) to attempt a Junction or to afsist you till reinforc'd by the Militia of the Colonies, for the immediate March of repeated Expresses have been sent. One of our Scouts brought in a Canadian Prisoner last night from the Investing Party which is very large, & have possess'd all the Grounds five miles on this side of Fort Wm Henry. The number of Enemy is very Considerable, the Prisoner says eleven Thousand and have a Large train of Artillery with Mortars and were to open their Batteries this day. The General thought proper to give you this intelligence, that in Case he should be so unfortunate from the delays of the Militia not to have it in his Power to give you timely Afsistance, you might be able to make the best Terms were left in your power. The Bearer is Serjeant of the Connecticut Forces and if is happy Enough to get in, will bring advices from you. We keep Continual Scouts going, to endeavor to get in, or bring intelligence from you.

I am &cc.

*G. Bartman
Aid de Camp*

To Monro, this letter was deeply alarming, and that alarm had nothing to do with the infamous phrase "*to make the best Terms were left in your power*". Instead, Monro fears that Montcalm's strength is so heavily inflated in this letter that there would be no chance whatsoever of Webb marching in relief. The lack of specifics concerning the strength of the French in his previous letters now comes home to haunt Monro. The next day, Monro writes Webb for the last time. The emphasis is clear, the French prisoner is deceiving Webb and should not be believed. Monro to Webb, Morning of the 8th (LO 4041):

Sir,

The Fort and Camp will hold out in hopes of the speedy Relief from You, which We hourly Expect, and if that does not happen, We must fall into the hands of our Enemies, Your letter dated 4th instant was delivered to me by an Aid de Camp of General Montcalm's; that letter falling into his hands was a very unhappy thing and has to be sure, elevated him greatly. As to the Numbers of the Enemy, the Canadian prisoner mentioned to you, every body here is of the opinion that was greatly Magnify'd. If they really had those Numbers, they might have demolished us at once, with out Loss of time. The Enemy are Constantly playing upon us from two heavy batteries of Nine pieces Cannon Each. Relief is greatly wanted.

I am, &c. Geo. Monro

Webb repeats his request for intelligence. Presented to Monro by Montcalm on the evening of the 9th, after the surrender. Webb to Monro, Evening of August 8th (LO 4041):

Sir:

I am directed by General Webb to acquaint you, that it is entirely owing to the delay of the Militia that he has not yet mov'd up to your Assistance, but as he had now got a party of them and Expects a thousand more tomorrow, you may depend, upon their arrival, that he will not fail to March to your Assistance; you will upon hearing him engag'd consult with Col. Young how you can by making a vigorous Sally from Camp best support his attack. We have sent repeated Letters but are sorry only one has got in, tho we hope none have fallen into the Enemys hands, as most of the Parties have returned but were all closely pursued. We shall have about an hundred & fifty Indians with Sir Wm. Johnson, but shall keep them nigh as to prevent any Mistake. We wish most heartily that you may be able to hold out a little longer, and hope to have it in our power to relieve you from your present disagreeable Situation, tho we are inform'd by a Prisoner we took the first Evening of the Enemy's landing, that they are eleven Thousand strong. On the receipt of this, the General desires you will send off several Expresses to acquaint him thereof, likewise what you judge the Enemys Numbers to be, and how long you think, you could hold out against the present Cannonading.

*I am &cc. G. Bartman
Aid de Camp*

Preparations came late. Lacking any sense of urgency, the two small sloops that survived Rigaud's Raid were not repaired or refitted, and the two new galliots under construction were not completed in time to confront Montcalm (LO 3179 — reprinted in Dodge 2007, Pages 41-44; and LO 4081). The 100-man galliots with their single 9-pounder plus swivel guns would have been key to controlling the Lake. With oars, these ships could easily be "parked" in position. The other two large vessels, flat-bottomed scows, were not considered capable of opposing Montcalm,

and their armament, if any, is unclear (The Montresor Journals, Page 41). Reestablishing the "navy" should have been the highest priority and pushed hard by Monro. If the British controlled the water, Montcalm could not have easily or quickly moved his artillery south, regardless of the size of his army. From Loudoun to Webb, June 20, 1757: MANA, Page 371:

"I am aware of the Objection that may be made, of getting possession of the Landing places at the lower or North end of Lake George, from the want of Boats, arising from those burnt last Winter by the Enemy; but you have still remaining, one Sloop unhurt, and another that wanted little repair, with the Bay Boats and Gondolas; And I should hope, that one of two of your Galleys might be finished by this time; with those, to carry Regular Troops with your Rangers, and what you can pick out of the Provincials to Act in that Shape, to be first carried down the Lake so far, and then go by Land, I should think it not difficult to get the necessary Force there."

Loudoun was hoping the first two galliots would be finished by the end of June. Pargellis (1933, Page 244) places all the blame for not rebuilding the "navy" on Webb. Webb, in turn, blames it on too few shipwrights under his command, only twelve. From LO 4020, Webb to Loudoun, August 1, 1757, regarding Parker's Scout:

"By this unfortunate Stroke Your Lordship will perceive the Enemy have at present the Superiority on the Lake, we having now but 2 of the old Sloops and 5 Whale Boats remaining. I have however given Orders to have 16 others sent up from Albany and Schenectady as soon as possible.".....

"Neither of the Galliots were yet lanced but one was to be ready in a few Days.".....

"We have set a great many more Hands at work on the Galliots (there being but 12 Ship Carpenters amongst the 49 artificers under Capt. Worthen) and hope if we can get them out in Time, to recover the Command of the Lake again."

Although truthful, Webb is not being entirely honest. The total number of carpenters that were actually assigned to Webb's command was forty-eight with twelve carpenters being shipwrights (Pargellis 1933, Page 235). On July 29th, many of these carpenters/artificers were at Fort Edward and would rush to Lake George to try to complete the galliots (Gridley 1906, Page 46; and Lyman 1899, Page 59). In 1760, Amherst used five rowed galliots on the St. Lawrence to good effect.

Montresor shares in this failure. Loudoun was decidedly unimpressed with Montresor's ability to complete orders or to prioritize work. Montresor's focus was planning over execution, and his attention would quickly drift onto the "next" project. He was not an asset to either Webb or Monro, if not an actual liability. With Webb and Montresor remaining in Albany and not reaching Fort Edward until June 24th, Harry Gordon was likely free to direct the carpenters and other artificers. Gordon's post was Fort Edward. As an engineer, Gordon was senior to Williamson at Fort William Henry. As both Montresor's and Gordon's focus was on improvements at Fort Edward, little emphasis was placed on the needed shipbuilding at Lake George.

Some caution is needed in the evaluation of the true strength and capabilities of the Lake George "navy". The British "navy" at Lake George (Fall 1756) and the British "navy" on Lake Ontario (Summer 1756) are remarkably similar in terms of number and armament. If the fourth sloop had been completed on Lake George, near mirror images. Similar to Loudoun's reasoning, Shirley

had relied on the "navy" to secure Oswego (Shirley Correspondence to Henry Fox, Volume II; September 16, 1756, Page 569 - 570). Following the disaster of Oswego, Loudoun had to realize that reliance on the "navy" came with considerable risks and no guarantees. But more important to Loudoun, it left his plans and regimental assignments for Louisbourg intact. During the Siege of Oswego, the British "navy" consisted of a new Brig (14 guns, *London*): six 6-pounders, eight 4-pounders, and fourteen swivels; a new sloop (6 guns, *Vigilant*): four 4-pounders, two 3-pounders, and twelve swivels; a one-year-old sloop (6 guns, *Ontario*): six 4-pounders, two howitzers, and twelve swivels; and a one-year-old schooner of twelve swivels (Lake Ontario, August 1756; MANA, Page 219; and Grant 1914, Page 360). The *Oswego* (sloop) had been stripped of guns and crew to fit the *London*. An even larger ship was launched that summer, but it lacked guns, rigging, and crew (eighteen 6-pounders). These ships were not used with much effect. On Lake Ontario, Montcalm moved his bateaux fleet mostly at night, hugging the shoreline. The British "navy" failed to detect the advance of the French until Montcalm was relatively near. When approached, Montcalm simply drove off the British vessels using 12-pounders positioned on the shoreline and proceeded to move on Oswego. Pressure from Vaudreuil almost guaranteed that Montcalm would try an advance on Fort William Henry. The simple presence of a "navy" would have troubled Montcalm, but he likely would have gambled as he did at Oswego and ventured south hoping that he would remain undetected until he was near Fort William Henry; and if challenged, again drive the British ships off with larger guns of longer range. Instead of amending his plans in response to Rigaud's Winter Raid, Loudoun ultimately accepts the same gamble that Shirley lost at Oswego. The row galliots being built under orders from Loudoun would each be equipped with a single 9-pounder in the bow plus swivel guns; the added effective range of a 9-pounder, when compared to 4- and 6-pounders, would be key. From the failures at Oswego, Loudoun realizes that 6-pounders were simply too small in caliber to "control" large lakes and their shorelines and that wind dependent ships suffered in this unique role. Loudoun wanted four of these row galleys built, not just two.

Starting in the last week of July, there was a chaotic move from the hillock southwest of the Bastion to a newly entrenched camp location to the southeast. With the majority of both the 35th and the colonials moving to the new entrenched camp, nearly all available hands were engaged in making it ready. Unfortunately, the simple breastwork of the new entrenched camp was not yet completed when Montcalm arrived, more logs and stone were still needed (LO 3994; reprinted in Dodge 2007, Pages 57-58). The Bastion itself seems to have been largely empty except for a guard of fifty soldiers (Furnis Letter, Page 311). Hospital staff with the sick and some civilians also remained in the Bastion. With the appearance of Montcalm's bateaux fleet, the remnants of the abandoned camp to the west were burned or leveled, including huts and any vegetation that could provide cover (Hays Journal). Those men slated to garrison the Bastion gathered their gear and rushed to the Bastion. Both movements were done successfully, but nearly all the livestock was lost in the chaos including the valuable horse and oxen freight teams from the Young/Fyre column. As many as 150 horses and oxen were captured or slaughtered, and Young's wagons and carts were now trapped (Laramie 2012, Page 297). These losses just added to Webb's logistical problems (Steele 1990, Page 99). Monro blames the late arrival of the Young/Frye Column on the inability to have properly completed the entrenched camp or to have enough timber and men to construct suitable livestock enclosures (LO 5309). Monro would write Loudoun that Young's column did not arrive until August 2nd, three days later than agreed at the officer conference on

the 28th (LO 3994 and LO 4479; Final Letter Appendix). Yet Young only arrived back at Fort Edward on July 29th, so the idea he could have been ready to march the very next morning does not seem plausible. Curiously, Montresor does not report this discussion of the 28th. Monro also writes that it was Webb's initial intention to then return to Fort William Henry to assume command during the Siege with Monro moving south to command Fort Edward.

Monro was facing other problems. Precautions were not taken to move the women and children south the required fifteen or so miles to Fort Edward. There is no indication of where the forty or so women and children were housed during the Siege, but logic would suggest casements in the Bastion. The roofs of the barracks had already been removed. Both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry were again experiencing an outbreak of smallpox. At many military posts, the hospital or a second satellite hospital for disease cases would have been positioned just outside of a curtain wall in a location and orientation where no attack was expected, but this appears not to be the case at Fort William Henry. The wounded at Fort William Henry were cared for in casements within the Bastion itself (LO 4654). Whether the wounded were isolated from the sick is not clear, the concern being smallpox. The Bastion was solidly packed – defenders, non-combatants, and the sick and wounded.

Most importantly, Monro appears to lack any overall appreciation of the true strategic situation and the difficulties faced by Webb. The repeated calling on Webb to send reinforcements and a new artillery train is understandable but hardly constructive. Monro offers no intelligence in his early letters to Webb and the elements that Monro was focused on should have been resolved during Webb's last inspection, specifically during the officer conferences on July 27th and 28th. As the senior officer, this was Webb's responsibility. Monro insists on clarification on the 28th (LO 3994 and LO 4479), but there is a good chance that Webb simply would not commit to any specific action. Webb arrived at Fort William Henry the afternoon of the 25th and did not leave until the morning of the 29th, ample time for private conversation between Webb and Monro. At the officer conference held on August 5th at Fort Edward, the question of relief of Monro was again examined, but Webb quickly turned the focus away from Fort William Henry to the status and needs of Fort Edward.

Wisely, Monro did not attempt to prevent Montcalm's bateaux from landing. Chevalier de Levis had independently marched with about 2,500 men from Fort Carillon to Fort William Henry by way of forest trails, more than 30 miles. If the landing was contested, these men were positioned along the west shore of Lake George ready to aid Montcalm. Yet there is no indication that Monro knew of Levis's advance, so Monro's decision not to interdict appears to be independent of Levis's position and numbers.

Monro was fully aware of the available manpower, troop depositions, and commitments that were facing the British in New York. Even under the best of circumstances, Monro knew the British could only equal the numbers of the French now surrounding Fort William Henry. Yet there is nothing in his correspondence or subsequent actions suggesting any sensitivity or acknowledgment of these realities. From Lt. Col. Young, Monro had to have realized that Webb had only about 1,600 men fit for duty remaining at Fort Edward (LO 4081) — there were some 2,200 fit men at Fort William Henry. Militia headed to the various secondary posts freeing the regulars and provincials to report to Fort Edward. Any further militia was to head to Fort

Edward, but time was needed for those forces to arrive and organize (Letters of George Bartman; To Gabriel Christie from Bartman, August 3rd, 1757, Page 418):

"I am to acquaint you, it is General Webbs order that as soon as the Militia shall have march'd into Albany, the Troops of which the present Garrison consists, are to proceed with their respective officers to join the Army at Fort Edward without the least delay. They have fir'd the Signals of the approach of the Enemy at Fort Wm. Henry, the General therefore desires you will do every thing in your power to forward the raising of the Militia; after they have reliev'd our Troops at Albany and the different Posts on the Hudson, the remainder is to proceed to this Place.

[P.S.] On the receipt of this you will please send off an Express to the different Colonels of the Militia with this intelligence, and to hasten them up with their respective Regts. as fast as possible."

Yet a second letter to Gabriel Christie modified these orders (Letters of George Bartman; To Gabriel Christie from Bartman, August 3rd, 2 in the Evening (Afternoon), Page 419):

"The Enemy is landed with a large Army to the attack of Fort Wm. Henry, it is General Webbs order therefore, that you do immediately send off the Garrison from Albany without waiting to be reliev'd; you are likewise to send up all the Militia that are ready to march, and send another Express to Sir Wm. acquainting him of this, and that the General desires his immediate presence, with what Men and Indians he can collect, also send an Express to the Lieut. Governor, and Colonels of the Militia. The Troops that move up are not to bring any Baggage but their Blankets, and make forc'd Marches."

For the first ten days of August, no timetable or list of when the additional regulars, provincials, or the newly arrived militia reached Fort Edward appears to have been made — it is not in the Montresor Journals. We do know that Webb had about 5,000 men at Fort Edward by the evening of the 6th (Letters of George Bartman, Fort Edward, August 6th, Page 422; quoted on Page 75 here). On paper, the British and French were now about equal in strength, but the British forces were divided in two. A thousand more militia were expected to arrive at Fort Edward on the 9th. From Webb to Monro, Evening of August 8th, Letters of George Bartman Page 423, and LO 4041; given to Monro by Montcalm after the surrender:

"I am directed by General Webb to acquaint you, that it is entirely owing to the delay of the Militia that he has not yet mov'd up to your Assistance, but as he now got a party of them and expects a thousand more tomorrow, you may depend, upon their arrival, that he will not fail to march to your Assistance; you will upon hearing him engag'd consult with Col. Young how you can by making a vigorous sally from the Camp best support his attack."

From this letter, the second pledge by Webb to march would have been on August 9th or 10th, the language is vague. This letter was intercepted by the French during the evening of the 9th. Monro surrendered on the morning of the 9th. This letter was given to Monro by Montcalm, but only after the capitulation. Webb's previous promise to march was for the evening of the 6th (LO 4041; Webb to Monro, August 6th; received after the surrender, see Page 75). As with all of Webb's letters, how much of the language belongs to Bartman is always suspect.

At the time of surrender, Montcalm believed that Webb's strength at Fort Edward was then about 6,000 men (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 597). For August 9th, the day of the capitulation, Webb would claim he had no more than a total of 4,500 men fit for duty; the militia accounting for no more than 2,000 men (LO 4198A). This suggests that Webb had managed to gather an additional 900 regulars and provincials since August 3rd (Fit for Duty: 4,500 = 1,600 regulars and provincials + 900 regulars and provincial reinforcements + 2,000 militia). Webb sheltered several hundred sick as well, both regulars and the provincials. Still, by the 9th, between fifteen hundred and two thousand regulars and provincials had not yet managed to reach Fort Edward, assuming they had all been summoned. Some of these troops would be needed to guard the western approaches to the Mohawk Valley settlements and Albany. Despite the title of the document, LO 4004 is the monthly rolls for all provincials under Webb for July through September, except those at Fort Number 4 in New Hampshire, but the actual postings are not provided. Provincials who serve at Fort William Henry were released from service and their numbers are not included in the August 30th or September 30th Return. Starting on July 15th, there are four tables presented. The table for July 30th is for Fort Edward only and suggests that after the relief column left, there were about 1,000 provincials fit for duty remaining at Fort Edward, including officers. Fully half of these provincials were from Connecticut serving under Lyman (585), the remainder from New York (156) and Rhode Island (263). This then suggests that about 600 regulars remained at Fort Edward, the four companies of the 35th known to be there and about the same number of companies from the 60th Foot. Much of this information is presented in Pargellis (1933, Page 245). Within the immediate time frame and independent of any correspondence, Monro had to realize that 4,500 - 5,000 men were the maximum that Webb could possibly gather. Webb argued that his advancing on Fort William Henry was not sound and that preserving his force at Fort Edward was the only way to protect Albany and the other colonies (LO 4081, August 5th). If a token force of 500 men would have to be left to garrison Fort Edward and several hundred sick, Webb's estimate of 4,500 - 5,000 men was painfully honest, or if anything, inflated. From LO 4198A, Webb to Loudoun, August 11th:

"I had not above two thousand of the militia with me at the time of the Surrender, which with the Troops under my Command after having called in the Detachments left at Albany and the other Posts did not amount to above four thousand five hundred men fit for Duty."

The British Army's faith in the fighting ability of the newly gathered militia would have been far less than that of the more seasoned provincials; the militia being primarily recently recruited farmers and tradesmen. Additional militia continued to arrive, and near certain, more regulars and provincials. On August 12th three days after the surrender, "A General Return of Militia Encamp^d Near Fort Edward" lists 4,239 men, but only 2,931 men on August 17th (Papers of William Johnson, Vol. II, Page 730). These last two totals do not include any of the regulars or provincial troops. On August 12th, not including any troops that served at Fort William Henry, the troops available to Webb at Fort Edward probably reached a minimum of 6,700 total – British regulars, provincials plus the militia with the militia accounting for more than half the total. How this force was equipped as regards supplies, wagons, and horses is unknown. The available field artillery would have been restricted to two 8-inch howitzers, 6-pounders, and 4-pounders. Outside of guns still at Albany, there were no 12-pounders or 9-pounders mounted on field carriages that could have been brought forward. There were no 5 1/2-inch royal mortars or 4 2/5-inch coehorn mortars at Fort Edward (LO 6686); these had been lost at Oswego.

Montcalm was comfortable that Webb would not advance against his position, but Montcalm was equally uncomfortable with the prospect of advancing on Webb. Fort William Henry was then razed and burnt to the ground. Montcalm returned to Carillon and then Quebec. The consensus of modern narratives is clear. With 1,500 Indian Warriors and another 1,000 Canadian militia between Monro and Webb, the idea of a British column fighting through to rescue Monro is woefully unrealistic, especially as poorly disciplined militia would have made up such a high percentage of the relief column. Montcalm was fully prepared to augment that screen with French regulars, as he did on August 8th following a report of a British Column moving north, possibly Johnson. Near certain, such an effort would have resulted in extremely heavy casualties on both sides or a disaster similar to the events on the Monongahela (reference LO 4245A, Webb to Loudoun, August 17th). By August 11th, Webb was confident that Montcalm would not be moving south, and that Fort Edward was secure (LO 4198A); some of the gathered militia had already left Fort Edward for home. Vaudreuil was livid that Montcalm did not advance on Fort Edward (Fort Lydius). He had given Montcalm specific orders to do so (Vaudreuil to Montcalm, July 9, 1757; O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 661). Montcalm gave several reasons for not advancing on Fort Edward, but none satisfied the aggressive Vaudreuil (Vaudreuil to M. de Moras, August 18, 1757; O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 663).

By this time, the very competent Lord Viscount Howe had arrived at Fort Edward; he had been dispatched by Cumberland to North America. George Howe was the Colonel-Commandant of the 3rd Battalion of the 60th (February 2, 1757); Loudoun was the Colonel-in-Chief of the entire regiment, 4 battalions. Howe was an extremely well-respected and liked officer. Howe arrived at Fort Edward late on the evening of August 6th (near 9 o'clock; The Montresor Journals, Page 26). New to the situation, Howe does not inject himself into a position of authority either on the 7th or 8th. Somewhat surprisingly, there is never any criticism of Howe for failing to influence Webb into advancing on the 8th. Montresor and Howe then concentrate on securing the defensive character of Fort Edward. If Webb had marched on the 9th or 10th, as promised, Howe would have likely commanded the relief column. Montcalm would not have been opposing just the facilitating Webb. The presence of Howe and Johnson guaranteed that the British would fight at Fort Edward. Though Webb held rank over Howe, Webb would not have been able to reject Howe's advice. Besides being sent by Cumberland, Howe was deeply politically connected — Howe's grandmother was half-sister to George I and Hanoverian by birth.

The arrival of Howe at Fort Edward late on the 6th goes with little or no comment in past histories. Earlier on the 6th, Webb wrote to Monro that he was planning to march that very evening (LO 4041), but whether he ever gave the orders to make ready is unclear. The supposed argument between Sir William Johnson and Webb may have its true origins here, the dates align. Whether Howe's sudden arrival caused a cancellation or rethinking of the relief march is only conjecture without any foundation. Undoubtedly, Howe's influence would have been considerable, but we have no idea if Howe chose to exercise it. Only just arriving and unfamiliar with any details, Howe might have chosen to be silent, or the issue could have been settled hours before the arrival of Howe. There is no mention of Howe's presence outside of the Montresor Journals. Likely, Johnson talked directly with Howe. Howe's presence could be responsible for the lack of any subsequent criticism of Webb by Johnson. Wisely, Howe is not mentioned in *Transactions* — dragging the King's cousin into this debacle would have benefited no one. Unfortunately, the Howe family library in Ireland and the contained papers were burnt in 1826.

In 1758, Howe was killed in a skirmish with the French as the British Army approached Ticonderoga. Two days later, Abercromby would be defeated by Montcalm.

A common feature of both Webb's and Monro's letters to Loudoun was their self-protective tone. Monro writing to Loudoun detailing the dates of the correspondences received from Webb is the most blunt and has no other purpose (LO 5275). There is a second common thread. In their correspondences to Loudoun, both Monro and Webb repeatedly praise the performance of the British regulars; then Monro takes considerable effort to dismiss the performance of the provincials (LO 4479 and LO 5309, Final Letter Appendix). Yet during July, Monro was more than willing to repeatedly throw hundreds of provincials into scouting missions directed at Ticonderoga, fully knowing there were at least five French regiments positioned there, and all the while, holding back his regulars. All told, Monro sends some 650 provincials on scouts in July. Webb is more understanding and simply calls the provincials "backward" (LO 4198A). Monro complains by the end of the Siege, the colonials often would simply fire their muskets into the air while sheltered behind the parapets and breastworks, rather than firing from aimed positions over these works. Monro writes in LO 4479: *"Sorry to say it, tho' with great truth, that in general, the Provincials did not behave well."*

All avenues of personal criticism were carefully blocked in both Webb's and Monro's correspondences with one notable exception. What is lacking in any of the letters was a defense for not calling for colonial reinforcements in early or middle July or the gathering of the British regulars from scattered posts weeks earlier. Calling for reinforcements in late July simply did not provide the needed time to mobilize the reinforcements. Considering the intelligence at hand, this lack of foresight is Pargellis's chief and strident criticism, especially of Webb. Surprisingly, no history or narrative discusses how the British would utilize a larger garrison or how to make the best use of any relief column while avoiding an even worse debacle than the actual surrender. Here, Lord Howe might have been of considerable assistance to Webb.

Webb appears to have an excellent understanding of Montcalm's intentions, but he does little during the key five-week period starting in late June. Webb's letters to Loudoun in August lack resolve, but they are intelligent and well-formed. Webb always displays an excellent grasp of the overall situation; something not evident in Monro, but then Webb fails to act. By early July, Monro had similar intelligence on Montcalm's intentions, the four French deserters arriving on July 2nd. Though lacking in the authority of Webb, Monro does little to prepare in case the French do advance beyond aggressive scouting using the provincials.

Not re-establishing the "navy" is a close second sin for Pargellis, but Monro has a share in the blame for that failure, it was his post. Loudoun still clung to his overall strategy, even though it was modified by Pitt. Loudoun's letter of June 20th to Webb only advises Webb on what to do if Loudoun's views on the Campaign proved accurate. If the strategy became unhinged, as it did, Loudoun offered no advice to Webb (Loudoun to Webb, June 20th, MANA, Page 370). In this regard, there is a gaping hole in this last letter. This letter is framed in a way that one expects this advice to be given later in the letter, but it is absent. Unexpectedly, Pargellis is silent on whether Webb should or should not have attempted a relief of Fort William Henry. The topic is never approached. All of Pargellis's criticisms of the British are best directed at missed opportunities at dissuading Montcalm from advancing on Fort William Henry. When Montcalm embarked down

Lake Champlain, there were less than 1,400 men positioned at Fort William Henry; Lt. Colonel Young's column had yet to arrive. Would Montcalm have advanced on Fort William Henry, if the French believed that there were 5,000 men positioned there?

Monro was extraordinarily careful to safeguard a letter advising surrender, signed by all his senior officers, but that also fully supports Monro's own conduct during the Siege (LO 4158). The letter describes a "Council of War" held very early on the morning of the surrender:

"Camp Near Fort W^m. Henry Tuesday 9th: August 1757. Upon a Representation to George Monro Esq^r. Lieut. Colonel of His Majesty's 35th Regiment of Foot and Commanding all the Forces at Lake George, by Several Officers Commanding Corps in this Camp that they were of Opinion Nothing further Could be done for the Defence of Fort W^m. Henry; They therefore desired that a Council of War should be Called, which was accordingly Composed of the following Officers: Who were unanimously of the Opinion that Considering the Barriers that have been erected and near approaches that the Enemy has lately Made, which are ready to play within one hundred yards of the Fort; & Likewise the Excessive bad Condition of the remaining Artillery; the greatest part of the Largest & Most Serviceable Pieces being already burst; and that all Communication between us & Fort Edward being cut off ever Since the 3^d Instant, as appears by a Letter from Major General Webb, Dated at Fort Edward the 4th Instant, the only intelligence We have now been able to Come at; And considering also from the whole tenor of the above Mentioned Letter, a Copy of Which here unto annexed/ that there was not the Least Expectation of either of Relief or Succour from General Webb; without which it was impossible to Continue the defence of the Fort & Camp Longer; that has already been done; They therefore have requested Lieu. Colonel Monro;/ whose behavior upon this occasion they are all thoroughly Satisfied with, and take this publick opportunity to return him their thanks for the Same/ to Send a Deputation to the French General Mons^r. Montcalm to obtain honourable terms for the Troops in the Camp and Garrison in the Fort. Upon Delivering it up into his hands.

Given under our Hands at the Camp near Fort Wm. Henry this 9th Day of August 1757.

*John Young Lt Col.
Cha' Ince Cap^t in y^e 35th Reg^t.
Lu Gardiner Cap^t Lieu^t in the Regt.
Wm Bamford. Lt. 35th Reg^t.
Will Hamilton Lt 35 Reg^t.
R. Faesch Cap^{ne} of the R.A. Reg^t.
Chas Cruikshank Cap^t of one Indep^t Compy
Joseph Frye Colonel of Mass^{ts}. Regim^t
John Parker
Co^{ll}. of the Jersey Reg^t.
John Goffe Co^{ll}. New Hampsh^r
John Gilman Maj^r of New Hamp^{sh}
Richard Saltonstall Capt. Massach^{ts}.
Jonathan Ogden Capt of Rangers*

The direct causes of the surrender were placed on the poor condition of the remaining artillery and the absence of any evidence of a relief column. The letter is truthful, well-reasoned without

hysterics. In this sense, LO 4158 is a companion document to *Transactions*. Young is the first signatory (this signature is a good match to LO 4170); whether he wrote the actual text is uncertain, but it is a distinct possibility. The letter is not in Young's hand, but in a handsome script, clearly the work of an established clerk. There are no corrections in the letter. Within the chaos of the surrender, this letter was written and then beautifully transcribed for signature. This letter could not have been written quickly and several hours would have been needed to finalize the form. The actual signatures of the officers are on the 3rd copy of the letter in LO 4158, so the signatures are easily overlooked. The individual signatures are in two different inks. None of the officers believed to have been in the Bastion are signatories. The letter is not harsh regarding Webb, but neither is it understanding of his difficulties.

Monro was not only careful to make sure that this letter not only survived the Siege, but the letter was then quickly disseminated. The value of having Young, a close friend to Loudoun, as the first signatory was not lost on Monro. The original with Young's signature was sent to Loudoun plus two additional copies listing just the names of the officers, absent signatures. A close facsimile of this letter is contained as part of the Fyre Journal; only how the officers are presented differs, otherwise the letters are nearly identical. On September 4th, the Fyre Journal was presented to Governor Pownall of Massachusetts. This letter ensured that Monro would be free of any criticism of his conduct during the Siege, at least from colonial quarters. Based on his subsequent actions and his correspondence to Loudoun, this aspect was of immense personal importance to Monro, as was the reputation and perception of the 35th Foot.

Hughes (2011, Page 210) argues that Monro requested the letter in case a court-martial was convened. How much involvement Monro had in preparing the letter is unknown, but he likely approved the text prior to the signatures being placed. The verb tense used in the letter is often past tense, suggesting it was written after the Siege, but as Captain Faesch of the 60th Foot was escorted to Canada as part of the surrender agreement and he is a signatory to the letter, the letter best dates to August 9th. Faesch did not reach Halifax until October (LO 4944); so the letter cannot be a Fort Edward document written post-Siege, as is *Transactions*. Without using the word battery but suggestive of battery, the letter has the nearest French work (trenching) at 100 yards from the Bastion — “*which are ready to play within one hundred yards of the Fort*”. *Transactions* uses the same distance; the author of *Transactions* may well have followed this “misdirection” from LO 4158, but then inserts the word battery — “*from the approaches of the Enemy; they intended, erecting another battery very soon, at One hundred yards distance.*”

Two facets beg question. During the officer conference on July 27th/28th, logic would dictate that an ammunition use schedule would be established. For example, no more than 10% of any shot or shell could be utilized before the first French batteries were opened and 40% of any shot and shell would be strictly quarantined until breaching batteries were established by the French. If set on a daily basis, the ammunition schedule also serves as a timetable for the arrival of the relief column, providing needed guidelines to both Webb and Monro. This precaution never even seems to have been adopted. For all intents and purposes, the ammunition for the remaining large-bore artillery was exhausted before the French opened any breaching battery, lasting just six days. The second question follows a similar line. Why were all the senior British field officers positioned in the Entrenched Camp? Both Lt. Colonel Monro (35th) and Lt. Colonel Young (60th) were at the Camp. The colonels of the provincials (Fyre, Parker, and Goffe) were also at

the Camp. With the engagement largely being an artillery duel and the early losses of artillery pieces to bursting, positioning either Monro or Young in the Bastion would seem logical. After the first losses, husbanding the few remaining pieces of large-bore cannon would seem paramount. The recently promoted 2nd Lt. Thomas Collins commanded the artillery in the Bastion. Collins was an "Ensign" in 1755, a Lieutenant Fire-Worker. Logic would dictate that the guns were being abused by the crews and that more discipline was required. But why trust Collins in light of the early and rapid losses of guns to bursting? Captain Lieutenant MacLeod, who had much more experience, commanded the artillery in the Camp. MacLeod was known to have spent considerable time in the Bastion, so Collins was not fully alone and had Engineer Adam Williamson for support as well, but Williamson was equally young, only 24 years old. The senior officer commanding the Bastion was a Captain in the 35th. Unless commanding the unruly provincials demanded Monro's presence in the Camp, the central question remains — Why was Monro not in the Bastion directing the defense?

Webb often appears to be indecisive and hesitant. Resigned to "losing" Fort William Henry might be a better description – the direct result of Loudoun stripping his manpower to mount the Louisbourg Expedition. Together, a resigned Webb and an unfocused Montresor proved to be a curse. Webb's resignation is best seen in his correspondence to Loudoun of August 5th (4081). Loudoun could not have been happy with Webb's tenor in this letter. Without naming names, Webb is shifting blame for the debacle to the failed strategy devised by Loudoun himself. There is never any self-criticism. From Webb to Loudoun (LO 4081, August 5, 1757):

"I am now to acquaint Your Lordship that my apprehensions which I so frequently communicated to Your Lordship upon my being appointed to this Command, the Enemy bending their whole Force this way before Your Lordship could have it in Your Power to make a diversion by the S^t Lawrence River have proved but too true, M^r Montcalm having Landed a very numerous army, on the morning of the Third Instant upon the West Side of the Lake, and invested the Fort, and cut off our Communication with the Camp with a Large body of Canadians and Indians."

All the correspondence suggests that Webb completely understood the intentions of Montcalm a full five weeks before the French advance. Yet in the face of this threat, Webb shows no leadership. Webb is the senior officer here, not Monro. With the advance of the French, Webb was pinned to Fort Edward, too weak to come to the aid of Monro. Yet for weeks before the advance, Webb had options with an all-out push to rebuild the "navy" being the most viable. The "navy" might not have stopped Montcalm's advance, but it might have delayed him. Any delay would have bought Webb time to better organize the relief and drain Montcalm's limited logistic train. Pargellis (1933, Page 243) suggests Webb could have taken up the offensive and moved against Fort Carillon early in the season before the French moved south from Quebec, but this option does not appear to be even remotely realistic. A massive and very visible reinforcement of Fort William Henry with British regulars and provincials in an attempt to persuade Montcalm not to advance would have been innately dangerous — the defenses of both Fort Edward and those in the Mohawk Valley to the west of Albany would have been seriously weakened. Stripping defenses from the Mohawk Valley to augment Fort William Henry does not seem to be a real option. At best, Webb might have been able to augment Monro with an additional thousand men from Fort Edward and the Hudson Valley, but then the logistic chain supporting these men might have collapsed.

Summoning the colonial militia was not a simple exercise to be adopted on a whim. As far as the colonial assemblies were concerned, the command of the militia rested with the colonial governors and not the British Army. At most, the militia could be called for a handful of days, so any call-up had to be exquisitely timed. If forced to remain in the field for more than two weeks, the gathering of thousands of militia would have serious command and logistical consequences, all these added men would have to be supported and fed. Any assignments or duties had to be attached to a visible need that justified these men being required to leave their homes. Their commitment was very different from the provincial troops. If badly done or mishandled, there would be deep political consequences. Colonial governments would demand full and complete reimbursement including any loss in revenues. The difficulties associated with calling up the militia are dismissed or underestimated in most histories, including those by Pargellis.

Much overlooked, the reinforcement of Fort William Henry represented a significant proportion of Webb's available strength. The Young/Fyre column accounted for nearly 40% of the fit men then at Fort Edward. With the Young/Fyre column, there were two light brass 12-pounders, two 9-pounders, and two brass 6-pounders. Evidently, these pieces were chosen so as not to substantially weaken Fort Edward. Yet only the 9-pounders had anywhere near the performance and effective range needed during the first days of the Siege. The barrel of an iron 9-pounder weighed somewhere between 2,700 and 3,100 pounds. The barrel on the light brass 12-pounders weighed only 1,000 pounds (Pargellis 1933, Page 322), some 350 pounds lighter than a Napoleonic light 12-pounder of the same length. The performance of a light 12-pounder was similar to a light 6-pounder or heavy 3-pounder (Hughes 1969, Page 76); the full powder charge being three pounds, not six pounds more typical of a medium 12-pounder. Often disregarded, the "older" brass 6-pounders were 2,100 pounds and hit hard using a three-pound charge. This left Fort Edward with sixteen large artillery pieces — eight 18-pounders, two 9-pounders, two 10-inch mortars, two 8-inch mortars, and two 8-inch howitzers. Fort William Henry had twelve pieces of similar sizes — two 32-pounders, two 18-pounders, two iron 12-pounders, two 9-pounders, three 8-inch mortars, and one 8-inch howitzer. Only these larger pieces would have the performance and the effective range needed to reach the first stage of any enemy entrenchments.

Whether the logistics and ordnance could have been better shared between Fort William Henry and Fort Edward is an open question. At around 2,300 pounds (Hughes 1969, Page 39, 1820 piece), adding one or both 8-inch iron howitzers then at Fort Edward to the Young/Fyre column would have been feasible and initially useful. The brass 8-inch mortars would have been even lighter at about 475 pounds, but there was a looming problem. While ample gunpowder was available, the supply of 7 3/4-inch shells was at or near exhaustion — *"except some 6 and 4 Pounds were rendered useless, our Shot and Shells expended"* (Furnis Letter, Page 312).

The previous October, Loudoun had the 13-inch mortar and the two 10-inch mortars that were at Fort William Henry moved to Fort Edward. But many of the empty shells for these mortars remained in Fort William Henry's magazines. The French reported the surrender of 185 shells for the withdrawn 13-inch mortar. Unfortunately, the French offer only a combined number for the 7 3/4-inch and 10-inch shells surrendered, some 360 shells (Appendix, Page 118). Although Loudoun reallocated the artillery between the two forts, he was unable to move or balance the ammunition stores. In September 1757, some one-hundred seventy 10-inch shells were in Fort Edward's ammunition stores (LO 6686) — a number closer to four hundred empty shells would

have been expected if all the 10-inch shells had been moved south from Fort William Henry. As none of Monro's mortars or howitzers could utilize a 10-inch shell, any 10-inch shell left in the inventory at the end of 1756 would still be there. Some six weeks after the Siege, there were 460 10-inch shells at Carillon, but only the captured brass 10-inch mortar from Oswego could utilize these shells (Le Mercier Inventory, September 26, 1756; Library and Archives, Canada, ID # 3073056). Less than a third of these shells would have been captured at Oswego (\approx 150 10-inch shells) or were of French or Canadian manufacture, the others were from Fort William Henry (Table 6, Page 158). Adding Furnis' statement to the French reports mandates that 10-inch shells formed the bulk of the remaining shells (\approx 300 10-inch shells). The wisest course of action would have been to forward the two iron 10-inch mortars then at Fort Edward to Fort William Henry. As the store of 10-inch shell then at Fort Edward was appropriate only for a single mortar, even sending a single mortar north would have been a boon with minimal cost (Fort Edward had 170 shells: LO 6686, September 6, 1757). The barrel weight would have been easily manageable at 1,800 pounds (about the barrel weight of an iron 6-pounder, six-foot length). Only the mortar(s) needed to be moved. This was the only option that was both clean and quick as it relates to the logistics, as well as providing the necessary performance and effective range. There was no 12-pound shot at Fort Edward that could have been sent (LO 6686). Moving the 13-inch mortar from Albany would have been feasible, but it would have taken considerably more time.

By late October, 168 captured 12 3/4-inch shells had already reached Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu River. These shells were compatible with the older French 12 1/2-inch mortars then at Quebec (Le Mercier Inventory, September 26, 1756; Library and Archives, Canada, ID # 3073058). Converting to French units, the shells would measure just 11.96 inches, a good fit for French-manufactured ordnance. Had these larger mortars been positioned at Fort William Henry, the initial stages of the French approach would have been much more difficult with the British having a distinct advantage in terms of range. Montcalm's 9-inch brass mortar would have had a maximum range of about 1,200 yards and his captured 8-inch howitzers about 1,700 yards. The 8-inch British iron mortars had a maximum range of about 1,600 yards. The much bulkier 13-inch and 10-inch iron mortars could accept much larger gunpowder charges and would have near double the maximum range, some 2,700 and 2,500 yards, respectively (Hughes 1969, Page 37). At the very least, these mortars would have slowed the progress of the French, buying more time to properly prepare a relief column.

The only other realistic option would have been to send several of the 18-pounders back to Fort William Henry. In 1755, there were two 18-pounders with between 700 and 900 round shot at Fort William Henry (Table 1, Page 116). A year later, the number of 18-pounders had increased to eight guns, but this increase required even more shot to be moved north. With some 2,300 round shot surrendered and both 18-pounders bursting early in the Siege, hundreds of the surrendered shot were for these guns. Transporting the guns, the needed carriages, stores, and tools was certainly doable, but completing the march in a single day was problematic (See Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 724). Just the barrels on the 18-pounders would have weighed around 5,800 pounds, 11-foot length. If the ordnance stores at Fort William Henry were to be substantially improved, the effort had to have been in early or mid-July, not in the last few days of July or the first few days of August. As it was, the Young/Fyre Column only reached Fort William Henry the night before Montcalm's arrival. Only Fort Edward was near enough to quickly provide any reinforcement to the artillery stores. With the summoning of the militia at

the end of July, as many as nine additional 4-pounders may have been brought to Fort Edward, but no other artillery arrives at Fort Edward until September or October when four 9-pounders come via Albany (LO 6686 - endnote). Fort Edward and Fort William Henry were on their own.

Montcalm was also constrained, and the constraint was unforgiving. With 1,700 Indian warriors joining Montcalm under the extremely aggressive watch of Governor Vaudreuil, Montcalm would have been obliged to advance somewhere, even if he did not want to do so himself. In this sense, Vaudreuil had trapped Montcalm. If Lake George had been secured, Montcalm may have been forced to advance on Fort Edward by the way of Wood Creek, but the logistic nightmare of moving cannon and powder from Wood Creek to Fort Edward would have been severe. With the French lacking sufficient horses and oxen and the necessary fodder to quickly move the artillery, the British would have had more time to reinforce Fort Edward than they did at Fort William Henry (Bougainville Journal, Page 131). The idea of sending powerful raiding parties south into the Hudson and Mohawk Valleys would have pleased Vaudreuil, this was his vision, but it would have disgusted the professional Montcalm (Nester 2008, Page 89). Although raiding parties might be able to strike hard, by their very nature, they lacked the logistics to remain in the field for an extended duration or to hold any ground. With the French advance on Fort William Henry, Webb did have the radical alternative of withdrawing to Fort Edward, but Webb would then have had to face severe criticism from a wide array of sources. If a large number of raiding parties had reached the Upper Hudson Valley or the Mohawk Valley after abandoning Fort William Henry, Webb may well have been looking at a court-martial, or at the very least, severe professional censor. Webb had few good options but securing Lake George and then forcing Montcalm to advance against Fort Edward may have been his best. In this regard, this lack of leadership by Webb in the two months before the French advance is glaring without excuse. Nester (2014, Pages 241 - 243) presents a further discussion of the conflict between Vaudreuil and Montcalm with Nester favoring a further advance on Fort Edward.

Unlike Webb, Monro's tenacity cannot be questioned, but judging his leadership is difficult. On what events does one judge Monro? With little to gain, Monro was willing to risk extremely dangerous scouts by hundreds of provincial troops. Yet he was very protective of his own 35th Foot; British regulars were not sent out on these extended scouts. When the French first arrive and block the road to Fort Edward, Monro orders the Massachusetts provincials on a sortie to dislodge the French, not the soldiers of the 35th Foot. The sortie was unsuccessful. On the first day, the Massachusetts provincials suffer 19 men killed (Fyre Journal, Page 358), four men more than the 35th Foot loses throughout the entire duration of the Siege. Monro does not leave the correspondence string that Webb did, but we know he did write to Webb (LO 3590). Webb's correspondence to Loudoun was so detailed that any intelligence reports from Monro to Webb would likely have been passed onto Loudoun by Webb, as was the arrival of the four French deserters at Fort William Henry on July 2nd (LO 4020), but any of Monro's insights and language are lost. We have nearly nothing from Monro that dates before the Siege that reflects the intent of the French or the circumstances of the Siege. Monro leaves LO 4479, but this only details the officer conference held on July 28, but it was definitely written sometime after the Siege. In none of Monro's correspondence is there any complaint or statement made suggesting that he warned Webb of the danger posed by Montcalm, how precarious his position was at the time, or what steps should be taken to secure Fort William Henry. Considering the complaints that Monro does make to Loudoun, if he had warned or advised Webb earlier, those communications would have

been central to his protests. Monro's correspondence is entirely self-absorbed without praise for anyone. Monro's letters to Webb during the Siege are seriously flawed, lacking any mention of the strength of Montcalm that might have proven useful to Webb or curtail the false intelligence that Montcalm's army was comprised of some eleven thousand men. Webb's first communication on the 3rd asks for intelligence. At no time does Monro attempt to provide any information on the strength of Montcalm. From Webb to Monro (LO 4041; Wednesday Evening the 3rd August, 1757; 1/2 after four; received the evening of the 3rd by Monro (LO 5275):

Sir,

Your letter Genl. Webb receiv'd by the two Rangers of Roger's Company about one O'Clock. We have just fired the two Minute Guns repeated each quarter of an hour to Shew you We knew your situation; but as for determining any further the General cannot, till he has more particular intelligence from you; which he desires you will take every opportunity of giving him. The Signalles wou'd have been answered early in the morning, but that nobody who heard them cou'd give a proper account how they were fired and soon after they became promiscuous. Six Rangers were sent off to you to enquire into your Situation, and acquaint us therewith, and whether the Communication was Cutt off between the two Forts. The General doubts not but every thing will be done for the best in your's and Colonel Young's part, and is determined to afsist you as soon as pofsible with the whole army if requir'd. We have as yet no Alarms here from the Enemy. This goes by three of Putnam's Rangers with orders to destroy it if likely to be taken.

I am &cc.

*G. Bartman
Aid de Camp*

In the end, we know very little of Monro. We do know he was very self-protective (LO 5309 and LO 5275). His total contempt for Webb was real without any trace of empathy for Webb. These are the only two things about Monro that we know as certainties. In his letters to Loudoun, Monro does not outline the events of the Siege but limits the writing to elements that relate to his conduct or where he believes others have failed him. We know nothing about his relations with those under his command or whether he was liked or disliked or of his temperament. Toward Webb, he appears brooding and vindictive, but whether these emotions were only directed at Webb is impossible to say. His perchance to offer criticism of others, even before any was offered at him, suggests a lack of self-confidence or a steadily stoked anger. The officers under his command, both regular and provincials, were quiet concerning Monro. Although he was not criticized by his officers, neither was he praised. The positive comments about Monro's conduct found in the Fyre Journal may have been a true reflection of his officer's sentiments, but they have to be dismissed as the language appears to have been manufactured or at least blessed by Monro himself. With the fall of Fort William Henry, Monro's role in the debacle of Parker's Scout in late July was forgotten. The focus of colonial criticisms was the barbarism and brutality of the French. In letters to Loudoun, Monro feels free to disparage the conduct of the provincials. This may have been done more to highlight the good conduct of his own 35th Foot than anything else, but instead of brief side comments which would be more understandable, they are central to the letters (LO 4479 and LO 5309; Final Letter Appendix). After reaching Fort Edward, Monro did not linger and was ordered to Albany while Webb remained at Fort Edward.

Monro assumed command of Fort William Henry four months before the Siege, but little seems to have been done during that time (reference Bellico 2010, Page 107). He does virtually nothing

to improve the defenses at William Henry, something that he had the clear authority to do. Everything known suggests that Monro and Webb shared their intelligence, and each had full access to whatever was known by the other and nothing was deliberately hidden. Monro remained strictly bitter toward Webb (Pargellis 1933, Page 249). The letter of the 6th is the better fuel for Monro's animosity toward Webb than the letter of the 4th. Monro appealed to Loudoun, but no formal censure of Webb was forthcoming (Hughes 2011, Page 242). With Webb fully prepared to blame Loudoun for the debacle, Loudoun wanted the affair closed, burying "*Transactions*" in his personal papers. Following Montcalm's capture of Oswego in 1756, Webb burnt two small decrepit forts and one "pretty good" post, the new Fort Eagle, at the Oneida Carrying Place on the Mohawk River, the route leading to Oswego, and withdrew toward German Flatts and Schenectady (LO 1282). This act had already tarnished Webb in the eyes of the colonials. Now Webb's reputation was beyond salvation. From Loudoun to Cumberland (LO 4642, Private; October 17, 1757, and MANA, Page 399; Final Letter Appendix):

"You will be surprised I have said so little of the Affairs in the Back Country. The real Case is I know very little with Certainty of what past there, more than what I have received from Mr. Webb, who sent off the Packet, two Days before I arrived with his Account of it.

The Country make great Complaints of his Conduct and of his Treatment of their People. As to the first, I am told by Mr. Delancy (Governor of New York) that on an Information of the Enemy's advancing he went to Fort William Henry, where he received certain Accounts of it, which he concealed and returned to Fort Edward from hence he writ to acquaint Lt. Col. Monro.

As to his Complaints of his ill Usage of the Militia, it rather appears to me that the Militia came very slow up, and when they were arrived to about the Number of 2000 the Desertion from that time was equal to their Acquisition by the Arrival of new Reinforcements. And this, Lieut. Govr. Delancy, who was then at Albany, took many of them Prisoners, and killed one of them who would not be stopt, told me."

This letter of October 17th is long and somewhat rambling, but this very brief passage is seemingly Loudoun's only comment on the Siege itself. Notably, one of Monro's false criticisms of Webb has found root (reference LO 5309). Already, Loudoun's focus is on his current problems, many political, and what future actions need to be taken, not the disastrous 1757 Campaign. The "*Packet*" likely refers to a letter sent to both Loudoun and Viscount Barrington by Webb. (LO 4245A; Webb to Loudoun, August 17, 1757; Final Letter Appendix). This letter does not criticize or threaten Loudoun.

Loudoun first hears of the loss of Fort William Henry while in transit from Halifax to New York following the cancellation of the 1757 Louisbourg Expedition (Loudoun to Webb, August 20, 1757; Final Letter Appendix). Loudoun missteps, he writes Pitt with blunt complaint of the overall command structure and interference from London (LO 4239, August 16, 1757; Pargellis 1933, Page 251). Loudoun arrives in New York on August 31, moves north and assembles eight battalions in the immediate area around Albany and Fort Edward, most of these battalions just returning from Halifax. Three battalions of regulars leave Albany on September 14th and head north (LO 4471, Abercromby to Loudoun). The loss of Fort William Henry was a stinging personal blow. Loudoun plans an immediate response, but soon realizes the logistics, lack of bateaux and other boats, and the limited time remaining in the campaign season closes that

possibility. Loudoun then contemplates a winter campaign, similar in nature to Rigaud's Winter Assault on Fort William Henry. The British would move north via a surprise march on a frozen Lake George, leaving the French little time to react or reinforce Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga). Loudoun planned to tell as few people as possible, just equip the battalions for winter duty, appear to be preparing for a summer campaign, and then call for a quick winter march — a sixteen-mile march from Fort Edward to Lake George, then another 35 miles across the ice to Carillon. Artillery, including the four light brass 12-pounders still at Fort Edward or Albany, would be dragged by sleigh. This plan was never fully implemented, but it is described in a letter to Cumberland (LO 4642, October 17, 1757; and MANA, Page 400); Bellico provides a detailed narrative of the plan (Bellico 2010, Page 133). In late February 1758 and after much preparation, the plan was reluctantly abandoned due to deep snow and the inability of the Rangers to cut trail for a much larger following column (LO 5584, Howe to Loudon, February 14, 1758, Appendix).

There is an unforeseen element that has escaped much comment that of the Indian Nations. Montcalm and Vaudreuil had an intense dislike for each other. By summoning nearly 2,000 Indian warriors and the British not threatening Quebec, Governor Vaudreuil compelled Montcalm into advancing, whether Montcalm genuinely wanted to or not. Montcalm fully appreciated the threat that Fort William Henry imposed on the French as an offensive staging area, so the destruction of Fort William Henry was not an issue for Montcalm, but it was a victory driven by Vaudreuil and his call to the Indian Nations. It is of some interest to recognize that Montcalm's victories over the British were all defensive in nature, all occurring within the Saint Lawrence Basin — Oswego (1756), Fort William Henry (1757), and Ticonderoga (1758). Montcalm knew he did not have the men or resources to defeat the British Army, but he might delay the British long enough so that a peace brokered in Europe might still secure Canada for the French.

The Indian cultures, particularly to the south of the Saint Lawrence River were agricultural societies, only augmented by hunting. The chief food sources were crops of corn, beans, and squash. They were not hunter-gatherers; their populations were too large to allow for that. When forced into just a hunter-gather mode, the native peoples could quickly decimate an area of nearly all game, as happened in Wisconsin during the Beaver Wars in the late 17th Century. In the long history of conflicts between France and Britain, the Indian Nations chose sides based on their understanding of the relative strengths of the British and French and what was deemed best for their people. The option of remaining neutral was open and often decidedly attractive, but exceptionally difficult to navigate. Nester (2014) offers an insightful look at the relationship between the various Indian Nations and the European powers. The trade good relations are both complex and unexpected, twisted by the graft internal to the Canadian Government, offering no benefit to the French Crown.

Although the Indian Nations had strong warrior traditions, they were not the European traditions but followed their own rules and sensibilities. The Indian Nations did not produce enough "excess males" that could be freely spent on costly military adventures, very much the opposite of Europe where the birthrates far exceeded the capacity of the land to support. When the Iroquois tried a similar strategy during the Beaver Wars against other Indian Nations, their warrior population was decimated through attrition and the number of Iroquois warriors plummeted even as the land they controlled grew greatly in size and extent. Indians favored large raiding parties, stealth, and ambush. These characteristics were tactics, not the driving influence. Limiting casualties, or

preferably suffering none themselves, was the central theme. Striking the enemy as hard as possible was very much secondary to limiting losses. Raiding was intended to strike when and where it was unexpected. By consensus, raiding parties that were detected would often simply abandon the raid altogether rather than risk falling into an ambush themselves. At the same time, this sensibility to loss helps explain the common practice among the Iroquois of adopting enemies into families to replace losses, a practice still poorly understood (Travers 2015, Page 176). As regards set-piece battles or drawn battle lines, the individual Indian viewed these tactics as simply "dumb". From the perspective of Indian cultures, they were unsustainable. In 1758, several hundred of Johnson's Iroquois warriors watched the Battle of Ticonderoga from the slopes of Mount Rattlesnake on the opposite bank of the La Chute River, some 1,200 yards away from the battlefield (Mount Defiance).

The Iroquois were politically astute with their own agenda. Many Mohawk had a distinct centuries-old hatred for the French, but the other five tribes did not. The Iroquois viewed themselves as being equal to the British and French, a third empire. While forced to align themselves with either the French or British, the Iroquois' strong preference was to maintain the status quo. They realized that their considerable ambitions required that the power and influence of the British and French offset each other. The Iroquois were fully cognizant that they needed the French to balance the British. Here, the corruption internal to the Canadian trade practices seriously hurt the French. With the British offering better quality trade goods at lower prices than the French, many Indians were drawn to the British traders while growing resentful of the French. This reality persisted even though they were keenly aware of the British desire for land — the temptation of better-quality trade goods was simply too great. In September 1755, the French under Dieskau moved south to attack Fort Edward on the Hudson. Instead, the Iroquois accompanying the expedition intentionally mislead Dieskau into attacking the British at Lake George (Castle 2013, Page 23). In the Iroquois' view, Fort Edward was in the British sphere of influence, whereas Lake George was in the French sphere. To maintain the status quo, the Iroquois would support a French attack on the British at Lake George, but not an attack on Fort Edward (Steele 1990, Page 46; and Laramie 2012, Page 192). Had the French attacked Fort Edward, they would have found it unfinished with a garrison of only about 500 provincials and with a single or no cannon (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Pages 132 and 365). When the French attacked at Lake George, the provincials under Johnson had twice the number of men as Dieskau and more than a dozen pieces of artillery. Had Dieskau attacked Fort Edward, there is a reasonable chance that he would have succeeded in destroying it. It is doubtful that Dieskau would have the strength or even the desire to hold Fort Edward, but Johnson would need to march south abandoning Lake George weeks before the start of construction on Fort William Henry.

Loudoun was cursed by the weather, delays, and uncertainty. Pitt waited writing detailed orders to Loudoun until early February. These orders were further delayed by the weather and did not reach Loudoun until May. Before this, Loudoun was guessing at the level of support he would be receiving from Europe. As a result, Loudoun adopted a worst-case scenario where he was hoarding men and supplies for the Expedition both at New York Harbor and Halifax. All he would need was a naval escort and an artillery train. Loudoun very much wanted at least 6,000 more men to arrive from Europe but may well have moved on Louisbourg or Quebec regardless. At the same time, his plan was overly aggressive, and many would argue, unrealistic. Taking Quebec in a single campaign season was difficult enough without leaving Louisbourg and its port

intact and to the immediate rear. The delay of Holburne's sailing for Halifax had the ancillary effect of directly stripping 59 days from Loudoun's campaign season. As recognized in the wake of the 1757 Campaign, any attempt on Quebec needed to sail from Halifax by the end of May. After the loss of the Lake George "navy" and the obvious delay of the campaign season, Loudoun's failure to reevaluate the situation in late May and reinforce Webb was his critical error in judgment and near pointless. There were thousands of troops more in Halifax than Loudoun could profitably use in the time remaining to him, three months maximum. Loudoun's defense of New York was to "pin" Montcalm to Quebec. The forces assigned to Webb were to oppose raiding parties, not the full weight of the French. A realistic appreciation of the abilities and constraints on Montcalm was pushed aside, as was any consideration of the decidedly aggressive nature of Vaudreuil. The apparent lack of specific orders to place all efforts into building the four galliots and repairing or refitting the two intact sloops was a lapse with grave consequences. Gambling that Pitt would send only a small fraction of the promised troops proved false. Though nearly two months late, Pitt sent the promised troops, supplies, and ordnance. In the end, Loudoun proves rigid and inflexible, married to his vision, not adapting to the true or current circumstances. At the same time, Loudoun rarely looks back. His focus is always on the problems ahead. Even after returning to New York in August 1757, Loudoun's planning remains exceedingly aggressive (LO 4642, October 17, 1757; Final Letter Appendix).

Loudoun was a dedicated royalist, committed to kingly prerogative. Brumwell (2006, Page 139) describes Loudoun as a "conscientious but conspicuously unlucky soldier who had presided over an era of defeat." Loudoun was too close to Cumberland to be completely trusted by Pitt. Through leaks in communications, Pitt became aware that Loudoun and Cumberland were still in frequent correspondence and that much of this information was not being shared with his office (LO 4624 and MANA, Page 399). This seals Loudoun's fate; Loudoun will be recalled. Interestingly, Loudoun never develops any commentary on the loss of Fort William Henry and allows Webb's letter of August 17th to become the "unofficial" report of the events (LO 4245A, Webb to Loudoun, August 17, 1757; duplicate to Barrington, Secretary of War — Final Letter Appendix). As regards the British command and officer corps, no blame or faults are assigned in this letter. In this sense, the letter is essentially benign, but at the very end of the letter, Webb then offers general criticism of the provincial troops. Webb had sent the letter to Barrington before Loudoun arrived back in Albany. Because of the criticism of the provincials and the unpopularity of Webb in the provinces, the letter was held tightly in London. Although Loudoun may not have been happy with this circumstance, his focus was already on future actions and not the past. He was happy to leave Fort William Henry behind him, something Monro could not do.

Loudoun was recalled to London in a letter dated December 30th (Kimball 1906, Page 133); and he was then immediately promoted to the permanent rank of Lieutenant General on January 22, 1758. The recall of Loudoun was at the direction of the King. The letter dismissing Loudoun arrives reached Loudoun on March 10, 1758. The next day, Loudoun leaves Albany for New York. Loudoun retains his rank of Colonel of the 30th Foot, a post he holds from 1749 - 1770. Loudoun leaves New York for London on May 3rd aboard the HMS Hampshire (Boscawen 2011, Page 121). Before replacing Loudoun, Pitt waited for the return of Admiral Charles Hardy from Louisbourg and his assessment of the overall situation and failure of the Louisbourg Expedition. Besides his naval duties, Hardy was also serving as the colonial governor of New York (1755 - 1757); he was allowed absence from this governmental post to serve as Secretary to Loudoun. As

such, Hardy was fully cognizant of the colonial sentiments toward Loudoun. All indications suggest Loudoun and Hardy had a good working relationship during the 1757 Campaign, but there was friction whenever the authorities of provincial governments and the Commander in Chief were in dispute. Hardy's assessment was balanced and fair, but Loudoun had made several missteps and poor decisions in Hardy's opinion (Pargellis 1933; Page 344). Abercromby writes Pitt a series of letters with wording supporting Loudoun, but in a tone suggesting elements could and should have been handled differently (Pargellis 1933; Page 343).

Reaching London, Loudoun meets privately with Pitt and quietly accepts Pitt's decision; there was no protest or argument. Loudoun's relations with the colonial governors and assemblies were poor and the news of his dismissal was warmly welcomed. Loudoun had particular difficulties with the exceedingly ambitious Thomas Pownall, who had been his Secretary in 1756 but was then Governor of Massachusetts (MANA, Page 404). Cumberland had no influence to shield Loudoun (LO 4907, November 26, 1757, Final Letter Appendix).

Webb's position could not be saved. Internal to the Army, Webb failed to support Loudoun and plays on the quiet animosity between Scot and English Officers (Pargellis 1933, Page 349). Instead of any rebukes, Webb was subsequently promoted. Recalled to London, Webb remained Colonel of the 48th until 1766. Although promoted to Major General in 1759 and eventually reaching the rank of Lieutenant General (1761), Webb complained of being ostracized by his fellow officers over his role at Fort William Henry (Hughes 2011, Page 243).

Per Pitt's explicit orders to intercept any French returning to Europe, Holburne remained in the waters off Nova Scotia (Kimball 1906, Pages 84, 89, and 110). Further reinforced in September, Holburne now had twenty-odd ships of the line in his fleet. In late September 1757, his fleet was lying off Louisbourg when a hurricane hit (see Letter Appendix, September 29, 1757). Two ships were lost and at least ten of the surviving ships of the line had been fully or partially dismasted. Four damaged but still seaworthy ships managed to reach England under Hardy. To prevent a French naval reinforcement of Louisbourg in Spring 1758, Pitt was writing orders to Holburne as the hurricane hit to leave eight ships of the line in Halifax that would winter under Hardy (Boscawen 2011, Page 48). As Hardy was to have remained in Halifax, he would not have been able to sit with Pitt to discuss Loudoun's overall performance. The hurricane changed all that. The few remaining sound ships wintered in Halifax under Lord Colville (Alexander Colville). Holburne returned to England in December. In February 1758, Holburne was advanced to Vice-Admiral of the White and made Port Admiral at Portsmouth. Holburne never assumes command of a fleet after 1757. There are a series of letters from Holburne to Pitt describing the event following the hurricane (Kimball 1906, Pages 114 - 118). Hardy survived the fallout from the 1757 Campaign. He was appointed second in command of the naval forces for the 1758 Campaign against Louisbourg, serving under Boscawen. Here, Hardy was outstanding.

Abercromby assumes the post of Colonel-in-Chief of the 60th Foot and Commander in Chief, North America. There are a total of three letters dated December 30, 1757, to Abercromby regarding his appointment, the same date as Loudoun's recall. Two are from Pitt and both are presented in Kimball 1906 (Page 134 and Pages 143 -151). The third letter is from King George advising of the appointment and detailing instructions (December 30, 1757; CO 5/212, 231). This last letter further demonstrates that the recall of Loudoun was done with the explicit

approval, if not instruction, of the King. With the recall of Loudoun, Shirley survives under the protection of Newcastle. In late 1758, Shirley was appointed the Governor of the Bahamas.

Under Pitt, much of the previous authority wielded by Braddock and Loudoun over the various colonial assemblies was stripped. Abercromby would lead the 1758 Ticonderoga Campaign. Pitt assigns Jeffrey Amherst, colonel of the 15th Foot, to head the 1758 Louisbourg Campaign. Amherst was competent, methodical, and detailed. Unlike many histories, Cubbison (2014) does not see him as being cautious or slow. Forbes leading the 1758 Duquesne Campaign shares these same qualities. The British Army was just then acknowledging that in North America late starting expeditions were at a severe disadvantage. Pitt's exacting orders delayed any start to the interior campaigns and strongly favored colonial sensibilities. The results were that the interior campaigns continued the long history of procrastination and slow progress. Colonial troops were both too numerous and poorly used. Promoted to the rank of Major General, Amherst arrives off Halifax from Europe on May 28th, just as the Fleet was in sail for Louisbourg. Amherst does not land in Halifax but simply transfers to Admiral Boscawen's flagship and continues on. Following, the disastrous Ticonderoga Campaign, Amherst would succeed Abercromby as Commander in Chief North America and leads the British Army in the conquest of Canada.

Serving as second in command, Loudoun performed reasonably well during the Franco-Spanish Invasion of Portugal, a British Ally (1762). The Campaign was a decisive British victory. In 1763, Loudoun became the Governor of Edinburgh Castle and was subsequently promoted to (full) General in 1770. There were ten other (full) Generals in the British Army; only Field Marshall Lord James Tyrawly outranked Loudoun. While walking the streets of Albany, Monro died on November 3rd from a stroke – less than three months after the Siege. Unknown to Monro, he had been promoted to the permanent rank of Colonel in the British Army. The 35th was reunited in October and placed in winter quarters at Philadelphia. In Spring 1758, both the 35th and the 3rd battalion of the 60th Foot would proceed to Halifax to serve under Amherst at the successful siege of Louisbourg and then at Quebec in 1759.

Kenneth P. Dunne
February 14, 2024

From Loudoun to Henry Fox, Secretary of State Southern Department, November 22 - December 26, 1756 (CO 5/48 001) with reference to Fort William Henry. A partial transcription is found in the Final Letter Appendix:

"and it is Commanded by a rising ground pretty much near it; and I shall hardly be believed, when I say, I have not yet seen a place for a Fort, that can Command a River, a Lake, or a pafs that is not itself Commanded."

From *Directions to Commandant at Fort William Henry*; William Eyre to Sir William Johnson, November 25, 1755; a full 20 months before the Siege. A full transcription is found in the Final Letter Appendix):

"When the Enemy advances close to the out Side of the Ditch and that by a Superiority of Cannon, and a great loss of their Troops, which last must be inevitable cost them, and from this Place they will be able to make a Breach, & not before (except in the Parapet) which will not be sufficient for them to make an assault; then, and not till then, a brave officer ought to think of Capitulating, when he may reasonably expect an honourable One, for his gallant behavior."

35th Regiment Foot: Fort William Henry, August 3rd, 1757

Regimental Commission Dates

Lieutenant Colonel George Monro	January 4, 1750
Captain John Ormsby	February 24, 1756
Captain Thomas Collins	March 12, 1754
Captain John Conyngham **	April 7, 1755
Captain Charles Ince (Grenadier Company)	February 24, 1756
Captain Lieutenant Luke Gardiner *	Captain Lieutenant: February 24, 1756 Captain: January 24, 1758
Lt. Richard Baillie *	Lieutenant: April 7, 1755 Captain Lieutenant: June 24, 1758
Lt. Maurice Herbert	January 24, 1752
Lt. William Bamford	February 16, 1756
Lt. Charles Gore	February 24, 1756
Lt. Gabriel Maturin	April 12, 1756
Lt. Theophilus Blakeney	April 13, 1756
Lt. William Hamilton	
Regimental Quartermaster - Feb. 24, 1757	April 15, 1756
Lt. John Cockburne	
Regimental Adjutant - March 25, 1757	November 26, 1756
Lt. Thomas Fortye	March 8, 1757
Lt. Thomas Cumberland	December 15, 1756
Lt. William Frederick Philips	May 16, 1757
Lt. William Widdrington	April 14, 1756
Ensign Eubule Ormsby *	Ensign: February 16, 1756 Lieutenant: January 24, 1758
Ensign William Mason *	Ensign: February 16, 1756 Lieutenant: January 24, 1758
Ensign William Brown	February 16, 1756
Ensign Colin Campbell	April 11, 1756
Ensign Charles Portis	December 1, 1756
Ensign Robert Bayard	March 8, 1757
Surgeon: Thomas Wilkins	March 22, 1747

* Ranks modified from LO 4170 — *A Return of Officers to the Detachments from several Corps, who are included in the Capitulation* (Lt. Colonel John Young; LO 4170, August 9, 1757). Captain John Conyngham is added, no deletions. LO 4170 lists both name and rank of all the

regular officers at the Siege. Luke Gardiner is a captain and Baillie is a captain lieutenant in LO 4170. This Lt. Richard Baillie is not the Lt. Richard Bailey who was at the Monongahela. As an ensign in the 44th, Cockburne was at the Monongahela (Steward 2015). Eubule Ormsby and William Mason are lieutenants in LO 4170. After correction for ranks, LO 4170 accounts for only 12 lieutenants, not the 13 lieutenants in LO 6751 or the 13 lieutenants in the Bougainville Journals, p. 176.

** Captain John Conyngham may have reached North America much earlier than the rest of the 35th. Although far from certain, there is the possibility that Conyngham was wounded in the arm at both the Monongahela (1755) and at Fort William Henry (1757). Among the British, several others are known to have been at both battles — MacLeod, Williamson, and Furnis; but if true, Conyngham is the only person to have the dubious distinction of being wounded on both occasions. On the January 1757 Monthly Return for the 35th, Conyngham is listed as absent (LO 6751). Under the printed columns "*Since what Time Absent; By whose leave & for what Time*", it simply reads "*I Jan -- 1757, Earl of Loudoun*". A similar notation is found in the return for February, plus the location of "*Philadelphia*". Conyngham then appears on the March return as being joined to the 35th. If at the Monongahela, the wounded Conyngham may well have recuperated in Philadelphia (reference Kopperman, 1977, Page 204; Matthew Leslie, dated July 30, 1755: "*Our friend, Captain John Conyngham is severely wounded, his horse fell on the first fire, and before he could be disengaged from the animal which had fallen on him, received a wound on his arm; I hope we shall soon be under your hospitable roof in Philadelphia*"). Matthew Leslie served as Assistant Quartermaster General to both Braddock and then Webb (Lieutenant in 48th Foot; November 4, 1755). Leslie and Conyngham were old family friends, but there is no motive to suspect any deception in Leslie's letter. Yet LO 2774 suggests Conyngham was in Albany in September 1756; only a single captain is listed as sick in Ireland — thought to be John Ormsby. Unfortunately, no captains are named in LO 2774 and neither Monro nor Major Henry Fletcher are accounted for in this abbreviated return. It is possible that Conyngham recuperated in Philadelphia following the Battle of the Monongahela (July 9, 1755), then met the 35th in Albany in September 1756. Conyngham may have then subsequently returned to Philadelphia for several months before rejoining the 35th in March 1757. The timelines would easily allow for this scenario. It is all conjecture, but the two independent references to Philadelphia and Conyngham suggestively remain. In the British National Archives, War Offices, Printed Annual Army List for 1758 (WO 65/5), John Conyngham has a line drawn through his name and a scribbled notation that may read *Ret.* (suggesting "Retired"). In WO 65/6 Printed Annual Army List for 1758 (yes, two lists for 1758), John Conyngham's name does not appear.

Andrews 2015, Vol. 2 contains short biographies of hundreds of British, French and American Officers who served during the French and Indian Wars, with and without connection to Amherst. Many low-ranking officers are included, but these entries do seem to have a connection to Amherst. Short entries are also included for many Native Americans. Although concise, these entries are decidedly informative — e.g. George Monro purchased the ranks of captain (1737, ~ 35 years old), major (1747), and lieutenant colonel (1750), all in the 35th Foot. James Prevost's entry is among the longest and most entertaining. Place names are also identified.

35th Regiment Foot: Fort Edward, August 3rd, 1757

Regimental Commission Dates

Major Henry Fletcher	December 25, 1755
Captain John Manusell	January 5, 1751
Captain George Fletcher	April 8, 1755
Captain William Bellew	February 16, 1756
Lt. Richard Allen	February 16, 1756
Lt. James Belcher	April 7, 1755
Lt. Thomas Brown	February 16, 1756
Lt. Edward Cane	April 7, 1755
Lt. James Field	November 29, 1756
Lt. Thomas Jetherill	March 12, 1754
Lt. John de la Valle	December 11, 1752
Lt. James St. Clair ***	November 28, 1756
Lt. Matthew Fleming (Not Joined)	November 27, 1756
Ensign Thomas Armstrong	April 9, 1756
Ensign William Ann Skinner	April 9, 1756
Ensign Nathaniel Weld	February 16, 1756

*** Likely, St. Clair left the 35th in Spring 1757. On March 8, St. Clair is enrolled in the 22nd Regiment. On the same date, Thomas Fortye is advanced to Lieutenant and Robert Bayard is appointed Ensign. With St. Clair dropped from the regiment and the other appointments, the number of lieutenants stays at the needed twenty. Sometime in 1757, James Belcher resigns from the 35th. The date of Belcher's leaving is uncertain, but it is likely near or at the end of the year. Loudoun had previously denied Belcher's request to leave the Army (Hughes 2011, Page 14).

Following Monro's death, there was some tension and quiet maneuvering within the British Army over his replacement (Pargellis 1933, Page 349). On February 16, 1758, Henry Fletcher was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel of the 35th and Roger Morris of the 48th was appointed Major of the 35th. Fletcher was Loudoun's candidate and the son of Lord Milton of Saltoun in Scotland. Webb quietly undercut Loudoun and lobbied for an English appointment. Culloden was only ten years distance, and there was still some lingering animosity toward too many Scots high in the Army. Morris served as an aide-de-camp to Braddock and as Brigade Major under Webb (MANA, Page 346).

Royal Artillery: Fort William Henry, August 3rd, 1757

Captain Lieutenant William MacLeod *	February 16, 1756 Captain: October 2, 1758
2nd Lieutenant Thomas Collins	Lieutenant Fireworker: March 1, 1755 2nd Lieutenant: February 4, 1757 1st Lieutenant: January 4, 1758
** Practitioner Engineer Adam Williamson (Equivalent to Ensign)	Ensign: October 14, 1755; 6th Foot Lieutenant: Sept. 24, 1757; 5th Foot

* Rank modified from LO 4170.

Two individuals named Thomas Collins were serving in the Bastion. One is a captain in the 35th Foot; the other is a 2nd lieutenant with the Royal Artillery. After the wounding of Captain John Ormsby, Captain Thomas Collins serves as the ranking officer in the Bastion itself. The second Thomas Collins leads the artillery in the Bastion. The Fyre Journal has Captain Thomas Collins of the 35th incorrectly identified as Captain Giles Collins (Fyre Journal, Page 361). Captain Thomas Ord (Royal Artillery) leads the artillery at Fort Edward and was at the Monongahela. Both MacLeod and Collins were part of Ord's divided company. Ord was at the Officer Conferences of July 27th and August 5th described in Montresor Journals (Pages 23 and 38).

** Most engineers were not given officer rank until May 1757, but Williamson was an exception and carried on the roll of the 6th Foot (Gibraltar). It was not unusual that engineers serve detached from their named regiment. During the Siege, Williamson was not a member of the 35th, but a staff officer assigned by Webb. As a captain lieutenant in the 5th Foot (Isle of Wright), he served at Louisbourg and then Quebec. He was promoted to captain in the 40th Foot (April 21, 1760). In 1762, he took part in the capture of Martinique and Guadeloupe (Baule 2014, Page 99). In late 1775, he became the lieutenant colonel of the 18th Foot. Williamson served as the Governor of Jamaica (1791 - 1794) but performed poorly as it relates to Hispaniola and was recalled in 1796. He was made lieutenant general on January 26, 1797, but died from a fall the next year.

A passage in the Hays Journal has Lt. Thomas Fortye (35th) commanding the sailors and crew of one of the galliots. Besides Fortye, the Fyre Journal places Ensign Thomas Pinckney (60th) and a third officer with the sailors, likely Ensign Charles Portis (35th; the spelling is badly obscured). At least some of these officers may have served with the sailors and artillery in the Bastion. These may be the unidentified officers from LO 4479.

3rd Battalion, 60th Regiment Foot: Fort William Henry, August 3rd, 1757

(LO 4170)	<u>Regimental Commission Dates</u>
Lieutenant Colonel John Young	April 26, 1757
Captain Rodoph Faesch (Fae/ch)	December 27, 1755
Lieutenant Francis Mackay	December 7, 1756
Lieutenant John Parker	December 16, 1756
Ensign Robert Campbell	January 17, 1756
Ensign John Mackie	December 14, 1756
Ensign Thomas Pinckney	December 12, 1756

New York Independent Companies: Fort William Henry, August 3rd, 1757 *

Captain Charles Cruikshank - 2nd	April 17, 1757
Lieutenant Alexander Colhoun	May 25, 1755
Lieutenant William Gullen	November 25, 1756
Lieutenant John Martin	April 26, 1757

His Majesty's Independent Company of Rangers: Fort William Henry

1st Lieutenant Noah Johnson	July 24, 1756
2nd Lieutenant Nathaniel Abbot	February 25, 1757
Ensign Stephen Holland	February 25, 1757

Likely, the 60th functioned as two companies, one under Young and one under Faesch. Pargellis (1933, Page 235) lists the strength of the 3rd Battalion of the 60th as 727 men. At various times during the war, Young served in the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Battalions of the 60th Foot. Young signs LO 4170 as 3rd Battalion. Young was captured by Indians at the Battle of Sainte-Foy in April 1760. In the chaos, he was thought dead and this is reported in some histories. Young retired from the Army in November 1762 with the rank of Colonel (Andrews 2015, Vol. 2, Page 362). Rodoph Faesch was a Swiss mercenary, who until August 1756 served with the French Army in Europe. He had been recruited into the 60th Foot by James Prevost, who was also Swiss.

*Independent Companies were part of the British Regular Army but were not tied to any regiment. The purpose was to provide a representative number of regular troops but without the need to support a full regiment or the associated costs. These formations were used as garrison troops and to raise the "King's Flag". There were four Independent Companies in New York to oppose the French in Canada and three Independent Companies in South Carolina to oppose the Spanish in Florida. Three companies had been in New York since 1664 and the surrender of the

Dutch. Independent Companies were extremely low on the British Army Hierarchy with lower pay for both officers and the Rank & File. Any officer desiring a higher rank had to transfer to a regular regiment. These formations were terribly neglected by London. In some of these Companies, new uniforms had not been issued for years and weapons were often absent or in disrepair. Invalids and older soldiers were common. Starting with Braddock and continuing with Loudoun, the New York Companies had to be rebuilt and this took considerable money and effort. Officers needed to be sacked and new captains appointed. Loudoun felt compelled to court-martial Captain Hubert Marshall of the 2nd New York Independent Company for embezzlement; Marshall's commission as captain dated to July 9, 1736. Pargellis (1933, Page 235) lists the combined strength of the four Independent Companies at 243 men, about 60 men per company.

The list of the 35th Officers who were at the Siege could be short one officer, either a lieutenant or ensign. At the same time, the list may be correct or there are minor discrepancies within the rank assignments. The first half of the return presented here lists 12 lieutenants and 6 ensigns at the Siege, or more simply put 18 subalterns (lieutenants plus ensigns). This leaves 7 lieutenants and 3 ensigns at Fort Edward; Fleming's "Not Joined" slot must be added to bring the total to the required 20 lieutenants. This number of 10 subalterns is more than reasonable to serve the four companies known to be at Fort Edward. As regards the Siege and the 35th officers, LO 4309 also lists 12 lieutenants and 6 ensigns (Major General Daniel Webb: *A Return of the State of the Following Corps, that were at Fort William Henry — August 25, 1757*). However, LO 6751 has 13 lieutenants and 6 ensigns as Appended Notes (November and December Monthly Returns); the Bougainville Journals lists 13 lieutenants and 6 ensigns; and LO 4170 has 14 lieutenants and 4 ensigns. Only LO 4170 provides both the names and ranks of the subalterns and is the foundation of the list presented here. LO 4170 has both Ormsby and Mason as lieutenants, not ensigns, yet adopting those ranks does not offer a clean answer, now leaving the ensigns unresolved without a hint of further solution. As regards the subalterns, the first half of the list here allows for 18 subalterns and is supported by half the correspondence. The other half of the correspondence indicates 19 subalterns.

There is an obvious check that can be made to verify aspects of the list presented here. One can reference the Monthly Returns by the company commanding officers known to be at the Siege and see the number of lieutenants and ensigns assigned to each company. The September Return shows 19 lieutenants plus Lt. Field "Not Joined" and 9 Ensigns — all the Subalterns are accounted for. Using this method and the September Return, there should have been only 11 Lieutenants and 5 Ensigns present at the Siege, a total of 16 Subalterns. Yet from LO 4170 which is the only source utilizing names, we can be certain that there was a minimum of 18 Subalterns at the Siege. This last check fails (See Figures 19A & 19B for the September Return, Pages 244-245). Seemingly, at least one lieutenant and one ensign detailed from the Fort Edward companies were at the Siege. As regards the 19th subaltern, there is no "likely" single suspect for the supposed missing officer — a lieutenant, if true. The most logical course is to simply accept the people identified in LO 4170, discounting anyone else, but adding Captain John Conyngham (*A Return of Officers to the Detachments from several Corps, who are included in the Capitulation*; Lt. Colonel John Young; LO 4170, August 9, 1757). There is no defining solution — an officer may or may not be missing. In contrast, when compared to LO 4170, the 60th Foot is underreported by 1 lieutenant and 1 ensign in the Bougainville Journals.

The official date of promotion may not reflect the real field date. The next group of promotions all happened on January 24, 1758, when Luke Gardiner was promoted to captain, Ensigns Ormsby and Mason were promoted to lieutenant and two new ensigns were enrolled, Warham Brown and Cornelius Lysaght (WO 65/6). Logic would dictate that Richard Baillie's promotion to Captain Lieutenant should also date to January 24th, but for some reason, Baillie's promotion was delayed until June 24, 1758. The core of the problem may well lie here, tangled in promotions and the dates of those promotions. Papers lost during the Siege relating to any promotions may have had to be produced a second time with different dates from the originals, obscuring the true timeline and ranks. Yet the Monthly Return for December 1757 shows no change in the company captains from the time of the Siege or even the previous January.

Loudoun had taken three companies of Rogers' Rangers to Halifax, as part of the Louisbourg Expedition. This left only a single company of Rogers' Rangers under the command of Webb – Captain Richard Rogers' company. While at Fort William Henry, Captain Richard Rogers died of smallpox on June 22, 1757. Because both Loudoun and Robert Rogers were in Halifax, Webb declined to appoint a new captain. During the Siege, this 101-man company of Rogers' Rangers was led by 1st Lieutenant Noah Johnson. These rangers would best be classified as regulars, as they were not carried on any Return of Militia (*His Majesty's Independent Company of Rangers*). Loudoun and London might have offered a vastly different categorization. In time, *A Corps of Rangers in North America* would appear in the Printed Annual Army List under the command of Major Joseph Goreham; all commissions date to September 25, 1761 (WO 65/12, 1763).

Captain Jonathan Ogden led the New York provincial rangers. Thirty-four Rank & File from this company are reported as being in Albany on August 30th (LO 4004). Monro's estimate of 140 rangers in the garrison seems very plausible and was a combination of both Johnson's and Ogden's men (LO 4367). Any reference to a company of New Jersey rangers under Captain Philip Burgin needs to be dismissed. Burgin had successfully "sold" Loudoun on the legitimacy of his ranger company, and they were to be posted to Fort William Henry. But it was quickly determined that his men had no woodcraft or wilderness training whatsoever. Following Loudoun's orders, Webb had the group paid off and dismissed on June 28, 1757. Out of over 100 men, only a single individual was accepted into Rogers' Rangers (Loescher 1946, Page 454). Webb then summoned Ogden's provincial rangers for duty at Fort William Henry.

There is a suggestion that Captain Gordon Graham of the 42nd Highlanders was at the Siege (O'Callaghan 1859, Page 728; but only as a footnote). He received his commission as a captain in the 42nd on June 3, 1752 (Steward, 2015). Graham does not appear on the list of regular officers found in LO 4170, and there is no narrative making this claim. More importantly, none of the references cited in the footnote concerning Graham seem to support this contention. In the "*Wilson's Orderly Book, Amherst 1759 Campaign*", there is a footnote on Page 14 making the same claim about Graham, but this statement is not in the original 1759 text, just as a footnote by the editor. The language in each of these footnotes is nearly identical. As there is no link to any source material that supports this contention, Graham is not included in the officer list for the Siege — See *Commissary Wilson's Orderly Book. Expedition of the British and Provincial Army, under Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Amherst against Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point. 1759.* edited by J. Waters De Peyster, 1857. J. Munsell, Albany, New York (online).

Notes on Officers Ranks: John Campbell, the 4th Earl of Loudoun, arrived in North America in late July 1756 with the rank of General and Commander in Chief, North America. Loudoun was Braddock's replacement. Within the British Army itself, Loudoun held the army rank of Major General. Loudoun also served as Colonel-in-Chief of the four-battalion 60th Regiment and Colonel of the 30th Foot. Major General James Abercromby was Loudoun's second in command and was with Loudoun in Nova Scotia in Summer 1757. Abercromby had been appointed a Major General on January 31, 1756. Abercromby would become infamous for the Ticonderoga debacle in 1758. Both Loudoun and Abercromby were Scots. Daniel Webb was third in command. Webb and Abercromby leave England in mid-April, first Webb then Abercromby a few days later. Loudoun leaves over a month later on May 22 and is off New York on July 22. The piecemeal arrival of the new command authority proves awkward with colonials immediately pressing Abercromby hard on various issues. At the direction of Lord Cumberland, Daniel Webb was raised and paid at the rank of Major General, but only as regards North America (Loudoun to Cumberland, April 25, 1757, MANA, Page 343). Webb was also the Colonel of the 48th (November 11, 1755). Earlier in 1755, Webb had been the Lieutenant Colonel of the 4th Regiment Horse, Irish Establishment.

At the time of Loudoun's arrival, there was a huge clash between the British Regular Army and provincial officers as regards rank (Pargellis 1933, Pages 81-93; and Rogers, 1974, Pages 68-72). Early during the war, any British Army officer would technically outrank any provincial officer, regardless of rank. This was unacceptable to the provincial officers, particularly those from New England. To keep command, those same officers had carefully crafted the language used to raise their provincial regiments, effectively negating the authority of the British Army in 1756. This insistence by the New Englanders was largely the result of perceived abuse by Lt. Colonel Monckton (47th Foot) during the Acadian Expedition the year earlier (Anderson 1985, Page 113). Winslow and Monckton had a particularly bad relationship. Loudoun was carrying new orders from London concerning command and ranks. With Loudoun's arrival in July 1756, provincial officers of high rank were to be treated as eldest captains when dealing with the British regulars. This was insufficient to satisfy provincial sensitivities and proved a huge time sink for Loudoun (LO 1377, July 31, 1756; Final Letter Appendix). From Loudoun to General John Winslow, Massachusetts Provincials (LO 1450):

Sir,

Albany 9th August, 1756.

I find myself under necessity, from the Conversation I had with you yesterday, to put the following Questions to You; and as the Situation of His Majesty's Affairs in this Country, make dispatch necessary, I expect an immediate answer.

As His Majesty, on the repeated Sollicitations from his Provinces & Colonies in North America, has sent over a considerable body of his regular Forces, in support of his own just Rights, and for the Defence & Protection of the Lives and Fortunes of his good Subjects in the Colonies, from the Invasion, Depredations, and Murders daily committed by the French, even in times of Peace; Also as His Majesty has thought proper to appoint a Commander in Chief, with a Commission under the great Seal, and a sufficient Staff of General Officers under him to Command these Forces; And with full Power to Command all Troops raised or to be raised in North America, as signified to each of this Governors, by his Secretaries of State the Earl of Holderness & S^r Tho. Robinson from the Year 1754, and last by IW(?):Secretary Fox:— I desire to be informed by you, in writing, whether the Troops now raised by several Provincial Colonies of New England, and

Armed with his Majesty's Arms, will be in Obedience to His Majesty's Commands, signified to them as above, Act in Conjunction with His Majesty's Troops, and under the Command of His Commander and Chief, in whose Hands he has been pleased to place the Execution of all these Matters.

I am with great Truth and Regard, Sir, &c

The response of the provincials was not as Loudoun hoped. Winslow wrote "*that the Terms & Conditions agreed upon & Established, by the Several Governments to whome they Belong and upon which they were rais'd be not alter'd*" (LO 1452). Loudoun was accepted as the overall commander, but the provincial officer ranks would remain unchanged. This arrangement effectively blocked the mixing of provincial and regular troops. Although livid, Loudoun was forced to temporarily concede the argument, but a workable compromise would be instituted the next year. Through 1756, Winslow would continue to lead the provincials with minimal interference from the British regulars. Anderson fully explores the conflict that entangles Loudoun, Winslow, and Shirley (Anderson 1984, Contractual Principles, Pages 167-195).

The first element of the compromise involved placing a ceiling on the rank of provincial officers. In 1756, John Winslow of Massachusetts led the Lake Champlain Campaign with the rank of a full general. In 1755 and 1756, Phineas Lyman of Connecticut held the campaign rank of major general, but he was also colonel of the Connecticut regiment. After 1756, there would be no campaign ranks for provincial officers; the highest rank would be regimental colonels. This initial step had limited reach and only established Abercromby's and Webb's command authorities. Entering 1757, the British were careful to ensure that there was no glut of low-ranking field grade officers among the provincials. Between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, there were six provincial regiments, but a combined total of only eight field officers — five colonels, one lieutenant colonel, and two majors (LO 4004; Major John Gilman of New Hampshire is detailed as "absent" but counted here as part of the eight field officers). Colonel Fyre was the only field officer for the 1,600-man Massachusetts regiment. Lt. Col. Whiting's command at Fort Number 4 is not considered here. The second part of the compromise came directly from Pitt (1757) — provincial officers were to be treated as equivalent rank to British regulars, but always with lower seniority. Now to avoid command and control problems, Pitt had all the lieutenant colonels in the Regular Army overseas promoted to "Colonel in America Only", ensuring that any British colonel or lieutenant colonel of the regulars would outrank any provincial colonel (Pargellis 1933: Page 316). This practice would have included Monro of the 35th and Young of the 60th, but very few other British officers. This compromise made it possible to mix regular and provincial regiments in the same campaign, including those against Ticonderoga and Niagara, but the authority was now with the British Army. Lyman is the only exception to this rule. Amherst will reference him as either colonel or often major general (See Middleton 2015, Page 110).

In 1758, to further clarify command roles, several "true" colonels were assigned the rank of brigadier including Forbes (17th), Stanwix (1st of the 60th), Howe (3rd of the 60th), Whitmore (22nd), and later Lawrence (3rd of the 60th). Forbes was detached to lead in Pennsylvania and was not with the 17th at Louisbourg. With a provincial force, Stanwix would guard the western approaches to Albany and was not at Ticonderoga. These brigadier ranks were theater ranks, "in America Only." Colonel James Prevost (4th of the 60th) felt so slighted at not being named a brigadier, he refused to join Abercromby's expedition against Ticonderoga and remained in New York City. Abercromby despised Prevost, as did Loudoun, and Abercromby was more than

happy to leave this extraordinarily difficult officer behind in New York (Nester 2008, Page 171). Brigadier should be thought of as a command rank. In the series *The Printed Annual Army List of Officers WO 65*, the rank of brigadier will not be seen — General, Lieutenant General, Major General, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, etc.

Although the New England officers had successfully blocked Loudoun in 1756, the British Army would never let something similar happen again. The laundry list of reasons why the independence of the provincial regiments had to be curtailed was complete and now accepted in London — poor discipline, poor drill, poor sanitation and hygiene, and a decided lateness to start. Although the provincial regiments were willing to serve into late November, the provincial infantry regiments could not be gathered until mid-June or late June and then needed additional time to organize. To the British Army, the momentum of a campaign needed to be established by the end of May, not in July. It was also recognized that once provincial troops lost momentum, it was near impossible to reestablish; their expeditions would flounder, and disease would likely take hold. On paper, late-starting expeditions appeared to be without justification or reason, but they often mirrored overdue shipping and supplies from Britain — a minimum of six to eight weeks in transit.

Winslow would not serve in the military after 1756. Shirley, the champion of independent provincial expeditions, was recalled in March 1756 and replaced by Loudoun. Loudoun's dislike of Shirley was truly intense with Loudoun placing the full blame for the rank debacle and the loss of Oswego on Shirley (Pargellis 1933, Pages 133-166). Shirley had no background as a British Army officer. To the professionals in the British Army, Shirley repeatedly fumbled the logistics and the accounting, a politician turned amateur general. The British Army had no more tolerance for colonial politics or sensitivities. Provincial regiments would never again lead expeditions, as they had in 1755 and 1756. The sea-land campaigns would be the sole domain of the British Army with the colonies providing only specialized troops — rangers, boatmen, and artificers. Provincial infantry regiments would be left behind. This is exactly what Loudoun did as regards the 1757 Louisbourg Expedition. Provincial troops were used sparingly at Quebec in 1758. If the decision were left to the British Army, any raised provincial infantry would be limited to garrison duty or work details involving artificers, construction, road building, and the transport of needed supplies — fatigue duty (Anderson 1984). Although the British Army argued that the cost of fielding the provincial regiments was exorbitant when compared to their value, Pitt decided to continue the practice of fielding provincial regiments. Provincial infantry would be used in land campaigns only when mixed with British regulars and under the command authority of a high-ranking British officer of at least the theater rank of colonel. The independence of provincial forces was lost, but the ranks and positions of the provincial officers were largely retained — lieutenants in the British Army would not be giving orders to provincial colonels. However, difficult provincial officers could still be "punished" by assignment beneath what was appropriate to their rank. Colonial militia did not have to adhere to this practice of limiting officer ranks.

Note: In January 1762, Britain declared war on Spain. Cuba was immediately targeted. British regulars first land on June 6th. At least 2,300 provincial troops joined the expedition. These men were from New England and New York, but the provincials arrive only in the latter stages of the Campaign (July 27th) with Havana surrendering on August 14th. British losses to disease were extreme, exceeding 5,000 men (Anderson 2001, Pages 501 and 804). This 5,000 figure does not include the provincial contribution. In one Connecticut Regiment of 1,050 men, some 625 die from disease (60%).




Figure 10. Fort Stanwix, Rome New York. This fort was active during both the French and Indian War and the American Revolution. About 340 feet per side, it was larger than Fort William Henry and the logistics would have been much easier to manage. Barrack space was described as suitable for 400 in the summer, but only 200 in the winter (The Documentary History of New York, Vol. IV, Page 524). The exterior faces of the individual bastions would be about 97 feet; the shorter flanks would be about 37 feet long. The 340-foot length comfortably allows six gun embrasures per bastion. The field of fire provided by an individual embrasure would be about 22.5°. Having two embrasures per flank would have been a distinct advantage, but difficult to achieve even at this dimension. To limit the number of embrasures that could target attacking trenches, the orientation of the trenches (saps) would often be directed at a bastion tip. At Fort William Henry, the orientation of the attacking saps roughly matches a line drawn from the tip of the north bastion to the tip of the south bastion. Only those few flank embrasures on the adjoining bastions would have the correct orientations and positions to fire on the approaching trench network. Individual bastions relied on the two adjoining bastions for protection with the smaller flank embrasures key to the defense. Accurate musket fire from the flanks needed to effectively sweep the full face of the adjacent bastion and ditch, preventing the enemy from having a "safe spot" under the adjacent face. In essence, the effect range of musket fire limited the length of the curtain walls and the maximum size of any bastion. Swivel guns would be an added precaution, but these would be both slow and decidedly awkward in daily use. National Park Service.




Figure 12. Lake Champlain and Lake George. Ordered by General Jeffery Amherst, 1762. Fort William Henry to the US/Canadian Border (shown) is about 110 miles (177 km).

Table 1. Ordnance at Fort Edward/Fort William Henry (1755) and Winslow's Expedition Needs (1756).

		Fort Edward 1755 (Remains)	Fort Will ^m Henry 1755 (Remains)	Winslow 1756 Full Proportion	Fort Will ^m Henry 1756 (Demand)
Brass	6-Pounders		4	4	—
	8-Inch Mortars		2	2	—
Iron	32-Pounders		2	2	-
	18 D.°		2	8	6
	12 D.°		2	2	—
	6 D.°		3	3	—
Iron	13 Inch Mortar		1	1	—
	7 D.° Mortar *		2	2	—
	10 In. Mortars		—	4	4
	8 Inch Howitz		—	2	2
Round	32-Pounders	150	77	600	375
Shott	18 D.°	150	896 **	2400	1354
	12 D.°	100	197	400	103
	6 D.°		733	2100	1367
Grape	32-Pounders	8 oz. 2160	—	40	40
Shott	18 D.°	4 oz. 10080	—	160	160
	12 D.°	3 oz. 2520	—	40	40
	6 D.°		143	210	67
Shells	13 Inch	160	36	200	164
	8 D."	100	—	400	400
	7 D."	100	228	400	172
	10 D. "	—	—	800	800

* Printed as *7 D.° Howitz* but modified here to a mortar designation to agree with two inventories from the Johnson Papers, Vol. II (September 29, 1755, Page 119; and November 6, 1755, Page 277). As printed, the 7 D.° Howitz and 8 Inch Howitz are equivalent, so a gun category is not removed by this change. ** Johnson reports this value as 689, not 896.

This list was prepared by Captain Thomas Ord of the Royal Artillery (March 7, 1756). Source: Provincial Papers — Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire from 1749-1763; Volume VI, Pages 495-496 (Bouton 1872, online). The column sequence has been re-arranged. Numbers differ between Johnson and Bouton, but they are reasonably close to each other. Winslow is only able to find two 10-inch mortars, not the four listed here. He then substitutes one additional 8-inch iron mortar and one additional 8-inch howitzer. Winslow's Artillery Train was charged with having eleven shell pieces, he has the eleven pieces.

The full list is much more extensive and includes dozens of other items and implements not shown here. The limited number of tools available to build Fort William Henry is evident. Although Winslow inherited Johnson's logistical problems, Ord was able to identify the shortfalls that needed to be filled. Shortages were common.

Discussions involving long-guns (cannon) are central to the Johnson Papers, their movement and the need for new carriages. There are repeated references to brass 8-inch mortars that were wanted for both Johnson's Campaign and Shirley's Niagara Campaign. The "best" reference to any howitzer is found for a single 7-inch howitzer with 100 shells being sent from Massachusetts (Johnson Papers, June 9, 1755, Volume 1, Page 571 then Page 623). A similar entry is for an unidentified howitzer on August 8th (Vol 1, Page 837). There is little else. On September 29th, Eyre writes "*Our Howitz Splitz during the late Engagement*" (Johnson Papers, Volume 2, Page 120). There is nothing in the Johnson Papers related to the 8-inch iron mortars beyond the inventories taken at Lake George.

Ord had commanded the artillery under Braddock at the Monongahela. Until the arrival of Lt. Colonel George Williamson (Halifax, July 1757), he was the most senior officer of the Royal Artillery in North America. During the Siege, Ord was at Fort Edward. The list itself was likely developed by a clerk from the Board of Ordnance using more than one inventory or source document. Notably, the list references both 7-inch and 8-inch howitzers and 7-inch and 8-inch shells. Like MacLeod, Ord has no problem with using both 7-inch and 8-inch "tags" in the same document. Typical of the jumbled nature surrounding 7-inch and 8-inch, there are two 8-inch brass mortars shown as being at Fort William Henry without any corresponding 8-inch shells. As regards this list only, the 8-inch shell designation appears tied to the brass 8-inch mortar and the 7-inch shell designation to the howitzer(s).

In December 1755, at least three 6-pounders were mounted at Fort Edward (Johnson Papers; Vol. II, Page 365). These guns may already be on this list, or they may be additional 6-pounders brought north from Albany. As no 32-pound or 12-pound ammunition appears in Ewings' comprehensive inventory of Fort Edward (LO 6686, September 6, 1757), it can be assumed that all the 32- and 12-pound ammunition listed under "Fort Edward 1755 (Remains)" was eventually moved to Fort William Henry.

Winslow's actual ordnance need far exceeded the quantities that Johnson was able to move north the previous year. Teasing out the table and with exceptions, about 300 round shot were wanted per cannon and some 200 shells for each mortar and howitzer. Winslow was particularly short of gunpowder and had to transport over 500 full barrels still positioned at Albany. By the end of July, Winslow's delivered ordnance was still well short of what was wanted. The work proved difficult; the need to move provisions competed. Loudoun offered to help, but attached conditions and mandated receipts (Pargellis 1933, Page 91; and LO 1377, Loudoun to Winslow, July 31, 1756). As regards "shell guns" and excluding the 13-inch mortar, Winslow's "Full Proportion" is eleven pieces. Winslow was able to deliver eleven shell pieces but in a different configuration from the list. These shell pieces were then split between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, six and four pieces, respectively. Because of the substitutions among the mortars, Winslow's "delivered" shell quantities may be jumbled — more 10-inch shells per piece and fewer 8-inch shells per piece than "wanted". This possibility aligns with the captured stores seen in Table 2.

Table 2. From (O'Callaghan, Vol X, Page 626 with notations):

Stores and Provisions in Fort William Henry

*Return of Warlike Stores and Provisions found in Fort George after its capture, 9th August, 1757
(Départment de la Guerre, Paris)*

17	pieces of cannon, from 32 to five-pounders of which two brass and three iron are unfit for service. (One burst cannon is overlooked; five iron burst, one brass gun was destroyed).
2	9-inch mortars, burst during the siege. (Misidentified: Two British 8-inch iron mortars)
1	6-inch iron howitzer. (British: one 8-inch iron howitzer)
1	6-inch iron mortar. (British: one 8-inch iron mortar)
13	small iron swivels.
1	shot grating.
227	barrels of powder of 100 ^{lbs} 22,700} 34,0000.
226	barrels of powder of 50 11,300}
2,308	shot of divers(e) calibre.
360	6 @ 9-inch shell...(British: 8-inch and 10-inch shells).....} 345* (Printing Error: Really 545)
185	12-inch shell (British: 13-inch shell)..... }
4	cases of balls, of 200 ^{lbs} = 800
1	" of grenades.
6	" of fire-works.

Artillery of the Intrenchments

6	brass guns, viz., 2 of 12, and 4 of 5 ^{lbs} .
4	iron swivels.
214	shot.
75	barrels of powder, 25 ^{lbs} . (=) 1835. (Comment: 1875 lbs.)
80	gun charges, in caissons.
600	lbs. ball.
50	lbs. match.

Recapitulation

23	cannon, of which 8 are brass.
1	fire howitzer.
1	mortar.
17	swivels.
35,835	lbs. of powder.
2,522	shot.
1,400	lbs. of ball. (≈ 19,600 musket rounds)
1	grenade chest.
6	chest of fire-works.
	Grapeshot of divers(e) calibre, and
3,000	barrels of flour or pork.

All this property has been conveyed to Carillon. Comment: Unfit pieces would be melted down.

List for Fort George + List for Intrenchments = List Recapitulation - unwanted. Do not double add. The French captured more large ordnance than was transported to Carillon (25), but only 19 or 20 pieces were "fit". This list cannot be correct. In the Bastion, a total of five iron cannon burst which cannot be "achieved" using this inventory. The only evidence supporting having two unfit guns in the Camp is the Fyre Journal, but no other British reference applies to the Camp on Aug. 7th. The Collins Inventory ignores the Camp. If a second brass gun was lost, it is better included under the Camp: 6 brass guns, viz., 2 of 12, and 4 of 5 ^{lbs}, one 5-pdr is unfit.

Considering the chaos at the time, Table 2 is an exceedingly honest document. Though not perfect, the accuracy can only be described as remarkably high. There is no trace of deliberate exaggeration or falsehood. In Table 2, the Bastion (Fort George) and Encampment (Intrenchment) accounting must be approached differently. The Bastion accounting attempts to distinguish between fit guns and those unfit. If the Collins Inventory is accepted and a second brass cannon was indeed unfit, the Encampment accounting would have to lump fit and unfit into a single number, as was done at Oswego. No change is required to the *Recapitulation*, but without doubt, the *Recapitulation* lumps fit with unfit ordnance, a source of error even in recent histories. Together the French identify twenty-seven of the twenty-eight pieces of large ordnance that were present; only one cannon is missing or overlooked from the Bastion Inventory. The combined French tally of eight brass guns is correct. The number of mortars and howitzers is correct. This accounting, together with Collins' Inventory, indicates that the missing cannon is an iron 12-pounder or larger gun, not the 6-pounder given to Monro. In the bastion, one brass cannon was destroyed by French artillery and five iron cannon burst. Here, the number of iron cannon bursting in the Bastion is short by two guns, not the one overlooked gun — so there is a definite error relating to the burst iron cannon. **Assuming the French found the missing cannon from the Bastion and accepting the Collins Inventory, the first line of text should read: *18 pieces of cannon, from 32 to five-pounders of which one brass and five iron are unfit for service.***

Eighteenth-century French nomenclature and measurements differ from that then used in Britain. In the 1750s, 1 Paris inch = 1.066 English inches and 1 Paris foot = 12.789 English inches. There were also differences in the standard of weights; the Parisian French pound (0.4895 kg) weighing some eight percent more than the British pound (0.4536 kg). The following descriptive pairings are better matches to the shell and shot diameters than to the caliber of the bores. This convention is likely related to differences in windage tolerances and manufacturing tolerances of the different shells and shots of each nation. As regards British artillery captured or surrendered, a 6-inch or 7-inch mortar or howitzer reference (French) is paired to the 8-inch pieces (British); the 9-inch reference (French) is paired to 10-inch pieces (British). Adopting this convention, the French misidentify the two-burst iron mortars as 10-inch mortars. But the French correctly identify the fit mortar and fit howitzer (8-inch British pieces). The 5-pounders (French) references are 6-pounders (British), but the French then fail to differentiate between the British 6-pounders and the British 4-pounders — they are lumped together. Often the French will adopt the 12-pounder designation for British 12-pounders. As regards cannon, a British 18-pounder would be referenced as a 16-pounder (French), and any British 9-pounder would be referenced as a 8-pounder (French). These translations are limited to French describing British artillery pieces and may not work in reverse. In a French inventory, if a bore diameter of a cannon is listed with an odd number, instead of an even number, it is likely a British gun. But the same is not true with mortars, especially as regards a 9-inch designation. The captured guns from Oswego illustrate these translation difficulties — the best list is O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 520, but even this list has internal problems.

Starting in 1732, the French army manufactured cannon as 4-, 8-, 12-, 16-, and 24-pounders (Vallière Ordnance System). These were brass guns, comparable to British heavy brass guns. The French navy is armed with 4-, 6-, 8-, 12-, 18-, 24-, and 36-pounders, nearly always iron guns. Mortars were manufactured in 8- and 12-inch; howitzers were limited to 8-inch (\approx 1749). Before 1732, French mortars were manufactured in a wide range of sizes 18-, 15-, 12-, 9-, 8-, and 6-inch (Persy 1832, Page 20). In 1749, the most common mortar in Canada was a 6-inch iron mortar with a 5-inch 8-line shell. These mortars were cast in the late 1740s at Forges du Saint-Maurice (Trois Rivières, Quebec; Samson 1998,

Page 226). Both Niagara and Frontenac had a single 6-inch iron mortar in their stores with two more at Montreal and a single piece at Quebec (French nomenclature, O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Pages 195-196). Outside of some half-dozen iron grenade mortars also cast at Saint-Maurice (nominal 3-inch 4-line French or 3.53 inches, English), there were only three other mortars in Canada — this inventory does not include the Louisbourg or Nova Scotia stores. There was a single brass 12-inch 4-line mortar and a single 9-inch 6-line brass mortar at Quebec. The final mortar was a brass 4-inch 9-line piece at Fort Michilimakinac in Michigan. With the unlikely exception of the 12-inch brass mortar, these mortars pre-date the Vallière System. Eight 6-inch iron mortars would arrive from France in 1757 (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 655; undated but appears to be Summer or Fall 1757). In October 1757, these 6-inch mortars were at Quebec (Le Mercier Inventory, October 30, 1757; Library and Archives Canada; ID # 3073054). These mortars do not appear to be the five 6-inch iron mortars seen at Frontenac in September 1756 or at Carillon in September 1757 (Le Mercier Inventory; Library and Archives Canada; ID # 3072938 and ID # 3073056, see Page 147). This second group of 6-inch mortars may well be Saint-Maurice mortars, but the reason to concentrate those mortars at Frontenac then Carillon is seemingly tied to the very limited shell availability (Table 6, Page 158). No brass mortar of any size appears in the 1756 Frontenac Inventory. In November 1758, Vaudreuil asks that four 9-inch brass mortars be sent from France (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 864). As such, any French reference to a 9-inch or 6-inch mortar could be either British or French manufacture, but circumstances may suggest whether the piece was brass or iron. Oswego fell to the French on August 14, 1756. Montcalm's siege train entering Oswego included an iron 6-inch mortar; the date and previous inventories dictate that this piece was of Canadian manufacture (See Chartrand 2018, Page 53).

In the 1750s, British cannon were manufactured as: 42-, 32-, 24-, 18-, 12-, 9-, 6-, 4-, and 3-pounders, the reference is to the weight of the shot. Each shot would be measured against a pair of circular gauges — one maximum diameter (high gauge) and one minimum diameter (low gauge). Often the low gauge is the number identified as the diameter of the shot for a gun, but both elements are needed (McConnell 1988, Page 287-289). The accepted range for a 12-pound shot would be between 4.403 and 4.476 inches with windage of 0.223 inches; for a 32-pounder, between 6.105 and 6.207 inches and a windage of 0.305. The low gauge plus the windage is the bore diameter; it is **not** the high gauge value. British mortars were manufactured as: 13-inch, 10-, 8-, 5 1/2-inch (royal - brass), and 4 2/5-inch (cohorn - brass). British howitzers were manufactured in these same increments minus the 13-inch (McConnell 1988, Pages 137 and 141). With this standardization, British mortars and howitzers could use the same shells. These naming references are tied to the width of the bore or the diameter of the shell — the larger pieces best match the bore diameter and the smaller pieces best fit the shell diameter. In 1753, the corresponding shell sizes are 12.75 inches, 9.75 inches, 7.75 inches, 5.54 inches, and 4.40 inches (McConnell 1988, Page 291). In the Collins' Inventory, all the mortars and howitzers are referenced to the diameter of their shells — 7 3/4-inch. The French designations follow a similar path but are more chaotic. The pre-Vallière ordnance best references the shell diameter; Vallière ordnance best references the bore diameter (1732).

By the end of 1758, ammunition stores in Canada are extremely poor. Vaudreuil asks that 31,200 shot, 14,500 shells, and 500,000 "*new campaign powder*" be sent from France (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 864). Except for large-bore mortars, ammunition is now of higher concern than the ordnance pieces themselves. As regards artillery, Vaudreuil only asks for four 18-inch mortars (comminge, a 528-pound shell empty) and four 9-inch mortars to be sent with 3,000 shells each for both types. He does not ask for cannon. Although Abercromby is defeated at Ticonderoga, his artillery train successfully retreats with his men. In 1758, there would be no captured British ordnance train to resupply the French. Then there is

the loss of Frontenac (Kingston, Ontario) and its attending ships (August 1758). Frontenac was the key supply depot on Lake Ontario supporting both Niagara and Fort Duquesne. Vaudreuil will take the blame for the Frontenac debacle, not Montcalm.

From M. de Vaudreuil to M. de Massaie, Minister of the Marine and Colonies (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 863, partial transcription):

My Lord,

Montreal, 1 November, 1758

I have the honor to transmit to you the requisition furnished me by Chevalier Lemerrier, of the ammunition to be sent this year from France. I have examined it, my Lord, with attention; have called for a report of what we have in the Colony, and have seen it impossible to make any retrenchment. I shall require that supply indispensably, to enable me to defend the Colony the King has confided to me, if attacked, as there is every appearance it will be. What is wanting can be made up by multiplying the fire of artillery and musketry, and taking up good positions; but 'tis impossible to avoid consumption of powder in war; this is the truth I beg you to place in the proper light before his Majesty.

You like likewise be able, my Lord, to observe to the King that there is no country where so much of it is consumed, both for hunting and distribution among the Indians; burning of powder is equally a passion among Canadians, but I think we gain thereby in the day of battle, by the correctness of their aim in firing. Were it not for the ammunition furnished me successively by the Beautiful River (Monongahela), Chouagouin (Oswego), and Fort George (Fort William Henry), I should not have had enough either for attack or defence. The Company of the Indies (Lower Mississippi Valley), which used to import annually and consume forty thousand weight, had no more powder. The consumption may, even in time of peace, be estimated at sixty-thousand weight.

The corruption of the Canadian mercantile would now hurt any call for succor from France. From M. Berryer at Versailles, Minister of the Marine and Colonies, to M. Francois Bigot (Intendant), January 19, 1759 (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 937): *"How do you wish me to reconcile, on the other hand, the enormous demands for all sorts of goods which you have made this year, under the pretext of a general scarcity of everything with your information contained in other letters wherein you advise me of the capture of Fort Frontenac; that the King has lost, in that fort, a prodigious quantity of provisions and goods. I am not ignorant that the fort was the depôt for the posts on Lake Ontario and Erie, and the Beautiful River; that therefore it must be always supplied, but if the posts in the Upper countries could have caused an expenditure of a million in provisions and merchandize, Fort Frontenac had no need of all that you say it contained."*

Following the victory at Carillon, Montcalm was promoted to Lieutenant General (October 1758). At least in army matters, Montcalm now has precedence over ("outranks") any colonial governor including Vaudreuil (Andrews 2015, Page 96). In February 1759, this news reaches Canada. Only then does Vaudreuil lose command over the military (Steele 1994, Page 206). Here Steele makes a balanced assessment: *"Although the French ministry formally gave Montcalm command over Vaudreuil in military matters only in February 1759, Vaudreuil's preferred approach had been less evident after the raid that destroyed the Mohawk Valley settlement of Germain Flats in fall of 1757. It is doubtful whether a continuation of Vaudreuil's methods could have saved New France, but his strategy had certainly postponed its fall."*

Notes on Artillery

a. Sources of the Guns — British Ordnance:

Determining the sources and character of the artillery at the time of the Siege involves following a convoluted trail of letters and correspondence. Multiple letters are often required to piece together the history. Special attention needs to be paid to the dates of the letters. Sometimes the letters are separated by months. Often the needed letters are entirely independent of each other and not part of the same letter thread. Until all the letters are viewed together, there is no clear understanding. Much about the cannon can be teased out of the available letter threads. Information concerning the shell pieces is harder to discover, but it may be buried within the Winslow Papers housed at the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston (unpublished) or in the writings of William Shirley.

Entering 1755, Shirley yields considerable power and influence throughout the northern colonies. However, Shirley was not popular with several of his fellow governors — Hardy of New York (arriving from England in September 1755), his own successor Pownall, or De Lancey, who is Acting Governor of New York until Hardy arrives. De Lancey then succeeds Hardy as Governor of New York in 1756. Among these rivalries, discerning the truth can be difficult. Twisting language, polite insults, and subtle distortions are not uncommon within the correspondence, especially in letters being sent to England. Loudoun has no tolerance for this political maneuvering and gamesmanship. Lt. Governor De Lancey writes from New York City (De Lancey to Secretary of State, Thomas Robinson; August 7, 1755):

"I hope it will not be improper to mention the number of Cannon that have been spared from this City for the several expeditions on foot, which could not have been done with safety to this place, had not Admiral Boscaven been sent out to awe the French fleet; for the expedition to the Isthmus of Nova Scotia, ten iron eighteen pounders with their carriages and implements; to Gen^l Shirley for this expedition against Niagara, 6. Brass twelve pounders, one brass eighteen pounder, and seven iron six pounders; and for the expedition to Crown Point, two iron thirty two pounders, six iron eighteen, two iron twelve, 4 brass six & 4 iron six pounders" (O'Callaghan, Vol. VI, Page 991).

By itself, this Crown Point reference represents a full-half of the British guns at the Siege — fourteen cannon (counting only two 18-pounders). Comparing De Lancey's numbers to the cannon inventory for New York Harbor in January 1755 (Appendix Page 258), there were enough "new" 32-pounders and 12-pounders to equip all three northern expeditions, but the number of "new" 18-pounders was short by half and there were no "old" 18-pounders in the inventory to make up any difference — New York Harbor was stripped of all its 18-pounders. Large-bore brass ordnance was minimal. However, De Lancey's statement is a misrepresentation.

From George Clinton, Governor of New York to the Duke of Newcastle, November 30, 1745: *"I have been endeavouring to set foot a scheme and to engage the Province therein, for the reduction of a Fort at Crown point, possessed by the French in the Indian Country, which is a very great annoyance to our frontiers, and had in pursuance thereof sent up six pieces of Cannon of 18 pounders with carriages and a proportion of powder, ball, match and other implements" (O'Callaghan, Vol. VI, Page 306; King George's War, 1744-1748).* These 18-pounders would have been used against Fort St. Frederic the following season (1746), but the effort never happens.

Two months previous to De Lancey's letter to Robinson, Shirley writes to De Lancey (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol 2, Page 182, June 1, 1755): *"As to the six 18 Pounders and 4 small brass field pieces, which your Honour hath spared for the Service of the Expedition against Crown point, as Mr. Clinton had done before, for the like service in 1746: I understand they were sent out of Albany, where they have laid for these last ten years, and I don't well see how the Loan of them now can have weakened the City of New York....."*

two of your ten Eighteen Pounders, together with two 24 Pounders out of Castle William (Boston), with Carriages and Implements to be put board a Sloop, which is to sail to-day for New York, and have Ordered the two last mentioned Cannon to be delivered to your Honour with the two 18-pounders, which I hope will be satisfactory to you and the Gentlemen of his Majesty's Council

I shall trouble your Honour no further upon this point than to observe, that in 1745 and 1746, all these Cannon were lent by the Government of New York to his Majesty's service for the Expedition against Cape Breton, and the then intended one against Crown point, without any demand for their being replaced from this Government, and indeed they were most readily for the present Service in which they are employed without any hesitation by your Honour until I requested of you to spare me the six 12 pounders for his Majesty's Service in which I am engaged at Niagara."

It is thought that these 18-pounders first reached New York in November 1739, unloaded from the *HMS Duke* (90 guns, second rate, *HMS Vanguard*, NYS Office of Parks). The ten 18-pounders sent to Boston by Clinton served at the successful Siege of Louisbourg (May - June 1745). From George Clinton, Governor of New York to the Duke of Newcastle, November 18, 1745 (O'Callaghan, Vol. VI, Page 284): *"During that interval, I sent ten pieces of Ordnance of 18 pounders with carriages ettc to Boston without which they could not have undertaken the affair, and I have the pleasure to tell Your Grace, those very cannon contributed greatly to the reduction of Louisbourg for which I received the thanks of the General Court of Massachusetts Bay in a publick manner (tho' I could hardly get my own to pay for the transportation of them) as well as M^r Shirley's acknowledgements in his speech to them, for this instance my care in taking such an intimate part in that enterprise."*

The 18-pounders were then returned to New York — Shirley is word-playing with "demand". In Spring 1755, there were no 18-pounders in Massachusetts (Correspondence of William Shirley, Page 183, June 1, 1755): *"and as there are no Cannon in this Province so fit for Battering pieces in that Service, I proposed to your Honour the Loan of them, which I should not have troubled you if they had been to be found here."* There were none in Nova Scotia (LO 4394). It is likely that Johnson's 18-pounders were part of Clinton's Louisbourg guns. The timeline and math will easily allow for this — Louisbourg surrendered on June 28, the six 18-pounders reached Albany sometime before mid-November. When writing Robinson, De Lancey conveniently fails to mention that it was 10 years previous that Johnson's 18-pounders were at New York Harbor. However, De Lancey did supply the 18-pounders needed for the Acadia Expedition and the brass ordnance to Shirley.

De Lancey's letter is also key to understanding the source of the 32-pounders and the iron 12-pounders. Goldsbroow Banyar was both the Deputy Provincial Secretary and an astute businessman. He seemed to be friends with both Johnson and De Lancey. For some reason, Banyar had a decided interest in Johnson's artillery train, especially as regards mortars (Johnson Papers, Volume 1, including Pages 519, 652, 746, and 759). Someone was supplying Eyre with information on the shortcomings of Johnson's artillery train and the guns in New York Harbor. This may be Banyar.

While still in New York, Eyre meets with Lt. Governor De Lancey and requests additional guns even before seeing the guns at Albany. This meeting was independent of Shirley and Johnson. From Goldsbroow Banyar to William Johnson, June 1, 1755 (Johnson Papers, Volume I, Page 557):

"Last Night at Willets, M^r. Ayres gave the Gov^r. a letter in which he desires him to order six Cannon more for the Expedition. Viz^t. 2 thirty two pdrs considerably lighter than the 18 pds at Albany, the two Brass 18 pdrs & 2 Iron twelve pounders with their Carriages: the Gov^r. told him he would give him an answer today, that if he succeeds he may acquaint Gov^r. Shirley with it and use it as an Argument for more Powder."

Clearly, Eyre already knew of the gun weights involved with both the 32-pounders and 18-pounders and showed a distinct understanding of the limitations of Johnson's artillery train. The sheer bulk of the 18-pounders was worrisome to Eyre. But at the same time, Shirley was requesting some of the same guns for his Niagara Expedition, the brass pieces. Although Shirley has command over Johnson, he was not superior to De Lancey. De Lancey splits the difference and sends the brass long-guns to Shirley, but against Shirley's objections, he retains two brass 8-inch mortars for Johnson's use. From De Lancey, Eyre was able to add two 32-pounders and two 12-pounders from New York Harbor to Johnson's artillery train, but not the two brass 18-pounders he asked for. This accounts for all the large-bore iron cannon at the Siege, 12-pounders and up (British guns). During the Siege, five out of the six large-bore cannon taken from New York Harbor would burst — the two 32-pounders, the two 18-pounders, and one of the iron 12-pounders. The fit iron 12-pounder was a heavy 12-pounder, 9 or 9.5 feet long — a single iron 14-pounder suddenly appears on the September 24, 1757, Inventory of Carillon (Keagle 2018, Page 9). Typically, the French identify medium British 12-pounders simply as 12-pounders.

Eyre supplies a brief description of Johnson's 1755 artillery train (MANA, Page 128; Camp near Albany; July 27, 1755): Nineteen pieces are identified, but no howitzers. An 8-inch iron howitzer would reach Albany by ship that August (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 837). Four of the 18-pounders would remain in Albany:

"Our Army Will amount to three thousand five hundred, & the Number of Cannon are 6 18^{pdrs}, 2 32^{pdrs}, 8 6^{pdrs}, one 13, & two 8 Inch Mortars, but as all our Artillery are Iron I am afraid we shall not be able to get them along, if the Roads prove bad, particularly the 18^{pdrs}, they weighing from fifty two to fifty three hundred weight, and the 32^{pdrs} only between 41 & 44 hundred. I have very little help to assist me in the management of the Artillery but my self, and was Obligated to Act as Q^r Master Genl. Since my Arrival, as there was no such Officer Appointed by the Provinces, nor any Body here was acquainted with that Service, so Major Genl. Shirley has lately Given me A Commission for that Purpose. I make no Doubt but we shall be able to reduce the Fort in a short time if we can get up our Artillery, but they are so extremely heavy, and so many other difficulties in our way, as I fear, will make it not easy to surmount, however, I long to make the experiment, and be persuaded there is no thing shall be wanting on My Side to bring things to a happy Issue.

Major Gen. Shirley is lately pass'd here in his Way to Niagara. I wish he could make a little more haste, or I fear he will Miss the opportunity to lay hold of it. His Army is about 2,000 & upwards."

Two iron 12-pounders are missing from this list. Eyre himself obtained these guns directly from De Lancey. These 12-pounders appear two days later in an order from Johnson to Eyre on July 29th to

start moving the artillery train north, so these guns were in Albany and should have been included in Eyre's letter (See Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 789). The "*all our artillery are Iron*" is incorrect, as referenced to the army. Four brass 6-pounders were part of the full train, but these brass 6-pounders appeared to have been moved north with the first detachments of men and are not with Eyre in Albany and the heavier guns (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 730; Gipson, Volume VI, Page 164). From repeated references in the Johnson Papers, Eyre knew of these brass 6-pounders.

The circumstances surrounding the mortars are particularly clouded. British 8-inch mortars were cast in both brass and iron. The problem is the math around the artillery train allows for both possibilities. The "Albany" brass 8-inch mortar was assigned to Johnson by De Lancey on June 24th (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 654) and the "New York" brass 8-inch mortar was shipped north by water from New York City on July 22 (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 759). Both Johnson and Eyre were in Albany at this time, so Eyre likely knew of De Lancey's decision to assign these brass mortars to Johnson. The few shipping lists involving the mortars are badly muddled and then foul Eyre's own description of the mortars at Lake George (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, September 29th, Page 119). All we know for certain is that there was a 13-inch mortar and four smaller mortars at Lake George by the end of September. Best evidence suggests these smaller mortars were all 8-inch pieces, two brass and two iron, without any 5 1/2-inch royal brass mortars. Before this September 29th letter, the Johnson Papers sole focus was on the two brass mortars and whether Johnson would request them from De Lancey. How and when any of the mortars were moved north from Albany is not clear; no mortar is mentioned in Johnson's order to Eyre to move the artillery train north (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 789). Following the assignment of the two brass mortars to Johnson and with reference to the Johnson Papers, the four 8-inch mortars just simply appear at Lake George without a paper trail. The origin of the two iron 8-inch mortars is unknown, but the lack of any earlier references and their poor condition suggests Clinton (1745) and Albany, but there is good reason to think they were colonial cast (see Page 132). As correction, Eyre's July 27th letter is only referencing the ordnance then assigned to his column, all iron.

The 18-pounders described here are massive — each gun weighing between 5,820 and 5,940 pounds with a length of 11 feet (McConnell 1998, Page 77). These characteristics also imply that the guns were old, an early Armstrong pattern (1720s) or even older. Lavery (1987, Page 100) mentions the existence of 11 ft. long 18-pounders in records dating to 1698, but without gun weights. As each gun mold could only be cast once, the variation between molds explains much of the variation seen in the individual gun weights. A Blomefield pattern 18-pounder of nine feet from the Napoleonic Wars would weigh about 4,760 pounds. At the same time, the 32-pounders seem too light at the given weights of between 4,590 and 4,930 pounds. Such gun weights suggest a length of 8 feet, but 32-pounders of this weight are absent from any of the artillery reference texts — the typical length for a 32-pounder was 9.5 feet. In the 1750s, a minimum weight of 5,900 pounds would seem to be more fitting for a 32-pounder. If the weights are switched between the guns, their values would be much more in line with those expected. However, Banyar's letter cements the idea that Eyre's descriptions and weights are indeed correct.

Seemingly, George Williamson, father of Adam Williamson, used this same 18-pounder in a comparison with a much shorter and lighter 18-pounder (Note: Any windage differences between the pieces seem uncontrolled, the difference between the diameter of the bore and the diameter of the shot). From Muller 1768 (Page xiii):

"Experiments made at Mahan in Minorca in 1745, with two iron 18 pounders, one of 11 feet long, which weighed 51: 0: 5 (5,720 pounds); and the other of 9 feet, 39: 1: 3 (4,400 pounds). They were fixed upon a rocky ground, and so be contrived as to be elevated to any number of degrees.

Hence it appears, that when the pieces were loaded with 9 pounds of powder, the range was greater than when loaded with more or less.

Again, that the pieces of 9 feet long carried farther than those of 11, in almost all the same circumstances, though the first is lighter than the second, which shews that the length of the ranges does not so much depend on weight, as on proper length, and on a proper charge."

Eyre's and Williamson's descriptions, Banyar's reference to Albany, and Williamson's timeframe all support the idea that Johnson's 18-pounders were sent north by Clinton in 1745. Nothing conflicts.

The gun pattern for the 32-pounders is a puzzle with few hints. The gun weights given for these 32-pounders are a perfect match to reference weights for 24-pounders and nearly dictate that these guns were bore-ups of older 24-pounders, but Eyre fails to even hint at that possibility in his July letter. Here, the bore of an existing 24-pounder (\approx 5,200 lbs.) would be widened from 5.823 inches to 6.410 inches, removing some 200 pounds of metal (\approx 8.5, ft. length; McConnell 1988, Page 63). At the time of manufacture, gun weights (cwt) were stamped somewhere near the vent or on the top of the cascable. Typically, brass guns bore a date of manufacture, but iron guns did not. With bored-up guns, the new weight and a date were then stamped on the first reinforcement.

The iron 12-pounders requested by Eyre were standard guns, not unique or light pieces. The harbor origin suggests these were ship guns. At the start of 1755, there were twenty-one "new" 12-pounders in New York Harbor and an equal number of "old" 12-pounders, but none were needed on the other Expeditions. From this quantity, it would seem that two sound guns could be found. The most plausible explanation for the burst 12-pounder is that it was "rotten". With dozens of guns being pulled from the defense of New York Harbor for the three expeditions (Acadia, Niagara, and Lake Champlain), whoever oversaw the harbor defense might have thought it wise to retain "good" guns for his own use and passed problematic pieces onto Eyre — speculation without any evidence. Equally likely, the guns given to Eyre were simply chosen based on the ease of shipping or from locations not critical to the defense of New York Harbor.

The artillery stores in Boston housed 42-pounders, 24-pounders, and a few shell pieces, but seemingly not 18-pounders (see Wood 1920, Page 241). In 1745, the successful colonial expedition against Louisbourg was able to transport and field 42-pounders, 24-pounders, and 18-pounders (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. 1, Pages 273-279). The 18-pdrs. were borrowed from New York Harbor, Clinton's guns. In 1755, iron 24-pounders were not wanted for the Niagara or the Fort Saint-Frédéric Expeditions because of their excessive weights, but 24-pdrs. may have been wanted for use against Fort Beauséjour, coastal Nova Scotia, where far easier sea transport would have been used — the distance between Fort Beauséjour (French) and Fort Lawrence (British) was less than three miles. In all likelihood, the 18-pounders requested by Shirley for use against Fort Beauséjour were heavier than the 24-pounders already in Boston Harbor, but Shirley would not have known this fact — his pleading with his "political rival" Delancy was pointless and unnecessary. Shirley was simply mirroring the logistics of the successful 1745 Expedition.

The 13-inch mortar seen at Fort William Henry in 1755 likely came from Castle William, Boston Harbor — Boston Spring 1745, to Louisbourg Summer 1745, to Albany Fall 1745 for the planned 1746 assault on Fort Saint-Frédéric (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. 1, Page 369). It was then “abandoned” at Albany — this mortar being shipped to Albany is supportive of the contention that the Albany 18-pounders were indeed Louisbourg guns (1745). Johnson's howitzer was not joined until late in the season suggesting it was not a New York Harbor or Albany gun. A problem arises because of the lack of suitable shells, many of those in storage at either Albany or New York were broken (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Banyar letters). By January 1756, New York Harbor was empty of shell pieces (Governor Hardy to Board of Trade, January 16, 1756; Final Letter Appendix). Apparently, many of the shell pieces that eventually reach Fort Edward and Fort William Henry were from a “Massachusetts” iron works (colonial border dispute, present day Ancram, New York), shipped by Shirley and/or Winslow. With his appointment as Commander in Chief, Shirley had much more authority in Spring 1756 than he had the previous year. Artillery would be allocated at Shirley's direction. Shirley replaces Johnson with Winslow.

Since the late 1720s, Oswego has been a British outpost at the eastern end of Lake Ontario. Shirley holds a Council at Oswego to discuss Niagara. From the Minutes of the Council of War, held at the Camp at Oswego on Lake Ontario, September 18, 1755 (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 268):

"That His Excellency proposes to take with him on the aforesaid Attempt 600 Regulars, including Gunners and Matrosses, besides Albany Men and Indians, and a Train of Artillery, consisting of one Cannon carrying an eighteen pound Shott, and four twelve pounders, one ten inch Mortar, one seven inch Hoyett, two Royals, and five small Swivel Hoyetts, with the four Vessels before mention'd, the Whale Boats and a suitable number of Battoes; and that then the Force remaining for the Defence of this Place will be about 700 Effective men, two cannon of twelve pounders, four nine pounders, ten six pounders, six three pounders, and eight Cohorns."

The 18-pounder and the six 12-pounders are all brass guns "borrowed" from New York Harbor. The 10-inch mortar is brass (See O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Pages 485 and 520). Opposite to Shirley's request, De Lancey does not supply Shirley with a brass 8-inch mortar nor are there any 8-inch iron mortars either in the siege train or as part of the defense. The 9-pounders would be iron. The "*two Royals*" likely reference 5 1/2-inch mortars. This is a somewhat better match to the 1756 French documents — but there is a distinct chance they may be howitzers. The five small swivel hoyetts seem to be coehorn howitzers or possibly naval armaments. As Oswego was an already established post, outside of the brass cannon, it is difficult to determine which pieces were brought north by Shirley, especially as it relates to the shell pieces. The ordnance being considered for the move against Niagara is nine pieces — five cannon and four shell pieces plus the "*five small swivel hoyetts*." Shirley writes of the lack of logistical support and supplies (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, September 28, 1755, Page 289). Parkman offers a balanced analysis of Shirley's position at Oswego (Parkman 1884, Page 334). Shirley leaves Oswego in mid-October without having advanced on Niagara. On November 5th, Shirley learns of his appointment as "*Commander in Chief of all his Majesty's Forces in North America*" (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 315). Oswego would fall to Montcalm in August 1756. Captured guns were added to Montcalm's siege train or sent to Canada.

The Battle of Lake George takes place on September 8th. On September 29th, Eyre writes as a note on the bottom of a letter to Johnson: "*N.B.: Our Howitz Split during the late Engagement*" suggesting only one howitzer had reached Lake George by the time of the battle (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 120). This is likely the single howitzer referenced as being part of the Albany ordnance on June 9th (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 571). There is a second reference to a howitzer on a ship at Albany (August 6th, Page 837). This may or may not be the same gun. The two 8-inch iron mortars reach Lake George before the end of September. There is little other information found in the Johnson Papers about these mortars. Any brass 6-pounders were older guns, likely 8-foot long and 2,100 pounds; these were not light 6-pounders.

In May 1755, Johnson inspected the assembled artillery at Albany (Johnson Papers, Volume 1, Page 510). This inspection would have been limited — the 18-pounders and possibly the 6-pounders. All the gun carriages were rotten and needed replacing, but the inexperienced Johnson did not demand that only "sound" guns be supplied, and the expedition moved north with "old" guns. Within the Johnson Papers, there is a wide range of letters relating to the replacement of the gun carriages and it proved time-consuming, but there is nothing in the correspondence about ensuring the quality of the guns themselves. In July 1755, eighteen new gun carriages and a single new mortar bed were shipped from New York to Albany (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 724).

Johnson's artillery train is poorly formed, the massive 18-pounders are only a burden. Here Johnson's inexperience shows. An experienced officer would have simply rejected the artillery train. Much of the blame here belongs to Shirley, his lack of detail, and overly ambitious plans. Except for the brass mortars which De Lancey refuses to give to Shirley, Johnson's artillery train is composed entirely of pieces not wanted by Shirley. The four long-guns added by Eyre help, but Eyre has yet to see the 18-pounders and does not fully appreciate their limitations. Moving a dozen or more "sound" 32- and 12-pounders north from New York Harbor would have been a straightforward solution — there are ample guns to do this simple substitution. Any 32-pounders would have weighed no more than the massive 18-pounders that were included in the train and there is a chance that there would have been additional "light" 32-pounders available. Ten "sound" heavy 12-pounders coupled with a half-dozen shell pieces would have sufficed — Shirley was bringing only a single 18-pounder to Niagara. Not having an officer of the Royal Artillery attached to Johnson's Expedition to supervise the formation of the artillery train from the very beginning would have distinct consequences.

Between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, there was a total of ten 18-pounders. In 1755, six guns were allocated to Johnson, the full number of 18-pounders sent to Albany by Clinton, but Johnson is only able to move two guns north. De Lancey mandated that the 18-pounders sent from New York for the Acadia Expedition (1755) be returned but then allows at least some of these Fort Beausejour guns to be brought to Albany to serve in Winslow's Expedition. In 1756, Winslow ends up inheriting and having to move four of Johnson's 18-pounders plus four additional 18-pounders (LO 1377). Any ordnance accounting is now confused. In May 1759 and after proofing the guns, Amherst orders two 18-pounders to be moved from Albany to Schenectady on the Mohawk River (Andrews 2015, Pages 84-85). This last element suggests at least six of the Fort Beausejour 18-pounders did end up at Albany. As this collection of 18-pounders was gathered from two distinct sources, six - Albany (1745) and six - New York Harbor (1755), there may have been appreciable differences in quality and condition among the guns. One of these cannons survive; there are plans

to place it at the Village of Cape Vincent on the St. Lawrence River at Carleton Island, New York (New York State Office of Parks, August 3, 2015). The weight of the gun matches Eyre's description of nearly 6,000 pounds. This gun may also have served at Louisbourg (1745).

By the end of 1755, two of the Johnson 18-pounders were mounted on the walls of Fort William Henry. In Summer 1756, there were eight 18-pounders at Fort William Henry — the math demanding a mix of both "Johnson guns" and "Winslow guns". In anticipation of moving north to Carillon, the other 18-pounders were not necessarily mounted on the walls. In late Fall 1756, six of these 18-pounders were then moved south to Fort Edward by Loudoun, leaving just two at Fort William Henry. Within three days of the arrival of the French, both 18-pounders had burst. Adam Williamson's Journal describes the loss of a thoroughly rotted 18-pounder. With Loudoun's known dislike for Fort William Henry and concern for the position at Fort Edward, there is a distinct possibility that these 18-pounders were culled based on the condition with the better-quality guns being sent to Fort Edward. At the same time, all the 18-pounders at Fort Edward and Fort William Henry might have been equally poor or the guns were not sorted based on quality, just ease of access for transportation south to Fort Edward.

The Sources of the British Artillery at the Siege — A Full-Half Were from New York Harbor:

British Artillery at Fort William Henry: Bastion Plus Entrenched Camp (August 3, 1757)

Two Iron 32-pounders (Bastion)	New York Harbor Eyre - De Lancey 1755
Two Iron 18-pounders (Bastion)	New York Harbor, Clinton 1745; Likely Louisbourg 1745; then Albany in Fall 1745
Two Iron 12-pounders (Bastion)	New York Harbor Eyre – De Lancey 1755
Two Iron 9-pounders (Bastion)	Winslow Artillery Train 1756 Young/Fyre Column 1757
Six Brass 6-pounders	

Subtotals:

Two Brass 6-pounders (Bastion)	New York Harbor then Albany 1745
Two Brass 6-pounders (Entrenched Camp)	New York Harbor then Albany 1745
Two Brass 6-pounders (Entrenched Camp)	Young/Fyre Column 1757 “old” Brass – MANA Page 350 (?)
Four Iron 4-pounders	Winslow Artillery Train 1756
One Iron 8-inch Howitzer	Winslow Artillery Train 1756
Three Iron 8-inch Mortars	Two Pieces, Johnson Artillery Train 1755 One Piece, Winslow Artillery Train 1756

Note: The information on British ordnance from the early 1700s is scant. During the Second World War, many of the records and archives of the Royal Arsenal were lost in the bombings. Unfortunately, no copy of the 1716 Regulations (Albert Borgard) seems to have survived and any secondary information is decidedly rare. These 1716 Regulations were the first attempt to truly organize the production of British ordnance and their loss leaves a deep hole in our understanding. Much of the information we have about the 1716 Regulations is gleaned from drawings, but no real written account is now known.

b. Sources of the Guns — French Ordnance and Captured British Ordnance:

Before 1755, older iron naval guns dominated the artillery stores in Canada. This is not unexpected as Canada was administered through the office of the Minister of the Marine and Colonies. The largest French brass cannon were the three 4-pounders at Quebec. There was a distinct shortage of large-bore mortars and howitzers, ordnance not typical of ships. The French Army made significant changes in their ordnance manufacture under Vallière (1732), but these brass guns are absent from the Canadian stores, the only possible exception being the three 4-pounders. Confusion surrounding the mortars is especially common. Howitzers are absent from any Canadian ordnance inventory until Braddock's Defeat at the Monongahela — the first French howitzers were not manufactured until sometime between 1745 and 1749, an 8-inch piece that weighed 1,200 pounds (French nomenclature; Persy 1832, Page 12). Sometime after 1765, Gribeauval would add the French 6-inch field howitzer, a much lighter piece, and two 10-inch mortars. By 1757, Montcalm's Siege Train was a mix of French guns and captured British pieces from the Monongahela (1755) and Oswego (1756). At the Siege, Montcalm's largest cannon were iron French 18-pounders, a naval gun. There were no new guns available. The French Navy was rebuilding from the previous war that ended in 1748 with completed warships often waiting in port for fresh guns (Dull 2005, Page 61). In late 1757 and/or early 1758, an injection of old unwanted guns and mortars reached Canada. There is suggestion that a few old iron 16-pounders were included among these guns, a bore unique to the French Army.

Le Mercier was Montcalm's artillery officer. He was not a French Army officer, but the commander of a company of the *Canonnières-Bombardiers de la Marine* — troops who serviced the artillery in France's overseas colonies. Le Mercier arrived in Canada in 1740, reaching the rank of *Captaine* in 1753. He was at Fort Necessity in 1754. Mercier had the difficult job of serving both Vaudreuil and Montcalm, but his chief loyalty was to Vaudreuil and Bigot. Among Le Mercier's duties was providing Vaudreuil with inventories of ordnance stores from the various posts in Canada. Seemingly, these inventories were then forwarded to Paris. Many of these inventories are in the Library and Archives, Canada (Online). The inventories are somewhat scattered before 1755 but are largely whole from 1755-1757. The 1757 Inventories carry the ID#s 3073054 through 3073059. Unfortunately, the 1757 Frontenac Inventory is apparently missing. After 1757, the inventories stop. For 1758, the status of the French artillery is particularly obscure. Care is warranted as there can be multiple inventories for Quebec in any given year — "effective" versus "needed". For the captured British ordnance, the French artillery clerks assigned line-item tags for accounting and tracking purposes so as not to confuse or mix stores; they were not intended to be exact per the actual dimensions of the piece. Although logical and useful to the artillery clerks who developed the inventory system, the logic adopted is decidedly obtuse. In their correspondence, Bougainville and other members of Montcalm staff may or may not adopt the clerk's tags for captured ordnance. Together, these elements seed confusion within histories. Once the tagging is deciphered, these inventories are extraordinarily helpful in understanding the capabilities and logistical limitations imposed on Montcalm.

Among the ordnance captured at the Monongahela were four 8-inch howitzers, four light 12-pounders, two light 6-pounders, and three 4 2/5-inch cohorn mortars — all these pieces were brass (British nomenclature). As Dunbar retreated, eight coehorns were buried on the road leading back to Fort Cumberland. Four coehorns remained with Dunbar's column. Within a month of the battle,

the eight buried coehorns were dug up by the French (Preston 2015, Page 289). In essence, the French captured eleven brass coehorns at the Battle of the Monongahela, not just three. As for Montcalm's 1757 artillery train, the artillery captured at the Monongahela satisfies the howitzer need but does not furnish the required number of large-bore mortars. Oswego was the next source of British ordnance.

Surprisingly, the British histories offer little as to what ordnance was lost at Oswego. We do know the British burst an 8-inch mortar (MANA, Page 221): *"During the fire, our seven Inch Mortar burst, & it is to be observed our Magazine which was only cover'd with Plank & Truff, so far from being Bomb Proff, was not Proff against a six pound Shott."* The Oswego Council Minutes are of considerable help (September 1755), but it fails to fully differentiate between iron and brass guns. De Lancey's August 1755 letter allows for the identification of the captured brass long-guns.

When the French ordnance clerks were rushing to complete captured inventories, they simply judged or estimated the size of the captured pieces; these identifiers or labels were not precise measurements. This is the case at Oswego, Montcalm wanted to return to Canada as quickly as possible. Often the clerks would attempt to categorize by a reference to French stores, classification as *"comparable to this piece"*. The use of 3-inch 11-line and 3-inch 4-line identifiers are references to the bore diameter of an 8-pounder and a 6-pounder, respectively. The 3-inch 1-line matches the French 4-pounder. By using a familiar tag, the clerks quickly gain an immediate understanding of the captured ordnance and are not delayed in completing their work by needless detail. When given time, the French would identify coehorns as 4 1/4-inch. The same is true for the British 8-inch mortars and howitzers, described at Oswego as 6-inch, but subsequently referenced as 7-inch.

As regards captured ordnance and supplies, Montcalm demands accuracy. Inflating any gains would only hurt his call for increased support from Paris while feeding Vaudreuil's aggressive nature. There may be errors in the accounting, but not willful exaggeration or bravado. Once an understanding of the accounting shorthand is achieved, the French ordnance clerks preparing the captured inventories at both Oswego and Fort William Henry can only be described as both efficient and beyond honest.

From the French, we have several lists of the ordnance captured from Oswego, but there are identification problems internal to all the lists. The focus of the problem in determining what was surrendered is centered not on the sizes or number of pieces, but whether they were cast in brass, iron, or a mix of both. The problems only involve the howitzers and mortars, not the cannon.

Before examining these lists, it is best to be cognizant of two tenets and a caveat:

(1) Any British iron coehorn would have been obsolete. The last British iron coehorns may have been cast around 1708 (see Caruana, 1988b). These iron coehorns were only cast in small numbers and are not referenced in any of the standard artillery texts. The first known brass coehorns were cast in 1715. In 1719, the 4 2/5-inch shell was adopted. During the mid-1700s, the smallest iron mortars manufactured by the British Board of Ordnance were 8-inch pieces (7 3/4-inch shells); this would correspond to a 7-inch designation (French), a textbook-size shell of 7.27 inches (French). Royal shells at 5 1/2-inches in diameter should ideally translate to 5 inches (5.16 French inches). The coehorn shells at 4 2/5-inches in diameter should ideally translate into 4 inches (4.13 French inches).

(2) British howitzers were cast only in brass. The first British iron howitzers were 5 1/2-inch pieces cast around 1800. Caruana's article on British 8-inch howitzers contains no mention of any iron howitzers until the 1820s (Caruana 1988a). Swivel guns could be iron or brass. But does this rule apply to Shirley's decidedly atypical identification of "*swivel hoyetts*"? McConnell (1988) does not include iron coehorns or small-bore iron howitzers in his volume.

(3) At least one American foundry was casting iron ordnance. David McConnell's work is an exhaustive treatment of the physicality of period British ordnance, 595 pages. If an iron howitzer or mortar is **carefully and repeatedly** connected to a colonial campaign, but that piece is not detailed in McConnell, those iron pieces may indeed be legitimate. Surprisingly and in light of the frequent criticism of colonial troops, these iron pieces were "accepted" by the British Army, the Royal Artillery, and the Board of Ordnance without comment on their colonial origin. Loudoun in his correspondence with Cumberland will reference these atypical pieces without further remark. The genesis of these pieces seemingly starts with William Shirley. Shirley was Governor of Massachusetts (1741-1749/1753-1756) and a driving force behind the successful 1745 colonial expedition against Louisbourg. From William Shirley to Thomas Robinson, Secretary of State – Southern Department, June 20, 1755 (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 199): *"In addition to these reinforcements, I am in hopes of procuring a number of Indians to join me at Schenectady and Oswego, which are necessary in the service for scouts, outguards in marches thro' narrow defiles, and to guard rivers and creeks, and gaining intelligence; and as the General (Johnson) could not spare me any part of his train of artillery, I have, with the pieces taken from Castle William in this province (Boston Harbor), others which I have borrow'd of Governor De Lancey from New York, and some pieces of ordnance which I have caused to be cast within my own Government (Massachusetts), collected a proper train for the service."* Little doubt, this foundry was at Ancram, New York ---- a location claimed by both Massachusetts and New York (Schutz 1961, Page 202). The iron ore was mined at Salisbury, Connecticut, some 15 miles distant. The ironworks dates to 1748.

Robert Livingston and William Alexander were chief among Shirley's circle of contracting merchants. Livingston owned the Ancram foundry. William Alexander also served as Shirley's private secretary. Ancram provided much of the "ironware" to the provincial expeditions including the cannon shot goods; Alexander believed it to be the only **blast furnace** then in America, cast iron goods (both statements Thayer 1957, Page 37). At Salisbury, there were bloom forges that produced wrought iron, tool-worked goods, but the first blast furnace dates to about 1762. At Ancram, the raw ore was smelted in the blast furnace to produce pig iron. Solid shot was then cast, subsequently reheated and forged over to reduce irregularities. In 1757, Bradstreet visited at least one foundry in hopes of improving the quality of the goods produced, the cast iron being very hard but too brittle, the shot subject to fracturing (LO 3022, March 1, 1757, Bradstreet to Loudoun; Godfrey 1982, Page 95; and Pargellis 1933, Page 236). A myriad of things could have caused the underlying problem — materials, temperatures, casting techniques, or workmanship, but by its very nature, cast iron is brittle. The fracturing issue suggests the shot lacked toughness, a metallurgical characteristic defined as the ability of a material to absorb energy (e.g. impacts or shocks) and plastically deform without fracturing. Hardness and toughness are very different metallurgical properties. After the initial casting, toughness can be increased via tempering, a type of heat treatment, a temperature and duration-controlled process with air cooling, not liquid quenching. Unfortunately, Bradstreet's letter lacks any technical specifics or foundry location; it was pointless for Bradstreet to antagonize

Loudoun by reminding him that he was still obliged to deal with Livingston. After some time and considerable effort, Bradstreet reported success.

Between fifteen and thirty pieces of iron ordnance appear to have been cast. The castings seem confined to howitzers and mortars. There was a store of iron 8-inch howitzers available to the Colonial Expeditions in 1755 and 1756. Besides the captured iron howitzer from Oswego (1756), an iron 8-inch howitzer had burst at the Battle of Lake George (1755). In 1757, there were two iron 8-inch howitzers at Fort Edward and one iron 8-inch howitzer at Fort William Henry; this last piece was subsequently surrendered to the French. Several of these pieces appear to have been associated with the 1756 Winslow Campaign. Together, five 8-inch iron howitzers are identified just from these sources.

Worrying that his artillery train would not arrive from England, Forbes purchased at least one 8-inch howitzer for his 1758 expedition against Fort Duquesne. General John Forbes to General Jeffrey Amherst, War Office Papers, 34/44 f.411, National Archive London, entries for June 9 and June 20, 1758, Captain Lieutenant David Hay, Royal Artillery: *Abstract of Warrants Granted by the Late Brig^d Forbes, during the Campaign 1758, on Account of the following Services*

June 9 *To Capt. Lieut: David Hay, for purchasing One Eight Inch Howitser & ca, without Deduction ---- 127 pounds, 16 shillings, 1 pence.*

June 20 *To Capt. Lieut: Hay, on Acco^t of purchasing Howitzers, Howitser Carriages & ca, without Deduction ---- 380 pounds, 10 pence.*

The assumption is that these Forbes' purchased howitzers were iron and that they were colonial cast, likely at Ancram. With the ability to cast howitzers and small-bore mortars, the Ancram foundry may have also been casting iron 7 3/4-inch mortars. The lack of metallurgical toughness is suggested again — one 8-inch howitzer burst at the Battle of Lake George (1755), one iron 8-inch mortar burst at Oswego (1756), and two iron 8-inch mortars burst at Fort William Henry (1757). In 1759, the British employed two iron 8-inch howitzers at Niagara (Dunnigan 1996, Page 137). These were likely the two iron howitzers from Fort Edward, but they could have been Forbes'. There is no evidence suggesting that American foundries were casting bronze ordnance, only iron.

What ordnance was being cast is best teased out by examining the records from the Siege of Fort Oswego, east end of Lake Ontario in New York (1756). To determine what pieces were surrendered at Oswego, one needs to examine six different documents. There are three separate lists in O'Callaghan, Vol. X — Page 444, Page 485, and the Page 520 - 522 List. Awkwardly, none of these three lists agree with each other. This Page 444 List is appended to a staff diary document concerning the siege and signed by Montcalm, as such it is very influential in framing histories. The obvious fault of the Page 444 List is that it lacks any mention of howitzers. The Page 485 List adds howitzers but then changes thirteen mortar characterizations from iron to brass. In this, the Page 485 List is the only list that does not offer conflicts with the standard British artillery references, almost schoolhouse corrected. The Page 520 List retains the howitzers, but only one mortar is described as brass, the rest of the mortars and all the howitzers are again iron.

The assumption that the thirteen smaller mortars were iron is understandable considering Montcalm's language on Page 443:

"We captured, also, 7 vessels of war; one of 18 guns, one of 14, one of 10, and one of 8, three mounted of swivels, 200 barges or bateaux, 7 pieces of bronze, 48 of iron, 14 mortars, 5 howitzers, 47 swivels, a quantity of shot, bombs, powder, and a considerable pile of provisions."

From O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 485:

*7 brass cannon, 19, 14, and 12-pounders.
48 iron cannon, 9, 6, 5, 3 and 2-pounders.
1 brass mortar, 9 inches, 4 lines.
13 brass mortars, of 6 and 3 inches.
5 brass howitzers, of 6 and 3 inches.
47 patereros.*

From Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 444:

*7 Brass pieces of the calibre of 19, 14, and 12.
48 Iron " of " of 9, 6, 5 and 3.
1 Brass mortar of 9 inches 4 lines.
13 Iron " of 6 inches and of 3 inches.
44 swivels (perriers).*

It is a simple task to generate a similar representation for the Page 520-522 List:

*7 brass cannon, 19, 14, and 12-pounders.
48 iron cannon, 9, 6, 5, 3 and 2-pounders.
1 brass mortar, 9 inches, 4 lines.
13 iron mortars, of 6 and 3 inches.
5 iron howitzers, of 6 and 3 inches.
47 patereros.*

Here the entries for the 13 mortars are easily identifiable as one 8-inch, five 5 1/2-inch royals, and seven 4 2/5-inch coehorns (Page 520 List, British nomenclature). The five howitzers reference one 8-inch and Shirley's four "swivel hoyetts". With both the mortars and howitzers, the only question involves whether the pieces were brass or iron. If cast in Britain, all the howitzers, all the coehorns, and all the royal mortars would have been brass — 17 pieces. Simply put, the British were **not** casting any of these pieces in iron. If the Page 520 List is accepted, all these same 17 pieces would have been iron and American cast; the 8-inch iron mortar is likely American, but it could be British.

The French ordnance clerks were not striving for dimensional accuracy, but inventory management. The clerks were making quick judgment calls, speed was needed. Seemingly, the clerks were careful not to inflate the size of any captured ordnance. If accurately measured, the lists would need to be modified, e.g. 13 iron mortars, of 7 and 4 inches and 5 iron howitzers, of 7 and 4 inches.

To make comparisons easier, the following passage is presented a second time. Two of the pieces mentioned here were not recovered by the French and only two of the five royal mortars were mounted, so their absence is explained (see the Page 520 List). From the Camp at Oswego on Lake Ontario, September 18, 1755 (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 268):

"That His Excellency proposes to take with him on the aforesaid Attempt 600 Regulars, including Gunners and Matrosses, besides Albany Men and Indians, and a Train of Artillery, consisting of one Cannon carrying an eighteen pound Shott, and four twelve pounders, one ten inch Mortar, one seven inch Hoyett, two Royals, and five small Swivel Hoyetts, with the four Vessels before mention'd, the Whale Boats and a suitable number of Battoes; and that then the Force remaining for the Defence of this Place will be about 700 Effective men, two cannon of twelve pounders, four nine pounders, ten six pounders, six three pounders, and eight Cohorns.

The fourth document is an original of this Page 520-522 List — Library and Archives, Canada - ID # 3073067. It is associated and cataloged with the Le Mercier Inventories. This correspondence is in a stellar, smooth-flowing hand with distinctive elements of cursive calligraphy. This document was undoubtedly prepared and compiled by Vaudreuil's office to be sent to various Ministries in Paris. It was presented to the King on January 15, 1757. The Paris copies may have been signed by Le Mercier, but this letter should be thought of as Vaudreuil's. The last two paragraphs may or may not be in a second hand. The transcription of this document on Pages 520 - 522 is accurate. The last two pieces that are needed are the ordnance inventory from Frontenac in 1756 (Le Mercier Inventory, September 26, 1756; ID # 3072938, see Page 137) and the inventory from Carillon in September 1757 (Le Mercier Inventory, September 26, 1757; ID # 3073056, see Page 147).

Following the fall of Oswego, the captured ordnance was first taken to Fort Frontenac on the north shore of Lake Ontario, near present-day Kingston. The September 1756 Frontenac Inventory is especially influential in determining whether the captured shell pieces were brass or iron. There are two line entries for iron howitzer, "*aubuzier fer*" — the single 8-inch howitzer as iron 6-inch 8-line, and the 4 2/5-inch coehorn howitzers as four iron 3-inch 11-line, Shirley's "*swivel hoyetts*". The single 8-inch mortar is identified as iron 6-inch 6-line, and the 4 2/5-inch coehorn mortars as five iron 3-inch 11-line. The captured coehorn ammunition is listed as 1,170 3-inch grenades. Eleven of the nineteen captured shell pieces are verified as being iron via the Frontenac Inventories (Figures 13C & 13D). Many of the iron pieces cast at the Saint-Maurice Foundry near Trois-Rivières in Quebec are also shown in the Inventory including five iron 6-inch mortars and four iron 3-inch 4-line grenade mortars (3-inch 3-line shell). The two remaining Canadian cast grenade mortars were positioned at Niagara, iron 3-inch 4-line (Dunnigan 1996, Page 135). There is an entry for a single 4-inch iron mortar that is not easily matched. Within the 1756 Frontenac Inventory, no entry is a good match for the royal mortars and the Inventory does not help with the brass or iron identification of the royals. These royal mortars seemingly disappear from all subsequent inventories. There is no need to "squeeze" these royal mortars into the 1756 Frontenac Inventory.

In the September 18, 1755, minutes of Shirley's Council of War — "*two royals*" are included in the siege train against Niagara. Within the Page 520 List, there is an entry — "*5 royal grenade mortars, two of which are mounted*", but without dimensions. The only other French "inventory" evidence for royal mortars at Oswego is the inclusion in the 1756 Frontenac Inventory of 56 grenade shells of 4-inch 3-line (4.51 inches, English). Although this is not even a good numerical match for a royal mortar, the Page 520 List includes an entry for 50 grenades without dimensions positioned just under the entry for the royal grenade mortars, hinting at a pairing. Without any other direction, it seems wisest to continue following the Page 520 List and accept iron royal mortars **per the summary table at the end of the Page 520 List**.

Note: The Page 520 – 522 List is not without problems. The summary table found in the Page 520 List proves awkward as it includes some inappropriate lumping among the different sized mortars (mixing royal mortars and coehorn mortars), and the use of dimensions not supported in the first half of the document, *Mortars iron, 3 in. 4 lines 12*. This 3-inch 4-line identifier is the root of much confusion. It is a truly miserable descriptor for either British royals or coehorns. However, the size used in the description throughout the first half of the Page 520 List is not 3-inch 4-line, but 3-inch 10-line or 4-inch 0-line, reasonable dimensions to be linked to coehorns. Why the change to 3-inch 4-line? The answer is inventory management. In 1748, four iron grenade mortars were cast at Saint-Maurice

near Trois-Rivières in Quebec. It seems the 3-inch 4-line dimension originated here. The French use the term "grenade mortar" to encompass a wider array of pieces than the British concept. In French writings, the term grenade mortar can reference French, French-Canadian, captured British coehorns, or captured British royal mortars. Although it has the appearance of precision, often this 3-inch 4-line identifier or an even simpler 3-inch identifier was being used as an ordnance accounting code for any grenade mortar or shell, a grab bag meant to facilitate speed when preparing inventories. In this context, its use was highly efficient.

Just focusing on the question of brass or iron construction, if one dismisses the Page 485 List (brass) and accepts the Page 520 List (iron), **one is then compelled to accept** that at least seventeen of the shell pieces captured at Oswego were cast in America: one 8-inch iron howitzer, five 5 1/2-inch iron royal mortars, seven iron coehorn mortars, and four iron 4 2/5-inch coehorn howitzers (Shirley's swivel hoyetts). The ancillary evidence suggests these pieces could only have been cast at the blast furnace in Ancram. The 8-inch iron mortar may have been British or American. Without being tied to any of these three lists and only relying on the other secondary sources, at least one of the royal mortars and two or three of the coehorn mortars **may** have been brass, the rest of the smaller mortars and all the howitzers were iron. If any of the mortars were indeed brass, these mortars may have been taken to Quebec and melted down. This possibility should not be discounted (See LO 1356 and Page 283).

After the fall of Oswego, the only American cast pieces remaining in "British" hands may have been three iron 8-inch howitzers and possibly a nearly equal number of 8-inch mortars, these pieces split between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. Forbes (1758) would have at least one 8-inch howitzer cast, but the language in his warrant suggests more than one. It is very unlikely that the proofing of any American cast pieces would have matched the standards of the Board of Ordnance. If true, this may explain the high rate of bursting seen with iron shell ordnance in New York — these were indeed American cast, but the British iron mortars at Quebec were equally prone to failure. Outside of Forbes' very specific need, the British Army wanted nothing to do with any American cast ordnance. Except for the largest iron mortars which provided significantly more range than brass pieces of the same bore, the British Army would embrace only brass ordnance.

The September 1756 Frontenac Inventory also provides a list of pieces not incorporated or dropped from Montcalm's siege train. Based on available ammunition stores, Montcalm had no need for any of these iron howitzers or the 8-inch iron mortar, likely an unfit piece (MANA, Page 221). None of these pieces were ever incorporated into Montcalm's siege train. French-Canadian iron grenade mortars used at Oswego were dropped from the train (\approx 3-inch 4-line) and replaced by the larger British coehorns (3-inch 11-line, Mercier's Carillon 1757 Inventory). Five iron coehorns were "parked". All five of the Oswego howitzers and the 8-inch mortar seemingly remain at Frontenac until captured by Bradstreet in August 1758. The 8-inch shells captured at Oswego were needed for the four 8-inch brass howitzers that had been captured at the Monongahela. Any ammunition intended for the "swivel hoyetts" would have been useable by the brass coehorn mortars from the Monongahela.

In September 1757, eleven brass coehorn mortars are shown to be at Carillon. These were Braddock's mortars. These mortars are absent from any other of Le Mercier's inventories. None were in the stores at Fort William Henry. Here Preston (2015, Page 289) is critical to the understanding — three mortars were captured at the Battle of the Monongahela and eight additional coehorns were recovered from Dunbar's Camp following his retreat.

artillerie		Première	306
Du Lac Ontario		Etat des Pièces d'Artillerie et Munitions de guerre, qui	
1756.		sont Effectives sur les Remparts du fort Frontenac, dans les Magazines,	
N. 7.		ou sur les Bâtimens le 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.	
Canada.		Sçavoir	
Noms des Pièces		Calibre	Nombre
		de . . . 9	4.
		de . . . 6	33.
		de . . . 5	1.
		de . . . 4	28.
Bombs de fer		de . . . 3	10.
		de . . . 2	5.
		de . . . 1	3.
		de . . . 8 onces . . .	62.
Total			146.
Pierriers de fonte à Boite			6.
Idem de fer			7.
		de . . . 8	4.
		de . . . 6	26.
		de . . . 4	28.
Officiers Marins		de . . . 3	10.
		de . . . 2	5.
		de . . . 1	3.
		de . . . 8 onces . . .	2.
Total			78.
Refouloirs de bois à viton		de . . . 8	8.
		de . . . 6	24.

Figure 13A. Frontenac Inventory, September 26, 1756. Le Mercier Inventory; Library and Archives Canada; ID # 3072938. Page 1 of 13. Information on the mortars and howitzers is found on Pages 3 and 4 of the inventory, below.

<i>Noms en France</i>	<i>Calibre</i>	<i>Nombre</i>
	de . . . 4	18.
	de . . . 3	11.
<i>Refouloirs et Secourtilloirs</i>	de . . . 2	8.
	de . . . 1	2.
	de . . . 8. onces . .	37.
	de . . . 12	7.
	de . . . 9	2.
	de . . . 8	2.
	de . . . 6	11.
<i>Lanternes et Verbeaux</i>	de . . . 1	9.
	de . . . 3	3.
	de . . . 2	4.
	de . . . 1	2.
	de . . . 8. onces . .	8.
	de . . . 12	1.
	de . . . 9	2.
	de . . . 6	16.
<i>Garnies</i>	de . . . 4	6.
	de . . . 3	3.
	de . . . 2	10.
	de . . . 1	13.
<i>Barres à Bourre</i>		4.
<i>Platons de plomb</i>		62.
<i>Ormes Serrures</i>		
<i>Garnies de leur Degorgoirs et Springles</i>		23.
<i>idem neu Garnies</i>		10.

Figure 13B. Frontenac Inventory, September 26, 1756, Page 2 of 13. de fer = iron.

Noms des Pièces	Calibres	Nombres	307
Boulets de fer			34.
Cannon			42.
Canon de mise			62.
Livier			9.
Pièces de fer			40.
	de. 18		186.
	de. 12		711.
	de. 11		188.
	de. 9		645.
	de. 8		927.
	de. 6		1925.
Boulets Ronds	de. 8		1378.
	de. 4		704.
	de. 3		446.
	de. 2		1455.
	de. 1		1653.
	de. 8 onces		1729.
	de. 4 onces		1640.
	de. 2 onces		1300.
Boulets ronds	de. 4		38.
Five French Canadian 6-inch Mortars	de. 6 pouces	5	●
One British/American 8-inch Mortar	de. 8 pouces	1	●
Mortar Iron	de. 4 1/2	1	
Five American Cast Coehorn Mortars	de. 3 1/2	5	●
Four French Canadian Grenade Mortars	de. 3 1/2	4	●
Total			16

Figure 13C. Frontenac Inventory, Page 3 of 13. Measurements of captured British ordnance not meant to be exact, only comparable to: 3-pouce (inch) 11 Line = bore diameter of a French 8-pound cannon; 3-pouce (inch) 4 line = bore diameter of a French 6-pound cannon; 3-pouce (inch) 1 Line = bore diameter of a French 4-pound cannon.

Noms des Pièces		Calibres	Nombre
Howitzer Iron	One American Cast 8-inch Iron Howitzer	de . . . 6 p ^{ou} 8 l ^{ie}	1. ●
	Four American Cast Iron Coehorn Swivel Hoyetts	de . . . 3 p. 11 ^e	4. ●
	Idem à chaudière	de . . . 3 p. 8 ^e	5
Mortar Beds	Affûts de Mortier	de . . . 6 p. 6 ^e	1
		de . . . 6 p. 6 ^e	4.
		de . . . 4 p. 3 3/4	8.
		de . . . 4 p. 3 ^e	1.
Carriage Howitzer	Affûts d'artillerie	de . . . 3 p. 10 ^e	4
		de . . . 3 p. 11 ^e	4
		de . . . 9 p. 6 ^e	168.
	Bombes	de . . . 7-8	217
		de . . . 6-6 ^e	400.
		de . . . 6 p ^{ou}	247
		de . . . 4-3 ^e	16.
	Grenades	de . . . 3	1170.
		de . . . 3-3 ^e	124.
		de . . . 7-8 ^e	172
	Fuzes à bombes et grenades	de . . . 6	61.
		de . . . 4	5
		de . . . 3	3245.
Armée, feu.			
	Grenouilles à chaudière		2.
	Fuzes grenades		107.
	Fuzes anglais avec Bayonnette		277.
	Idem sans bayonnette dont 15 à radoubes		269.
	Total		666.

Figure 13D. Frontenac Inventory, Page 4 of 13. Measurements of captured British ordnance not meant to be exact, only comparable to: 3-pouce (inch) 11 Line = bore diameter of a French 8-pound cannon; 3-pouce (inch) 4 line = bore diameter of a French 6-pound cannon; 3-pouce (inch) 1 Line = bore diameter of a French 4-pound cannon.

As regards the French claims of captured ordnance, the Oswego Minutes are fully supportive of the French writings (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, September 1755, Page 268). Absent from the Minutes is any mention of an 8-inch mortar (British nomenclature). The Page 520 List also includes three additional royal mortars that were not attached to their beds, a total of five royal mortars. These three additional mortars are not referenced in the Oswego Council Minutes, but Shirley might have decided to only include mounted pieces in this record.

Only eight pieces of ordnance captured at Oswego were added to Montcalm's artillery train, seven brass cannon and one 10-inch brass mortar. These pieces were certainly useful. However, the ammunition stocks captured at Oswego were key to the next two years of French success – 23,000 pounds of gunpowder, 150 10-inch shells, 300 8-inch shells, and 2,950 round shot. The need was acute, the French had captured four brass 8-inch howitzers at the Monongahela, but only fifty-seven 8-inch shells. Most of the remaining stores were moved to Frontenac. From Frontenac, some stores were then shipped to Niagara including two coehorns (See Dunnigan 1996, Page 134).

Shirley had a full year to further reinforce the artillery at Oswego. In Spring 1756, Oswego was a logistic nightmare, supplies and foodstuffs were far below the minimum (Pargellis 1933, Pages 133-166). Bradstreet manages to conduct the resupply. Ordnance was moved north (MANA, Pages 200 and 219), but beyond the needed foodstuffs, the focus was on ship guns and rigging. On July 1, Bradstreet arrives with six 6-pounders, ten 4-pounders, and fourteen swivels to further arm the ships, but no additional mortars are referenced. Captain Housman Broadley (British Navy) leads the fleet. His letters survive, September 1755 - January 1757 (Grant 1914, Pages 348 - 368). The focus of this correspondence is the "navy", but the letters lend a decided human touch and perspective — one step forward, two steps back, colored with frustration. By August, four ships can be put out to "sea", a fifth and sixth ship lacked crew, rigging, and guns; the rigging arrived at New York from Europe in July 1756. A smaller schooner was in the stocks. Two out of the three largest ships were among those short of crew, rigging, and guns. Oswego's defense relied on these ships to prevent any advance by the French, not the forts themselves. Adding to the confusion, pieces that the British twice identified as howitzers are referenced as mortars by the French. One of the sloops carried: "*Six Carriage Guns Four Pounders, and twelve Swivells, and Two Haubitz*" (MANA, Page 219, a British reference). These are Shirley's "*swivel hoyetts*." On the Page 521 List, this sloop corresponds to the *Ontario* with "*6 guns of 6, 2 small iron mortars, and 12 swivels*".

Shirley's near maniacal desire for brass ordnance is evident here. At Oswego, a brass 18-pounder and six brass 12-pounders were captured — the Council Minutes coupled with De Lancey's letter provides the identification. The French identify these guns as a brass 19-pounder, two brass 14-pounders, and four brass 12-pounders. Why the unusual identification tags of 19-pounder and 14-pounders were given is initially puzzling. At the start of the 1700s, all French Army cannon were cast as 10-foot guns. A second short 8-pounder and a second short 4-pounder were also cast, 8-foot long (see Saint Remy, 1745, Vol. 1, Page 77). However, the French foundries and gun manufacturers became slack meeting standards, and there was considerable unwanted variation around delivered guns, especially the bore-widths; fitting shot to cannon often proved difficult. Under the French Vallière Ordnance System (1732), standards were more vigorously enforced, but there was only a single gun length for any bore size. All Vallière guns were brass cannon, heavy. The 4-pdr. was \approx 1235 lbs./7.2 ft; the 8-pdr. 2,250 lbs./8.7 ft; the 12-pdr. 3440 lbs./9.6 ft; the 16-pdr. 4,510 lbs./10 ft; and the 24-pdr. 5795 lbs./10.5 ft. (barrel only, English Units). There was no

distinction between the Army's field and siege guns. Under pressure to provide a lighter piece, a smaller 4-pounder (*à la suédoise*) would be added, \approx 720 lbs. and 4.8 ft. in length (1740). The five Vallière cannon are depicted in the 1745 edition of Saint Remy (Vol. 3, Pages 462 – 477). French naval guns would be iron, distinct and separate. From 1690-1766, the French Navy fixed their gun lengths to standard values (Rif and Roberts 2017, Page 6). Gun designs and patterns could change, but not their lengths, a useful tenet when fitting ships — this is the background of Le Mercier's clerks. In deep contrast, the British manufactured heavy, medium, and light guns of the same bore caliber for several guns, including the 12-pounders. Brass 12-pounders would range in length from 9 feet to 5 feet. Iron 12-pounders would vary between 9.5 and 7.5 feet. Among all these 12-pounders, weights varied between 3,800 pounds to 980 pounds (Hughes 1969). The use of an unexpected identification such as a 14-pounder or an 11-pounder appears to be a clever method to differentiate heavy, medium, and light guns — a type of shorthand decidedly useful to Le Mercier's ordnance clerks. There is no difference in the shot diameters or weights. This allows the individual pieces to be easily identified in the Le Mercier's Inventories — 14-pounder = British heavy 12-pounder. The 11-pounder designation is linked to the light 12-pounder (Keagle 2018, Page 13).

As to the Monongahela where four light 12-pounders were captured by the French, the ammunition stock captured is minimal — Bréard to de Machault (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 311; August 13, 1755):

4 brass pieces with the arms of England, of the calibre of 11^{lbs}
4 ditto, of 5 1/2^{lbs}
4 brass mortars or howitzers of 7 1/2 inch diameters
3 other grenade mortars of 4 1/4inch
175 balls of 11^{lbs}
57 Howitzers of 6 3/4 inch (shells)
17 barrels of powder, 100^{lbs}

This is the first instance where British light 12-pounders were described by the French as 11-pounders. This use would continue for the next five years. Only two light 6-pounders were in Braddock's column, not the four seen here. This error is propagated in a few histories. Four 8-inch brass howitzers had been captured, but there were only 57 shells to share between all four of these guns. Oswego supplied several hundred additional 8-inch shells. The three grenade mortars were brass coehorns, but eight other coehorns would be dug up by the French from Dunbar's Camp. These eleven coehorns were eventually added to Montcalm's siege train. Oswego would supply the ammunition necessary to allow this.

Note: Monongahela Brass 4 2/5-inch Coehorn Mortars (July 1755)

Three coehorns were captured at the Battle of the Monongahela. Eight additional coehorns were buried by Dunbar during the retreat. Later in July, these eight mortars were dug up by the French (Preston 2015, Page 288). Four coehorns remained with Dunbar's column. These captured coehorns appear in the Le Mercier's September 1757 Inventory of Carillon. They do not appear in any of Le Mercier's 1756 Inventories. No coehorns are among the ordnance listed by Amherst as being captured at Carillon in August 1759 (Andrews 2015, Volume 1, Page 120). With little or no remaining ammunition, they might have been melted down for brass.

Table 3. Oswego Captured Ordnance – Clarification; Page 520 List Accepted

The French Inventories of the captured British ordnance from Oswego leave a brutal mess as it relates to the mortars, less so as regards the howitzers. The Page 444 and Page 485 Lists are both rejected. Seemingly, the Page 520 List has the metal and number of pieces correct, but the dimensional characterizations leave much to be desired. The analysis is circumstantial but hopefully reasoned. The disagreements (*) only involve mortars and howitzers. "Heavy" and "Medium" are relative to other cannon. All fractions (lines) have been dropped with no rounding up or down. French nomenclature, then British:

1 Brass 19-Pounder	British 18-Pounder (Medium?)
2 Brass 14-Pounders	British "Heavy" 12-Pounders
4 Brass 12-Pounders	British "Medium" 12-Pounders
48 Iron Cannon; 9, 6, 5, 3, and 2 Pounders	
1 Brass Mortar, 9-Inch	British 10-Inch Brass Mortar
1 Iron Howitzer, 7-Inch *	American Iron 8-Inch Howitzer; A Better Fit for the Colonial Stores
1 Iron Mortar, 7-Inch *	American or British Iron 8-Inch Mortar; Burst Iron Piece
5 Iron Mortars, 5-Inch *	American (Iron), 5 1/2-Inch Royal Mortars; 56 Shells
4 Iron Howitzers, 4-Inch *	American 4 2/5-Inch Coehorn Howitzers; Shirley's "Swivel Hoyetts"
7 Iron Mortars, 4-Inch *	American 4 2/5-Inch Coehorn Mortars; Shirley Lists 8 Coehorns 1755
47 Pateros	Swivel Guns

Between 1755 and 1757, at least five different iron 8-inch howitzers are seen in New York — Battle of Lake George, Fort Oswego, Fort William Henry, and Fort Edward (two pieces). In 1755, Shirley likely brought the iron howitzer to Oswego. Shirley's use of "royal" in describing the 1755 artillery at Oswego, negates the thought of reducing their bore size. The 1756 Frontenac Inventory supports the contention that Shirley's "*swivel hoyetts*" were indeed iron. On the surface, the adoption of iron coehorn howitzers appears extreme as these pieces are not part of the standard British artillery texts, but the same generalization is true for the 8-inch iron howitzers. Without the 1756 Frontenac Inventory, the "swivel hoyetts" would have received a tag of — *without question, brass*. Here, the iron designation for the royal mortars is a "*best guess*", the other four "disagreements" are more firmly resolved. All the American iron shell pieces were forged at Ancram, New York via Shirley.

Colonial stores included both brass and iron 8-inch mortars, but iron mortars were more common. The two readily available brass mortars were both assigned to Johnson's Expedition. There were no 8-inch mortars at Oswego in September 1755; the 8-inch mortar was seemingly moved to Oswego in late 1755 or early 1756. Adding a second piece of 8-inch ordnance would have been a very reasonable step — a howitzer plus a mortar. The ordnance at Oswego was intended to assault Niagara, so having multiple pieces able to use the same ammunition stock would have been a simple and effective safeguard. The bursting of Oswego's 8-inch mortar is further evidence it was iron. The first piece of ordnance to burst at Fort William Henry was an iron 8-inch mortar; the last piece to burst was an iron 8-inch mortar. When rushed, it appears that French clerks would routinely include burst ordnance as part of the ordnance captured. The inventories may or may not then differentiate fit from unfit pieces. The time available to conduct the inventory might be the deciding factor, Montcalm wanted to leave Oswego as quickly as possible. At Fort William Henry, the Bastion ordnance was identified as fit or unfit, but possibly not at the Entrenched Camp (Table 2, Page 118). At Oswego, there was no apparent attempt to differentiate fit from unfit. Eleven brass coehorns were at Carillon in September 1757 (Le Mercier Inventory, ID # 3073056), but these were Braddock's mortars. The 8-inch mortar, all five of the Oswego howitzers, and at least five iron coehorn mortars seemingly remain at Frontenac until captured by Bradstreet in August 1758. Based on the limited ammunition stores then available, Montcalm had no real need for any of these iron howitzers or mortars; they were never incorporated into Montcalm's siege train. **NOTE:** For 1756, lists of ordnance at the various British posts may be housed in Kew England with the Colonial Office Papers 5/46 or 5/47 (see Correspondence of William Shirley, Shirley to Abercromby, June 27, 1756, Page 469).

The 14-pounder designation could be attached to any captured British heavy 12-pounder, brass or iron. The iron 14-pounder from the September 1757 Inventory of Carillon was the fit iron 12-pounder captured at Fort William Henry, a New York Harbor gun. This circumstance is what is strongly suggested in a letter from Banyar to Johnson which states that two heavy brass and four "light" brass 12-pounders were assigned to Shirley at Oswego (May 19, 1755; Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 519). The brass 19-pounder designation distinguishes this British 18-pounder from the larger-bore French naval 18-pounders in Montcalm's siege train, but little else. However, some ideas about the gun itself may be guessed. At the time, the British brass 18-pounder was not a common gun; it was dropped from service in the navy around 1716 (Lavery 1987, Page 100). The British Army would not adopt the brass 18-pounder again until around 1790. Banyar's letter offers some information that aids in the identification of the gun: *"We have two Brass 18^{pdrs.} one ab^{t.} half the weight of the Iron, & the other about 2/3, the light one M^r. Shirley wants, but the Council in an Opinion they gave said they thought 'em too heavy for him. M^r. W. Alexander says now he must have both (Shirley's secretary), & the other two brass 12 pdrs. W^{ch.} are heavy and has wrote to M^r. Shirley to send some 24 lb in lieu of them. I told you before the Council had agreed to his having the 4 light brass 12 lb You see how well Gov^r. Shirley want to be provided, as he applied for all 7. If you think those 2 brass 18 lb necessary and will apply for 'em, I believe the Gov^r. (De Lancey) will spare them for that, rather than the other Service."*

Johnson's 18-pounders weighed some 5,800 pounds. Assuming it was the smaller 18-pounder that was given to Shirley, this description tenuously suggests a brass 18-pounder of 7.5 feet and 3,100 pounds (see McConnell 1998, Page 34). Even if the identification and barrel weight are wrong and the gun to Shirley was the larger 18-pounder, this "19-pounder" was no larger than a French brass 16-pounder — 10 feet long and 4,510 pounds. The reason for the 19-pounder identification remains unclear; it is unique and functional, but a 17-pounder tag is equally logical. By Fall 1757, the French have captured six 8-inch howitzers, four brass and two iron. Only a single iron 8-inch howitzer was left at Carillon, a piece nearly certain to be from Fort William Henry (Le Mercier Inventory, September 24, 1757; Library and Archives Canada, ID # 3073056).

In the various French ordnance inventories, the British light 12-pounders captured at the Monongahela and the four 12-pounders captured at Oswego are never combined into a single line item; they are treated separately with different identifiers. A similar practice is associated with captured 6-inch brass guns, separating light 6-pounders from the larger and "older" 6-pounders. We know that all six of the Oswego 12-pounders were from New York Harbor. Light 12-pounders were first cast around 1750 (McConnell 1988, Page 36); there is no reason for them to be sitting in New York Harbor in 1755. The brass 18-pounder from New York Harbor is an older gun, pre-1720s. The smaller 12-pounders may also be old guns and Banyar's "light" tag may be a simple method to indicate they were smaller than the other two 12-pounders which he describes as "heavy". At the same time, we know Banyar viewed Braddock's siege train while visiting Virginia, so Banyar had seen a "true" light 12-pounder. The four smaller 12-pounders captured at Oswego were likely "medium" guns, but it is impossible to identify their age, the gun pattern, or whether the lineage was army or navy. The ordnance trains being sent from Europe to America and Halifax under Pitt contain both heavy and light 12-pounders, but medium 12-pounders were not included.

How the long-guns captured at Oswego and Fort William Henry were distributed by the French is not well understood. This issue is best examined in Keagle (2018). From Oswego, some twenty

cannon were sent to Niagara (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 481). Before this, Niagara had mounted only six cannon. A large number were also sent to Frontenac, where Bradstreet would capture some sixty cannon and sixteen mortars in August 1758; none of these were Braddock's guns. These pieces serviced the French brigs and sloops on Lake Ontario. About half of these mortars were iron French-Canadian (\approx 6-inch and 3-inch). Dozens of small-bore British cannon had been taken but captured large-bore cannon were rare. Some forty-three cannon were surrendered at Niagara in 1759 (Dunnigan 1996, Page 134). All of these were iron cannon plus two iron coehorn mortars, no howitzers. Among the cannon, there were two 14-pounders, nineteen 12-pounders, and one 11-pounder — some twenty-two iron "12-pounders". However, between the Monongahela, Oswego, and Fort William Henry only a single iron 12-pounder was captured. Niagara's large-bore cannon were French, not British. Clearly, the French were not without their own resources.

The value of brass ordnance is as mobile field guns or as part of a siege train with the leading attribute being their lighter weight when compared to iron. The six captured light brass 12-pounders were little more than heavy-hitting light 6-pounders; these guns should not be overvalued (Hughes 1969, Page 76). By the end of 1757, the French had captured twelve large-bore brass pieces: one 18-pounder, two heavy 12-pounders, four "medium" 12-pounders, four 8-inch howitzers, and one 10-inch mortar. These pieces had the attribute of "range". Plus, there were another twelve "smaller" captured brass pieces: six light 12-pounders (fit), four "heavy" 6-pounders, and two light 6-pounders — a total of twenty-four brass pieces plus additional coehorn mortars. The 8-inch mortar from Oswego is not included as it is considered both iron and unfit. The 8-inch howitzer from Oswego was iron and not included. Last seen at Frontenac in Fall 1756, this 8-inch iron howitzer disappears from all the subsequent French inventories. It was not surrendered at Quebec (Doughty 1901, Page 128). The royal mortars from Oswego are not included as they were likely iron. The value of the five royal mortars to Montcalm was minimal due to the lack of shells.

Unfortunately, the French documents do not fully describe their own siege train at Fort William Henry, particularly as it relates to whether their pieces were brass or iron (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 653). Bougainville only documents the calibers of some of the guns in the first two batteries. Captured British ordnance furnished three of the four shell pieces, but most of the cannon were French naval guns. Because of the distance to the Bastion, only long-range guns would have been positioned in these batteries: 8-pound cannon and up; 6-inch mortars and up; and 6-inch howitzers and up (French nomenclature). Here, the much larger French iron 12-pounders (naval) would have a decided advantage in range and hitting power over any previously captured British light 12-pounders.

Among the French texts and letters, the ordnance tags attached to captured pieces are not consistent. However, the French "artillery clerks" were consistent within their own narrow framework. More than anything else, the tags assigned by the clerks seem to be an attempt to avoid any possibility of confusing the stores. Once a size tag has been assigned to a piece or pattern, the artillery clerks will rarely change the tag. The names used by Bougainville can be a poor match for those used by the artillery clerks. In describing the second battery at the Siege, Bougainville writes "*two seven inch howitzers and a six inch mortar*" (Bougainville Journal, Page 166). In Table 2 detailing the captured ordnance, an iron howitzer of this same bore size is referenced as 6-inch which is consistent with the Oswego Inventory (See Appendix, Page 118). The standard British reference is an 8-inch howitzer with a 7 3/4-inch shell. An accurate measurement of this shell would be French

= 7.27 inches. With captured British shell ordnance, the French artillery clerks will use smaller values than expected, but never higher. This is very much a rule of thumb; the internal patterns created prevent confusion within the stores. Only after a review of a detailed inventory with all the different shell pieces included do the patterns become visible (Frontenac 1756 ID # 3072938 is the best inventory to use; the artillery pieces can be paired with the shells but reference the bottom note of Table 6). Quantities do not appear to be distorted.

Seemingly, Montcalm kept his "brass" guns within reach including any captured 6-pounders. We know that they were not at Carillon, Niagara, or Frontenac—the exceptions being the single brass 9-inch mortar, two light 12-pounders, and eleven brass grenade mortars which were left at Carillon in September 1757. The grenade mortars were British coehorns, but no size designation is given. Why leave the brass 9-inch mortar at Carillon is puzzling, but it does leave Carillon with a defensive piece having some range (1,200 yards) and a sizable ammunition store, some three hundred 9-inch shells were captured at Fort William Henry (89 pounds each, empty). Montcalm's focus was on moving 168 captured 12-inch shells to Quebec (195 pounds each, empty; Table 6). Shells fired from a British brass 10-inch mortar could not have reached Mt. Defiance, but a British iron 10-inch mortar would have the needed range (2,500 yards - Hughes 1969, Page 37). These iron 10-inch mortars were much bulkier pieces, designed to accept a much larger powder charge than a brass 10-inch mortar. Following the capture of Oswego, Montcalm's brass cannon were moved to Quebec City (Le Mercier Inventory, October 13, 1756; Library and Archives Canada, ID # 3072934). After the Siege of Fort William Henry, Montcalm's brass train was then moved to Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu River (Le Mercier Inventory, October 19, 1757; Library and Archives Canada; ID # 3073058). The bulk of the iron guns and the two largest mortars remained at Carillon, 9-inch and 6-inch (French measurements). Montcalm's attention is focused on the brass ordnance, not on any attached French iron naval guns. At the same time, Carillon is left with an appreciable and strong artillery store. During these two years, Montcalm was careful to keep his siege train intact and safe. Montcalm did not leave his siege train in a forward position that could easily be attacked by the British, a precaution that Shirley did not take at Oswego.

Montcalm's artillery train entering Oswego is known: four brass 12-pounders*, two brass 6-pounders*, two brass 2-pounders, four iron 12-pounders, six iron 8-pounders, four iron 6-pounders, two brass 8-inch howitzers*, one 6-inch iron mortar, and eight iron grenade mortars (Chartrand 2014, Page 53). There are no 18-pounders or 16-pounders in the artillery train and the guns captured at the Monongahela are prominent (*). The four brass 12-pounders are light guns — five-foot barrel \approx 1,000 pounds. Notably, these guns are not referenced as 11-pounders by the French, but there are no other British brass 12-pounders to confuse them with. In later inventories, the light 12-pounders revert to 11-pounders. None of the British brass coehorn mortars captured at the Monongahela were in the train. No brass mortar appears in any of Mercier's Frontenac Inventories.

As to Fort William Henry, Montcalm's artillery train includes 18-pounders (naval guns); but there is no mention of any Vallière 16-pounders (army guns), ten-foot-long brass guns of about 4,530 pounds. These brass guns would have been lighter and easier to move than the iron 18-pounders, the break-even point for an iron gun would likely be around 8.5 feet. Montcalm's 18-pounders would have been either 9 or 9.5 feet long (1674 Naval Establishment or 1690-1758 Naval Establishments, respectively). The French naval 18-pounders had a wider bore than a British 18-pounder — 5.472 and 5.292 inches, respectively (Muller 1768, Pages 6-10), and a shot weight of

19.425 British pounds (Winfield and Roberts, 2017, Page 5). As a strict paper exercise, these would match best to a British 20-pounder (non-existent). Though lighter than naval guns, the brass Vallière guns were still considered excessively heavy. The only "dedicated" field gun until the reforms of Gribeauval in the mid-1760s was the light 4-pounder (Model 1740, 720 pounds).

Whether any of the Vallière army ordnance ever reached French Canada is an open question. There is a single inventory reference to four bronze 8-pounders being at Fort St. Saint-Jean as part of Montcalm's brass artillery train (Le Mercier Inventory, October 13, 1757; Library and Archives Canada; ID # 3073058, see Pages 145 - 146). If true, these were French Army guns, one of a few oblique references of Vallière cannon possibly being in Canada (above the 4-pdr. designation). In the 1749 Inventory of Canada, the largest brass cannon listed are three 4-pounders at Quebec (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, 1858, Page 195). Montcalm's Oswego artillery train did not include any brass 8-pdrs, suggesting their possible arrival from France in Spring 1757. However, these brass 8-pdrs do not appear in any subsequent British inventory of captured French guns. The brass 9-inch 6-line mortar known to be in Quebec in 1747 and 1749 is seemingly unaccounted for. It is not in Quebec between 1754 - 1757; it is not part of Montcalm's siege train at Oswego. The 9-inch mortar that Montcalm brought to Fort William Henry is thought to have been captured at Oswego, but there is a remote chance it was the Quebec mortar. The 9-inch brass mortar from Oswego is almost equally elusive only appearing in the Oswego Inventory, the Bougainville Journal, and then Le Mercier's 1757 Carillon Inventory. Following Oswego, the four Monongahela brass howitzers disappear until referenced by Bougainville at Fort William Henry. Unlike the other captured brass pieces, they were not part of the Quebec October 1756 Inventory (ID # 3072934) and they are not listed as being at Frontenac that September (ID # 3072938).

The October Fort St. Saint-Jean Inventory allows a limited view of Montcalm's artillery train, but only the brass segment, the iron cannon are absent (ID # 3073058. Figures 14A and 14B). This view is post-Siege. Twenty-two pieces are listed, but three are from Fort William Henry itself. The brass British 10-inch mortar captured at Oswego was left at Carillon (French 9-inch; ID # 3073056). Again, this St. Jean Inventory may well be the only reference suggesting French brass 8-pounders reached Canada (French Army, Vallière guns, post-1732). As such, the brass identifier is suspect to question — the 8-pounders actually being iron with Montcalm simply filling a size gap in the train. The left column naming "tags" are as in the original document:

One 19-pdr.	(British Brass 18-Pdr. - Oswego)
Two 14-pdrs.	(British Heavy Brass 12-Pdrs. - Oswego)
Three 12 pdrs.	(British Medium Brass 12-Pdrs. - Oswego)
Four 11 pdrs.	(British Light Brass 12-Pdrs. - Monongahela / Fort William Henry?)
Four 8 pdrs.	(French Vallière Brass 8-Pdrs.; Barrel Weight 2,100 lbs.)
Three 6 pdrs.	(British Brass 6-Pdrs. - Fort William Henry, ≈ 8 ft; 2,100 lbs.)
One 5 pdr.	(British Light Brass 6-Pdr. – Monongahela, 4.5 ft; Barrel Weight 560 lbs.)
Four 7-inch Howitzers	(British Brass 8-Inch Howitzer - Monongahela)

Note: Attempting to track any portion of Montcalm's naval guns related to the Siege yields little beyond frustration. In 1757, iron 12-pounders or 8-pounders could easily slip in and out of Carillon's stores with no paper trail; there are both enough cannon and traveling carriages at Carillon to allow this. However, the confusion most evident relates to the five French 18-pounders believed to be at the Siege. In 1749, twenty-two iron 18-pounders were at Quebec, so a source for

these 18-pounders is not an issue (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 195). One of these five 18-pounders may or may not have been the brass 18-pounder captured at Oswego, the other 18-pounders being French naval guns. Pre-siege, the usefulness of the captured brass 18-pounder would have been limited because the Oswego store was likely the only source of shot; the equivalent would have been French Army 16-pounder shot, not 18-pounder naval shot. The Le Mercier Inventories never identify any 16-pound shot anywhere in Canada. However, the 1756 Frontenac Inventory, which includes the bulk of the captured Oswego ordnance, lists 156 18-pound shot, but no 18-pound cannon. Logic suggests these 156 shot represented the only usable shot for this British cannon. In Fall 1757, there were two iron 18-pounders at Carillon along with the needed traveling carriages. The math then suggests there should be at least two French naval 18-pounders included in the Fort Saint-Jean Inventory alongside Montcalm's brass cannon — there is only a vague reference to four iron cannon which appears to be Fort Saint-Jean's own limited small-bore armament. These 18-pounders were not at Fort St. Frederic (ID # 3073057, October 2, 1757). This leaves at least two, if not three, "ghost" 18-pounders that appear and then disappear, only Bougainville's battery descriptions detailing their presence at the Siege. Although there is temptation to conclude that the French siege train included only three 18-pounders, two of these "ghost" guns seemingly reappeared at the hastily constructed defense of the Île aux Noix on the Richelieu River (August 1760, Colonial Office Papers 5/59 Part 2 014). A single brass 12-pounder and two brass 6-pounders could be added to this list of "ghost" guns only to appear again in 1760 (Siege of Quebec / Fort Levis / Île aux Noix).

In September 1757, some of the cannon at Carillon were fitted to traveling carriages, some to garrison carriages with a good number of guns having access to either, 58 carriages for 45 guns. There are two traveling carriages for 18-pounders, seven traveling carriages for the 12-pounders, and four traveling carriages for the 8-pounders at Carillon. If one adds all the traveling carriages for the 12-pounders and the 8-pounders together, there are eleven carriages or guns (11). At least four naval 18-pounders would have to be added to this total (15). Acceptance of the Fort Saint-Jean Inventory adds four additional 8-pounders (19). Summing all the British brass cannon believed captured at the Monongahela and Oswego, there are thirteen additional cannon (32). This combined accounting adds to thirty-two cannon. The number of cannon described in Montcalm's siege train is thirty-one (not including any mortars or howitzers). Factoring in the 6-pounders and 4-pounders is not realistic as some eight 6-pounders and four 4-pounders were captured at Fort William Henry, blurring any comparisons. However, the 1756 Inventory of Carillon lists four 6-pounders and two 4-pounders. Together, these numbers mandate that nearly all the captured British cannon and any iron 12-pounder or 8-pounders that could be fitted to traveling carriages at Carillon were included in Montcalm's siege train.

The value of the French naval 12-pounders to Montcalm should not be underestimated or overlooked. These would be hard-hitting guns with range, using French round shot, not limited to stores of captured ammunition. These guns would be some 9 feet long and 3,200 pounds; little resemblance to a British light 12-pounder at 5 feet in length and 1,000 pounds. The French 18-pounders would be around 9.5 feet long and 4,500 pounds. Again, the French navy had fixed their gun lengths in 1690, a single length for each caliber (Rif and Roberts 2017, Page 6). Short is relative to what is considered long. Before 1732, the French Army adopted a 10-foot standard length for all gun calibers. There were additional short patterns for the 8-pounder and 4-pounder at 8 feet in length, nowhere near the concept of a "light" gun (Persey 1832, Page 6).

Artillerie
Fort. Jean
1757.
No 6.

30. 8. 1757
215

Etat des Pièces d'Artillerie et Munitions de Guerre
qui sont Effectives au Fort Jean le 13. Octobre 1757.

Sçavoir

Canada

Nom des pièces	Calibre	nombre
18. Pièces Canon de fonte de	19	1
	16	2
	12	3
	11	4
	8	4
	6	3
	5	1
4. Idem de fer		4
12. mortiers de fer		12
9. Boîtes de fer		9
4. Aubus de fonte de Fort William		4
19. Affûts		19
2. Quantités		2
1. Charrue ou Garnis		1
247. boulets Ronds		247
168. Bombes de 12. Diam.		168
8. Carcasses chargées		8
185. fusils		185
100. poudres de guerre		100
300. plomb en balles		300
264. fusils	30. diam.	164
	de chasse	100
fait a Quebec le 30. Octobre 1757		au Radeau ou hors de Service

Le Capitaine

Ju. Paudron

Figure 14A. Le Mercier Inventory for Fort St. Jean, October 13, 1757; Library and Archives Canada, ID # 3073058, Page 1. Post-Siege. The unorthodox naming convention relating to captured British brass ordnance is seen among the first seven entries. Unexpected, there is a line entry for French Army brass 8-pounders, Vallière guns? There is a line entry for 168 13-inch shells captured at Fort William Henry; these were a good fit for the 12-inch mortars at Quebec.

<u>Noms des pieces</u>	<u>Calibres</u>	<u>Nombre</u>
Colours Enclous		39.
couplets		1.
Rochets		1.
Suifs Grenadiers avec Bayonettes		41.
Mousquetons Couplets		12.
Carabins Lagers		4.
Pistoles		65.
Sabres		20.
Poudre de guerre		13200.
plomb en balles		12000.
fait à Quebec ce 30. Octobre 1757.		
Le Chevalier		
J ^e Vaudreuil		

Figure 14B. Le Mercier Inventory for Fort St. Jean, October 13, 1757; Library and Archives Canada, ID # 3073058, Page 2. The signatures are Le Mercier's and Vaudreuil's. There are no iron guns positioned here that can be associated with Montcalm's artillery train. There are no entries for iron 18-pounders or 12-pounders.

30. 8. 62 1757 211

Artillerie
Fort de Carillon.
1757.
8^{re} 1/4

Etat de l'Artillerie, ustensilles, et Munitions des
Garnisons qui sont Effectives au fort de Carillon Le 24. Septembre 1757.

Premierement

Noms des Pièces	Calibre	Diametre	Nombre
Artillerie			
2. pieces Canon de fonte de 11			2.
	18		2.
	14		1.
	12		16.
43 pieces de Canon de fonte	8		10.
	6		9.
	5		1.
	4		2.
	3		2.
1. Aubuzier de fer de		6 1/2	1.
1. Mortier de fonte de		9	1.
5. idem de fer de		6	5.
11. idem de fonte de Grenadiers			11.
39. pierriers de fer			39.
Armes des pieces			
affuts			
	18		2.
	14		1.
	12		2.
	8		4.
30. de campagne d'aubuzier	6		9.
	5		1.
	4		2.
	3		2.
	11		2.
	18		1.
	14		1.
28. de Marine de	12		18.
	8		5.
	6		3.
1. affut de campagne d'aubuzier	9		1.
1. Demie de Marine de Roue de fer	6 1/2		1.
1. Chapeau pour Mortier	9		1.
5. idem pour idem	6		5.

Figure 14C. Le Mercier Inventory for Fort Carillon, September 24, 1757; Library and Archives Canada, ID # 3073056, Page 1 of 4. “de fonte” is the identifier for brass. “de fer” is iron. “1 affut de campagne d'aubuzier” = 1 field carriage for a howitzer. Two British light 12-pounders are identified as 11-pounders in the first line (French nomenclature).

As relates to the Siege and the French artillery positioned in the first two batteries, the two 7-inch howitzers were captured British 8-inch brass howitzers from the Monongahela — the iron howitzer captured at Oswego was at Frontenac. It is thought that the 9-inch mortar (French nomenclature) was the captured British 10-inch brass mortar from Oswego and not the missing 9-inch 6-line brass mortar from Quebec. The 6-inch mortar was French-Canadian made; one of these mortars was in the French artillery train entering Oswego (see Samson 1998, Page 226). If it was British, Bougainville would have referenced it as a 7-inch mortar — the same shell as the 7-inch howitzer. The "captured" 7-inch British mortar from Oswego was a burst piece, leaving little evidence to argue that it was a British mortar. Conserving captured ammunition stores for the howitzers strongly argues for a Canadian-made 6-inch iron mortar, using Canadian-made shells of 5-inch 8-lines. Using only word insertions, the simplest expansion of Bougainville's description is: "*two seven inch British brass howitzers and a French-Canadian iron six inch mortar*".

Though often overlooked, the ammunition stores gained were just as important as the artillery itself, if not more so. Especially as regards mortars and howitzers, the French were firing British shells at the British using British ordnance. Not only did the French have to win each engagement, each win had to be of a magnitude where the British had to surrender or flee the field, leaving their supply train behind. Unless cottage industries were set up in Canada, the only source of these shells would be through capture. From the Monongahela through Ticonderoga (1758), the French luck held. The measured and methodical progress of Amherst and Forbes ended those opportunities.

The lack of 8-inch shells for captured British ordnance was likely a persistent problem that limited their usefulness. For the seven fit 8-inch shell pieces known to have been captured by the French, the French appear to have captured only about four hundred 8-inch shells, including the 300 shells from Oswego. Comparing the Frontenac 1756 and the Carillon 1757 Inventories shows that the remaining stores of 8-inch shells dropped to less than three hundred, a decrease of some 100 shells. From Table 1 (Page 116), the British were attempting to supply 200 shells per piece per campaign season. Understandably, Montcalm only takes two of the four 8-inch brass howitzers captured at the Monongahela to Oswego. The French inventories can be baffling as regards shell sizes and store quantities, there can be more or fewer shell line items than expected. Only by comparing multiple inventories can some sense be made, but the focus was the consistency within the ordnance identifications, not the accuracy of the identifications — accounting wins.

The focus of the French military was the European Theater. The defense of Canada was a secondary concern thought subject to inevitable peace negotiations. In 1757, the ordnance pieces reaching Quebec from France were decades old, this is best seen with the mortars. All the mortars sent were iron and pre-date Vallière's System (1732). From a *Memoir of Chevalier Le Mercier on the Artillery in Canada* (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 655; undated but appears to be Summer or Fall 1757):

Article First - Concerning Quebec

The town at present sufficiently provided with cannon, but it is highly necessary that it should have a proportionate quantity of shot. Seventeen iron mortars arrived this year, 4 of which were 12-inch, 5 of 8, and 8 of 6-inch, and only a few shell came, the most of which have not the necessary vent. A requisition was made last year for four Cominge brass mortars (18-inch) and for four mortars of 12-inch 4 li. diameter, with conic chamber capable of containing 11 @. 12^{lbs.} of powder; they have

not been sent; 'tis certain, however, that had we mortars of this description, no ships could anchor in the basin of Quebec.

The mortars which we received were intended for sieges and forts; this was the reason they were required to be brass, as they are easier of transportation; they are of iron, and 5 and 8 inches; some of them have their trunnions broken in France, the thickness of the metal is lessened by nearly an inch at this point. They had to be fastened to their carriages with iron bands, which renders the transport of them difficult; it is, moreover, impossible to elevate them, as they are immovable.

2d.

Although there are none in Canada who can manufacture shell or shot, some might, however, have been made at the forges of St. Maurice; but that establishment can scarcely supply metal necessary for the castings needed for service in the Colony. Therefore 'tis useless to think of it; should the King order it, however, 'twould be necessary to send from France some moulders in clay and sand for the shells.

As with many French-Canadian sources, some care is needed in fully accepting the writing, especially if connected to Bigot. The single iron foundry in Canada was at Saint-Maurice near Trois-Rivières in Quebec. In 1747, a few 4-pounders were cast and then sent to France, but these guns all failed the proof-testing (Samson 1998, Page 22 and see O'Callaghan, Vol. VI, Page 581). In 1748, six 4-pounders, six 2-pounders, five 6-inch iron mortars, and six iron grenade mortars were cast. That year, Saint-Maurice also produced 161 six-inch shells (5-inch 8-line), 110 nine-inch shells, 144 twelve-inch shells, and 2,700 cannon shot. Canadian 6-inch mortars had a bore diameter of 6 inches, slightly smaller than a French-made piece (6-inch 3-line). Unlike cannon, mortars could be easily strengthened simply by bulking up the wall thickness, but without lengthening the bore. This made them ideal for casting in a colonial foundry. One of these 6-inch mortars was part of Montcalm's siege train at both Oswego and Fort William Henry. The Oswego mortar had to be of Canadian manufacture, no British mortar had been captured before its fall (August 1756). Shell availability would have been the determining factor on how many of these mortars would be incorporated into the siege train, not the number of mortars available. Outside of smaller grenade mortars, this was the only Canadian-made ordnance in Montcalm's siege train. The other shell sizes fit the two large-bore mortars already at Quebec. Absent were any French-made 8-inch mortars — a bore of 8-inch 2-line or 8-inch 4-line, 8-inch shell. After 1752, difficulty in staffing the foundry with skilled workmen was a distinct problem and limited the output. Around this time, the management of the foundry seems to have moved out of private hands to Bigot's office.

The last of Le Mercier's Inventories dates to Fall 1757. Without those inventories, it is difficult to track Montcalm's ordnance. Montcalm's train was not at Ticonderoga in 1759: "*We took in the Fort, two 18-Pounders, one of 16, seven 12, four 9, one 4, seven Swivels, two 13 Inch Mortars (French 12 1/2-inch), one 6-1/2, one 8-inch Howitzer with Shot Shells, 56 musquets, great quantity of old Iron, and 50 barrels of Powder taken out of a boat on attacking them on their retreat.*" (Amherst Journal, July 27, 1759: Page 120). All these pieces were iron (CO 5 56 Part 1 008, August 3, 1759). Although several of these cannon may have been from Fort William Henry, only the 8-inch howitzer can be assigned with certainty. The "*great quantity of old iron*" may have included "burst" iron scraps and remnants from Fort William Henry. The easiest path is to label the 16-pounder a misidentified French naval 18-pounder, one of Bougainville's disappearing "ghost"

18-pounders. The 1757 Carillon Inventory only shows two 18-pounders, not three, so this “iron 16-pounder” remains somewhat a puzzle without any hint of its location in late 1757 or 1758.

In September 1759, three brass 8-inch howitzers were surrendered at Quebec (Doughty 1901, Vol. VI, Pages 128 and 129). These howitzers were recognized as Braddock’s (Vol. IV, Page 332). Out of 314 pieces surrendered, there were only eleven brass pieces: six French (a 13-inch mortar, three 4-pounders, and two 2-pounders); four British including the three howitzers and a 3-pounder, and a single 6-pounder that could be British or French.

Entering 1760, the men of the *Canonnières-Bombardiers de la Marine* were stretched far too thin, only a single company was in Canada. The British were approaching from three directions and each direction needed to be blocked. There were simply not enough experienced men to effectively man the guns or lead gun crews. In Spring 1760, Lévis attempts to recapture Quebec. He defeats Murray and the British at the Battle of Sainte-Foy on April 28th and then besieges Quebec. Lévis’s effort was predicated on the French Navy reaching Quebec before the British. On May 9th, the *HMS Lowestaff* becomes the first ship from Europe to reach Quebec. On May 16th, the French abandon their trench work in front of Quebec and retreat to Montreal, leaving behind a major segment of their artillery train: “*We took their camp standing, great part of their stores, ammunition, 34 pieces of cannon — four brass 12-pounders, — six of our own field pieces, six mortars, four petards, a large provision of scaling-ladders, and intrenching tools beyond number.*” (Murray Journal, Siege of Quebec, Page 44). It is near certain that these four brass 12-pounders were among the guns that De Lancey gave to Shirley in 1755.

Fort Lévis on the St. Lawrence River fell to Amherst in August 1760: “*Their Artillery consisted of twelve 12-Prs, two 8-Prs, thirteen 4-Prs, four 1-Pr & four Brass 6-Prs, besides several Guns with Trunions broke off, small Arms, and a great quantity of Powder & ball & provisions.*” (Amherst Journals, August 26, 1760; Page 239). Between 1755-1757, three or four medium brass 6-pounders and two light 6-pounders had been captured by the French and added to Montcalm’s train — four brass 6-pounders appear in the Fort St. Jean Inventory, three medium guns and one light gun (October 1757).

To guard the approach to Montreal from Lake Champlain, the French reinforced the fortifications at Île aux Noix on the Richelieu River. Fifty-two cannon, 4-pounders and larger were entrenched on the island or mounted on sail-row galleys (feluccas) — two iron 16-pounders (likely misidentified, more likely the last of Bougainville’s “ghost” French 18-pounders), seven iron 12-pounders, five iron 9-pounders, twelve iron 6-pounders, and twenty-one iron 4-pounders. The largest mortars were two iron 6 1/2-inch mortars suggesting they were cast in France, not at Saint-Maurice. The old ordnance from Fort Saint-Frédéric was placed including two brass 2-pounders, fourteen swivels, and two iron 1/4-pounders. The French position was flanked by Haviland. Bougainville was forced to withdraw the night of August 27th; but the ordnance and stores were lost to the British, little was destroyed by the retreating French. The captured guns include a brass 16-pounder — this was the brass 18-pounder given by De Lancey to Shirley in 1755. Two brass 12-pounders, two brass 6-pounders, and five brass coehorn mortars were found; these were British-made. The presence of the brass 18-pounder suggests these were De Lancey’s heavy 12-pounders. The full ordnance list for the captured pieces from the Île aux Noix is found in the Colonial Office Papers 5/59 Part 2 014, August 28, 1760. On September 8th, Vaudreuil would surrender Canada to Amherst.

As regards the Siege of Fort William Henry, captured British shell pieces were unquestionably included in the only two French batteries that were opened. However, there were enough French iron cannon to supply all the long-guns without the use of any of the British brass pieces. Between Fort Carillon and the Île aux Noix, five iron 18-pounders can be identified from the ordnance captured by the British. Carillon itself could easily supply the other long-guns, all sizable naval guns. Shot numbers for these brass guns were limited, arguing against their use. The light 12-pounders would have been ideal in the role of maneuverable camp protection.

Note: French Army Ordnance: Vallière Guns and Older

In 1749, all the large bore cannon in Canada were concentrated at Quebec; the heaviest pieces being iron 24-pounders, twenty-five guns (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 195). The largest brass cannon were three 4-pounders. Outside of Quebec, the largest cannon were iron 6-pounders. There were no 16-pounders in the inventory, a gun size unique to the French Army. There were two brass mortars, 12-inch and 9-inch. Outside these few brass pieces, any evidence of French Army ordnance is absent. For 1757, the artillery inventory for Quebec only lists two brass 4-pounders and two brass 2-pounders (Le Mercier, October 30, 1757, ID # 3073054). Since 1749, ten iron 36-pounders and some 26 iron 24-pounders have been added to Quebec's stores. Quebec is now defended by ten 36-pdrs, fifty-one 24-pdrs, thirty-five 18-pdrs, fifty-six 12-pdrs, thirty-two 8-pdrs, and over forty smaller cannon. As before, there were no 16-pounders. On the date of this inventory, Montcalm's artillery train was at Fort St. Jean. Discounting the brass 4-pounders, there is no evidence of French Army cannon being at Quebec. Four 12-inch and eight 8-inch iron mortars have been added to the inventory, more mortars would arrive from France (Doughty 1901, Vol. VI, Page 128). Starting in 1732, all French Army cannon were **only** cast in brass (Vallière). Before this, some 16-pounders may have been iron cast as suggested by a sample inventory list, all quantities are left blank (Saint Remy, 1745, Vol. 3, Page 242). Persey discusses the difficulties of casting iron cannon in detail, but Persey **never** mentions any army cannon being iron cast in the first half of the 18th Century (See Persey 1832, Pages 10-12). Mortars could be cast in either metal. Vallière's System gave order to the chaos surrounding the Army's artillery stores, setting bore sizes and gun lengths, but this did not reduce the gun weights — the focus remained on siege guns, not maneuverable field pieces.

There are at least four exceedingly tenuous references to French Army guns being in Canada, but only the first mentioned has any real staying-power. In the October 1757 St. Jean Inventory, four brass 8-pounders are listed, suggesting Vallière guns (Le Mercier, ID# 3073058). There is no further mention of these guns anywhere. Amherst lists one 16-pounder as being captured at Fort Carillon in 1759 (Keagle 2018, Pages 14 and 25), but this is an iron piece (CO 5 56 Part 1 008, August 3, 1759). Four 16-pounders are listed as among the guns captured at Beauport, a position some three miles downstream of Quebec, 1759 (Major John Godwin, Royal Artillery; Doughty 1901, Vol. VI, Page 129). Godwin does not provide any brass/iron qualifier; the lack of a brass identifier suggests iron guns. The fourth reference is to the two 16-pounders surrendered at the Île aux Noix, but these were iron guns (August 1760; Colonial Office Papers 5/59 Part 2 014). These guns cannot be identified or dated further. **Conjecture:** The three iron 16-pounders described here are likely the three "missing" 18-pounders from the Siege of Fort William Henry, but subsequently misidentified by the British — an easy mistake with British army officers being more familiar with French Army 16-pounders, not French Naval 18-pounders (see Bougainville Journal, Page 166). If French naval 18-pounders, these pieces would have been substantial guns \approx 9.5 feet (French).

Table 4. References to Montcalm's Artillery Train (1757) and Possible Ordnance that Might Have Been Included in the Train.

"A bateau mounted with a 12-pounder, fixed by Lieutenant Jacquot" — Montcalm's fleet of bateaux moving south on Lake George (Bougainville to M. de Paulmy; O'Callaghan, Documents Vol. X, Page 610). This same gun is referenced as an 11-pounder in the Bougainville Journal, July 31st, Page 156.

"Our artillery consisted of 31 pieces of cannon, 1 mortar, 3 howitzers, 10 grenade mortars, 70 thousand weight of powder; shell and shot in proportion" (O'Callaghan, Documents Vol. X, Page 629). "Our artillery consisted of 31 guns, 2 mortars, 3 howitzers, 10 grenade mortars, 70 thousand weight of powder, shells and shot in proportion" (O'Callaghan, Documents Vol. X, Page 643). Most histories reference the first quote, but the second quote is correct and includes the 6-inch iron mortar from Saint-Maurice, Quebec. Depending on the inventory, the 5-inch 8-line shell can be grouped with "*bombes*" or with "*grenades*". The Carillon Inventory lists eleven brass coehorns (October 1757). The French brought eight iron grenade mortars (Saint-Maurice) to Oswego, but none appear in the Carillon Inventory suggesting that the small grenade mortars at FWH were British brass coehorns.

"eight cannon, three of which are eighteen-pounders, and a nine inch mortar, started firing." Bougainville Journal, August 6th, Page 165.

"two eighteen-pounders, five twelves, one eight, two seven inch howitzer and a six inch mortar, commenced to fire". Bougainville Journal, August 7th, Page 166.

Cannon that may have been included in Montcalm's July 1757 Siege Train:

British "Medium" Brass 18-Pounder	1	Oswego – De Lancey, New York Harbor
British "Heavy" Brass 12-Pounder	2	Oswego – De Lancey, New York Harbor
British "Medium" Brass 12-Pounder	4	Oswego – De Lancey, New York Harbor
British Light Brass 12-Pounder	4	Monongahela
French Iron 18-Pounder	4 or 5	Bougainville Journal; Fifth 18-Pounder is the British Gun?
French Iron 12-Pounder	7	Carillon Carriage Inventory 1757
French Iron 8-Pounder	4	Carillon Carriage Inventory 1757
French Brass 8-Pounder?	4	Fort Saint-Jean Inventory 1757
British Light Brass 6-Pounder	2	Monongahela
French Iron 6-Pounder	4	Carillon Carriage Inventory 1757
French Iron 4-Pounder	2	Carillon Carriage Inventory 1757
Total Cannon	38 or 39	Not all these guns were included in the actual train.

The math demands that French naval guns from Carillon make up the bulk of the cannon in the train. Of the thirty-one cannon present, no more than thirteen cannon were British brass guns. These thirteen brass cannon comprise the first five lines of Le Mercier's Inventory for Quebec, October 1756 (ID # 3072934). The howitzers were from the Monongahela — all the howitzers at St. Jean were brass, October 1757 (ID# 3073058). The Oswego howitzer was an iron piece derived from colonial stores. The 9-inch mortar is nearly certain to be brass and from Oswego — there is no 9-inch mortar in Montcalm's Siege Train entering Oswego. The 9-inch 6-line brass mortar from Quebec (1747 / 1749) is missing from subsequent inventories; the Saint-Maurice Foundry made shells for this piece in 1748, so the piece existed. The "Quebec Mortar" and the "Oswego Mortar" would appear identical in any French Inventory. Unless named, it would be impossible to tell them apart. The 6-inch mortar is iron, a piece cast at the Saint-Maurice Foundry (1748). All five of these Saint-Maurice 6-inch mortars and their shells were gathered at Frontenac and then moved to Carillon. This movement can be seen in a comparison of the inventories, Frontenac (September 1756) and Carillon (September 1757). The limited availability of the 5-inch 8-line shell may be the reason all the 6-inch mortars were gathered together. The inclusion of the four brass 8-pounders is decidedly circumspect, these guns may have been iron.

Table 5. Montcalm's Brass Ordnance; Quebec 1756 and Fort Saint-Jean 1757.

A comparison of the brass cannon positioned at Quebec City following the Oswego Campaign (ID # 3072934, October 13, 1756) and those at Fort Saint-Jean after the Siege of Fort William Henry (ID # 3073058, October 20, 1757):

French Nomenclature	Quebec 1756	Comment	Fort Saint- Jean 1757
19-pounder	1	British "Medium" 18-pdr. - Oswego	1
14-pounder	2	British "Heavy" 12 pdr. - Oswego	2
12-pounder	4	British "Medium" 12-pdr. - Oswego	3
11-pounder	4	British Light 12-pdr. - Monongahela	4
8-pounder	0	French, Brass Vallière Gun ?	4
6-pounder	0	British "old" 6-pdr. - F.W.H. (8 Ft.?)	3
5-pounder	2	British Light 6-pdr. - Monongahela	1
4-pounder	3	French Gun at Quebec in 1749	0
3-pounder	2	French Gun at Quebec in 1749	0
7-inch Howitzer	0	British 8-inch Howitzer - Monongahela	4

Loudoun describes the brass 6-pounders available to Webb as "*some old Brass 6 Poundsers*" (MANA, Page 350), suggesting an 8-foot gun with a barrel weight of 2,100 pounds (McConnell 1988, Page 42). These would have been the Fort William Henry brass 6-pounders. The light 6-pounder would have had a length of only 4.5 feet, 550 pounds. In Fall 1757, the 9-inch brass mortar and the iron 6-inch mortar were at Carillon (Le Mercier Inventory, September 24, 1757; Library and Archives Canada, ID # 3073056). The iron 8-inch howitzer captured at Fort William Henry was also at Carillon. For accounting purposes only, the two light 12-pounders from Fort William Henry were at Carillon. Most of the small-bore iron guns from Fort William Henry were likely added to the Carillon Inventory (see Keagle 2018, Page 9).

At Oswego, four iron 8-pounders were included in the French siege train (1756). In the Fort Saint-Jean Inventory, the four 8-pounders are bronze (1757). There is a sizable temptation to conclude this is a simple clerical error and that these guns were iron; however, no other iron cannon seemed to have been moved to Fort Saint-Jean at this time suggesting that these may have been brass guns, but the attribution is decidedly dubious. The captured Oswego shell pieces are not listed in the Quebec Inventory: the 7-inch mortar, 7-inch howitzer, and the "swivel hoyetts" were at Fort Frontenac (Le Mercier Inventory, September 6, 1756; Library and Archives Canada; ID # 3072938).

The Fall 1756 Inventories fail to identify the location of the Monongahela howitzers or the brass 9-inch mortar. The 9-inch mortar next appears in the narrative of the Bougainville Journal and then in the 1757 Carillon Inventory (Le Mercier Inventory, September 24, 1757; Library and Archives Canada, ID # 3073056). There are no mortars listed in the Saint-Jean Inventory. However, the Fort Saint-Jean Inventory has a line item for a store of 168 shells (12-inch 8-line). These are the British 13-inch shells captured at Fort William Henry — a good fit for the 12 1/2-inch mortars at Quebec.

* In the late 17th Century, the British and Dutch fought a series of conflicts over mercantile dominance. Naval engagements were key (Anglo-Dutch Wars, 1652-1674). In 1685, nearly a thousand Dutch 12-pounders were in the British ordnance stores and some British naval vessels were outfitted with these guns (Lavery 1987, Page 100). As such, any older ordnance derived from colonial ports may include "hidden" Dutch ordnance. If the Fort William Henry ordnance were Dutch, it would have been undoubtedly commented on in Eyre's letter to Napier, but there is no such statement (Eyre to Napier, July 27, 1755; MANA, Page 128).

Table 6. French Shell Munitions - Montcalm's Siege Train, 1756-1757.

Le Mercier Inventory ID Number →	Frontenac 1756 3072938	Carillon 1757 3073056	Fort Saint-Jean 1757 3073058	Net Change
British 13-inch Mortar	0	0	168 (French 12-inch)	+ 168
9-inch 4-Line Brass Mortar (British 10-inch Mortar)	168 (9-inch 4-line)	460 (9-inch)	0	+ 292
7-inch Howitzer (British 8-inch Howitzer)	400 (6-inch 6-line)	285 (7-inch)	0	- 115
6-inch Saint-Maurice Mortar	247 (6-inch 0-line)	155 (6-inch)	0	- 92
Unknown Shell Assignment Exact Inventory Line Format	217 (7-inch 8-Line)	219 (7 ½-inch)	0	+ 2

There is no thought that the net change numbers are an accurate reflection of the number of French shells fired during the Siege. At the same time, the numbers are more than reasonable and support both the British and French narratives. Nothing shown here is in direct conflict with those narratives or the idea that the ammunition for the remaining fit British shell pieces was near exhaustion.

In Table 2 (Page 118), the French Inventory of captured stores, lumps 10-inch and 8-inch shells into a single value, 545 shells. By itself, the lumping indicates that at least some 8-inch shells were indeed captured with the British contending that it was only a few shells. The net change values fully support that contention. At most, only a few dozen 8-inch shells were captured by the French. Citing different colonial sources, both Starbuck 2002 (Page 9) and Lucifer (2007, Vol. 2, Page 293) describe 17 usable shells remaining. However, the net change values do allow some understanding of the siege mechanics. Each day, each piece would be assigned a set number of rounds; the number of rounds per day was not high. For the shell pieces, the numbers suggest between 30-50 rounds per day, maybe three or four rounds per hour. When needed, letting a gun rest and cool was not an issue. The baseline would be the maximum number of shells to be spent before the opening of the breaching batteries — an accounting exercise, expending fewer shells would have been preferred. Accuracy would have been valued, not speed. The surrender occurred before the opening of the breaching batteries. Gun crews were not rushed; trenching gangs were pushed hard.

The unknown shell assignment is a total frustration. Seemingly, the French moved these shells from Frontenac to Carillon, but then never utilize any of the store. What was the logic behind this move? The shell itself strongly suggests a 7 3/4-inch shell (British), but the French adopted another line item for those shells. **CRITICAL:** In the Frontenac Inventory, the 6-inch 6-line shell is directly mated to a 6-inch 8-line howitzer. This can only be for a British 8-inch piece. The French 8-inch mortar had a shell size of 8 inches (French), the bore was larger. There is no evidence of any French 8-inch mortars being in Canada in 1756. No French 8-inch mortar was at Carillon in 1757. In 1755, the French captured four howitzers at the Monongahela, but only 57 shells. Without any supporting evidence beyond an attempt to find logic, there is a distinct possibility that these “unknown” shells were 7 3/4-inch shells manufactured at the Saint-Maurice Foundry, Winter 1755-1756 (7 3/4-inch British = 7.27 French). The “name” of such a shell would be close to the actual dimensions of the shell, as is the case here. If true, the French then decided to keep the two stores separate and made the conscious decision to utilize only British-made shells during the Siege. These Saint-Maurice shells would have “fit” the British howitzers, but the windage tolerance may have been reduced (a tighter fit) or the British shells simply performed better.

Table 7. Plausible “Final” Locations for Elements of Montcalm’s Siege Train (1755-1760).

	#	First Appearance	Final Location
British Brass "Medium" 18-Pounder	1	New York Harbor, 1755; Oswego 1756	Île aux Noix, August 1760
British Brass "Heavy" 12-Pounder	2	New York Harbor, 1755; Oswego 1756	Île aux Noix, August 1760
British Brass "Medium" 12-Pounder	4	New York Harbor, 1755; Oswego 1756	Siege of Quebec, April 1760
British Brass Light 12-Pounder	4	Braddock, Monongahela 1755	Unknown
British Brass Light 12-Pounder	2	Fort William Henry 1757	Unknown
British Brass "Medium" 6-Pounder	4	Clinton 1745 Albany, Fort William Henry 1757	Fort Lévis, August 1760
British Brass Light 6-Pounder	2	Braddock, Monongahela 1755	Île aux Noix, August 1760
British Brass 8-inch Howitzer	3	Braddock, Monongahela 1755	Siege of Quebec, September 1759
British Brass 8-inch Howitzer	1	Braddock, Monongahela 1755	Unknown
French Iron 18-Pounder	2	Fort William Henry, Bougainville Journal 1757	Carillon 1759
French Iron 18-Pounder	1	Fort William Henry, Bougainville Journal 1757	Carillon 1759; "16-pounder"
French Iron 18-Pounder	2	Fort William Henry, Bougainville Journal 1757	Île aux Noix, August 1760; "16-pounders"
British 10-Inch Brass Mortar	1	Oswego 1756; Fort William Henry 1757	Siege of Quebec, 1759? A Deduction

Several assumptions are made concerning how the pieces were allocated, especially in 1760. Guns of the same type are grouped for the ease of the logistics, stores, tools, and extra carriage wheels. The assignment of the British brass 18-pounder to the Île aux Noix, three of Braddock’s howitzers being surrendered at Quebec, and the capture of two 18-pounders at Carillon are the only certainties in the table. Here, all the “old” medium brass 6-pounders captured at Fort William Henry are fit guns; Fyre’s claim for bursting a six-pounder is discounted, 20 fit guns surrendered. This accounting identifies all five of Bougainville’s 18-pounders as French Naval 18-pounders with the British misidentifying three of these guns as 16-pounders (French Army). The three “18-pounders” at the Île aux Noix were armament for a large sail-row galley, poorly used (Laramie, 2012b, Page 21). The missing 10-inch brass mortar from Ticonderoga 1759 remains a puzzle. This mortar is last seen in the Carillon Inventory (September 1757) with an appreciable number of shells, ideal in a defensive role. With Amherst about to seize Ticonderoga (July 1759), this mortar might have been moved north with the retreating French (1,200 pounds, British). Logic would suggest it would have been moved to the Île aux Noix, but it is not among the listed stores captured in August 1760. However, there is a curious entry at the end of Townsend’s Journal, the capture of Braddock’s mortar (Siege of Quebec, 1759; Doughty, 1901, Vol IV, Page 278) — “*There are also 37 guns and one mortar of General Braddock, found on the several batteries on the coast of Beaufort*”. Braddock did not have a large-bore mortar in his train. This statement seems to be a much better fit for the Oswego mortar, bordering on mandatory — “the only game in town”.

Any “ghost” guns, cannon that seemingly disappear in Fall 1757, are most evident when dealing with the five 18-pounders referenced by Bougainville. Only three of these 18-pounders would be labeled “ghosts”, but three other brass British cannon can be added to this list — a medium 12-pounder, a medium 6-pounder, and a light 6-pounder. These “ghost” guns then seemingly reappear in subsequent British Inventories of captured pieces in 1759 and 1760. Assuming these cannon existed and were fit, locations for these guns in late 1757 remains unanswered, but they could simply have been in transit between Carillon and Fort St. Jean on the dates of the inventories. Unfortunately, Le Mercier’s ordnance clerks lump any 18-pound shot and 16-pound shot together, blocking any attempt to follow gun movements via tracking the shot. The need to separate these shot sizes was negated by the absence of any French Army 16-pounders in Canada. Any captured British 18-pound shot would have been undersized for a French 18-pounder, but still useable. True French 18-pound shot would have been too large for the single brass British 18-pounder but tracking the shot can still lead to a few insights. **Conjecture:** Entering the Siege of FWH, the French had somewhere around 1,500 18-pound shot available at Carillon (Quebec 1756 Inventory – Quebec 1757 Inventory + Carillon 1756 Inventory + Frontenac 1756 Inventory: 6,133 – 5,175 + 411 + 156 (British shot?) = 1,524 — suitable for a train of five or six 18-pounders. The 1757 Carillon Inventory shows some 2,090 18-pound shot, an increase of 566 shot, suggesting the British surrendered at least 900 18-pound shot, if not more, and supporting the contention that the ammunition for the remaining fit guns was nearly exhausted.

c. Gun Design and Performance:

At the start of the war in 1755, there was a single Royal Regiment of Artillery composed of about fourteen companies, but the numbers and structure would soon change. In August 1757, the regiment was organized into two battalions of ten companies each plus there was a separate company of artillery in Ireland. By 1759, there were a total of three battalions of ten companies each plus one undersized "regiment" of four companies based in Ireland.

The Royal Artillery and the associated Engineers were under the umbrella of the Board of Ordnance and not the British Army in Whitehall. For various constitutional reasons and to limit the power of a standing army, the Board of Ordnance was a civilian authority, not an arm of the Army. The administration and service of the Royal Artillery was headquartered at Woolwich Warren in London which also housed the Royal Military Academy (1741). The technical schooling provided at Woolwich was key to the success of both the Royal Artillery and the Engineers. The Board of Ordnance was responsible for all matters related to firearms, artillery, and ammunition including the supply and distribution of ammunition, even while on campaign. This was not part of the "army quartermaster" duties. The Board of Ordnance would assign civilian clerks, tradesmen, artisans, and its own paymaster to each campaign. (Note: The title "Corps of Royal Engineers" is not formally conferred until April 25, 1787).

In reality, the Board of Ordnance and the Royal Artillery were not totally independent of the Army. The Royal Artillery was headed by very high-ranking officers of the Army itself, another example of multiple ranks and stations at the very top of the military, but the budgets and administration were separate. The head of the Royal Regiment of Artillery held the rank of "Master General and Colonel". In 1757, this was the Duke of Marlborough, Charles Spencer (Army Rank: Field Marshal). In 1759, the "Lieutenant General of the Ordnance and Colonel-en-Second" was Lord George Sackville (Army Rank: Lieutenant General; also, Colonel of the 3rd Regiment of Horse). In 1757, the effective daily control of the two battalions was with the Colonel Commandants (Colonel William Bedford and Colonel Bogard Michelsen). To each of the various campaigns, one or more companies of artillery would be assigned. Several companies fielded together would be under the charge of a lieutenant colonel or major. In this sense, the Royal Artillery was very adaptable to need. For the 1758 Louisbourg Campaign, five companies of artillery were assigned under the command of Lt. Colonel George Williamson. Williamson would subsequently direct the artillery at the Siege of Quebec and would accompany Amherst down the Saint Lawrence River in 1760. Although he was in Halifax at the time, the Royal Artillery at Fort William Henry would have been from Williamson's battalion. George Williamson was also the father of Adam Williamson, the Engineer serving in the Bastion during the Siege. Based on merit and repeated solid performance, George Williamson would reach the rank of Major General in 1762 and subsequently Lieutenant General in 1772. Ranks in the Royal Artillery were organized and named differently from the Regular Army. Company officers included captains, captain lieutenants, 1st lieutenants, 2nd lieutenants, and lieutenant fire-workers. The lieutenant fire-worker was essentially an ensign learning the trade of preparing charges. Within the Royal Artillery, the step of captain lieutenant was in the normal progression of rank and would not be skipped; there was one captain lieutenant per company — not one captain lieutenant to a battalion as in the infantry foot regiments. Non-commissioned officer ranks included sergeants, corporals, bombardiers, and drummers. The "rank & file" would include gunners and matrosses (equivalent to privates). Most engineers were "professional men" and did not gain officer rank until May 1757.

Cannon in the mid-18th century fired solid round shot, canister shot, or grapeshot — all non-explosive. The damage is done by the kinetic impact of the metal striking the target. Damage done to structures is in proportion to the velocity on impact: the closer the distance, the greater the velocity and the greater the energy transfer. These relationships are defined by $E = \frac{1}{2} mv^2$ and $P = mv$ (momentum, directional). Momentum is the hitting power — a 32-pound cannonball traveling at the same velocity as a 4-pound ball will hit eight times harder (kilogram-meter/second). There is no "Hollywood" explosion on impact. With all things being equal, the longer the barrel length, the higher the muzzle velocity and the greater the range; however, one quickly reaches a point where there is no benefit gained or there is a loss in range caused by the shot tumbling within the barrel. Within reason, the smaller the windage, the difference between the barrel diameter and the shot size, the greater the muzzle velocity and the greater the range. Considerable effort was taken by most countries in matching the manufacturing quality of their cannon to that of their shot. The more precise and consistent the manufacturing of both the cannon and the shot, the smaller the windage that could be allowed. As such, each nation had its own standards. The quality, uniformity, and fineness of the gunpowder were also factors with the British having among the best gunpowder manufacturing capabilities, using high-quality saltpeter (saltpetre, potassium nitrate) derived from their overseas colonies, particularly India via the East India Company (Lavery 1987, Page 134; McConnell 1988, Page 274). Changes in how the charcoal was manufactured resulted in the production of the much more powerful "cylindrical" gunpowders of the Napoleonic Era. Uniformity in grain size was particularly important as it allowed the powder to spark at the same instance. Muskets benefited from the use of a finer powder, but coarser powders were favored in larger guns. At the same time, there was no guarantee that even British gunpowder would be of the highest quality and ensuring proper dry storage was a constant problem, particularly under damp conditions, ship holds, or in underground magazines.

In stark contrast to Johnson's Expedition is Braddock's Expedition. In Summer 1755, each struggled to move provisions and food stores, but Braddock's military hardware was professional and complete. Johnson's ordnance stores were near amateurish and lacking, a condition subsequently reflected in Burton's inspection reports of Fort Edward and Fort William Henry (August 1756, found in the next appendix). Any depth to the stores came from the contributions by Massachusetts. The full list of military stores that the Board of Ordnance shipped with Braddock from England can be found in MANA (October 12, 1754, and November 16, 1754; Pages 479-487). This list is beyond extensive, some 360 items, including wheelbarrows (200), cart whips (45), nine different nail sizes with quantities (58,600), poundage of twine (13), leather buckets (11), and four pairs of scissors. Six types of intrenching tools were shipped, some 1,550 total — pickaxes, spades, shovels, felling axes, hand hatchets, and hand bills. Shipping ten gunpowder ladles is not surprising, one for each long-gun, but the Board of Ordnance also ships fourteen spare ladle staves. Under Braddock, spare carriages and limbers were shipped for all categories of guns. An additional spare wheel was sent for all carriage positions, fore and hind. If a carriage was destroyed by enemy fire or accident, a spare carriage would allow a serviceable gun to be quickly remounted — especially applicable to siege or any fortification. A patient review of this ordnance list is very instructive as it pairs gun types with ammunition, many with wooden bottoms (sabots). Cubbison (2010, Appendices) supplies a similar list of ancillary items needed for Forbes 1758 Expedition against Fort Duquesne. Caruana (1979) is an excellent resource on ammunition and trains.

Gun casting was a slow and tedious process as the mold itself was destroyed with each casting — one casting attempt per mold (Hughes 1969, Page 26; Lavery 1987, Page 80; and Henry and Delf 2002, Page 9). Artillery could be fashioned in brass or iron. Here brass is a reference to bronze, an alloy of copper and tin. With bronze, the percentage of copper and tin would be varied based on need. Compared to cannon, bronze church bells would have a much higher percentage of tin in the metal and a lower specific gravity. At the time, gunmetal bronze was typically 90% copper and 10% tin with a trace of other metals. Today, the term gunmetal implies the addition of zinc (2-4%), but this is not the case in the 18th Century. Muller (1768, Page 3) lists the specific gravities for various metals: copper (9000), tin (7320), gunmetal bronze (8784), cast brass (8000, true brass), and cast iron (7425). A volume of gunmetal bronze is about 18% heavier than the same volume of cast iron, but bronze is more elastic. Metallurgical analysis clearly demonstrates that the brass ordnance being cast at the time was "true" bronze only having traces of a zinc fraction and not "modern" gunmetal or red bronze (Meide 2002, Page 31 and McConnell 1988, Page 16). Both iron and bronze had merits as regards ordnance, but each presented problems in terms of manufacture or performance.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, brass (bronze) guns were highly favored because it was very difficult to cast iron into large gun molds without segments of the iron pour cooling before the full pour could be completed. Poured steels were too brittle for gun manufacture. The obvious shortcoming of iron guns was that they rusted, whereas brass guns did not. Both guns could burst, but the bursting was "controlled" in brass guns. Bursting is the word often used in the original source documents, so it is carried in histories, but that concept also includes the less dramatic splitting and fracturing of the barrel. Iron guns were much more prone to catastrophic failure. Yet when needed, iron guns could be fired at higher rates than brass guns and at higher charges (greater range). If excessively heated, brass guns tended to lose strength and the barrels would "droop". To safeguard the gun crews from catastrophic failures, the barrel walls and reinforcements were thicker on iron pieces than the corresponding brass pieces with this added metal explaining why the lighter density cast-iron guns weighed more than the brass pieces of the same length and caliber. Traditionally, brass guns were at least 5-20% lighter in weight than the corresponding iron guns of the same bore and length. As such, they were strongly favored on the upper decks of ships, but the monetary cost was too great and the idea was abandoned in the late 1600s (Lavery 1987, Page 87). Brass mortars of the same length were even lighter in comparison, weighing some 40-50% less than iron. The "extra" iron was used to thicken the walls, allowing higher charges. When compared to brass of the same bore width and length, the maximum range of iron 10-inch and 13-inch mortars doubled, but at the cost of doubling the weight (Hughes 1969, Page 37). Even though the iron 8-inch mortar weighed nearly twice as much as the brass mortar, iron 8-inch mortars had a maximum range of 1,700 yards, only 100 yards longer than a brass 8-inch mortar, suggesting the reinforcements were insufficient to further extend the range.

Due to the cost of the ores involved, brass (bronze) guns were many times more expensive to produce. Muller (1768, Page 53) states for the cost of a single set of brass guns, nine sets of iron guns could be manufactured, but these iron gun sets appear to be of shorter barrel lengths. In the end, the keen desire for brass guns was mitigated by the cost. For warships in the 17th century, the cost of brass guns might be a full third of the entire cost to build a large warship. By 1700, only the very largest warships were fitted with brass guns (Lavery 1987, Page 87). To supply brass guns to the very largest ships, any brass guns that could be found on smaller vessels or in land service were transferred. Muller (1768) was a keen proponent of iron over brass both because of manufacturing costs and

several elements related to gun performance, particularly overheating under rapid and continuous use. Muller further maintained that brass guns performed poorly in the actual forcing of a breach. Period warships had an expected lifetime of maybe 15 years before the ship needed to be retired, so if well maintained, iron guns were not necessarily a poor match. Under long-term garrison duties, especially in colonial use, iron guns were problematic as so clearly proven at Fort William Henry.

Muller's views on the merits of iron guns were not universal. For Army use, Pitt strongly favored brass and the truly massive siege trains sent to the Americas starting in 1757 were chiefly brass for all classes of artillery — siege cannon, field cannon, mortars, and howitzers. Pitt would append the ordnance lists directly to his letters to his theater commanders. Showing this distinct preference, Pitt sent large numbers of heavy brass guns to the Americas plus a near equal number of light brass guns (Cubbison 2010, Page 27; Pargellis 1933, Page 233; and Cubbison 2014, Page 103). Beyond sending over 120 coehorn mortars, Pitt sent at least 180 larger brass pieces. At a minimum forty-four heavy 24-pounders and some twenty-six heavy 12-pounders were shipped. The heavy brass 24-pounders would have weighed about 5,800 pounds with the heavy brass 12-pounders weighing about 3,250 pounds, barrels only. A review of Cubbison's works suggests that Pitt was sending both brass and iron 13-inch mortars to North America — a 13-inch iron mortar had double the range of the much lighter 13-inch brass mortar (2,700 yards and 1,300 yards, respectively; Hughes 1969, Page 37). By this time, the British Navy was "iron".

The 24-pounder was the preferred "offensive" artillery. Starting in 1758, the British regularly employed 24-pounders against the French. The heavy brass 24-pounders would be 9.5 feet in length, compared to 8 feet for a medium brass 24-pounder. Instead of the maximum 1/3 service charge of eight pounds of gunpowder, a heavy 24-pounder had a maximum 1/2 service charge of twelve pounds of gunpowder — conferring a higher muzzle velocity and hitting harder at these higher charges (McConnell 1988, Page 392). Maximum hitting power was a key characteristic of a breaching battery, but lower shot velocities could prove more effective against certain wall materials and wall thicknesses. The 18-pounder was often the preferred "defensive" artillery, as an 18-pounder used less gunpowder than a 24-pounder with little loss of range, and the targets for defensive guns were not hardened being freshly dug trench works and earthen batteries. With the rare exception, 32-pounders were only used where they could be temporarily off-loaded from a large warship and formed into batteries, such as at Louisbourg and the Siege of Quebec. Over time, certain gun calibers would come in and out of favor, especially as regards the fitting of ships (Lavery 1987, Chapter 18). In the early 18th century, the British Navy was replacing the 18-pounder with heavier caliber guns. As a consequence, port defenses in North America relied on iron 24-pounders and iron 12-pounders. The iron 18-pounder was relatively uncommon but would again be a common gun in the latter half of the 18th century, especially with the introduction of new frigate designs.

Artillery pieces did not scale with the size of the shot. Many competing practical elements determined gun lengths, not simply their weights. Aboard ship, where space was at a premium, room to efficiently service the gun was a key consideration and dictated an upper limit on gun lengths. As such, many of the larger guns were of similar lengths. Barrel lengths of ship guns were selected to limit the concussive damage to the ship's hull resulting from their firing. The longer the barrel, the less damage the hull would experience; yet guns would rarely exceed 10 feet, such guns being too heavy to maneuver. By the 1750s, a barrel length of 9 feet for an 18-pounder and 9.5 feet for 24-pounders and 32-pounders would be relatively standard. The typical "ship" 12-pounder mounted to a garrison

carriage would often be 8.5 feet in length, only a foot shorter than the 32-pounder, but would weigh just 60% of the larger gun. Stripped of its carriage, the barrel of a 32-pounder would weigh between 6,000 and 6,250 pounds. Smaller caliber guns had fewer limitations mandated by weight, thereby allowing for more variation in gun lengths. In 1782, the British navy had seven recognized lengths for their 6-pounders with the largest 9 feet in length and weighing 2,600 pounds (Lavery 1987, Page 102). With smaller caliber cannon, the largest ships would often favor the longest barrels available for the perceived increase in accuracy and range.

As regards fortifications, longer barrels had another practical advantage over shorter guns of the same caliber. As the sole of the gun embrasure was sloped downward, guns with longer barrels would extend deeper into the embrasure, and when fired, the longer guns did less concussive damage to the embrasure itself than shorter barrel guns of the same caliber. Similarly, the recommended embrasure width for the much shorter howitzers was wider than for other pieces.

Ricochet fire was intentional and a definite tactic, not just a mere consequence. Against formed troops, solid shot was intended to strike at very shallow angles, literally bouncing several times through the formation, not unlike a stone skipping across a pond. Naval guns commonly used ricochet shot against an enemy's hull. The ricochet distances could be substantial. For a 12-pounder on hard ground, the shot might travel 500 yards before the initial impact, 250 yards more on the first ricochet, and then 125 yards more on the second ricochet. Shot fired at above 2° horizontal would likely strike too steeply and would bury itself in the ground on the first impact, limiting the potential damage. Often flat cannon trajectories were favored (angle of arrival). Solid shot traveling through a position or column at head or shoulder height could cause extensive damage and numerous casualties. At other times, ricochet fire would reference low charge shot being lobbed just over the parapets with the intention of bouncing or rolling the shot through the defenders behind. The idea here is not to bury the shot, but to keep the shot "moving" as long as possible after the initial impact — illusions of bowling are frequently referenced to ricochet fire. The damage caused by even seemingly slow-moving solid shot is considerable, particularly if striking an individual or a group of individuals. At Fort William Henry, French gunners amused themselves by firing on the Bastion or the neighboring ground in such a way that the shot would ricochet on first impact and then hopefully strike the Entrenched Camp, hundreds of yards to the rear (Bougainville Journals, August 7th, Page 166). The guard on Colonel Young's tent lost his leg to rolling shot, a distance of more than 1,400 yards (Fyre Journal, Page 360).

Any reference to "maximum range" should always send up a red flag. Poorly framed and considered, it can easily mislead both the writer and the reader. Gunpowder stores were too valuable to waste at distances beyond effective range. Even effective ranges can be misleading as those judgments were made based only on the horizontal plane, drift from the left or right of the target line, simulating a column of advancing troops. Estimates of effective ranges were based on the gun being fired with a nearly level barrel, not arching fire that would bury the shot. Point-blank and effective ranges are best thought of as 1° barrel rise. The effective range of the various gun calibres was not that different, but the energy transfer was massively different ($P = mv$). Cannon carriage designs and their reinforcements assumed that most round shot would be fired at 5° or less.

The maximum rate of fire for a gun depended on the setting – a siege or a battle. Range to target, gunpowder reserves, and shot reserves would be the key factors in determining the rate of fire. Under the typical noise and dense smoke of a battle, a 12-pounder on a field carriage might fire at an average

rate of once per minute, but a well-drilled gun crew could increase the rate of fire to between six and eight rounds per minute for a short time. The obvious downside of such high rates of fire was the quick exhaustion of the ammunition supply. In a siege setting where smoke was allowed to fully clear, siege guns were probably fired no more than about eight to ten times per hour, but gun crews could be pushed to double that rate. The longer ranges involved with the first stages of a siege were inherently less accurate and demanded considerable care with the aim. The need for precise and directed loading was another factor that increased with range — there was no point in a hurried loading. In a similar vein, knowing the gunpowder and shot reserves had to be husbanded over the long term, slowed the rate of fire. All of these factors negated the desire or need for high rates of fire and accuracy was strongly favored over other considerations. The standard protocol was to assign each gun a specific number of rounds per day. If gunpowder stores were limited, either side might allocate the vast majority of the gunpowder to the later stages of the siege and only then increase the rate of fire. In many ways, this became a matter of logistics and accounting. Schedules would be set and timetables for work established based on accepted engineering standards. During the early stages, each gun might be assigned a maximum number of rounds per day, ten rounds or less would not be unusual, especially defensive fire. In the latter stages of the siege when the ranges decreased, the rounds assigned per gun might increase to sixty or more per day. Siege gun firing rates could approach or exceed ten per hour, but the guns had to be allowed to cool after 10-12 rounds or the barrel would warp, or the vent could enlarge. The cooling could be done via repeated swabbing with water but resting the gun for a period of time was an additional recommendation. Starting in 1758, the British would include many heavy brass guns in their siege trains including those expeditions in the interior. During the Peninsula War in Spain (1807-1814), the British brass siege guns were limited to less than 120 rounds over 24 hours; iron guns could be fired at double or triple that rate (Hughes 1969, Page 22). However, the logistic limitations were key, and a trenching schedule would be developed to determine how long it would take to establish breaching batteries. For Winslow's artillery train, the shot allotments in Table 1 (Page 116) suggest an assignment of 300 round shot per gun for the full campaign season. At fifty rounds per day, guns would exhaust their supply within a week.

Point Blank Range (Fortune 1778, Page 11): Best match a 1° barrel rise (Hook and Wise, 1979, Page 29).

<u>Cannon (Iron)</u>	42-pdr	32-pdr	24-pdr	18-pdr	12-pdr	9-pdr	6-pdr	4-pdr	3-pdr
<u>Point Blank Range</u>									
<u>(Yards)</u>	583	633	650	615	733	716	666	500	400

Gunners would vary charge weights based on intention, convenience, caution, or the simple desire to conserve powder stores. Even against structures, slower moving shot can be more destructive than faster moving shot; the damage depends on the materials, thicknesses involved, and the path of the shot. In the early stages of a siege, defensive fire might use only 1/6 the weight. Flat ricochet fire used less than a full charge. Since the 1720s, the maximum service charge was incrementally dropping, so the points when it "reached" 1/2 the weight and then 1/3 the weight are somewhat muddled. During the first half of the 18th century, this rule was also tied to gun size, pattern and caliber. In 1750, the maximum service powder charge for a British heavy or medium gun would be between 2/5 and 2/3 the weight of the shot (40- 66%; Lavery 1989, Page 22). The larger iron guns used the lower charge of 2/5 the weight of the shot, 32- and 24-pounders. The British iron 18-

pounders at the Siege would have had a maximum service charge of $\frac{1}{2}$ the weight of the shot. Some iron 9-pounders were rated at $\frac{2}{3}$ of the shot weight. In a very broad generalization with expected exceptions (1750s), British heavy and medium cannon had a maximum service charge of $\frac{1}{2}$ the weight of the shot and light guns $\frac{1}{4}$ the weight of the shot. This last statement is more in line with McConnell than Lavery. Proof charges would be greater. As gunpowder formulations increased in quality during the 18th century and the windage tolerances decreased, the full charge ratio was progressively reduced to avoid overcharging and bursting the gun. By the end of the Seven Years' War, the maximum service charge on all British heavy and medium guns had been reduced to $\frac{1}{3}$ the weight of the shot — Board of Ordnance Regulations of 1764 (Muller 1768; McConnell 1998, Pages 281, 392 - 412; Caruana 1992, Page vi). Significantly, this change occurred before the development of the more powerful cylindrical gunpowders in the 1780s — a clear recognition of the understrength barrels of the early Armstrong patterns. The French adopted the $\frac{1}{3}$ full-service charge in 1739 (Persy 1832, Page 13). Before this, the full charge was $\frac{2}{3}$ the weight of the shot (Persy 1832, Page 20).

The recognized effective range of cannon was only 40 or 50 percent of the maximum range. During the Siege, the French established their first batteries just within the effective range of their 9-pounders (650 yards), the smallest cannon in those batteries, and very much within the effective range of the 18-pounders. These first batteries were just beyond the effective range of the ten small-bore cannon within the Bastion. The maximum range for a 6-pounder or even a light brass 12-pounder was about 1,400 yards. The full-service charge on a light brass 12-pounder was only three pounds of powder, one-and-a-half pounds less than a full charge for most 9-pounders, not the six pounds of powder typical of a heavy or medium 12-pounder (McConnell 1988, Page 392). Using a heavier ball and less powder, the effective range of a light 12-pounder was less than that of a 9-pounder (about 700 yards and 900 yards, respectively). Although the defense of the Bastion would have improved if these light 12-pounders had been moved from the Entrenched Camp, their value would have been considerably less than their size would initially suggest. A heavy brass 12-pounder had a barrel length of 8 or 9 feet with a medium 12-pounder typically having a barrel length of 6.5 feet (field carriage). The 1,000 pound "light" 12-pounder was made possible by having a barrel length of only 5 feet. As regards the Siege of Fort William Henry, the only guns known to have been light guns were the two light British brass 12-pounders. The brass 6-pounders were "older" pieces, suggesting 8-foot guns. Before the Siege, the French had captured four light brass 12-pounders and two light 6-pounders at the Monongahela, so some light guns may have been used by the French (MANA, Page 97).

By Napoleonic times when field guns were consistently being made lighter or eliminated from the inventory and keeping the same 5-foot barrel length, the barrel weight of the brass light 12-pounder increased from about 1,010 pounds to 1,340 pounds suggesting the need for greater range and/or durability (McConnell 1998, Page 396; and Henry 2002, Page 14). By the end of the 18th century and among brass field guns, only the "medium" 12-pounder gun remained in service, 6.5 feet long and weighing some 2,020 pounds. This gun was the same length as the older medium pattern but weighed some 400 pounds less. At this same time, the light 6-pounders saw an increase in both length and weight (Old: 4.5 feet, 560 pounds; New: 5.0 feet, 670 pounds — Hughes 1969, Page 29). There is no consistent pattern surrounding these changes.

Cannon lengths are measured in calibers (calibres), a single caliber being the diameter of the gun's bore. The cannonball for a 9-pounder had a diameter of 4.0 inches, a 12-pound shot had a diameter of 4.40 inches, and 32-pounders had a diameter of 6.10 inches. Adding about $\frac{1}{20}$ for windage, these

values would then represent the bore width. The actual bore length is shorter than the gun length, about one caliber less. The cascable at the rear of the gun is not included as part of the gun length. Cannon lengths were very much influenced by their intended use. The obvious caveat being that as the gun's length increased, the weight of the gun would also increase. There were three broad categories of guns — field pieces, siege guns, and ship guns. Field pieces needed to be light and maneuverable, so the shortest of the guns. Siege and garrison guns needed to have barrels long enough so that the concussive forces of the firing did not destroy their own embrasures, these were often the longest guns. Ship cannon were somewhat intermediate, they needed to be light, especially on the upper deck, but also long enough to limit concussive damage to their own hull with firing. Different gun designers would then set the number of calibers for each type of gun with the important measurement being the bore length in calibers. There was a near-constant struggle to reduce gun weights while achieving a high standard of gun performance. There were two distinct but related issues: (1) where the gun design was weak and needed reinforcement; and (2) where there was excess metal that could be stripped and used in the needed reinforcements. Addressing only the first question simply generated heavier and heavier guns. The second element was often harder to evaluate. Discipline in gun design was needed when attempting to reinforce the breech or first reinforcement without then also adding to the second reinforcement or the barrel chase. Throughout the 18th century, the keen desire to make long-guns lighter was never realized. The successful Blomefield patterns of the Napoleonic Wars did not reduce long-gun weights, particularly as it relates to naval guns. The steady changes and increases in the potency of gunpowder formulations made standardizing gun patterns even more difficult.

Designs and patterns were not transferable between brass and iron guns. The differences between the materials mandated the adoption of independent gun patterns, particularly as relating to the thickness of the gun walls. There is no defining proportional relationship between brass and iron guns. Although gun patterns were developed and tested at Woolwich Warrens, the "true" testing only occurred in war. After each conflict, the shortcomings were identified, and new patterns developed. Before the adoption of the Frederick-Armstrong Pattern in 1760, British gun patterns were not fully successful with a common criticism that they remained understrength. Only starting in the mid-1770s were the British cannon bored from solid castings. Previously, the bore was developed from a hollow casting that was reamed out to the final bore dimension. This change resulted in a marked increase in gun performance and fewer failures, but the ability and speed of each nation to adopt solid core casting was different — Britain was decades slow.

Most of the British guns at the Siege were likely earlier Armstrong patterns or even older guns. These guns were recognized as subject to bursting. The more successful Armstrong-Frederick Pattern was not fully adopted until 1764. Muller (1768, Page xvi) advocated that the gun length of field pieces be at 14 calibers, siege/garrison guns at 21 calibers, and ship guns at 15 calibers. Muller was a strong proponent of shorter iron guns. Although very influential as regards certain aspects of gun design, Muller's recommended gun barrel lengths were not adopted and nearly all field and ship guns were longer and heavier than Muller advocated. This was especially true of naval guns where the lengths approached those of siege guns. Blomefield's field guns of the Napoleonic Period were about 17 or 18 calibers in length, longer than recommended by Muller. The Admiralty resisted adopting shorter barrel lengths and many naval guns were between 7.5 and 9.5 feet for both hull protection and increased accuracy, regardless of shot size. If needed or desired, you could find naval 6-pounders 9 feet in length, whereas a heavy 6-pounder field gun under Blomefield would only be about 5 feet 3 inches in length. Muller's recommendation for siege and garrison guns at 21 calibers was more closely

followed (reference Adye 1802, Pages 154 and 155). Under Vallière, French cannon were bulky guns, often near a length of about 25 calibers and a weight of 260 round shot. These guns were superb garrison and siege guns, but too heavy to be effective field guns. A French brass 12-pounder would weigh about 3,400 pounds (9-foot); a British brass medium 12-pounder some 2,500 pounds (6.5-foot). Any captured brass ordnance would have been a huge boon to Montcalm. Starting in 1764, Gribeauval would develop French field guns that were less than two-thirds the weight of Vallière's guns (4-, 8-, and 12-pounders; \approx 150 round shot) plus heavy 8- and 12- pounders.

Older guns could be sound, age alone is not a factor. Iron guns needed to be parked and maintained with a dry bore, the vent sealed and protected, the bore capped, and the barrel orientated slightly downward so that the gun would drain. If water was allowed into the barrel, the guns would rust, loose metal, and honeycomb. Promoting drainage and some method for allowing atmospheric gas exchange were key. Freeze-thaw cycles and saltwater were especially problematic. Over time, the loss of metal to the rear of the breech was a certain problem (internal to the barrel). With the Blomefield pattern, the thickness of the metal at the rear of the gun would be added to with a much more rounded form. In British North America, the "abandoned" condition was the rule rather than the exception.

Howitzers and mortars fired exploding shells with inserted fuses. Ideally, the shells would detonate in mid-air just before or at the instant of hitting the ground. By varying fuze lengths on the shells, some crude control of the timing of the explosion could be achieved. When targeting a gunpowder magazine or any casement, it was hoped that the shell would first penetrate the roof structure before exploding. Alternatively, howitzers could be used in ricochet with the idea the shell would not be buried by arching fire, but neither would it explode prematurely high in the air. The explosion would occur while the shell was still rolling on the ground or had just stopped. Here, damage does not correlate with muzzle velocity or range. Instead, metal shards from the shell casing and the concussive wave of the explosion would cause the damage. Much of the damage done to Fort William Henry and the casualties was from shell. For air explosions and the safety of the mortar crew, the minimum workable fuse length required that most mortars be at least 600 or 700 yards away from the target — the position of the first two French batteries (Wise and Hook 1979, Page 29). With 8-inch and 10-inch brass mortars, the maximum range was judged to be about 1,600 yards and 1,200 yards, respectively. The much bulkier and heavily reinforced 10-inch iron mortar allowed for a much higher gunpowder charge and had a range of 2,500 yards — two of these mortars were with Webb at Fort Edward. With the fall of Fort William Henry, some three-hundred 10-inch shells were surrendered to the French. The much smaller brass 4 2/5-inch mortar had a maximum range of 800 yards (Hughes 1969, Pages 37; but see Page 100). The brass 5 1/2-inch mortar could reach 1,000 yards.

If a target was massive in size, the need for accuracy was diminished and high arching artillery was an option. Effective against cities, packed towns, and large encampments, against spread armies in the field, it was often problematic — the solid shot would most likely simply bury itself in the open earth on first impact. Often mortars were fired at a fixed angle of 45°. To alter the distance the shell flew, the size of the propellant charge would be varied. Alternatively, the angle on the mortar could be modified using wood wedges. As a large percentage of shells exploded after hitting the ground, arching mortar fire could lose much of its effectiveness on soft wet ground where a falling shell could bury itself.

The use of fuses made shells distinctly unreliable. In the early part of the 18th century, two fuses would be lit simultaneously, one for the propellant charge and the second for the mortar shell itself. This was inherently dangerous, and the crew had to be ready to quickly abandon the mortar if something went wrong. By the mid-to-late 18th century, some windage (air space) was allowed when fitting the shell into the mortar; then only a single fuse would be lit in hopes the propellant charge would subsequently ignite the shell fuse. At the time of the Siege, the British were utilizing a single fuse and no wadding, whereas the French continued lighting two separate fuses and used wadding (Muller 1768, Page 155). Duffy (2006, Page 119) has the French adopting a single fuse sometime after 1747. Mortars were most effective in a siege; they were especially feared when arrayed against cities and structures apt to burn. If desired, the explosive formulation inside a perforated round or oblong shell could be modified to promote the formation of fires (a carcass) — pitch 2, saltpeter 4, sulfur 1, and corned gunpowder 3, tightly packed into the shell (Muller 1768, Page 205). The carcass would burn for some 10 minutes after firing. Bomb ketches were specialized ships fitted with mortars, typically two 13-inch or 10-inch sea-service mortars plus six or eight small-bore cannon. These mortars were much more massive than land-service mortars allowing for heavier propellant charges. A 13-inch iron sea-service mortar had a range of 4,100 yards with a 10-inch iron sea-service mortar having a range of 3,800 yards — 1,300 yards further than the corresponding land-service mortars (Hughes 1969, Page 37). Bomb ketches were used to reduce coastal fortifications and cities. Loudoun had requested three or four bomb ketches for the 1757 Louisbourg expedition (LO 2859, Final Letter Appendix). Under James Wolfe, the British would employ three bomb ketches against Quebec (1759). Wolfe moved at least four sea service mortars, six additional 13-inch mortars, one 10-inch mortar, and six 32-pdrs to the top of Pointe-aux-Pères (opposite to Québec) and established two batteries (Doughty 1901, Volume 5, Appendix II, Pages 38-39). At least two more batteries would be constructed. Throughout this campaign, the British expended some 18,000 shot for 32-pdrs, 18,350 shot for 24-pdrs, 3,000 13-inch shells, and 2,300 10-inch shells, but only some 1,000 shot for 12-pdrs, and 1,000 8-inch shells (Doughty 1901, Volume 5, Appendix II, Page 57). The British used some 3,880 barrels of gunpowder during the siege. Although Duffy (2006, Page 99) questions the validity and efficiency of this practice, the carcasses proved brutally effective in the fire-bombing of Quebec (MacLeod 2015, Pages 30-34). Nearly four hundred carcasses were fired, 283 13-inch shells and 93 10-inch shells. MacLeod provides ammunition expenditures for the Pointe-aux-Pères batteries. Comparing these Pointe-aux-Pères numbers with Doughty's numbers suggests that the British Navy was viciously pounding Lower Quebec City — although two-thirds of the 24-pounder shot seems to have been expended from Pointe-aux-Pères, only ten percent of the 32-pound shot (1,600 shot) was seemingly fired from the Pointe.

High arching fire by cannon was not prohibited, just rare outside a siege. On August 8th, the day before the surrender, there was considerable troop movement by both the French and the British. Whether the British movement was in response to the initial French movement is uncertain, but it is likely. The French were reacting to intelligence that a British relief column was marching from Fort Edward, an event still keenly hoped for by the British. There was no actual relief column. The language below suggests that two French guns were moved forward toward the garden to lessen the range to the Camp by some three hundred yards; howitzers and mortars would seem the most logical candidates, but cannons are not excluded. At the time, the French artillery positions could only reach the Camp via high arching fire and ricochet fire; the Camp being at least 1,200 yards distance from the second French battery and even a greater distance from the first French battery.

From the letter - *Journal of Expedition against Fort William Henry; From 12th July to 16th August, 1757; Département de la Guerre, Paris* (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 598, no author is credited):

*"8th The working party was dismissed at day-break; 300 other men have been employed in perfecting the night's work, in commencing a new battery 100 toises (213 yards) in advance of that on the left, continuing the sap and forming a épaulement to cover the new bridge; a working party has crossed the swamp to construct a slope which terminates at the gardens. A Bearn soldier has been killed and 4 belonging to different regiments have been wounded. At three o'clock some men and the glitter of some arms were observed up one of the mountains. Scouts came to report to the General that relief was approaching. He dispatched three companies of grenadiers to Chevalier de Levis, with orders to proceed and oppose the arrival of reinforcements and followed the brigade of La Reine and one of Militia; left that of the Royal Rousillon on the heights ready to support him or the trench to which the La Sarre brigade entered. M. de. Bourlamaque made arrangements to repeal the sorties, ordered the artillery officers to bring two guns on the gardens and plateau, to fire à toute volée * on the intrenched camp in which considerable movement was observed, and the troops were seen in line of battle."*

** To fire as to propel the shot to the greatest possible distance by elevation.*

Whether the French actually moved these two guns forward and subsequently fired on the Camp from that position does not seem to be recorded anywhere. The surrender occurred the following morning.

British muskets with a 0.75-inch bore used a 0.67-inch ball. Grapeshot was an arrangement of nine much larger iron shot set around a wooden spindle that was attached to a round wooden base of a specified diameter. The size of the shot used varied per the caliber of the gun, 32-pdr \approx 2.75 inches, 18-pdr \approx 2.25 inches, 12-pdr \approx 2.0 inches, and 6-pdr \approx 1.5 inches. The shot was then placed in a bag and tied in a specific pattern to secure the shot to the spindle. Brass cannon would use round shot or canister shot (tin or rarely copper cans filled with small iron shot), but not grapeshot for fear of damaging the barrel. The shorter barrels of brass howitzers would allow the use of grapeshot. Braddock carried grapeshot only for his brass howitzers, tin cases (MANA, Page 480). At FWH, the first two French batteries were established beyond grapeshot range even for the 32-pounders (\approx 500 yards). The unopened third French Battery was within grapeshot range of a 6-pounder (\approx 300 yards).

As part of Johnson's 1755 Expedition, a large amount of grapeshot was delivered to Fort Edward (Bouton 1872; Vol. VI, Page 496). The grapeshot was shipped as loose balls, not cloth wrapped. Some twenty-one hundred 8-ounce balls of grapeshot were supplied for the two 32-pounders. For the more numerous 18-pounders, ten thousand 4-ounce balls were shipped together with twenty-five hundred 3-ounce balls for the two 12-pounders. As there was no gunpowder internal to the packed shot, a laboratory was not a requirement and the nine balls used in preparing the grapeshot could safely be placed into a flannel bag. If desired, a wooden sabot could then be used to join the shot with a powder charge. Johnson used grapeshot at the Battle of Lake George to repulse the French (September 1755). The provincials still had 132 rounds of 6-pound grapeshot in their inventory at the beginning of November (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 277). The list of ordnance and artillery stores wanted for Winslow's 1756 Expedition can be found in Bouton (1872; Vol. VI, Page 495: Appendix Page 116). Beyond the 1755 guns already positioned at Fort William Henry, there were twelve additional guns wanted — six 18-pounders, four 10-inch mortars, and two 8-inch howitzers. A further 3,000 solid shot and 1,500 shells were also wanted. There were few tools, gunpowder ladles, or barrel sponges to service the guns.

Throughout 1755, concerns over gun carriages plagued Johnson. In July 1755, eighteen new traveling carriages were shipped to Albany (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, Page 724). In 1756, Burton writes from FWH that *"The Artillery and stores that were there last Winter, and in the Spring according to an Annex'd List, all in bad condition, the Gun Carriages being rotten and Decay'd, Except the four Brafs Six pounders, for which they are at present at work on, for the making of New travelling Carriages, all the ladles and Spunges are out of Repair and unserviceable, there is a very small proportion of Ammunition both for the Guns and Mortars in the Fort, and the Rest of the stores so confus'd and intermixed that no exact account could be taken of them, but were oblig'd to take a Return of them from the Provincial Commissary"* (LO 1583, August 25, 1756). With moving provisions having priority, it seems Johnson's new traveling carriages remained at Albany throughout 1755. In 1756, Winslow inherited the task of moving Johnson's new carriages plus a dozen additional carriages north, the carriages not arriving until late August and September 1756.

Ignoring the 6-pounders and smaller pieces, the artillery at Fort William Henry and Fort Edward arrived in two waves. Johnson had brought about half of the larger pieces north in 1755. The following year, Winslow's Expedition brought additional pieces to the region including eight iron 18-pounders, four 9-pounders, eleven 6-pounders, five iron 4-pounders, two iron 10-inch mortars, at least one iron 8-inch mortar, and as many as three 8-inch howitzers — three iron howitzers are at Albany in June 1756 (see LO 4394). New York Harbor would again be the likely source for the 9-pounders. Among the larger pieces, the only increase in 1757 was the addition of six light brass 12-pounders assigned to Webb by Loudoun. Although two light 12-pounders were lost at Fort William Henry, the other four light 12-pounders were not at Fort Edward and were not immediately available to Webb to send as reinforcement to Monro (reference LO 6686). Where these other four light 12-pounders were located is uncertain, but they may have still been in Albany (reference MANA, Page 372). Under orders from Loudoun, the larger artillery accumulated for Winslow's Expedition (1756) was simply split between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry without the loss of any pieces; the moving of the massive 13-inch mortar to Albany being the only exception. In the end, there are no issues concerning the identities, numbers, or locations of the larger artillery pieces with one possible exception. At the end of Ewings' exhaustive ordnance list for Fort Edward (LO 6686, September 6, 1757), the text includes a note stating four 9-pounders were on the road from Albany and that these guns had not yet arrived at Fort Edward. This may well be accurate, but there is a chance that these guns were really the "missing" four light brass 12-pounders that were thought to have been left in Albany.

Keeping track of the smaller artillery pieces is awkward and contains a good measure of conjecture. Under Winslow in 1756, there were nineteen 6-pounders split between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, but only sixteen 6-pounders in 1757. In 1756, provincial regiments camped outside of Fort Edward had a single 6-pounder attached to each, six 6-pounders (MANA, Page 239). At least three, if not five, of these provincial guns were likely returned to their home colonies with the returning regiments. The two 6-pounders and the single 3-pounder given to the 60th Foot in 1756 are problematic and not included in these tallies. In 1757, the 60th's guns may have been moved to Schenectady, further south with Bouquet, or added to the Fort Edward Inventory. The only other gun whose regional number was not fixed by 1756 was the 4-pounder. In October 1756, there was only a single 4-pound cannon at Fort Edward. In September 1757, there were ten 4-pounders at Fort Edward (LO 6686). These 4-pounders may represent regimental guns brought with the returning provincials in Spring 1757 or guns conveyed by militia with Webb's summons. Fully conforming to Loudoun's

Inventory, there were only two 9-pounders at Fort Edward in September, not the six reported for November 1757 (Pargellis 1933, Page 322).

As it relates to British mortars and howitzers, there is considerable confusion as to the actual sizes and nomenclatures used. The source for Loudoun's inventory found in MANA (Loudoun to Cumberland, October 3, 1756, Page 239) seems to be a copy of Winslow's commissary stores, now lost (see LO 1583). From MANA, Page 239 (excessive colon use is removed for clarity):

"Our Situation at Fort William Henry is, the Provincials in an Intrenched Camp, under the works of the Forts, which are by this time finished, and the Barracks and Store Houses near compleated. they have of Artillery, two 32 pounders, Eight 18 Pounders, two 12 Pounders, Four 6 Pounders, four 4 Pounders, Iron: — Brass, Four 6 Pounders, two 8 Inch Mortars, fourteen Swivels, One 13 Inch Mortar, two 10 Inch Mortars, two 8 Inch Hautsbitzers, and one 7 Inch Hautsbitzer, three 7 Inch Mortars, with a great Quantity of Ammunition."

MacLeod had accompanied Burton and Montresor on the inspections of both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry in August 1756 (LO 1424). This inventory suggests that British 8-inch and 7-inch mortars and howitzers are of different bore sizes. A Return of the Guns & Mortars in Nova Scotia (LO 4394, June 6, 1756) lists two brass 8-inch mortars and one brass 7-inch mortar in the Inventory.

From a description of the Siege of Oswego (1756): *"During the Fire our seven Inch Mortar burst"* (MANA, Page 221). This same usage of 7-inch is found in Winslow's description of the Lake George "navy" (LO 1710; September 5, 1756): *"Our Party Consisting of One Sloop with two Six pounders, One Seven Inch Morter and Eight Swivels fifty men, One Sloop four swivels forty men, One Ditto two Swivels and thirty five men, and Seven Whale Boats Eleven men each."*

There is an incredibly detailed inventory of the ordnance stores at Fort Edward prepared by Flavell Ewings, one of the ordnance clerks (LO 6686). Ewings' Inventory dates to one month after the Siege (September 6, 1757). If the Collins' Inventory for the Siege and Ewings' Inventory are then added to the information found in the Loudoun's Inventory, the logic concludes that Collins' 7 3/4-inch pieces and Loudoun's 7-inch pieces are indeed the same pieces. Williamson reports the loss of a 7-inch mortar on the 4th which had to have been included in Collins' Inventory (Williamson Journal, Final Letter Appendix). Although the 8-inch pieces may be distinct somehow from the 7-inch pieces, the accepted vernacular allowed these 7 3/4-inch pieces to be referred to as being 7-inch — this is what Loudoun, Ord, Williamson, and Winslow did, but Collins did not. Ewings' Inventory indicates the 8-inch mortars at Fort Edward were brass mortars; those at Fort William Henry were iron. Yet the 8-inch howitzers at Fort Edward and the 7-inch howitzer at Fort William Henry were all iron and likely American cast, so any 7-inch reference is not a simple distinction between brass and iron pieces. In Ewings' Inventory, there are two iron 8-inch howitzers and two brass 8-inch mortars at Fort Edward. No howitzer or mortar is described as being 7-inch. Yet there are no 8-inch shells in Ewings' Inventory, but there are 287 shells of 7 3/4-inch. Ewings then flips references and lists 170 shells of 10 inches; Ewings does not identify them as 9 3/4 inches. Although only two inches wider, the shell of the 10-inch mortar weighed 93 pounds, whereas the 7 3/4-inch shells weighed 46 pounds. The 13-inch mortar used shells weighing 200 pounds (empty).

As the howitzers involved here were all iron and used the same 7 3/4-inch shell, one logical explanation is that there were some differences in the size and dimensions between the 8-inch howitzers and the 7-inch howitzers. The barrel bore lengths, wall thickness or powder chambers of the two howitzers might have differed, as would be the case with the mortars. For the 8-inch iron howitzer, Hughes (1969, Page 39) lists only a single 4-foot barrel length with a slight variation in weight of between 2,324 and 2,464 pounds, but this reference appears to be for 19th-century pieces. Muller (1768) only identifies a single 8-inch howitzer at 1,380 pounds, presumably brass. McConnell (1988) identifies two different weights for 8-inch howitzers —1,750 pounds and 1,380 pounds, but these are described as brass pieces with different bore lengths. There is the temptation to reference these 7-inch pieces as "light" howitzers, in the same contrast as the "standard" 5 1/2-inch howitzer and the widely used light 5 1/2-inch howitzer of the Napoleonic period, but there is not enough evidence to do so, and it would be likely wrong. If the confusion is just human "sloppiness", it is exceedingly atypical of the Board of Ordnance.

In the end, it appears that all the 7 3/4-inch mortars and the 7-inch mortars could legitimately be referenced as 8-inch mortars and all three howitzers were 8-inch howitzers. For the pieces in question, there is only a single shell size of 7 3/4-inch for all mortars and howitzers — best confirmed in an examination of Ewings' and Collins' Inventories. Ord's inventory will now balance. Within those groupings, logic would suggest that there had to have been enough variation in the overall bulk, materials, and bore lengths to permit the distinctions between pieces made during Winslow's 1756 Expedition and then independently in Nova Scotia. Seemingly, MacLeod and Loudoun accept these inventories without correction. McConnell (1988, Page 124) identifies two "early" 8-inch iron mortars: one of 2 feet 4 inches (868 pounds) and one of 1 foot 10 inches in length (896 pounds). However, Hughes (1969, Page 37) only identifies a single 8-mortar also of 896 pounds, but 2 feet 1 1/4 inches in length. The situation for howitzers is similar. There is nothing in the literature that suggests two patterns of differing bore lengths. Even the existence of British iron howitzers in the mid-18th century is absent from the standard reference texts including Muller (1768), Hughes (1969), and McConnell (1988). None of these books on artillery referenced here use 7-inch or 7 3/4-inch as identifiers or slang for any mortar or howitzer; all book references are to 8-inch. There is no evidence that the use of 7-inch or 8-inch was an attempt to identify different pieces or characteristics, just inconsistent language strangely common to both British and Americans, officers and clerks. As an attempt to clarify, but remain correct (this author): *In late October 1756, one 13-inch iron mortar, two 10-inch iron mortars, two brass 8-inch mortars, and two 8-inch iron howitzers were moved to Fort Edward from Fort William Henry. This was done at the direction of Lord Loudoun during his visit to Fort William Henry that October. Except for the 13-inch mortar, these pieces remained at Fort Edward through 1757. The 13-inch mortar was sent to Albany; there were only thirty 13-inch shells in Ewings' Inventory of Fort Edward. The three 8-inch iron mortars and an 8-inch iron howitzer remained at Fort William Henry. Two of these iron mortars burst; one was the first piece of artillery to burst on the 4th, one was the last piece to burst, probably on the morning of the 9th, the day of the surrender. One fit iron 8-inch mortar and one fit iron 8-inch howitzer were surrendered to the French.*

There was a recognized need to improve the designs of both mortars and howitzers (Muller 1768, Page 82). At the Siege of Quebec, two batteries of British 13-inch and 10-inch land mortars firing at or beyond maximum range lasted only a few weeks before the mortars proved useless. These land service mortars were quickly augmented with sea service mortars. Taken from bomb ketches, these

mortars were two (iron) or three (brass) times the weight of land service mortars (Hughes 1969, Page 37). By August 29th, only four sea service mortars remained fit (Doughty 1901, Vol. V, Pages 38, 39, and 292). The mechanics were simple. At the moment of firing, cylindrical powder chambers were causing far too much stress on the lower lip of the barrel bore, promoting bursting. Mortar beds were destroyed. As a result, the shape of the powder chamber at the base of the bores was changed. By the late 18th century, the powder chamber internal to mortars was modified to a conical shape reducing stress and increasing durability. Equally important was the clear intent to make pieces of lesser weight by eliminating any excessive metal that did not contribute to the strength or reliability of the piece, but this aim did not extend to large-bore mortars where achieving range was paramount. For much of the 18th century, British mortars would be manufactured as 13-inch, 10-inch, 8-inch, 5 1/2-inch (royal mortar, brass only), and 4 2/5-inch (coehorn mortar, brass only). There is a second source of nomenclatural confusion around mortars. In many diaries and correspondences of the period, the 5 1/2-inch royal mortar is simply referred to as a "royal" without any reference to it being a mortar. As a "royal" is not a cannon, it will not be included on "nickname" lists of cannon that are commonly referenced, so the piece remains unidentified to the reader with the reader incorrectly assuming that the reference is to a cannon. The 5 1/2-inch howitzer is occasionally referenced simply as a "royal", so some care in identification is needed when a piece is simply referenced as a "royal". Forbes had four royal howitzers in his 1758 artillery train (Cubbison 2010, Page 27; extended list of ancillary items connected with the ordnance is on Pages 212-216); Amherst had two royal howitzers in his 1760 train (Cubbison 2014, Page 104). Brass coehorn howitzers were introduced sometime before 1750 (McConnel 1988, Page 137); these pieces would utilize the same 4 2/5-inch shell as a coehorn mortar. Unlike mortars, there were no range differences between brass and iron howitzers of the same caliber. Mounted on carriages that were stressed on firing, a howitzer was limited to a maximum elevation of about 12° — more than enough elevation to fire over the heads and positions of your own troops.

Ewings' inventory of Fort Edward indirectly reflects on the inventory at Fort William Henry —there are only seven 32-pound shot and no 12-pound shot in the inventory, either round shot or grapeshot. As such, it can be assumed that all the 32-pound shot and 12-pound shot, still at Fort Edward at the end of 1755, was eventually moved north to Fort William Henry (Ordnance Table, Page 116). This increased the available 32-pound shot to at least 220 rounds and the 12-pound shot to at least 300 rounds. Though some of this shot was expended during Rigaud's Raid, these numbers were a great improvement when compared to the 1755 stores. Webb sending the two light 12-pounders to reinforce Fort William Henry did not weaken Fort Edward. No 12-pounders had been positioned previously at Fort Edward until the arrival of these light 12-pounders earlier in that year, so there was no meaningful store of 12-pound shot in Fort Edward's magazines that could have been used in case of a siege. The French list 35,835 pounds of gunpowder as being surrendered at FWH, some 528 barrels (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 626). Over 2,300 solid shot and some 545 shells are also listed as being captured. None of the shot sizes are identified and the shell sizes are nearly all for pieces that Loudoun had withdrawn the previous October. The large amount of gunpowder surrendered was Winslow's powder stores for the previous year's planned assault on Carillon and Fort Saint-Frédéric. Unfortunately, the detailed ordnance inventory of Fort Edward conducted by Ewings, 8-pages in length, does not contain any references to the actual powder stores, so it is not possible to make a comparison or determine if the powder stores at Fort William Henry were balanced to the quantity of shot and shells (LO 6686). At Oswego (1756), the French claimed 23,000 pounds of gunpowder were surrendered (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 522).

In regards the Siege, no one seems to have questioned the cause of such a high rate of bursting among the artillery pieces. One day into the Siege, August 4th, Adam Williamson writes to Monro: "*The Mortar on the North Bastion is burst to pieces which is replaced by a Howitzer. An Eighteen pounder on the East Bastion is split at the muzzle & extremely Honeycomb'd, which I think would be dangerous to fire, so will replace it with a Nine pounder.*" (LO 4061; Hughes 2011, Page 183). This repeated bursting would seem to be an obvious focus, but it attracts no comment or speculation, even those critical of the British Army or in the provincial newspapers. No British officer, of any rank or at any time, offers any derisive comment of the performance of the artillery or the quality of the artillery with one exception. In LO 5309 (November 1st), Monro simply writes: "*The Artillery in the Fort, was In very bad Condition. from the beginning*". Had Loudoun knowingly moved the highest quality mortars to Fort Edward? We know Loudoun did have the two largest mortars (10-inch) and the only two brass mortars (8-inch) transferred to Fort Edward. The two burst iron 8-inch mortars might have been of American manufacture, but no one offers this statement.

The loss of at least five iron cannon to bursting during the Siege was probably due to a combination of poor maintenance and abuse by the gunners, but neglect was likely the key factor. Left to the elements without any care, guns would age resulting in a weakened honeycomb barrel, rust, and the loss of metal. If maintained and the bore kept dry, the service life on a gun could approach 100 years. Wet bores, especially when subjected to freeze-thaw cycles, were problematic. Powder vents needed to be sealed. Deep snows required bore caps (tompions), but the cap had to allow drainage out of the gun. Water could not be allowed to pool in the barrel or breech. Nearly all the colonial governors requested new artillery be sent from England because of the hundreds of cannon that had been sent to the colonies, few had been maintained (Pargellis 1933, Page 322). For the 1757 Campaign against Louisbourg, Loudoun asks that a new artillery train be sent including siege guns, even though in January 1757, Loudoun reported 182 cannon and 33 mortars including sixty-five 24-pounders in the Nova Scotia inventory (LO 4394). Interestingly, there are no 18-pounders. Loudoun lacks the needed siege mortars, only four of his mortars were 8-inch or larger (reported as 7-inch mortars) but fears the 24-pounders were rotten and would soon fail. From Loudoun to Cumberland, January 5th, 1757 (LO 2637 and MANA, Page 293):

"On a full Enquiry, I find almost all the 24^{lb} (pounders) in this Country, are either at Newfoundland, laying without carriages or Men to fight them; or at Annapolis Royal, where I suppose they are not much better; or at Halifax: there I dare not meddle with them, but the truth is, almost the whole of Iron Guns in this Country are Honey Combed and rotten; having lain in the Dirt many Years, without the least Care. As this is the Case, I shall make all Preparation in my Power, but do most humbly beg, Your Royal Highness will consider our Situation; for I am sure, if you do not Protect & Support us, none else will; And if my Plan is approved of, Cannon will be absolutely necessary."

Gun inspection was not limited to a simple visual assessment. The outside of an iron gun might appear sound, covered in thick paint, while the interior bore might be highly degraded with appreciable loss of both metal and strength. The inspection of long-guns required specialized training and tools to examine and probe the full length of the bore. However, the evidence suggests additional complications. In April 1755, Johnson and Banyar had seen Braddock's siege train while in Alexandria, so Johnson had at least a rudimentary idea of what was needed to form a train (Johnson Papers, Volume I, Page 520). Johnson then tackles his most pressing problem and focuses on getting new gun carriages made, not on the guns themselves (Johnson Papers, Volume 1, Pages 504, 510, 611,

and others); these carriages had limbers and extensive ironwork (Page 725). Even for the 32- and 18-pounders, it seems that Johnson's carriages were tall-wheel, double-bracket carriages — not garrison carriages. Traveling pull-weights could easily approach four or five tons. In September 1757, there were five traveling carriages and four garrison carriages for the eight 18-pounders in the Fort Edward Inventory (LO 6686). The large bore guns at Fort William Henry could have been on either traveling or garrison carriages or a mix; there is no way to be certain, but the missing commissary inventories from Winslow's 1756 Expedition might provide some hints.

Arriving at Albany in mid-June, Eyre had the opportunity to do a critical inspection of some of the artillery before the guns were moved north, but there is no correspondence that he actually reported on their condition to Johnson (see MANA, Page 128, July 27, 1755). Of the six 18-pounders then available, only two were moved north, so there may well have been a culling of the heavy guns by Eyre (Johnson Papers, Volume 1, Page 789). Only long-guns are included in these last two inventories, no howitzers or mortars. In the case of howitzers, one or two pieces were shipped by boat from New England. These pieces arrived at Albany later that summer. It seems that the howitzer traveled north behind and separately from the bulk of the artillery train. In 1756, Winslow would be tasked with moving eight additional 18-pounders from Albany. In total, Johnson's Expedition was only able to move some twenty pieces of artillery to Lake George, including one 13-inch mortar, two 8-inch brass mortars, two 8-inch iron mortars, and one iron 8-inch howitzer. This last gun burst at the Battle of Lake George (see Page 116, Ordnance Table). At least seven of the pieces were 6-pounders, including three guns that were positioned at Fort Edward in December. Eyre knew the value of mortars and howitzers to a siege and would have transported any that were available. With the loss of a howitzer in September, Johnson probably had only five pieces that fired shell. Winslow planned for eleven shell pieces.

In Summer 1757, Loudoun took at least twenty-two artillery pieces from New York with him to Nova Scotia, but none of these pieces seem to have any connection to Fort Edward or Fort William Henry — four light brass 12-pounders, ten brass 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and four 8-inch howitzers (Pargellis 1933, Page 233). Loudoun may also have brought ten 5 1/2-inch mortars and fifteen 4 2/5-inch cohorn mortars to Halifax. All these pieces arrived at New York in mid-August 1756. The four light brass 12-pounders were being brought to Louisbourg not as siege guns, but for camp defense (MANA, Page 350). The existing inventory in Nova Scotia was all iron guns except for five brass 6-pounders, two 8-inch brass mortars, one brass 7-inch mortar, four brass 5 1/2-inch mortars, and nineteen brass 4 2/5-inch cohorn mortars (LO 4394). Loudoun knew artillery was being sent to Halifax from England, but he may or may not have known the composition or numbers. Pitt was sending an additional eighteen heavy brass 24-pounders, twelve heavy brass 12-pounders, four light brass 6-pounders, four royal 5 1/2-inch howitzers, two 13-inch mortars, two 10-inch mortars, four 8-inch mortars and thirty cohorn mortars (4 2/5-inch). Had Loudoun known the size of the artillery train being sent from England, he could have significantly augmented the artillery at both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry by transferring these New York pieces to Webb. The four 8-inch howitzers could have proved particularly useful.

Swivel guns had a bore diameter of up to two inches but were often much less. They fired either solid shot of less than one pound or "partridge" shot. A 1.25-inch swivel gun would fire a solid shot of 1/4 pound. The value of swivel guns should not be underrated. Nearly all, if not all, the 17 available swivel guns were fitted to the 1756 "navy". Half the swivel guns were assigned to the larger *"Earl of*

Loudoun" and the other half was split between the two smaller sloops. If more swivel guns had been available, the two smaller sloops may have been able to mount even more guns. Whaleboats used to patrol Lake George are often depicted with a swivel gun mounted on the bow. Yet the largest swivel guns could become far too heavy and too awkward to use in many applications. Recoil was a definite consideration and the guns had to be appropriately mounted and the stanchion and brackets reinforced. Swivel guns were versatile, easy to employ, and economical in terms of gunpowder stores, but the fire was not as accurate as a 3- or 4-pound cannon. In defending a fortification, the longer reach of a swivel gun over musket fire was welcomed, but wallpieces served a similar function. A wallpiece was musket-like but significantly upscaled with a larger bore and much longer range, three or four times the effective range of a musket. Wallpieces were too heavy to be utilized in hand and had to be stabilized with a yoke and pivot, the pivot being inserted into the holes drilled into the top of the surrounding walls. The increased accuracy of wallpieces over swivel guns was their chief advantage, but they were awkward to handle and time-consuming to load. Lt. Colonel George Williamson of the Royal Artillery describes British wallpieces as weighing just over 35 pounds with a barrel length of 4-1/2 feet and a bore of 0.91 inches (LO 6683; September 4, 1757). Ewings' Inventory of Fort Edward lists four wallpieces as being in the stores (LO 6686). Sent from Europe, Braddock's artillery train included ten wallpieces. Though Montcalm's entrenchment at the Battle of Carillon in 1758 lacked cannon, ample wallpieces mounted on the breastwork gave considerable range to the French fire (Campbell 2010, Page 95).

In November 1757, James Montresor writes to Loudoun as regards Fort Edward (LO 4754): *"That in the Traverse of the N. West Bastion be well supplied with Wallpieces, much better than Swivels which are there at present, and the Shells now at Fort Edward which have no Mortars for them to be kept ready loaded, for Rolling, in case of being brusqued and at hand."* Having the Chief Engineer in North America advising that "unusable" mortar shells be fully loaded and stockpiled so that they could be rolled downhill into the perimeter ditch or down the glacis slope to the outside of the ditch was either brilliant or bizarre or both. Further on in the letter, Montresor describes "mining" the glacis with packed 13-inch shells (fuse boxes).

The shallow draft bateaux were key to moving ordnance on Lake George and Lake Champlain. Both the British and French built bateaux. These boats were flat-bottomed, double-ended. The dimensions of the bateaux varied between location, nationality, and need. Anywhere between 24-32 feet long with a maximum width of 6.0 or 7.0 feet would have been common, but they could be narrower, less than 4 feet wide. Tough oak planks on the bottoms, hardwood frames and ends, but lighter weight woods used on the sides. Because of the rough open waters of Lake George and Lake Champlain, the British bateaux on these lakes were often at the very large end of the scale with gunwale heights of about 34 inches. The construction of these bateaux would have been profitable winter work that would have been embraced by the colonials. Prices paid would be set for different sized boats. In 1755, William Johnson was paying £9 for the larger boats, £7 for a medium bateau, and £5 for a smaller bateau. (Papers of William Johnson, Vol. I, August 6, 1755, Page 839).

At considerable cost, the British would employ thousands of colonials during the war under John Bradstreet in the "Bateaux Service". In 1756, Shirley first authorized the Service at 2,000 men. Just for 1756, the cost was approximately £50,000 sterling (Godfrey 1982, Page 91). By Spring 1756, the condition of supply was critical at Oswego, but the very capable Bradstreet managed to successfully conduct the resupply. Besides Oswego, Winslow's Expedition needed support. The cost of supplying

both Oswego and Winslow continued to rise, but Shirley's funds were exhausted. By September, logistics and supplies at both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry were not good (LO 1710; Winslow to Loudoun, September 5, 1756). Soon after Loudoun arrived in America, the debts accumulated by Shirley loom and drain much of Loudoun's contingent fund. Bradstreet requested and received £9,000 from Abercromby and Loudoun to settle the debts and wages of the Bateaux Service (LO 1536; August 7, 1756, three of the invoices). Loudoun then antagonizes many of the merchants by refusing to pay the debts accumulated by Shirley without the necessary receipt vouchers, some £14,000 for provisions (Pargellis 1933, Page 139). Where there was a question of Shirley's authority to spend monies, Loudoun refused payment. Shirley's debts would not be untangled for years. Loudoun's 1757 Campaign was not as dependent on bateaux and the Service was dissolved. A decidedly reluctant Abercromby would have the Bateaux Service restored in 1758, the high cost being Abercromby's chief concern. The timeframe established by Pitt for the 1758 Ticonderoga Campaign forced this decision.

For an expedition requiring hundreds of bateaux, the bateaux had to be built before the start of the campaign. Otherwise, the bulk of a campaign season would simply be used for their construction. Besides building the three-sloop "navy", Winslow employed many of his men camped at Lake George in the construction of bateaux, but these preparations cost all of June through August (1756). Abercromby would have 900 bateaux as part of his 1758 Ticonderoga Expedition (Bellico 2010, Page 143). The vast majority, if not all, of these bateaux were built away from Lake George and "marched" to the Lake. There is a distinct possibility that at least some bateaux could have been "recycled" from Johnson to Winslow to Abercromby.

Bateaux were subject to quick rot and required constant maintenance, primarily caulking. Bailing was routine. The largest and strongest bateaux could transport up to three tons, but cargo placement and security were key. Smaller bateaux would haul less than half that weight. When needed, two bateaux were secured to each other and planks would be placed bridging the two bateaux, the construction of a raised raft. In the open waters of Lake George and Lake Champlain, large cannon were moved via rafted bateaux, not with single boats. This was true for both the French and British (Bougainville Journal, Page 156). Though simple construction, the building of bateaux still took time. A team of fifty skilled workmen would only be able to manufacture between fifteen and eighteen bateaux per week, dependent on the sizes of the boats needed. From the Bouquet Papers, Volume 2, Page 529:

ESTIMATE FOR BUILDING BATEAUX

Six Men in two Days turns off a Battoe 24 Foot long 1 Man to flitch Knees — 1 Sawyer for Plank — to make 2 Battoes in two Days - 14 Carpenters and 2 Sawyers — and to make six Battoes in two Days requires 44 Ship Carpenters, six Sawyers — allowing 2 to cork 1 Barrel of Pitch and 100 Gross Weight of Oakum with cork 13 Battoes.

Loyal Hannon 20th Sep^r 1758.

*Harry Gordon
Chief-Engineer*

N. They must bring their Axes and Adzes and Gimblets.

A more thorough discussion of bateaux and whaleboats is found in Andrews 2015, Volume 2, Pages 407-409. Bateaux are described as heavier and tougher than whaleboats. Whaleboats were some 34 feet in length, 28 feet in keel, 5-feet 2-inches broad, and 25-inches deep, seven oars plus the steering oar, made light to promote speed. Amherst never describes whaleboats as having swivel guns.

Notes on Fortifications: Fortifications have two principal attributes, defensive character and logistics. Defensive character is the more entertaining to explore, but logistical support is often the most important aspect. Forts served as staging points for offensive expeditions, raiding parties, and intelligence gathering. The value of a fort would often be determined by how well a position could support such operations. Barrack space, dry warehouse space, drinking water, and secure gunpowder stores were central issues. Depending on the circumstance, how many loaves of bread could be produced in the bake ovens per day may well be more important than how many cannon were present. This was certainly true in the Lake Champlain Valley during the 1750s.

Laying out a bastion fortification followed established principles that had been formulated into various methodologies. Following whichever methodology was selected, the sharp lines and angles of the bastion were the result, not the reverse. The methodologies relied on first determining the distances between the various bastion tips. Then simple ratios based on this distance were used to determine the other elements and a pattern of intercepting lines was used to establish the positions and orientation for each turn in the trace. For example, the length of the face of a bastion was $\frac{2}{7}$ of the overall distance between the corresponding bastion tips. The angle of the face was determined by establishing the midpoint between the bastion tips; then for a 4-sided fort, moving inside $\frac{1}{8}$ that distance and developing the needed intercepting lines using that location. The rules were few and were not complicated. The methodologies were very flexible in that uneven sides, angles, and rough ground did not represent a problem or cause any change to the methodology. An engineering tool, a Plain Table, would be used to stake the perimeter dimensions. Once the locations of all the bastion tips were known, the methodology was simple and very straightforward; the resulting pattern was repeatable and predictable. Lacking a plain table, the methodologies of intercepting lines had been so well developed that the only angles that needed to be established in the field were all 90° . As Fort William Henry was rectangular, only four corner stakes were needed to establish the resulting perimeter, the methodology did all the rest. There are several different methodologies or schools for tracing the perimeter of a bastion fortification each resulting in slightly different outlines with slightly different angles. But by the mid-1700s, a simple square or rectangular "textbook" bastion fort would approach the following: the tip of each bastion forms a 60° angle; the flank and curtain wall meet at a 100° , 105° , or 110° — this is the key design angle; and the shoulders of the bastion where the face and flank intercept would then follow at 115° or 120° . To limit exposing the flanks to enemy fire, Vauban strongly favored 100° at the flank and curtain. Again, these values are all derived from the methodology itself, not directly establishing these angles. Fort William Henry followed the conventions of the methodology. Fort Carillon did not (Laramie 2012, Pages 223 - 235 and Page 385).

References to orientation and positions at William Henry can be awkward, the long axis of the Bastion was not orientated to one of the cardinal directions. The individual bastions can be referenced as North (or Northwest); East (or Northeast); West (or Southwest) and South (or Southeast). The South Bastion is the furthest from the French batteries and the only bastion not subject to direct fire from the French artillery. Often, the wall along the lakeshore is referenced as the North Wall and then the other wall orientations and names follow that convention. Barrack names followed this convention. Simply put, there are two different naming conventions, one for the individual bastions, and another for the walls and barracks, but following those two naming conventions was not universal. In a few references, including the Collins' Narrative, walls can be

referenced as Northeast (or North), Southeast (or East); Southwest (or South), and Northwest (or West).

The walls at Fort William Henry met the standard minimum length of 300 feet. Total wall heights were only between 12 and 15 feet – squat and stable with a 30-foot-wide base. In Figure 1, the wall length averages 300 feet per side. This is the classic and often used illustration of Fort William Henry. Using the As-Built Plan (Figure 2), the wall lengths average about 315 feet with the shortest being the north wall along Lake George at about 280 feet. When referenced to Figure 1, the east wall of Figure 2 is longer by about 55 feet and the south wall by about 25 feet. The north and west walls scale within 10 feet of each other. The length of the east wall is made equivalent in length to the west. As a simple paper exercise, the methodology for laying out a bastion fort would easily accommodate these differences, only a single corner stake needs to be moved. The larger dimensions seen in the As-Built Plan are divided between the bastions and the parade ground, not all of it is absorbed into the parade ground. Although still rectangular, the "squared" up construction allows for a much bigger parade ground. Comparing the two drawings, the western facing elements match — those elements opposing the French artillery. Any differences in the individual bastions between the two drawings are mainly to the elements facing east, particularly the south bastion. The locations for the gun embrasures in Figure 1 are wrong, especially in reference to the west curtain wall and the tip embrasures of the bastions.

Recognized minimum wall lengths for fortifications changed based on the evolution of technologies. The increase in the range of rifled muskets over smoothbore muskets allowed for longer curtain walls between the adjacent bastions. In 1759, the British replaced France's Fort Saint-Frédéric with the much larger Crown Point, a pentagon fort with wall lengths averaging 450 feet. Fort Independence in Boston Harbor is 350 feet per side (1830's). By the time of the American Civil War, the recognized minimum wall length for a fortification had been increased from 300 feet to 375 feet and the maximum from 500 feet to 750 feet. This increase in the minimum dimensions greatly eased the logistics and garrison overcrowding.

In many European sieges, much of the defending infantry was arrayed along the outer lip of the perimeter ditch, and not on the walls of the fortification. This location was called the covered way, where the perimeter ditch meets the glacis. Essentially, the covered way would function as the front wall of a trench and be stabilized with planking, not dissimilar to a World War I trench. With the glacis being a smooth manufactured slope, clear of obstructions, depressions, or any cover, the infantry positioned here would have a clear field of fire while having the protection of the ditch. This moved the defending infantry well forward of the walls. At the end of their "shift", the men would then move back behind the walls. Holding the covered way was the key to the defense, particularly of a walled city, and as a result, Europeans were very exact when constructing both the ditch and glacis. Ditches could be wet, dry, or a mix. Following standard protocols, defensive features and small earthworks would be placed internal to the ditch itself. Great care was taken to ensure that any communication paths that crossed the ditch between the main fort and the covered way were safe and well protected. At Fort William Henry, the covered way was not contested, and no troops were positioned there. The ditch itself was a formidable obstacle being 8-foot deep and 30-foot wide with a small palisade wall in the center (Figure 1, Page 3). This low height palisade wall was yet another obstruction to the attacking infantry trying to scale the rampart.

In North America, the garrisons and forts themselves were too small to defend both the covered way and the walls, the logistics and manpower would not allow it. In Europe, the fight for the covered way was often the bloodiest element in a siege, infantry against infantry. Once the attacking force secured the covered way, it was expected that the defenders would surrender, otherwise, there would be a bloodbath. If you surrendered earlier, the defenders might not receive honors. At Oswego, Montcalm did not grant honors to the defending British because of the feeble performance of the British, but he did at Fort William Henry. Yet, according to the Williamson Journal, Montcalm offered Monro "all the honors of war" on August 3rd, the first day of the Siege. If Monro had then surrendered, Montcalm would have gained the maximum war "booty" without having to sacrifice any of his own limited logistics or men. Unlike the British, Montcalm knew he could not readily replace any lost men.

Besides designing Fort William Henry, William Eyre left detailed instructions concerning the defense of the position (Sullivan 1922; Papers of Sir William Johnson, Vol. II, November 25, 1755, Pages 328 - 332). After commanding the fort during the Winter of 1756/1757, Eyre writes Loudoun advising that the palisade walls surrounding Fort William Henry be completed with particular attention to the east and that passages leading to the interior magazines be bricked or stoned (LO 3728; May 29, 1757). Apparently, these minor changes were made that summer by Monro. Eyre also advises that the storehouse outside the north wall be razed. In August 1756, Montresor had ordered the construction of this storehouse; it was not Eyre's handiwork. After the experience of Rigaud's Winter Raid (March 1757), Eyre now considered it a distinct liability; the fear being that if the storehouse caught fire and being only a few feet away from the north wall, any fire would quickly spread to the interior of the Bastion. On orders from James Montresor, this storehouse was demolished just before the arrival of the French. At this same time, Montresor orders that sandbags be placed on top of the timber roofs over the magazines to further increase the level of protection.

About 80 yards south of Fort William Henry, there was a small advance work connected by a depressed path. This advance work is shown in Figure 2 and measured about 120 feet by 120 feet and opened to the rear, a lunette. Eyre now recommends that the advance work be made more secure by fully closing the rear, transforming the work into a redoubt. Eyre thought this work had a distinct value – "*Field pieces may be used here advantageously*" (Figure 2, Page 5, Note V). Although Eyre advised that this defensive feature be retained, Montresor had the advance work razed and the ground leveled the week before the Siege (Montresor Journals, Page 24 and reference MANA, Page 177). The inherent danger with advance works at this distance was that they could be occupied by the attacking force and used as shelter. Equipped with 6-pounders, this advance work might well have proved annoying to the French militia and the Indian allies positioned in an arc to the south, forcing the encirclement into a broader ring. At the same time, if lost in battle, the casualties to the British might have been high. Eyre warns that if threatened, the advanced work should be abandoned. If retained, the advance work could not have impacted the French trench work or their artillery batteries in any way or delayed the surrender; however, the livestock losses that occurred with the arrival of the French may not have happened and the sniper line would have been driven back from the south wall of the Bastion. Montcalm would not have assaulted the position and suffered needless losses that could not be replaced. In all probability, Montcalm would have simply pulled backed some additional distance to the south and warned his soldiers and Indian allies to stay well clear of the position. Montcalm had no interest in sniping duels or their inevitable casualties.

Ideally, any fort would be constructed to take advantage of the surrounding topography. This was done by rotating the fort's orientation to maximize the defensive character while forcing the attacking trench network into the poorest alignment. The defense would want to have as many different gun embrasures focused on the attacking trench network as possible. From the defensive perspective, compelling an attack against a curtain wall was preferred. The attacker would favor targeting the most exposed and vulnerable bastion from an orientation that would expose the trench network to fire from the fewest defending guns possible. This was true at William Henry with the centerline of the north bastion being the focus of the French attack. To European professionals, this was a simple straightforward textbook operation, bordering on the mundane.

For clarification, fortification elements can be referenced by structure or by position. Many names are restricted to elements inside the perimeter of the covered way and ditch. A similar structure detached from the fort proper would have a different name. Adding to the confusion, various nationalities would utilize the terms slightly differently. A ravelin is always positioned in front of a curtain wall within the ditch; it is often referred to as a demi-lune, but never as a counterguard. French usage would favor demi-lune; British ravelin. Works that would be positioned in front of an individual bastion within the ditch would be called a counterguard or even a demi-lune, but not a ravelin; here counterguard would be favored as it better denotes position. A true counterguard would be a second bastion in front of the main bastion, but much lesser structures have been called counterguards if they are positioned in front of a bastion or another salient angle and within the ditch; an inverted V sitting in front of a second inverted V, but all elements are contained within the ditch. The outer structure would be lower in elevation than the inner structure but serve to protect the main structure from direct artillery fire and as a fallback position for any infantry defending the covered way and the ditch. At Carillon, Lotbiniere hoped to have a counterguard constructed in front of the northwest bastion.

The simplest structure is the redan, a V-shape work having a protective parapet on the rear slope. A lunette is a redan with the addition of two flanks positioned to the sides that point to the rear. With a lunette, the interior space itself is open to the rear – walls only to the front and sides. A redoubt is a smaller independent work that is enclosed but without bastions. To avoid problems in nomenclature, positions some distance outside the main fort could simply be referenced as an advance work or outwork, as Eyre and Montresor did at Fort William Henry (a lunette).

Each individual bastion would have two long walls, termed faces, and two shorter walls, termed flanks. The flanks connect to the curtain walls. To determine the "textbook" approach for the enemy trenching at Fort William Henry, simply connect the south bastion tip to the north bastion tip in a straight line and then extend that straight line toward the French position. The first phase of the attacking trenches would then zig-zag around this line. At this phase, the attacker would avoid adopting a trench network perpendicular to the axis of any curtain wall. Terrain considerations would then modify the position of the approaching trenches or shift the orientation slightly, but if possible, the trenching would adhere closely to this line. Very few embrasures within the fort would have the needed orientation to fire on the approaching trenches, thus the value of the arching fire of mortars and howitzers. Few, if any, embrasures on the curtain walls would have had the necessary views to fire on the trench network. Attacking batteries to the sides of the trench axis would be more exposed to defensive fire (Figure 5B, Page 20). In the later stages of the siege, there

would be a shift to allow placement of breaching batteries opposite a curtain wall, but most of the opposing gun embrasures would have been destroyed or dismantled by this time.

Outside of Figure 2, the single most complete description of Fort William Henry was written by Harry Gordon (*Remarks on Forts William Henry and Edward by Harry Gordon*, in *Military Affairs in North America* —MANA, Page 177). Gordon was a staff engineer under Montresor and had been wounded at the Monongahela. Gordon suggests a series of improvements, including the construction of a ravelin along the western wall:

"Fort William Henry is situated at the South End of Lake George formerly called Lake St Sacrement— It is a Work that consists of 4 Bastions with intermediate Curtains—and a Ditch eight foot deep and about thirty wide from the North-West Bastion to the South East one. The work of the Ramparts and Parapets is faced with large Logs of Timber bound together with smaller ones. The Rampart is in most Places fifteen Foot broad on the Curtains—the Bastions are filled up—The Parapets are, in the Faces of the Bastions most exposed, from twelve to eighteen Foot thick, and on the Curtains from twelve to fifteen— The Rampart is between ten and eleven Foot high and the Parapets from five to five and a half— There are Barracks for between three and four hundred Men— A Casemate under the left Flank of the South East Bastion, and another under the East Curtain. Likewise a Magazine under the N. E. Bastion towards the Lake and another smaller under the N. W. Bastion.

This Fort stands upon a high sand Bank twenty Foot above the Lake which covers one Front— A Morass another which winds within fifty yds of the third; so that an Attack cannot be well carried against any but the Western Front. There is rising Ground about 300 Yards distance before the South West Bastion which rises to between sixteen and eighteen Foot higher than the Ground stands upon— likewise the rising ground across the morass is higher.

In order to strengthen this Fort it is necessary to raise the Faces exposed to the rising Grounds three Foot higher— to cover and defend the South West Bastion and Curtain, from the Batteries an Enemy might raise upon the rising Ground, so as not to be battered in breach from thence— To effect this a ravelin ought to be raised before the said Curtain and a Countergarde before the S. W. Bastion. A Communication ought to be made to the Ravelin— which ought to be sunk under the Curtain to come out at the bottom of the Ditch— and to cross it by a Caponiere (protected path or trench) with steps up to ascend the Ravelin— a covered Way palisadoed ought to be carried from the left Face of the Counterguard to a detached Redoubt, made last Year, very properly to scour the Bank above the Morass which was not seen by the Fort—This Redoubt for Want of Communication being properly secured, is at present insuitable, but may be made very necessary to scour the left Face of the Countergarde.

These proposed Works will entirely cover the exposed Front of the Fort (and without them a Breach may soon be made without shifting the Batteries from the rising Ground — but if these Works are added the Enemy must first destroy them and afterwards make their Batteries in them to make a Breach in the Bastions. A Casement should be made under the left face of the Ravelin which cannot be battered but obliquely. The covered Way will serve for a small retrenched Camp, or a Cover for Magazines of Provisions &^{ca}.....

As to the Works to be added to Fort William Henry — they seem to me so necessary for a Defense — that without them the Enemy can in one Night open Trenches make a Battery within 280 Yards of the Bastion which entirely commands it and which without shifting may soon make a Breach."

Here Gordon is suggesting a ravelin in front of the west curtain wall between the north and west bastions and a covering structure in front of the west bastion (a counterguard), similar to the approach taken by Lotbiniere at Fort Carillon. Eyre's lunette would be made into a redoubt and retained to protect the Counterguard. Unfortunately, Gordon does not include much, if any, detail about the interior of the fort or any of its buildings.

Often not appreciated is the limitation of fixed gun embrasures. The field of fire from each gun of these embrasures was restricted to about 22.5° of arc, four embrasures would be needed to cover 90° — neat, orderly, and very textbook, but individually narrow. As so few embrasures might have the proper orientation to fire on an approaching trench work targeting the tip of a bastion, fitting two or more gun embrasures into each flank was strongly preferred. Due to the likely position and orientation of the attacking trench work, the defensive strength of any of these individual bastions was very dependent on the adjacent bastions. At Fort William Henry, the east and west bastions defended the north bastion, the point of the French attack. One of the highly valued 18-pounders was positioned in the east bastion, presumably in the flank. Although slightly farther away from the French than the north or west bastion, this location provided one of the better firing lines on the approaching trench works (Figure 5B, Page 20). When this 18-pounder burst on the 4th, it was replaced with a 9-pounder. At this point in the Siege, the more numerous 6-pounders did not have the needed range to accurately fire on the approaching trench work. Although the focus of the attack and having only a few embrasures that could actually fire on the approaching trenches, the north bastion was ideal for positioning the indirect fire of mortars and howitzers. When the first mortar burst in the north bastion on the 4th, it was immediately replaced by the single howitzer.

In many forts, the number of cannon would be far fewer than the number of gun embrasures. When needed, cannon could quickly be moved to the embrasures having the proper orientation. At Carillon, only two of the flank gun embrasures were oriented to oppose what would be the obvious trench positions, thus the vital need for the additional ravelins. Individual embrasures could be constructed on oblique angles to the wall or even at the tip of a bastion, but the firing arc was still restricted to about 22.5° (Reference Figure 2 and Figure 6A). Being the As-built Plan by Eyre, Figure 2 is more authoritative on the positions of the gun embrasures and shows tip embrasures in both the north and west bastions. The tip embrasure in the north bastion was undoubtedly one of the first targets of the French artillery. By the end of the 18th century, the limitations of embrasures were so irksome that various traversing and raised gun platforms were developed to fire over the top of the parapets, *en barbette*. This method of gun placement was optional, not a rule.

Parapet thickness was determined by anticipating the caliber of the enemy's artillery. These values were well established and based on shot penetration tables for the variously sized guns plus a safety factor. Different aspects of a fortification could have differing parapet dimensions. As such, narrow parapets with cannon embrasures might be placed on some aspects to guard against an infantry assault, but only where there was no fear of facing heavy artillery. Against 6-pounders, the recommended minimum thickness for an earthen parapet would be around six feet, whereas it would be near fourteen feet for defending against 12-pounders. For field fortifications, a 14- or 15-foot

earth parapet was the recognized standard and conforms to the width of the parapets at Fort William Henry. Solid stone parapets were common to coastal fortifications not facing "parked" siege guns and could be smaller at 6-9 feet thick (Duffy 2006, Page 54). Other authorities set the minimum for a stone parapet at four-foot thick (Davis 1813, Page 131), but now without any safety factor. Stoned works were innately hazardous because of the potential for flying shards. This is why many parapets in Europe were faced in stone and then backfilled with stone-free soil and grass-topped. Another drawback of solid stone was the sizable expense of their construction. Against true siege guns, an 18- or 20-foot-wide parapet was standard even if faced in stone and then earth packed, wider was too costly to construct. Regardless, repeated strikes of undersized artillery could defeat a properly sized and well-constructed parapet. Early in a siege, the attacking artillery was too far away to breach the walls. At this stage, the attacker would often train an entire battery on a single defending embrasure until that embrasure or gun was destroyed or dismounted; and only then move to engage the next embrasure in a very systematic and deliberate fashion. Flank embrasures were often the hardest to target. To obscure intentions and limit casualties from sniping, parapet heights were typically six or seven foot tall and wooden shutters would be mounted on the inside of the embrasures that could simply be closed and the guns backed out or even moved. Larger European ramparts could exceed 60 feet in width, 20 feet in parapet plus terrepleins much wider than described here, 44 foot wide being textbook, leaving room for cart paths beyond the gun runs. Duffy (2006) provides an excellent overview of period fortifications.

Brick was a favored building material for a fortification. Brick had a much greater lifespan than timber as it was not subject to rot and did not burn. Not being as hard as most stone, impact damage to a brick surface was typically limited to a relatively small area. Hard stone was subject to fracturing, often extending the damaged area. With brick, the damage was easy to repair. Brick was much cheaper than stone; no rock quarries were involved, and brick was universally available. In many European fortifications, a mix of stone and brick would be used depending on the application. The hardness and quality of the bricks varied depending on the materials and the manufacturing techniques. The strength of either a brick or stone wall was very dependent on the quality of the mortar. In wilderness settings, poor quality mortar was a real and reoccurring problem. A French officer suggested that the four-story-tall artillery tower at Fort St. Frederic on Lake Champlain could withstand only four impacts before collapsing (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 707). The mortar had not been maintained.

The amount of interior space within a fort determined much of that fort's character. The more interior room, the easier it was on the logistics — barracks, storehouses, and workshops. This was equally true for earth-filled bastions, simple wooden stockades, or where both were used in combination — e.g., earth-filled bastions in each corner, but stockade curtain walls. If inadequate in size, the role of the fort could be reduced to little more than a somewhat secure camp and limited supply depot, requiring near constant resupply, better referenced as a post. Less secure outbuildings would be needed. When part of a supply chain, fields for hay and fodder would often surround a fort. However, there was much more flexibility associated with the exterior dimensions and features. The needed thickness of any earth-filled exterior wall or gun embrasure was dependent on what artillery would have been expected to be used against it. Where no opposing artillery was expected, earth-filled walls were not necessary, but still had considerable defensive value. Fort Loudoun at Winchester, Virginia was designed by George Washington, a 1756-1758 construction window. It served as the command center for the defense of the colony from raiding parties coming from the

west, supporting a chain of smaller satellite posts. It was a square bastion, \approx 240 feet per side, 14 small-bore cannon. The earth-filled walls were only some 18-foot thick, not 30 foot, but the interior dimension was \approx 135 x 135 feet, rampart edge to rampart edge, so the functionality was maintained (See Page 1). It was a formidable target for any raiding party, but still open to a *coup de main*. Compared to many stockade forts, these dimensions are impressive, but a plot 135 x 135 feet is only 0.42 acres, a 100-foot x 100-foot plot is only 0.23 acres. A typical single-story barracks (100 ft x 19 ft) could accommodate about 140 rank and file. The seemingly common 60 x 60-foot stockades were very limited with an interior space less than 0.1 acres. Outside the central stockade, low-height perimeter "walls" would be constructed in zig-zag patterns allowing for defensive musketry.

a. Carillon

Fort Carillon was started in Fall 1755, as was Fort William Henry. The British raced to finish Fort William Henry and it was defensible within two months. The French engineer, Lt. Michel Chartier de Lotbiniere, adopted an approach and design knowing that it would take years to complete. Lotbiniere was under the protection of the Governor General of Canada, Pierre de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil. Vaudreuil's wife was Lotbiniere's aunt. Although Lotbiniere attended school in France for at least three years, he was dismissively recognized as a "Colonial Engineer". It is clear that Lotbiniere's design would not have withstood a review by seasoned military engineers of the French regular army (Royal Corps of Engineers), but Montcalm and his staff had yet to arrive in Canada. In 1755, the work proceeded but only slowly.

The inexperienced Lotbiniere ended up designing Fort Carillon largely by default. Baron Jean Armand de Dieskau had been sent to Canada at the head of six French regiments of regulars (troupes de terres), sailing in April 1755. Along with Colonel M. de Rostaing, the expedition's second in command, the three military engineers traveling as part of the reinforcement had all been captured when the *Alcide* was forced to surrender after a five-hour fight with the British off Cape Race, Newfoundland (June 8, 1755). In September 1755, Dieskau was wounded at the Battle of Lake George and taken to New York as a prisoner. As a result of this setback, Vaudreuil then ordered the construction of Carillon. As the work here was not typical of "soldiering", the soldiers were paid a daily extra on top of their meager regular pay. Although not much, the increase in pay was welcomed. From Vaudreuil to Machault, Controller-General of Finance, September 25, 1755 (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 325):

"I have dispatched M. de Lotbiniere, the Engineer, to Fort St. Frederic, and agreeably to my orders, he has been to the outlet of Lake St. Sacrament (Lake George). He has reported to me that the situation at Carillon is one of the best adapted for the construction of works capable of checking the enemy; that the suitable place for a fortification is a rock which crowns all the environs, whence guns could command both the river which runs for Lake St. Sacrament, and that leading to the Grand Marias (Drowned Lands of Southern Lake Champlain) and Wood creek.

I see no work more pressing and more useful than this fortification, because it will enable me to maintain a garrison to stop the enemy in their march from Lake St. Sacrament, the immediate outlet of which is no more than a league and a quarter from the post; and I will be able to harass and fire on them pretty often, within pistol range, for more than 3/4 of a league in a river, both on this, and on the other, side of the Carrying Place. I add, that 'tis of infinite consequence to hasten this work,

as 'tis feared that the enemy will seize upon Carillon, of which 'tis certain he would employ every means to keep possession. I have given order that men should set to work there without a moment's delay. It would be highly necessary that this fortification should be finished this fall, and that it were possible to place a good battery there.

I have likewise, issued my orders that there be sent to Fort St. Frederic 8 twelve-pounders, 4 sixes, with the necessary powder and ball; so that nothing may retard the construction of that battery."

Montcalm arrived in Canada on May 12, 1756. With him, he brought two engineers to replace those lost on the *Alcide*. Captain Jean-Claude-Henri de Lombard de Combles was his Engineer-in-Chief, assisted by Second-Captain Jean-Nicholas Desandrouins, both of the Royal Engineer Corps. Writing from Montreal, without yet visiting Carillon, Montcalm to the State Secretary of War, Count d'Argenson, June 12, 1756 (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 414):

"Since the battle of St. Sacrament (Battle of Lake George; September 8, 1755), the regiments of La Reine and Languedoc have remained in camp at Carillon; Bearn at Frontenac; Guienne, at Niagara, and entered into winter quarters only at the end of November. As this entire Colony had been neglected and the forts existed only in name, these regiments had been engaged with some Canadians in putting them in order. M. De. Vaudreuil employed M. Pouchaut, Captain in the regiment of Bearn, who erected a good fortification at Niagara. It consists of a horn-work with its half-moon, covert-way, lunettes at the places d'armes reentering from the covert-way. The front of this work is 120 toises (765 feet). It is fortified according to M. de Vauban's method.

"At Carillon has been constructed a square fort with four bastions, which are defended by a redoubt situated on a hill that commands the fort. The object of this fort within fives leagues of Fort Saint Frederic has been to cover the latter, which becomes a place of second line; to secure the navigation of Lake Champlain, and to command the principal egress of the English at that point. The works are of earth and will be soon in a state of defence. The fort of Carillon has been superintended by M. de Lotbiniere, Colonial Engineer. He has been assisted by Captain Germain, of La Reine, and by Adjutant Joannes, of the Languedoc regiment. I have written to these gentlemen to enable me to render you a more exact account thereof.

Frontenac which is the center of our line of defence, is the part in which the least has been done. Our two Engineers are on the march for that place, to construct a fortification there partaking of the character of an intrenched camp and commanding an ill location, which must be preserved because it is in existence."

Montcalm leaves Montreal for Fort Carillon on June 27th. Decombles and Desandrouins do not accompany Montcalm but were already at Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario preparing for the expedition against Fort Oswego. Montcalm then leaves Carillon and arrives back at Montreal on July 19th. Montcalm then heads to Fort Frontenac. Levis is left in command at Carillon with some two thousand men to oppose Winslow.

Unfortunately, Decombles was killed in a friendly fire incident on August 11 while scouting the approaches to Fort Oswego (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 465). If traveling with Bougainville, Desandrouins does not arrive at Carillon until September 10th. Desandrouins would have been the first engineer to have seen or visited Carillon, other than Lotbiniere himself. By this time, the fort

was more advanced. The building of the gun embrasures did not start until very late in 1755 or early 1756. The first twelve cannon were "in place" by late February 1756 (Hamilton 1964, Page 41). By September, the remaining north- and west-facing parapets and gun embrasures of the Bastion were nearing completion. By the end of the 1756 construction season, some two dozen cannon were fitted, most facing north, northwest, or west; other cannon were in "storage" waiting on the construction of the ravelins. Two of the larger stone buildings, started earlier that year, were likely finished as well — the west barracks and the eastern storehouse. Unfortunately, we have no contemporary letters from Desandrouins relating to the construction of Carillon.

From the Bougainville Journal, September 11, 1756, Page 33: *"September 11: Fort Carillon, commenced last fall, is situated almost at the head of Lake Champlain on a peninsula pointing south which divides the lake from the south bay, and to the north (of) the outlet of Lake George. The fort is square with four bastions of which three are in a defensible state. It is of horizontal timbers. The position is well chosen on a rugged rock formation, but the fort is badly oriented and is not far enough out on the north point of the lake, which has obliged them to make a redoubt at the place where the fort should have been. As for the rest of it they would have done better to take advantage of the rock, breaking it up with a pickaxe and using it for the parapets."*

Vaudreuil had a keen interest in Carillon. He directs much of the work over the next few years but through Lotbiniere, not Montcalm. It was Vaudreuil's decision to erect stone buildings around the parade ground, but there is no indication that Vaudreuil knew that these stone buildings would tower over the ramparts creating a distinct hazard to the troops fighting below. At least in Summer 1756, Levis was in the position to stop or modify Lotbiniere's building designs, but there is no evidence that he attempted to do so. Hamilton (1964) is the classic volume relating to the construction of Carillon and is an enjoyable read, particularly as it relates to corruption within the Canadian government and the power of the Intendant, Francois Bigot.

As a continuation of their failed 1755 Campaign, the British organized to attack Carillon in Summer 1756 under Winslow. This attack on Carillon was anticipated by the French, but with the fall of Oswego, the attack lost much of its momentum. If attacked in Summer 1756, Carillon would still have been deep into the construction phase and would not have been ready to withstand a siege. If Winslow had advanced, the defense of Carillon would have relied on an earthen redoubt, some 900 yards west of Carillon. If the British were able to secure this redoubt, the defense of Carillon would then depend on the arching fire of mortars and howitzers. Only a few of the existing gun embrasures would have had the needed orientations to allow smoothbore cannon to oppose the British advance from the northwest. A small number of embrasures might have been re-cut to provide better firing angles for cannon, but most orientations would have remained poor. The construction of the ravelins was only now in the very earliest phases.

Lacking defensive character in 1756, Carillon had one strong attribute, artillery. Nester (2008, Page 110) describes the armament of Carillon in 1756 as including twelve 18-pounders, fifteen 12-pounders, and nine 9-pounders with ten additional guns lacking carriages. Keagle (2018, Pages 9 and communication) lists the September 1756 armament as two 18-pounders, sixteen 12-pounders, two 8-pounders, four 6-pounders, and two 4-pounders — twenty-six guns. Keagle's description is more authoritative. Simply stated, the timeline for the construction of Carillon does not match the known threat or need. Carillon took at least two years to make minimally defensible.




Figure 15. Plan Fort Carillon, 1758 by Captain Francois - Joseph, Chevalier de Germain of the Regiment de La Reine. Related information suggests that 1757 may be a more accurate date for the map. Source: Plan du fort Vaudreuil suite sur la montagne de Carillon en Canada. Gallica - Bibliotheque nationale de France. The difficulty in locating Fort Carillon is evident. Even if moved toward the upper right, adjacent higher terrain remains a problem. Mount Defiance is off-map to the lower left. The perimeter walls would not have been excessively tall. From the ground outside the wall to the top of the parapet was only 14-15 feet. The mass below the elevation of the terreplein was only 7 feet in height. This map depicts the Engineer's Headquarters in front of the large storehouse on the east wall and a building or long shed on the north wall. Just beyond the south curtain wall is the storehouse that supported cannon on the roof. The Redoubt Lotbiniere is located along the lakeshore. The supporting town is to the south of Fort Carillon.

Beyond the ditch work, the construction of the raised elements of the ravelins had not progressed very far; that work was done in the third season (1757). Although the ravelins provided additional gun embrasures, the true value of the ravelins was that they allowed the power of Carillon's cannon to be shifted in orientation by a full 45° of arc. Guns needed to be orientated to the northwest, not just to the west. Yet, with the ravelins now blocking the curtain wall embrasures, particularly those facing west, a new weakness was created suggesting the enemy would then shift the orientation of their trenchwork from the northwest and approach from nearly due west, essentially masking and neutralizing the north ravelin. Even after the construction of the ravelins, Montcalm's Engineer-in-Chief Pontleroy writes (July 1758): *"Only one or two guns can be opposed from the fort against all the batteries constructed by the enemy."* Ravelins were most effective when established at a lower elevation than that of the curtain wall behind, allowing the ravelin to be temporarily evacuated and the guns on the curtain wall to engage. In this regard, the western ravelin is much more worrisome than the northern. Instead of constructing two ravelins, a more straightforward and less expensive solution would have been a five-sided pentagon fort. Besides solving the orientation problem and the masking of curtain walls by ravelins, the interior space would have more than doubled the size, thereby avoiding many of the logistical issues relating to the lack of space including the "too tall" barracks. In 1759, Eyre adopted this exact solution at Crown Point, Fort Saint-Frédéric.

Two wooden barracks occupied the south wall. These buildings housed the rank & file. In 1757, the wood barracks were replaced with a single sprawling two-story stone barracks that occupied the entire wall. Vaudreuil again orders the use of stone. Lotbiniere continues designs where the stone walls of the adjacent buildings loom over the ramparts. Besides continuing to build too tall buildings as regards the height of the rampart, numerous elements of Carillon's construction remain a puzzle of materials and intent.

Captain Nicolas Sarrebource Maladre de Pontleroy arrived at Quebec from France on October 15, 1757 (Bougainville Journal, Page 188). He would serve as Montcalm's new Engineer-in-Chief (Cardy and Dunnigan, 1994, Page 138). Much of the confusion concerning Carillon stems from a letter by Pontleroy. A correction has been made in the text which is explained below (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 720, July 1758; online):

Memoir on Fort Carillon, by M. de. Pont le Roy, Engineer-in-Chief

"This fort is built on the left bank of the River of the Falls, commanding its outlet into the River St. Frederic as well as that of the head of the bay.

***It is an irregular square, the long sides of which are fifty-four toises of exterior Polygon (345 feet); the small thirty-nine (250 feet).** Its revetment consists of squared pieces of oak laid on the other, bound by traversines fastened to the corps morts (anchored to the stone foundation); its periphery is pierced with embrasures lined with oak timber directed towards different points of the exterior ground, Only one or two guns can be opposed from the fort against all the batteries constructed by the enemy.*

The ramparts are but thirteen or fourteen feet wide, and the platforms consequently so short that the recoil at each discharge makes the gun run off. Should one be dismounted, it becomes necessary to fire the one next to it, in order to convey another there.

The bastions are casemated and serve for the bakery, cistern, powder magazine and provisions. The casemate under the curtain entrance, which may serve to lodge the garrison, is only twelve fit wide by six high, extremely damp, the roof consisting only of beams laid side by side, covered with four or five feet of earth.

The place of arms is only eighteen toises (115 feet) by nine wide (58 feet).

The foundation is solid rock; the building for civilians are of stone and two stories high. The roof overtops entirely the parapets of the rampart. The shot and shell directed against these buildings, would present, by their explosion, the appearance of the garrison either on the place of arms (parade ground) or on the rampart.

The great number of embrasures excludes the use of musketry, the only means, nevertheless, of defending the place.

On two fronts which are open to attack, a half-moon (demi-lune or ravelin) has been constructed so high that it entirely covers the embrasures of the curtains.

The covert way is not yet commenced, and part of the counterscarps (roughly the outer perimeter of the ditch) remains to be built, as well as the parapets of the place on two fronts (south and east).

The cistern contains only fifteen thousand quarts of water; it is filled by the conductor from the place of arms (parade ground), which has no cistern, a circumstance that renders the water muddy and no doubt unwholesome.

The powder magazine being roofed only by beams laid side by side, covered with earth, is always damp in spring and fall; the powder has to be removed.

All the store-houses and sheds, necessary for the garrison, are outside the place, encircled by the palisade.

*From this description 'twill be seen how little susceptible of defense is this fort; yet, 'tis the only work that covers Lake Champlain and, consequently the Colony. **Were I entrusted with the siege of it, I should require only six mortars and two cannon.**"*

"The above document was written in cipher."

Note: The original printed text reads: ***It is an irregular square, the long sides of which are fifty-four toises of exterior Polygon (345 feet); the small twenty-nine (185 feet).*** At 185 feet, the short axis generates massive geometry problems relating to Carillon's dimensions. The corrected value of 250 feet is directly taken from the same volume (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 926): *"No stronghold in the country; Niagara, the most tenable of the whole, cannot, if properly attacked, hold out for more than three weeks. Shell alone will force Carillon to surrender; a small narrow right angle, inasmuch as its longest side is 54 toises and the small one 39, without casements."* On Page 720, there is a printing error The value of "29" toises is now "39" toises on Page 926.

Pontleroy's letter was forwarded by Andre Doriel, Montcalm's paymaster and army supply intendant, to the office of the State Secretary of War, Marshall de Belle-Isle. There is a very good

chance that Montcalm and his staff had already come to a similar conclusion; Pontleroy's review was just written confirmation. Carillon was a superb staging area, but it was indefensible against a well-managed siege. Carillon and its considerable cost belong solely to Vaudreuil.

As used here by Pontleroy, the rampart width is equivalent to the terreplein width (terre-plain). More specifically, it is a reference to the open level ground directly behind a parapet at an embrasure. Under modern usage, the rampart would be the full mass of the wall and earthwork – including the revetment (front slope), the parapet, any banquette (firing steps for muskets), the terreplein, and the talus (rear slope). Notably, Harry Gordon's description of Fort William Henry (MANA, Page 177) adopts a similar approach, so this usage by Pontleroy was not "wrong", but an accepted convention at the time. Gordon writes as if the rampart and parapet are separate and distinct from one another with the parapet simply sitting on top of the rampart. As engineers, neither Pontleroy nor Gordon uses the word terreplein or banquette in their descriptions. In John Muller's *A Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification, Regular and Irregular* (1756; online), rampart is used in both ways, as the full earthwork and as the terreplein, even in the same sentence. Notably, Muller does not use the word terreplein anywhere in his text but describes the feature as the "level ground" of the rampart, and terreplein is not a word found in Muller's extensive glossary of terms. When reading period writings, considerable mental flexibility is needed around the words rampart and parapet, and the expected use of terreplein may be entirely absent:

"The parapet is a part of the rampart elevated from 6 to 7 ½ feet above the rest in order to cover the troops, which are drawn up there, from the fire of the enemy in a siege; and the banquette is two or three feet higher than the rampart, or about four feet lower than the parapet; so that when the troops stand upon it, they may just be able to fire over the parapet." (Muller 1756, Page 27). Here the second "rampart" would read "terreplein" under current word usage.

There are two independent descriptions of the parapets at Carillon that support this usage for rampart. Captain Pierre Pouchot was the Commandant of Fort Niagara and later Fort Levis. He was at Ticonderoga in 1758 but had been captured at Niagara in 1759. In December 1759, he was at Ticonderoga waiting for a prisoner exchange to be completed. Pouchot writes in *Memoirs on the Late War in North America between France and England* (Cardy and Dunnigan, 1994; text references conditions in 1759 or 1760, clearly post-Amherst. The actual text was likely written in 1768 or 1769, Page 344):

"The fort of Carillon is a 45-toise square (288 feet) measured along its external sides and is constructed of 14 to 15-inch square timbers piled one on top of the other. The parapets are 12 feet thick and banked up with earth & pebbles excavated from the mountain. A demi-lune (ravelin) on the facade looking towards the mountain ridge, a ditch 5 to 6 toises wide (32 to 40 feet) with its covered way & a glacis at the back of the fort at the far end of the rising ground are its external fortifications. There is also a redoubt which commands the water."

Yet Pouchot's memory is somewhat faulty. He references only a single ravelin and describes Carillon's Bastion as being square — the 1758 map by Germain plainly depicts a rectangular fort (Figure 15). Lotbiniere's own report to Count d'Argenson, the State Secretary of War, fully supports Pouchot's description of the parapet, October 31, 1756 (The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, Vol. II, No. 3, January 1931, Pages 92-93):

"We were not prepared to build in stone, having neither the material assembled nor the workmen. We were therefore obliged to line the works in oak which fortunately was plentiful on the spot. I began the parapet of the whole work which I formed of a double row of timbers distant ten feet from one another and bound together by two cross-pieces dovetailed at their extremities, to retain the timbers. This had reached the height of seven feet by the 28th of November (1755), date of the departure of the Army, which could not remain longer owing to the ice beginning to form. I remained until February hoping to be able to use the Garrison to advance the works; but finding that it was not possible to make the Garrison work, I decided to return to Montreal after the Barracks had been finished, to recuperate from the fatigues of the campaign and the unwholesome food I had taken.

I left (Montreal) this year—at the end of April (1756) and arrived at the Fort the first days of May, when I resumed work which dragged on for nearly a month not having the required workmen. During this campaign, we raised all the Fort to the height of the Cordon (roughly the elevation of the terreplein). The earth ramparts were made, — the terre plein of the Bastions completed, a cover built for each bastion bombproof, two stone barracks built, the ditches of the place dug to the rock everywhere, part of the rock even removed on two fronts, the ditches of the two Demi-Lunes also excavated to the rock, a store-house established outside the Fort as well as a Hospital. The parapet was raised on the two fronts exposed to the enemy's batteries if he undertook to besiege this place, the exterior part of the Fort supported by masonry resting on the solid rock. The next campaign will be devoted to overhauling the main body of the place and building the two Demi-Lunes proposed, as well as the Redoubt at the extreme of the Carillon Point. We will also work at the covered way and the Glacis. There will be two Barracks to build in stone in the interior of the Fort. As there is but one Bastion exposed to attack I think it would be well to protect it by a counterguard."

This construction would yield a parapet about twelve feet in width (a 1-foot thick outer timber + 10 feet of earth fill + a 1-foot thick inner timber). Here, the translation uses the words "terre plein" (literally "earth full"). Clearly, Lotbiniere is referencing the terreplein elevation in the then-current sense. Verification of the specific language used by Lotbiniere might prove informative as the use of "terre plein" within this letter itself is not associated with gun embrasures or any artillery, but simply the floor of the bastions even before the parapets were placed. The important aspect here is that both Pouchot and Lotbiniere describe parapets twelve feet in width. This is a clear validation that Pontleroy's "rampart" is the "terreplein". Note: French 12 Foot = British 12.79 feet.

When referenced to the terreplein, Lotbiniere's description suggests 7-foot-tall parapets. This is a standard textbook value suggesting that banquettes were also part of the design – musket firing steps immediately to the rear of the parapet. At Carillon, any banquettes would have made the terreplein even more crowded, but Pontleroy's description lacks any mention of banquettes even though he disparagingly touches on the topic of musketry. A typical banquette would be a raised step about 4 or 5 feet wide to the rear of the parapet; the parapet now being 4.0 or 4.5 feet tall, when referenced to the floor of the banquette. This step-up allowed the infantry to look over the top of the parapets and fire their muskets. The soldiers then had the option to step off the banquette and reload without exposing themselves but stepping off was often frowned upon as the soldiers would then lose their view of the battle. The banquette would not be continuous; it would not be placed in front of an artillery embrasure or where it would interfere with the servicing of a gun. If present, Carillon parapets would have been one-or-two-foot taller than those at Fort William Henry. If there were

banquettes at Carillon, the step up would have been considerable, about 2.5 or 3.0 feet, but they may have been largely absent with reliance on empty embrasures to allow musket fire. Either way, the terreplein at Carillon would have been very cramped. At Fort William Henry, Eyre references the banquette (Johnson Papers, Volume II, Page 328): "*The Footstep all round the Ramparts should be in good repair, that every Part by full Mann'd.*"

At Carillon, the soils were very stony and there was bedrock debris. The backfill of at least some of the parapets was a mix of stone and soil which was derisively commented upon, again the concern for flying shards. Manning-Sterling (2010, Page 42) suggests that at least in some orientations the parapets could be smaller, 8 or 10-foot wide to the east and south – directions from which artillery attacks were not expected. At the same time, Manning-Sterling (2010, Page 33) writes that "*the demi-lunes (ravelins) contained parapets between four and six feet thick, which protected the soldiers and artillery in times of direct assault*" (but this last statement is without citation or source). Unless stone, these would have been grossly undersized, but then innately hazardous to the defenders. Yet there is no reason to place these grossly undersized parapets on the ravelins where space was not a consideration. Twelve-foot-wide oak parapets similar to those on the Bastion walls would seem more logical. At the end of 1757, the east and south curtain walls remained without parapets or gun embrasures.

In all likelihood, Carillon's ramparts over the northern and western curtain walls would be 25 - 26 feet in width – a 12-foot-wide parapet and a 13- or 14-foot-wide terreplein, the room available for the gun and the gun run. These ramparts would have been around four or five feet narrower than those at Fort William Henry, but only two feet narrower on the terreplein (gun platform). Pontleroy's comment on musketry suggests that banquettes were absent or sporadic. Pontleroy's criticism remains intact — narrow terrepleins along the curtain walls that were below accepted standards, especially for any 18-pounder positioned on the curtain. The parapets of the two western bastions and the northeast bastion were likely of similar construction and width. For a 24-pounder, Duffy (2006, Page 48) describes the needed terreplein as 26 feet wide, twice the width of Carillon's terreplein – 14 feet for the gun itself and 12 feet for the gun run and service. Here the needed room for the gun assumes the gun is parked just outside the embrasure and the barrel does not extend into the embrasure. For the same reasons, the curtain walls on Fort William Henry would not have been able to comfortably support a 24-pounder or even an 18-pounder — a minimum of 4 feet for the gun carriage, leaving no more than 11 feet for the gun run. In Europe, any gun on the rampart that could be targeted by an enemy battery would be removed from the embrasure unless it was actively firing, and the embrasure would be closed from view by shutters; explaining, the need for the additional room to allow passage behind any retreated gun. If a gun had a daily limit of 10-rounds, the gun would only appear for the time needed to fire and then it was quickly withdrawn and the shutters closed, retaining the option to move the gun to an entirely different embrasure — very much a cat-and-mouse game. Often the last intact embrasures were in the less exposed flanks of the individual bastions. The number of guns available to the defense was always much smaller than the guns in a properly sized siege train. At both Fort William Henry and Carillon, no large bore guns could have been placed on the curtain walls. The large bore cannons would have been confined to the individual bastions and ravelins. In reality, this was probably only a minor consideration. Neither Fort William Henry nor Carillon housed more than a half-dozen large-bore cannon (18-pounders and up), so finding room for the larger guns would not have been an issue, but the attacker's intelligence would have known this fact and targeted embrasures accordingly.

There is a second element of Pontleroy's description that demands examination. As presented in the printed text, the Bastion dimensions given in Pontleroy's original description are impossible to accept. Developing an outline of a bastion fort is a simple exercise. You only need the distance between the tips of the individual bastion and then the width of the rampart itself, especially as regards the curtain walls. If drawn at the dimensions given in Pontleroy's letter (345 feet by 185 feet — 65 feet less on the short-axis than the current restoration) and assuming a 25-foot rampart all around, the resulting parade ground would be around 230 feet by just 15 feet. Moving outward the curtain walls by 25% (15 feet on each side) to represent the shorter flanks of each bastion and reducing the southern rampart width to 20 feet wide, the parade ground would then increase to about 50 feet wide, but no buildings have been placed yet. Yet further in his letter, Pontleroy describes the parade ground: "*The place of arms is only 18 toises long (115 feet) by 9 toises wide (58 feet).*" With 30-foot-wide barracks on the south wall, the width of the parade ground minus buildings should have been a minimum of 88 feet on the short axis, not the 50 feet estimated here using Pontleroy's measurements. The long width of the open parade ground could have been reduced to 115 feet by the presence of the Engineer's Headquarters, so that dimension has some logical explanation. As regards the narrow dimension of Carillon, Pontleroy's apparent measurement of 185 feet is obviously wrong. The correction from 345 feet by 185 to 345 feet x 250 feet needs to be made; this error may be a simple printer's error or the result of illegible handwriting. Outside of this last element, Pontleroy's description of Carillon remains one of the best.

To generate additional interior parade ground space, Lotbiniere chose to move the curtain walls outward from their standard positions while keeping the bastion faces in place. This choice was made in tandem with the decision to include ravelins, but the ravelins took years to build, and the timeline required for their construction does not correspond to the need. Per the standard convention, the outer perimeter length of the flanks should be just under 11% of the bastion tip to bastion tip distance. The flank lengths were reduced by as much as a third (to about 8.5% of the tip-to-tip distance) — e.g., flanks of 35 feet are reduced to about 27 feet. With a protective 12-foot parapet to the outside shoulder, the interior flank where a gun could have been positioned would have been reduced to about 15 feet. The bastion faces are of the standard length, 2/7 of the tip-to-tip distance. All the exterior angles of Carillon are textbook and decidedly French.

There are two maps of Carillon believed to have belonged to Amherst (Figures 16A and 16B). The scale measurement is in toises (1 toise = 6.394 feet), indicative of a French origin. The dimensions depicted on these maps are an excellent match for the current reconstruction. Using Figure 16A, the north wall is 315 feet and the west wall 255 feet. If scaled, the open parade ground of the figure measures about 116 feet by 64 feet and is in very good agreement with Pontleroy's description, but that agreement requires sheds on the north wall. Figure 16A scales well for a parapet width of 12 feet and terreplein width of 13-14 feet (Norman Leventhal Map & Education Center, Boston Public Library).

Using Figure 2 and assuming a fourth barracks, the open parade ground of Fort William Henry can be estimated at 165 feet x 65 feet. If the Engineer's Headquarters is removed from Figure 16A, Carillon's open parade ground approaches 160 feet x 65 feet — very comparable values. In this regard, Pontleroy's description and Figure 16A do not conflict. Pontleroy's complaint of the small size of the parade ground is valid in that it was awkward and cumbersome, but if constructing a bastion fort at near minimum dimensions, totally expected. Figure 16A has a light-line style tracing

the casements under three of the bastions and shows the gun embrasures being confined to the north and west orientations. A companion map, also available from the Boston Public Library, appears to be the work of the same person (Figure 16B). This companion map shows fourteen additional gun embrasures in three of the individual bastions. These additional embrasures are all orientated to the south and east. This map shows two separate barracks on the south wall map and the ravelins are not completed, suggesting an "older" map. This companion map scales perfectly with Figure 16B. Both drawings show the interior Engineering Headquarters and the storehouse to the south of the Bastion. Small cannon were mounted to the roof of this storehouse which overlooked the palisade and its cluster of buildings further south (Figure 16A, Page 197).

Manning-Sterling (2010, Page 33) describes the north wall building as a long open-front storage structure. Regardless of the name, the structure along the north wall is in a different color shading from the barracks and the eastern storehouse. This structure appears to have housed Lotbiniere's horses of which as many as fifty may have died in the fire following the retreat of the French (Hamilton 1964: Page 98); but a number closer to the fifteen horses thought to be there in 1756 or the seven horses in 1758 would seem more logical (Hamilton 1964, Page 47). As the daily "rental" of horses was such a valued source of income for Lotbiniere, he may have simply wanted his horses to be secure and erected this extended structure. Pontleroy's letter supports the idea that the structure was essentially a barn: *"All the store-houses and sheds, necessary for the garrison, are outside the place, encircled by the palisade."*

As regards Figure 16A, only Pontleroy's outside dimensions are in contradiction (pre-correction) but agree once corrected; nothing else conflicts with one minor exception. The number and positioning of the gun embrasures seems lower than suggested in Pontleroy's letter and their orientations are open to question. Logic would dictate that the northwest bastion at Carillon would have had a tip embrasure, but there are no tip embrasures shown. Notably, the shorter west wall only allowed for the fitting of a single gun embrasure in each of the flanks, while there were two gun embrasures in each of the flanks of the longer north wall.

Obviously, the character and dimensions of Fort Carillon require much more clarification and documentation than is offered here, which admittedly leaves it as a muddled jumble. The first step would be to verify the translation of Pontleroy's letter, especially as the original was written in a cipher with special attention to any numbers. On June 1, 1757, d'Hugues writes to the Marshall de Belle-Isle, the State Secretary of War (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 707):

"Tis an irregular square, the defect of which proceed for it having only between forty-five and fifty toises front, instead of 80 or 100 toises at least,"

Measurement Conversion: *"Tis an irregular square, the defect of which proceed for it having only between 290-foot and 320-foot front, instead of 510 or 640 feet at least,"*

This letter provides numerous insights into the topography of the peninsula, as does Pouchot's memoir. Strictly from an engineering standpoint, d'Hugues dimensions are near the recognized minimum standards, but not violating those standards. From bastion tip to bastion tip, the current reconstruction of Fort Ticonderoga is about 315 feet x 250 feet, about 49 toises by 39 toises. Without buildings, the parade ground is about 210 feet by 110 feet, about 23,100 square feet. Although the square footage provided to the interior parade ground is above the needed minimum,




Figure 16A. Plan of Fort Carillon. British Library Collection, Boston Public Library. Believed to date to 1759, but 1758 appears to be equally valid. This map is thought to have once belonged to Jeffrey Amherst, the British commander at Ticonderoga (1759), and had been in the collection of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Casements can be seen under three of the bastions. The Engineering Headquarters sits in front of the eastern storehouse. A long structure is shown along the north wall, thought to be open storage sheds or horse stalls. Twenty-three gun embrasures are shown within the Bastion; another fourteen embrasures are on the ravelins. No gun embrasures are mounted on the eastern or southern walls, but they are shown in the companion figure (Figure 16B). The roof of the storehouse to the south was fitted with small cannon. No bridges are shown connecting the curtain walls to the ravelins. Figure 16A is from the Norman Leventhal Map & Education Center, Boston Public Library.

The scale on the bottom of the map is in French toise (1 toise = 6.394 feet). The long bar is equal to 60 toise or 383.64 feet. From bastion tip to tip, the north wall is estimated at 315 feet and the west wall at 255 feet. The south wall is longer at about 350 feet. The parade ground measures 118 feet by 65 Feet. All evidence suggests that this map is extraordinarily accurate.

<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11z178j>

http://searcharchives.bl.uk/IAMS_VU2:IAMS040-001999744




Figure 16B. Plan of Fort Carillon. British Library Collection, Boston Public Library. The southern barracks is shown as two buildings and the two ravelins are not finished. This suggests a date of 1757. Casements are absent from this figure. Within the Bastion, the number of embrasures is thirty-two. When compared to the companion figure, there are fourteen additional embrasures on the south and east walls of the Bastion, but none are positioned on the south or east curtain walls. There is a distinct temptation to move these fourteen embrasures to the companion figure (Figure 16A). Five gun embrasures would be added to the north curtain wall.

North is to the top. Barracks are to the west and south. The King's Storehouse is on the east wall. Lotbiniere's Engineering Headquarters is the "center" building in front of the Storehouse. The north wall is in open sheds or horse stables. Several of the gun embrasures on the west curtain wall have been cut to fire to the northwest, not to the west. In themselves, oblique embrasures are not a problem. The northwest bastion does not include a tip embrasure. Tip embrasures can be seen at Fort William Henry (Figure 2).

The scale bar on the map is to 50 toises or 319.75 feet. This map is thought to have once belonged to Jeffrey Amherst, the British commander at Ticonderoga (1759), and had been in the collection of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. Figure 16B is from the Norman Leventhal Map & Education Center, Boston Public Library.

<https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:hx11z1760>

the rectangular shape proved very awkward. At a minimum, the parade ground should have been at least 25 feet longer in the narrow dimension allowing for easy placement of a barracks on the north wall. For a four-sided Bastion expected to offer resistance to an artillery train, the minimum standard would be 300 feet by 300 feet, bastion tip to bastion tip, plus an interior dimension of 135 feet by 135 feet before any buildings are placed.

If attempting to project military power and permanence, none of these values should be violated. Values over those minimums would be most welcomed as it makes the logistics and building layouts that much easier. The dimension of the curtain walls would have been fixed at 25 or 30 feet wide, so any increase in dimensions above these minimums is shared only between the interior parade ground and individual bastions, and not the curtain walls. If the 250-foot dimension is correct, why Lotbiniere would have adopted such a short dimension is without explanation and flies in the face of accepted standards — much of Pontleroy's pointed criticism has its origin here. The 250-foot dimension "squeezes" the parapet widths, terreplein widths, the length of the gun runs, and limits the number of guns that can be placed in the flanks — the key north-facing flank of the southwest bastion only has a single gun embrasure. Once adopted, a 250-foot dimension would directly result in limited barrack space, a mathematical certainty: *"I should have wished it to be somewhat larger, capable of containing five hundred men, whereas it can accommodate at most, only three hundred men."* (Montcalm to Count d' Argenson, the State Secretary of War, July 20, 1756; O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 433).

But a serious problem persists, the layout of the buildings as developed by Lotbiniere. Not having a barracks on the north wall or the east wall generates the need for the "too tall" barracks on the west and south walls, another mathematical certainty. Placing sheds on the north wall only benefited Lotbiniere via his horse concession, as did the positioning of his headquarters building in the middle of the parade ground. The limited parade ground space was far too valuable to squander in this manner. Even with the tight dimensions, a barracks should have been placed on the north wall, but it was not until after the Oswego Expedition that Montcalm's staff first reached Carillon (September 1756). By this time, the barracks were largely completed.

In this muddle, there is something unexpected. The narrow dimension of 250 feet does not match any written description — neither Pontleroy's (185 feet), Pouchot's (288 feet), or d'Hugues (288 feet). Squaring up the perimeter by lengthening the east and west curtain walls is tempting. Yet the map by Germain, who assisted Lotbiniere, clearly shows a distinctive rectangular shape (Figure 15, as does Figure 16A). As regards the dimensions of the Bastion, Figures 15 and 16A are in very good agreement with each other and the reconstruction — with the possible exception of the southeast bastion. The south wall of the reconstruction is some 35 feet shorter and the flank lengths on the east wall are not mirror-images, as they should be. On the last night of Amherst's siege in 1759, the French detonated their gunpowder reserves attempting to destroy Carillon. Only the southeast bastion and segments of the two adjacent curtain walls suffered heavily in the explosion (Bellico 2010, Page 195). Amherst did not want to waste time or resources, so he then ordered the repairs per the original dimensions — British Fort Ticonderoga: *"I will repair the Fort upon the same Plan as the Enemy had built it which will save great expense & give no room for the Engineers to exercise their genius which will be much better employed at Crown Point"* (Bellico 1999, Page 123). The "repair" likely shortened the south wall and moved the bastion away from the worst of any cratering, avoiding subsequent foundation issues. The north and west walls of the

reconstruction are excellent matches for Figure 16A. The lengths of the faces of the ravelins match. Outside the southeast corner, the reconstruction is very close to the historical perimeter dimensions before Amherst and a good match for post-Amherst.

Although the faces of the two ravelins at Carillon were in stone, whether the timber exterior (revetment) of the Bastion itself was stone-faced is problematic. This stone facing would have been placed between two and three years after the initial timber construction but installed only below the elevation of the parapets. There are conflicting thoughts concerning this point. If it was done, it was done slowly as time and men permitted. Pontleroy's description of July 1758 describes the timber revetments as being placed on a solid rock foundation, but there is no mention of any stone facing. Pontleroy fails to describe the materials used to construct the ravelins, just their position. Below the elevation of the wood-framed parapets, any stone revetment would have offered some proof against wall breaches. The French are known to have backfilled the ramparts and parapets of the Bastion with a mix of both soil and broken stone. Once abandoned and left to fall, the stone backfill would then be visible, leading to the conclusion that they were faced in stone.

Narratives suggesting stone facing of the bastion lack citation to an original French source. One of Webb's letters to Loudoun may be a primary source of the idea that the bastion fronts were stone-faced. From Webb to Loudoun (LO 4020; August 1, 1757): *"July 2. Four Deserters came into Fort William Henry from Tienderoga, who confirmed all the former Accountants of the Number of Cannon and Boats at the Fort, and further added, that they were very busy facing it all round with Stone, of which the Casements & Barracks were built."*

The date of July 2, 1757, suggests that the stonework being described by the deserters is best tied only to the ravelins, not the bastions. The stone facing of the ravelins was still ongoing in June 1758 (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 892).

General Jeffery Amherst led the successful Siege of Ticonderoga in 1759. On August 5, 1759, Amherst writes William Pitt (General Evening Post, London, September 8 - September 11, 1759, and Lucier 2007, Page 298):

"August 31st. I ordered the fort by the water-side to put in thorough good order, and to be compleated, as the enemy had not quite finished it. Ordered the fort at Ticonderoga to be repaired on the same plan as the enemy built it, which will save great time and expences, as it is but a small part of the whole ruined: The Costs the enemy have been at in building the fort and houses are very great. The glacis and covered way quite good: the counterscarp of the glacis, masonry: Two ravelins of masonry that cover the only front to which approaches can be carried on, a square with four bastions, built with logs on the rocks, which are covered with some masonry to level the foundation. The wood part of it is the worst finished. One Bastion, and a part of two courtins, demolished, but not in the front that can be easiest attacked. The casements are good; the wall of the burnt barracks are not damaged. Eleven good ovens have helped us greatly. As the situation of the fort is very advantageous for the protection of his Majesty's dominions, and the approaches may be rendered as difficult to the enemy, as they have been to the King's troops, and that there is no fault in it but its being small, I have thought it proper to have it repaired, which I hope will meet with your approbation."

Amherst's description suggests that the horizontal wall timbers rested on a foundation of bedrock and placed stone. As regards the issue of facing, Amherst's language here is ambiguous and could be interpreted in at least two radically different ways. Where not on bedrock, the original stone foundation was covered by a front of more finished masonry up to the start of the log walls. Or it could be taken to mean that masonry was placed above the stone foundation of the walls in some locations, but to what extent or height is unclear. If done, the logical place to do such work would have been the faces and flanks of the west and north facing bastions. More simply put, the question becomes — what was being covered by the masonry, the original foundation or the logs? It would seem that the second interpretation where the logs are covered is often accepted in various narratives; however, the true intent of the language appears to be a description of a level foundation upon which logs were placed, favoring the first interpretation. There is also a logic train in accepting the first interpretation. The letter describes placing masonry on the outer edge of the perimeter ditch where it meets the glacis (the counterscarp). Placing masonry to protect the foundation would have been a natural precursor or extension of that work. Repairs done by the British to the southeast bastion and the east curtain wall following the detonation of the powder magazine in 1759 may also be obscuring the truth by mixing materials, not necessarily following this aspect of the original French construction. By itself, Amherst's letter is not proof that the revetments of the Bastion were faced in stone; it could be argued that the letter is better proof that the exterior walls were not faced in stone — see Chartrand (2008, Page 38) for an illustration with attention to the foundation stone.

In Amherst's letter, the fort being unfinished is a reference to the artillery battery along the lakeshore, and not Carillon itself. In Figure 15, this battery is labeled as Lotbiniere's Redoubt and is located overlooking the narrows to the east of Carillon. Amherst is quite frank in that the fort is small. Amherst's judgment on the casements is made in high-summer, not in the cold damp of winter when the French write of the necessity to remove the powder stores before their being ruined. The value of eleven intact bread ovens is not lost on Amherst.

Manning-Sterling (2010) is an archaeological investigation of the eastern quarter of Carillon plus the eastern half of the northern ravelin. The construction techniques and features identified include an extensive stone underdrain system that was developed for the curtain walls, the individual bastions, and the large eastern storehouse. The subsoil at Carillon is a clay. When wet, clays are miserable to work and difficult to drain or keep dry and readily pond; not an environment conducive to storing gunpowder. Though not discussed, this underdrain may or may not have been part of the "conductor" used to fill the cistern under the northwest bastion (see Pontleroy's letter). The northeast bastion is described as stone (Page 33). This reference may be limited to the construction of the interior casement; the investigation evidently did not include excavations of the outer walls of the bastion. The profile section through the east curtain wall shows what appears to be an 18th Century stone parapet wall extending above the elevation of the terreplein (Manning-Sterling 2010, Page 38). As this section of the curtain wall was not vulnerable to attack and no gun embrasures were planned, this feature is not a true defensive revetment. It appears to be a simple 3-or 4-foot-tall, two-foot-wide stone wall placed on top of the terreplein that provided the needed security; below this wall was the ditch, an additional 6 or 7 feet lower in elevation. If needed swivel guns or wallpieces could fire over the wall, *en barbette*. It may not have been until 1757 that the adjacent bastions were equipped with east facing embrasures, so some small cannon may have been placed

or stored here which would explain the artillery platform found by Manning-Sterling. The profile section also suggests the eastern storehouse included an underground casement.

Besides the character of Carillon, the position and orientation of Carillon baffled the French professionals, but the orientation more so (Bougainville Journals, Page 33). Carillon was not close enough to Lake Champlain to provide an artillery umbrella across the Lake, a separate redoubt was needed to cover the Lake. At the same time, it was poorly orientated to defend against the higher ground of the rising plateau to the west and northwest. Carillon seemed to do nothing well. In fairness to Lotbiniere, the surrounding geography made Ticonderoga a near-impossible position to defend from a single position while at the same time controlling passage on Lake Champlain. No location was free of defects or shortcomings. Mount Defiance (Rattlesnake) was to the southwest, just within artillery range of much of the peninsula.

The standard textbook solution would be the establishment of four or so strong defensive points, including positions on Mount Independence, Mount Defiance (Rattlesnake), on the crest of the plateau above Carillon with the main fort, and finally artillery redoubts near Lake Champlain – considering the resources available, a totally impractical solution (Nester 2008, Page 113; and Laramie 2012, Page 224). An obvious consideration was the rotation of Carillon by 45° and the construction of a larger fort with better barrack and storehouse space. This rotation may or may not have removed the need for the ravelins, but the current topographic maps suggest it may well have solved that problem. A careful examination of Figure 15 shows at least some of the dilemmas and advantages of shifting Carillon to the west. The position that Montcalm's entrenchment would occupy can be discerned in the upper left corner. The fatal flaw associated with excessive building heights could have been eliminated with a larger fort, especially if a pentagon fort, but the problem of the adjacent high ground remains unresolved and any retreat by water is made much more difficult. With a western shift of Carillon, the range from Mount Defiance would be at least 1,200 yards from where the nearest batteries could be established. At this distance, only the largest cannon and mortars would have been within range, but it would have been feasible — Abercromby's siege train did include at least six 24-pounders, two 10-inch mortars, and two 8-inch mortars. Even 24-pounders would have been using some elevation on their guns to reach Carillon, but any sense of accuracy would be absent at this distance. Yet if this location had been adopted by Lotbiniere, the French victory at Ticonderoga (July 1758) may well not have happened. With the Bastion on the crown of the plateau, the British would likely have conducted a traditional textbook siege even under Abercromby – the "errors" of Lotbiniere would not have been erased by the recklessness of Abercromby and the French would have lost the Champlain Valley a full year earlier than they did.

Innately attractive and appealing, many aspects of Carillon simply do not make sense and seem more a testament to the designer, Lotbiniere, than anything else (reference O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Pages 769 and 889). There appears to be no justification for moving away from the accepted engineering standards (Nester 2008, Page 111). Although the criticism of both Carillon and Lotbiniere by Montcalm's staff was severe, there appears to be no actual correspondence suggesting that the fort should have been to the west. This was not a hindrance to subsequent histories and narratives. Moving the fort west would not have canceled all criticism, just redirected it, with the closeness of Mt. Defiance now being a more central issue, at least on paper. Overall, the best workable option would likely have been to locate Carillon in its original position as a pentagon fort,

a minimum of 300 feet per side. A strong satellite redoubt would still be needed along the lakeshore, essentially an enlarged Lotbiniere's Redoubt. As pointedly stated by both Pontleroy and d'Hugues, mortar fire could prove devastating against fortifications like Carillon. Geography had dictated that there would be no perfect or even good solution — the option to retreat by water needed to be retained. Sometime after September 1757, the French brought at least two 12 1/2-inch mortars to Carillon, pieces that had the range to reach Mt. Defiance (Keagle, 2018, Page 14).

In 1759, Amherst did not waste time or effort establishing a battery on Mt. Defiance or engaging in a maximum distance artillery duel with the French. Instead, Amherst occupied Montcalm's entrenchment from the previous year and immediately trenched his way forward using fascines (stick bundles) where needed. In a textbook siege, the first batteries of the attacker would be opened some 600 or 700 yards from the covered way (outer perimeter of the surrounding ditch). With William Eyre directing the earthwork, the first British batteries were established at less than 500 yards from Carillon, but the French wisely withdrew to Fort Saint-Frédéric before the first British batteries could open fire (Bellico 2010, Page 194).

Throughout the letters and writings concerning the construction of Carillon, there is a deep resentment held by nearly all the regular French army officers against Lotbiniere, but also against the workings of the Canadian Government. The level of graft and corruption was ever-present, particularly as regards commodities shipped to Canada by the government in Paris and managed by the Intendant, Francois Bigot (Hughes 2011; Bougainville Journal, Page 6, Note 15). The inefficiencies, political and monetary kickbacks associated with the construction were very visible to the regular officers with Lotbiniere being a prime beneficiary via several private contracts including the only wine concession at Carillon (Bougainville Journal, October 8 and 26, 1756, Pages 51 and 63). Horses needed in the construction were owned by Lotbiniere and then rented to the King on a daily basis, whether they were needed that day or not. Bougainville's criticism continues citing Lotbiniere's frequent absence and the perceived desire of Lotbiniere to slow construction so that he could benefit via the various outside contracts.

At the Battle of Ticonderoga (1757), Pontleroy and Desandrouins direct the building of the forward timber entrenchment that proved so successful. All the while, Montcalm knew he had to be extraordinarily careful not to be pinned and trapped on the Ticonderoga Peninsula. Lotbiniere is visibly shunned by the other engineers. Pontleroy's writing suggests near contempt for Lotbiniere's abilities. Lotbiniere remains within Carillon (Lotbiniere to Marshall de Belle-Isle, the State Secretary of War; O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 893): "*All the Militia of the three governments (Montreal, Quebec, and Trois Rivières) were commanded to repair to Carillon, where the Marquis de Montcalm arrived on the 29th of June with Messrs de Pontleroy and Desandrouins, Engineers, who might be necessary there in consequence of the weariness of Sieur de Loebiniere's lungs, which had, through fatigue of his detail that he has borne alone, having no one with him capable of sharing it, increased to such a degree as to confine him from time to time to his bed, he continued notwithstanding, after their arrival, to occupy himself equally with the care of the fortification of the place.*"

From the Bougainville Journal (July 10, 1758, Page 238): "*Since the landing of the first British troops Sieur de L(otbiniere) was only busy in putting his cash box in order and making the wisest provisions so that the fruit of his labors should not be lost for everybody.*"

Andre Doriel was a regular army officer and served in the role of paymaster general and army commissary intendant for Montcalm. Doriel had arrived in Canada with Dieskau and returned to France in November 1758. Doriel to Marshall de Belle-Isle, the State Secretary of War (July 31, 1758; O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 769): *"In all views, Fort Carillon is worth nothing and costs the King as much as Brisack (Neuf-Brisach in France). An ignoramus constructed it — a relative of M. de Vaudreuil, whose fortunes it was desirous to make and who has made it, See in this connection M. de Pont le Roy's Memoir, which I have put into cipher. Ineptness, intrigue, lies, cupidity, will in short time destroy this Colony, which costs the King so dearly."*

Following the Battle of Carillon, Lotbiniere is pushed aside by Pontleroy. Together with Desandrouins, Pontleroy turns his attention to completing various aspects of Carillon Doril to de Moras (July 28, 1758; O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 746): *The remainder and the Colonial troops are encamped at the Falls, and the eight French battalions are working industriously in constructing regular intrenchments and in finishing Fort Carillon. M. de Pont le Roy and, under his orders, M. Desandrouins are directors of the work. M. de Lotbiniere is here since the fifteenth.*

Lotbiniere is bold enough to directly write the Marshall de Belle-Isle, the State Secretary of War (November 9, 1758; O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 889): *"I flatter myself, my Lord, that you will be pleased to have the Cross of St. Louis conferred on me. 'Tis a favor, I dare say, I have merited by the zeal I have evinced on all occasions."*

The letter is appended: *"This Account is filled with falsehoods and deception. This Colonial officer says he has the honor to be known to the Marshall and to be in correspondence with him since some years. He has only just made Captain, even to the prejudice of some Seniors, and is not in a position to expect as yet, the Cross of St. Louis.*

He has officiated as Engineer; lacks not theory, but has little or no practice. He it is who built Fort Carillon, which, though 'tis worth nothing, costs the King so much and it is not perfect yet. He did not impoverish himself by it; he receives an income of 7 @ 8 thousand livres since three years; he had scarcely anything in 1755. He is a relative of the Marquis de Vaudreuil."

Instead, the Cross of St. Louis was awarded to Desandrouins for his efforts at Ticonderoga (1758). After the war, Lotbiniere traveled to France in an attempt to rejuvenate his military career, but his reputation was deeply tarnished, and he was harshly rejected. In this, Doriel and Pontleroy had been successful. Over time, Lotbiniere was able to regain some status and a sizable pension, but he never again served in the military. From Hamilton (164: Page 52):

"All the French regular officers who left us journals seem to have made bitter remarks about de Lotbiniere, perhaps because of the contempt of the regular for the colonial, perhaps on account of the character and actions of the young engineer. My own belief is that de Lotbiniere was an ambitious young man with little experience but most powerful connections who saw a chance to make a fortune and did, while always keeping within the law as it was then interpreted in New France. His intentions, unlike those of Bigot, were not evil."

With the capture of Fort St. Frederic and the construction of the much larger Crown Point, the British needed a secure staging area at Ticonderoga, not a front-line defensive position. Any defensive weaknesses conferred by the geography and position of Carillon were no longer relevant

and did not need correction or revision. Although Carillon would be repaired, the town adjacent to Carillon now became the true focus. Attributes associated with support and logistics would become fundamental to its changing role — wharves, dry warehouse space, bake ovens, boat stocks, artificers, sawmills, temporary housing, brick kilns, vegetable gardens, and hospitals.

The Champlain Valley contained a curious mix of fortifications. Chambly, very castle-like with 30-foot-tall curtain walls and even taller corner towers, but relatively small in footprint, about 175 feet square (1711). It is best described as a secure staging area. Fort Saint-Frédéric, whose central focus was a four-story artillery tower, more typical of a European coastal port (1738). And finally, there was Carillon, a bastion fort (1755). Notably, none of these forts experienced a full siege, including Carillon. Against Amherst in 1759, the French withdrew from Carillon just before the British opened their first battery. The perimeter stone walls of Fort Saint-Frédéric beyond the tower itself were only 2.5 feet thick and the stone walls of Chambly were 4 feet thick. If opposed by siege guns, all the parapets and embrasures were near the minimum dimensions for the materials used or were undersized. Both Saint-Frédéric and Chambly were abandoned with the approach of the British Army. At the same time, positioning large cannon in undersized parapets was not an issue, and had the distinct advantage of greater power, range, and intimidation. Upgrading the defensive character of these forts would have been extraordinarily difficult as both Saint-Frédéric and Chambly were fatally flawed by being dominated by adjacent high ground. All these forts had two functions, securing the water passage, and at the same time, the defense of that position. The geography and topography dictated that these two functions would conflict. Being in a fort and adjacent to higher ground was the obvious problem with no obvious solution.

What all three forts had in common was they mandated that the British convey a siege train through a wilderness without roads. Against these stone works, 4-pounders and 6-pounders would be problematic. The attacking pieces would need to be heavier guns with additional power and range, but those guns would be much more difficult to move. This was the cornerstone of their defense. Geography allowed the French to move by water, eliminating the need for most roads. The British had to cross over the drainage divide from the Hudson River into the St. Lawrence Basin and needed roads. Four times the British staged to attack Fort St. Frederic on Lake Champlain and four times never managed to move their substantial artillery trains within 30 miles of Saint-Frédéric before being defeated by the logistics and the wilderness. Without ever firing a cannon or scarcely a musket shot, Fort Saint-Frédéric remained a thorn and a constant irritant to the British for over 20 years.

b. Fort William Henry

The first phase of the construction of Fort William Henry occurred between late September and November 1755. The perimeter walls and bastions were completed, but only half the interior buildings were erected at this time. Although the design of Fort William Henry followed established protocols, the quality of the actual construction was somewhat mixed. But as regards the Siege itself, the walls proved convincingly solid. Tools were in short supply (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Pages 148 and 190). More importantly, there was an absence of enthusiasm and little time for the work. The initial construction was rushed and completed in less than two months, allowing for some sloppy work — green lumber displayed the inherent shrinkage issue and the waterproofing of the powder magazines proved troublesome. It was now late November.

Some aspects of the construction of Fort William Henry are well understood; some aspects are not. The interior elements are the least understood. At Fort William Henry, the barracks were built in two stages. The North and South Barracks were built in 1755 without underground casement storage. This was the work of Eyre (Figure 2). At the end of November, the interior of the barracks still required considerable work — there was no glass for the windows and only the second floor of the North Barracks had a wooden floor (Johnson Papers, Vol. 2, Page 354, November 28, 1755). The Western Barracks was also started in 1755, but it had progressed very little that year (Figure 2, Note T: *A Barrack not finished*). LO 1583 suggests that the initial construction was so hurried that no separate blacksmith or carpenter shops had been established, nor was there a large garrison bake oven. Some drawings suggest that officers may have been first quartered in a series of smaller buildings along the east and west walls.

Starting in late August 1756, these smaller buildings were demolished, and the larger East and West Barracks were built/completed with underground casements. The West Barracks was the first of the new barracks completed and included a bomb-proof casement. The casemate of the East Barracks was not bomb-proof (LO 3728). Just beyond the north curtain wall, the North Wall Storehouse was also constructed. This two-story building has been described as a magazine, but a storehouse label is more accurate. Montresor does not call it a powder magazine, just a magazine. Eyre only refers to it as a storehouse (LO 3728).

Until 1757, the British were reluctant in posting regulars with colonials, particularly those from New England. The work done in late 1756 appears to have been ordered by Burton and Montresor with no involvement by Eyre (LO 1583). All this work was done by the provincials under John Winslow of Massachusetts (Figure 1). Although positioned at Fort Edward, Nathaniel Meserve's command likely supervised the actual construction (reference Boyd-Raynes House, Portsmouth, New Hampshire). For the first year, Fort William Henry was a provincial posting. Together, the two phases of construction took no more than five working months to complete.

Internal to the Fort, the various drawings of the building layouts are decidedly inconsistent, particularly as regards the east and west walls. This may be a simple reflection of the changes over its two-year life. Bellico (2010) contains a near-complete collection of all the various illustrations of Fort William Henry. Several of the drawings best date to 1756 and the early months of the Winslow Expedition (Bellico 2010, Page 86; and Starbuck 2002, Page 28). Those drawings showing small sheds and huts on the east and west curtain walls should not be summarily discounted. These drawings may simply reflect the building configuration in either 1755 or 1756, but not 1757 (Figure 6A, Page 29). In LO 1583, these officers' huts are described as "*not habitable*". Figure 1 might be the closest representation of all the figures to the time of the Siege with four completed barracks. It is unclear if the north warehouse is shown on the plan or if the intention is to simply show where the footprint of the north warehouse was before it was removed. Neither the advanced work nor its footprint are shown.

Casements were rooms built internal to a structure or under a structure. Where there was no roof slope to shed rain and snow, the difficulty of casement construction was compounded. Precision and care were required to prevent excessive dampness or the pooling of water. Even if the work was initially sound, the freeze/thaw cycle may have quickly negated any quality work. Between the exterior and interior timber walls, the timber frame was filled with sand. If properly packed in 6-

inch lifts, the sand would have been stable and any infiltration by water markedly reduced. If placed loosely and unpacked, the sand would run, and water would readily move through a now porous backfill. As with Carillon, Fort William Henry suffered from wet and damp casements.

Casements were commonly used for storage but were not necessarily underground and could be located aboveground inside a curtain wall or under a bastion or ravelin. Casements were also used for shelter during an attack (Figure 2, Note O). At Fort William Henry, there was a total of six casements — two casement powder magazines, one under the north bastion, and one under the east bastion; a casement under the East Barracks; a casement under the West Barracks; a casement in the East Curtain Wall; and a casement under the south bastion. The two magazine casements under the north and east bastions were partially underground, but the casements in the East Curtain Wall and under the south bastion were aboveground. This East Curtain Wall Casement was primarily designed as a bomb-proof shelter, not storage (Figure 2, Page 5 and 6, Note O). Although not designed for storage, the East Curtain Wall Casement was quickly adopted for storage by the Provincials. Storage was intended to be aboveground in the long building sandwiched between the South Curtain Wall and South Barracks (Page 6, Note S and Section F – G; and Figure 18, below). Here the roof is pitched. Built by Eyre in 1755, this "hidden" building is not a casement. Unless informed of its presence, one could easily assume it to be part of the South Barracks. Apparently, it was overlooked during the inspections by both Gordon (MANA, Page 177) and then by Montresor (LO 1583, below). This oversight then "blurs" much of LO 1583. This storehouse was key to the logistics — there is no reason to believe it would not have been functioning in that role when the command of the fort passed from Eyre to Monro in April 1757. The existence of this storehouse is absent from all histories and narratives.

Underground casement storage of goods and supplies was difficult as casements were often damp and subject to seasonal flooding — the reason for the aboveground storehouse just outside the north wall. Whether above or below ground, providing adequate ventilation for a casement was often problematic and the ceiling heights were often very low and cramped. Even aboveground casements could prove frustratingly difficult to keep dry. Although drains might be provided, the near-flat overhead terrepleins were not watertight and seeping water from above was to be expected. When needed, heavy cloth fabric would be placed on top of a casement and treated with a waterproofing, only then would covering boards or stone be placed. In Figure 2, the powder magazines are depicted in the upper and lower section views. Both magazines featured angled roofs. In all likelihood, these roofs were first covered in heavy canvas and tar pitch was applied before placing the "top" roof boards. The magazines were then buried in a packed sand — the mass of the bastions securing the magazines. Access to the gunpowder stores was only from the parade ground via narrow, twisting passageways.

With the removal of the North Wall Storehouse, there is the distinct possibility that one of the four large interior buildings may have been transformed into a storehouse. Line drawings for three buildings are at the British Library, but none show casements (Figure 17; Note the title of the top drawing - New Magazine). Although we have these line drawings, no overall dimensions for the internal buildings are actually given. Histories and narratives do not assign any values to these dimensions. At Fort Edward, the barracks are described as 18 feet wide, but this dimension might be internal to the building (Hughes 2011, Page 70). In Figure 2, the outline for the West Barracks scales to 150 foot long and 20 foot wide (external).

Besides designing Fort William Henry, Eyre commanded the Fort during the Winter of 1756/1757, but he was likely absent throughout Summer 1756, only returning in late October with two companies of the 44th and two companies of the 48th (*Journals of the Hon. William Hervey*, Page 43). Outside of a period of a few weeks in Spring 1756 to temporarily relieve the provincial garrison that had wintered there, this was the first time that British regulars had ever garrisoned Fort William Henry (MANA, Page 176). With Eyre's arrival, a renewed effort focused on improving the conditions within the Fort was a certainty. No new structures were built, but the emphasis would have shifted to maintenance tasks and more routine housekeeping — waterproofing, the completion of the surrounding palisades, and bunks for the barracks. Stores and inventories would have been ordered. Eyre had some 475 men in his garrison with some 350 members of the 44th, the rest being Rogers' Rangers. None of these men were provincials and there would be no provincial pushback on Eyre's directions or orders. Eyre the Engineer would have made good use of this workforce. This occurs after Burton's often-quoted field review (LO 1583).

Following the near success of Rigaud's Winter Raid the previous March, Eyre's concern for fire was acute. In his letter of May 1757 (LO 3728), Eyre recommends that the southern barracks be razed and rebuilt of brick with a brick casement and that the eastern barracks be razed and not rebuilt, increasing the permanent size of the parade ground and lessening the worry of fire. These last two suggestions were not adopted. For the size of any anticipated garrison, Eyre reasoned that the three remaining large buildings and the dedicated storage adjacent to the south curtain wall would easily provide the needed barrack and storehouse space (reference Figure 2). Eyre did not undervalue Fort William Henry, but he understood its role in conjunction with Fort Edward. When conducting their assaults on Ticonderoga, neither Abercromby (1758) nor Amherst (1759) were markedly delayed by the loss of Fort William Henry.

After securing Fort St. Frederic in 1759, the British constructed a massive pentagon fort at the site, Fort Crown Point. Four of the wall lengths exceeded 400 feet with one exceeding 500 feet — the maximum dictated by the range of a smoothbore musket. This fort was to serve as one of the key staging areas for the British invasion of Canada in 1760. Logistics drove the design, not the need for a defensive colossus. The size of Crown Point allowed the British to safely winter the entire 27th Foot and two companies of Rogers' Rangers in a forward position while gathering and securing supplies for the next season (Cubbison 2014, Page 93). Much of Amherst's 1759 artillery train would winter here. Six companies of the 17th Foot wintered at Ticonderoga. In April 1773, Crown Point was lost to a chimney fire that started in a barracks and eventually spread throughout the fort. Crown Point was another of Eyre's designs.

At the end of 1756, enlisted men occupied at least two of the large barrack buildings. Space for administration, officer quarters, bake ovens, and a guardhouse would have to be provided. If constructed on the French model, these bake ovens would have been large enough to turn out hundreds, if not thousands, of loaves of bread each day. This does not appear to be the case here. The blacksmith shop was in an underground casement at the north end of the East Barracks. The well was located at the north end of the parade ground. Vegetable gardens were to the west and south of the Bastion.

Considering the rampant diseases that were common, hospital space would need to have been substantial and it was known to be internal to the Bastion. Unfortunately, the location of the

hospital internal to the fort itself is not mentioned in any of Eyre's or Harry Gordon's writings. Hints of where the hospital was at the time of the Siege focus on the North Barracks and South Barracks (LO 1583). There is a map suggesting the hospital was in the southeast corner of the parade ground, carved out of the South Barracks, but this map contains a myriad of problems (Starbuck 2002, Frontpiece and **Page 28**; and Bellico 2010, Page 86). This hospital is not shown in Figure 1, but there is just enough space for a small building in the southeast corner. The lack of any mention of a hospital in Figure 2 strongly suggests that the hospital internal to the fort was not established when Eyre prepared the drawing. Although maps suggest the South Barracks for the hospital, the North Barracks would be the safer of the two locations. There is a small building attached to the North Barracks in Figure 1 that might have served, but this building is labeled as a storehouse in Figure 2.

At the time of the Siege, LO 4654 places the sick and wounded in casements. The wounded were likely treated in the hospital and then subsequently moved to a casement. There was a total of six casements. Two were used as powder magazines. Locating the wounded under the south bastion would be problematic. Although aboveground, this casement appears to be too small for the need, roughly 36 feet by 12 feet, dark with poor ventilation. In Figure 6, this casement is labeled as the "Dungeon", likely a reference to the garrison's jail. Of the three remaining casemates, the East Curtain Casement offers the best position for placing the wounded. It has the needed size, and it was aboveground (Figure 2, Location O, heavily reinforced, about 60 feet by 15 feet). If attempting to isolate the sick and yet remain in the Bastion, this location probably offers the best and only opportunity to do both. This casement could easily be subdivided into separate rooms and wards, each with direct access to the parade ground. Unless well aired, the East Curtain Casement could prove to be both damp and wet, but in high summer this was less likely an issue (LO 1583; August 25, 1756). Steele (1990, Page 111) places some of the sick and wounded "*under the ramparts*" which only describes the East Wall Casement. Several skeletons were found in the East Barrack Casement (Starbuck 2014). Though not proof, it suggests that some of the wounded and sick were cared for there. No evidence rejects the possibility that the West Barrack Casement was also used to house the sick and wounded. In Figure 2, Location P offers some protection, but this unusual and poorly understood element was likely removed with the construction of the East Barracks.

Under recognized best practices, a satellite hospital for disease cases should have been located outside the Bastion in a secure location away from the rest of the garrison. If possible, a separate and isolated smallpox hospital would be provided, as was done at Fort Edward, the logical place would have been outside the east wall. Eyre describes "*an Old Hospital*" being burnt outside the east wall during Rigaud's Raid (William Eyre, Letter of March 24th, 1757, in the Final Letter Appendix; O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 572; and Parkman 1922, Page 450). The reference to "old" suggests a construction date of 1755 for this building. Eyre's tone suggests this "old" building was no longer being used as a hospital; it was being used by a tradesman. In this same letter, Eyre does reference the existence of an established hospital internal to the Bastion, so there were indeed two "hospitals", but only a single internal hospital at the time of the Siege. Monro does not replace the "old" hospital.

Entering Winter 1755-1756, this outside hospital was "naked". The ranger encampment and picketed stockade had not been built yet. The first provincial garrison quickly abandoned the hospital and housed their sick in either the North or South Barracks. With the undersized provincial




Figure 17. Buildings at Fort William Henry. Upper Figure: *Elevation of the New Magazine on the back of the NE: Curtain at Fort William Henry*. The taller end of the roof would have been immediately opposite the North Curtain Wall. Lower Figure: *Elevation of the Barracks Intended to be Built at Fort William Henry*. This is likely the East Barracks. Fireplaces and outside staircases are prominent. These buildings date to 1756 and the Winslow Campaign, but do not show any casements. The separate room in the lower drawing is likely a blacksmith shop (plus the casement below). There is a third drawing to this set at the British Library - *Elevation of the New Barracks built at Fort William Henry* (Steele 1990, Page 63; and Starbuck 2002, Page 28). This last drawing is likely the West Barracks. As a set, there is a problem with the drawings. It appears the numbers on the scales have been switched on two of the drawings, the Magazine and the West Barracks. As printed, the West Barracks scales to about 91 feet and the Magazine to 150 feet, a length far too long to fit in front of the north curtain. The scale on the West Barracks should read 0-90; the scale on the Magazine should read 0-50. With this switch (the bars stay the same), the West Barracks scales to 160 feet and the Magazine to 86 feet. The unchanged East Barracks scales to about 170 feet. After this change, the widths scale to 23 feet (West), 25 feet (East), and 26 feet (Magazine). Dimensions may need to be reduced a further 5-20%. The British Library credits Captain Abercromby as the author — likely Captain James Abercrombie of the 42nd Foot. British Library, King George III Topographical Collection. Online.

garrison, finding space would not have proved too difficult. The construction of a secure hospital outside the Bastion should have had a high priority in 1756, but Winslow chose to focus on shipbuilding instead. Winslow does not order the construction of a hospital until August 20th (Pargellis 1933, Page 95) which exactly corresponds to the window of Burton's and Montresor's review and inspection (LO 1583, August 25th). At the same time, Winslow builds the East and West Barracks. The new hospital may have been part of this work or the hospital may simply have remained in its then location with expansion, the additional space provided by the two new barracks would have allowed for this. Montresor had wanted the hospital included as part of the North Wall Storehouse, but there is no evidence to suggest it was and no chimney is included in that drawing. Although conjecture, this sequence matches with the correspondence, the narratives of Rigaud's Winter Raid, and the Siege.

Along the lake edge and along the stream to the east of the Bastion, there were at least three large storehouses (March 1757). Boat stocks and a sawmill were nearby. A simple timber palisade protected the ranger huts fronting the stream. Except for the large storehouse in the saddle of the north curtain wall, this collection of buildings was burnt in Rigaud's Raid. Two of the large storehouses were total losses. Any ship gear, boat rigging, sails, and ship carpenter supplies were likely stored there. A third structure holding a large quantity of cut building timber was also lost to fire.

There was a sizable wharf. In 1756, the wharf had to be large enough to berth three sloops, five bayboats (sail), and four gundolas or scows (LO 2242). Beached on the lakeshore were twelve whaleboats (keeled), and 209 bateaux (rowed flat-bottomed cargo boats). A larger fourth sloop was in the stocks under construction and very nearly finished. In the original letters, gundolas is spelled gundolas (LO 2242 and LO 3179), not gondolas as in many histories. The general thought is these were unarmed sailed/rowed transport vessels for artillery, but they may have been unarmed simply to allow the three completed sloops to be outfitted with all of the available swivel guns. Russel Bellico has gathered many old plates and drawings for these vessels and his volumes represent by far the best overview of the 1756 "navy" (Bellico 2001, Page 38 and especially Page 337; and Bellico 2010, Page 89).

The week before the arrival of Montcalm, ship carpenters and sailors were likely pushing very hard to complete the replacement vessels then in the stocks. This was the direction given by Webb at the first officer conference in late July. Two rowed/sailed galliots were being constructed, each capable of supporting at least one forward-facing 9-pound cannon and numerous swivel guns. At least one of these ships "was to be ready in a few days" (LO 4020, referenced to July 25th). Provincials who owned needed skills may have been drafted to help in this work as well. Still, this would be at a time when only men from New Jersey, New Hampshire, and a few from New York were at Fort William Henry, the much larger contingent of Massachusetts provincials was still at Fort Edward. The New Jersey provincials had been devastated at Sabbath Point on July 23rd, losing some 250 men (killed and captured), just under 50% of their total strength. Unluckily, most carpenters had been stripped from the New Hampshire provincials and formed into a 100-man artificer company that was with Loudoun in Nova Scotia (Head 1866, Page 189). In an even more ironic turn, Colonel Meserve, leading the New Hampshire men under Loudoun, was a respected shipbuilder from Portsmouth, New Hampshire (Boscawen 2011, Page 67; and LO 2859, Final Letter Appendix). Given authority, Meserve might have proven invaluable at William Henry. This hurried effort may

be reflected in "*Transactions*" where there is a reference to 150 sailors and carpenters: "*The Garrison of the Fort consisted at this time, of a Captain, Two Subalterns, and Sixty Regulars; with about One hundred and Fifty Sailors and Carpenters, but was afterwards augmented with Provincials, to about Four hundred.*" Alternatively, and fully consistent with *Transactions'* theme of shielding any British officer, the reference to 150 sailors and carpenters was a subtle attempt to buffer both Webb and Montresor from any criticism for not prioritizing shipbuilding earlier in the season, when in fact there were only 60 sailors and carpenters actively working on the ships, as suggested in Monro's writings (LO 4479 and LO 4367). Although the urgency to complete the work came too late and regardless of their actual number, these men likely provided very good service throughout the Siege both with the artillery and making repairs to any damage done by the French bombardment. Evidently, these men were absorbed or re-absorbed into other units at the time of surrender and do not appear as a distinct body of men in the Bougainville Journals (August 22, Page 175).

Regionally, inadequate barrack space and lack of winter quarters was a huge issue (Loudoun to Cumberland; MANA, Page 265): "*I have been forced to keep the Troops too late in the Field; first, from the Enemy keeping so long in a body in our Neighbourhood; then to finish the Forts so far as to make them defensible; and thirdly here for want of barracks, in which I have been very ill served; for M^r Montresor, whom I employed as being Chief Engineer, has shifted so often from one thing to another, without Acquainting me, tho' on the Spot, and making Alterations, & carrying works without Acquainting me, which has thrown the Barracks so far back, that I am, forced to put the Troops into Quarters, which are not able well to contain them; this I believe he will not try again, but business will not go on under his direction; it is all very well when his is with you, but as his Practise has plainly been all, in drawing & directing in his room, it neither goes on nor is well directed, when he is from you.*"

When the 1757 Campaign against Louisbourg was canceled, there was insufficient barrack space or winter quarters to house the 17 battalions then in Nova Scotia. Loudoun was forced to send many of the battalions south to the coastal cities of Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. Stinging from the loss of Fort William Henry, Loudoun planned to assemble an army at Albany for a winter offensive against Ticonderoga and a half-dozen or so battalions returning from Halifax were scattered throughout the Mohawk and Hudson Valleys (Loudoun to Cumberland, October 17, 1757; LO 4642 and MANA, Page 400). Payment for winter housing, legal squabbling with the legislatures and local authorities, and the sheer inconvenience could overwhelm communities, even supplying sufficient firewood would become problematic. Without clear legal mandates and direction from the British Parliament and clarification of colonial legislative powers via London, the quartering of regular troops would remain a thorny issue throughout the remainder of the war (Pargellis 1933, Pages 187- 210). The 77th suffered in near-absent winter quarters in South Carolina.

The typical life of the enlisted soldier is described in Brumwell (2002). In the 1750s, barrack space was minimal per enlisted man. Each soldier might be assigned as little as 12 - 13 square feet of individual space. Beds and even blankets were commonly shared. Disease was ubiquitous. During the first winter at Fort William Henry, there were few beds and the provincial soldiers found it necessary to use tents as blankets (Travers 2015, Page 45). When Winslow arrived in Spring 1756, few usable tents remained. By the time of the American Civil War, 18 square feet of unencumbered

barracks space was allocated per enlisted man. Under current U.S. Army guidelines (US Army, 36-017-0110), the minimum standard is 72 square feet of floor space per man; 90 square feet per man is the recommended minimum for a room assignment of four soldiers.

The Journal of Captain Nathaniel Dwight (Massachusetts Provincials) describes Fort William Henry in Fall 1755. Captain Dwight was an accomplished surveyor by profession, arriving at Lake George on October 7th and leaving in late November, likely on the 27th. While at Lake George, he participated in the construction of the fort, but he was seriously sick for much of the time. The accompanying figure seen in the 1902 publication of the Dwight Journal appears to have been prepared specifically for that 1902 publication but adopting the style and format of the Rocque Plan (Figure 1). Apparently, the author of this 1902 drawing very carefully modified the Rocque Plan using the information from the Dwight Journal (Figure 18). The adaptation is exceedingly faithful to the Dwight Journal. As such, this figure itself does not date to 1755. Unfortunately, the Dwight Journal is not repetitive, and many individual dimensions are not specified, but several interior elements are best detailed here particularly the bastion casements and magazines. Only the dimensions of the west bastion are described in the Journal, but these values are then transferred to the other three bastions, so the individual bastions appear nearly identical in size and shape, simple inversions. Instead of giving the wall length from bastion tip to bastion tip, only the length of two curtain walls is provided. The Journal indicates that the east and west curtain wall lengths were near identical, as are the north and south curtain wall lengths, so the fort would have a distinctly rectangular shape — much closer to Figure 2 than Figure 1. The northern and east curtain walls, which lacked gun embrasures, are incorrectly shown in the figure as the same width as the western and south curtain walls; they should be narrower resulting in a shorter distance from bastion tip to bastion tip. As such, the overall result depicted in Figure 18 is a much larger fort with the shortest outer dimension scaling to about 335 feet and the largest to about 380 feet.

The two storehouse locations are identical to those in Figure 2. The dimensions of both magazines and the casement under the south bastion are given dimensions, but their positions should be modified to correspond to Figures 2 and 3; they are not centered. In Figure 18, the main access leading to the ramparts is via the west bastion, presumably a ramp. Logic demands access to the rampart from this corner (See Figure 2), but the Dwight Journal itself does not mention this feature anywhere. Figure 2 suggests at least three of the corners provided access to the rampart. There is no mention of a hospital.

Besides Figure 2 and the Dwight Journal, two letters hint at the internal structure of Fort William Henry. One is LO 1583, dated August 26th, 1756. This Inspection Report was prepared under orders from Loudoun and shared under the signatures of Lt. Colonel Burton of the 48th, Montresor, and Captain MacLeod of the Royal Artillery (August 25, 1756). MacLeod's contribution was in all likelihood the source of the artillery inventories for Fort William Henry and Fort Edward found in *Loudoun to Cumberland – Albany, October 3, 1756* (LO 1968 and MANA, Page 239). The other letter providing information regarding the building layout is Eyre's letter to Loudoun, dated May 28, 1757 (LO 1328). There has been considerable confusion involving this inspection report and the other reports prepared for Loudoun; letter numbers and identifications have been jumbled. For clarification, Loudoun ordered Burton to conduct the reviews of both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry on August 5th (LO 1424). The inspection reviews then happened in mid-August. The




Figure 18. As-Built Plan of Fort William Henry. The Journal of Capt. Nathaniel Dwight of Belchertown, Mass. During the Crown Point Expedition, 1755. New York Genealogical and Biographical Record (Vol. 33, 1902; January and April Issues). The figure apparently dates to 1902 and the publication of the journal text, not 1755. The scale reads 8 rods (above) and 132 Feet (below). The distance between the bastion tips on the west side scales to about 380 feet; the distance between the bastion tips on the north side scales to 335 feet. The gangway to rampart is at the west bastion, but this element is not mentioned in the text.

The Journal of Capt. Nathaniel Dwight Of Belchertown, Mass., During The Crown Point Expedition, 1755. Contributed by Rev. Melatiah Everett Dwight. The New York Genealogical and Biographical Record. New York City, January and April 1902:

Plan of Fort William Henry

Hear followeth Some Dimensions of ye fort (fort William Henry) building at Lake George. From the S^o W^t Corner of that Bastion on ye outside 5 rods to the middle or width of ye bastion then turn to main wall 2 ½ pr, crosses the Bastion in ye middle or widest place 4 ½ pr 5 feet.

Main wall on the So 6 ½ pr to S^o W^t Bastion, on No ye same as ye South. Main wall on the W^t 10 pr Long, on ye E^t same. Main wall 30 feet thick. Wall where the Ambrazers are is 12 feet thick. A baruck on the N^o side from W^t wall runs E^t within about 12 feet of E^t main wall and Divided in middle, a chimney in each half in middle so as to make four rooms. N.B. — it is 2 Story high about 20 feet room N^o and S^o.

Our barruck on ye S^o 10 feet from W^t wall runs as far as the other, Divided as ye other and same width as ye other. A Store house 7 feet inside back side S^o Barruck from Gangway at W^t wall even with the Gate which is about 10 feet wide between the S^oE^t Bastian and E^t main wall. A small Storehouse E^t end N^o Barruck from the slant of ye Barruck running E^t to Bastian. A room in S^oE^t Bastian 2 rod 3 feet long, 15 feet E^t end and 10 feet W^t end. Doar near ye Gate. One Magizene NE^t Corner. Rode runs S^o 6 paces then W^t 5 paces then S^o 2 paces yⁿ W 15 paces, or a Little bearing S^oW^t, so as to come out just at the Corner of the Little Storehouse which runs E^t from the Square end of ye barrack one rod and the middle of it right ag^t ye inside of the E^t main wall and E^t end slants away towards the Bastien, and ye front of the N^o Barruck ends right ag^t the Square End of ye S^o Barruck without the Slant of the North barrack. From the slant of W corner at the W^t End of N^o barruck one step to the entrance of ye magazine the Gangway runs N^o 5 paces then W^t 5 paces to the Dore of the Room, which Dore is at S^oW^t Corner of s^d room which room is six paces long N^o and 3 ½ paces wide the other way.

Paragraph 1: The exterior face of the west bastion is described as 5 rods (82.5 feet); the exterior flanks 2 1/2 pr (41.25 feet); and the outside width of the bastion 4 1/2 pr 5 feet (79.25 feet) as measured at the interface of the faces with the flanks.

Paragraph 2: South Curtain Wall is described as 6 1/2 pr (107.25 Feet); North Curtain Wall the same length; West Curtain Wall 10 pr (165 feet); East Curtain Wall the same length. Curtain walls 30 feet thick; gun embrasures on the curtain wall 12 feet thick. These curtain wall dimensions are good matches for Figure 2, Eyre's As-Built. The Barrack description suggests four rooms per floor, two chimney stacks.

Paragraph 3: The South Barracks is similar in dimension and construction to the North Barracks. A long, narrow Storehouse is sandwiched between the South Barracks and South Wall, but the representation is not in complete agreement with Figure 2, Section F - G. There is an exceedingly small Storehouse to the east of the North Barracks. The dimensions of the NW Magazine (15 x 12.5 ft), NE Magazine (15 x 8.75 ft), and the casement under the south bastion is a trapezoid (10 ft x 36 ft x 15 ft x 36 ft). Distance definitions:

1 rod = 16.5 feet; perch = pr = 16.5 ft. or 19.183 ft depending on authority; pace = 2.5 feet.

A plan drawing for 1757 melding Figures 1, 2, and 18 does not exist at present. Recent drawings often drop the west curtain wall embrasures, have the wrong number or orientations for the embrasures, have a reduced eastern wall length, and lack the "narrow" southern storehouse — a heavy dose of Figure 1. Gifford (1955, Page 10) includes an exceptionally accurate rendering that is based on Figure 2, not Figure 1.

inspection report for Fort William Henry was completed on August 25th (LO 1583). A separate report was prepared for Fort Edward (LO 1619; August 29th, 1756). The original for this transcription is from the Huntington Library in San Marino, California. Slightly different versions of this letter are housed in the Canadian Archives and the British Archives. Burton writes a third companion letter to Loudoun two days later under his own signature that relates to the sickness and disease at both Fort William Henry and Fort Edward (LO 1599, August 27th). After commanding the garrison for five months, Eyre responds to the changes made by Burton and Montresor in LO 1328 (May 28, 1757). LO 1424 and LO 1599 are transcribed in full in the next appendix. LO 1599 is by far the most referenced of all these reports and letters.

LO 1583. From Burton, Montresor, and MacLeod to Loudoun, dated August 25, 1756, in response to orders contained in LO 1424:

A Report of the present State of Fort William Henry pursuant to His Excellency the Earl of Loudoun's Instructions to us for Examining into the state of that Fort with regard to the Artillery and Military Stores and the Magazine for Ammunition and provisions, and to give the Necessary Orders to prepare Barracks for the Reception and Accommodation of Such a Garrison, as we shall judge Necessary for the Defence of that Fort. together with Store houses for provisions for Nine Months for the Garrison, Dated at the head Quarters at Albany August the fifth 1756

1st. The Fort it self is not finished, one side being so low that the Interior is seen into (in Revers) from the rising Ground on the South East side, also the East Bastion has the same defect from the Grounds to the West, both of them considerably higher than the Fort, the Ditches being Dug in loose sand crumbles away so that they are at present without form. the Gateway and communication into the Fort is seen into from the south East, The Platforms for Cannon are Defficient, the Saillant Angles are too low (salient angles and the bastion tips are too "pointy"), no Drawbridge, a bad Gate, and too many Embrasures in the Northwest Curtine, which renders it weak, The outwork intended to Scour the Swamp, not finished. Its Communication, and also the Ditch and Palisades are wanting, without Banquetts or Platforms, or the Gorge secur'd

2^d. The Casemate under the East Curtine exceeding Damp, the Timbers beginning to rott and all mouldy, this Casimate can contain three hundred Barrells, the rest of the Casimates are some what better, and will contain in the whole Eleven hundred Barrells of Provisions, the Powder Magazine is in a very bad Condition, by the wet and Dampnefs of it, which has been the lofs of one hundred Barrells of Powder belonging to the Provincials that was stor'd there, it is Capable of Containing Eight hundred Barrells

3^d. The Barracks at present will Contain two hundred and Twenty Eight men but neither Bedsteads nor Bedding and no lodgings for Officers except a few Sheds built against the North west Curtine not habitable. No Magazine for provisions within the Fort except for the Casimates above mentioned. (Comment: The Storehouse adjacent to the south curtain is overlooked, Figure 2).

No Hospitall, part of one the Barracks being made use of for that purpose, there is a Well the Water not fit for Drinking, no guard house the men lying under a Miserable shed next the Gate; No smiths Shop or Forge within the Fort or anyplace to work in.

4th. The Artillery and stores that were there last Winter, and in the Spring according to an Annex'd List, all in bad condition, the Gun Carriages being rotten and Decay'd, Except the four Brafs Six pounders, for which they are at present at work on, for the making of New travelling Carriages, all the ladles and Spunges are out of Repair and unserviceable, there is a very small proportion of Ammunition both for the Guns and Mortars in the Fort, and the Rest of the stores so confus'd and intermixed that no exact account could be taken of them, but were oblig'd to take a Return of them from the Provincial Commissary.

5th. The state of the Artillery and stores brought by the Provincials to the Camp at Fort William Henry this season will be seen by the Second List hereunto annex'd sign'd by their Commifsary, and was Examin'd into by Captain MacLeod, But in regard to the Return of Shott and Shells they are found short, some being left on the Road and not Collected together.

The above being a true and exact account of the state and condition we found Fort William Henry in, Gave the following Orders and directions for its Repairs, additional Defence and Necessary Buildings, to be proceeded upon Immediately, according to his Lordships Instructions to us of the foremention'd date.

1st. That the South East Curtine be rais'd so high with logs that the Interior part of the Fort, or its opposite Curtine may be cover'd, that the Traverce upon the East Bastion be thickn'd, and rais'd with a passage underneath to go into the Bastion, That the Platforms be new laid and compleated, The Ditches new traced, with the Scarp and Counterscarp faced with Fascines, to prevent the sand Crumbling away, That a Tonaille (Tenaille) be made in front of the south East curtine to Cover the communication into the Fort, That a new Gate and Drawbridge be made, besides a Bridge over the Ditch of the Tonaille (Tenaille), The Saillant Angles next the rising Grounds to be raised two foot higher in order to Cover better the flanks of its Bastions, and every other Embrasure in the West Curtine to be stopt up, the outwork next the swamp to be finish'd with its communication enlarged, to move small pieces of Cannon on Occasion, It's Gorge clos'd up with a Barrier, a Ditch on its west face, and the whole pallisaded with platforms & Banquetts,

2^d. As to the Casimates for powder and provisions that are bad the tops are to be taken off, to be new Boarded and Caulk'd with a Pitch Cloth over its Boarding, Small Gutters to Carry off the water from penetrating into the Casimates, and air holes to keep it dry,

3^d. It is thought Necessary that Eight Eighteen pounders, two thirty two pounders, two twelve pounders, four Six pounders and four four pounders with one thirteen Inch Morter, two ten Inch Morters, & one Eight Inch Morter, be kept Continually mounted on the Batterys of the Fort, and to Supply the Out Works on Occasion with a proper proportion of Ammunition and stores requisite for the above Number of Guns, and Morters, and also for the Infantry

4th. A Pile of Barracks to be Built parralel to the West Curtine to Contain two hundred and twenty four men, also another Pile opposite to that for one Field Officer, Four Captains, twelve Subalterns, one Engineer, one Artillery Officer, as it is thought Necefsary that this Garrison should Consist of four hundred and thirty two men, Exclusive of a Ranging Comp^y, an Hospital for Sixty Men with an appartment for Surgeon and Mate, a Magazine for Nine Months provisions for five hundred Men, to be Built Paralel to the North Curtine next the Lake on the out side of the Fort; as there is not Room within. this Magazine will be secured and defended by the two Flanks and Palisades, it being out of

the line of Fire, It is also Necessary that there should be a small Laboratory and a Smiths Forge, with a Carpenters Shop, a Cantine for a Sutler, an Oven for Bread, but as there is not Room within the Fort for all. those that are of the least Consequence, must be Built in the most secure part without.

5th. That on the rising Ground to the South East side of the Fort at about Seven hundred Yards distance commanding the Road from Fort Edward, the East strand of the Lake, and a great part of the Swamp a Redoubt or Blockhouse should be erected, with a Ditch before it, Mounting Two pieces of Small Cannon, and proper Accomodations for fifty men would Greatly Contribute to strengthen Fort William Henry, by taking possession of that Advantageous piece of Ground, preventing the Enemy from Approaching it that way, and giving timely Notice to the Fort,

6th. That the rising Ground to the south West at about four hundred Yards distance Commands the Fort, part of the back swamp, and the west corner of the Lake, it is a very Advantageous Piece of Ground, if taken Possession of by an Enemy, for which reason Another Redoubt is propos'd on it, and will be of great Security for the Defence of the Fort on that Side, as these two sides are most are most proper for an Enemy to Attack upon, and will serve as two great Supports to the place bearing at about right Angles from one another, 'Tis Necessary that this Redoubt should be Defended and Accommodated as the other, both in Respect to Artillary, Construction and the Force to maintain it, whenever the above Redoubts are Built the strength of the Garrison must be Augmented from four hundred and thirty two, to five hundred and thirty two men, with Officers in proportion.

*Fort William Henry
Augst. the 25th. 1756*

*R. Burton L^t. Col^l. 48th. Reg^{mt}.
Ja^s. Montresor Chief Engin^r.
Wm. Macleod Cap^t. L^t. of Artillery*

Note: Although referenced twice in this letter, no annex lists or other attachments are included as part of the manuscript document for LO 1583 (Huntington Library). If found, these lists should provide the best understanding of the British stores heading into the Siege. Copies of these lists may be with the John Winslow Papers in Boston (Massachusetts Historical Society, MHS, Manuscript Boxes N-483, N-484, and N-485; and N-1942 compiled by Edward Brooks) or with the Loudoun Papers in California without reference to the LO 1583 manuscript.

Loudoun could not have been happy with either of the inspection reports, but neither was he entirely happy with the focus, particularly that of Montresor. Earlier in the year, Gordon had inspected Fort William Henry under orders from Shirley (MANA, Page 177). The letter sequence in MANA suggests Gordon's Report was written in June. Aspects of Montresor's report mirror Harry Gordon's Report. Gordon served under Montresor. Gordon's review does not touch on the internal structure but gives great detail as regards the perimeter construction. When reading LO 1583, one needs to add in the description and detail found in Gordon's letter, but little of his recommendations. Both Montresor and Gordon had reviewed Fort William Henry as a textbook exercise with little consideration of the underlying purpose, more so of Gordon than even Montresor. Montresor had misgauged Loudoun's intentions and more importantly his needs. Loudoun had no thought of turning Fort William Henry into a defensive juggernaut at the expense of any possibility of moving north on Ticonderoga. Montresor saw Fort William Henry in a very different light than Eyre. Unfortunately, neither of these letters attempts to provide a full description of Fort William Henry. The overlooked storehouse may simply have been passed over, assumed to be part of the South Barracks. The concentration in both letters was on needed work and the work needed is carefully prioritized in LO 1583. The Burton letter

should be referenced to Figure 2; the Eyre letter is best referenced to the building configuration found in Figure 1 with the addition of the advanced work to the south. The two letters should be read in tandem.

After the first season, this report documents that no major construction had occurred within the Bastion up to that time. The North Wall Storehouse, the East Barracks, or the West Barracks had yet to be built. There was no dedicated hospital internal to the Fort. Winslow's focus had been building the "navy", not on improving or expanding Fort William Henry. Saying that Winslow "ignored" Fort William Henry for the first four months would be fair and accurate, but it was not part of his mandate, moving on Carillon was. The call for the establishment of redoubts on hillocks to the southwest and southeast was not surprising and mirrors Gordon's thoughts. The addition of these redoubts was low on the priorities and never adopted. This was either a reflection of the lack of time remaining that season or Loudoun's own objections to expanding the Fort. Monro does not attempt to implement the last of these recommendations. Of some note, the report provides an understanding of how the first provincial garrison was wintered. Per the report, a single barracks could accommodate a little over 200 men. The first winter garrison consisted of 200 to- 300 colonial troops under Colonel Jonathan Bagley of Massachusetts (Steele 1990, Page 62; Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 354; and Vol. IX, Pages 324 – 326; \approx 206 initial troops + 107 scheduled reinforcements). The North Barracks, having a second floor, was large enough to house the initial number of rank and file, but no more. The South Barracks was likely "shared" between the officers with the sick isolated in separate rooms. The scheduled reinforcements may not have been sent, the lack of space an easy excuse. More suggestive that there were no reinforcements was the 205 soldiers in Governor Hardy's relief column — 80 British regulars and 125 New York Militia (Spring 1756), nearly identical to the initial number of provincial troops. Per Johnson's instructions to Bagley (Johnson Papers, Vol. 2, Page 354), parade ground huts were built in anticipation of the reinforcements, but the quality of the construction was so poor that these huts may never have been used. These are the *not habitable huts* described in LO 1583. Provisions were positioned in the storehouse sandwiched between the South Barracks and the South Curtain Wall. Unless well provisioned with roots and vegetables, the diet would have been decidedly unhealthy, scurvy. By winter's end, the windows may still have been without glass and the construction was of green wood, guaranteeing shrinkage and bitter drafts. Any found tent canvas was used for blankets. Cold misery, but the volume of provisions was much better than that at Oswego, the suffering less.

In Figure 2, the number of gun embrasures in the west curtain wall does not appear excessive. There are six embrasures over a 140-foot run, an interval of 20 feet from center to center. Although the interval between embrasures approaches the minimum standard of 18 feet, they do not violate that standard. More importantly, the artillery stores are a confused jumble to the extent that an accurate account cannot be made. There is strong troubling language, but lacking the inventory attachments makes any judgment speculative: *"there is a very small proportion of Ammunition both for the Guns and Mortars in the Fort, and the Rest of the stores so confused and intermixed that no Exact Account could be taken of them ... But in Regard to the Return of shott and shells they are Found short some being left on the Road and not Collected together."*

Leaky casemates had caused the loss of over 150 half-barrels of gunpowder or at least the need to sift the powder, so the suggestion for rain gutters was not without merit. The problem with damp casemates would never be fully solved. James Furnis of the Board of Ordnance was sifting powder as Montcalm approached in August 1757; otherwise, he would have returned to Fort Edward with

Montresor. Yet, the idea that the total shot and shell was not in proportion to the calibers of guns present or the anticipated need is now firmly established. MacLeod knew or may have suspected this a full year before the Siege. Artillery tools needed to service the guns are lacking including gunpowder ladles and bore sponges. The quality and soundness of the guns are not directly addressed in the report. This information could have been included in the inventories that were attached and given to Loudoun, but these inventories may now be lost. Still, if any guns were found to be rotten, one would expect it to be highlighted in the body of the reports themselves. The only hint in either of the reports relating to the soundness of the guns is a single unexact sentence — *"The Artillery and stores that were there last Winter, and in the Spring according to an Annex'd List, all in bad condition, the Gun Carriages being rotten and Decay'd"*. Precisely, what *"all in bad condition"* references is unclear.

Loudoun now has a stack of detailed information and decisions were made. Burton's report only confirmed Loudoun's decision to cancel the provincial's advance on Fort Carillon (Loudoun to Winslow, August 20, 1756; Final Letter Appendix). The report includes a critically important statement: *"Gave the following Orders and directions for its Repairs."* Evidently, Winslow adheres to these orders and quickly moves ahead with the building of the East Barracks, the West Barracks, and the North Wall Storehouse. After the confrontation over officer ranks, Winslow had little interest in a second clash with Loudoun. All these buildings were completed within three months. The construction of the additional outworks recommended in the letter was not done; this adjustment seems more in line with Loudoun's original orders (LO 1424). As a first step, Winslow seems to have suspended all further shipbuilding — leaving the fourth sloop in the stocks, only a few days away from completion (LO 1599). It remains in the stocks until burnt by the French in March 1757, a full seven months. Winslow then politely makes a statement by touring the full length of Lake George in the three completed sloops, firing a 6-pounder at a small French barge encountered at the northern end of Lake George (LO 1710, September 5, 1756). Winslow wanted Loudoun to know the price paid when he was directed to "complete" Fort William Henry.

In September, Burton was made commander of Fort Edward. Loudoun then visits both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. That October, Loudoun moved at least twelve large artillery pieces south from Fort William Henry to Fort Edward. On October 24th, elements of the 44th arrived at Fort William Henry and Eyre was made commander (Hervey Journals, Page 43). For the first time, garrison duties now transfer to the British regulars, both at Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. Loudoun and Webb were headquartered in Albany. In mid-November, the provincials headed home.

With the arrival of Eyre to take over garrison duties, the jumble of stores was likely fully resolved and good order established. Gun carriages would have been repaired to the best of their abilities. Many of these would have been garrison or truck carriages which offered less recoil than a field carriage mount, a distinct asset on narrow ramparts. To absorb the shock of firing, these carriages were reinforced and quite heavy. William Johnson identified the same problem in 1755 and took great effort to have new carriages made in New York City and Albany (Johnson Papers, Vol. I, numerous entries starting on Pages 504 and 724). Anticipating wear and tear on the carriage frames, a considerable number of spare carriages were ordered. Johnson's new carriages were shipped north separately from the guns, so there was an obvious disconnect in marrying the cannon to the new carriages.

By Fall 1755, the shipping of food and provisions overrode any need for ordnance or gun carriages. Burton's letter implies that many of the new gun carriages ordered by Johnson had failed to reach Fort

William Henry. At least through August 1756, the guns were still mounted on older and poorly maintained carriages. With the arrival of Loudoun, Eyre, and then the Royal Artillery, the gun carriages were made serviceable or the new carriages had finally arrived.

This letter by Eyre is best referenced to Figure 1. From Eyre to Loudoun, May 28, 1757 (LO 1328):

*Memorandum of the Works necessary
to be done at Fort W^m. Henry and what
has been lately ordered.
New York, 28th May 1757*

The Palisading to be continued quite round the Fort as directed, the slopes to be compleated west to the Swamp and the out Work to be closed in the Gorge.

The communications at the Interance to the Powder Magazine to be made up of Stone or Brick, and the curtain next to the Lake to be lined with the Same Material.

The above has been ordered, and I believe by this time pretty nearly, if not compleated.

Directions were likewise given about one Month Ago to burn as many Bricks, as there could be found hands who knew any thing of the Businefs Amongest the Troops.

For the Security of the Garison and to prevent the fatal Effects of a Fire within Side, it would be necessary, if time will Allow, to takedown the framed Barrack on the South West Side (South Barracks) & built it up with Brick, make officers Apartments at each End of it, According to a former Design, which with the other two Piles formerly built, may contain as many men as will be sufficient to defend the Garison. And if that Pile of building was removed which is opposite to it on the South East Side (East Barracks), it would greatly enlarge the Parade & very much diminish the ill Consequences that might Arise if a Fire should happen in the Fort. The Casement which is under this framed Pile of Building should be made Bomb-proof in the same Manner as the opposite to it; these two will put into Security as much provisions as can ever be thought Necessary for the Use of the Garison, if there were no Others in the Fort.

The Same precautions in regard to these Buildings to be carried on at Fort Edward would be of great Security, in case of Fire. orders have like wise been Sent there to burn as many Bricks as they could find Hands for that Purpose.

N:B: The Storehouse built next to the Lake at Fort Wm. Henry may be prejudicial to the defence of the Side, and should be removed.

This letter documents the presence of the East and West Barracks, and the North Wall Storehouse. All three buildings had to have been built by Winslow in Late Summer and Fall 1756, but only after the inspection by Burton and Montessor. Only the West Barracks is “bomb-proof” construction. Eyre accepts the West Barracks but fully rejects the North Wall Storehouse. He prefers the elimination of the East Barracks, but if it will stay, the underground casemate should be made stronger, possibly bricked or thick-timbered with additional piles, pillars, and internal supports. Eyre favors the replacement of the Old South Barracks with one constructed of brick. Previously, Eyre had gone into great detail discussing the defense of Fort William Eyre focusing on the problems imposed by the

adjacent high ground (Johnson Papers, Volume II, Page 331; November 25, 1755, Final Letter Appendix). Eyre suffered from no illusion as regards the weaknesses of Fort William Henry. With a well-managed siege, Fort William Henry would fall to the French. Interestingly, Eyre foresees the possibility of a winter raid. Written after the first phase of construction, Eyre's 1755 letter remains solid. Eyre does not discuss the quality of the guns or artillery stores. Montresor's recommendation to reduce the number of gun embrasures on the west curtain from six to three would have put the west curtain embrasures over 50 feet apart (August 1756). Eyre assumed command of the Fort in October 1756. Even if three embrasures were blocked by Winslow, Eyre had the time and temperament to restore the west curtain wall to its original configuration, \approx 25 feet apart.

In one sense, Eyre greatly benefited from Montresor's orders to Winslow. Eyre defeated Rigaud's Raid in March 1757. Eyre's garrison was a mixture of the 44th and Rogers' Rangers, about 474 men including the sick. The Rangers had their own picketed area outside the main fort, but some 350 - 375 members of the 44th were housed inside the Fort. Had Montresor not ordered the construction of the East and West Barracks, there would have been only room for some 200 or so members of the 44th. Only one of these barracks was needed to house the additional men of the 44th, but the second new barracks allowed Eyre to easily accommodate the added Rangers. Without the new barracks, the garrison had been reduced by some 150 men and Eyre would have had a much harder time beating off the French and their attempts to burn down the entire Fort. Clearly, the new barracks were a boon.

At the time this letter was written, both Loudoun and Eyre were in New York preparing for the Expedition. At best, Eyre might have hoped that the letter might be forwarded to Webb or Montresor with orders to adopt Eyre's recommendations. The North Wall Storehouse, previously ordered by Montresor, was removed just prior to the Siege. Delays associated with Loudoun's Expedition moving forward likely spurred Eyre to write this letter at this late date. By this time, Eyre probably realized that the prospect of pinning Montcalm to Quebec was fading.

The impact of LO 1619 should not be ignored. Burton's and Montresor's assessment of Fort Edward was even more negative than that of Fort William Henry. At the same time, Loudoun's view that only Fort Edward had real strategic value was made apparent. This colors many of the subsequent events. Any discussions that Loudoun had with his senior officers and staff that winter were now completely negated by the burning of the Lake George "navy" in late March; however, Loudoun then fails to give written orders requiring maximum effort in rebuilding the "navy". Loudoun's focus was now on his Louisbourg Campaign and now only offered weak advice to Webb. In Spring and Summer 1757, Webb's carpenters were not fully committed to the ship-building tasks and none of the galliots were completed in time to oppose Montcalm. Although some elements were likely rejected by Loudoun, the remainder of LO 1619 represents an "approved" laundry list of things that needed to be done at Fort Edward.

Both Webb and Montresor spent the winter and spring in New York and Albany. Together, they first arrived at Fort Edward on the evening of June 24th (Montresor Journals, Page 17). Before Montresor's arrival, Harry Gordon was likely directing the work of the carpenters and other artificers at Fort Edward. Gordon's thoughts on Fort Edward aligned with Montresor. Immediately, Montresor begins directing various improvements to Fort Edward, but there is no mention of the needs at Fort William Henry beyond the diary entry for July 15th: *"Gave a Plan with Profile of a Float to Captain Ingersoll*

to be erected for the Lake." This is likely a reference to a barge. The only engineer at Fort William Henry was Ensign Adam Williamson.

LO 1619. From Burton, Montresor, and MacLeod to Loudoun, dated August 29, 1756, in response to orders contained in LO 1424:

A Report of the present State of Fort Edward pursuant to His Excellency the Earl of Loudouns Instructions to us for Examining into the state of that Fort with regard to the Artillery and Military Stores with the Magazines for Ammunition and provisions, and to give the Necefsary Orders to prepare Barracks for the Reception and of such a Garrison, as we shall judge Necefsary for the defence of that Fort, together with store houses for provisions for nine Months for the Garrison, Dated at the head Quarters at Albany August the 5th 1756 —

1st. This Fort is situated on the Fork of Hudson's River and a small Rivulet which embraces part of the said Fort. It has an Island in front of it, which prevents the Command of the West branch of the Hudsons river, with an Eminence to the East at six hundred yards distance commanding the place. That part of the Fort where no repair has yet been made is in a Miserable Weak Condition, having neither Parapit to cover from an Enemy, or Ramparts to mount Cannon for its Defence.

2nd. The Ravelin in front of the Gate is Nearly finished and will be in a Capacity to mount Guns on next week, with its Ditch sunk to its proper Width and Breadth, the Powder Magazine under the North East Bastion finish'd and powder in it, also two Casements under the North Bastion which will be cover'd in next week, with its parapet, Rampart, & Bastion. With a great Quantity of Timber Cut and Squar'd both in the Woods, and in the Fort ready to be laid.

3rd. The Barracks at present made use of for an Hospital will contain two hunderd and twenty four men, but neither Bedsteads or Beding and no lodging for Officers except some few old houses and Sheds built next the West and south Curtine, made use of for a Guard house and not habitable in the Winter, neither Magizine for provisions or Hospital except the Above Mention'd Barrack, nor Artificer's shops, no room for them within the Fort. There is a Well but the Water not fit for drinking, for want of being clean'd. The Retrenchment which is Piquetted with a Ditch before it, will be finish'd in a Few days, so as to secure the provincials in there camp.

4th. The Artillery on the Works at present consists of five Six pounders, and one four pounder, mounted on Iron Truck Carriages, in very bad order and weak, not in a capacity of standing any firing nor are they repairable, They have neither Ladles or Spunges, and have only thirty rounds of rounds of Shot for Each. The four pounder has no proper shot for it. The two Eighteen pounders that came last from Albany were mounted on the north Bastion yesterday, and there Ammunition consists of one hundred and ten Rounds Each, ten of which are grape. Their Attirails (French: Gear) and Apporinances (Appurtenances) in good order, but are mounted on such Carriages that they cannot be made us of. The Powder at present in the Magazine is Seventy one Barrells.

The above being a true and Exact account of the state and condition we found Fort Edward in. The following orders and Directions for its repairs, Additional defence and Necefsary Buildings according to his Lordships Instructions to us of the foremention'd Date, will be requisite to be given as soon as the Necefsary works now carrying on for securing the place will be finish'd —

1st. That the Fort be intirely rais'd so high as to cover from an Enemy with a Rampart sufficient to mount Cannon, under which there is to be four Casements, and two powder Magazines in the Bastions, the Ditch to be lower'd to ten feet, and the Width to forty feet, that the south West Angle be Advanc'd next the river, so as to gain two flanks. That the Ravilin be finish'd to cover the Gate and Draw Bridge of the Fort. That its Ditch be twenty four feet wide with apart of a cover'd way from it, and place of Arms to cover the communication of the road to the River.

2nd. Its thought Necefsary that twenty Cannon Including those on the works already with Six Mortars, no under Eight Inches, will be Sufficient to defend the Fort and Ravelin with a proper proportion if Ammunition and stores requesite for the above Number of Guns and Mortars, and also for the Infantry Design'd to Garison it.

3rd. The Barracks at present within the Fort, the Chimneys require to be all repaired, and part of the floor to be new made to it with Bedsteads and Bedding.

4th. Another pile for Soldiers to be built to contain two hundred and twenty six men being the Compliment to compleat to four hundred and fifty which is thought to be a proper Garrison for the defence of this Fort. a Barrack for one field Officer, four Captains, twelve Subalterns, one officer of Artilary, and Engineer with a Magazine for provisions for one Month for Six hundred men, also an Oven for Baking of Bread.

5th. The Island opposite the Fort being a large spot of Ground of about one Mile in Length and one hundred Yards over and more, in some places, preventing the West Channel of the River from being seen from the Fort. It is thought necefsary that a Horn work should be Constructed acrofs the said Island, with two Whole Bastions in its Front, that the Wings may still be better flank'd, notwithstanding the Defence it receives from the West side of the Fort. This work must have a Ditch and Rampart, sufficient to mount four Cannon or more with a good Parapet, A Magazine with Rook for a Commisary to Contain provisions, for nine months for Seven hundred men, including the two Ranging Companys, which are thought Extreemly Necefsary and of great Service here for Scouting from hence to south Bay and Wood Creek, who are to be hutted on the said Island. A Barrack for one hundred men, with appartment for one Captain, and three Subalterns, an Hospital for Eighty men, with proper lodging for Surgeon and Mate, Apothecary shop, and Surgery, Carpenters and Smiths Shop, with a Forge and a Guard house. All these Buildings being absolutely Necefsary, and no room in the Fort for them, this place was thought the most secure place to Erect them.

6th. As to the communication between the Fort and Island, it is Necefsary that a Pontoon should be made, with two Cables fix't on each side, for pafsing backwards, with it sides Musquet proof. And between the Island and the West side, which is at present the road to Saratoga, to have another pontoon built in the same Manner, and to be cover'd on the West side by a Tete de Pont wherein should be kept a Guard of Serjeant and twelve men, with a small bason (bastion) to be made on each side of the Island, pallisaded, with a barrier for the protection of the pontoons —

*Fort Edward
Augst. the 29th. 1756*

*R. Burton L^t Col^l. 48th. Regim^t
Ja^s. Montresor Chief Engineer
Wm. Macleod Cap^t L^t of Artillery*

Loudoun had to be even more unhappy with the focus of this letter than the inspection report of Fort William Henry. This letter stresses only defensive considerations without any mention of moving

north on Canada. It was a review without any appreciation of purpose. Evidently, Loudoun did not question the need for additional barrack space. The year earlier, the winter garrisons at both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry were too small to do anything beyond the very basics of garrison duty. Those recommendations for completing previously started bastions and ramparts at Fort Edward were also accepted, but not those dealing with the expansion of forts or adding outworks. Gordon's inspection report to Shirley includes a description of Fort Edward similar to his description of Fort William Henry (MANA, Page 177). Had Dieskau attacked Fort Edward in September 1755, as he originally intended, he would have found it without any artillery (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Pages 132 and 365).

Having only eight cannon at Fort Edward was troubling. Four 9-pounders were found and moved north to Fort Edward. Loudoun then does something not suggested in the letters and balances out the remaining guns between the two forts by moving guns from Fort William Henry to Fort Edward. Still, there was another option. There were nearly five dozen "new" iron 32-pounders, 12-pounders, and 9-pounders then positioned in New York Harbor and even more "old" guns (Johnson Papers, Vol. 1, Page 443; Letter Appendix Page 262). Nearly all the brass cannon referenced here were moved to Oswego by Shirley in 1755. A number of these pieces could have been moved north by water to Fort Edward with little difficulty. Burton writes a separate letter, LO 1599 on the 27th, probably to gain some distance between himself and Montresor. Although the focus is on the lack of sanitation within the camps, the poor road conditions are repeatedly noted, and the Lake George "navy" is carefully detailed. In LO 1599, Burton is supplying information that is useful to Loudoun (next appendix).

The status of Fort William Henry in early Spring 1756 is muddled, but the details may be buried in the Winslow Journals at the Massachusetts Historical Society. In Spring 1756, Governor Hardy arranges for the relief of the provincial garrison with a mix of 80 British regulars drawn from the 44th and 48th Regiments and 125 New York Militia (MANA, Page 176). Bagley may or may not have remained in command. Bagley commanded Fort William Henry for the duration of Winslow's 1756 Expedition, so any return to Massachusetts that spring by Bagley would have been short-lived. Bagley seems to have spent at least 20 months in the field before any meaningful relief, from March 1755 thru November 1756. Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Whiting of Connecticut commanded the garrison at Fort Edward over the winter of 1755-1756. Under Winslow, he served as Quarter Master General to the provincial forces (See LO 2242, Whiting to Loudoun, November 27, 1756). During the 1757 campaign season, he was in command at Fort Number 4 on the Connecticut River in New Hampshire. In 1758, both Bagley and Whiting would be leading provincial regiments as part of Abercromby's failed Ticonderoga Campaign. Leading the 2nd Connecticut Regiment, Whiting would accompany Amherst's 1760 campaign, crossing Lake Ontario to Fort Frontenac and then down the St. Lawrence River toward Montreal. On August 18th, Whiting was put in charge of the British position at Camp Swegatchie - Fort William Augustus on the St. Lawrence River, now Ogdensburg New York (Middleton 2003, Page 211). On September 10th, two days after the surrender of French Canada, Amherst orders Whiting's regiment to Fort Stanwix on Lake Oneida (New York). On September 12th, Major Robert Rogers was ordered to Fort Niagara (Middleton 2003, Page 221). For a multitude of reasons, Amherst was strict in his desire to remove the bulk of the provincial forces from Canada as quickly as possible, especially as regards Quebec or Montreal (Journals of Jeffrey Amherst, Page 245). These provincial officers were dedicated men, not summer soldiers to be disregarded or scorned by British subalterns.

Notes on Camp Conditions, Disease, and Sanitation:

At the time, the sanitary conditions within any fort or military camp would likely have been poor, but much more so among the provincials who lacked the discipline of the British Army. British officers were often appalled and disgusted by the state of the provincial encampments. Often these camps were described as filthy, unkempt, and laden with debris and animal waste. Smallpox was particularly prevalent, and many died from that disease. Rangers had separate encampments outside of the Bastions of both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, but their discipline did not extend to sanitation. Just among the four ranger companies, Captain Humphrey Hobbs (February 1757) and Captain Richard Rogers (June 1757) both died from the pox while at Fort William Henry. At Fort Edward, Captain Robert Rogers was bedridden with the pox from March 5 to April 15, 1757.

The problems associated with organizing and training provincial regiments were massively compounded by disease. Moving provincial columns were far healthier than stagnant columns or mass camps where disease and poor sanitation could take hold (Travers 2015, Pages 60-75). If a large body of provincials settled at a location for any extended time, disease would prove rampant. However, if dispersed, little or no training was the rule. With the provincial standards of hygiene, there was no simple solution. In 1755, Braddock was able to leave any sick at Fort Cumberland and then start his long march with fit men and then leave others behind with Dunbar. At Fort William Henry and Fort Edward, the army was simply gathered and waiting, an open invitation to disease.

Unlike today, there was no summer respite from disease. In 1752, John Pringle authored *Observations on the Diseases of the Army*. This was one of the very earliest works that directly addressed the problems of disease and sanitation in a modern army. Cleanliness was paramount and the need for a nutritional diet throughout an entire campaign was finally recognized. Pringle was Scottish and was a friend and personal physician to the Duke of Cumberland, the head of the British Army. The work endorsed a wide array of feasible and sensible practices regarding sanitation that could be applied with moderate discipline. Pringle's work was gaining wide acceptance and acknowledgment within the British Army itself, but its influence had not yet reached the American Colonies. This helps explain the dichotomy between the British and provincial views on camp sanitation, one of education or the lack of it on the part of the provincials. By 1768, this work was in the sixth edition and highly influential across armies.

The sanitary conditions experienced at Fort Edward and Fort William Henry are best described by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Burton, 48th Foot (LO 1599, Burton to Lord Loudoun, August 27th, 1756; and in Parkman 1914, Vol. 1, Page 402). At the time of this inspection, Fort William Henry and Fort Edward would have been garrisoned by provincial troops as part of General John Winslow's 1756 Expedition against Carillon. There was no role to be played by the British regulars under Winslow and the British regulars assumed the role of garrison troops around Albany. Winslow was from Massachusetts and had essentially assumed the role held by William Johnson in 1755. During Winter 1755-1756, the garrisons of both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry were entirely provincial. Johnson's orders to those provincial garrisons for the coming winter lacks any direct mention of cleanliness or sanitation, simply saying "*keep up all that Discipline & good order amongst the Troops posted here which is necessary for the preservation of said Fort & the Tranquility of its garrison*" and "*to make it as habitable & as comfortable for the Troops as Circumstances will allow*" (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 355 and Page 361, December 2nd).

British regulars under Major Eyre (44th) do not assume garrison duties at Fort William Henry until Fall 1756, not 1755 as often related. The same is true for Fort Edward which was then garrisoned by elements of the 48th Foot. For a full year after their construction, both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry functioned under provincial command. Of the encampments, Roger's Island at Fort Edward was among the most squalid. This was the last summer and campaign when there was a distinct "desire" to keep provincials and regulars separated as much as possible and to authorize expeditions under the field command of provincial officers. This separation was driven by unwavering New England sensibilities to command their own men. Loudoun had sent Burton and Montresor on a field inspection of the installations (MANA, Page 232; LO 1424). Simply put, this was a quiet review by British officers of provincial troops under provincial officers. This explains the tone and bluntness of the language, but the review of camp conditions seems both accurate and fair. Burton was at the Monongahela with Braddock the previous year and was fully aware of the difficulties of wilderness campaigns. At the time, there was no link between disease and bacteria, but there was a distinct pairing of sickness with "bad air" and "stinks".

In clarification, Burton's Report to Loudoun is sometimes cited as being LO 1424. This is an error. LO 1424 is the initial instructions from Loudoun to Burton and Montresor to conduct the reviews. Loudoun had been in the country only a matter of a few weeks before ordering the inspections (LO 1424, August 5, 1756; Huntington Library, San Marino, California):

By His Excellency John Earl of Loudoun:

Instructions for Lieut. Col. Burton, & James Montresor Esq. Chief Engineer.

You are to repair to Saratoga, and take from that Post, a sufficient Detachment of the 48th Regiment, to escort You to Fort Edward and to Fort William Henry.

Upon Your arrival at Fort William Henry, You will examine into the State of that Fort, with regard to the Artillery and Military Stores, & the Magazines for Ammunition and Provisions; and you are to give the necessary Orders to prepare Barracks, for the reception & accommodation of such a Garrison as you shall judge necessary for the Defence of this Fort; together with the Store Houses, for Provisions for nine months for the Garrison.

You are to observe the same Instructions with regard to Fort Edward, having it always under Your Consideration, what numbers these Forts can contain; as well as what Number of Men are necessary for the Defence of these places. You are also to consider what Artillery & Military Stores will be necessary; to assist you in this particular, take Captain McLeod along with You (Royal Artillery); and Lastly, You are to give the necessary directions, to put these two Forts in the best posture of Defence, with all Expedition: and for that End, You are to apply to Maj. General Winslow, or to the Commanding Officer for the time being of the Provincials, for as many Men as they can Spare, for carrying out this necessary Works.

And Lastly, as several unforeseen matters may occur, You will give according to the best of Your Judgments, the necessary directions for carrying on the above mentioned Services: all of which, you will make a Report to me as soon as possible, together with an Account of the Artillery & Stores, when the Provincial entered these Forts this Spring.

Given under my Hand & Seal at Head Quarters at Albany this 5th day of August 1756.

Burton's formal responses to Loudoun's order can be found in the Loudoun Papers (LO 1583 and LO 1619; previous appendix). LO 1599 was written within the same four-day period, but the focus is on camp conditions, disease, and sanitation at both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry under a single document. It is a companion document. Elements of Burton's third letter to Loudoun are widely quoted in various histories concerning the Siege (including Parkman 1914, Page 402; Pargellis 1933, Page 95; and Bellico 2010, Pages 88 and 318). Other histories use segments of this letter to illustrate a major reason why the British Army viewed provincials as poor soldiers — the filth of their encampments and the near absence of any personal hygiene was simply a reflection of their near-universal lack of discipline, which was in itself a reflection on their officers (Anderson 1984). As some of these quotes attributed to Burton are second or third-hand, slight variations in the language and grammar have crept into the texts. The full version will be presented here without change in grammar or capitalization, the *f* is a long S. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Burton to Lord Loudoun, August 27th, 1756 (LO 1599, Huntington Library, San Marino, California; second Copy CO 5/47 Part 3 008):

Camp at Fort Edward Augst. 27. 1756.

My Lord.

I am got back to this Place upon my return from Fort William Henry. I take the liberty of sending your Lordship a few remarks, that I have made; which I shall be able to explain to your Lordship, at my return with the Report, of the State of the two Forts.

At Fort William Henry.

About 2500 Men. 500 of them sick, the greatest part of them what they call poorly, they bury from five to eight, daily, and Officers in proportion. extremely indolent, and dirty, to a degree The Fort stinks enough to cause an infection, they have all their sick in it. The Camp nastier than any thing I could conceive their necessary houses, Kitchens, Graves and Places for Slaughtering Cattle, all mix'd through their Encampment. A great waste of Provisions, the Men having just what they please. No great Command kept up, Cole: Gridley (Colonel, Massachusetts) governs the General. not in the least alert, only one advanc'd Guard of a Subaltern and 24 Men, no advanc'd Picket, no Scouting Party out from thence when I came there, nor did they send one during my stay which was six days.

The Cannon and Stores in great confusion. An Intrenchment orderd, and trased out, by Mr Montresor, but am afraid will not be got done; as the People are extremely indolent; and want to be brushed up by their Commanders. A great deal to be done to the Fort, more I am afraid then will be finished in time, as your Lordship will see by the Report. Not near so much ground cleared of Wood, about the Fort, as ought to be; and might have been, with the People, they have had there.

They have two small Sloops, of about twenty Tons each, have four Swivels mounted on each. One Sloop of thirty Tons launchd the 23 Instant (23rd of this month), another of the same size, to be launched in a few days, they propose having in each of those Vefsell, four small cannon or Royals (5 1/2-inch mortars). Two large Scows, and others building a good many Whale Boats, and more building, a great many Battaues scattered about. No Guard on board the Vefsell, and they lay at

anchor a good way of (off) from the Fort, that I think it would not difficult, or any great risque to the Enemy, cutting them away, or burning them.

No care taken of the Whale Boats, any one making use of them that pleases. I went down the Lake as far as the first Islands, about five miles and a half from the Fort, the Lake so far about a Mile over, very high Hills on both sides, but highest to the Eastward. I went over S^r W^m Johnsons Encampment, round the Abattis, and Place of Action, very Stony, and broken, but stony ground they must have fought, or have run have into the Lake. The Road from Fort William Henry, to Fort Edward, sixteen miles, very stony and broken in many places, extremely dangerous for Convoys to pass, without great precaution, which the Provincials don't attend to, having not been intercepted hitherto. A many Passes so very advantageous for an Enemy, especially the kind of one we have to deal with that without great precaution, and a proper Disposition, the Enemy might with three hundred Men, cut to pieces a Convoy of six hundred, and go of (off) unchastised. The Provincials are no judges of Ground, and march with very little precaution. When they arrive at the half way, with their Convoys, were they always halt, there being a fine run of very good water, which empty's itself into Wood Creek, they ground their Arms, and all go for the water, and then sleep scattered about under the Trees, were I am astonished they have never been attack'd.

A Picketed Fort would be very necessary here to be destroyed at the end of the Campaign. There is a good spot of Ground for such a Fort. When Mr. Winslow received your Lordships letter, with the account of Oswego being taken, and your Lordships orders to him not to proceed for the present. I am certain they had no thoughts of moving farther this year, but then pretend what they please hereafter. Mr. Winslow had said as much to me before he received your Lordship letter, and orders. Nor are they in a Capacity for any such undertaking. Their Troops very sickly and weak, not to say a word of their Generals, Colonels, and great Warr (?) Captains, they don't know of any feasible Road, for their Cannon, or water sufficient for their Sloops, and Scows to transport their Artillery &c (etc.) near to the French advanced Guards, which are by the Intelligence of their Scouts, four miles from Ticonderoga, on each side of the Lake, consisting as they say of four or five hundred Men each, strongly Intrenched, and a few pieces of Cannon.

At Fort Edward, About 2500 Men, between five and six hundred Sick, bury daily from five to eight Men, and Officers in proportion, the Camp much cleaner than Fort William Henry, but not sufficiently so, to keep the Men healthy. A much better Command kept up here then at Fort William Henry. General Lyman (Connecticut) very ready to order out to work, and to assist the Engineers with any amount of Men they require. And keeps a succession of Scouting Partys out, towards Wood Creek, and South Bay. Are hard a work Intrenching and Picketing their Encampment, which will be finished in a few days. The Fort in a very weak Condition, as your Lordship will see by the Report; an infinite deal to be done to the Works; Barracks to be built, both for the Men and Officers; in short a great deal to be done to the Fort, exclusive of what is necessary to be constructed and built upon the Island than can be got done before winter.

From Fort Edward to Fort Miller, nine miles, the Road bad, being very much cut and broken, not water enough at present in the River for a Battau to go up laden'd to Fort Edward.

Fort Miller is a miserable affair a few Pickets stuck into the Ground, at the mercy of eighty or hundred of the Enemy. From thence to Saratoga five miles, the Road broken and bad.

There are my Lord amongst the Provincials Forces, but chiefly in the New York Regiment, between two and three hundred Indians, who are of very little use where they are, were they properly Officered, some white People mixed with them, Cloathed and made use of as Indians, might be made very useful.

The best Command kept up in the New York Regiment, have some sort of Discipline. If they are to be disbanded at the Campaign, a good many of them I think with a little management may be got to Inlist in the Kings Troops.

I hope in a few days to bring to your Lordship a Report of the State of the Forts, and what is Ordered to be done with them which I shall be able to talk your Lordship more fully upon many things I have here hinted at.

*I am my Lord with great respect,
your Lordships most obedient humble Servant. R Burton.*

*To His Excellency
The Earl of Loudoun. &^c, &^c, &^c*

Burton's account would reflect conditions in August 1756, a year before the Siege. Unfortunately, disease was still rising and the death rate would only mount through late September. Captain Edmund Wells of Connecticut writes that there were 92 graves at Fort Edward on September 17th, and by September 21st, the number had ballooned to 112 graves. Wells was among those too sick to serve (Pargellis 1933, Page 96). There was a second graveyard at Fort William Henry that is not counted here. Burton's assertion that Fort Edward was much cleaner than Fort William Henry is not comforting when coupled to Wells' account. In response to Burton's report, Loudoun wrote to Winslow offering quiet advice as regards improving camp conditions (LO 1706).

The prevalence of disease was not related to season, but disease was tied to permanent established camps with their unsanitary conditions. The longer the camp existed, the unhealthier it became. While on campaign, provincial regiments could manifest death rates of 4 – 14 percent just from disease (Anderson 1984, Pages 100-101). This rate was much higher than in civilian populations like Boston. Marching troops were much healthier.

Luke Gridley was a private in the Connecticut provincials under Lyman. Gridley leaves a diary of his time in service starting in late March through November of 1757 (Gridley 1906). Much of the time Gridley was at Fort Edward including the period centered on the Siege. Throughout much of the summer, Gridley provides a short daily entry describing the events as he understood them, but without comment or judgment. The pervasiveness of disease is a central theme throughout his diary, as is, the disciplining of soldiers. Smallpox, bloody flux (dysentery), lung fever (pneumonia), and distemper (diphtheria or mixed illness) are among the diseases reported. Smallpox was especially feared, and there was a separate smallpox hospital at Fort Edward (Gridley 1906, Page 56). Scouting missions, particularly those conducted by the Connecticut rangers under Putnam, are another focus. As seen in this and other writings as well, death to disease was blandly accepted as part of everyday life under campaign with little overt resentment, but this may just be a reflection of the poor understanding of disease itself. Still, by the end of campaign season, a broad dissatisfaction manifested itself and heading home became the focus of the provincials. Based on previous campaigns and before enlisting, the provincial troops had to know their encampments

would be ravaged by disease with numerous deaths, yet the seasonal enlistment quotas were routinely achieved or reported as such (Pargellis 1933, Page 100). The sizable enlistment bonus for a single campaign season was likely key in attracting the needed men.

In August 1756, Winslow reports that a full-quarter of the 5,400 men in his expedition against Fort St. Frederic were incapable of any duty, more than 1,400 sick: the number of sick increased five-fold from June to August (Pargellis 1936, Page 94). In August, the number of sick at Fort Edward was 843 men with an additional 600 men at William Henry; in June, it had been a combined 253 men. The disease situation needs further explanation. Provincial regiments typically did not all gather together until mid-June or late June but would then serve through mid-November. In all likelihood, disease would blanket both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry for at least two more months following Burton's departure and only then were the provincial regiments allowed to return home. Between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, the losses to disease had to have been many times those incurred in actual combat, which in 1756, was restricted to skirmishing and scouts without a major engagement.

The number of sick experienced under Winslow's campaign, mirrored duty in tropical climates where a quarter or more of the men were routinely reported as sick. This level of sickness was not expected mid-summer in a northern climate. As a result, the available medical supplies were quickly spent and the hospital space proved grossly inadequate for the need. Throughout the Americas, the need for medical supplies far outweighed the allotted stocks, especially in the tropics, and this shortcoming was never adequately addressed during the War (Brumwell 2002, Pages 145 - 160). Fred Anderson's (1984, Pages 103-107) description of the care in hospitals provides little comfort. Maintaining any semblance of sanitation in hospitals was extraordinarily difficult, the hospitals themselves reeked of disease.

Colonials would often complain about officer status, rank, pay, and British Army discipline, but the improvement of sanitary conditions was not one of their perceived grievances. Again, these poor sanitary conditions were self-imposed, provincial troops under provincial command. Although not directly stated, there is a strong suggestion that sanitary conditions were determined by a consensus of the rank & file. This unhealthy circumstance may be related to the terms of their enlistments and perceived personal rights shared among the provincials. Anderson (1984) describes the lack of hygiene as pervasive among the Massachusetts provincials who would routinely spend week after week in the same unwashed clothes. British officers were quick to link the rampant disease to sanitary conditions (LO 1706), but the British regulars were not immune to the same losses, just at lower percentages. In this regard, the independence of the individual provincial soldier came with a distinct cost.

In Fall 1756, the provincial troops left Fort William Henry and the fort was then garrisoned by a mixed contingent from the 44th and 48th Regiments (*Journals of the Hon. William Hervey*, Page 43). By winter, some four or five companies of the 44th Foot arrived to assume garrison duties under Eyre. The 48th had been withdrawn. As both a garrison commander and an engineer, Eyre had the knowledge and authority to greatly improve the sanitary conditions within the Bastion itself which then housed the men of the 44th, but winter was fast approaching and soon the soils would be frozen. The two undersized ranger companies were camped in huts just outside the east wall, protected by a wooden picket. At the same time, it is unknown if Eyre cleaned and buried all the

refuse and trash that accumulated during the previous summer's campaign when the ground around William Henry supported several thousand provincial troops. But regardless of Eyre's efforts, his men still suffered badly from various diseases, exasperated by harsh winter conditions and dietary scurvy, with a full quarter of his garrison deemed sick at the approach of Rigaud's Winter Raid (March 1757) — a figure identical to the percentage of sick under Winslow the previous August (LO 3179). Scurvy is the result of the lack of Vitamin C in the diet. In winter or any campaign relying on salted provisions, scurvy was often widespread and particularly debilitating (Brumwell 2002, Page 150). Eventually, the British Army adopted the practice of drinking spruce beer, a good source of Vitamin C that could be brewed in winter from spruce leaf buds. Anderson (1984, Pages 83-90) provides a detailed look at the typical diet and the associated nutritional shortcomings.

In March 1757, the 44th was relieved of garrison duty and was then replaced by the 35th Foot. The continued presence of British regulars under Monro likely led to further improvements in sanitation at William Henry, but it was not a cure, and may not have extended to the returning provincials or their encampment which was then southwest of the Bastion. Smallpox losses continued.

Loudoun had only been in North America for a little over a month before receiving Burton's reports and letters. Burton confirmed the worst expectations of the provincials as professional soldiers — poor discipline with little sense of rudimentary hygiene or any regard for cleanliness. Yet Loudoun had directed them to be thorough, so the reports were. At least in one regard, the report was decidedly favorable. Burton's report contains a detailed description of the Lake George "navy" as it was in Summer 1756 - three completed sloops and a fourth sloop in stocks only a few days away from being launched and two scows for the transport of artillery. Despite the number of sick, poor sanitary conditions and the apparent lack of discipline, the provincials under Winslow built or transported hundreds of boats. An inventory, dated more than two months after Burton's inspection, includes four sloops, five bayboats, four scows, twelve whaleboats, and 209 bateaux, but some of these may have been built or transported to Fort William Henry under Johnson in 1755 (LO 2242; Provincial Quartermaster General Nathan Whiting to Lord Loudoun, November 27, 1756). By Fall 1756, the *Earl of Loudoun* was even more heavily armed than described by Burton — two 6-pounders, one 7 3/4-inch mortar, and 8 swivel guns. On September 2, the three finished sloops with Winslow aboard scouted the north end of Lake George (LO 1710, Final Letter Appendix; and Bellico 2010, Page 89).

As described in Bellico (2010, Page 88) and typical of Montresor, Montresor's reports go into a nearly exhaustive list of suggested improvements to both Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. The list covers nearly all aspects associated with the construction of a fort but lacks focus on any sense of need and purpose of the installations themselves. Some of the suggestions were clearly sound and very much needed, others were simply grandiose. Loudoun learned not to have faith in Montresor's abilities (MANA, Page 265). Gordon's letter to Shirley was similar in tone and also lacked the needed focus.

The first phase of Fort William Henry was built in two months at the minimum textbook dimensions; it was not a Gibraltar. A great deal of work would be needed to improve the position detailed in the inspection reports, but for what purpose? Fort William Henry was never sanctioned by the British Army or any provincial government, it was built only as visible compensation following the collapse of Sir William Johnson's failed campaign in 1755. Fort William Henry was a

relatively secure staging point for an offensive against Ticonderoga and Fort St. Frederic, not a defensive juggernaut. It made little sense to improve Fort William Henry to the degree being called on by Montresor or Gordon at the expense of removing workmen from completing the Lake George "navy" or forwarding any offensive plan that required hundreds of bateaux and whaleboats to be built. A balance needed to be reached, but that balance is not found in Montresor's report. Fort William Henry would become Loudoun's unwanted child with the Lake George "navy" being the succor.

After 1756, there would be no more provincial-led expeditions. From 1757 on, the British Army would utilize provincial infantry regiments on campaign only when British regulars led and British officers had overall command. Being mixed with the British Army, the provincial regiments and their officers were most probably instructed repeatedly on various aspects of military discipline, especially sanitation and hygiene. At least outwardly, the provincial camps would become much cleaner, but disease remained a real threat and concern. Increase discipline did nothing to improve the diet. Diaries suggest little improvement in personal hygiene — the clothes of many provincial soldiers remained unwashed for weeks at a time and the camps continued to be closely packed. Anderson (1984) provides excellent first access to several provincial diaries with special reference to those in the collection of the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston. These diaries are centered on Fort Edward, the bulk of the Massachusetts men only arriving the night before the Siege.

The Winslow Papers, also at the Massachusetts Historical Society, might clarify the intended roles of the East and West Barracks. This may be the only collection of papers that might shed light on the more mundane events in Fall 1756. Constructing these barracks is central to Burton's and Montresor's August 25th letter to Loudoun (LO 1583). We have the building drawings (Figure 17, Page 210), but no true written description on how the buildings were actually used. There are a considerable number of gaps relating to officer quarters, the hospital, the blacksmith and carpenter shops that are not resolved by LO 1583. Archaeological investigations place the blacksmith shop at the north end of the East Barracks, but little is known beyond that aspect (Starbuck 2014). Eyre does not discuss how the buildings were used (LO 1328, Eyre to Loudoun, May 28, 1757).

Note: Lt. Col. Burton offers a particularly difficult handwriting to read and transcribe (LO 1599). Out of frustration, authors will borrow earlier transcriptions of his letters. Burton's "ladles and Spunges" has become "Sadles and Springes". At the time "Spunges" was a common spelling, a reference to cannon sponges (plus Sadles = gunpowder ladles). "Instant" has become "In stock". With other authors, a poorly written number 5 or 8 can easily be transcribed as 1 and 0, respectively. Word usage changes over time. For example, the word "piles" is used very differently than it is today and offers only puzzlement. "4th Instant" would mean the "4th of this month" and is often used to reference an earlier correspondence. "4th Past" would be the previous month. Spelling is an open and chaotic field but can be corrected in print to the wrong word. Omissions (missed words and phrases) are common and can be surprisingly hurtful to the understanding. Even short quotes from the original often leave the mood, tenor, and true meaning behind. Kopperman's *Braddock at the Monongahela* spends much of the volume reviewing the complete historical accounts without edit. There is joy and comfort in reading the source materials, especially if in the original hand.

Notes on Regimental Organization: Before the Seven Years' War, the typical British infantry regiment had only a single battalion attached. Guard Regiments were organized differently and supported two battalions. In September 1756, fifteen regiments formed second battalions. By April 1758, there was a directed effort to limit and reduce the number of multiple battalion regiments, the 42nd and the 60th Foot being notable exceptions. These second battalions were spun off as their own distinct regiments and were renumbered from the 61st Foot through the 75th Foot. None of these parent regiments served in America, but the 62nd and 69th and smaller detachments of the 73rd and 75th served as "marines" in fleets sent against Louisbourg and/or Quebec, sea-service duty. These "marines" were not Royal Marines, but regular soldiers serving in the role of marines on warships while remaining under the banner of the Regular Army and not the Admiralty. Although there were about 130 companies of Royal Marines in 1758, their number remained insufficient compared to the need.

As the 35th only supported a single battalion, the words regiment and battalion identify the same body of men and the words are often used interchangeably without much harm. In the attempt to save money by limiting the number of officers attached to a regiment, especially in peacetime, the British Army adopted policies that squeezed the officer corps. Lieutenant colonels and majors were expected to lead their own companies and the colonel's company was functionally commanded by a captain lieutenant, who was paid at the rate of a lieutenant. The rank of captain lieutenant is convoluted; there was only one captain lieutenant per foot battalion. The captain lieutenant gained his "captain seniority" based on his date of commission to captain lieutenant, but only **after** actually reaching the rank of full captain. This could be viewed as a saving in that three captain slots were satisfied without incurring the actual expense of paying for these "additional" captains. At the same time, hundreds of experienced officers, who may have been needed in wartime, were placed on half-pay. These officers were free of any duty or service until recalled. This was an exceedingly costly practice, but it was deemed necessary. Secondly, the practice provided positions and income for "second sons", especially important in Ireland where the economy was heavily agricultural. In 1755, the 35th was carrying 14 officers on half-pay; none of who would go on to serve in North America with the 35th Foot (reference Stewart 2015, Page 124). How these officers would be paid is obscure, either a separate fund or possibly internal to the £8,847 budget authorized by the Irish Parliament.

The Printed Annual Army Lists for 1757-1758 (WO 65/4, 65/5, and 65/6) indicate that there were 20 lieutenant and 9 ensigns slots assigned to the 35th; additional slots were not assigned for the adjutant or quartermaster. A review of other regiments in North America shows the same pattern, additional officer slots were not assigned for either post. At least on paper, many officers from the lieutenant colonel down through the quartermaster were doing double duty. A captain served as the paymaster for the regiment. The Monthly Returns for the 35th are found in LO 6751 (January; partial Return in February; March; and September through December 1757). The Returns for when the 35th was at Fort William Henry were lost in the Siege. The format of the Monthly Returns suggests that the adjutant and quartermaster were distinct and separate, but they are not and those two individuals are doubled counted on the Monthly Return, once under Commissioned Officers and a second time under Staff Officers. Only by carefully comparing the Monthly Returns to the Annual Army List is this evident. The War Office also houses the Muster Books and Pay Lists (WO 12), but this collection evidently does not include any lists or rolls before 1759.

The 35th was part of the Irish Establishment. Under the Irish Establishment, peacetime companies would be organized as a "Company Captain", a single lieutenant, and a single ensign with two sergeants, two corporals, 1 drummer, and 29 private men. Once called up and shipped out of Ireland, these regiments were routinely transferred to the British Establishment. While still in Ireland, drafts (transfers) from other Irish regiments would be used to increase the Rank & File to about 50 private men per company. When deployed outside of Ireland, these Irish regiments had a great deal of work to do in a short time to reach the strength of the regiments under the British Establishment. Regardless if peacetime or on campaign, the standard practice was to have ten companies in each battalion. During peacetime and under the British Establishment, a battalion company would be officered by a "Company Captain", 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign with 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 drummers, and 70 privates. With a "sign manual" by the Secretary of War placing a regiment on a campaign footing, 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 30 privates would be further added to each company (reference Pargellis 1936, Pages 47-49). With the 35th now in North America and authorized to full strength, this was the new target for company sizes, 104 rank & file (corporals and privates). During an engagement having the extra command and control would be a huge boon. But adding another lieutenant and a sergeant to the mix was essentially mandatory to keep the regiment functioning. Running a company with only two or three officers was probably not overly burdensome, if not the standard practice, especially if the rank & file were around 60 or less. The ten "new" lieutenants can be thought of as being available for duties not directly related to their line company. Two of these positions would be the regimental adjutant and regimental quartermaster. Disease was so common and hurtful in America that Loudoun felt obligated to appoint a second surgeon's mate to each battalion and additional mates to hospitals and other postings (Loudoun to Cumberland, April 25, 1757; MANA, Page 346). With all officers and men present, a battalion would approach 1,144 men of all ranks including two surgeon's mates. This would be the battalion at full strength under a "sign manual". In December 1757, the 35th reached 1,093 men of all ranks with 51 rank & file wanting to complete establishment (LO 6751).

Theater-only ranks can add a minor confusion. At the Army level, there was only a single colonel of a regiment or battalion. Otway was the colonel of the 35th; Monro was the lieutenant colonel. As one of the steps to clarify command authority, Pitt had all the lieutenant colonels in North America assigned the theater-only rank of colonel. However, the individual officers were careful not to seem pretentious about a temporary rank. Monro consistently signed his Army correspondence as Lt. Colonel, his army rank, and not Colonel, his theater rank (Figure 19B). Young's correspondence is signed as Lt. Colonel, 3rd/60th. Brigadier was a theater or command rank, not an Army rank. Away from his own regiment, which was then in Halifax, John Forbes (Duquesne Expedition, 1758) would sign his Expedition's correspondence simply as "*Jo: Forbes*".

As regards officer-purchased commissions, there were understood rules attached to the protocol. If an officer honorably retired from the service, the purchase price formed a substantial part of the retirement income for that officer, so that purchase was accepted within the officer corps without substantial complaint. Poor performing officers might be encouraged to sell their commissions, but internal to their battalion. At the same time, if an officer died in uniform or was subject to court-martial, it was expected that the slot would be filled by internal promotion to that battalion without purchase, captain rank and lower. Often more than a single officer was involved with a purchase — a lieutenant would purchase a captain's slot, while at the same time, an ensign would purchase the lieutenant's slot and a "gentlemen" would purchase the ensign commission. The monies would be

passed stepwise from the bottom upwards. In the end, all the monies involved would be paid to the retiring officer. Purchases funded officer retirements.

As Commander in Chief, North America, Loudoun could appoint officers, but only up to the rank of captain (Fox to Loudoun, April 15, 1756; CO 5 212 Part 1 002). More care and review would be taken by army leadership when the promotion involved the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. Battalion colonels were appointed only at the highest authority in the Army. When a battalion was raised in strength and additional officer slots were opened, the Army leadership had more options available for filling those officer slots and recommendations from those well-connected held significant weight in determining those appointments, but here the leadership itself was strongly encouraged to appoint by merit (Pargellis 1933: Page 308). Well-led regiments were prized by their theater commanders and suitable for independent assignment. Poorly led regiments, regardless of political connections, were a nuisance in comparison and needed more supervision and oversight and were poorly suited to independent assignment beyond simple garrison duty. Army leadership was fully aware of the need for competent leadership at the regimental level. In the case of the poorly performing Daniel Webb, the Army chose to promote him to the permanent rank of Major General and then quietly and permanently "beach" him in administrative postings. A year later, Abercromby would suffer a similar fate following the disaster at Ticonderoga.

From a review of these Monthly Returns, several conclusions and statements can be made. All four of the companies at Fort Edward were carrying two lieutenants. The grenadier company under Captain Ince consistently carried three lieutenants and four sergeants. Captain Collins' and Captain Lieutenant Gardiner's Companies (Otway's) carried only a single lieutenant in all these Returns — one of these two slots was being held for Lt. Fleming who never joined the Regiment, but who remained enrolled for all of 1757. Of the five "tricornet" battalion line companies at Fort William Henry, four would have been functioning with only a single "full-time" lieutenant; two of these may have had part-time help from the adjutant and quartermaster, assuming they had any free time to devote to those duties.

In the four-battalion 60th regiment, Lord Loudoun was colonel-in-chief in 1757 with a colonel-commandant assigned to each of the four battalions. These colonel-commandants were expected to be in the field with their battalions. This atypical arrangement can lead to confusion in determining who was leading any of the 60th battalions in any particular engagement. It also made it possible to "beach" difficult and unpopular senior officers away from their battalions. Either the colonel-commandant or the lieutenant colonel could then be sent on an extended secondary assignment as was done with Colonel James Prevost and Lieutenant Colonel John St. Clair, both of the 4th Battalion. Under normal circumstances, only two field grade officers were needed, either the battalion colonel or lieutenant colonel plus the major. Quietly, the respected Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Haldimand of the 2nd Battalion led the 4th Battalion for at least the next two years (1758-1760) with the wary Jeffrey Amherst continuing the policy of "beaching" Prevost. Although extraordinarily unpopular within the British Army itself, Prevost's political connections with the Duke of Cumberland remained solid. Even though Swiss-born, Prevost eventually attained the rank of Lieutenant General in March 1772. Appointed Deputy General Quartermaster for North America in 1755, St. Clair had theater-wide responsibilities and was never on campaign with the 4th/60th. St. Clair performed reasonably well under Braddock, but then poorly under Forbes for whom St. Clair developed considerable personal animosity. St. Clair made the misstep of complaining about

the situation to Amherst, a friend of Forbes. After 1758, Amherst had the difficult St. Clair "beached" for the remainder of the war. As part of a brigade, a battalion could even be led by a major. At Ticonderoga in 1758, the 932-man 4th/60th was led by Major John Rutherford, the 560-man 1st/60th by Major John Tullikens, and the 888-man 44th Foot by Major William Eyre (Nester 2008). Rutherford was killed in the attack and both Tullikens and Eyre were wounded. In 1755, Rutherford was the Captain of the 3rd New York Independent Company and was with Dunbar's Column as part of the Braddock Expedition. Haldimand led the composite grenadier battalion.

There were other variations to the standard battalion authorization. Scotland had a birthrate beyond which could be employed in industry or agriculture, excess males. In Ireland, Roman Catholics were "officially" not to be recruited. As such, recruitment was far easier in Scotland than in England or Ireland. At least two of the newly raised Scottish regiments, the 77th and 78th, had different organizations both being deployed to North America. Both the 77th and 78th were authorized to fourteen companies but supplying drafts (transfers) before being sent to North America had weakened both to thirteen companies. Apparently, the first ten companies were first transported across the Atlantic at full strength and then the remaining men were subsequently shipped. This decision was more likely related to transport considerations than anything else. Also, these regiments were led by lieutenant colonels for several years without any assignment of a colonel, but with two majors assigned to each battalion (77th and 78th, reference Printed Annual Officer Lists, British Archives, WO 65/ 1757-1762). The math suggests that at full strength these regiments could reach 1,600 men of all ranks. In 1758, the 77th was reunited in Pennsylvania and was central to Brigadier John Forbes' successful campaign against Fort Duquesne; that year, the 78th fought at Louisbourg.

The easiest way to reference the strength of the Scottish Regiments can be found in a letter between Pitt and Loudoun, July 18, 1757 (Kimball 1906, Page 88):

Whitehall, July 18th 1757.

My Lord,

On the sixth Instant, I was honored with your Lordship's several Dispatches of the twenty fifth April, & third & thirtieth of May, all of which were immediately laid before the King. I have the Satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the two Highland Battalions, commanded by Lieutenant Col^l Montgomery (77th) & Lieutenant Colonel Fraser (63rd, renumbered 78th), sailed from Cork, on the thirtieth last month, and that these Corps were not only entirely compleated, but a good Number of Supernumerary Men were also embarked with them, I am further to acquaint Your Lordship that in order to reinforce the Troops, under your Command, His Majesty has been pleased to direct the Draught of 100 Men to be made from Several Battalions in Great Britain and Ireland. And also that Nine additional Companies of Highlanders, consisting each of 100 Men be forthwith raised, three of which Companies are to be added to Each of the Highland Battalions already in America by the Month of October, when the Ports will still be open: — And the King is pleased to leave it to Your Lordship's Prudence to dispose of this Reinforcement in such a Manner as Your Lordship shall judge best for His Majesty's Service. The King is persuaded that this His Most Gracious and timely Attention to supply the Body of troops employed in the Important Service of North America cannot fail to animate the Zeal of all His Subjects there(as printed).... I have the

pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that His Majesty is pleased to approve the great Diligence & Application which appears in your Lordship's Conduct.

I am etc:—

W. Pitt.

A distinct drawback to wilderness postings and piecemeal assignments was that a battalion could not exercise large-scale battalion movements beyond simple company maneuvers. Those regiments assembled at Halifax in 1757 at least gained considerable practice and drill time at the battalion and brigade level. These regiments would form the core for the campaigns against Louisbourg in 1758 and Quebec in 1759. Those battalions not the beneficiary of such training were at a distinct disadvantage and considered inferior. This criticism was leveled pointedly at the 1st of the 60th at Ticonderoga. Before Ticonderoga, the newly raised 1st of the 60th was widely split and had no opportunity to practice the needed battalion maneuvers. Their previous focus was on road construction, camp security, and maintaining the logistic trains. Not timid and suffering exceedingly high casualties in proportion to their numbers, the 1st of the 60th was inadequately trained as regards the task it was given at Ticonderoga. When the six companies of the 1st battalion of the 60th moved forward, these companies lacked the needed cohesion and performed poorly with the collapse of the British right flank being disproportionately blamed on the 1st of the 60th. Although detached to guard the Mohawk Valley with a largely provincial force, Colonel Stanwix had repeatedly warned that his battalion did not have the experience needed for placement in a battle line, but he was ignored. Although in the same brigade as the 1st Battalion, the 4th suffered proportionally fewer casualties than the 1st at Ticonderoga, yet its performance was not criticized. The 4th Battalion had been at Halifax the previous summer.

In 1757, the 35th was split between Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. The 3rd/60th was even more scattered across New York, stationed at Schenectady guarding the western approaches to Albany, as well as being positioned at Fort Edward. These units were adequately prepared to function in company-sized groups, construction details, and on escort duties, but they lacked the needed experience to function in a battle line. Before the Siege, the 35th was untested. During the Siege, the 35th remained behind their fortifications, so it remained untested. All evidence suggests that the 35th did not have the needed training to function as a unified battalion in a set-piece battle. Although all of the 35th was sent to Halifax, it arrived piecemeal and only six or seven companies of the 35th may have been at Louisbourg (reference Boscawen 2011, Pages 125 and 348). Placed in a battle line, those units whose experience was largely limited to functioning as individual companies or as smaller detachments not only performed badly but suffered from higher casualty rates than those units adequately drilled in battalion maneuvers. The inexperienced 3rd/60th suffered the highest casualties of any battalion at Louisbourg (Campbell 2010, Page 103). Assigned to cover flanking exposures, neither the 35th nor the 3rd/60th was in the front battle line at Quebec.

Early in the War, it was assumed that regiments sent to North America could be brought up to full strength through the recruiting of local colonials. As such, regiments were sent to North America at little more than half the authorized strength, 400 - 500 Rank & File below authorized levels. In 1755 and early 1756, recruitment efforts into the regulars were substantial, some 7,500 men — enough to replace the losses suffered by the 44th and 48th at the Monongahela, field the 50th and 51st foot, attract some men to the four battalions of the 60th, and repair three depleted battalions in Nova Scotia (Pargellis 1933, Pages 108 - 109). Alone the 50th and 51st Foot, recruited some 2,000

men. These numbers include both American-born and immigrants. But after Spring 1756, this proved false as the colonials were much more likely to join provincial regiments. With the enlistment bonuses paid by the provinces, anyone joining the regulars would suffer a distinct financial penalty when compared to joining a provincial regiment. The commitment to provincial regiments was only a single campaign season, whereas the commitment to regular regiments would be years, if not life. In 1757, only some 1,200 men were recruited in North America.

Complicating the recruitment was the fact that each regiment would lose between 10% and 15% of its strength each year to disease, disability, and age. These losses needed to be replaced. For English and Irish Regiments in North America, recruiting absorbed as many of the extra officers as possible, but other officers could be posted "*On Command*" in various locations away from the Regiment. Unlike English and Irish Regiments, Scottish Regiments arrived in America at full strength, so little emphasis was placed on recruiting. Even though the 35th was sent to North America at much greater strength than either the 44th or 48th, the importance given to recruiting by the 35th should not be discounted. From January through March 1757, Captain Manusell, Lieutenants Cane, Jetherill, de la Valle, and Herbert, Ensigns Philips and Skinner, seven Sergeants, and three Drummers were assigned to recruiting and absent from their Companies (LO 6751). Except for the grenadier company, Monro had stripped every company of their "extra" officer to recruit. Three of the companies were functioning with a single Captain and a single Lieutenant, but this was in winter quarters and not actively campaigning. In December 1757, Lieutenants Bamford, Cumberland, Fortye, and Ensign Brown were assigned to recruiting; all had been at the Siege. Notably, none of these recruiting efforts involved officers or sergeants of the grenadier company. Regardless of the importance given to recruiting, the efforts were only marginally effective. For 1757, it is estimated that only 46 men were recruited in America, less than 5% of the rank & file of the 35th (Brumwell 2002, Page 318; and LO 6616). The 48th Regiment which arrived with Braddock in 1755 had reached only some 16% "American-born" recruits by 1757.

After Spring 1756, recruiting in America became even more difficult a (Brumwell 2002, Pages 19 and 57). This was partially a reflection of the loss of Oswego and Fort William Henry, but more so on the now widespread knowledge of the pitfalls and disadvantages of joining the regulars. Throughout most of the American colonies, recruiting parties were met with stiff local opposition. Past behaviors and questionable practices had poisoned the recruiting grounds. Methods were suspect and often involved trickery mixed with alcohol. Local jails could be scoured of men. The routine recruitment of indentured servants, without any compensation to the "owners", proved to be a particularly thorny issue that drew the anger of the provincial assemblies.

In anticipation of poor recruiting over the winter of 1756-1757, Cumberland sent 1,200 drafts from other regiments then in Britain to America to amend needy regiments (Pargellis 1933, Page 109; and Loudoun to Cumberland, January 1757, MANA, Page 290 and reference Page 381). Pitt was to send another 2,400 drafts. In December 1757, 195 drafts (transfers) from other regiments joined the 35th — from the 59th (Montagu's - 63 men), 17th (Forbes' - 23 men), 77th (Montgomery's - 19 men) and 78th (Fraser's - 90 men) (LO 6751, December Return). Any Scot transfers were likely Lowland Scots, more adaptable and much more likely to speak English, over just Scot Gaelic. All four of the regiments supplying these drafts to the 35th were still in Britain when the order was issued by Cumberland, which would have been in late 1756. Three of these regiments arrived in North America in mid-1757. The 59th would remain in Britain until 1763 and only then be sent to

Nova Scotia for garrison duty. As this was about meeting manpower needs, these drafts had to be pulled directly from the British Isles or newly arrived regiments, not transfers between regiments already established in North America. The 35th now includes 989 rank & file with only 51 wanting to complete. Per the Return, the target company size was 104 rank & file in each of the ten companies. This 104 men per company target was the same as in the 44th and 48th Regimental Returns for June 1755 (MANA, Page 86) and the same as in the Scottish Regiments. Except for the Scottish Regiments, where the available pool of men greatly exceeded the civilian need for able body men, rarely did a British Regiment reach this size. Fifty or sixty-man companies were much more common and remained effective throughout the War. By the time of the Quebec Campaign in June 1759, the number of rank & file that was embarked on the expedition by the 35th was reduced to 863 men, 136 fewer rank & file than in December 1757.

The grenadier company was atypical in that the size of the grenadier company was established before the beginning of the Campaign Season at a number that was hoped would be later mirrored by the rest of the Regiment. It was not developed simply from 1/10 of the Rank & File. In March 1757, the grenadier company of the 35th had 95 "fit for duty" among the Rank & File of the 35th, 20-30 more men than the other line companies. Braddock had done something similar for the 44th and 48th Regiments during the Monongahela Campaign. The size of the grenadier company may explain why the third lieutenant was permanently assigned, even though other companies were functioning with only a single lieutenant. Monro always seems to have kept his grenadier company close by and at near full strength. Regimental strengths cannot be estimated from the size of the grenadier company.

Many of the policies present here on regimental organization proved awkward, if not detrimental, and would be changed soon after the conclusion of the Seven Years' War. There was a distinct and dramatic shift toward eliminating nearly all the "double duties" of officers. The size of both battalions and companies were reduced. Company size would target about 47 men, officers plus rank & file: 1 captain, 2 lieutenants, 2 sergeants, 3 corporals, 1 drummer, and 38 privates. The French adopted even more radical changes decreasing the number of companies but increasing the manpower in each company.

Through 1757, the officer roll was not static. Individuals left, promotions occurred, and some individuals joined. What was static was the number of lieutenants and ensigns. These numbers remain at 20 and 9, respectively. Lt. James Field was carried on the rolls since January but only joined sometime between April and August. Field was assigned to Fort Edward. Those leaving the regiment included Lt. James St. Clair and Lt. Belcher. James St. Clair had been with the 35th less than five months before transferring to the 22nd Regiment. The transfer happened on March 8, 1757. Thomas Fortye then joins the 35th as a lieutenant on the same date. He was on Half-Pay from the 50th. Ensign Robert Bayard joins the 35th, the same date, half-pay from the 51st Regiment. The Monthly Returns list Matthew Fleming as "Not Joined" in January, and the same "Not Joined" 11 months later in December. Fleming never joins the 35th, but neither Fleming nor St. Clair are connected to "one Lieutenant Vacant" that appears in the January through March Returns. Apparently, James Belcher leaves the 35th sometime in 1757, likely resigning from the Army, but no date is attached in WO 65/5. As Phillips' promotion to lieutenant dates from May, there is a chance that Belcher leaves in May 1757 or that Phillips' promotion simply fills the long-open vacancy. Phillips filling the vacancy is more probable with Belcher retiring at the end of 1757.

Nothing in a review of the 1757-1760 Regimental Returns offers any direct hint or clue to help identify or confirm the "true" roster at the Siege, correct in both name and rank. No "new" lieutenants from outside the 35th appeared in late 1757 or early 1758; all promotions were internal to the 35th. The next group of promotions all happened on January 24, 1758, when Luke Gardiner was made Captain, Ensigns Ormsby and Mason were promoted to lieutenant and two new ensigns were enrolled, Warham Brown and Cornelius Lysaght (WO 65/6). Others leave the 35th. Near the end of December, Lt. Thomas Cumberland and Ensign Robert Bayard leave to join Gage's 80th Light Infantry. Cumberland was killed at Ticonderoga on July 8, 1758 (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 731). Bayard quickly moves to the 60th and remains there. He was promoted to Captain on April 18, 1759, and Major in the 60th on October 4, 1765.

As with any modern army, accounting and cost controls were a huge issue. Many expenditures or payments went through the Treasury in London and authorization from the Treasury was obtained before those expenditures were incurred. The "accountants" overseeing these expenditures were very aware of all regulations and applicable laws. Army needs often conflicted with commercial laws. Yet the commercial laws trumped. These conflicts were most evident with transport and shipping, which also required Treasury consent before authorization. It was not simply a negotiation between the Army and the Navy. Many aspects of equipping a regiment were via commercial interests and contracts overseen by the Treasury. To further complicate matters, the Royal Artillery and the Engineering Corps were administered by the Board of Ordnance at the Royal Arsenal, not the War Office at Whitehall. The Board of Ordnance operated under its own set of rules and regulations with numerous civilian clerks, skilled workmen, and their own paymasters. It was James Furnis of the Board and his staff who were shifting the powder stores at William Henry just before the Siege.

The British Army ran on budgets authorized by Parliament. The Army had a civilian clerical staff, but in the end, the books needed to balance and meet the funds as budgeted by the Treasury. The controls were targeted at ensuring that monies were not spent over the allotted amounts forwarded by the Treasury. At the same time, the Office of Paymaster-General accumulated any excess funds and that person was able to use those funds for personal gain without paying any interest. Huge sums were quietly hidden in the balance of the monthly accounts and not returned to the Treasury until a new Paymaster-General was appointed and the previous accounts fully resolved. Lord Holland (Henry Fox) was the Paymaster-General from 1757-1765. The monthly balance in the accounts over that period averaged £455,000. The accounting rules associated with the Paymaster-General were developed to be particularly convoluted and slow, thereby ensuring the accumulation of excess funds, and were equally byzantine to guarantee a nearly impossible independent audit of the actual accounting. In 1719-1720, the accounts under Lord Lincoln were examined and £473,000 disappeared without any trace (Fortescue 1902, Page 511).

Depending on which army establishment a regiment was attached to, each regiment would be assigned an Agent headquartered in London or Dublin. Each of these Agents would provide service to a large number of individual regiments, they were not exclusive to a single regiment. These Agents would be responsible for securing uniforms, making sure that the uniforms were per the approved and current pattern, any associated leather goods, and shipping those items overseas. It is thought uniforms and equipment would be replaced proportionally, not all at once, but on a steady systematic schedule. Any budgeted monies for equipment that was not spent would go directly to

the Colonel. By conjecture, this arrangement may have contributed to the neglected status of the New York Independent Companies. To complicate things further, any firearms, ammunition, or gunpowder would be handled via the Board of Ordnance. Monies would be funneled from the Paymaster General to the Agent, except the subsistence money which would be funneled through the various Deputy Paymaster Generals. Among the paperwork maintained by the Agent was an "Account of the Non-Effective Fund" which paid for recruitment. Essentially, the more authorized, but unfilled slots, the more this fund would accumulate. As access monies in this account could be used as further compensation to the regimental officers, this fund was subject to chronic manipulation. Yet this was the only means to pay for recruitment. Loudoun showed a keen interest in that these funds be appropriately managed and not abused.

During the 1750s and after various stoppages, the typical subsistence pay for a private would be sixpence a day, but this was often reduced by an additional sixpence per week to serve Company shortages and expenses (Reid 1996, Page 8). Subsistence pay was 1 shilling per day for sergeants and 8 pence per day for corporals, before any reduction for Company shortages and expenses (1 shilling = 12 pence). Essentially, sergeants would receive twice the subsistence pay per day as privates. While on campaign, actual pay was episodic, often limited to three times per year.

The pay for provincials was very different and led to considerable friction between the regulars and the provincials. As regards Massachusetts, a provincial private was paid 10 ¼ pence per day without any stoppages plus a sizable enlistment bonus (Pargellis 1933, Page 101). Pargellis has the pay for British regulars at 8 pence per day, but subject to stoppages. For the provincials, any equipment needed for campaign was provided with the unsaid understanding that the equipment would become the soldier's property at the end of the season including the musket. At the same time, provincial officers would be paid a lower daily allowance than regular officers of the same rank reflecting colonial sensibilities as regards the gap between officers and the rank & file.

There was a single Quartermaster General, an exceedingly high-ranking position in the British Army. In each theater or under campaign, there would be a Deputy Quartermaster General. The Deputy Quartermaster General would be responsible for the transport and distribution of nearly everything needed by the various regiments in their theater, except for arms and ammunition whose transport was directly handled and contracted by the Board of Ordnance. The provisions themselves were obtained via civilian commissary agents, but not the transport of those provisions. Sir John St. Clair was the Deputy Quartermaster General in North America, but he had been severely wounded at the Monongahela in 1755, shot through the lung. His recuperation was long and does not appear to have resumed active duties until Forbes Campaign in 1758. St. Clair was a notoriously difficult man and unpopular with his fellow officers, both senior and junior. In static positions, the role of the Deputy Quartermaster could become routine, but when advancing as an Army, this role was extraordinarily difficult with an immense amount of responsibility including key roles in determining line-of-march and camp establishment, but at the same time, supported by minimal staff. While road construction was key to several of the campaigns, supplying the needed number of wagons and horses was a major problem and lack of fodder for the horses was an ever-present obstacle — interior North America was dense forest and lacked the expansive hay fields needed to supply the required quantities of hay and fodder. Where supplies were moved by water, the lack of sound bateaux was another constant headache. Teamsters, boatmen, and cattle drivers all needed to be hired. A superb discussion of the logistics and organization needed to undertake an 18th-century

campaign in North America is found in Cubbison (2015). The difficulties unique to North America are described in a letter from Loudoun to Cumberland, dated October 2, 1756 (LO 1748 and MANA, Page 234).

Internal to each regiment, there would be a regimental quartermaster. Often these duties were assigned to an ensign, but experienced sergeants were occasionally selected for the role. Lieutenant William Hamilton was the regimental quartermaster for the 35th at the time of the Siege, having been assigned the duties that February. His commission to lieutenant in the 35th dates to April 1756, but he does not appear on the 35th's officer list for 1755 (WO 65/2). Although time-consuming, it was nowhere near as difficult as the position of Deputy Quartermaster General. Major Gabriel Christie of the 48th, based in Albany, served as Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General under Webb and would have been responsible for the 35th at Fort William Henry. Christie was assisted by Lt. Matthew Leslie of the 48th at Fort Edward. Both Christie and Leslie had been part of Braddock's Expedition. Leslie is often wrongly placed in the 44th Regiment. Leslie's commission to Lieutenant in the 48th dates to November 4, 1755 (WO 65/6). He was promoted to the rank of Captain in the 48th on September 29, 1760 (WO 65/9, 1761). Leslie served as Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General at Quebec (1759) and Havana (1762). In 1768, Captain Leslie moves to half-pay in the 76th Foot and then "exchanges" to the Bengal Army (WO 65/18). Reaching the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, Leslie died in May 1778 while on service in India (Cardew 1903, Page 41).

The Deputy Paymaster General for North America was a civilian, William Johnston (Albany) or Abraham Mortier (New York). Civilian clerks would verify that regimental paperwork and expenses were authorized, if not, no payment. Drafts arriving from Britain, although sorely needed, could throw a regimental budget into a muddle with no apparent funds to pay for the additional men. Loudoun faced this awkward dilemma at Halifax, where drafts from Britain were scheduled to arrive. The two battalions of the 60th had the needed funds in their accounts, but the 22nd, 44th, and 48th regiments lacked the funds to pay for the newly arrived drafts (Pargellis 1936, Page 291). On campaign, a contingent fund might be provided to the Commander in Chief, but that was an expenditure that was already authorized and would be subsequently reviewed. Braddock was assigned a contingent fund of £3,000 (Schutz, Page 220), but any still remaining monies were seemingly lost with Braddock's death and not transferred to his successor, Governor Shirley.

Under the peacetime British establishment, a foot regiment had a "garrison" strength of 814 men and an annual budget of £15,217 (Steward 2015, Page 168). Under a wartime establishment of about 1,145 men, the budget approached £20,175 (Pargellis 1933, Page 122). Of this sum, £9,590 was used to cover clothing and customary charges. This money never left England. For each regiment, about £10,585 was then given to the appropriate deputy paymaster generals under the ledger of the regiment's **subsistence fund**. The regimental paymaster would then request monies from the deputy paymaster general based on the total number of effective men as detailed in each of the monthly returns. If the regiment was understrength, those monies not paid in wages would be allocated to the **non-effective fund**, but those monies remained with the deputy general paymaster until requested by the regiment's commanding officer. This non-effective fund was the source of the monies that were spent on recruiting. Each colonel or lieutenant colonel would then get periodic updates on how much monies could be allocated to recruiting needs. Care was needed to prevent the mixing of these two funds, something not tolerated by the deputy paymasters or the Treasury.

Monthly Return of the Thirty Fifth Regim ^t of Foot, Commanded by																					
COMPANIES										OFFICERS PRESENT.										Effectives Rank & File	
										Commission					Staff			Non Commission			
Colonel	Lt Col.	Major	Captains	Lieutenant	Ensigns	Chaplain	Adjutant	Q ^r Master	Surgeon	Mate	Serjeants	Drumers	Fit for Duty	Sick Present	Sick in Hospitals	On Command	Recommended	On Furlough			
Col ^o Lieut Gen ^l Chas ^r Otway			1	1	1		1	1	1	2	4	2	57	3	0		4				
Lt Col ^o Geo ^d Monro	1		2	1							4	2	70		1		6				
Major Henry Melcher		1	2	1							4	2	79	2	7		3				
Captain { John Monroville			1	2	1						4	2	79	3	4		4				
	Thos Collins			1	1	1					4	1	62		3	1	5				
	John Cunningham			2	1						4	1	65	2	3		0	2			
	Geo ^d Melcher			1	2	1					4	2	74	4	3		3				
	William Belliss			1	2	1					4	2	73	6	5		2				
	John Crosby			2	1							4	2	64	4	5		4			
Chas ^r Ince			1	3							4	2	84	5	1						
Total,		1	1	6	19	9		1	1	1	2	40	10	709	29	40	1	36	2		
Absent Officers																	Names of				
Since what Time Absent		By whose leave & for what Time										Months									
Lieut Gen ^l Chas ^r Otway		Fort Edward										lying Wounded		Oct 1855							
Capt ^t Cunningham		at Montreal										D ^d		32							
Capt ^t Crosby		not yet found												49							
Lieut Fleming		3 March 56										Capt of Loudoun		45							
Chaplain Whitley																					
NB: All the men who deserted,																					

Notes on Monthly Returns and Annual Army Lists: Returns and muster rolls can be a total quagmire. Seemingly, the British Army had a Standard Monthly Return. Except for the company commanders, these forms report numbers, not names of individuals plus the names of officers on other duties, such as recruiting, absent on leave, or recovering from wounds. Pages 86 - 89 of *Military Affairs of North America* (MANA; Pargellis 1969) are formatted based on the Standard Monthly Return, but without the names of the company commanders, as in LO 6751. Sergeants and drummers are each listed as separate entities under NCO (Non-Commissioned Officers). At the time, corporals were considered NCOs and were part of the Rank & File — corporals plus privates. The actual number of corporals per company in the field was likely four (LO 2774), the same as sergeants. Although detailed, these monthly returns do not appear to be detailed enough to be pay rosters, a duty held by one of the company captains. While on campaign, pay would not be issued monthly, but every three or four months. For context, all the Returns from September through December date to the 25th of the month (LO 6751). Monro's abbreviated Return for August also dates to the 25th of the month (LO 4313), as does Webb's Return (LO 4309) which is often more informative.

The British National Archives, War Offices, Printed Annual Army Lists (WO 65) are incredibly valuable, but these volumes do not pick up all the changes in officer postings that happened. For example, Lieutenant James St. Clair's 5-month service in the 35th is entirely missed (November 28, 1756 - March 8, 1757). When an officer joins a regiment that date is recorded, but when an officer leaves that date is often not recorded (Lieutenant James Blecher); this is especially true if the officer retires. Regimental Adjutants and Quartermasters are typically listed a second time under Lieutenants and Ensigns, but there still can be confusion. When the role of the Quartermaster is assigned to a sergeant, then his name only appears once on the List, but it would be wrong to assume that if the Quartermaster's name only appears once on the List that he is indeed a sergeant. Corrections are in pen and squeezed between lines of printed text making deciphering the corrections difficult and abbreviations are common. Often, the official date of the promotion, as recorded in London, did not match the actual field date — this may be what happened to the 35th. For example: In the 22nd Regiment, William Neale was appointed Adjutant on April 21, 1758, but he is not enrolled as an Ensign until November 20, 1758 (WO 65/6, WO 65/7). Often the changes that occur late in a year are not apparent unless the following year's Army List is reviewed. Pargellis (1969, MANA, Page 281) notes that some of the promotions authorized by Loudoun do not appear in the Printed Annual Army Lists until 1759.

With the advent of the Seven Years' War, the British Government authorized impressing men for the Army in both 1756 and 1757 (Brumwell 2002, Page 63). Fifteen new battalions had to be filled. The impressing was limited to unemployed men between 17 and 40 years of age. Catholics were not to be impressed. In 1756, at least 410 men were impressed and initially accepted into the 35th (LO 2774). LO 2774 is similar to a Monthly Return, but it is exceedingly exact in separating the established Rank & File from the "impressed" men that arrived in August at New York with Major Fletcher. Of these impressed men, 351 men reached Albany. Most of those not reaching Albany were already discharged as unfit for duty or in hospital in New York. Six men had died at sea and an equal number deserted. In September 1756, the total Rank & File was estimated at 813 men, and 818 men in January 1757 (LO 2274 and LO 6751). To reach this level, about 975 men had been culled through including more than 60 impressed men rejected by Major Fletcher as unfit for duty even before they actually joined the 35th or appeared on any Rolls or Returns. Later, both in

England and once arriving in New York, others had been discharged as unfit for duty, but there were deserters and deaths. By January 1757, there was no differentiation or identification of "impressed" men in the Monthly Returns, all being Rank and File. After September 1756, any recent addition to the 35th was simply referenced as a "recruit" without any appearance of the word "impressed" in any of the Returns. As regards the Siege, both Webb and Monro praised the performance of the 35th without making any distinction between the impressed recruits and the veterans of the 35th. Later in September, there was a rash of desertions from the 35th Foot. Eighteen men desert with 15 of these being from the companies present at the Siege. On the Monthly Return for September, there is a notation "*All the Men Who deserted, were this Year's Recruits.*"

Under the protection of a sizable French escort, Monro reached Fort Edward on August 15th. Monro was in Albany by August 25th. Webb remained at Fort Edward. Most of the 35th reached Albany by mid-September. After being relieved by regulars coming from Halifax, the four Fort Edward garrison companies joined in October. To soldiers living in close quarters, disease is often a more serious threat than the enemy. Although there are no discharges in September, 41 men were discharged in October with 21 being from the four companies not at the Siege. Throughout the entire 35th, there were 31 desertions and 51 discharges between September and December. The companies present at the Siege account for 19 desertions, but only 22 of the discharges. The four companies not at the Siege account for 12 desertions and 29 of the discharges. Without any apparent explanation other than disease and sickness, the Fit Rank & File in the four companies not at the Siege decreased by 30 soldiers between September and October. The number of sick remained steady, but the number discharged then needs to be recognized. Logic would suggest that the six companies returning from Fort William Henry were in the most need of hospital care, but this was not the case. In September, the hospital beds were split evenly between the companies at the Siege and those not at the Siege, 21 beds and 19 beds, respectively. Six of the ten soldiers that died in September were from the four companies not at the Siege, but the cause of these deaths is not found in the Returns. In October, those companies at the Siege occupied 30% of the beds and those not at the Siege 70% of the beds, 11 and 25 beds, respectively. By December, the total number of hospital beds needed was reduced to 13. Despite Lt. Colonel Burton's warning, Fort Edward had remained an unsanitary post with little respite from disease and sickness.

The 35th Foot then moves to Philadelphia in November and winter quarters. For the 35th, there were no deaths in October and only a single death each in November and December. In November 1757, a total of 26 men rejoin the 35th. In the lower right corner of the Return under "Joyn'd", the value of 26 is amended (Reference Figure 19B) and there is a written notation — "*26 of the above men returned, recruited are Prisoners that were taken at Fort Will^m Henry and are Since Returned from Quebeck.*" November is the only Return that indicates the return of any of the missing. Between September and November, the 35th loses over 90 men to discharges, deaths, and desertions — essentially a full company or 10% of the 35th's strength. This number is slightly greater than the number Monro reports on August 25th for the combined killed and missing from the Siege and the march to Fort Edward, 75 Rank & File (LO 4313) — 15 Rank & File killed and Captain John Ormsby, 1 sergeant, 2 drummers, and 60 Rank & File missing. Montcalm had the gravely wounded Ormsby taken to Montreal under the care of a surgeon, but he was returned to New York by the end of the year.

In September, the Total Rank & File was 817 men with 709 Fit Rank & File. In November, these numbers were 790 and 695, respectively. The decrease was largely due to those being discharged in October. In December, 195 drafts (transfers) from other regiments just arriving from Europe join the 35th Foot, including 109 Scots from the 77th and 78th Foot. The Total Rank & File increases to 989 men and the Fit Rank & File to 892 men. The average company was now at a strength of 99 Rank & File, just five men short of the 104-man ceiling. The "Wanting to Compleat to y^e Eftablifhm" was 51 men.

A glimpse of how a battalion functioned on a daily basis can be found in Orderly Books kept by the battalion adjutants. Corporals would be assigned to details involving four to eight men. Sergeants were assigned to command details of between eight and twelve men. The orders detailing sergeants may or may not direct a corporal to be included as well, but often they would. Ensigns commanded details of less than twenty men and then lieutenants the same and somewhat higher. Still, most orderly book assignments simply direct the officer assignments to a subaltern officer or several subaltern officers, either lieutenants or ensigns. If assigned to a specific company, the captain would then make the subaltern assignments. Often a detail assignment coming from the adjutant would specify the number of subalterns, sergeants, corporals, and privates that were involved. Captains do not appear until the detail or assignment approached forty men. Braddock's Defeat (1959) edited by Hamilton is an entertaining read of two journals and Halkett's Orderly Book for the 44th from the Monongahela. One journal is authored by an unknown officer, the other is by the batman (servant) to Captain Robert Chomondeley (Chomley) of the 48th. Wisely, Hamilton did not correct the grammar or spellings from the original manuscripts. Braddock's Orderly Book is available online, but the book only covers the period through June 17th. The subsequent volume was lost during the Battle on July 9th, 1755. Halkett's Orderly Book extends through the Battle.

(<https://archive.org/stream/docksorderlybook00bradrich#page/lvi/mode/2up>).

Restored Fortifications: As regards French and Indian War fortifications, Google Earth is a fantastic free tool, and the use of the "ruler" allows for very easy distance and dimension measurements. Fort William Henry has been privately restored. To provide even more open-air visitor space, two of the barracks were not rebuilt. The restored Fort William Henry blends Figure 1 and Figure 2, but the foundational element is Figure 2, Eyre's As-Built. The reconstruction lengthens the east wall some 30 feet compared to Figure 1, but this length is still some 50 feet shorter than in Figure 2 and may relate to property boundary issues or utilities more than anything else. The number and the locations of the gun embrasures are clearly derived from Figure 2. Gifford 1955 (Page 10) includes an accurate rendering of the fort with all four barracks, but the position of the hidden storehouse on the south curtain wall is obscured from view, so its presence or absence is a non-factor. Of any modern drawing or plan, this rendering is by far the best representation of the Fort at the time of the Siege — **all** but one of the gun embrasures are correct.

Fort Carillon (Fort Ticonderoga) has been reconstructed, but when viewed, you can easily see that the gun parapets have been seriously reduced to widen the terreplein (gun platform) allowing visitors more room on top of the walls. To further ease visitor overcrowding, the interior of the north wall is bare. It is largely stone.

In Quebec, Fort Chambly on the Richelieu River has been restored. Located on the outlet from Lake Champlain, it is a square stone fort with 30-foot-high walls that blends aspects of a castle with tower bastions. By 1755, Chambly's function was reduced to a supply depot for forts more forward. It is simply gorgeous.

The reconstructed Fort Ligonier in Pennsylvania involves hybrid construction and a substantial change in intent midway through construction – General Forbes did not approve of the original design of the engineer (a substantial bastion complex) and ordered a palisade fort to be built for the remainder of the structure. Forbes was moving west. He only needed a secure supply depot, not an artillery-resistant bastion.

Fort Stanwix in Rome, New York illustrates a textbook bastion design (Figure 10; note: the brown planking forms the gun platforms on top of the ramparts). It is larger than Fort William Henry with wall lengths of 340 feet, but the hospital which was outside the bastion walls is not part of the reconstruction. It was built to secure the western approach to Albany via Lake Ontario.

Fort Niagara has also been restored. Fort Niagara is a peninsula fortification and follows very different protocols and standards than a strict square bastion fortification, but the fundamental principles remain. Built by the French, Fort Niagara fell to a siege by the British in 1759. *Siege - 1759: The Campaign Against Niagara* (Dunnigan 1996) is an excellent read, packed with illustrations that are relevant to other campaigns as well. Niagara was prominent for a much greater length of time than the other forts spanning from the French and Indian War through the War of 1812 and remained an active military post into the 20th century.

The dimensions of Crown Point (New York), Fort Pitt, and Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh) can be discerned in the aerial views (Google Earth). The Bastion of Fort Duquesne was very small with wall lengths of only 160 feet. After the buildings were erected, the open parade ground of Fort Duquesne measured only about 31 feet by 31 feet. To function, undersized bastions such as Fort Duquesne required numerous outbuildings in support.

Letter and Journal Appendix: Letters from Shirley, Mercer, Winslow, Pitt, Cumberland, Loudoun, Eyre, Webb, and Monro as it relates to the Campaigns of 1756 and 1757 are transcribed here. The letters are arranged by the date when written or in groupings. Grammar and spellings are as in the original with the exception that a period (.) or colon (:) is often omitted following numbers or as part of a calendar date. Some excessive commas have been removed, but this is inconsistent. The letters are not edited, but in some cases, it was easier to spell out the abbreviation than use the abbreviation. The use of superscripts is less than in the originals. Loudoun's letter to Fox (November 22 - December 26; CO 5/48 001), Pitt's letter of February 4th (LO 2765), Loudoun's letter of March 10 (LO 3004) and Webb's Letters of August 1 (LO 4020 and LO 4081) are among the most illuminating. Where letters lack a citation to a published source, the transcription is by this author, as are the errors. The presented letters attempt to close several different letter chains.

Some letter files contain duplicate letters that are not exact copies of each other. These letters may differ in spelling and punctuation. Often duplicates prepared by clerks were included with the original as the penmanship of the author was so poor and to be nearly indecipherable, e.g. LO 1263 A&B). Different institutions may have slightly different copies of the "original" correspondence; there will be some minor variations, especially as regards capitalizations and the formats for calendar dates. Unfortunately, words can also be dropped. Word usage is similar to current English with the notable exception of the word "Instant". "Instant" often best conforms to "soon" or if regarding a letter to "this month". In LO 1599, Burton writes "Instant", but repeated histories record it as "In stocks". "Piles" describes attached buildings, often used with barracks.

The last entry is Adam Williamson's Diary from July 1st through August 8th. The scouting missions conducted that July by Monro are best described here and are a key element of most histories of the Siege. This is a companion to Collins' description of the Siege found in LO 4395 which is fully transcribed in the main body of the text (Page 26). The Fyre and Hays Journals can be found online. The Colonial Office Papers referenced below are now available online, but researchers need to use the "_" to locate documents. The Montresor Journal can be found online, but a much more detailed report was prepared by Montresor for the Ordnance Board — Transactions of the Campaign, June 1 to October 1, 1757. This report is at the National Archives in London (War Office 55:283, referenced in Pargellis 1933, Page 244). This source is not referenced or reviewed here. Pargellis describes this as being "a much fuller account".

The Winslow Papers are housed at the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston (unpublished) are woefully neglected and may contain a significant store of information concerning the Lake George "navy", the burst of construction in Fall 1756 following Burton's inspection, commissary and ordnance stores, and duties of the provincials. Whether Winslow intended to actually advance on Ticonderoga may best be seen here and Travers (2015).

For the most part, the letters chosen for inclusion here are not in print. The notable exceptions are a few letters written by Shirley, Pitt, Eyre, Cumberland, and Loudoun that are central to understanding the events or to provide some background on the role of provincial governors. Shirley's role demanded the inclusion of more previously published letters than planned. Additional letters connected to Pitt are transcribed in Kimball (1906) and are online. Other letters and journals that are available online include the Montresor Journals, the Frye Journal, the Hays Journal, the Furnis Journal, *Transactions*, the George Bartman Letters, and *Military Affairs in North America, 1749 -1765* (Stanley Pargellis, 1936), so they are not included here. Of the letters not

transcribed here, the most important are between Cumberland and Loudoun. Cumberland writes an extended letter, October 22nd - December 23, 1756 (MANA, Page 251). Loudoun writes a very long letter to Cumberland, starting on November 22, and concluding on December 26, 1756 (MANA, Page 263). Loudoun writes Cumberland again on January 5, 1757, MANA, Page 290. Even in private correspondence to Cumberland, Loudoun barely discusses the events around the surrender of Fort William Henry. Following the Siege, Loudoun does offer a single brief comment to Cumberland; this passage is included in the main text (LO 4642, New York October 17, 1757; and MANA, Page 399).

In July 1757, James De Lancey replaces Charles Hardy as Governor of New York. Hardy joins the Louisbourg Expedition. In the Letter Appendix, both men will be referenced as Governor of New York, dependent on the date. William Pitt replaces Henry Fox as Secretary of State for the Southern Department on December 4, 1756. Pitt was forced to resign his office on April 6, 1757; but regained the position on June 27, 1757. Pitt then holds the office until October 1761. Loudoun's 1757 Campaign was first formulated under Fox, not Pitt. Many of the important letters from Loudoun involving Fort William Henry were written by Loudoun to Fox, not Pitt. As part of his new duties, Pitt was given these letters or copies of the letters, but the returning correspondence to Loudoun was from Pitt, not Fox. Pitt writes Loudoun on December 7th (LO 2322). In all likelihood, Loudoun learns of Pitt's rise to Secretary in early February 1757 (see Belcher to Pitt, February 9; CO_5/18_Part_1_005). Pitt's first letters to Loudoun do not reach him until early March. From July to September 1757, Loudoun is working under the assumption that Holderness is Southern Secretary, not Pitt.

The letters are arranged by date. The sequence of presentation is roughly Shirley and Winslow; Eyre; Loudoun and Pitt; Rigaud's Winter Raid; Webb and Loudoun; Monro; and then the Williamson Diary. There are a few key letter chains where the correspondence appears to be lost. The chain between Webb and Monro before the events of the Siege is the most prominent and may be entirely lost (see LO 3590). This would have been the period between March and the end of July 1757. Webb authored at least two letters to Loudoun in June 1757 that were not located, June 19th and June 22nd (see LO 4020A). In this interval, Webb leaves Albany and arrives at Fort Edward, so they may simply be unimportant correspondence related to his traveling north. These letters do not appear to be housed with the Loudoun Papers at the Huntington Library or the Colonial Office Papers in London. Loudoun would be on-board ship heading to Halifax when these were written. There is a small possibility that these June letters are housed with the Cumberland Papers. Loudoun had a pronounced tendency to write both Cumberland and Fox on the same calendar date. The letters are not duplicates and care is needed to avoid confusion. Loudoun would often then include copies of other letters he received from the various governors and officers under his command as attachments to his own letters. The individual provincial governors would follow the same procedure. This is how various letters and documents ended up as part of the Colonial Office Papers, as attachments to letters to the Secretary of State, Southern Department — Robinson, Fox, Pitt, or Holderness. Notably, *Transactions* does not appear to have been forwarded by Loudoun, remaining in his personal papers housed at the Huntington Library.

When Loudoun ordered the inspection of Fort Edward and Fort William Henry by Burton and Montessor in August 1756, MacLeod attached ordnance stores to both reports (LO 1619 and LO 1583). These lists were derived from provincial sources and not formal accountings developed by MacLeod or the Board of Ordnance. These provincial accountings may be with the Winslow Papers

in Boston (plus MS. N-1942; Edward Brooks Box, 1933). MacLeod's inventories are then obliquely referenced in a letter from Loudoun to Cumberland (October 3, 1756; MANA, Page 239). Unfortunately, MacLeod's inventories do not appear to be attached to those documents now housed in the Huntington Library. A more systematic search may be warranted.

With regard to the 1755 and 1756 New York Campaigns, the Loudoun – Shirley disputes are a vexing and time-consuming sinkhole. Provincial commercial and political interests violently inject themselves. Scapegoats are offered, and facts twisted, obscured, or forgotten. Misdirection is near constant. Historians choose sides. With Schutz (1961) and Thayer (1957) supporting Shirley, it takes considerable effort to unpack and shift through all the correspondence. Gipson (*The Repudiation of Shirley* in Vol. VI. 1958) is balanced, offering both praise and criticism of Shirley. Compared to Pargellis, Gipson's "what-ifs" are more reasoned — *"Nevertheless, it may be said that had Braddock been permitted to make Niagara his objective, he would doubtless have succeeded where Shirley failed. Johnson, de Lancey, and Pownall would not have dared to combine to destroy him; in fact, there is every reason to believe that, with his royal commission and unchallenged authority, he would have secured their support; he certainly would have received that of Shirley — and that meant of New England. In coming to Albany, he would have had a staff skilled in the peculiar procedures controlling the use of funds by military agencies, and, what is of more importance, a well filled military chest; whereas Shirley had neither and was plagued by problems arising out of this lack and even accused, upon unjust grounds, of grave misconduct in financial matters."* (Page 182). Anderson (2001, Pages 141-149) is a wonderful and colorful read as regards the relationship and conflict between Loudoun and Shirley. The deeper underlying conflicts between the provinces and the Crown are central to this discussion. Within this same passage, he is brutal on Abercromby's role surrounding Oswego's surrender — non-responsive and non-committal to the situation, determined to wait on the arrival of Loudoun. In this squabble, the plight of the common British soldier is meaningless to both sides. The class and patronage system triumphs.

As it regards North America and the tension between Britain and France in 1754-1755, Graham (1968) vividly describes the ever-changing nature of the London politics. Newcastle, Robinson, Halifax, Cumberland, Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia, and Shirley are prominent in the discussion. With several political and military ministries offering correspondence and guidance to the colonies, events were moving much faster than communications allowed control. As Prime Minister, Newcastle favored a political solution, but Cumberland privately influenced the King that a strong initial military move was needed. The ten-week travel time between Europe and America was a brutal sieve. The British ministers were fully aware of these limitations but soon feel impotent to influence the events. If "feasible", orders and advice given months earlier would be revised — e.g. Halifax hoped that Braddock would eventually decide to march on Niagara, not the Monongahela. Robinson, with crossed fingers, was keenly hoping that any conflict would not escalate beyond North America. The assessment of the capabilities and speed at which the troops being sent and recruited could move in the interior of North America was grossly unrealistic, if not comically delusional. For the ministries, it was a long, if not anxious, wait. Time for second guessing and questioning orders and correspondence was in abundance. Shirley was viewed favorably by the British ministers, but already somewhat of a "loose cannon". In a strong statement, Graham writes "And it was Shirley's initiative which extended a limited plan into one which led to the destruction of French power in Canada." (Graham 1968, Page 552). This paper does not delve into the events of 1756.

From Sir Thomas Robinson, Secretary of State, Southern Department, to William Shirley, October 26, 1754 (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 97).

Govr. Shirley

Whitehall, Octr. 26th, 1754

Sir,

The King having taken into consideration the State of His Colonies, and the Encroachments made by the French, in several parts of North America, You will see by my Letter of this date to you and to the respective Governors of the several Colonies and Provinces in No. America, the Orders, which his Majesty has thought proper to give for the Defence of His just Rights and Dominions, and as the King has upon former occasions, experienced your Activity and Fidelity in His Service, He has graciously pleased to appoint you Colonel of a Regiment of Foot (50th Foot), consisting of one Thousand men, to be raised by you, and to rendezvous at Boston, when raised, and you will accordingly receive, in a short time, a proper Commission for that purpose. The King having likewise nominated a certain number of Field Officers, Captains, Lieutenants, Ensigns, an Adjutant, and a Quartermaster, and having been pleased to sign the Blank Commissions, for the remaining Complement of Officers, the same will be transmitted to you, together with a List of the whole Number with all possible dispatch.

His Majesty having appointed Sir William Pepperell to be a Colonel of a Regt to be raised in the same manner (51st Foot), and to consist of the same number with that, whereof you are now appointed Colonel, I have acquainted him therewith by this Conveyance, and I have likewise informed him, that it is the King's pleasure, that the said Regiment when raised, shall rendez-vous at New York and Philadelphia, in like manner, as that your Command will rendez-vous at Boston.

You will carefully correspond with the Commander in Chief when He arrives, and Sir Wm. Pepperell and will communicate to them, from time to time, the Progress you shall have made in the Execution of these His Majesty's Orders; and you will likewise correspond with the several Govrs. of His Majesty's Colonies, as often as the service shall require it.

I am etc.

T. Robinson

Endorsed:

Octr. 26th 1754

To Govr. Shirley and Sir Wm. Pepperell

by Mr. Pitcher; and Duptes

by Sir. J. St. Clair

Comment: Although never having served in the military, Shirley was now a Colonel in the British Army. He was sixty years old. James Pitcher was the Commissary of Musters and John St. Clair was the Deputy Quartermaster General. The Commissary of Musters certified that the regiments under their authority met the standards in terms of men, training, and equipment to be included within the British Army. The position was different from that of the Deputy Paymaster General. Pitcher reviewed the 50th and 51st Foot at Oswego in July 1756, eight companies per regiment; the other four companies were on the Mohawk River. Ideally, musters occurred twice per year.

From Sir Thomas Robinson to William Shirley, October 26, 1754 (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 98).

Sir,

Whitehall, Octr. 26th, 1754

Having informed you in my letter of July 5th that the King had under his Royal consideration the State of affairs in North America; I am now to acquaint you, that, amongst other measures, that are thought proper for the defence of His Majesty's just rights and dominions, in those parts, the King has not only been pleased to order two Regiments of Foot, consisting of 500 Men each, besides Commissioned and non Commissioned Officers, commanded by Sir Peter Halkett (44th Foot) and Col. Dunbar (48th Foot) to repair to Virginia, and to be there augmented to the number of 700, each; but, likewise, to send orders to Sir William Pepperell, and yourself to raise two Regiments of 1000 Men each; and also to sign Commissions for a number of Officers to serve in the said two Regiments, and who will forthwith repair to North America, for that purpose.

Whereas there will be wanting a considerable number of Men to make up the designed complement of the said four regiments, it is His Majesty's pleasure, that you should be taking the previous steps, towards contributing, as you can, to have about 3,0000 Men in readiness to be enlisted; and it is His Majesty's intention, that a General Officer of Rank and Capacity, to be appointed to command in Chief all the King's forces in North America, a Deputy Quarter Master General, and a Commissary of Musters shall set out, as soon as conveniently may be, in order to prepare every thing for the arrival of the Forces abovementioned from Europe, and the raising of the others in America.

You will receive from that General, and the other Officers just mentioned, a full and exact account of the Arms, Cloathing, and other necessities to be sent, upon this important occasion, as likewise the Ordnance Stores, and of the Officers, and attendants, belonging thereto. All which being ordered for this service, are such proofs of His Majesty's regard for the security and welfare of his subjects in those parts, as cannot, fail to excite you to exert yourself, and those under your care, to take the most vigorous steps to repel your common danger, and to shew, that the Kings orders, which were sent to you last year by the Earle of Holdernessee, and were renewed to you in my letter of 5th July, have, at last, roused the emulation and spirit, which every Man owes at this time, to His Majesty, the publick and himself. The King will not therefore imagine, that either you, or the rest of his Govrs., will suffer the least neglect or delay, in the performance of the present service, now strongly recommended to you; particularly with regard to the following points: vizt: That you should carefully provide a sufficient quantity of victuals, at the expence of your Governmt, to be ready for the Troops at their arrival. — That you should likewise, furnish the Officers, who may have occasion to go place to place, with all necessities for traveling by land, in case there are no means of going by sea; and: That you should use your utmost diligence, and authority, in procuring an exact observance of such orders, as shall be issued from time to time by the Commander in Chief, for quartering the Troops, impressing carriages, and providing all necessities for such forces, as shall arrive, or be raised within your Government.

As the Articles above-mentioned are of a local and peculiar nature, and arising entirely within your Governmt, it is almost needless for me to acquaint you, that His Majesty will expect, that the charge thereof be defrayed by His subjects belonging to the same. But, with the regard to such other articles, which are of a more general concern, it is the King's pleasure, that the same should be

supplied by a common fund, to be established for the benefit of all the Colonies in North America; for which purpose, you will use your utmost endeavors to induce the assembly of your province, to raise forthwith as large a sum as can be afforded, as their contribution to this common fund, to be employed, provisionally, for the General service of North America (particularly for paying the charge of levying the Troops, to make up the complements for the Regiments abovementioned) until such time as a plan of general union of His Majesty's Northern Colonies, for their common defence, can be perfected.

You will carefully conferr, or correspond as you have opportunities upon every thing relative to the present service, with Generl. Sir William Pepperell, and as it is the King's intention to give all proper encouragement to such persons, who shall engage to serve upon this occasion, you will acquaint all such persons, in the King's name that they will receive arms and cloathing from hence, and that they shall be sent back if desired to their respective habitations, when the service in America shall be over.

At the several Governors, in all the Kings provinces and Colonies in North America, will receive this conveyance a letter to the same effect with this, which I now send you, will be prepared at the same time, to obey His Majesty's commands; and I am to direct you to correspond with all, or either of them, occasionally, as you shall find it expedient for the General service.

I am ettc.

T. Robinson

Comment: Robinson was directing Shirley and the other colonial governments to recruit some 3,000 men into the British Army with the cost for the recruiting (levying charges) to be paid by the provincial governments through a **common fund**, still to be established. These men were not provincial troops. The monies would have to be voted on and passed via each of the separate provincial assemblies.

Including the commanding colonel, a regiment of the British Foot was authorized to forty officers. Most of the officers joined to the 50th and 51st Foot were British, some 70%. These men were selected in Britain without any input from Shirley or Pepperell. Of the British officers, only about 15% had experience in America, but this American experience included the highest-ranking field officers of each regiment. Both Lieutenant Colonel Ellison and Major John Littlehales were on half-pay from the previous 50th, broken in 1748 (Steward 2015, Page 69). Lieutenant Colonel James Mercer was on half-pay from the previous 51st Foot. Ellison died in November 1755. Between Shirley and Pepperell, there were twenty-three blank commissions that could be awarded (patronage), some 30% of the officer corps (Pargellis 1933, Page 32). Seemingly, the vacancies in each regiment included those for two captains, one captain lieutenant, four lieutenants, and four ensigns. Serving as Braddock's secretary, William Shirley Jr. held a lieutenant's commission in the 50th. Jack Shirley, the second oldest son, held the rank of captain (50th). Captain William Williams, who figures so prominently in the resupply of Oswego, does not appear on Steward's 1755 list for the 51st Foot. Williams was one of the American patronage appointments. If identified correctly, Williams was born in New Groton Connecticut in 1708, the son of Colonel William Williams of the Connecticut Provincials.

From William Shirley to Sir Thomas Robinson (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 107).

Sir,

Boston, New England, Decr. 14th, 1754.

In my last letter I acknowleg'd the honour, I had, of receiving three letters for you, two of them dated the 26th of October and the other the 25th, and I shall punctually conform to his Majesty's Orders signify'd in the two former of them to me concerning the raising of the Regiment, of which his Majesty hath done me the honour to appoint me Colonel, to the utmost of my power, particularly in procuring the Assembly within my own Governmt to contribute their proportion towards the Expence of Levy money etc. for the Troops sent over from Ireland, and to be rais'd here.

In the mean time as Sir William Pepperell's and my delay to begin raising our respective Regimts until Levy Money can be obtain'd from the several Colonies (a point which I am apprehensive may prove difficult to be carry'd) would disappoint His Majesty's service very much, We shall be under the necessity of raising Money at present by drawing on our Agent; which may be reimburs'd to the Crown, upon the Colonies complying with his Majesty's pleasure; for inducing my own Assembly to do which I shall use my best Endeavours, as also that our beginning to raise the two Regimnts at present shall be of no Disadvantage to my Application to them to be at their part of the Charge for the requisite Levy Money.

I now beg leave, Sir, to mention to you that my Lieutent Colonel and Mr. Pitcher, the Commissary General of the Musters of all his Majesty's forces rais'd and to be rais'd in North America, have both assur'd me that my Regiment was to rendezvous at Boston, and Sir William's Pepperell's in New York and Philadelphia, and the latter of those Gentlemen tells me that he is certain that the place assign'd for the Rendezvous of my Regiment in your letter which is New York and Philadelphia, and that for Sir Williams Pepperell's which is Boston, must be an Error of the Clerk in filling up the Blanks left for those places; If it is not, I would beg leave, Sir, to submit for your Consideration whether in all cases it might not be for his Majesty's Service that the General plan of Rendezvous for my Regimt should be in Boston rather than in New York and Pensilvania, as in the former case I might have it more under my eye and immediate command, than I could have in the latter, since by his Majety's Instructions to me as Governor of the province of Massachusetts Bay, I am forbid to stir out of it without his express leave; whereas Sir William Pepperell may attend and Inspect his Regiment any where. At this time particularly I am concerting Measure with Colonel Lawrence to drive the French out of Nova Scotia next Spring, in Obedience to his Majesty's Orders signify'd to me in your Letter, Sir, dated 5th of July last, and propose that my Regimt should assist in the Service, unless I am forbid by different Orders; in which first case their being rendezvous, as they are rais'd in New York and Pensilvania instead of Boston would be an hindrance to the Service.

Upon these considerations, and the assurances of the Commissary General of the Musters, that it is design'd by you, Sir, that my Regiment should be rendezvous'd at Boston, and it must be owing to the Error of the Clerk in copying the letter, that it is there otherwise express'd which seems very profitable, I shall assemble my Regimt at Boston, as fast as I can raise them, and continue to do so, until I have the honour to receive your further Orders on his head.

*I am with the greatest respect,
Sir,*

*Your most Humble, and
most Obedient Servant,
W. Shirley*

P.S. I shall observe your Directions, Sir, concerning giving Mr. Pitcher all Assistance in my power; and am oblig'd to you for the honour of your Message to me by him.

I am afraid there was a mistake in my last, viz, that the 1st of April was the time, by which 20,00 (sic) stands of Arms should be shipped and Dispatches sent in Answer to that letter, whereas it should have been the 1st day of February. (20,00 as in the penned original, should be 2,000).

*Rt. Honble Sir Thomas Robinson
One of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State.*

Comment: For Shirley and Pepperell, there was little choice but to follow Robinson's orders. The Treasury had already "assigned" these recruiting costs to the colonies, some £7,700 per regiment. The Treasury had also assumed it would take some time to recruit these regiments, so it forwarded pay monies for only 4 months, September through December, some £3,528 (subsistence fund, 1754). The officers were enrolled in the regiment starting in early September 1754 (Stewart 2015, Page 69). Shirley's own commission dates to September 23rd.

Shirley "borrows" the full cost of the recruiting from his son-in-law, Judge Hutchinson. Starting in March 1756, Shirley then draws on the general contingent fund to repay Hutchinson. However, several of Shirley's warrants were written in such a way as to not identify the actual purpose of those monies (Pargellis 1933, Pages 142-143; LO 6716 A & B). From LO 6716 A & B: *By Extraordinaries paid Lieutent George Bartman (without deduction or account) on account of raising the Non-Commisison Officers & Soldiers of his Majestys 50th Regiment of Foot £4,666.* This money was then given to Hutchinson. These warrants were likely the work of William Alexander, Shirley's private secretary. Loudoun was unaware of all these details, but the "irregularities" were soon apparent and contributed to Loudoun's ire. Shirley had not "stolen" any monies, but he does not offer Loudoun any explanation either. Explanations would only come after Shirley's recall to London.

Pepperell's 51st Foot faced the same problem of how to pay for recruiting costs without having immediate access to the general contingent fund. Here, the paymaster for the 51st Foot debits the recruiting costs (1755) from the subsistence fund (1756) with the faint hope of accumulating monies in the non-effective account. The first warrant to pay back Hutchinson was issued on March 2, 1756, some £4,666. A second warrant to pay back Hutchinson was issued on May 2nd for £700. These two warrants only targeted the 50th Foot. Word that Shirley was paying recruiting costs for the regular regiments quickly spread. By the end of June 1756, all the regular regiments under Shirley received some monies — the 44th, £1,473; the 48th, £2,489; the 50th, £7,146; the 51st, £2,214; and the 60th, £1,000. Not surprisingly, nearly fifty percent of the monies went to Shirley's own 50th. While Loudoun and Abercromby were still at sea, the last recruiting warrant was issued on June 4, 1756, to Loudoun's own 60th Foot. Again, these monies should have come from the regimental non-effective funds, not the general contingency fund where they needed to be

categorized as extraordinaries, something Loudoun would never have allowed. By paying some monies to each of the regiments, someone had shielded Shirley.

Captain John More (Moore), the regimental paymaster of the 50th Foot, was not at Oswego over the Winter of 1755-1756. In October 1755, the wages of the 50th at Oswego were paid. Captain More leaves Oswego before the winter isolates the post. He arrives back at Oswego around July 1 when the officers and the rank & file of the 50th were paid through August 1756 by warrants from Shirley. Captain More soon leaves, avoiding being captured by the French (August 1756). At the very least, a third of the subsistence fund for the 50th should have been unspent, monies for September through December, some £3,528. The 51st regiment had not been paid. On July 2nd Mercer wrote: *“The grievances at present are mostly from Sir William Pepperells (51st Foot), first the want of their pay for the Eight Months past, the reduction of the price of Labour, and withholding any allowance of Rum the second arises by your Excellencies Order to reducing the price of Labor to six pence per day”* (LO 1279, Mercer to Shirley, July 2, 1756). Together with: *“I wrote you the 15th Instant acknowledging the receipt of your Letter dated the 20th past agreeable thereto. I now transmit you the Accounts, Sales, and Current of the transactions committed to my care relating to yourself, Mr. Livingston. Mr. Erwin, and the Government, there is some debts still outstanding from the Officers which they promise me payment of as soon as they can receive money of the paymasters”* (CO_5_48_020, Francis Lewis to William Alexander, July 22, 1756, transcribed below). Loudoun contributed to the irregularities himself by ordering a “loan” from the 51st to settle back-pay of the 50th positioned on the Mohawk River, but the “loan” was three times the size than anticipated by Loudoun, £1,252. The 50th had no monies to repay the loan, so the 51st was then unable to pay their own rank & file. With the non-payment of this loan, it appears the subsistence fund for the 51st was some £922 in debt by the end of the year. In a prisoner exchange, many of those captured at Oswego were returned to England. Most of these regulars were then joined to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Foot (Royal Scots) and sent to Halifax for the assault on Louisbourg. Reluctantly, Loudoun used £753 from his general contingent fund for their back-pay which Loudoun then charged to the broken 50th account (Pargellis 1933, Page 144). In this tangle of jumbled accounts, the most egregious irregularities involved the 1756 subsistence fund for Shirley’s 50th Foot which was depleted with no real explanation (See MANA, Pages 274-277). Loudoun believed that the return rolls of the 50th used to draw monies from the Deputy Paymaster General were grossly inflated and that considerable monies had been paid to officers via contrived or exorbitant food and billet allowances (“slap-gelt”). Without evidence, the exorbitant food allowances may have been linked to the private Oswego traders and sutlers which were tied to Shirley’s circle and his secretary William Alexander. However, the dictated affidavit of Captain John Vickers (50th Foot) discounts this possibility (MANA, Page 286), but officers had the opportunity to “warrant” for expenses at a later date so Vickers may have held back (See LO 6716 A & B). Peter Way (2001) sees the corruption. However, as a professional soldier, Vickers’ affidavit likely steered Loudoun’s mind against granting any sympathy to Shirley — it is a disheartening document.

The non-effective funds are even a more perplexing puzzle. Loudoun writes that the non-effective fund for the 51st had ballooned to £7,998 (August 24, 1756) and that of the 50th to £1,878 (Christmas 1756; LO 2262; and MANA, Page 276). Unless the Treasury allocated funds in 1756 to cover the 1755 recruiting costs, how the non-effective fund for the 51st Foot could have reached this

level is without answer. Although likely tempted, Loudoun follows the accepted protocols and refuses to mix the subsistence and non-effective accounts.

The Deputy Paymaster General had many of the needed returns allowing Loudoun to review how the monies were being allocated to the 50th, but only Captain More and Shirley were left to 'accuse'. **Sometime in 1756, Loudoun had Captain More (50th) arrested and sent back to England as a prisoner.** Although the accounts of Pepperrell's 51st were eventually "explained" (1764), those of Shirley's 50th remained shrouded in misdeed.

By the time Loudoun arrives in North America (July 1756), Shirley's general contingent fund as Commander in Chief was exhausted. The largest "withdrawals" involved Shirley loaning some £44,953 to three of the provinces to finance their obligations for the 1756 Expeditions — Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire (March 1756, Pargellis 1933, Page 140 and Correspondence of William Shirley Vol. II, Page 518.). To Loudoun, Shirley had no authority to loan these monies to the provinces. By mid-summer, there were outstanding invoices that needed to be paid including some £14,378 for provincial provisions and £12,000 for Bradstreet's bateaux service, the only means of supplying Oswego (Pargellis 1933, Page 139). Loudoun used the new Baker & Kilby contract to supply the British regulars. Fortunately, Bradstreet followed all the required protocols and had the needed delivery vouchers; the bateaux payments were quickly resolved (LO 1536, August 7, 1756). Loudoun balked at any further payments to Shirley's merchant circle and any payments would need to be settled via London. Without the needed vouchers, it would take years to resolve Oswego's unpaid carpentry invoices with the contracting firm refusing to pay the workmen or their families until first being paid itself — six ships had been built at Oswego. The £14,378 bill for provisions was eventually paid by the Treasury, but the petitioning process took over five years to resolve and had to wait on Amherst's 1761 review of Shirley's accounts. In 1763, London tired of Oswego and ordered Amherst to settle the carpenter families' claims (Pargellis 1933, Page 139 and see Way 2001, Page 75).

If Shirley had not lent the monies to the provinces, there would have been sufficient money for Shirley to pay all the outstanding invoices before the arrival of Loudoun, but this assumes that bills of exchange would have been offered for sale in New York via agents for the Deputy Paymaster General. In the rush to clear accounts, Shirley authorizes twenty-five warrants just before the arrival of Abercromby (May and June 1756) — fully one-third of all warrants issued by Shirley. However, the Deputy Paymaster General was selling bills of exchange slower than Shirley was submitting warrants and Shirley drains the cash monies. Any contracting work done in June and July would have to be paid for by Loudoun, *e.g.* the unpaid bill of £14,378 for provincial provisions (LO 6734 suggests the unpaid bill was £16,956). Using Shirley's authority as Commander and Chief, Alexander had proved successful in manipulating the accounts, but this run lasted only four months. All but one of the "irregular" warrants were issued between March and June 1756 — the exception being a warrant for £1,473 to cover recruiting costs issued to the 44th Foot (September 10, 1755). As a result of these irregularities, Loudoun orders the Deputy General Paymaster to maintain a minimum cash reserve of £10,000.

The instructions prohibiting the use of non-effective funds for recruiting in North America were contained in the written orders given to Braddock. Pitt rescinds this order in December 1756 (LO 2383, see below). Before leaving London, the evidence suggests Loudoun knew this change was

coming. The obvious question becomes did Shirley know? Under Loudoun, all charges to the non-effective funds had to be fully itemized, something not done by the regimental paymasters of either the 50th or the 51st Foot.

Note: Shirley was a lawyer by profession. Trained in England, he arrived in Boston in 1731 at age thirty-seven. Historians will often comment on Shirley's inattention to detail relating to military matters and logistics. Both Pargellis (1933) and Schutz (1961) often hint that Shirley relied on others to perform these mundane tasks, particularly his private Secretary William Alexander. Besides Alexander, Shirley's son Jack served in the role of a personal secretary. Jack Shirley was also granted an officer's commission in the 50th Foot. There are hints that Captain James Kinneer (50th Foot) served as Shirley's aide-de-camp in 1755 with Lieutenant George Bartman (50th Foot) serving as the aide-de-camp in 1756. Loudoun transfers Bartman to the 44th where he serves as Webb's aide-de-camp. Bartman had the patronage of Fox. At the same time, Shirley is described as a very competent lawyer, industrious, and not likely to overlook even small details. In negotiations with the French over Nova Scotia (1750-1751), both Lord Halifax and Lord Bedford suggested Shirley was too attentive to the detail and trivia to get the needed issues resolved and that some change in the approach to the negotiations was needed. Schutz (1961, Page 161) writes *"Shirley who had an inexhaustible capacity for detail, tried to overwhelm the opposition with facts. His statements of claims were a ponderous assortment of documents that might have been filed with a court inquiry."*

Describing Shirley as an armchair general is valid. The execution of Shirley's military schemes failed wherever the logistics proved difficult. The only segment of the 1755-1756 Campaigns that was "successful" was in Nova Scotia, where the forces could be supplied by sea. However, when things went badly, Shirley refused to take any responsibility for his actions or omissions. This is best seen in his combative letter of September 4, 1756, to Loudoun (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 536), the response to Loudoun's pointed letter of August 29 (Page 521). The other late August and September letters surrounding these two last letters are illuminating.

Regardless of how one views Shirley, this letter is a clear demonstration of Shirley's alleged lack of attention to specifics. In a previous letter, Shirley had asked that the arms for his regiment be **shipped** from England in April, but the intent was for the arms to **arrive** in Boston in April. Luckily, this error was recognized by someone in England, possibly by James Pitcher or someone at the Board of Ordnance. The eight-week difference reflects the time needed to cross the Atlantic. Repeatedly excusing Shirley's actions or omissions under the disguise of being ignorant of detail seems too easy, a personal need to "problem solve" may be more accurate. Shirley's strength was in the politics of rallying provincials to the cause of defeating the French. Thousands of provincials were raised by the efforts of Shirley. In this, no other colonial governor was equal.

From *The Documentary History of the State of New York, Volume II*, Pages 648-651. 1849. E. B. O'Callaghan, Weed, Parsons & Company. Partial transcription, about 20% of document.

Minutes of the Council Held at Alexandria

*At a Council held at the Camp at
Alexandria in Virginia April 14, 1755.*

Present

His Excellency Edward Braddock Esq^r General & Commander in Chief of his Majestys Forces in North America.

The Hon^{ble} Augustus Keppel Esq^r Commander in chief of his Majestys Ships and Vessels in North America.

The Hon^{ble} William Shirley Esq^r (Massachusetts). The Hon^{ble} Robert Dinwiddie Esq^r (Virginia). The Hon^{ble} James De Lancey Esq^r (New York). The Hon^{ble} Horatio Sharpe Esq^r (Maryland). The Hon^{ble} Rob^t Hunter Morris (Pennsylvania).

April 14, 1755

- 1. That a fund should be established conformable to his Instructions abovementioned and to Sir Thomas Robinsons Letter to several Governors dated Octob^r 26, 1754.*

>>>>>>

The Members of the Council having taken into Consideration these secret matters in the order proposed by the General. The Governors present acquainted his Excellency that they had severally made application to their respective Assemblies for the establishment of the common fund proposed, but had not been able to prevail upon 'em to agree to it, and gave it as their unanimous opinion that such a Fund can never be established in the Colonies without the aid of Parliament. They likewise declared that having found it impracticable to obtain in their respective governments their proportions expected by his Majesty towards defraying the expense of his service in North America, that they were unanimously of opinion that it should be proposed to his Majesty's Ministers, to find out some method of compelling them to do it, to their respective abilities, their shares of the whole money already furnished and which it shall be thought proper for them to furnish towards the General expence of his service. They also assured the General that they would still continue to use their utmost endeavours to raise all possible supplies but were unanimously of Opinion that the Kings Service in the Colonies and the carrying on of the present Expedition must be at a stand unless the General shall think proper to make use of his credit upon the Government at Home to defray the expence of all the Operations under his direction.

>>>>>>

W. Shirley, Secr'y

Comment: The idea of a common fund was rejected by each of the provincial assemblies under the pretext that only Parliament could mandate the establishment of such a fund. This probably was anticipated by many in London as a no-go proposition, but it looked good on paper, satisfying those ministries worried about costs, particularly the Treasury. If it had succeeded, so much the better. The minutes were written by Governor Shirley's son, William, Braddock's secretary.

From the Papers of Sir William Johnson (Sullivan, 1922; Volume 1, Page 443):

JOHN WALDRONS' LIST OF CANNON AND STORES
A List of Cannon with other Ordnance Stores in and round the
the City of NewYork
A.D.S.

New York 27th. January 1755

2 Cannon of Brass of pounders	18
6 DittoD	12
15 Ditto Iron New	32
8 Ditto..... D ^o	18*
21 Ditto..... Ditto.....	12
29 Ditto..... Ditto.....	9
39 Ditto..... Old.....	32
22 Ditto..... D ^o	12
14 Ditto..... D ^o	9
10 Ditto..... D ^o	6

166 of Sundry bore

(Old and New may be references to chronological ages or to the gun patterns. Any reference to the 1743 Artillery Establishment must be dismissed. The 18-pdrs as being “new” suggest a categorization of around 1722.)

15 Carriages New — for pounders	32
18 D ^o D ^o Note: six I shall want if them at Albany be bad	18
21 D ^o D ^o	12
28 D ^o D ^o	9
2 D ^o D ^o Note: these 2 I will want if them bad at Albany.....	6
24 D ^o Old	32
21 D ^o D ^o	12

115 New and old (Continues with Stores...Pages 443 - 445).

Comment: This list only references cannon, not shell pieces. Johnson's notations demonstrate his early concern for the soundness of the gun carriages. * Other documents have ten 18-pounders at New York Harbor, not the eight listed here (Correspondence of William Shirley, Page 184, June 1, 1755; and Lt. Governor De Lancey to Secretary Robinson, August 7, 1755, O'Callaghan, Vol. VI, Page 991). De Lancey's letter of August 1755 does not fit this inventory. Counting the six 18-pounders already at Albany, there were not enough 18-pounders to cover all the listed needs — Acadia, Niagara, and Lake Champlain. De Lancey was short by six guns, but there were no "old" 18-pounders to make up the difference. Per Shirley, ten 18-pounders were sent north to join the Acadian Expedition, but Shirley returns two guns in a failed attempt to placate De Lancey. De Lancey had a deep dislike of Shirley. Except for a single brass 18-pounder, which was deemed too heavy by De Lancey, the other seven brass guns listed here were assigned to Shirley and Niagara. In 1757, there are ten 18-pounders split between Fort Edward (8 guns) and Fort William Henry (2 guns), six guns would have been from the Albany stores (1745). The “new” 18-pounders arrived in New York Harbor in 1739 (See Page 123).

From Captain William Eyre to Sir William Johnson (Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume II, September 29, 1755, Page 119):

From William Eyre
A.L.S.

Lake George 29th, Sep: 1755

Sir,

Pursuant to Yr. order of this Day, to know my opinion whether the Artillery & Stores here, at Fort Edward, & on the Road from Albany to the last Mentioned Place are Sufficient to proceed against Crown Point, I answer no upon the Supposition that our Acc^{ts}. from the Front are to be depended on, As their Information acquaints us that they have (Meening the Enemy) thirty pieces of Cannon, many of the 16 & 24 p^{drs}. equal or nearly to our 24 & 32 p^{drs}., and also thirty five mortors. now our strength consists of four battering Pieces, viz. two 32 p^{drs}. & two 18^{pds}., two 12 p^{ds}. beside one 13-inch Morter with four Smaller ones of five Inch & a half Diameter to Seven Inches, and to this a Scarcity of 6p^d Ball. There are my reasons for determing me to think our present State of Artillery not sufficient.

To General Johnson

N.B:

Our Howitz Split during the late Engagement

I am S^r.

Yr. Most Ob^t. Serv^t

Will: Eyre:

Comment: The strength and numbers for the French Artillery are greatly exaggerated here. For Carillon, Keagle (2018) lists the French Artillery in October 1755 as six 12-pounders, eight 8-pounders, six 6-pounders, four 4-pounders, and four 3-pounders. In 1756, Winslow would have been facing additional guns. By September 1756, Carillon cannon included two 18-pounders and some sixteen 12-pounders, but no shell pieces.

Additional artillery would have been at Fort Saint-Frédéric, 15 miles to the north (Crown Point). In 1749, the artillery at Fort Frederic was far from impressive — two 6-pounders, seventeen iron 4-pounders, one iron 2-pounder, two brass 2-pounders, one grenade mortar, eighteen swivel guns, and twenty-five breech-loaded swivels (boîtes de pierriers). A further 100 miles north on the Richelieu River, Fort Chambly had a single 3-pounder with a broken bore, three swivels, and twenty breech-loaded swivels (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 196).

The 5 1/2-inch mortar reference is unexpected. This is the only substantial reference to a royal mortar being at Fort William Henry or Fort Edward (1755-1756). But the number of four smaller mortars matches the November 6th Inventory of two 8-inch brass mortars and two 7-inch iron mortars; this suggests Eyre is in error here (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 277).

From Captain William Eyre of the 44th Regiment to Sir William Johnson (Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume II, Page 328; a full 20 months before the Siege):

Directions to Commandant at Fort William Henry

D.S. ¹

Lake George Camp 25th. Nov. 1755

Directions to be observed, and followed after, as much as Circumstances Will admit in Fort William Henry in case of an Attack by Artillery.

Upon Notice of the Enemys approach, the Commanding officer is to level every sort of Cover round the Garison (if not done before) as Soon and as much possible his time Will allow, and to take every Method to deter if not hinder them from getting possession of the Eminence to the South West of the Fort, by keeping a Constant fire of Artillery upon them Should the approach it from the North East, by the West Side of the Lake, as they must be much exposed from the Fort in drawing their Heavy Guns that way; this Method to be Observed on the Supposition that the Lake is not froze, and that the Enemy Will come by Water within near Gunshot of the Garrison before they Land their Force and Artillery. If they should attempt a Siege when the Lake is lock'd in Ice, they Will be under the Necessity to mount up the Bank on one Side or the Other, for the Surface of the Water is so much below the Garison that they will not be able to do any Mischief with Batteries on the Ice, besides their being so exposed, therefore if they march to the Westward of the Lake the Method before mentioned should be observed.

If the Enemy should think it advisable to bring their Artillery to the South, & South East Side, by the East Side of the Lake, or on the Lake, they Will still be exposed coming that Way to Cannon from the Fort, tho' more remote than the Other, and after they have raised Batteries on their Side, as near as the Swamp Will allow them, yet they Will not, it's apprehended be able to make from those places practicable Breaches prudent to assault what is chiefly feared from Cannon at this distance, is their dismounting of some artillery if care is not taken, tho' let what will be done, accidents may, and will happen.

But then if the Enemy, as is very likely will endeavour to Cross the Swamp to the South East of the Garison, in order to seize the above Mentioned rising Ground to the South West; in that Case, if this be done within Cannon Shot of the Fort it will prove to them a difficult undertaking, besides their Loss, before they can accomplish it; and if this Passage is made further off, they Will find it not an Easy Matter to ascend the very high & Steep Bank, that is to be met there. However in the End it may be Supposed all those difficulties are to be Surmounted, at the Expencc of Men, & time, and they get entrenched on this rising Ground, before which is done, the Cannon should be placed as fast & quick as possible; and the greatest care should be taken to Secure all those which can not be made Use in the most Safe Places which the Commanding officer must be best Judge of.

¹ Original destroyed by fire.

When the Enemy get themselves safely Secured by means of trenches and Breast Works, and have or, are rising Batteries, the Mortars as well as the Guns should be at Work, to retard and hinder the Progress of their approaches; where the Enemy begins to descend this Hill, then they become much more exposed, and their approach more hazardous and difficult, if the Garison Will take their advantage and are obstinate. I may naturally Suppose by the time all the Barracks may be much damaged if not wholly destroyed, by means of Shells, fire & Shot, but this must be expected, and the Men off Duty to lie in the Casements where they can repose themselves without Danger; Pains ought to be used to prevent the firing from spreading as much as possible, otherwise, one do not know but it may be possible an accident may happen to one of the Magazines, the Powder should be divided between them. All that can and will contribute to make a Noble Stand is, but not being intimidated by accidents, considering Maturely the advantages the Works and their design, and being resolute, if it must go, to make them deerly Pay for it, both in loss of time as well as Blood. should the resolute defence not give time to the Country to come to its relief; which must certainly happen, if the Garison Will act on those honourable Terms, and the following aforesaid Rules, as nearly as Circumstances, and time Will allow.

When the Enemy advances close to the out Side of the Ditch and that by a Superiority of Cannon, and a great loss of their Troops, which last must be inevitable cost them, and from this Place they Will be able to make a Breach, & not before (except in the Parapet) which will not be Sufficient for them to make an assault; then, and not till then, a brave officer ought to think of Capitulating, when he may reasonably expect an honourable One, for his gallant behavior; and it's generally, if not always, that such a defence meets with great respect even from an Enemy; and they will not think it a prudent Scheme to force a brave officer to be desperate, being convinced from his former Conduct he Will make their attempt cost dear. this manner of acting must reflect honour on the Commandant & Garison, and no doubt but it Will bring him a timely relief, or procure him honourable Conditions.

Scouts should be always kept out to give timely Notice, and Sally's during the Siege should be as often attempted as times and Seasons will admit; but they should be made with the utmost precaution and Secrecy, otherwise they may be cut off, so Weaken the Garison, & by that Means Shorten the Siege.

Every Material that can Mend Carriages, Ramparts & Parapets, ought to be brought into the Fort, otherwise the Ramparts & parapets will Soon not be tenable, and fire of the Cannon too soon be lessen'd; besides Spare Planks for repairing Platforms; a certain Number should be fix'd on this Service. The honours of War are colours flying, Drums a beating, with one or two Pieces of Cannon & Match lighted & so many Rounds, and Days provisions; and the whole to march thro the Breach; But this is never alow'd to any, but those who make an obstinate defence.

Will: Eyre, Eng^r

In the case that the Commandant is acquainted that a Body of Troops are on their March Without Cannon. He may be assured their Intentions are to approach the Garison unobserved and to Storm the Fort by Escalade, which is often Successful, if the People Within have not good look out, and reflects great honour on the Assailants, and the Contrary on the Garison if, they should be Successful, but if this designed Attack be discovered by the defenders it cannot be Successful if the Commandant and his Troops do their Duty, and consequently must be fatal to the Enemy; this is one

of the most Bloody attacks made against a Fortress, and fatal when the Issue is not favorable to the assailants. When this is apprehended all Guns on the Flanks should be loaded with Grape Shot, as they being chiefly useful on Such Occasions. The Footstep all round the Ramparts should be in good repair, that every Part be full Mann'd. if small Brush-Wood can be found a few fascines and Gabions should be made upon Notice that the Enemy are making preparations for a Siege, they being of the greatest Use to repair Parapets, I mean the fascines fasten'd with pointed Sticks, and the Gabions, by filling them with Earth, Serve Many Purposes, but particularly in making Blinds or Traverses on any Part of the Works, which are Secur'd by the Besiegers Cannon.

One third Part, if not half the Troops, should be on Duty at once, and to be relieved Just before Night during the Siege. The Small arms to keep a Constant firing both Night and Day, but particularly in the former, which time the Cannon should cease except the Enemy were making an attempt by Escalade; but the Mortars are to be used at all times; this Method Will render the Enemys progress under the Shelter of Darkness very hazardous, as well as Slow which otherwise they would make use of their advantage. A Proper _____ Party should be posted in the advanced Work in order to keep the Enemy from making a Lodgement close to the Bank and a field Piece may be advantageously Used there, taking care that when there appears apparent Danger of its soon falling into the Enemys Hands to be brought into the Garison. Its impossible to enumerate all the Incidents that happen in a Siege, in order to give Directions thereupon, therefore those must be left to the Discretion and Abilities of the Commanding officer.

Comment: Eyre writes a companion letter for the defense of Fort Edward, December 2, 1755. (Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume II, Page 365).

From Governor Charles Hardy to Board of Trade (O'Callaghan, Vol. VII, London Documents: XXXII - XL. 1756-1767; Page 2, Partial Transcription):

*Governor Hardy to the Lords of Trade.
[New York-Papers, Bundle L1., No.11]*

My Lords

Fort George N York 16 Jan 1756

Inclosed are returns of the Cannon now in and belonging to this Province, also what number of Cannon the works of this City and other raised will require, together with a return of Warlike Stores in the Magazine of this Fort. Most of the small Cannon from 6 to 3 Pounders are unfit for Service, it was with some difficulty I could furnish Fort Edward with the few there from the Fort at Albany, and those left in it are not safe in Firing; mortar or Hobits we have none; and only two royals, that of iron split in Service at the battle on Lake George the 8th of September last.

I must beg your Ldps will please to observe how deficient we shall be in Ordnance, when the work in and about this city are finished the greater part of which I hope to have compleated this Summer; we shall also want a good many Cannon of the smaller size for the out Forts, Block House, and I hope in the Indian Castles, as they seem inclined to have such built for their Security. Small arms we have none in the Magazine but six chests that belong to the four independent companys; this city has a stand of 1000 muskets, they provided last year; and what is in the possession of private People are chiefly for Indian Trade.....(Page 4)

I should be of opinion that three Forts should be erected on the Northern Frontiers towards Canada, One Fort on the Hudsons River, at the great carrying place, another at the south end of Lake George (by the French called Lake St Sacramend). These are done by Fort Edward and Fort William Henry. The third Fort I would propose should be on Wood Creek which emptys itself into the drowned lands. The best situation for this Fort, I suppose to be at or about the Falls near where Wood Creek and the South Bay mix their waters, whether a proper situation for erecting a Fort can be found there, or thereabouts will depend upon a view and Examination of the Ground, and whether it be practicable and in what manner to support a Garrison there with Provisions and other necessaries; I was in hope of coming at this Knowledge when at Albany, by imploring proper people to explore and survey the country between the Great carrying place, and the falls of Wood Creek but was disappointed.

The advantages resulting from these Forts are very considerable. Fort Edward stands at the Great Carrying place on the Hudsons River near 50 miles above Albany, and is the common passage from Canada to Albany, whether they come by Lake George, the South Bay or Wood Creek. Fort William Henry secures the pass by Lake George to the Hudsons River, Schenectady and the Mohawks Country. This as it is a cover to their Country, I dare say is very pleasing to them, as the French can not while we hold it, pass with any great body undiscovered towards them. By Fort William Henry and the other erected on Wood Creek we shall be masters of the Waters that lead to Crown Point and may facilitate any enterprize on that Place, or further up Lake Champlain should such be thought adviseable, and I am persuaded had these Forts been erected last year, the Provincial Forces raised for this expedition, might have proceeded much further than they did; I can not on this occasion omit observing to your Lordships that the French Generals expedition demonstrates

the usefulness of these Forts, to prevent such an other quick march against us without any discovery, as was his. For had he not been repulsed by the Forces under Major Gen^l Johnson but had beat him and taken Post at Fort Edward then unfinished he would have thrown the Country into the Utmost Consternation, and have laid us inexpressible difficultys: from the great body of Indians he had with him, he might have sent detachments into the Mohawks Country, and have cut off all communication between Schenectady and General Shirleys Forces, at least for some time, whereby a total stop would have been put to the supply of Provisions for those Troops, who I believe had not at that time great plenty.

Comment: Hardy arrives from England to assume the post of Governor of New York in September 1755. He would occupy the office only for a few months before joining Loudoun at Halifax and the planning of the Louisbourg Expedition (1756). Beyond politics, Hardy was an admiral in the British Navy. Unfortunately, the ordnance returns referenced in the letter are not found within this volume. But Hardy does provide solid confirmation that New York Harbor does not have a supply of mortars or howitzers. Winslow would have to find another source for the six shell pieces he would add to his ordnance train (1756).

Hardy's letter injects confusion as regards the shell ordnance. Outside of the Hervey Journal entry (October 1756), there is no reference to 5 1/2-inch shell pieces being present at either Fort Edward or Fort William Henry (Summer 1756 or 1757). As used in the letter, "royal" should denote a shell size of 5 1/2-inches. British royal mortars and howitzers were only manufactured in brass, not iron, so Hardy's reference must be to American cast iron pieces or the size designation is wrong. This confusion is reinforced in the Johnson Papers where a single mortar is referenced as both "royal" and 7-inch (June 9, 1755, Vol. 1, Page 571). As regards the Battle of Lake George, Eyre reports the loss of only a single howitzer and there were no fit howitzers in his remaining inventory, not the loss of two mortars or two howitzers (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, September 29, 1755, Page 120; and November 6, 1755, Pages 277-278). There is merit in simply rejecting the royal label and allowing only for the loss of one iron 8-inch howitzer, not two pieces. But as regards mortars, Eyre's September 29th letter further muddles the ordnance accounting. These last two accountings list the same number of mortars but of different sizes. Likely, someone in the Expedition's Commissary (Provincial) repeatedly used "royal" incorrectly and the errors were passed forward. Here, the best option is to simply accept the November 6th inventory, a much better fit for Table 1, Page 116.

Hardy's assessment of the value of Fort William Henry is somewhat unexpected, but as the new Governor of New York understandable. In this regard, Hardy adapts to the needs of whatever his current assignment is — politics or the military. In this case, the need is political. Hardy can be bluntly honest and not always predictable, as in Hardy's assessment of Loudoun when meeting with Pitt. Hardy describes the third fort as being close to Old Fort Anne (Figure 9, Page 58; east end of the trail leading from Fort Edward to Shone Creek and running next to the large swamp; not Dieskau's Path). The British had abandoned this post decades earlier as it was far too exposed. In 1755, this is the location that Shirley advocated for the second fort. Shirley did not want a fort on Lake George. Hardy's evaluation is entirely defensive. Both Loudoun and Shirley thought only in terms of offense. Hardy's thoughts are the antithesis of both Loudoun's and Shirley's view where only Fort Edward was needed. To Loudoun and Shirley, Fort William Henry was a waste of limited resources and no better than an unnecessary offensive staging area along an inferior route leading north to Canada.

From the Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731-1760; edited by Charles Henry Lincoln, Vol. 2 – Page 453 (Online):

Minutes of Council of War Held at Albany

At a Council of War held at the Camp at Albany May 25th 1756.

Present

His Excellency William Shirley Esqr. General and Command in Chief of all his Majesty's Forces in North America.

*The Honble. Liet. Col. Thomas Gage. (44th Foot)**

*Lieut. Col. Ralph Burton. (48th Foot)**

Major (Russell) Chapman. (44th Foot)

*Major William Sparks. (48th Foot)**

*Sir John St. Clair, Deputy Quarter Master General.**

John Montresor Esqr. Chief Engineer.

His Excellency acquainted the Council, that he desir'd their Opinion and Advice upon several Matters relative to his Majesty's Service in the Campaign.

That in order to set them in proper light for their Consideration, it was necessary first to acquaint them with the plan of Operations, which was determined upon in a Council of War held at New York the 12th and 13th December last, consisting of Governors and Field Officers according to his Majesty's seventh Instruction to the late General Braddock and himself; which Plan was accordingly read.

His Excellency then inform'd the Council that he had transmitted the said Plan to England to the Right Honorable: Sir Thomas Robinson, then one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, to be lay'd before His Majesty, and that he acquainted Sir Thomas Robinson, that if should not receive his Majesty's Commands upon it by the beginning of the Campaigne this Year, he should proceed to carry it into Execution.

His Excellency then acquainted the Council with the State and Strength of the Garrison at Oswego and of the Forces destin'd for the Expedition against Crown point, vizt:

That the Naval Force upon the Lake will consist this Year of two Vessells of ten Carriage Guns each and to Row Gallies of ten Swivels each, built last Year, and one Vessell of 18, one of 10, and another of eight Carriage Guns, for building and equipping of which preparations have been making at Oswego some time, and which were three Months ago order'd to be built and equipp'd as soon as possible, this Year; and that there will be 250 Whale Boats for Navigation of the Lake, capable of holding sixteen Men each.

* These four officers fought at the Battle of the Monongahela under Braddock, July 1755. Major Chapman was with the support column under Dunbar, some 40 miles to the rear.

That the Land Forces now at Oswego, and upon their March thither, and those which are design'd to be employ'd in keeping open Communication between Albany, and Oswego, consist of the 50th and 51st Regiments, the New Jersey Regiment, and the four Independent Companies of New York, but for Want of exact Returns of the present Strength of the 50th and 51st Regiments on Account of their remote and scatter'd Situation, it can't be precisely determin'd what Number of Effectives fit for Service the whole will produce; That of these, 100 must be posted at the Conajohara Falls to guard the Magazine of Provisions and Stores there, and convoy them over that Carrying place, 100 at the German Flatts to guard the Magazine there, 200 more at the Oneida Carrying place to guard the Magazine there and convoy the Provisions and Stores over that Carrying place and thro' Wood Creek, and 50 at the Fort propos'd to be built at the Oswego Falls; that besides the before mention'd Regiments and Independent Companies, he propos'd to raise four ranging Companies of Irregulars consisting of 60 privates each to be employ'd in scouting parties for keeping open Communication with Oswego, and harassing the Enemy's Country between Fort Frontenac and Montreal.

That the Works at Oswego consist of the old Fort situated on the South Edge of the Lake Ontario, mounting five small Cannon towards the Lake and surrounded with a very weak Stone Wall, and that the Inside of this Fort is fit only to contain provisions and Stores; and the whole Fort would be of little or no Defence against an Enemy; Wherefore in order to protect it, together with the Harbour, a strong Log Fort mounting sixteen Cannon with Barracks for a Garrison of 300 Men was built last year on a high point opposite to the Fort on the East Side of the River, from whence it commands both that and the Harbour there at 450 yards distance, as also the Lake (which is 100 yards distance from it) and the Country around it; And on the West Side of the old Fort, at a distance of about 450 yards from it, was built on an Eminence, which commands it, as also the Lake (which is 150 yards from it) and the Country round it, a Regular Fort of a square Form with Bastions built of Earth and Masonry, and mounted with eight Cannon, with Barracks for 200 Men, and that Mr. Mackellar the Engineer en second, and one of the practitioner Engineers are sent to Oswego to add such Works, as shall be found necessary further to strengthen it.

His Excellency acquainted the Council, that as to the State of Provisions and Stores in the several Magazines at the Conajohara Falls, German Flatts, Oneida Carrying place, and at Oswego itself, six Months provisions in the whole for 7000 Men were design'd to be lay'd in at these several places in proportion to the Number of Men to be posted in each of them; But what the present State of provisions at each of those places is does not yet appear, any further than that 200 Whale-Boat Loads and about 500 Battoe loads have been sent from Schenectada to Oswego since the 1st of April last, where it is suppos'd the greatest part of it arriv'd, and that the transportation of the Remainder of the Provisions propos'd to be sent to Oswego for the Support of the Forces to be employ'd there and the necessary Stores will take up untill the middle of July.

That the Provincial Troops voted for the Expedition against Crown point amount to 8800, Officers included, but from the Accounts, he hath lately receiv'd, he expects they will not produce more than 7000, inclusive of Officers; that part of these will be necessary for garrisoning Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, and escorting Provisions and Stores from Albany to those Forts; That he expects they will be join'd by 100 or 200 Indians, and that he hath rais'd one Company of Rangers consisting of 70 privates, with proper Officers to harass the Enemy upon Lake Champlain, and in scouting Parties by Land as far as Montreal, and to procure Intelligence; and is raising out of those Forces three more such Companies to be employ'd in the same Service.

That for an Account of the Strength of the French at Ticonderoge and Crown point, he must refer them to the Intelligence, he receiv'd this Morning from Lake George, which from former Accountants he has receiv'd of their Numbers and Works appears to him to be depended upon.

His Excellency then proceeded to acquaint the Council that as the Strength of the 50th and 51st Regiments and the four Independent Companies, with the Provincial Regiment of New Jersey will fall so short of the Number of Troops judg'd requisite by the last Council of War to be employ'd on the Lake Ontario against the French Forts there this Year, and the Provincial Troops rais'd for the Expedition against Crown point fall so short of the Number of Troops thought sufficient by the same Council for the Reduction of the French Forts at that place; it seems impracticable with these Troops even in Conjunction with his Majesty's 44th and 48th Regiments to carry on the Expeditions upon the Lake Ontario and at Crown point, at the same time (as was propos'd to be done by the last Council of War) with a prospect of Success; and therefore desir'd the Opinion and Advice of the Council upon the Disposition of the two last mention'd Regiments, in giving which he desir'd they would consider.

1st. What Number of Troops they were of the Opinion would be sufficient to put Oswego in a proper State of Defence, and to keep open the Communication between Albany and that place.

2dly. Whether if the 44th and 48th Regiments, which are judg'd to have about 1500 Men fit for Action, should be employ'd upon the Lake Ontario, together with what might be spar'd for that Service out of the 50th, 51st, and the New Jersey Regiments, and four Independent Companies of New York, with four companies daily expected from North Carolina, would be a sufficient Force for attempting the Reduction of the French Forts at Niagara or on the Lake Ontario; and whether it would be adviseable to leave the securing of the Country Northward of the City of Albany, as also that City, to the Provincial Troop rais'd for the Expedition against Crown point.

3dly. Whether if the 44th and 48th Regiments should be employ'd in Conjunction with the before mention'd Provincial Forces, to attempt the Reduction of the French Forts at Ticonderoge and Crown point, they would be a sufficient Force for that Service.

His Excellency then proceeded to observe to the Council, that as from Sir William Johnson's success hitherto with the Indians of the Six Nations he found, he could have no Dependence on them for keeping out Parties to scout the Woods and keep the Communication with Oswego open thro' their Country; and it appear'd from one of Sir William's Letters, that he despair'd of keeping open the Communications without the Assistance of some Companies of rangers fit for that Service, he was raising four such Companies of Rangers; part of which de design'd to employ in procuring Intelligence and harassing the Enemy in their own Country, and Desir'd their Opinion and Advice upon the Utility of such Companies for his Majesty's Service in this Country.

His Excellency also propos'd to the Council to have a practicable Road made from German Flatts to Oswego as soon as might be.

The Council having maturely consider'd and debated upon several Points lay'd before them by his Excellency for their Opinion and Advice were unanimously of the Opinion.

1st. That 1300 Men would be necessary for putting Oswego into a proper State of Defence; and that for keeping open the communication between Schenectada and Oswego, it was necessary

to have 50 Men posted at the Oswego Falls, 200 at the Oneida Carrying place, 150 at German Flatts, and 150 at the Conajohara Falls; which Troops together with the four Companies of Rangers propos'd to be employ'd by his Excellency in the manner, he hath mention'd, they judge would be sufficient for securing Oswego, and the Communication between that Place and Schenectada; And as they were of the Opinion that the 50th and 51st and the New Jersey Regiments together with the four Independent Companies of New York and four North Carolina Companies should not be depended upon for producing above 2000 Men fit for present Service, they advis'd his Excellency to employ the whole of these Regiments and Companies in the above said Service.

2dly. That the 44th and 48th Regiments together with what could be spar'd out of the aforesaid Regiments and Companies for attempting the Reduction for the French Forts at Niagara or on the Lake Ontario, were not a sufficient Force for that Service, especially as it appears by the Minutes of the Council of War held at New York on the 12th and 13th of December last, which was compos'd of the principal Governors upon this Continent and his Majesty's Field Officers then present, that they were unanimously of Opinion that 6000 Troops at least were necessary for that purpose, and that it is not adviseable to leave securing the Country to the Northward of the City of Albany together with that City to the provincial Troops rais'd for the Expedition against Crown point.

3dly. That the 44th and 48th Regiments with the Provincial Troops appear to be, from the Intelligence of the Enemy's Strength, a sufficient Force to attempt the Reduction of the French Fort and Ticonderoge and Crown point; but that for present those two Regiments do remain where they are now encamp'd, and that immediate Preparations be made for joining them with the Provincials in the Reduction of Crownpoint, that being the only Way at present, where they can be of use in annoying the Enemy.

4thly. That the Ranging Companies mention'd by his Excellency are necessary for his Majesty's Service, and they are of Opinion, that his Excellency should have as many more such Companies rais'd, as will make up the Number of them ten to be employ'd in keeping the Communication open between Schenectada and Oswego, and with our Advanc'd Forts, procuring Intelligence, surprising and cutting off the Enemy's Convoys, and Stores, and harassing them in Canada by scouting parties in every way they can.

5th. They are unanimously of Opinion, that a practicable Road be made, as soon as conveniently may be, from the German Flatts to Oswego.

Lastly, That it appears to this Council very necessary further to strengthen Fort Edward, and to build a Fort at South Bay in the Way to Crown point; the former being a post of utmost Consequence as a deposit for Stores and Provisions, and in the Center of all the different Routes to Crown point, the other commanding the Route, by which the Baron Dieskau came to attack Fort Edward, and by which all parties of the Enemy do come to incest our Northern Frontier, and which would cover our Convoys of Provisions for the Expedition against Crown point from the Insults of the Enemy.

a true Copy

Wm. Alexander Secy.

Endorsed:

Copy. Minutes of a Council of War held at Albany the 25th of May 1756. In Maj. Genl. Shirley's of June 23d, 1756.

The minutes of the December 1755, Council of War are found in another of Shirley's letters to Robinson (Correspondence of William Shirley, Volume II, December 19, 1755, Pages 343-350). Care must be taken in reading this last document due to numerous geographical name changes identified in the footnotes.

Comment: This document lends considerable clarification to the core military situation before the arrival of Loudoun. By mid-April, Shirley is fully aware that he is being recalled to London and that Loudoun is coming to America as his replacement. Loudoun would arrive within three months, but Shirley is determined to leave his stamp on the 1756 Campaign. Shirley's plan for 1756 is a reboot of the previous year's failed plan for a two-prong assault on Canada. New England provincials would still move north via Lake Champlain with the change being that the Lake Ontario Campaign would largely be British regulars. Shirley had the 44th, 48th, 50th, and 51st Foot available for the Lake Ontario Campaign. Where British regulars and provincial troops would be mixed, the provincial troops would not be from New England, but further south.

By late May, Shirley realized the 1756 Campaign Plan developed the previous December was unworkable. Neither campaign was progressing well. Shirley cites the understrength provincial regiments as the chief cause of the failing campaigns — the number of provincial troops that were actually fielded was far fewer than were authorized. This “explanation” clears Shirley of any responsibility for the failing campaigns. Logistical and supply problems seem a more plausible reason. There were simply not enough men, wagons, or supplies available to launch attacks on Fort Niagara, Fort Frontenac, Fort de la Présentation on the St. Lawrence River, and Fort Ticonderoga. Shirley canceled the whole of the Ontario Campaign, leaving the sole offensive to Winslow.

Shirley then considers moving the 44th and 48th to Lake Champlain, but this idea comes too late to rescue the 1756 Campaign (Laramie 2012, Page 243). Shirley has spent two years keeping the New Englanders separate from British regulars, but he now wants to join them. For this newest scheme to become real, the consent of the New England regiments to alter the framework of their enlistment “contracts” would be needed. Shirley's subsequent talks with Winslow suggest no change in the attitudes of the New Englanders toward their serving under British officers. If forced to mix troops or serve under British officers, the New England regiments were determined to disband. Throughout June and July, Shirley investigates the possibility of achieving a compromise, but then concludes it is impossible to gain an agreement with the New Englanders (Shirley Correspondence, Vol. II, Pages 492-519).

Both elements of the 1756 Campaign suffer from underestimating the logistical problems associated with supplying troops and positions in the St. Lawrence Basin. A drainage divide from the Hudson to the Saint Lawrence had to be crossed to reach either Fort William Henry or Fort Oswego. There were no road networks and any supply by water required several long portages. The portage at the Oneida Carry, connecting the Mohawk River to the Lake Ontario Basin, was nearly eight miles in length, but it was then reduced to about three miles. Even to reach Fort Edward on the Hudson from Albany, at least three portages would have been required to move around falls and rapids. The shortage of wagons and horse teams was equally acute. There are two major questions involved: (1) how to supply the troops, and (2) where to mass the troops before decisively moving forward. During the 1755 Campaign, William Johnson alienated both Shirley and the New England officer corps to the degree that any shortcomings of the 1755 Campaign were blamed on Johnson. As Commander in Chief, Shirley hand-picked John Winslow to replace Johnson, both men were from Massachusetts. Establishing the Bateaux Service in 1756 was Shirley's attempt to solve the first consideration, but he failed at solving or possibly even identifying the second issue. In 1756, the New Englanders were to repeat many of Johnson's mistakes. The logistical headache associated with massing and then "sitting" troops at Fort William Henry was a huge and largely unnecessary burden. Neither Abercromby nor Amherst would suffer under this liability; both men moved quickly north from Fort Edward to attack Ticonderoga with minimal time spent organizing on the south shore of Lake George.

The duties and roles of the 44th and 48th Foot during Summer 1756 remain somewhat vague. Simply put, the capacity of the supply chain to move provisions and stores would not allow the 44th or 48th to be added to the Oswego garrison. With limited options open to him, Shirley now "parks" the 44th and 48th Foot to serve as protection for Albany, but in positions away from the New England provincials and easily supplied. Unexpected, Shirley displays little faith in the provincials. Previous to this, Shirley was in full support of independent provincial campaigns.

Pargellis (1933) devotes a full chapter to discussing Shirley and the 1756 Campaign. Shirley was a political man and not a trained officer of the British Army. With the death of Braddock, the office became his largely by default, but he does hold the rank of Major General in the British Army (commission date of February 26, 1755). This was blunt-force patronage. Shirley shows little capacity for detail. Pargellis argues that the conditions described in this May 25th letter as regards Oswego were tantamount to fiction and the true condition and state of the Fort were much worse. Little work was done between Fall 1755 and Spring 1756 due to the lack of supplies and no pay. The garrison suffered through the winter of (1755-1756) at three-quarter rations or worse (Way 2001, Page 61). Hundreds of men died from sickness and near starvation. Goods were positioned at Oswego, but these were in private merchant hands and offered at exorbitant prices, merchants closely connected to Shirley and his family through marriage. West of Schenectady and except for Oswego itself, the supply and storehouse situation improved only marginally during the Summer of 1756. Oswego fell to Montcalm on August 14, 1756. Loudoun blames the loss of Oswego squarely on Shirley and asks for a Court of Inquiry. This call is seconded by Cumberland and the Treasury (Pargellis 1933, Page 165). Shirley defends himself in a letter to Henry Fox, dated September 16th, and faults the loss of Oswego on the failure to move the needed ship cannon from depots on the Mohawk River to Oswego, all the other needed stores had been moved. Shirley argues convoys were needed to move the guns safely; the previous supply train had been attacked by a large body of French and Indians (July 3rd). The theme in the letter is that the transport of the guns was waiting

on Bradstreet's Bateaux Service and the 44th Foot to first join together and only then move forward to Oswego. Per Shirley, the 44th was delayed nearly a month with the Bateaux Service waiting on the 44th's arrival from July 11th to August 12th — *The naval force design'd for the protection of Oswego was, according to all Accounts, superior to that which the French were preparing for Lake Ontario (said to Consist at the most of no more than five Vessels mounted with Cannon, two of which were known to be inferior to any of the English Vessels which carry'd great Artillery), and consequently sufficient to have kept the Command of the Lake, and prevented the French from landing any large number of Men with Artillery and Stores near the Fort, particularly Artillery, without which Oswego was not to have been taken* (Shirley Correspondence to Henry Fox, Volume II; September 16, 1756, Page 569 - 570). However, Mackellar reports that at least some guns had arrived on July 1st; a Brig of 16 guns and a Sloop of 12 guns were launched on July 3rd (MANA, Pages 200 and 219). There were two other smaller armed ships and two uncompleted vessels; these uncompleted ships lacked guns, rigging, and crew. Shirley's account and Loudoun's account of the circumstances surrounding the loss of Oswego are wildly divergent from each other and cannot be reconciled.

What is surprising is Shirley's view of the Fort Ticonderoga - Fort St. Frederic Campaign. Even though Fort William Henry was constructed the previous year, Shirley rejects the idea of moving down Lake George to Ticonderoga, again favoring moving north via Wood Creek and South Bay. Shirley envisions yet another large fort, this time at South Bay. In this and earlier writings, outside of a simple garrison to serve as a screen for Fort Edward, Shirley has no use for Fort William Henry. Shirley's evaluation of the merits of Fort William Henry date from its initial construction — *"little or no utility for carrying on another expedition,"* (Shirley Correspondence to William Johnson, Volume II; September 19, 1755, Page 275). In this thought, he agrees with Loudoun. Yet it was Shirley himself who directed Winslow's Campaign to Lake George. Two months before this Council of War, Shirley writes Winslow — *You are hereby directed to take upon you the Command of the Forces raised and to be raised within the Province of Massachusetts Bay and to take care they be properly Armed and Accoutered, and cause them as soon as possible to March for the City of Albany, where you will be Joined by the Forces of the other Governments named, of which also you are to Command, and with them proceed to Lake George, and from hence to Crown Point, in the way you Judge most expedient, and to Oppose all persons by Force of Arms, either Subjects of the French King, or Indians, or any other who shall appear to molest you on your way, and by every proper Method to reduce any Fortifications you shall find on the said Lake Iroquois or in your Passage thereto or places adjacent, more especially the Fort of Crown Point* (Shirley Correspondence to Winslow, Volume II; near March 29, 1756, Page 424). To Shirley, Fort Edward remains the key; but there appears to be no written evidence that Shirley subsequently directed Winslow to adopt the Wood Creek/South Bay Route to Ticonderoga. At the end of June, Shirley does meet with Winslow in Albany, so the topic of the Wood Creek/South Bay Route could have been quietly considered in detail. Shirley very much wants to keep these minutes private — reference the following letter.

Note: The stated reasons for the failure of the 1755 Niagara Campaign are found in two letters from Shirley to Robinson (September 18 and September 28, 1755, Shirley Correspondence, Volume II, Pages 261 and 289). The British were not prepared to move against Niagara until mid-September, but the weather turned rainy and the winds were strong from the west. By late September, it was

evident the 1755 Niagara Expedition needed to be canceled, but any idea that Shirley had solved the logistical problems is illusory and only benefits Shirley.

Note: Shirley becomes Commander in Chief through a series of unplanned events. Along with many of the other provincial governors, Shirley meets with Braddock at Alexandria, Virginia, the Carlyle House Congress, April 1755 (Crocker 2009, Pages 95-107). Impressed, Braddock made Shirley his Second-in-Command, bypassing both his regimental colonels — Halkett of the 44th and Dunbar of the 48th (Schutz 1961, Page 196). Whether this was Braddock's sole decision or London's is not fully clear, but it appears to have been Braddock's call. Although Shirley was not truly qualified by experience, neither was anyone else in America — a best choice, among only unqualified choices. Even before Braddock's death, Shirley's attention was torn between his political duties as Governor of Massachusetts and his military responsibilities relating to both Oswego and the Crown Point Campaigns. With Braddock's death, it was now even more difficult. Secretary Robinson writes Shirley on August 28th confirming his appointment as Commander in Chief, North America (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol II, Page 242).

The previous twelve months had been physically and emotionally hard on Shirley. Born in 1694, he was now 61 years old, a dedicated politician. He was not a soldier by profession or endurance, but he had been compelled to lead an arduous field campaign the previous summer at Oswego. In July 1755, his oldest son, William, was killed with Braddock at the Monongahela. Later in November 1755, his second oldest son, Jack, died of dysentery while returning from Oswego; Shirley's column had exhausted all medicines.

As regards historians, Pargellis (1933) is nearly as hostile of Shirley as Loudoun. Schutz (1961) is apologetic and excessively forgiving. Gipson (1946, Volume VI) is more balanced, but still critical of Shirley as a military commander. Gipson lacks the venom of Pargellis. Gipson writes with more authority about the London politics behind the recall of Shirley. Thayer (1957) is a defender of Shirley and Shirley's merchant circle. Jennings (1988) is caustic. In the tradition of Fred Anderson (1984), Way (2001) measures with respect to the common soldier.

The first "history" published concerning the events of 1755 and 1756 is Livingston (1757, Pages 144, London, three shillings, online) — *A Review of Military Affairs in North-America from The Commencement of French Hostilities on the Frontiers of Virginia to the surrender of Oswego on the 14th of August, 1756*. It is written by William Livingston, a New York newspaper publisher, and brother to Peter Livingston, head of Shirley's circle of merchants. Advertised as a letter, long sections read as a history. It is decidedly pro-Shirley and careful to provide details in places where Shirley might be criticized. The segment on Oswego is particularly detailed and seemingly accurate as it relates to Bradstreet's July 3, 1756, battle with a French raiding party and Webb's attempted reinforcement of Oswego. It is highly critical of William Johnson and Pownall then to a lesser degree of Abercromby. Webb is not criticized. Outside of the date of his arrival, Loudoun is not mentioned, so the writing cannot be criticized as anti-Loudoun. It is signed September 20, 1756, but without any authorship. It apparently influenced Gipson's writings.

A second history appears in 1758 written by William Alexander — *The Conduct of Maj. Gen. Shirley, Late General and Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America*, 140 pages, London, online. A strict defense of Shirley, informative of detail, but full of omissions.

From William Shirley to Charles Hardy, Governor of New York. Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731-1760; edited by Charles Henry Lincoln, Vol. 2 – Page 460 (Online):

WILLIAM SHIRLEY TO CHARLES HARDY

Albany, May 27th, 1756

Sir,

I inclose your Excellency a Copy of the Minutes of a Council of War held at Albany the 25th: Instant, which I have not done nor shall do to any other Governor, and now communicate it to your Excellency in confidence that you will not disclose it to your Council, or any other person whatever untill the 44th, and 48th Regiments shall actually Join the Provincial Troops in the Expedition against Crown Point, in case such a Junction shall ever take effect.

No person besides the Members of the Council of War and my Secretary, except my first Aid de Camp, my under Secretary, and the Captain of the Train of Artillery is privy to it. I believe it may be likewise necessary to communicate that part, which respects the Destination of the 44th : and 48th : Regimt : to General Winslow: and to induce an Expectation in all the Officers and others that those two Regiments are destin'd for Oswego; a Regulation of Allotment of Battoes allow'd by the Crown for carrying the Officers Baggage, etca : will be given out in Publick order, which may we hope keep their real Destination from Transpiring.

I promis'd your Excellency at New York to forward the making additional works at Fort Edward; And I shall accordingly give Instructions to General Winslow for that purpose, as also for building a Fort at South Bay; which will, I apprehend, be the most ready and effectual Way of having both done at the Joint expence of the Colonies; I only wait for the Opinion of Capt. Montresor as to the manner of doing it, which will be founded, with regard to Fort Edward, upon a Report of Engineer Gordon, who I have order'd to Survey it, as also Fort William Henry, and Expect him in a day or two.

I also include your Excellency a Copy of the Examination of a French prisoner Taken by Capt. Rogers between Ticonderoge and the Enemy's advanced Guard; which will shew their Strength and motions; Likewise the Copy of Sir William Johnson's Conference with some Indians of the Six Nations at Fort Johnson on the 12th Instant; upon which I am to acquaint your Excellency, That Six William is at least determin'd to go to Onondago, and I expect from thence after the meeting is ended, to Oswego.

General Winslow, since his Arrival here, hath much alter'd the appearance of every part of the preparations making for the expedition, and I am now in hope, things may be put under some Regulation, and in a proper Channel; I shall give him the utmost assistance in my power for extricating every thing out of disorder, which he found them in.

I am to acknowledge the Receipt of your Excellencys Favour of the 16th : instant : Mr. Alexander has now the Account of the Balances due to the Several Waggoners for Waggon-hire etca.; and they have receiv'd Orders to come for their Money.

*I am with Great Esteem
Sir
Your Excellencys most Humble
and most Obedient Servant*

W. Shirley

His Excellency Sir Charles Hardy.

Comment: Hardy was Governor of New York from 1755 - 1757, but his true professional background was in the Royal Navy. In 1757, he joined Loudoun's staff for the Siege of Louisbourg. Rear Admiral Hardy "survived" the failed 1757 Campaign, serving as second in command under Admiral Boscawen at the successful 1758 Siege of Louisbourg.

Shirley was adamant that Hardy not disclose any of the sensitive information contained in this letter, particularly that relating to mixing British regulars and New England provincial troops. Shirley was more than happy to mislead the New Englanders until an agreement could be quietly worked out with the provincial officers, but he failed. Again, Shirley displays his strong preference for an attack via Wood Creek and South Bay, plus a new fort at South Bay.

Shirley was aware of his being replaced by Loudoun well before Loudoun's actual arrival. Shirley writes Robert Hunter Morris in mid-April of the circumstance (Correspondence of William Shirley; April 18, 1756). Loudoun arrives on July 23rd in New York. Although Shirley receives orders to immediately return to London, he remains in America for nearly two months; Shirley was still writing from Boston on September 20th. Loudoun and Shirley trade numerous letters through August and September. Over time, the letters grow increasingly hostile. Eventually, Loudoun attempts to cut off the correspondence. Loudoun wants Shirley gone from America. A portion of the letter exchange between Loudoun and Shirley can be found in *The Correspondence of William Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts and Military Commander in America, 1731-1760*; edited by Charles Henry Lincoln, Vol. 2; Pages 495-561 (available on-line). Other letters can be found in the Loudoun Papers at the Huntington Library in California. The deep dislike that developed between these two men is readily apparent in the reading. Pownall's near hatred of Shirley is even more pronounced and visceral (Laramie, 2012; Page 242).

From William Shirley to James Abercromby, June 28, 1756 (LO 1258):

Sir,

Albany June 28th 1756.

I have now the Honour to inclose you a List of the Forts and works carrying on at Oswego, and between that place and Schenectada with the Strength of the Parties posted in each.

As to the new Forts at Oswego, Plans of which I shall take an Opportunity of laying before you, I have, as the Season of the Year is advanced and the Garrison hath been much infested with parties of Indians from Oswegochie (La Presentation on the St. Lawrence River), order'd Mr. Machallar Engineer en second (engineer rank) now at Oswego for the immediate Security of the place to compleat them as also the works round the old Fort, and in the mean time to send me his Opinion concerning the building a more respectable Fort upon the Point where Fort Ontario stands (eastern fort).

I likewise inclose a plan of Lake George & Lake Champlain, the South Bay and Wood Creek, & on which is delineated the Route by Land from Fort William Henry to the French Forts at Ticonderoga & Crownpoint, which was communicated to me as take by Captain Rogers, commanding a Company of Rangers employ'd between Fort William Henry and Montreal, upon Surveys made by himself and his Lieutenant.

As to the State of the 44th, 48th, 50th, & 51st Regiments, You will know that the two former from a View of them upon the Sport; I wish the two latter were as good a Condition: from their remote and scatter'd Situation, I have not been able to procure exact Returns of them; But from what I have, & are lay'd before you, their Strength is lefs than that of the 44th and 48th Regiments owing to the great Desertions, Deaths, & Sicknefs, which has occasion'd many to be dischr'd as incapable of being ever fit again for Duty; not to mention that indente'd Servants among their Recruits, as I am inform'd, are detain'd in Prison in some of the Governments for having inlisted into the King's Service.

The 50th Regiment consisted of 940 Rank and File on the 24th of April 1755, since which the Officers have inlisted, according to the best Accounts I have had, upwards of 250 Recruits.

The Arms of both these Regiments were in the beginning very bad, due Representations of which were made 8 Months ago to the Secretary of War; their Cloathing sent from England the last year was likewise extremely bad, but the 50th Regiment in particular had all the proper Appointments allow'd it.

It likewise probable from their Sicknefs, Fatigue of Duty thro' frequent Alarms, and their being posted at different places they may be so well disciplin'd as might otherwise have been expected; But the 50th Regimt. Which came more withing my Knowledge than the 51st was, before their March from Boston in June 1755, judg'd by the Officers appointed from England to be remarkably well disciplin'd for so new rais'd a Regiment; & both the 50th & 51st Regiments were, during my Residence at Oswego in very good Order; Desertions & Sicknefs excepted, which prevail'd greatly among them.

*I should think a party of 50 Men at Oswego Falls, 250 upon the Oneida Carrying Place for the three Forts there, 120 at Conajohara Falls, * 80 at Brunetsfield (German Flatts) might be sufficient*

to keep open the Communication between Oswego & Schenectada, especially if one or two Companions of Rangers were employ'd in that Service.

*I am with the greatest Regard and Esteem, Sir
Your most Humble, and most Obedient Servant,
W. Shirley*

A true Copy

Wm. Alexander, Secy.

Comment: This is Shirley's cover letter to the documents and ledgers given to Abercromby upon his arrival at Albany. Writing Loudoun, Abercromby called them "voluminous" (LO 1263 A & B, June 30, 1756, see LO 1257 A & B, , 1756, and LO 4394 – Theater Return). None of the documents appear to be intentional deceptions, but some returns and inventories were best honest guesses. **What is lacking from all these June correspondences was any fresh assessment of the intentions of the French or the exceedingly aggressive nature of Pierre Vaudreuil, Governor General of Canada.** Shirley may have thought that these elements were too intricate to put in writing and that it was best to brief Abercromby and Loudoun in person, but there is no evidence to support that these topics were approached. If they had been, logic dictates, these elements would have been central to the deluge of letters written by Shirley that September, but they are not.

Here, Shirley is suggesting posting some 500 men on garrison duty along the Mohawk River plus the fort at Schenectady itself would require one to two companies. This amounts to the near commitment of a full regiment to a string of garrisons that remained exceedingly vulnerable to the large French raiding parties that were being sent south from Canada. Below Fort Edward, the posts along the Hudson River required yet another regiment to garrison. Then there were the larger posts themselves — Fort Edward, Fort William Henry, and Oswego. Loudoun deeply loathed all these defensive commitments that drained much of the strength and monies away from any offensive strike. From LO 1282, Loudoun appears to be discussing and then discounting the possibility of a new fort at Oswego (this document is a series of letter extracts, July – November 1756):

Extract from Lord Loudoun's Letter to Major General Webb dated Albany 26, August 1756.

As to the Fort, I think it is very unlucky that within a twelve month, the Government should be forced to build a third one, for the same purpose; but that there is no help for the place seems to me much too large; for if we are to have many Forts that require Garrisons of Five Hundred Men, we shall have no Army for the Field; so that must be contracted.

Among the papers presented to Abercromby was LO 4394, *A Monthly Return of His Majesty's Forces in North America* (Francis Halkett, 44th Foot, Albany, June 24, 1756, British Regular Army only). This exhaustive return includes Nova Scotia, but it contains little about Oswego. This document was prepared before Abercromby reached Albany. Questions concerning Oswego forced the preparation of a second document, LO 1365 (Halkett, Albany, July 27, 1756). At Oswego, there was over 160 days of bread and pork, but only 14 barrels of rum. However, the ordnance store for the shell pieces bares little if any resemblance to Shirley's September 1755 Minutes or the Page 520 List (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 520). Without judgment, Halkett's list includes one 10-inch brass mortar, one 6 6/8-inch brass mortar, one 7 1/2-inch brass howitzer, one 7 1/2-inch iron howitzer, one 7 1/2-inch iron mortar, and one 6 6/8-inch iron mortar — too much to unpack (See Page 283).

From Lt. Colonel James Mercer at Oswego to General William Shirley, July 2, 1756 (LO 1279).
Abercromby reached Albany on June 25, 1756. Loudoun was on ship.

Sir,

The Danger I suspect the Garrison is in from the discontent of the Troops, Forces me to trouble your Excellency with this, by Exprefs, that I may the more Speedily have your direction for my conduct how to avoid the threatned Inconveniencies, As I understand Capt. More has brought up the Subsistence for Your Excellencys Regiment (50th), the grievance at present are mostly from Sir William Pepperells' (51st), first the want of their pay for this Eight Months past, the reduction of the price of Labour, and the withholding from them any allowance for Rum, which every man here the Army Excepted enjoy, the first I must be occasioned by some Neglect of the Paymasters, which Can only be rectified by your Excellency, the Second arises by your Excellencies Order to reducing the price of Labor to Six pence per day, which were the others removed, might I believe be Calmly submitted to, the third from the want of Sufficient Quantities of Rum in the Store, these with the flattering Invitation from the French promising great rewards to such as will Join them and the annonomus threatening to desert if regard is not paid to what they call their Just complaints, causes my present anxiety, I hope Your Excellency will Judge it for the good of His Majesty's Service to remove those difficulties, in Council of the Field Officers of the Garrison this day, it was thought impracticable to carry on the Publick works longer than the Seventeenth instant, for want of money to pay the workman, unlesfs before that time your Excellency remit us funds for that purpose, the Trade here being in no degree equal to the sums wanted, were the Dealers inclined to accept of Mr. Lewis's Bills for their Cash arising from a suspicion that these Publick Bills may not be punctually paid, Mr. Lewis likewise complains of his want of proper powers to Draw Bills, having only Mr. Alexanders Verbal order, which in case His Death might involve him in the greatest difficultys, he seems quite Tired of the Service, and has desired me to interceed for your Excellencys leave to retire, I must confefs he has been diligent and carefull and his Service will I hope meet with your Approbation. Inclosed, I send Your Excellency a Copy of the last Monthly returns by which you will see the present Effectives fit for duty in this Garrison are.

	50th Regt.	266
	51st D ^o	325
Colonl. Sckylers (New Jersey Blues)	D ^o	164
Detachmt. of (Artillery) Train		<u>18</u>
Total	773

Since which time we have been reinforced by the Cpts. More, Padgett &ca: with one hundred & fifty men. I have by the advice of the Field Officers Present withdrawn the detachment of your Regt. From Fort Oswego (western fort). Judging a small number of Men not able to defend that Fort if attacked, your Regt. Colo. Schuylers and the Train are at present encamped within the works and Sir Williams Pepperells in Fort Ontario. Eleven Men deserted lately for the 50th and with this two days fourteen from the 51st Regt. I doubt the French Promises have Corrupted their Fidellity, We shall Launch the Brigg and Sloop tomorrow, and the Snow as Mr. Marsh afsures me in Lefs than three weeks, I wish the Guns were here & they fitted for the Sea. I leave it to Capt. Bradley to acquaint your Excellency, how he was chased into this Port by a Superior Force, of the Lofs of one of our small Schooners, and the Escape of the other in the Sight of the Garrison, Colonel Bradstreet

proposes seting out tomorrow and I hope will reach Schenectady time enough to receive your orders.

Oswego, July 2, 1756

*I am with the most perfect regard, &ca
James F. Mercer*

Comment: Nothing in this letter warns of an imminent danger to Oswego. Reading this letter would have only reaffirmed Loudoun's already low opinion of Shirley as a military commander and professional soldier. With the 150-man reinforcement, this would place the number of fit soldiers in the garrison at around 925 plus sailors and carpenters. Mackellar's Oswego Journal details the daily events and routine from May 16th until the surrender (MANA, Pages 187-221, online, with map).

In Spring 1756, hundreds of new recruits joined the 50th and 51st Foot and then journeyed to Oswego. By July 24th, some 837 fit were present with the sick decreasing to only 100 men, 50th and 51st Foot only (Regimental Returns LO 481 and LO 1931; = 450 + 387 and = 81 + 19, respectively). Adding in the same Blues and the artillery numbers as in this Mercer letter, the fit rank & file was now about 1,019 men. Some 109 rank & file from the 50th Foot and 302 rank & file from the 51st were not at Oswego; 42% of the rank & file of the 51st were "*On Command*" (not at Oswego). These men were at posts on the Mohawk or en route to Oswego. At least some of these men would arrive at Oswego before the siege on August 10, 1756. Assuming some 18 companies were present, each company had about 40-45 fit men.

The numbers lost from the 50th and 51st regiments in Summer 1755 and the winter of 1755-1756 were essentially replaced but not augmented. Chartrand (2014, Page 64) provides a list by formation of those that surrendered at Oswego. Examining this list and adding in sergeants and 150 casualties, the number of effective (fit) at Oswego approaches some 1,300 men, not including the officers. On September 18, 1755, Shirley wrote the number of effectives (fit) including sergeants at Oswego was 1,376 men (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 267).

Shirley's attempt to save monies by cutting the pay for extra work is a bookkeeper's solution to a military problem. On July 2nd, a company of Pioneers which had arrived with Bradstreet on June 28th was sent back to the Mohawk because there was no cash to pay for the extra work; the extra work rate paid to these Pioneers was much higher than the standard extra work rate to the common soldiers and Mercer feared morale problems if they stayed (MANA, Page 200). Bradstreet leaves Oswego on July 3rd. Whether Loudoun was concerned by the plight of the common soldier is impossible to judge. Loudoun never offers any warmth or sensibility to rank & file, simple duty-obligated servants to the Crown. In none of the letters chastising Shirley as a military commander does Loudoun write of the mistreatment of common soldier due to Shirley's incompetence, suggesting it was a non-issue to Loudoun.

Leaving Oswego on July 3rd, Bradstreet arrived in Albany on July 12 (Godfrey 1982, Page 81, Note 65). His column of bateaux-men had driven off a large French raiding party of some 730 men on the return trip — 450 Canadians, 180 French Regulars, and 100 Indians (Godfrey 1982, Page 79). Bradstreet would have brought additional letters and an officer's perspective on the situation at Oswego, but he would have been unknown to either Abercromby or Webb. What advice or insights the ever-aggressive Bradstreet chose to give is unknown, but he decided to avoid backing Shirley. Abercromby does not warm to Bradstreet. Bradstreet seemingly adopts a waiting posture, taking no

risks or making any statement that would endanger his career or that might antagonize Loudoun. Regardless, Bradstreet's arrival at Albany does not change Abercromby's views or plans. Abercromby's chief focus was on the Winslow Expedition and Lake Champlain.

Following Shirley's meetings with Abercromby in June, an inventory for Oswego was quickly prepared by Captain Francis Halkett, 44th Foot, LO 1365, July 27, 1756. This is a companion piece to LO 4394 – *A Monthly Return of His Majesty's Forces in North America* (Halkett, June 24, 1756). Halkett served as Shirley's Brigade Major. For all posts, not just Oswego, the 50th has a rank-and-file strength of 633 men (499 fit + 134 sick) and the 51st has 627 rank-and-file (532 fit and 95 sick) — wanting to complete 407 and 413 men, respectively. Here LO 4394 (June 24) and LO 1365 (July 27) are using the same rank-and-file numbers, though shown somewhat differently, but July's LO 1365 shows nineteen additional officers in these two regiments, including one new major and six new captains. Shirley had filled all the officer slots in both the 50th and 51st. This may have been a key reason why Shirley needed to have LO 1365 prepared, but Loudoun was clearly irked that Shirley granted these new commissions. In LO 1365, there are forty-three pieces of ordnance, but the ship guns delivered by Bradstreet on July 1 are missing, including ten 4-pounders. There are sixteen shell pieces, howitzers - mortars, but LO 1365 is a poor fit for the September 1755 Minutes (See P. 127). Even if one rejects the Page 520 List and accepts this ordnance as being at Oswego, **the Ancram Foundry still remains the only source** for ten iron howitzers and mortars included in the 1756 Frontenac Inventory. Unfortunately, the source of this ordnance tally is unknown. Notably, Halkett did not include it as part of June's LO 4394. The document was prepared at Albany, not Oswego, intended to be reflective of July 2, highly reformatted (partial transcription):

Proportion of Ordnance & Stores at the old Fort Oswego & Fort Ontario

BRASS ORDNANCE:

1 Brass 18-pound Cannon, 6 Brass 12-pound Cannon
1 Brass 10-inch Mortar, 1 Brass 6 6/8-inch Mortar,
1 Brass Cohornes Mortar, 2 Brass 4 2/8-inch Mortars, 1 Brass 2 7/8-inch Mortar
1 Brass 7 1/2-inch Howitzer, 1 Brass 4-inch Howitzer

IRON ORDNANCE:

8 Iron 9-pound Cannon, 6 Iron 6-pound Cannon, 6 Iron 3-pound Cannon
1 Iron 7 1/2-inch Mortar, 1 Iron 6 6/8-inch Mortar,
1 Iron 4 2/8-inch Mortar, 2 Iron 4 1/8-inch Mortars
1 Iron 7 1/2-inch Howitzer, 1 Iron 4-inch Howitzer, 1 Iron 4 1/8-inch Howitzer

Corn'd Powder Serviceable Barrels 261

Corn'd Powder Repairable Barrels 39

Bread Tierces 660; Flour Barrels 800; Meal Bags 1,213; Pork Barrels 1,800

Rum Barrels 14; Rice Tierces 5; Live Cattle 28; Pease Bags 220

One Hundred & Sixty Days Bread, Meat and Flour for 2,500 Men.

One Hundred & ninety Days Pork &ca:

From the Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 9, Pages 483-487; July 16 - 20, 1756:

At a Council of War, held at Albany July 16th 1756

Present

Major General James Abercrombie, Commander in Chief &ca.

His Excellency Sir Charles Hardy, Knight

Captain General and Governor in Chief of the province of New York

Colonel Daniel Webb

Sir William Johnson, Baronet

Lieut. Colonel George Munroe (35th Foot)

Lieut. Colonel Thomas Gage (44th Foot)

The Honble. James Delancy, Deputy Governor of the province of New York

Lieut. Colonel Ralph Burton (48th Foot)

Lieut. Colonel Francis Grant (42nd Highlanders)

Lieut. Colonel Sir John St. Clair, Deputy Quarter Master General

James Montresor, Chief Engineer

Major General Abercrombie's Commission being read by which His Majesty appoints him, Commander of all, and Singular His Forces Employed in North America, until the arrival of the Earl of Loudoun.

Major General Abercrombie Acquainted the Council that a Considerable Body of Provincials under the Command of General Winslow were on their March to Fort Edward and Fort Wm. Henry in order to proceed upon an Expedition against Ticonderoga and Crown Point. Major General Abercrombie further informed the Council, that from several Conference with General Winslow that he had the Strongest reason to believe the provincials would not act in Conjunction with His Majesty's Troops, upon which the Council desired that General Winslow Might be called in, and he being asked what Effects he apprehended from the Junction of his Majesty's Regular Troops with the provincials on their intended Expedition against Crown Point.

General Winslow replied that he looked upon himself to be under the Command of His Majesty's Commander in Chief, and that he would be very well satisfied a Junction would be accomplished, but that he apprehended that if His Majesty's troops were ordered to Join it would almost Occasion an universal desertion amongst the Provincial because they were raised to server solely under the Command of their own Officers, whose Commissions (particularly those from the province of Massachusetts Bay) are worded in the following Manner. Constituting and appointing such a One, to be a Colonel, Major, Captain &ca of a Regiment or Company to be Employed upon an Expedition against Crown Point whereof John Winslow Esqr. is Commander in Chief.

General Winslow further informed the Council that it was the Opinion of the officers under his Command that they had a Sufficient Force for the Reduction of Crown Point, but that if a further Force should be necessary, he had reason to Expect a Reinforcement; whereas if His Majesty's Regular Forces were to Join them, he apprehends they could not get further Supply of Men; particularly from the Four New England provinces; General Winslow then acquainted the Council that he would repair to his Camp, and there Call a Council of the principal officers of the

Provincials to know their Opinions upon this point, and Transmit the same to the Commander in Chief.

In Consequence of this declaration of General Winslow's and upon a Supposition that the principal Officer amongst the Provincials will be against a Junction; in that Event Major General Abercrombie desired the opinion of the Council whether it would be adviseable for him to Exert the power granted to him by His Majesty's Commission by making a Junction of the Regular Troops with the Provincials and taking upon himself the Command of the whole.

The Council is unanimously of Opinion (that under the present Circumstances) the Attempting and forcing a Junction of His Majesty's Regular Troops with the provincials is Extremely unadviseable, and might be a fatal Consequence to publick Service.

Major General Abercrombie desired to know the Opinion of the Council in what manner it was almost adviseable to Employ His Majesty's Regular Troops.

The Council is of opinion that a Regiment should March to Fort Edward upon the provincials Evacuating the same, leaving a detachment of 150 Men at Saratoga to guard the Magazine there and Escort the provisions to Fort Edward ad that one of the Regiments lately arrived from Britain should take post at the half Moon and Still Water upon the Hudson's River; at which post they can be under Cover until their Tents and Camp Equipage arrive, and that in the meantime a Sufficient Number of Troops, be Employed in Compleating the Works at For Edward, General Winslow having Engaged to Garrison and keep a Sufficient Number of Men at Work in perfecting the Fortifications at Fort William Henry, which will be the Chief Magazine of the Provincials.

Major General Abercrombie laid before the Council Engineer Mackellar's Report of the Fortifications at Oswego of date the 25th May last, together a plan of said work. as also Lieut. Colonel Mercer's letter of the 2d. July to Major General Shirley, with regard to the State of that Garrison under his Command — He also informed the Council of the Intelligence he had Received of the Enemy's designs of interrupting and cutting off the Communication between Albany and Oswego, of which the Attack upon Captain Bradstreet the 3d. Instant near the Oswego Falls was a strong proof, upon which point, the advice of the Council being asked.

In the opinion of the Council, that in Consideration of the great importance of Oswego and the defenceless Situation of the place at Present, and the necessity of building a small Fort at Oswego Falls to keep the Communications open; that for these Services a Regiment should forthwith march to Reinforce that Garrison, and put the works in a posture of defence, and that considering the interruption's Convoys by water are liable to, and the impossibility of Transporting Stores and provision during a Frost (which is often of many months continuance) they are also of the opinion, a Road between German Flatts and Oswego shou'd be cut.

Captain Bradley's Letter of the 28th, June and 2d July last being read, representing the present Force of the French on the Lake and likewise the preparations they are making at Cadaraqui (Fort Frontenac), the General desired the Opinion of the Council what as necessary to be done to gain a Superiority of the Lake.

It is the Opinion of the Council that a Vessel of a large a Size and Force as the port will admit off, be built, as also a small one to Replace the one that was lately lost, somewhat in the Nature of a Quarter Galley, that can both sail and Row.

And lastly Major General Abercrombie having represented to the Council that the Scheme for raising two Companies of Rangers Recommended by the Council of War held at Albany May 25, 1756 is quite failed.

It is the opinion of the Council that Major General Abercrombie should immediately give Directions to Sir William Johnson to raise such a Number of Rangers, as he shall Judge necessary to Join them with Indians in harrassing and annoying the Enemy in Canada. The Council also Recommended it to the General to raise another Company of Rangers for the Publick Service.

After several Adjournments, this Council of War was closed and Signed at Albany, the 20th day of July 1756.

(List of Signers, Same as Opening List)

*A True Copy
James Abercrombie
Aid de Camp as Secretary*

Comment: This council occurred over a four-day period. Only the council members themselves appear on the signatory list. John Winslow is not listed, but he was asked for a declaration and was questioned by the council. Abercromby could only conclude that he was effectively handcuffed and limited by the New England provincials. Loudoun would re-fight the same ground and “lose”. At least two regiments of regulars would be on guard duty on the Hudson. The provincials would remain in command at Fort Edward under Phineas Lyman of Connecticut.

A brief summation of the information provided by Shirley to Abercromby is found in LO 1258, but no emphasis is placed on Oswego nor is there any analysis or judgment offered to Abercromby (Abercromby to Loudoun, June 30, 1756). The Mackellar May 25th letter is found in MANA (Pages 187-189 **only**). There is a second journal entry for May 26th that is more detailed (Pages 189-193). Mackellar’s report on the fortifications at Oswego may have had considerable influence on the attachment of a “defenceless Situation”. Mackellar’s opinion would have been championed by Montresor. Like Mercer’s July 2 letter, Mackellar’s input does not directly warn of an imminent attack by the French. Dominated by the surrounding high ground, Oswego’s geography presented total misery to any engineer. The large center fortification was also the lowest in elevation.

Bradstreet had taken and questioned French prisoners after the battle on the Oswego River, July 3rd, but only Bradstreet knew this intelligence, so he likely addressed the Council. However, Bradstreet was an unknown quantity to both Abercromby and Shirley. Carrying the praise of Shirley, he may have been viewed with suspicion by Abercromby. Bradstreet’s immediate need for thousands of pounds to pay his men was a second strike against his veracity. Abercromby was cool to Bradstreet and quickly dismisses some 400 of Bradstreet’s bateaux-men, some third of Bradstreet’s men (Godfrey 1982, Page 86). Whether Bradstreet even attempted to truly influence the council is unknown; he seems to be “laying low”, steering clear of the Loudoun – Shirley squabble. Bradstreet’s primary focus was always Bradstreet. He was extremely careful not to antagonize Abercromby. His ambitions would wait for the arrival of Loudoun.

From Francis Lewis to William Alexander, July 22, 1756 (CO_5_48_020). Lewis was the agent for Shirley's merchant circle positioned at Oswego. Lewis was at Oswego during Summer 1755 and Winter 1755-1756.

Sir,

Oswego 22nd July 1756

I wrote you the 15th Instant acknowledging the receipt of your Letter dated the 20th past agreeable thereto. I now transmit you the Accounts, Sales, and Current of the transactions committed to my care relating to yourself, Mr. Livingston. Mr. Erwin, and the Government, there is some debts still outstanding from the Officers which they promise me payment of as soon as they can receive money of the paymasters. You perceive I have charged your Acct. Curr. with the Ballance of the Generals. It was for several things for the Indians of your Goods delivered both before and since his Excellency left this of which shall send you particulars with the Next copys.

The Express sudden departure will not permit my time to enlarge therefore can only add that unless some live Cattle be sent up soon, the Forces must drop this Year by Fluxes (dysentery) as they did the last having no Animal food but Salt Pork, which for Continuance must subject them to disorders, the consequence already begin to appear. Flower & Peas will be still wanting for the Winter supply, of Pork there is a large quantity.

*I am Respectfully,
Your Most Humble Servant,
Francis Lewis*

Comment: The 50th had been paid earlier in July, but this letter substantiates that the 51st was not paid — credit was still being extended to some officers by Lewis. Having a full half of the garrison unpaid for eight months, including many officers, would have been an unremitting strain on the entire fabric of Mercer's command.

A balanced diet was key in keeping at least some diseases at bay; the other key element was sanitation. Salt pork is a heavily salted pork belly, exceedingly high in fat — fatter than bacon, and barreled in a brine. In preparation, it was often boiled to lower the salt content. Lewis clearly knows of the dietary shortcomings of salted pork; it must have been common knowledge that a diet based on salt pork was decidedly problematic (see Brumwell 2002, Page 151). The need for greens and vegetables was clearly recognized, but difficult to obtain in bulk in wilderness settings and made more difficult in winter months. Even when available from local farmers, vegetables were not cheap in price with vegetables being desired as much as rum; the lack of fresh dairy led to its own set of problems (see Anderson 1984, Pages 87-89). Post gardens were encouraged.

Signs of dysentery were already beginning to reappear among the garrison, a bacterial or parasitic infection of the intestine. Parasitic dysentery is largely tropical. The disease can be transmitted by contaminated water, food, feces, or contact with infected people. Abdominal pains, bloody diarrhea, and severe dehydration are standard. It is not a winter-only disease. Any historical reference to flux is likely dysentery, a reference to bloody flux is dysentery. It was a universal problem in any crowded or static camp or posting where poor sanitation was allowed to become established. The disease typically worsened as the campaign season wore on. Dysentery was responsible for many deaths among the soldiers at Forts Edward, Oswego, and William Henry.

From Lt. Colonel James Mercer at Oswego to General William Shirley, July 22, 1756 (LO 1325). This is the last “command” letter from Oswego before the garrison’s surrender to the French on August 14, 1756. Abercromby assumed command at Albany on June 25th, Loudoun would arrive in New York on July 23rd.

Sir,

From a Mefsefsagua (Mississauga) Indian at present Prisoner in Fort Ontario, I have the following Intelligence, that the french are very numerous at Cadaraqui (Fort Frontenac) and design to attack us here the Next New Moon, for which purpose twelve hundred Regulars and one hundred Indians have left that Place, to approach us from the Eastward and that five hundred are March'd Westward who are to Crofs the Lake in Burch Canoes, and attack us on this side. To confirm this, Lieut. Hamilton & Ensign Grant of Sr. Wm. Pepperels Regt. (in company with whom was Courier this Exprefs) report they saw yesterday about noon on the edge of the Lake a french Camp about the distance of four days March to the Eastward of this place, with which information, they arrived here this Morning, for these Reasons (notwithstanding your Secretary's Letter to Mr. Lewis of the 20th Ult^o.) I have by the advice of the Engineer, Field Officer & Capt. of this Garrison, Employed several Overseers & Most of the Men not on Duty in Strengthening & repairing Our Works. I have Candidly Acknowledged to them of our want of Cash at present, either to Pay what is due, or may become so untill Your Excellency send Us a Supply, but have Engaged my Word of honor, to see it Punctually done, We have likewise for the Sake of their Healths thought it necessary to Allow Labourers Rum, for which purpose I have order'd Mr. Lewis, to take into his Possession, all the New England Spirits belonging to the Traders here; In case we are oblig'd to use it, as there has been very little sent here on Account of the Public, We must Pay them the same price as during the last Winter, As the Good of His Majesty's Service was our sole motive, I hope our Conduct will meet with Your Excellency's Approbation and that our Zeal & Joint endeavours we may be able to Preserve this Place. The Snow is Launch'd a fine Vefsell & had we Sailors, Guns & Rigging, I'm in great hopes we might Command the Lake, As I have receiv'd no Letters of Later date than the 23rd Ult^o. I am afraid some have miscarried.

*I am with the most Perfect Respect &ca.
James F. Mercer*

Oswego July 22nd 1756

Comment: This letter is fundamental in understanding the situation at the time of Loudoun’s arrival in North America. Logic dictates that this letter was delivered to Abercromby at Albany in late July, on or very close to Loudoun’s arrival at Albany, too late to be of any consequence. Shirley claims he never received this letter — “*If any thing further appears of the Weakness of those Regiments in Colonel Mercer’s Letter, as I have never yet seen it, I can say nothing concerning it*” (Shirley to Loudoun, September 4th, Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 538).

From July 3rd until July 22nd, the work on improving the fortifications had stopped and over two weeks had been lost. Without sympathy for the soldiers or workmen, Loudoun would have traced the blame directly to Shirley’s mismanagement of the accounts. Loudoun was careful to have Webb carry monies to pay the 51st, but those monies never arrived.

On July 1, Bradstreet arrived at Oswego with six 6-pounders, ten 4-pounders, and fourteen swivels to further arm the ships. Shirley writes Bradstreet that twenty-four 6-pounders had reached the Great Carrying Place on July 24th, but there is no mention of the needed ship rigging (LO 1719, September 7, 1756, transcribed below). If true, these guns would have been moved by Bradstreet's men, but this is seemingly the only mention of these guns anywhere.

Fred Anderson's pointed criticism of Abercromby waiting on Loudoun and not ordering Webb and the 44th to quickly march on Oswego is beyond harsh, but Anderson's reasons for the criticism are not fully explained, especially as it relates to Oswego (Anderson 2000, Pages 141-143). Pargellis (1933, Pages 161-166) holds a similar view, but Pargellis' reaction was to Bradstreet's arrival at Albany on July 12th with no mention of this July 22 letter. Simply ordering Webb and the 44th west would have been pointless. Provisions and supplies first needed to be moved from Albany to Schenectady and the hundreds of bateaux-men accompanying the 44th would need to be paid and provisioned.

Outside of this July 22 letter, there is no correspondence that one can point to that indicates an immediate reinforcement of Oswego was obligatory. Supply concerns were a non-issue, Bradstreet had reached Oswego earlier that month with 600 bateaux. However, it is true that Shirley was far from transparent and forthcoming as it relates to the conditions at Oswego. In this, Loudoun and Abercromby were correct. With the very limited communication between Oswego and Albany, Shirley had little other information to forward on Abercromby's arrival, but Loudoun would have answered that it was Shirley's responsibility to know the true situation and pass that knowledge on to Abercromby. The question becomes did Shirley self-deceive himself?

By August, the raw strength of the British at Oswego was comparable to that in September 1755 when Shirley was about to launch his attack on Niagara, but now with even more raw recruits. Of the officers present at the Council, only Bradstreet was positioned to advocate a quick and substantial reinforcement of Oswego via the prisoner interrogations taken on July 3rd, but he was unknown to either Abercromby or Webb. The July 2 letter does not have the needed force to make that argument; it was not a factor. Nothing written by Mercer to that date makes that argument. Leaving Oswego, Bradstreet reached Albany on July 12th. This is the true start of the decision clock on Oswego. Without seeing a pressing need, Abercromby declined to pay the bateaux-men and Webb's column was unmoving beyond Schenectady. Loudoun pays the bateaux-men on August 7th (LO 1536), only then does Webb's column start moving west. By itself, this July 22 letter could only have been acted on if Webb and the 44th had already reached German Flatts (Burnetsfield); otherwise, the time remaining before Montcalm reached Oswego was too short to lend any meaningful aid. If this July 22nd letter had been written on July 2nd, Abercromby may have been forced to quickly move on Oswego, the situation being too dire and public to ignore.

From CO_5_46_Part 3_005, Bradstreet to Shirley, July 16, 1756, and July 24, 1756:

Extract of a Letter from Captain Bradstreet to Major General Shirley dated Albany, July 16th 1756

Sir,

I am to return to Oswego with Provisions and Stores and only wait here for Money, the Battoe-men not being willing to go without.

Colonial Webb and the 44th Regiment moves up there also; the 48th Regiment is gone from hence to day for Fort William Henry, and the New England Troops, &c. left the halfmoon Yesterday.

The French have had 1000 Men besides Indians out for these two Months to cut off the provisions and Stores, and their general Rendezvous has been at the Fort built 34 miles from Oswego.

A true Copy

Wm. Alexander, Secy.

Extract of a Letter from Captain Bradstreet to Major General Shirley dated Albany, July 24th 1756

I should have set out some Days ago for Oswego with the 48th Regiment and Colonel Webb, but no care being taken to send Provisions for them to Schenectada, they cannot move till a large Quantity is sent there, which I fear will take some time for want of Waggon.

Notwithstanding every thing being so forward at Oswego for to proceed upon Action, by all Appearances nothing will be done that way without the French make it a Visit, w^{ch} (which) by my Intelligence, is more than probable, if proper Care be not taken.

The French are certainly collecting in great Numbers toward Crownpoint, & our Affairs that way seem to wear a gloomy Aspect, this would not have happen'd had your Excellency continued here (Albany), & taken the Command upon You, as in that Case they would have consented to the Regulars joining them.

A true Copy

Wm. Alexander, Secy.

**NB. he means the 44th Regiment instead of the 48th.*

Comment: Supplying the 44th was still slowed by the lack of sufficient wagons to move the provisions from Albany on the Hudson River to Schenectady on the Mohawk River. By July 28th, two weeks of supplies were at Schenectady, but Webb wanted four weeks before marching. Payment for the bateaux-men would have to wait for the arrival of Loudoun at Albany (LO 1536, August 7, 1756). Webb left Albany on August 9th. Webb, the 44th Foot, and elements of the New York Independent Companies, accompanied by Bradstreet and his 800 remaining bateaux-men, started the move west from Schenectady on August 12th, but without haste (Gipson 1946, Vol. VI, Page 194).

These extracts were attached to a very long letter Shirley sent to Henry Fox, Secretary of State, defending his conduct as Commander in Chief (September 16, 1756, Correspondence of William Shirley, Volume II, Pages 564-577).

From Lord Loudoun to General Jonathan Winslow, July 31, 1756 (LO 1377):

Sir,

Albany 31st July 1756

On my Arrival here yesterday, I was informed by Major General Abercrombie, of the Situation in which affairs stood, between the Kings Troops and those raised by the Provinces, in Consequence of His Majestys Orders, signified by His Secreatry of State to the several Colonies, Directing them to raise a Body of Troops to be ready to March against the Common Enemy, under the Commander in Chief, appointed to Command all the Troops raised or to be raised in North America and likewise of what had pafsed between him & you on the Subject, in which you had declared your opinion, of the impofsibility of bringing Provincial Troops to Obey His Majestys Commands which he has indisputably the Sole Power of giving.

I was extreamly glad to find you had yourself declared that you had no objection, as it gave me the Satisfaction to see you continued to Act in The Way I had always heard of you, & for which I had conceived so good an Opinion of you.

Which-ever way this affair is to End in which not only the Honour of His Majestys Arms is concerned, but the Lives of Thousands of His Subjects, and even the Safety of the Provinces which are extream Material Considerations both for the Publick and the Actors in it.

To prevent Mistakes as far as Lies in my Power I think it proper to acquaint you that I have received the King my Masters Orders to Garrison his Forts Edward & William Henry, with His Regular Troops, in Consequence of which, I shall soon relieve the Garrison of Provincial Troops who have had the Charge of them last Winter, from whom I shall expect a faithful return of the Artillery & Stores that were there when they took Pofsefsion of these Forts.

As I am now come to the Article of Artillery, I must acquaint you that I find a demand has been made of S^r Charles Hardy for Several Pieces of Cannon, which before my arrival he had ordered here, and delivered to Maj^r Gen^l Abercrombie, then Commanding His Majestys Forces in North America, that on my arrival Maj^r Gen^l Abercrombie had shewed me a Letter from you acquainting him, That you had sent a person with a certain number of Horses, to carry Those Cannon to Fort William Henry; In Consequence of this desire of yours I gave Orders to allow your people to carry them on as I am extreamly unwilling to give the least impeding or delay to any Project that may be undertaken by any Set of Men for His Majestys Service, And the good of these Provinces, But at the same time I must acquaint you, that in consequence of the Trust Reposed in me it is my Duty, not to deliver any part of his Majestys Artillery or Stores to any person whatsoever, till after I am Satisfied to what purposes they are to be used, and whether they are in Danger of falling into the Enemies Hands, and upon proper Receipts given to me for them, Which is the Common Course of Businefs, without exception, in every part of the World; And His Majestys Commands to me, make the Knowledge of the use they are to be put to and a Proper Receipt for them, absolutely necessary for my Justification of my Conduct to my Master.

As Unanimity in the Kings Servants, & in the Colonies, is of Utmost consequence both for His Majestys Service and the safety of the whole of His Provinces in North America, I am sure, no Man will contribute more heartily in Cementing that Union than you will do; and as I can see no Method by which that Union can be brought about, but by a meeting between you & me, Therefore I desire

you will immediatley repair to me at Albany, and that you will bring along with you, such of the Gentlemen, as you think necefsary to be at that meeting, And I have not the smallest doubt; That in half an hour we shall be able to settle all points that at the present seem to be so difficult; And I do afsure you, That you shall not find me that impracticable man, you at present seem to Apprehend.

I am likewise to acquaint you That His Majesty has Thought proper to make A New Regulation of the Rank of Officers, Signed by Himself, which I shall Lay before you at our meeting; I am with great Esteem, &cc.

Comment: Loudoun arrives in New York from Europe on July 23rd and then quickly makes his way to Albany, where he meets with Abercromby who has been in America since June. Without further loss of time, Loudoun accepts Abercromby's assessment and acts (Pargellis 1933, Page 91). In this letter to Winslow, Loudoun is being both polite and forceful regarding the military command structure — Loudoun is in overall command, not the provincial officers (or their assemblies). Yet, the politeness only extends to Winslow himself. If there are provincial officers who are likely to cause difficulties over the command structure, Loudoun asks that they travel to Albany where he will deal with them himself. Loudoun makes it clear to Winslow that even routine matters, such as the moving of the cannon, are subject to his approval. Winslow's request that these cannon be sent forward was not something new or unexpected. A comparison of subsequent inventories clearly shows that Shirley had authorized these guns for Winslow's Campaign the previous March (Ordnance Table 1, Page 116). Abercromby warns Loudoun that there is another looming issue, payments. Loudoun establishes that he is duty-bound to follow the accepted British Army protocols for the issuance of stores and all payments, a policy not followed under Shirley that would take years to fully unravel. This veiled threat by Loudoun has teeth, but the provincial supply problems will not be evident until the beginning of September. The tone of this letter so concerned Winslow's officers that they convince a reluctant Winslow to send a written reply to Loudoun under the guise that his duties at Fort William Henry would not allow a meeting. Loudoun rejects Winslow's refusal. Loudoun and Winslow meet in Albany on August 8th (See Page 109). Anderson (1984) adds significant color to the interactions involving Loudoun, Shirley, and Winslow.

Sir,

Albany 20th August 1756.

As by Accounts I received last Night, His Majesty's Fort & Garrison at Oswego, has been taken by the French; it must be necessarily for the present, make an alteration in the Measures — I shall first Acquaint You, with what Steps I have taken. — Maj^r. Gen^l Webb, with about 1400 Men, is gone to take post at the great carrying place (east of Lake Oneida); Sir William Johnson, with a thousand of the Militia, is to take post at the German Flatt's (on the Mohawk River), to prevent the Enemy from cutting in behind Gen^l Webb, and to Act in everything with him. — The Transports are arrived; I have sent for the Train &cc. that is come in them. — I have wrote to the Southern Governors, to Caution them to guard their Frontiers, and to furnish Recruits for the immediately compleating the Royal American Regiment. I have also wrote Sir Charles Hardy, and the Governors of the Provinces in New England, for as great a Reinforcement of Men as they can send, and also Carriages, to enable me to keep up a constant supply of Provisions. — From the few Troops, you see I have left in my hands to dispose of here, You must perceive that Fatal Consequences to this Country, If you, in proceeding to Attack Tienderoga before we are reinforced from New England, should meet with any misfortune; is it might not then be in my Power, to stop the Enemy's overrunning the whole Country, and cutting off the Communication with Maj^r. Gen^l Webb. I must therefore send you my directions, for the present, that you do not proceed; but that you, to the utmost of your Power, guard against the Enemy's attacking You; or getting into this Country, by Slipping by the South Bay or Wood Creek. This You see, will make it necessary to Strengthen yourself at Fort Edward; and I must desire to hear from day to day, what dispositions You make.

I am &cc.

Comment: After the loss of Oswego and Fort Bull, German Flatts and Fort Herkimer on the Mohawk River served as the westernmost British posting. Schenectady was downstream, sixty miles to the east, and a much stronger post. Together these posts now guard the western approach to Albany. After being in North America for less than a month, Loudoun's fear of a French advance via Wood Creek is already strongly evident. Loudoun would hold tight to this idea for the remainder of his time as Commander in Chief. Although this letter officially ends Winslow's 1756 Campaign against Fort Saint-Frédéric, Burton's letter of August 27th states that Winslow acknowledged that he did not have the logistics needed to move north (LO 1599). With the French Regulars split between Oswego and Carillon, some historians argue that Loudoun should have immediately ordered and vigorously supported an attack on Carillon and Fort St. Frederic by Winslow, similar to Bradstreet's assault on Fort Frontenac in 1758 (Laramie, 2012; Page 247). Needed supplies could have been found. Loudoun declines to do so.

The French had captured some 1,590 prisoners at Oswego including some 84 women (Chartrand 2014, Page 64, detailed accounting not seen in O'Callaghan, Vol. X, 1858). In 1756, the stranglehold of the British Navy was not complete. Many of these prisoners were sent to France to be used in prisoner exchanges (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 532). This also relieved Vaudreuil from the burden of supplying the prisoners with food and shelter. However, some individuals were used in North American prisoner exchanges tied to the loss of Frontenac (August 1758).

From General Jonathan Winslow to Lord Loudoun, September 5, 1756 (LO 1710):

Fort William Henry, Sep^r 5, 1756

Since mine to your Lordship of the 31st of August I have as I then proposed made a Tour round the Lake, Sett out with Col^os. Gridley Thatcher &c: On the Second and Returned Yesterday afternoon, Our Party Consisting of One Sloop with two Six pounders, One Seven Inch Morter and Eight Swivels fifty men, One Sloop four swivels forty men, One Ditto two Swivels and thirty five men, and Seven Whale Boats Eleven men each, Proceeded all the way to the Entrance of the Lake that Leads into the Pafs at Ticonderoga without Discovering any Boats or Forces till the Entrance where appeared a Boat Built after the maner of a Row Galley with about Twenty men, four of our Whale Boats being ahead, I ordred to make a Stop and Ordred Our Other two Sloops to ply to Windward and Stood In with the One I was in which Caused the Enemys Boat to return Back, and as we was like to Loose Sight of her, Just Shuting in with a Point of Land, we fired One Six Pound Shot at her tho' at a Large Distance, I was fully Determined had the wind been favourable to have gone as far as their Advance Party, but unluckily the wind blew Fresh right into the Pafsage which is Narrow and the Currant Setting the Same Way I was fearfull in what Method I should make my retreat which might have Cost us men for no real Advantage, and so Desisted and returned all safe Save One man Drowned, there is no plan of the Lake that I have ever yet seen in the Least Like it, the whole after Entering the Narrows being full of Small Islands till you come with Eight Miles of the Pafsage into Ticonderoga where opens a Considerable Bay and the Enterance is a short Turn from the North East Part of the Lake to the East round a Bluff head of Land on the Southerly Side of It, I presume we may Carry Six Fathom of water all the way being Carefull in our Soundings have made may Pilots by this Excursion and turned through the Narrows in the Night.

On our Pafsage Down we met with Capⁿ Rogers with One French man and two Women which he took Lefs than a Mile of Crown Point Fort who I Examined and find their account agrees with the French Deserters, Only they make the Troops four Thousand Fiver hundred, Instead of three thousand five hundred, but as your Lordship has Captain Rogers's Journal and the Prisoners accompany this, Shall say no more on the head —

(?) Last Sent your Lordship a State of Provisions at this place by which It appears we then had 120 Days Bread and 174 days Pork of the Province for twenty Seven hundred men, Our Small Stores Such as, Rum, Sugar, Butter & Rice are very Short, I have wrote the Commifsioners upon It, how far they will Proceed in the future Supplys I can't say (as the Present Expedition seems to be near at an End) but this is Certain that the men Depend upon their Provisions as Stipulated by the Governments, the Allowance agreed to is herewith Inclosed, mention these matters to your Lordship to prevent any Confusion that may arise in the Troops.

As to the provisions at Fort Edward, I Desired General Lyman to Send me the State which he has done, a Copy of which is Inclosed by that It will appear we have not at Fort Edward Ten days Provisions of Bread and Pork for the men we have there, your Lordship may be Supprised at first Veiw, to know how these things happened, but the Case when Examined into, is, that we had Lodged the Provisions Sent by the Several Governments at this place to proceed On, and expected Soon to have quited the Forts, and as alteration is made by the unhappy Affair at Ofwego, Necefsity has altered the Plan. I would humbly be of Opinion that the Provincials at Fort Edward be

Supply'd with Provision from below of the Kings till furnished by the Provinces, to prevent Transporting what we have here back to Fort Edward which will be a needles Expençe.

My Lord, yesterday was held a Council of Our Colonels & Commanding Officers of the Regiments at this place, who gave it as their Opinion that It would be Advisable to find the Sick that are proper to be recovered to the Hospital at Albany, the Surgions making a Strict Enquiry and recommending them to the General for the Purpose, and this I have also from General Lyman as the mind of the Officers at Fort Edward, should be Glad of your Lordships Direction in this Point, and wether Considering the Season is thus far Advanced It would not be better to Discharge them Intirely, Such as are unfit for Duty and able to proceed to their respective Habitations.

We Sometime Since had a General Court Martial On Some Officers &c. for neglect of Duty, &c. and Six Deserters four of which were Sentenced a Whiping. One Acquited and one Condem'd to be hanged, the Sentence of Whiping has been Executed, I am not Clear in hanging matters and if your Lordship thinks Proper, In Leiw thereof will Drum the fellow Out of the Regiment as he is Seams a Common Disturber of the Camp, Out Negligent and Disobedient officers I have Discharged agreeable to the Sentence of the Court to be a Warning to Others. I am with the Greatest Regard

*Your Lordships
Most Obedient &
Most humble Servant
John Winslow*

To His Excellency John Earle of Loudoun

Comment: In August, Winslow had successfully defended the position of the provinces as regards officer ranks, forcing Loudoun to acquiesce. But the fall of Oswego resulted in Loudoun adopting a very defensive strategy for the remainder of the campaign season. Loudoun now needs the provincials in the field until near-winter as a defensive force against the perceived threat of a French advance into New York.

The loss of Oswego damages the relations and understanding between the Iroquois and the British. Oswego was a long-established trading post (1727) but within the Iroquois' territory. As a British trading post, it was sanctioned by the Iroquois. A small permanent garrison seems to have been established, possibly a New York Independent Company under orders from the Governor of New York. It was garrisoned by provincial troops during the King George's War (1744-1748, War of Austrian Succession). Travers (2015, Page 78) suggests that this arrangement was only temporary, subject to refusal by the Iroquois (See Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II Page 164-179). After Braddock's Expedition (1755) and then the loss of Oswego (1756), the British were viewed as chronically inept. There was deep concern among the Iroquois that allowing the British military to stage at Oswego had been a mistake. Fortunately, Johnson was able to limit any overt change in the Iroquois allegiances, but the shift was clearly toward neutrality. The Mohawk remain committed to the British, the western Iroquois far less. Without Johnson, this could have become a much more pressing issue for Loudoun. Only with Bradstreet's sacking of Fort Frontenac (August 1758) and the fall of Duquesne (November 1758) would this view change.

The responsibility of supplying the provincial regiments laid with their respective colonial governments, not Loudoun. The methods were convoluted and seemingly inefficient, but in many ways, the schemes were not that dissimilar to the methodologies of the Board of Ordnance, if not a mirror. Each of the provincial war committees shipped supplies to Albany. From Albany, civilian commissioners were tasked with delivering the supplies to their own regimental commissaries further north. The regimental commissaries would then consider and act on "requests" by Winslow, but they did not have the authority to share supplies between the different provinces. By August 1756, the supply situation for the Massachusetts regiments was tolerable (Bagley at Fort William Henry), but those from Connecticut and Rhode Island were nearly exhausted (Lyman at Fort Edward). Arriving in mid-July, this was just one of the issues that Loudoun needed to quickly resolve. Loudoun's frustration grew as he became embroiled in contractual issues that the commissioners argued only could be "legally" modified at the direction of the colonial assemblies (See Anderson 1984, Pages 179-185). However, with the French threat, leverage was now with the provincial assemblies and the provincial commissioners. To many, Loudoun has the only full purse available; he is the only person who has authority over the British regular stores. The situation was saved by the knowledge that Henry Fox (Secretary, Southern Department of State) had agreed to compensate the provincial assemblies for the needed provisions. This letter arrived in the colonies around March 13, but too late to be included in the legal contracting language so important to New England sensibilities. Here Loudoun had some wiggle room, but at the same time, Loudoun was extremely careful not to commit the same accounting "errors" as Shirley and does not want to run afoul of the Treasury. Somehow the logistics were resolved, and the provincial regiments remained in the field until mid-November. Unlike many merchants, Bradstreet was fully prepared to present the needed vouchers and receipts expected under British Army protocols. Loudoun promptly paying Bradstreet's invoices for payments due to the Bateaux Service removed at least one of the obstacles to supplying the troops (LO 1536; August 7, 1756).

There is an inventory of the foodstuffs positioned at Forts Edward and William Henry in late 1756 and the projected status of those provisions relative to 700-man garrisons over a six-month duration (LO 3375, Robert Leake to Loudoun, November 8, 1756). Deficiencies and excesses were carefully identified. The supply situation at Fort Edward has been rectified. The soldier's diet would be heavy in barreled pork and bread (flour) with adequate rice at Fort Edward. Butter was short of need. Peas, the only green available, were in very short supply. At least some 1,500 barrels of pork and 900 barrels and casks of flour/bread were in excess at Fort William Henry. This diet was decidedly unbalanced, Eyre's garrison was hard hit by scurvy over Winter 1756-1757.

The power of the 1756 Lake George "navy" is best described in this letter — three launched sloops; an even larger sloop is on the stocks at Fort William Henry (LO 1599; August 27, 1756). This fourth sloop would be burnt during Rigaud's Winter Raid (March 1757). Instead of completing the fourth sloop, Winslow's carpenters are set to work on Fort William Henry, building the East and West Barracks and the North Storehouse. Curiously, the French rowed galley described by Winslow simply disappears without further mention in any other history or correspondence.

By early September, Winslow was content to let the entire campaign lapse. Winslow would not serve in the military after 1756. Whether there is an air of chastisement in the letter is open to discussion. If not for Loudoun canceling his Expedition, Winslow appears to be demonstrating that he could have reached and taken Ticonderoga.

From Loudoun to the Duke of Cumberland, October 2, 1756 (LO 1948 and MANA, Page 233). LO 1948 is from Huntington Library, California; MANA is from the Cumberland Papers, England. Loudoun has an exceedingly difficult hand to read. Apparently, Loudoun penned both copies and did not use his Secretary for this private letter. Capitalization and punctuation vary widely between the documents. The spelling in LO 1948 is much more chaotic than shown here and long passages lack punctuation. This transcription is a combination of both source documents:

Private Coppy

Albany, Oct^r 2d 1756

Sir

I have made my Secretary coppy most of the Letters I have the Honour to write you in order to save you the Trouble of reading a very bad Hand, but what follows I thought your Royal Highness would rather choose to have from me directly.

1st I shall begin with the Deputy Quarter Master General (Sir John St. Clair), who has lived very ill with both my Predicessors, but I hope that is all over now, for as far as I can judge we are on a very good footing and I have talked to him on all sorts of Buusiness either such as belonged properly to the Buusiness of his Department, or where I could get light from the Experience he has had in the Service. Some times our Oppinions varie but realy very Seldom; when they do I take my own way if his Arguments do not convince me. I think the only one was about defending the Great Carrying Place (Fort Edward), which he thought at too great a Distance; then you see Mr. Webb settled for us both without my Knowledge till it was done, and I wish it had been still to do for the appearance it had among the Indians.

2nd In this Country the Qr Mr General has a great deal of Buusiness, more than in any Service I ever was in, which arises from the Variety of Services going on at the Same time in so many different Places; the Supplying the Garrisons and Troops at the two Forts, supplying the Parties on the Mohawk River and carrying on the Works here, of Hospitals, Storehouses, and Barracks, besides the stockading the Town and making some little Works, which is all it can admit of, not one Carriage provided, nor in my Power hitherto to make a Contract to carry on those Services, makes an infinite deal of Work, and Sir John is not at all well, and I think cannot hold it a great while, for he still has great Pain from his Wound, and every little burdern lays him up, and if he were gone, from any thing I have get seen of the People here I do not know where to find one to putt in his Place. The likliest Man I see is Major Robertson (60th). He had one Deputy when I arrived whom he did not choose to part Mr Leslie, but as I found they were not able to carry on the Buusiness, I was obliged to give him Captain Christie as an afsistant.

3rd I have told you the footing I imagine I stand in with Sir John, but you will know better how that realy is from his own letters.

4th M. G. Abercromby is a good Officer, and a very good Second Man any where, whatever he is employed in.

5th Mr. Webb, by being detached, has been little with me, and I was afraid the things that happened on that Command might have Soured him (Oswego Carry); but now that he is returned I do not find it has. I proposed at first to have carry'd him up with me, and that he should have Commanded at Saratoga, for there is so much to do here and the People of the Place so extremly unruly that I have determined to leave him here.

6th As to the Corps Col. Monro does what he can to keep that Regiment right, but they must have examples made before it will do. None of them have ever been in Service. These Men are large Bodied but the most unruly I have ever met, and I think by next Campaign I shall make the Pressed Men better than the old ones; and the Officers want full as much to be reclaimed as the Men, and I have not hitherto been able to bring them to act like other Troops. They have overdrawn their Provisions; they have lost the Live Stock I delivered to them, and they have taken others in their Place; all which I have ordered to be payed to the last Shilling, which I hope will do them good as it will amount to above one hundred pounds.

7th Lt Col Gage (44th) is a good Officer and keeps up Discipline Strictly: the Regt is in Rags but look like Soldiers.

8th Lieut. Col Burton (48th) I did not know before, but he is Dilegent Sensible Man, I think will be of great use here.

9th Both those Regiments have some Men in them that with all the Severity they are able to use, they are not able to cure of Thefts and Drunkenefs, but I must do them the Justice to say, they have no Bowels on them. (Tenderness, Softness).

10th The Highland Regt (42nd) will be a good one next year, but they have not near two hundred Men left of their old ones.

11th Lieut. Col. Bouquet (1st/60th) is a diligent Officer and seems to understand his Bu/siness, and if we can keep the Men now we have got them, will make a good Battalion next year, but I doubt we much shall be very disappointed in the Engineers, when I know from my own Knowledge I shall acquaint your Royal Highness just as it appears to me.

12th I have in my Letter to the Secretary of State mentioned my Oppinion of the Operations for the Next Campaign; that Quebeck is the Point we should push for, by the River St. Lawrence. I need not explain to you the Consequences would arise from our Success there. But I realy see no other Point we are so likely to Succeed in as in that, which is the main Point; for where ever we make our Point; we must fight the whole Force of Canada before we arive at it; As their Power over their People can bring the whole to what ever Place they are wanted. There, if we have a proper Fleet and that comes in time, we can arrive with our whole Force at once; if we can land and Establish our Selves, we have nothing then but the Siege to make; if we Succeed in that I imagine the Bu/siness is done, for there we shall have I do suppose (meet) all their Regular Forces, which so far as I have yet learnt is Six Battalions from Europe, besides their Marine and their People of the Country, with their Indians which are very numerous. Their Town is mostly built of Wood, and probably must be Burnt about their Ears.

13th The Troops we have for the Execution of this Plan your Royal Highnes know & what they are. In my oppinion I must leave at least two Battalions here, to defend the Forts and prevent their coming in whilst we are going round to attack them, otherwise they could make a very distressfull Attack here and be back time enough to meet us there.

14th I know in England they will say we may have all the Men in New England to go on that expedition tis what their Hearts are Sett on.

15th But then Mr Shirley has instiled into his Party whom he has Bound to him by all the Ties Knaves can be tied by, that is, Proffits Received. A Belief of Power in him to protect them and

continue Proffits to them. To oppose & disappoint every Scheme that can be proposed for Publick Service Except Mr. Shirley is to execute it. The Crushing of him, if that is thought proper, will end that, but from him Staying here so long, that must probably come too late to have its effects this year.

16th There is another objection, I believe, to having a great Aid from them, which arises from this, That so far as I can see, all the Expeditions they fitt out have their first foundation in an intention to enrich particular People, then a Popular Point is taken up and the People Run madly into it.

17th That motive now ceases, for if they go with Regular Troops, for these the Kings General must command, and these Profits cannot arise unless he is a Knave likewise.

18th These Men receive a Bounty when they enlist, but no Pay till the Campaign is over. They allow no Suttlers or Traders of any Sort, but the Officers supply them with every thing they want, by which Means they receive most of their Pay when they come back; this you see does not promise much for them in the present Sittuation, and yet as Canada has been so much Preached up to them, numbers of these Enthusiastick People might engage, and if they did, they will a very great Expençe to transport them by Sea, and furnish them with Provisions considering the use they would be of, which so far as I can see is when first brought out, will undertake any rash thing, but if they do not get forward they immediately Languish to go home, and when ever they grow Sick their Hearts break and they Die. They say their time is come, and there is no help for it, and from that Principle never Struggle to live.

19th If they could be brought to Cross the County in Small bodys, for great ones can not be maintained that way and breake up all these Settlements, they would strike a Terror into the Enemy, and in case we miscarried would storme them next Year, if the Fleet will prevent their having Supplies from Europe, and the People here can be brought not to supply them, which will be difficult, as the Councils can take off the Embargo and are the People that supply them, as happen'd in Philadelphia this year before Mr Denny arrived.

20th I have throw'n out those things for your Royal Highness's Consideration, and beg leave to further add, that if you should approve of going to Quebeck, I should hope it would not be talked of, but when ever you are to send it, it should be said it goes to New York, and that you will consider what Troops are necefsary for it. And altho I can have 24 lb Cannon from the Colonys here, they are Iron and so heavy that without Horses, which I suppose we shall not get there, or the Enemy will drive them off, so I should hope you would send what you think necefsary of Brafts. Ball for the 24 lb are much wanted in this Country.

21. In case the Project is approved of, I believe it would be necefsary to acquaint Mr. Baker the Contractor (England), that he may provide accordingly (See Pargellis 1933, Pages 72 - 74).

22. I can give you no Certain Accounts of the Road to Tienderoga, as it has never been reconoitred properly, but by all Accounts I have been able to get, tis not to be done with Troops whilst the Enemy are so Supperior in Irregulars, for in reallity we have none but our own Rangers. Before winter is over, if they do not drive us from the Forts, I shall be able to give you an Account with more Certainty,

23. The retaking of Oswego by Land Labours under many Difficultys. Tis 217 miles from hence, and as the Enemy have now learn'd so many Avenues from the Indians by which they can at several

places attack our Convoys, it requires an Army to secure the Communication for carrying such a Number of Boats on the Lake and we were to oppose them, if they chose it they can before we are Cover'd, Land what Forces they please, within what Distance of the Place they please, and give us Battle, tho I think they would rather choose to starve us, as we could not leave People enough to keep up the Communication at every Place where they could attack us.

24. Things appearing to me in this Light is the Reason I have proposed going to Quebeck, and I have been more particular in them, that your Royal Highness might be better able to Judge whether they have not the weighted more with me than they ought, and that the King's Service might not suffer more for my misjudging.

25. I ought to have mentioned above that if a Siege is to be undertaken Powder will be wanting, for the Provincial Troops make an intolerable consumption of it.

26. I hope your Royal Highness will pardon the Incoherence of this Letter, as I really believe tis the fortieth time I have been interrupted in the writting of it, and as I am just setting out for Fort Edward I cannot write it over again.

27. I must acquaint your Royal Highness that I have hitherto had no formal Council of War but have on all Occasions consulted with the General Officers, the Qr Mr General, and such of the Field Officers as I could get any Benefit from talking to. But I found when I had several of the Field Officers together and came to talk to them of what was fitt to do in one Case, and what in another, but I got no Aid, so I have gone in the Method I have told your Royal Highness.

28. I have this Moment a Warrant of Mr Shirley's put into my Hands, drawn on the Paymaster for an Account of building Barracks on Schenectady last Year. The Warrant is dated June 20th 1756. Mr. Webb arrived here June 7, and in three Days after, Mr. Shirley received his Letters acquainting him he was Superseded in the Command, and the Man who got this Warrant left me at Albany to go to New York to Settle this Account for which the Warrant is granted. Mr. Shirley will find himself mistaken if he expects to draw any Money out of the Deputy Paymaster's Hands till the King gives him a new Commission to Command.

*I am Sir,
Your Most Dutifull and
Obedient Servant Loudoun*

From Loudoun to Cumberland, October 3, 1756 (LO 1968 and MANA, Page 242; partial transcription of this equally long companion letter):

Your Royal Highness will see in my Publick Letter, the Plan I throw out for Consideration, of attacking Quebec; I have in that mentioned neither the number Ships or Men, necessary for that, as I know Your Royal Highness to be, a much better Judge of it than I am, and shall be ready, to Execute whatever Orders I receive from You: I must only beg, that if you go into it, there be a good Man at the head of the Fleet, that will not create Confusion; And that the Fleet come very much earlier than any have done of late, for the French have always been here before Us.

Comment: This private letter is the best synthesis of Loudoun's views on the North American situation. The deep dislike of Shirley and his policies is evident. After a little more than two months in America, Loudoun's ideas and prejudices were set in stone, little changes over the next year. If his plan for an attack on Quebec was approved, Loudoun has already determined that only

two regiments of regulars will be left with Webb. Cumberland immediately acts on the letter and secured the additional battalions that Loudoun would need (Cumberland to Loudoun, December 23, 1756; Final Letter Appendix). The possibility of a French Fleet blocking the approaches to Canada was recognized. Repeatedly, Loudoun warns of this risk. Loudoun was fully cognizant that his defense of New York was totally dependent on his "pinning" Montcalm in Quebec, not on Webb.

Loudoun's dislike for Shirley is easiest seen in annotated letters sent from Shirley to Loudoun. The focus of the first letter is the dispute over colonial officer ranks. Loudoun annotates the letter with numerous comments and then forwards the annotated copy to London on August 19th. The annotated copy is found in the Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol 2, August 10, 1756, Page 501. Loudoun uses the words "false" or "falsely" three times. A second annotated letter from Shirley to Loudoun involves Shirley's recall to London and his seemingly late departure (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol 2, September 13, 1756, Page 551). Both annotated letters were forwarded by Loudoun to Henry Fox (Secretary of State, Southern Department) as attachments to a lengthy 35-page letter (LO 1961, October 3, 1756, fully transcribed below).

Regardless of later suggestions by Shirley, nothing in Shirley's early communications with Abercromby suggests any crisis was imminent at Oswego (Shirley to Abercromby, Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, June 27, 1756, Pages 468 – 478 and LO 1257 with attachments; Shirley to Abercromby, LO 1258, June 28, 1756; and Abercromby to Loudoun, LO 1263, June 30, 1756). Both the War Office and the Treasury advocated that Shirley be court-martialed for his actions while Commander in Chief, North America. Again, Shirley had never served in the British Army; he was strictly a politician. From Pargellis (1933, Page 165): *"He was careless in financial matters; he was too trusting of his subordinates; he was ignorant of army routine, and therefore an excellent example of the evils that flow from civilian control in the field. But he was no deliberate criminal, and it was 2four years before the British officials could reach the conclusion that a bungler is not necessarily a thief. Eager as the War Office was to bring him before a court martial, it could not prove that he had broken any of the Articles of War, nor advance any evidence beyond Loudoun's accusations and enclosures, themselves unauthenticated by oath, that would meet the rigid requirements of court martial procedure. Pitt was lukewarm, and after Cumberland's resignation in the autumn of 1757 the whole matter was dropped, except for the passing of accounts."*

Shirley left to his successors the heritage of mismanagement. As far as the construction of an adequate service of transportation, supply, and intelligence was concerned, Loudoun had to begin at the bottom without foundations."

Note: John Appy was Loudoun's correspondence secretary. Appy can be described as "comma happy in the extreme". From MANA, Page 234: *"Moreover, Appy's love of excessive punctuation, which can be seen in the L.S. Loudoun to Cumberland letters in this volume, often completely altered the meaning which his chief intended. The editor has thought the wisest solution to this problem to present a mean between the modern and the contemporary copy, giving Loudoun every benefit in spelling and holding Appy to a judicious use of commas. By this device the sense is better presented."*

MANA does not employ the *f* — long s or esh. It disappeared from many print mediums in the early 19th century. It survives in modern use as the integral symbol in calculus, *f*umma. If desired, a global change command can be used to modify this character into a standard letter s.

From Loudoun to Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, October 3, 1756 (LO 1961)

Sir,

Albany October 3: 1756

Since my last of August 21st, We have got four Men into Oswego; who staid there one Night; they bring an Account that the Enemy remain'd there but Six days, after taking it; and returned to Frontenac, after demolishing and Burning the place; and having Stopt the Road from Oswego falls; carrying with them all the Prisoners, Vefsels, Boats, Artillery, & Military Stores, except one Gun they thought uselefs; and they left part of the Pork and Bread, which they scattered about the Place.

The Information I had, that most of the Provisions lay in the Sun and Rain from whence great part of them were damaged, I think explains the reason why they left those behind; for I cannot believe they have such Plenty, as to leave that were Eatable.

The first People Mr. Webb sent from the great Carrying place to get Intelligence were stop'd by the (British allied) Indians, under pretense of preventing their falling into the hands of the French Indians; but I believe the true reason was first to conceal the French were gone; and the Second was to give time for their carrying off whatever was left; which last, our Peoples saw them hard at work about.

The Indians had informed us before these People got there, that after being in Possession of the Old Fort of Oswego, the French had let the Indians loose on the Garrison, under pretence of a Quarrel between them and their Indians about Prisoners being given to them; and they had Murdered the whole, but about 150: but this seems to have no foundation, as those Men say in the Old Fort, there were but two Graves, one for which seemed to be for a single Man; And that the Onondago Indians, who came to them, said was Colonel Mercers; and the other they thought might contain about 10 People — there was one larger than that at Fort Ontario with a Crofs Stick set up by it; this was probably their own People that were killed in the Attack of the small Arms; for by all Accounts, we lost but two Men there of M.G. Pepperel's Regiment.

As to the Siege itself, the Reports are almost as various as the places they come from; but then I compare them altogether, it does not appear to me that the Enemy were very Numerous. I am far from sure that they were above fifteen hundred, tho' the Boston News Paper calls them 3000: and I have never seen the smalest occasion to believe that the Attack on Fort Ontario, with small Arms only, lasted longer than two days; that their Garrison abandoned it; that during the Night, the Enemy raised a Battery near Fort Ontario, and when the Garrison fired the morning Gun, loaded with Balls, they immediately opened their Battery, and were in possession of the Fort, the same day by ten o'clock.

By all the Accounts I can get, the Enemy lay sometime Encamped within a mile of them (some say a Fortnight) and they knew nothing of it till a Boat accidentally saw them. Where I from my Judgment of their numbers from is their Camp at Oswego in which both the White Men agree that the Front of it was not above a half-mile long and that the Streets of Hutts, were not above three or four in depth from the Front; for there they were in Hutts.

The Indians informed those People, that they had several pieces of Ordnance in the Camp, where they lay before the Attack, but they brought up none of them, till after Fort Ontario was in their

Pofsefsion; that then they brought up one brass 12 pounder and one Hautsbitzer, which they planted a little distance from the Battery, in order to keep in the Ships, in case they had offered to have gone out of the Harbour; and it has the appearance to me, tho' I cannot say it with certainty that they had no Guns in the Battery which they plac'd on the Old Fort, but those they took in Fort Ontario, which were four 6 pounders and two 4 pounders. Mr. Shirley, in his last Letter to me, calls the two Regiments 1400 Men, by all the other accounts, I have ever got, the whole Men there, consisting of M.G. Shirleys. M.G. Pepperels, and Col. Schuylers New Jersey Regiment; the Sailors, Ship Carpenters, and Artificiers of all sorts, who are in this Country all Armed, amounted to about 1200.

You will observe by the Account I have given you above, it was very long before we could get any certain Account of the Motions of the French at Oswego, by the (British allied) Indians preventing our People going there.

Not being able to detain the Militia any longer at Burnettsfield (Herkimer, New York), and M.G. Webb's retiring to that place, I sent Sir John St. Clair, Quarter M. Genl. to reconnoitre all that country, being determined to do my utmost to prevent their penetrating any farther, if they came that way; And I likewise determined to have built a respectable Fort, to have covered that Frontier; but on his return, I found the Country, a very difficult one to defend; and no Spot for 12 Miles to be found, where the proposed Fort could Command the (Mohawk) River and not be Commanded itself: the only Strength of the Country is that they have a great way to bring Cannon it it, tho' they have many paths that lead to it.

During this time of uncertainty of the Enemy's motions on this hand, I was taking all the Pains pofsible by our Ranging Companies in the Neighborhood of Tienderoga to get a Prisoner from there; where, tho' they have killed several, they are not able to take one alive; and indeed they were not fond of taking Prisoners, as they are troublesome to carry off, and a Scalp is easily carried.

About the same time, I had the certain Accounts of the Enemys having abandoned Oswego, I had an Account from Jacob, the Stockbridge Indian, that the Camp at Tienderoga was greatly diminished; on which. I suspected their having Joined part of their Force from thence, to those that were at Oswego, and gone down the River St. Lawrence to Fort Cumberland (Acadian Peninsula); but on reconnoitring their advance Posts, of which they have three, two on the West side, and one on the East side of Lake George, I found they were moved up to them.

And soon after my Intelligence for all Places agreeing that the Enemy were moving up the whole Force they could collect to Crown Point.

And finding at the same time from the delays made at Boston and the other Province waiting to take their measure from them that I was not likely to have any Aid of Men from that Quarter; which you will see by the Letters enclosed, has turned out entirely So: And having during that time got up here, the prest (pressed) Men for Lt. Gl. Otways Regimt., the Highland Recruits, and collected one Battalion of the Royal Americans: I made an entire new Disposition of Troops; and determined to throw up all the Force I pofsibly could Spar from every place towards Crown Point: to move forwards from Fort Edward, all the Provincials, Except the New York Regiment and the New Hampshire Men, to reinforce the Camp at Fort William Henry; And that the Troops should be Stationed at Fort Edward; which I think in more danger of attack by the way of Wood Creek than

Fort William Henry, as there is no road that I can learn by which they can bring Cannon to it without coming by Fort Edward; and if that is taken, Fort William Henry falls of Course.

For this purpose, I have move up the 48th Regiment from Saratoga, leaving a party to secure that Post, till the Highland Regiment relieves them, who marched from hence the 20th of September; And Major General Abercrombys Regiment, Marched from hence the 26th: They would have gone two days sooner, but is was not in my Power to get Waggons to carry their Tents and the Baggage that is absolutely necefsary.

M.G. Abercromby set out to take the Command there, September 24th and the first division of the Royal Americans, Marched the 28th for I cannot get Carriages to move the whole; and the Second Division of them March the moment I have Carriages for the: I go with this Division. The one half of the Americans, I propose to Fort Edward, and to leave the other half to secure Saratoga: and I leave Lieut. Genl. Otways Regiment here to secure the Magazines and carry on the Works; which is as small a Garrison as I dare trust this place with.

This make a large number of Men on Paper; but I hope you will consider what they are composed of and what things they are fit to be employed in.

If the Country were pafsable to Tienderoga, this way, the Season is too late to make an Attempt by Wood Creek and to provide the Boats, if that were practicable; and I think it is pretty plain, the Provincials have found no Road by Lake George; as they were forced to bring off in Boats, what they could find of the remains of Capt. Hodges Company of Rangers, who was defeated by a party of French, who had laid an Ambuscade for them (the other day) and Lieut. Kennedy, who is returned from a Scouting party, which set out from Sir Wm. Johnson's soon after my arrival here; The party was large at first, composed of a good many Indians and some Highlanders and M.G. Abercrombys; but they divided afterwards, and are all returned, but one Grant of the Provincials and a Volunteer of the Highland Regiment, who parted last from Lieut. Kennedy and left him with four Indians: He is so Ill, he is not able yet to write himself; but M.G. Winslow, with whom he is, Acquaints me, that he took two Prisoners between Montreal and St. Johns, and burnt a large Magazine there of Sails, Cordage, Nails and other things, which he computed must have been worth between Six & Seven thousand Pounds; and did them many other mischiefs, of which I have not yet an Account. The Prisoners, he left with two Indians, and are expected every day.

You will observe from my former Letter, that on the first Account of Oswego's being taken, I applied to the New England Governments for an Aid of Men and Carriages to afsist me to supply them with Provisions; and as I have enclosed Mr. Shirleys Answer to that, with Notes, You will see what sort of Aid, and at what time he had thought proper to grant it; and the Impofsibility of its being turned to any manner of Use to the Service: but this has not Stopped there, for by this means, the other Governments have been drawn into the same measures, as You will see from Govr. Fitch's Second Letter to me which is the only one I have yet receiv'd on that Subject (Connecticut), and You see how it differs from the first; as I suppose Governor Hopkins will from his Letter to his Son, which I have likewise enclosed (Rhode Island).

All those Evils have their rise from one Source, and if you cannot Stop his raving or Influence in this part of the World, from the favour and Power, he tells them he has the King and his Ministers, he will continue to do infinite Mischief here, and retard the Service in every article.

From the time I received his Letter of August 10th, I resolved to drop all Correspondence with him as Mr. Shirley; (as) the Governor I could not do that with; the only Letters I have writ him since was the demand for Aid on the taking Oswego; the next was an Account of it's being certain that it was taken in answer to one from him in the name of his Assembly; the third was the Letter to Acquaint him that is was Expected he should obey His Majestys Command in going home. (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 501 is a transcription of Shirley's August 10th Letter to Loudoun plus Loudoun's extensive margin remarks and pointed comments, online).

These are the only Letters I have writ to him, for I have neither time nor Inclination to enter into a Paper War with Mr. Shirley.

During the long Interval of my having made the demand for Aid of Men from the Provinces and receiving any Answer to it, I had many private Letters brought me by people here from their Correspondents at Boston, that it was believed there that the Provincial Troops were immediately to be called home, in place of serving any Additional Force to defend the Frontier.

I had at the same time, a Letter from M.G. Winslow, Acquainting me that he had for the Troops at Fort William Henry, a Sufficiency of Provisions; but that there was at Fort Edward, Provisions only for ten days; and desiring that I should order the to be supplied out of the Kings Stores.

At the same time, Mr. Kilby, the Contractor for Provisions, brought me a Letter from Lake George with a proposal to him to buy a very considerable Quantity of Provisions, said to be Sound, by one of the Provincial Commisaries and that the others had more.

The Report, the Demand, and the appearance of embezzlement, coming all at once, and I not in a Condition to get Carriages to supply them if what Provisions they brought with them were embezzled, I ??? Alarmed me very much, as I had then no Troops to Stop the Enemy with if they (the provincials) went away.

I sent off the next day, all the Carriages I could collect to Fort Edward with Provisions, and sent for the Commisaries, who are Gentlemen appointed by each Province to Collect Provisions and forward them to the Forts, for the Troops raised by their Province, and proposed to them that if they would deliver over to me all the Provisions they had of the Species the King has ordered for his Troops, I would undertake to supply the Provincial Troops in the same manner as the regular Troops are Supplied; that if they made any bargain with their People to have Rum, Sugar, Molasses and Ginger, those were small articles and the Provinces must continue to deliver them or Satisfy the Men; as I did not see how I augment the Kings Allowance.

On this Proposal, the most of them hesitated to come to a resolution, but it came out in the Conversation, that Mr. Shirley had promised them that the King should be at the Expence of the Provisions and transportation and so far as I can see the whole Expence of the Expedition: And that they were afraid, if the received Payment from me of a part, it would have the Effect of cutting them off from the Demand of the whole.

I thought I was entitled to make this proposition for your Letter to the Governors, in which you Acquaint them that the King has appointed a Commisary to provide Provisions for the whole Troops; and that all that was expected of them was Arming, Paying and Cloathing &^c for their Men.

I should not, from the time I arrived, have made any difficulty of furnishing Provisions, if they had demanded them, but thought there was no occasion to encrease the Expence, so long as it could be avoided; but when it appeared that some People in the Provinces had formed a Plan of withdrawing the Troops; and that the People who had the care of those Provisions were about to Embezzle their Stores; and turn them to their private advantage; I thought it full time for me to prevent giving them the pretence of want of Provisions, for putting the other plan in Execution.

The New York & Rhode Island Commiſſioners agreed at once, and now I have Commiſſioners from Connecticut to settle that point with me: the Maſſachusetts will not accept of my Aſſiſtance, as you will ſee by their Letter and I have not yet heard from the others.

The Connecticut Commiſſioners propoſed, I ſhould Pay for the Carriage of he Proviſions, from Connecticut to Fort William Henry, and all other Expences; I told them that was far above my Power, and muſt be Settled at home; but that I was ready to Pay the Original Price, of ſo much of thoſe Proviſions, as they ſhall deliver over to the King's Contractor, who agrees to receive on this footing all that are in good Condition and fit to Iſſue.

As the ſeaſon is far advanced and the diſtance ſo great, it is neceſſary for me, now to begin to Acquaint You, with my Opinion of the Situation of things here in general, and what Steps will be neceſſary to purſue hereafter.

From the Situation in which we found things at our Arrival; the Troops not recruited; the Money Exhausted; the Fortifications every where Defenceleſs: No preparations made to ſupport Troops any where this Campaign but at Oswego and here; nor no preparation made to ſupply them any where elſe, if there was was occaſion to move them; nor no preparation to lodge them next Winter; We are thrown into a Deſenſive: And altho' we have colected a great many Mouths, we ſtill have very few Soldiers to make the Deſenſe with. And yet I would fair hope, the Enemy will be better informed of our Numbers that the People they are compoſed of; in which caſe, we may finiſh this Campaign without ſuffering any further loſſes in it, if our Raw Men will Act at all, it ought to coſt them dear, if they get any more; as every where we have fortified Camps, and covered with Forts well furniſhed with Cannon; but indeed we are very deficient in Men to work thoſe Cannon; but we have done all, the time would permit, in breeding Men to that part of the Service.

If I have ſaid we were drove into a deſenſive War, which I think impoſſible to ſupport another year, from the Situation of our Enemies, and the Extent of our Frontier, which is about 1500 Miles, and great difficulty to ſupport Troops when they come at it, both from the great Diſtance we have to March the Troops in the Wilderneſs, and the eaſy methods the Enemy have cutting off our Expensive Convoys, by their great Superiority of Indians to what we have, if we at preſent have any, that deſerve to be ſo called.

On the other hand, the Enemy have an eaſy acceſs to Attack Us where they will, with very little Moleſtation from their Situation, and the Condition things are brought to.

If they chuſe it, they can without Moleſtation, Transport their Troops down the River St. Lawrence to Fort Cumberland, and ſo fall in on Nova Scotia. If they mean to come by Crown Point, they ſet out from home into the impracticable Country that divides us; if that is made unſafe for them, they may retire directly and are Safe preſently, which is not our Caſe, or if we Attack them that way,

they can cut in behind us, and with their Indians, cut off our Convoys and prevent our Retreat, whilst they with the regulars of which there are now a great many in the Country, have a good Fort at a strong pass to defend.

If they chuse to attack us from Oswego, they have Water Carriages from their Capital (Montreal), still without Molestation, to Attack us on that hand; And if the Troops are prepared to defend at Crown Point, they must be at such a distance that the Country must be destroyed before they can be brought back to oppose them the other way.

If they should make a faint either of these ways and at the same time send their Force by Niagara, which they have now Vessels and Boats enough to do, they can fall down on the backparts of Pensylvania, Maryland, Virginia or the Carolinas; and the distance is so great, that it is impossible to give them relief, in such a time, as to save those Provinces.

From all which, it appears to me, that there is no method of carrying on War with Success in this Country, but by striking at the root of the Evil at once; by making your Attempt on Quebec by the River St. Lawrence; where, if it pleases God to bless my Masters Arms with Success, it will at once throw most of the advantages they now have over to Us, into our Hands. I am told Montreal would fall of Course; I think not and that it must be taken, if that were done, Niagara and all the Forts North (comment: South?) of that must fall into our hands without striking a Stroke, for they cannot Supply one of Them; So that they must Surrender and beg for Bread.

If this project is approved of, there are many things necessary to be considered and done, in order to put it in Execution.

To being on this side, there must be such a force left here, as to prevent their penetrating into the Province, on this side, whilst we are going around where their Access is short, if not opposed.

In the next place, the Force to be sent round to Attack their Capital in the Heart of their Country must be sufficient to Execute it when they get there; which is not so easy now as it was formerly since such Numbers of Regular Troops are introduced into the Country.

And this Force must be supported by a Fleet sufficient for the purpose; and that Fleet must be here early or the Project must probably fail.

It is necessary next to consider the Force here that can be applied to it, the present Strength of which you see in the returns of the different Regiments and Companies: M.G. Shirleys (50th Foot) and M.G. Pepperels (51st Foot) almost totally lost. If I can recruit them this Winter, so as to compleat M.G. Abercrombys (44th Foot) and Mr. Webbs Regiment (48th Foot) out of them, it is all I can hope from there. I have then, Lt. Gen. Otways Regiment (35th) to Compleat, and three Battalions of the Royal American Regiment (60th Battalion) to raise; and the four Independent Companies, who make them for Service will want near 300 Men; all this besides making up for desertion, which in this Country is without any bounds; I have already lost out of the Battalion of the Royal Americans, since they came here, 30 Men; I am doing my utmost to cure it, but it will be sometime before it has its Effects: Those I hope to compleat during the Winter, and it will be as much as I can considering all the discouragement we meet within it.

As to what Aid may be expected from the Colonies, New England is the only place from whence Men can be got. If one were to believe words, one would imagine, they would turn out almost to a Man; but You have their own Letters and their own Actions to shew what Aid they have given me on this occasion. When M.G. Shirley is gone and his Influence likewise removed, which must take time, I am hopefull, the Kings Service may go better there; tho' I am glad to tell You, his influence daily grows less, and People begin to see that his conduct here out not to entitle him to favor.

I have just thrown out what appears to me necessary for carrying on H. M. Service, and where the blow may be Struck with the greatest Effects; for from thence, all the Northern Forts draw their Supplies, both the Provisions and Men, and of course, when those are cut off, must fall into our hands.

Whereas, by any other road we can go to attack the Enemy, the distances are so large, through uninhabited Forest, that whoever is Superior in irregulars has the infinite advantage over the other side; and must greatly weaken, if not totally destroy them, before they can get to the Point where they mean to make their Push; besides which the Subsisting of your Army in those long Marches, where you have no Magazines, and where the County produces no one thing for the support of Men, is an intollerable Expence, and almost impracticable in the face of that Superiority of light Troops.

I have not in this Letter, mentioned the number of French regular Troops on this Continent, as I have not yet been able to learn of their numbers with certainty; but by all accounts I can find, they are greatly encreased this Year and very well supplied with Provisions; and with what has come from Europe, and what they have got from Us, plentifully Supplied with Artillery.

Nor have I inventoried, the number of Ships necessary for carrying on the Plan of Attacking Quebec, nor what number of Men may be necessary for such an undertaking, as I think, You can Judge better of that than I can; and as I have not received one Letter from Europe, of a later date than the 4th of June, nor no lone Letter of business since I left Portsmouth (May 22; Pargellis 1933, Page 81), I know of nothing of the Situation of things at home; and of course, can form no Judgment what you will either be able or willing to give further to this Country at present.

The moment I return from the Forts if we can prevent any further misfortune from happening this Campaign, which may totally overturn all Plans that can be formed now; I shall set about preparing everything for the next Campaign, where you approve of the Plan here mentioned or any other; that is, I shall do my utmost to compleat and discipline the Troops, so far as I have mentioned them above; for till I receive Orders, I do not propose meddling with the 50th and 51st Regiments further than employing as many of the Officers as can be spared in recruiting.

I shall secure Provisions, and provide working Tools; and I shall Negotiate with the different Provinces; and as far as I am able, Settle provisionally what Supplies can be got from them for carrying on whatever Plan shall be settled by You: If no Plan comes, I must beg to be informed as soon as you can that the Operations may not be Stopt from the uncertainty of what is to be undertaken.

As I find not only, a general backwardness in every Colony, but even almost in every individual of this Continent to Aid in carrying of the Publick Service; and as every Expence is raised as high as possible to the Crown; And as the strange mismanagement in the last Campaign, and in preparing

for this, have thrown the Affairs of this Continent into so great Confusion, much to long to be fully Explained in Letters, by People who have so much business on their hands at present; I have thought it necessary to send home Mr. Pownal, who has been present at all the Transactions since my arrival by which he will be able to give you lights into many Points, which you will want to be informed of, that in the present situation of things, it is impossible for me to recollect, much less write to you.

As to Your Indian Affairs, it will be necessary that you take them into Consideration; By the Kings Commission, the Six Nations and their Allies are put entirely into Sir William Johnson's hands under the direction of the Commander in Chief for the time being; but that has not is the least stopped the other Colonies from treating with them; Negotiating, making Peace or War at their Pleasure, or carrying on Trade with the in whatever way they think proper, which creates the greatest Confusion, and must have very bad Consequence whilst it goes on; at present it is difficult to determine what should be done in this as the Indians are so wavering from the Situation of our Affairs; And I doubted with myself, whether to put in a paragraph on that Subject into my Letters to the Governors; but the Accounts I received of the constant interfering for private Interest made me think it absolutely necessary to do it.

As to the Southern Indians, they are at present on the Old footing, for I have heard nothing of Mr. Atkin since I have left London: but as by this Arrangement of Indian Affairs, the Provinces are prevented for Negotiating with them, there must be a Consideration, how the Trade is to be carried on with them for the future; and that must be out under proper and very strict regulations, or the mischief will not be cured; And as it is very profitable, it must be well considered before any Step is taken in it: As soon as time will permit, I shall consult Sir William Johnson; and transmit his thoughts, and what may occur to myself on that head to the Earl of Halifax (Board of Trade): my view is to try, if it can be so managed, that the Publick may reap some benefit from it.

As to the Indian Presents that were sent out with me: I determined from the beginning that in place of calling a great Meeting of Indians, and giving them myself, as had been the custom formerly, I would give them to Sir William Johnson, to distribute in small, as occasion required; and in which Case, the Indians really would carry home with them what they got, whereas in the other way, they were always made drunk and robbed before they left the place where the Meeting was held. As to the presents which came out, I put the money into Mr. John Pownal's hands, who has provided a very good assortment and a large Quantity for the Money: the Intention was that one third of them should be for the Northern Indians, and two thirds of them should be for the Southern Indians; but as the strong remonstrances for Sir William Johnson, and the Consideration that the Scene of Action is at present among the Northern Indians, I have agreed to put into his hands, the two thirds here for him to distribute, and reserve only one third for the Southern Indians, which he assures me is more than ever was really distributed among them; but of this, I can say nothing with certainty, but will look into it carefully, whenever I can, according to my Instructions.

I have not had it in my Power to do anything about the Intercepted Letters (Pargellis 1933, Page 76); before I arriv'd Mr. Webb had talked that affair over with Sir Charles Hardy, but they could find nothing from any light it gave them, nor could I on my first arrival: but lately, I find from Mr. Croghan that there were some People in Pensilvania, who were going off to the French, and some of them were Stopped; but this Scene lies in Pensilvania and some of the People, I am informed,

were brought before Magistrates, it must be known, both to Mr. Shirley and Governor Morris, so you certainly must have had accounts of it since I left London. I do not chuse to make a Noise, till I have further lights, but the moment I can get to Pensilvania, I will endeavor to bring light to whatever I can come at in this Affair.

I find Barnard Leak &c. &c., who was a Soldier in M.G. Shirleys Regiment, was taken up in Jersey, and Papers and Plans found on him and Commifsions; but was discharged, as a Soldier on furlough, in Mr. Shirleys Regiment; he went then back to Pensilvania, and I have never been able to learn, whether he went to the Regiment at Oswego, or deserted: but when we come to make an Enquiry into the Affairs of that Regiment, I shall endeavor to find this out.

Mr. Winslow writ to me two days ago that he imagined the french were moving towards him; but I had a Letter from him since to Acquaint me that it was only some of his own Boats that had been out for timber and were blown over to the other side of the Lake; however I set out directly to be present myself.

Since writing the above, I am informed, Mr. Shirley is endeavoring to lay the Mismanagement at Oswego on Us; and says that after he had forwarded Provisions to Schenectady that we brought them back here (Albany). I was sure that had not happened after I arriv'd, but must have been in the time he Commanded, if it was at all, and after Examining into it, I have the State of the Case from the Commifsary of Stores, who at that time, had the delivery of the whole Provision, which I send enclosed.

I have said in my Observations on Mr. Shirleys last Letter, that I did not expect any of that Recruit to the Provincials of 600 Men, which he mentions, or the Waggons, which there were no appearance of at that time: But that I may not do him any injustice, I must now acknowledge that there arrived 320 Men and 16 Ox carts; and I hear there are more Carts on the Road; They will be of great use, tho' they come very late, considering I demanded them August 20th, and they arrive October 2nd.

I have the honor to be

Comment: In the last third of this letter, Loudoun slowly and carefully outlines the strategic approach Britain should adopt to defeat France in North America. Unlike the previous letter to Cumberland, this letter was aimed at influencing politicians. The letter would arrive in England around the time when Pitt assumed the responsibilities of Secretary of State, Southern Department (December 4, 1756). Outside of Louisbourg, the letter aligns with Pitt's strategic thoughts, but the men diverge as regards the role of the provincial forces.

The middle third of the letter may have been useful to Pitt or a simple confirmation that a new approach was required when dealing with the provincial assemblies. Pitt realized it would be best to carefully avoid these entanglements; Pitt had the power of the purse to do so. Here, Pitt was successful by directing the provincial governments via his office while reducing the powers of the Commander in Chief — removing the British Army from the provincial political equations or establishing commercial shipping embargoes, so keenly protested by the provincial governments.

With Braddock's death in July 1755, Shirley became Commander in Chief, North America, but neither Johnson's nor Shirley's 1755 Campaigns proved successful. Shirley's chance to prove he could serve as the overall commander was limited to the events of 1755; he failed. At considerable

annoyance to Whitehall, Shirley mistakenly believed he had broad authority to grant commissions in the British Army; he did not. In March, the “intercepted letters” appeared in London. These “intercepted letters” detailed a plan for a broad Indian uprising supported by some 10,000 men centered in Pennsylvania (Pierre Fidele to Duc de Mirepoix, French Ambassador in London, Pargellis 1933, Page 76; Gipson 1946, Vol. VI, Page 189; and Jennings 1988, Page 239). Near the same time, William Johnson forwards a letter from Shirley that Shirley failed to forward to London. Shirley to Johnson, December 24, 1755 (reaching London in March via a letter sent by Johnson to the Board of Trade, Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 367):

“That a party of the Six Nations to consist of a few Sachems the rest to be Warriors be engaged by private applicators and the offer of rewards to take up the Hatchett against the French and their Indians who have fallen upon the Provinces of Virginia, Maryland and Pensilvania.

That they be requested to immediately proceed to Pensilvania where they will find a large force in readiness, and there concert the best measures for carrying on the War.”

No one in London was aware of this plan or had granted any monies for the payment. Here Johnson was preempting Shirley from further interfering in his role as the Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Both men had wanted to control any talks, agreements, and allocations of the Indian allies. The bitter feud between Johnson and Shirley is best seen in a “memorandum” that seemingly passed through Newcastle’s hands (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 2, September – October 1755). Johnson had the firm support of the Board of Trade and the Earl of Halifax. Within two weeks of the arrival of Johnson’s letter, the decision to recall Shirley was formalized around March 29, 1756, but the actual decision was made much earlier — around January 20, 1756, by Fox and Cumberland. Jennings (1988, Page 284) credits Johnson with the downfall of Shirley, but add Pownall and De Lancey (Gipson 1946, Volume VI, Page 187). Selecting a more reserved language, Shirley unwisely butted heads with the Board of Trade. The decision to recall Shirley was made seven months before Loudoun arrived in North America or the fall of Oswego.

Fox was not an ally or even sympathetic to Shirley. Shirley’s unique disregard for established protocols would not be fully evident until the 1756 Campaign — not having served in the British Army or Navy, where attention to detail was so universal, proved a huge liability for Shirley. By July, the logistics chains were nearly breaking. Shirley had acquiesced so much authority to the New England provincial forces that the 44th and 48th were essentially limited to guard duty around Albany and Saratoga. Although many in the Treasury and War Ministry pushed for a court-martial of Shirley, the lack of **attested** evidence and documents required under court-martial regulations negated those efforts. More importantly, Pitt seems to have no interest at all in the Shirley – Loudoun squabble. To Pitt, Shirley was past history, a distraction, and a waste of time.

The negotiations and lengthy dealings with various offices, but particularly the Treasury, delayed Loudoun’s leaving for North America by some four months. Much of the delay centered on supply contracting and the Treasury’s keen desire to lower costs. Knowing that Loudoun would not be free to sail to America until spring, a decision was made in February for Webb to sail separately with the temporary authority of Commander in Chief, supplanting Shirley. Webb sailed on April 13th. Abercromby, Webb’s superior, would sail some two days later from Plymouth. Webb arrives in New York on June 7th, but knowing that Abercromby was near, he waits in New York. Abercromby arrives on June 16th. Abercromby and Webb then journey to Albany where

Abercromby takes command on June 25th. Shirley's last warrant dates to June 26th. However, Webb's and Abercromby's orders were limited to military matters, particularly as it relates to Oswego and the idle 44th and 48th (Pargellis 1933, Page 75). Their orders did not touch on the political, lacking any authority for dealing with colonial governments. The provincial governments were deeply annoyed at now having no one to deal with who had an open purse. Wherever able, Shirley continued his authority, especially as it relates to accounts and attempting to influence provincial governments and provincial forces. Setting sail on May 20th, Loudoun did not reach New York until July 23rd. In less than two months, the Commander in Chief passed from Shirley to Webb to Abercromby to Loudoun.

Pargellis states the distrust of Shirley by Loudoun and Abercromby "did not begin until August 10". This traces to a specific letter from Shirley to Loudoun that deeply vexed Loudoun (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 501, annotated by Loudoun). The focus of the letter was provincial ranks and whether the New England troops would serve in concert with British regulars. This August 10th letter pre-dates the loss of Oswego (August 14th). By the end of August, the animosity between Loudoun and Shirley was bitter and deep. Regardless of Loudoun's stated desire, Shirley and Loudoun were in a paper war not only with each other, but both felt the need to dominate the narratives being sent to ministries and boards in London. Loudoun annotates a second Shirley letter (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, September 13, 1756, Page 551). Against established military norms and customs, Shirley delayed his return to England as long as possible. To Loudoun and his officers, Shirley's delay was both unexpected and near unfathomable, hinting at malfeasance. Deeply complicating matters, Shirley retained his governmental post as Governor of Massachusetts until he sailed for England on or about September 20, 1756, Schutz (1961, Page 242) suggests October. Although recalled, Shirley felt free to write London until he sailed. With London, Shirley's communications were more numerous and often arrived first. Loudoun had Shirley's narrative to combat or at least check. But neither Loudoun nor Shirley could have been aware that it was Pitt, and not Fox, who would be judging the situation.

The British at Oswego faced a quandary. They had skilled workmen including ship carpenters, but what to build and where to place the priority? The planned assault on Niagara required a half-dozen armed ships to neutralize the French Fleet, but there were other pressing needs. Whaleboats and bateaux were needed to transport the troops some 135 miles west to Niagara. Before 1755, Oswego was little more than a trading post. The fortifications were in dire need of maintenance and upgrading. There was a critical shortage of storehouses, and the troop barracks were pitiful to non-existent. The decisions made favored those relating to the assault on Niagara and the building of ships, not the defensive or logistical character of Oswego. From the very start, Niagara was Shirley's Campaign; this was Shirley's decision.

In many of his letters, Loudoun was especially careful to include qualifiers — "I think", "I believe", and "best information". He craved accuracy. Still, some of Loudoun's statements concerning Oswego were wrong and there was a key omission. At Oswego, the French numbered some 3,100 men, not 1,500 as in this letter — some 1,350 French Army regulars, a near equal number of Canadian militia, 34 artillerymen, 100 colonial marines, and some 250 Indian allies ((O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Pages 441, 455, and 468). On September 4th, Shirley writes the Earl of Halifax (Board of Trade) that the French force totaled some 7,500 men including 4,000 regulars (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol II, Page 531).




Figure 20. Map by T. Raymond Parker in Gilbert Hagerty's volume on Fort Bull – Mowbray Publishers, Providence, Rhode Island, 1971. La Presentation (Oswegatchie) was a principal staging area for Canadian scouting and raiding parties moving south toward the Mohawk River Valley. La Presentation is present-day Ogdensburg, New York. Oswegatchie, a name often used in British documents, is not Oswego. The "trail" to the immediate west of the Black River was the route taken by the de Liery Raid that sacked Fort Bull on March 27, 1756. The Oneida Carrying Place was the path that linked Fort Williams on the Mohawk River to Fort Bull on Wood Creek. This path crossed a drainage divide between the Hudson and the St. Lawrence River Basins. Here, goods and provisions needed to be transferred to wagon or sledge (sleigh), about a 2.75-mile portage. Nearly all the contemporary British documents will reference Fort Bull as Fort Wood Creek. Fort Craven was about 1 mile due south of Fort Williams. In 1758, Fort Stanwix, a large four-sided bastion was constructed about a quarter mile to the east of Fort Williams (Figure 10, Page 113). Fort Frontenac is not shown; it is due north of Oswego, on the north shore.

The Lower Mohawk has a series of swift rapids plus Cohoes Falls, a 90-foot drop, so river transport is not as easy as the map would suggest. In July 1756, supplies for the 44th Foot needed to be moved from Albany to Schenectady by wagon and then transferred to bateaux for transport to Fort Williams. Loudoun paid Bradstreet's men, not Shirley.

The primary reason that the British abandoned Fort Ontario and retreated to Fort George was the French were about to finish a gun battery that looked down on Fort Ontario from an adjacent hillside (MANA, Page 211 with map). Post-battle, the British complain the defending cannon were incapable of achieving the needed elevation and that only the arching fire of their mortars and howitzers could reach the first French battery. The interior of the fort was open and exposed to this first French battery. The British shellfire proved ineffective. Loudoun was keenly aware of this “adjacent ground problem” as detailed in St. Clair’s inability to find a suitable site for a new fort along a 12-mile stretch of the Mohawk River. Why Loudoun elected to leave this element about Oswego out of this letter is open to speculation, but it might be connected to his animosity toward Shirley. At the same time and more likely, Loudoun viewed the abandonment of Fort Ontario simply as a matter of dishonor and refused to provide any cover or excuse for the retreat; the British had abandoned Fort Ontario **before** the French cannon fired on their position. Shirley does not write Fox on Oswego until two weeks later (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol II, September 16, 1756, Page 566).

The next phase of the battle was a more prolonged artillery duel with no clear-cut winner. By mid-morning on the 14th, Fort George (center fort) was surrounded and Lieutenant Colonel Mercer of the 51st Foot, the overall British commander, was dead. The French artillery was to the east, the new hornwork added to Fort George by Shirley faced west. Simply put, Fort George was in a hole-in-the-ground; the bluff on the east side of the Oswego River dominated, but with the fall of Fort Ontario, the bluff was then in French hands. The French now had a second opportunity to fire down on the British (Figure 21). Following Mercer’s death, Lieutenant Colonel Littlehales of the 50th Foot surrenders the garrison. Montcalm does not offer honors to Littlehales. The British prisoners were transported to Canada and then Europe. **Note:** There were three separate “forts” at Oswego. The fort naming convention adopted here follows the detailed British documents and maps found in MANA: British convention east = Fort Ontario, center = Fort George, and west = Fort Oswego (Fort “Rascal”). The names of the center and western forts are switched in the French accounts (O’Callaghan, Vol. X) and many subsequent histories.

On August 29th, Loudoun writes a pointed letter to Shirley placing much of the culpability for Oswego on his doorstep (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 521). Shirley’s response was combative and dismissive, Shirley grasping for any argument or contrivance that would shield him from blame (Shirley to Loudoun, September 4, 1756, and Shirley to Fox, September 16, 1756, Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol II, See Pages 536, 538 and 571). A letter from Lt. Colonel Mercer to Shirley about the conditions at Oswego before the siege was central in Loudoun’s letter, but Shirley contends he never saw the correspondence. The date of the key Mercer letter is not identified by Loudoun, but the central letter seems to be Mercer to Shirley, July 22, 1756 (LO 1325; Colonial Office Papers 5/47, 167-169; transcribed above, sorted by date). This letter was written too late to be acted upon before the surrender of Oswego, but it tells of the condition and circumstances at Oswego, some three weeks before the arrival of Montcalm. The conduct of Abercromby, Webb, and Bradstreet and the slow advance of the 44th is difficult to understand and would only be consistent with the July 22nd letter not being distributed. This situation makes nearly no sense in the case of the aggressive Bradstreet. If the letter was received in late July, Webb and the 44th were probably too far away and not “textbook ready” for the extended march needed to arrive before Montcalm, but there is no evidence that they tried to reach Oswego before Montcalm or marched with any sense of urgency.




Figure 21. From *A Review of the Military Operations in North America; From the Commencement of the French Hostilities on the Frontiers of Virginia 1753 to the Surrender of Oswego, on the 14th of August, 1756*. Dublin, printed for P. Wilson and J. Exshaw, 1757. This figure is from the 276-page edition that includes Washington's Journal of his Expedition to the Ohio in 1754 and letters carried by Braddock found by the French at the Monongahela in July 1755, as published by the French Court — "None of these Papers are contained in the English Edition". Among the Braddock Papers were *Instructions given to General Braddock by his Britannick Majesty*, plus several cabinet-level letters. There are several different printings of this work including a 1758 printing of the English Edition that was sold in New England. Only this Dublin edition contains the letter appendix, online.

Oswego was initially established as a trading post. Looking north, the drawing better relates to 1754, but key features are depicted. Lake Ontario is to the deep background. Fort George is in the center, the flag. Fort Ontario would be on top of the tall bluffs to the far right (east, not shown). Fort Oswego (Fort Rascal) would be on the hills to the far left (west, not shown). The foreground buildings belong to the individual traders and merchants, these are not military barracks. The "street" would be the path between the center of the two lines of buildings.

Fort Ontario was established as a defense against raiding parties (muskets), not cannon; this fort was dominated by hills even further to the east where the French were establishing artillery batteries. The British successfully retreated from Fort Ontario and safely reached Fort George before these first French batteries were opened. The French occupy Fort Ontario on top of the bluff to the right. Montcalm crossed the *Onondago River* (Oswego River), near foreground. The British then abandoned Fort Oswego to the west and crowded into Fort George. The French established a second line of batteries on the top of the bluff to the east (far right) that looked down on Fort George. Fort George was now surrounded and surrendered on August 14, 1756. The geography dictated the difficulty in defending this position.

In writing London, Shirley focused on the failure of Webb and the 44th Regiment to advance from Schenectady to Oswego in late July, a time when he was no longer Commander in Chief. Shirley also chastises William Johnson for his failure to mobilize the British-allied Iroquois. Unfortunately, Captain William Williams of the 51st, who was positioned at the Oneida Carrying Place (Fort Williams), had deeply antagonized several of the Iroquois tribes that summer. From William Johnson to Shirley, Papers of Sir William Johnson, Vol. II, June 27, 1756, Page 495: *"I find all Nations who ever resorted the Carrying place, that Capt. Williams is a very disagreeable person to them, they earnestly desire & insist upon it that he be removed, or they will never go on the Scout, or any other Service there."*

I am sorry I am under the necessity of taking so disagreeable a task in hand, as to write against any Gentleman, but as I plainly see & find he has greatly disoblged all the Oneidas, Tuscaroras, and Onondagas greatly to the prejudice of the Service, I think it is my Duty to take notice of it to your Excellency. His interpreter is as much found fault with."

From Documents VII, Page 173, July 21, 1756: *"Sir William had a meeting with the Senecas who came down with John Abeels Skins, and gave them 8 Strings of Wampum, desiring they would as soon as possible undeceive their Nation and the others with regard to the villainous falsehoods, which Capt. Williams told them at the carrying Place, and that they would let them all know **he was now a Prisoner at Albany & would be tried for several misdemeanors and crimes laid to his charge.** This they promised to do immediately, and added that they were fully satisfied that what he said with regard to Sr. William was false, and so ended."*

Shirley arrived at Oswego on August 18th and stayed a little over two months; Shirley leaves Oswego on October 24, 1755 (Hervey Journals, 1906, Page 12; and Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 537). On reaching the Oneida Carrying Place, Shirley turned over the responsibility of resupplying Oswego to Williams. These orders to Williams would have been given at the tail-end of October or in early November. In unforgiving tones, Schutz has him failing to do so (Schutz 1961, Pages 216 and 231). Though cast as the scapegoat by Shirley's staff, how much of this blame truly belongs on Williams' doorstep is difficult to judge without additional details and dates. However, these October-November orders were a simple continuation of the instructions given to Williams that summer (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, August 12, Page 235):

"You are to keep twenty Battoes with a proper Number of Battoe men constantly employed in bringing provisions and stores from Johan Jost Herkimer to this place and also 30 Battoes in Carrying the same from Wood Creek to Oswego, you shall be furnished with the power to Impress men if Necessary for this Service, and you are to keep the Slay men employed in Carrying the same from hence to the other end of the Carrying place, and to keep exact accounts of what Provisions and stores come here, what you send to Oswego, and of the Service of the Battoe men and Slay men, employed in the Same, and as none are to be paid for the future without your Certificate of their work, you are from time to time to give them proper Certificates of the same, and you are to give such Certificates to none who quit their work without your leave. And lastly you are from time to time to send me exact returns of the State of your Command and of what provisions and Stores are with you."

While at Oswego, Shirley had a full two months to evaluate the performance and ability of Williams. Returning to the Carrying Place in the Fall, Shirley does nothing regarding Williams; he

was not replaced, but there was the realization that the number of bateaux positioned at Fort Williams was insufficient to transport the needed supplies from German Flatts and further east. In all this, there is no indication that excess stores were accumulating at Schenectady or German Flatts. The stores were only accumulating at Albany which was easily reached by ship. From Albany, wagons, ever absent, were needed to transport the goods to Schenectady. This responsibility belonged squarely with the merchant circle (Schutz 1961, Pages 211-212), not Williams. Without pay, the bulk of the bateaux-men deserted. Although sorely tempted, Loudoun does not pursue any detailed inquiry; the time needed was not there (LO 1763, Williams to Loudoun, September 10, 1756).

At Oswego, the labor costs for any “extra work” were paid by Alexander’s merchant circle, some £4,864 (LO 1483). A profit was then added to the final bill submitted to Shirley. This ledger includes the period between September 23, 1755, and June 30, 1756, with a separate ledger for July and August 1756. Labor costs for carpentry, road building, and the construction of fortifications are among the three hundred entries, but it also includes payments to bateaux-men. Three consignments of rum arrived in November, some 340 gallons. An extremely limited amount of provisions reached Oswego that December — 4th, 12th, 13th, 22nd (root stores from German Flatts), and on January 28th (three bateaux). Nothing seems to have arrived in February or early March. The Oneida Carry was some 2.75 miles long. On this leg of the route to Oswego, goods could not be transported by water; one needed wagons or slays (sleighs) to cross the drainage divide between the Hudson River and the St. Lawrence. These “slays” were skid-like and could be used in summer. However, any meaningful resupply was dependent on bateaux and skilled bateaux-men. Bradstreet’s Bateaux Service was officially formed on January 19, 1756, so this option was not available to Williams in Fall 1755 (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, Page 403). That October, Shirley had also ordered Captain Williams to construct a four-sided stockade with four-half bastions plus three buildings — a barracks, a magazine, and a storehouse. Four cannon were fitted to the half-bastions. This fort was at the east end of the Oneida Carry, Fort Williams. At the west end of the Oneida Carry, Fort Wood Creek (Fort Bull) was also constructed, but it lacked any artillery.

Winter 1755-1756 proved exceedingly difficult for the soldiers at Oswego. On February 4th, Governor Charles Hardy at New York writes Johnson (Johnson Papers, Vol. II, Page 431): *“I am informed there is not more Provisions at Oswego than will serve the Garrison to the last Week of March, if you send to Colonel Mercer, I desire you will inform yourself in this particular and let me know, that all proper assistance may be given them, in the mean time, if they should be of want, you will take all measures in your power to afford them the necessary relief, for that Garrison must not be reduced for want of timely Supplis; I should hope if the Waters are and continue to be shut for some time, that horses might get up with Supplis in Sacks, which on such occasions must be impressed for this Service; upon a full consideration of this matter, I must desire you will send a trusty Indian to Oswego, to be satisfied in the point, and you may use my Name to Colo. Mercer upon it.”* On March 12th, Hardy sends the warrants to impress horses to Johnson (Johnson Papers, Vol. IX, Page 400). Regardless of any suggestion otherwise, there is no doubt that Shirley knew of the true status of the stores at Oswego.

There were ample supplies positioned at Albany with Schutz suggesting that there were also significant stores at the Oneida Carrying Place with Williams. In winter 1755-1756, Williams left his post at the east end of the Oneida Carrying Place, not returning until sometime in February

(Schutz 1961, Page 231), but Mercer's letter of February 22nd rejects that date (LO 844, below). Williams was fully aware of the "miserable circumstances" at Oswego (Papers of William Johnson, Vol. IX, March 6, 1755, Page 395). In William's view, moving supplies forward would require that Lake Oneida be clear of ice, and writes Johnson that the ice was gone on March 13th (Papers of William Johnson, Vol. IX, Page 403). The previous day, a resupply moved on Oswego with all the provisions then at Fort Williams, twelve or fourteen bateaux, March 12, 1756. When the convoy reached Lake Oneida, the lake was still frozen. The supplies were then dragged across the ice (Gipson 1946, Page 184). This resupply was not done by Bradstreet or Williams but by men of the 50th and 51st foot (LO 1483). The resupply reached Oswego on March 22nd (LO 960, Mercer to Williams, March 23, 1756). Without this scant resupply, Mercer was planning to abandon Oswego within a few days; there was less than a week of reduced rations remaining (Pargellis 1933, Page 152; and Gipson 1946, Vol VI, Page 183).

An examination of Mercer's letters to Williams allows for the fairest assessment. Mid-winter, Mercer wrote Williams directing that the preparations for moving supplies to Oswego be done without delay. However, there is a clear acknowledgment that the actual movement of the supplies was dependent on Wood Creek, Lake Oneida, and the Oswego River being open (free of an ice sheet). Mercer asked for a list of supplies then at Fort Wood Creek, Fort Bull, and Burnetsfield (German Flatts). Mercer was careful to supply the needed couriers to get the information back to him. To reduce the amount of food being consumed at Oswego, Mercer was planning on sending some 100 men to the Carrying Place and if needed to Burnetsfield, further east on the Mohawk River. Several segments of this first letter frequently appear in histories. From Lt. Colonel James Mercer to Capt. William Williams, LO 768 and CO 5:47 in Gipson, 1946, Volume VI, Page 184; complete letter transcribed):

Sir,

Oswego, Jan^{ry}. 24th. 1756

I hope this will find You safely returned to Your Command, as I am affraid Necefsity will oblige me to send a Detachment to Your Fort, I have sent the Bearer on Purpose to bring me an account of the Accommodations & Quantity of Provisions there, in Case You have not suficient to support them for a Month or six Weeks, & to send us an early supply the Moment the Waters are open, I will send them down to German Flats, as You must know the State of the Provisions at Burnetsfield, I beg You'll inform me of it, least it might be inconvenient sending them there. This Garrison has been all Winter at 3/4 Allowance, I cannot reduce them to lefs & Preserve their Health, so must beg the Favor of You to let me know Your Quantity of Provisions & Your Opinion, if I may venture to send down about 100 Men. At the Generals Departure from this place, he left us only 40 Days Bread, two Months Meat, & three Weeks Spirits. It has been my constant Employ ever since to remind him & his Secretary of our Wants. It would appear that in the Multiplicity of other Businefs we have been entirely forgotten and neither of them have taken the least Notice of our Necefsity (Shirley and William Alexander, respectively). I should have been glad to acted by his Excellency's Directions had he honour'd me with them on this Head, as he has not I am in duty bound, to preserve the Health & Lives of the Troops left under my Command, to the best of my Judgmt. Your Intelligence & Advice in this Matter will be extremely obliging, I would have the Bearers to return after they have rested themselves two or three Days with You. If there is any Packets or Letters for this Garrison at the Carrying Place, You may send them by this Opportunity. Send me the State of Your Detachments & a Copy of it to Maj^r. Craven that he may fill up the Companys equally as the

Recruits come in. Col. Littlehales desires M^r. Bull would send him the State of his Detachment. I expect a large Collection of News from You of the Parties and Factions in Gen. Johnson's Army, our Intentions next Campaign, &C, &C, &C. There was a Barrel of Rum received by Lieut. Tilton soon after You left the Carrying Place, marked with a brand Iron, SVSl for which he gave Receipt. It belongs to me, I must beg the Favor You would forward it by the first Opportunity. If it has been used as King's stores, pray write Mr. Lewis to Replace it here, I doubt not of Your expediting every Thing for the Garrison particularly what are addresed to the Officers, I am sure before they reach us we shall be in Want.

I am, Sir

Your most obliged & most Obedient, humble Servant, James F. Mercer

Lt. Colonel James Mercer to Captain William Williams, LO 844 (full transcription):

Sir,

Oswego, Feb^y. 22^d. 1756

Your Favors of the Last of January were deliver'd me by Corporal Thomas, I'm obliged to You for Your Care of us, & shall not doubt of all the Relief in Your Power soon as the Season will permitt, as the winter has been remarkably open, I am in Hopes every Day of seeing Batteaux, Meat, Peas, & Flower, are most wanted & Some Butter, I must likewise beg You'll send by the first Command all the Axes and Flints You can Spare.

However improbable the French attacking this Place may appear, I am affraid to lesen our Numbers, & would rather suffer by Famine, than risque the los of the Place, Vefsels, and Artillery. All the Indians that have yet been here, do agree that they will Certainly attempt it, that they design to coast along the south side of the Lake having collected a Number of large Birch Canoes (each capable of containing 30 men) with a large Vessel or two carry their Artillery & Provisjion.

The Garrison begins to be sorely afflicted with an inveterate and obstinate Scurvey, the Consequence of salt and unwholesome Food, in this Case Medicines are ineffectual & our Surgeons say nothing but vegetables can avail, I must beg you to send on Purpose to the German Flats for Cabbages, Turnip, & other seeds, & if they are to be had, some Cabbage Plants. I shall have the Ground ready for them, if you can likewise send me a few Poullets or Ducks, I will endeavour to make a Colony of those Fowls here, for both the Soil and Climate will allow of it.

The Regt. have not been paid since the 24th Oct., write Maj^r. Craven at New York, and he will send subsistence (pay) for Your Company & Detachment & Cloathing when it comes to had, I desire You will send me another Return of Your Command, specifying the Casualties that have happened since I left the Carrying Place, that may be entered in the Return Book, write likewise the Names of Your NonCommisjion'd Officers. Inclosed You have for Your Direction a List of the Men left by Lieut. Haldane & the Number of Your Detatchm^t. not accounted for, I'm persuaded it will be needles to fatigue the Men with scouting either Wood Creek or this River, as it is impossble for the French to come lodge on continue there without our Having previous Notice. Pray offer my Compliments and & best wishes to Mr. Felton, I am Sorry it's not within my Power, to comply with his Request, that depends entirely on You, if an Officer chooses to quit the Service, it is the usual Method, after obtaining Leave from the Commanding Officer of this Reg^t., to look out for a proper Person to purchase the Ensigny & to submit the Difference betwixt an Ensigny & a Lieutenancy or betwixt a Lieutenancy & a Company to the Officers of the Reg^t., the Price for which he sells the Ensigny & that Difference making up the Sum Total for his Commisjion. There must be an

application to Gen^l. Shirley from all the other Officers of this Army, for short allowance, I dare say his Excellency will do them Justice.

As I know Turnips are raised with little Culture on any ground, I must beg You will procure a large Quantity of that & Cabbage seed, with the seeds off whatever Pot Herbs or Salleding you can get, when You let me know the Expence, if you choose it, I shall remit the money by the first Batteau, This Commifsion with 10 Batteau Load of Meat & Peas delivered here, before the 25th March, will save us a great Deal of Misery, I hope you have before this Time sent the Provisions over to Wood Creek, where I hear there are Plenty of Batteaux, of which You may pick out the best & prepare Setting Poles and Paddles for them, that as soon as the River is open, you may meet with no Delay in supplying our Wants, I have offered Your Compliments to the Gentlemen here, as You desired, who in Return, beg You will accept of their best Wishes, Let Me beg the Continuance of Your Fav^{rs}. & be afured that I am with a most perfect Attachment, Sir

Your most obliged & most Obedient, humble Servant, James F. Mercer

P.S. Let me beg of You to write the Gentlemen at Scenectady and Albany concern'd in sending up provisions for this garrison, the Scarcity We are in here. Except they are very deligent we shall be reduced to the Extreamest Misery, & perhaps at a Time the most Critical.

Against Williams, there is no trace of animosity or expression of displeasure in either of these letters. However, there is one sharp passage targeting both Shirley and Alexander. As regards Williams, these letters offer a different flavor than found in Schutz's biography of Shirley (See Pages 216 and 231). In discussing the likelihood of a French attack, Mercer makes no mention of the British Navy.

Fort Wood Creek (Fort Bull) at the west end of the Oneida Carry was closer to Oswego. Beyond a large quantity of gunpowder and rum, the stores at Wood Creek are little understood. A large resupply seems to have reached Fort Wood Creek in early winter — ledger entry for December 20, LO 1483: *To Lieut. Halden for Battoemen of his party bring provisions @ Bulls Fort ... £145* (a substantial sum; the word “from” is used frequently elsewhere in the ledger), but the suggestion is that these provisions were then housed at Fort Wood Creek and not moved forward that December. On March 27, 1756, Fort Wood Creek was sacked by a large French and Indian raiding party, some 360 men ((O'Callaghan, Vol. X, Page 403). Fifteen or sixteen nearly loaded bateaux intended for Oswego were among the stores lost, but this may have been a simple pass-through of goods recently shipped from German Flatts on the Mohawk River — wagons or slays from Fort Williams being unloaded into bateaux for the next leg of the journey. By April 6th, twenty-two bateaux had reached Oswego; this may or may not include those that arrived in March (Lt. Colonel Mercer to Captain Williams, Papers of William Johnson, Vol. IX, April 7, 1756, Page 422). More bateaux and cattle arrive in mid-April (LO 1483). Under Bradstreet, another resupply reaches Oswego around May 16th (MANA Page 187). On July 1st, a resupply of six-hundred bateaux reached Oswego, again Bradstreet (Pargellis 1933, Page 157). In this last resupply, cannon and ship rigging were provided, but not enough, two ships remained unrigged. The additional guns and stores needed to rig all six warships did not arrive in New York from Europe until sometime in mid-summer. A letter from Shirley to Bradstreet has twenty-four 6-pounders arriving at the Great Carrying Place on July 24th, waiting on the 44th for the final move to Oswego, but there is no mention of ship rigging (LO 1719, September 7, 1756, see below). If true, logic dictates that it was Abercromby and

Bradstreet who had the guns moved forward to the Great Carrying Place, but this appears to be the sole reference to these guns anywhere. When the 51st was struck in December 1756, Williams was put on half-pay and never again served in the British Army (Documents VII, Page 151).

The toll on Oswego's garrison was beyond brutal. In February 1756, the total of fit had dropped to some 330 men (Way 2001, Page 62). From MANA Page 288, affidavit of Captain John Vickers (Vicars): "*When General Shirley left Oswego, my Company Consisted of 50 men, that before May there were 39 of them dead, and one taken Prisoner, I think each of the 8 Companys at Oswego lost above 30 men (50th Foot). I am of the Opinion this mortality was owing to bad Barracks and want of Beds, which threw men into Scurveys (a Vitamin C deficiency), and the Water which gave them Fluxes*" (Dysentery, a bacterial infection of the intestine). The 50th barracks were constructed from green wood which then shrunk, offering wide gaps for the winter winds and snows. With better barracks, but still miserable, the 51st suffered less.

Although Vickers' affidavit is the best single source document on the conditions of Oswego, Winter 1755-1756 (MANA, Page 286, online), Peter Way (2001) provides a detailed overview, particularly as it relates to the individual soldier, discipline in the British Army, and the repeated failures of the paymasters and logistics. In April 1755, the 50th Foot had 1,019 listed in the monthly return. By Spring 1756, only some 170 remained, a decrease of some 849 men. The rampant illnesses and decrepit conditions at Oswego had killed 361 soldiers of the 50th. An additional 86 were discharged because of poor health. About thirty men had been killed. Even though facing the possibility of truly byzantine punishments, some 347 men had deserted (Way 2001, Page 64). It is more difficult to track numbers for the 51st Foot. Steele 1994 (Page 191) estimates that some 800 men total deserted on the way from Albany to Oswego — 50th, 51st, and New Jersey Blues, bateaux-men may or may not be included in this figure (Summer 1755). In April 1756, Shirley responds to the sacking of Fort Wood Creek by ordering a combined 500 men from the 44th and 48th Foot and 500 men from Schuyler's New Jersey provincials into positions at German Flatts and the Oneida Carrying Place (Johnson Papers, Vol. IX, Pages 434-436). These 1,000 men would have to be fed, further straining the logistical chain. It is unclear if portions of the 44th and 48th moved to these positions, but some of the 44th were already positioned at German Flatts. No more than 200 of Schuyler's New Jersey Blues actually moved into the Mohawk Valley and then to Oswego.

At Oswego, the carpenters had only recently turned from shipbuilding to improving the fortifications. With Loudoun's expected arrival in North America and knowing that Shirley's funds were exhausted, Shirley's circle of merchants refused to guarantee Oswego's carpenters' future wages (Pargellis 1933, Page 158; and Gipson 1946, Vol. VI, Page 199). With little choice, Mercer suspended work on the fortifications by the civilian carpenters from July 5 through July 23, some eighteen days. Montcalm would arrive on August 10th.

Returning from Oswego, Bradstreet arrived at Albany on July 12, 1756. Soon after, Abercromby ordered Lt. Colonel Gage of the 44th Foot to be ready to march on Oswego. Shirley neglects to mention that the 44th's provisions were in Albany and that the provisions first needed to be transported by wagon to Schenectady on the Mohawk River, but there were precious few wagons not already engaged in supplying Winslow's Expedition. By July 28th, two weeks of supplies were at Schenectady, but Webb wanted four weeks before marching. Once supplied and positioned at Schenectady, the 44th and Bradstreet's bateaux moved in concert toward Oswego, but without a

deep sense of urgency. The movement of the 44th had been delayed a full month. The 44th does not reach German Flatts on the Mohawk River until August 14th. While still at German Flatts, Webb first learns of the fall of Oswego on August 17th. Webb was at the Great Carrying Place from August 20 – August 31st and was still at German Flatts on September 15th (LO 1282). There was no panicked retreat, but Webb does feel exposed and troubled by the wildly vacillating intelligence on the intent of the French. Bradstreet is with Webb. Shirley shifts the explanation for the lack of supplies at Schenectady on Webb and Abercromby, orders issued before the arrival of Loudoun (Shirley to Fox, Correspondence of William Shirley, September 5, 1756, Vol II, Page 542 and Page 576, bottom note). Anderson (2001, Pages 142-146) is highly critical of Abercromby's conduct that June and July, but Abercromby's focus was on the Winslow Expedition and the uncooperative New Englanders. Here, Shirley is criticizing Webb for only utilizing the provisions supplied or accepted by Baker-Kilby, not the total supplies then positioned at Schenectady. Although factual, the criticism is empty; it takes some eight months for Loudoun to get to the truth, but the truth itself is not meaningful. On March 1, 1757, Oliver De Lancey writes Loudoun that when Shirley was superseded, the Schenectady stores contained only seven barrels of pork (not "eatable"), eight barrels of bread (not "eatable"), 445 barrels of rum, 13 skipple of peas, 48 1/2 tierces of rice, 28 barrels of salt, and 1 firkin of butter (LO 6560 and Pargellis 1933, Page 163; 1 skipple = 27.8 liters, 1 tierce = 42 gallons, 1 firkin = 81 pints). Histories can easily get entrapped in this pointless examination. Shirley's letters and the histories written by Shirley's supporters in 1757 and 1758 go deep into this rabbit hole and demonstrate that more than sufficient supplies were available for a march on Oswego in July 1756 — the delay was caused by the unnecessary review of the stores by the new contractors and the unwarranted indecision of Abercromby. Omission is central. While ample supplies were less than 20 miles away, their transport from Albany to Schenectady required ever-absent wagons to move around the rapids and falls on the lower Mohawk River; Cohoes Falls is 70-90 foot tall. Only when the supplies reached Schenectady could they be loaded in bateaux. This element is absent from pro-Shirley histories. The lack of wagons was only the first of the problems, but the more pressing problem was the pay owed to Bradstreet's bateaux-men. Although Abercromby discharges some 400 bateaux-men, some 800 remained under Bradstreet's command. Abercromby refuses to pay, but it is unclear that Abercromby even had access to monies, Shirley had drained the war chest. Shirley was exceedingly careful not to offer any criticism that would cause undo focus on the empty war chest. Pay to the bateaux-men would wait on the arrival of Loudoun.

Shirley learns of the fall of Oswego on August 29th (LO 1627). Godfrey (1982, Pages 83-85) argues that Shirley then attempts to influence Bradstreet with promises of patronage on his return to London in exchange for letters that remove Shirley from any responsibility for the late march of the 44th Foot — shifting the blame to Abercromby or the new supply contractors would be even more desirable (LO 1627, Shirley to Bradstreet, August 30, 1756; LO 1719, Shirley to Bradstreet, September 7, 1756; and LO, 1807; Shirley to Bradstreet, September 14, 1756). Shirley was silent on the need to pay bateaux-men their due wages. Bradstreet was silent on Shirley's repeated request for support. Instead, Bradstreet forwards the letters to Loudoun, but when is unclear. From Shirley to Bradstreet (LO 1719):

Dear Sir,

Boston, Sept^r. 7. 1756

Since my last letter of the 30th of August to you, I have heard attempts have been made to throw blame of the Vefsels built this Year at Oswego's not being able to act upon Lake Ontario this Year, before it was attack'd for want of Cannon, Rigging &ca. On the other hand, I have the pleasure to have taken a Deposition upon Oath by two Young fellows, employ'd at Wood creek y^e. 24 cannon 6 pdrs. arriv'd at the Great Carrying place on the 24th of July and lay ready there for your Convoy so that these not being at Oswego in time is clearly owing to your waiting for the 44th Regim^t. Be pleased to inform me of that Affair and every thing else relating to the number and health of the Garrison, when you last left it; and of every thing concerning it; as also the strength of the Works, Fort Ontario in particular, and whether the French did not bring Cannon with them, tho[^] they did not actually fire against that Fort.

Be please also to let me know in particular, how long you stay'd for the 44th Regiment; and the day, if you can, when it was first destin'd for Oswego; also whose Provisions you made use of last; & whet (whether) the dispute was about provisions and between whom.

I had the pleasure of supping with your Mrs. Bradstreet and your family at the Province house two days ago and they are all well.

Once more adieu and depend upon all friendship in my power to do you in England, particularly with regard to the Indian Affairs.

Direct for me undercover to Mefrs. Thomlinson and Trecothick, Merchants in London, where my Letters will come safe; and let me hear from You often.

With my best Wishes for your health and Prosperity – I am Dear Sir, Your most faithfull, Humble Servant.

W. Shirley

If Shirley had not made the loan to the provinces and managed to retain monies to fully pay Bradstreet's Service in mid-July, there is a chance that the 44th Foot might have managed to reach Oswego before Montcalm. Whether this would have changed the outcome is far from certain, but it opens a pandora's box of speculation, some favoring the French and some the British. This exact question is asked by Gipson (Gipson Volume VI, Pages 200-203), but Gipson's speculation is nowhere near exhaustive. In Gipson's fifteen-volume set: *The History of the British Empire Before the American Revolution*, Braddock's Campaign is covered in its own chapter, *The Disaster at the Monongahela* (Volume VI, Pages 62-98). *Niagara and Crown Point* (Volume VI, Pages 127-161) covers Shirley's actions in 1755. Gipson devotes an even longer chapter to Shirley's failings as a military commander, *The Repudiation of Shirley - 1756* (Volume VI, Pages 162 – 211). In a similar vein, Pargellis pens *Shirley and Oswego* (1933, Pages 132 – 166).

Note: In all this finger-pointing, there is a curious closing passage in a letter from Bradstreet to Shirley (LO 1523, August 19, 1956, two days after learning of the fall of Oswego): "*Could a Man be happy at this time I should be so under the Command of General Web, he being obliging to me and as I find him both Sensible and Active.*"

Loudoun now began his more detailed overview of Shirley's logistic shortcomings and expenses. The records of the various commissaries needed to be examined and compared to orders issued by Abercromby and Webb before Loudoun's arrival. The accounts of the 50th and 51st Foot were so

jumbled, irregular, and mixed with other accounts that Loudoun left it up to London to untangle (Pargellis 1933, Pages 141-156). In this, the two regimental paymasters suffered great rebuke and suspicion. Loudoun's investigation takes months.

The second to last paragraph in this transcribed letter together with De Lancey's letter suggests the 35th, 44th, and 48th stores were in the correct numbers as subsequently verified by the King's commissary, but these provisions only could have been at Albany or Saratoga, not on the Mohawk River at Schenectady. None of these regular troop's provisions seemed to have been embezzled or stolen, but there were strong hints of deep patronage and padded pricing as part of the original contracts signed by Shirley and connected to William Alexander, his personal secretary (Pargellis 1933, Page 135). Per Pargellis, supply contractors were using subcontractors with each claiming an independent profit margin that thoroughly confused the accounts, but always to the advantage of the contractors and subcontractors (see LO 6734). Thayer (1957, Page 43) disputes this claim.

Provincial politics often centered on not-so-hidden animosities. Internal to New York, there were two prominent factions. One was centered on Governor Clinton and the Livingston family and one on the De Lancey family. The rivalry was bitter. An element often contended was supply contracting and who would reap the patronage. After pleas from Clinton, Shirley writes London in support of Clinton. There was a second issue. Smuggling had been a key element in the De Lancey family's rise. Furs would be moved south from Montreal in exchange for English trade goods moving north to Canada. As Governor of Massachusetts, Shirley attempted to thwart this lucrative, but illegal trade. When Clinton leaves the governorship (1743-1753), he was replaced by James De Lancey. De Lancey was unforgiving of Shirley and harbored a deep loathing. In this spirit, De Lancey made the letter negotiation with Shirley over the brass cannon being sent from New York Harbor to Oswego as painful as possible. For the 1755-1756 campaigns, the supply contracts go to Shirley's allied circle (1) Peter van Brugh Livingston, Lewis Morris, and William Alexander (New York) with Thomas Hancock and John Erving (Boston based) being the primary benefactors, but there were others. Alexander was only twenty-nine years old. Erving was Shirley's son-in-law. Shirley provides little to De Lancey's circle of merchants. With the arrival of Loudoun, the principal supply contracts shifted to Baker-Kilby (London) with Oliver De Lancey as their New York agent. As part of the negotiations with the Treasury, Baker-Kilby agreed to purchase the remaining unspoiled supplies of Shirley's contractors, but these judgments would be made by Oliver De Lancey.

Loudoun had the Deputy Paymaster General, Abraham Mortier, prepare a summary list of seventy-three warrants authorized by Shirley, a total of £224,080 (LO 6716 A & B, twelve pages of warrants from June 5, 1755, to June 26, 1756; the document is not dated, but the number sequence suggests the document was attached to an early 1759 correspondence). Loudoun also used De Lancey to review Shirley's circle of contracting accounts. De Lancey's review shows a profit of some £8,558 — from June 12, 1755, until July 23, 1756 (LO 6925, February 6, 1758, as cited in Pargellis 1933, but the bulk of the document is cataloged as LO 6734, May 15, 1756, but this date is incorrect as several entries are from July 1756, the time of Shirley's recall). The review harped on the lack of vouchers, lack of itemization of goods received, and payments that should have been via warrants without merchant commissions. At five percent profit, there is the suggestion that the underlying supply contracts cost about £179,718, including the contracting profit. But this profit should be thought of as somewhat illusionary. Soon after reaching America, Loudoun refuses to process any

new warrants for Shirley's supply contractors. Payment would be via London. The £14,378 still owed for the delivered supplies would not be resolved for some five years (Thayer 1957, Page 46). Unfortunately, De Lancey's review of the contracting and Mortimer's warrant list do not fully coincide as to coverage dates. Mortimer's review starts a week earlier (£5,516 in warrants for sundries supplied) but ends a month earlier than De Lancey's review. At a minimum, thirteen warrants are directly tied to Braddock's 1755 Campaign, some £24,729. The three loans to the provinces are also among these warrants, £44,593. Eleven warrants were issued as regards recruiting within the regular regiments, £14,325. These last two categories contain most of the more "irregular" warrants, about £58,918 or 26 percent of the total monies allocated by the warrants. The second to last warrant reads: *By D^o (Extraordinaries) paid William Alexander for his Account of Contingencies for his Majestys' service paid by him£5,385* (June 22, 1756; Extraordinaries = legitimate expenses, but not directly included in monies provided by Parliament). The last warrant is to Captain More (50th) for additional recruiting costs, some £381 (June 26, 1756).

It seems that Shirley and Alexander used the last two weeks in May 1756 to clear his accounts. Until the arrival of Abercromby, Shirley spent the funds as fast as Mortimer could sell bills of exchange. When Loudoun arrived in New York, Mortimer had £5,000 in cash, but this was likely from selling bills in late June near the time of Abercromby's arrival at Albany. Shirley and Alexander had indeed bled the "cashbox" dry. Within the next week, Mortier anticipated raising an additional £5,000 - £6,000 selling bills through agents in New York (LO 1164, Mortier to Loudoun, July 23, 1756). Exactly how these bills of exchange were negotiated and redeemed is unclear, but the final redemption was done via Agents for the Money Contractor to the Royal Army — Charles Apthorp at Boston and John Hunter at Hampton Virginia (Cubbison 2015, Page 18). There was no agent in New York, just representatives of Apthorp. These bills of exchange could be purchased with the various provincial currencies and these monies were then used to pay the warrants. The "chain of command" was (1) Shirley to (2) the Deputy Paymaster General to (3) the Agent for the Money Contractor, but all the paperwork needed to be correct, and there were distinct geographical separations at each stage that slowed transactions. The De Lancey faction may have had an "inside man" working for Apthorp, William Bayard (Schutz 1961, Page 200 plus Thayer 1957, Page 42). Regardless of motivation, Bayard turned openly hostile and was able to delay at least one sizable payment to Alexander, likely on the pre-text that Hunter's signature was also required as elements of the warrants were associated with Braddock's Campaign. What limits the Deputy Paymaster General had on selling these bills of exchange is obscure — had the Treasury set an upper limit on the cumulative amount of bills that could be sold? With these bills, a key benefit to the Crown was that large numbers of coins, particularly small denomination coins needed to pay the individual soldiers, were not required. Any needed coinage was sent aboard British warships via the Money Contractor, Thomlinson and Hanbury, England, at a 2% profit.

However "irregular" the warrant or the lack of vouchers, Mortier seems to have acquiesced to Shirley's authority as Commander in Chief and paid those warrants, but it is near certain that Mortier made the Treasury in London fully aware of the irregularities. To the consternation of Alexander, Mortier rejected any warrants not signed by Shirley. In 1755, this forced Alexander to "paper chase" Shirley at Oswego to obtain the needed signatures (Schutz 1961, Page 212). Pargellis (1933, Pages 279-336) devotes a chapter to the *Administration of the Army* which includes discussions of warrants, selling of bills of exchange, currency exchanges, and currency manipulations (MANA, Page 245). The topic of bills of exchange is not fully explored.

Of the total cost of a campaign in North America, extraordinaries always exceeded the parliamentary and regimental authorizations as detailed by the records of the Deputy Paymaster Generals. Later, the Audit Office of the Treasury might add expenditures or reclassify expenditures greatly reducing the percentage of extraordinaries (Pargellis 1933, Page 290, especially the bottom note). Care is needed when conducting these comparisons. For 1759, records suggest that the cost of the North America Campaign was £780,000 with 77% being extraordinaries. Audit Office records for 1760 estimate the campaign cost at £1,344,309 with only 40% extraordinaries. For the whole of 1756 (Shirley plus Loudoun), some £60,000 was spent on subsistence with some £210,000 on extraordinaries, excluding the £44,000 loaned to the provinces. Of the extraordinaries, some 25% was spent on Bradstreet's bateaux service, £50,000 sterling (Godfrey 1982, Page 91; 1756).

The honesty of Shirley's contracting circle is often debated by historians, exemplified by Schutz and Thayer on one side of the argument with Pargellis, Gipson, and Jennings on the other. Peter Way tries hard to be fair and strike a balance, but in the end, he is deeply critical of the contractors (Way 2001, Page 86, Notes 86 and 87). A common abuse cited is the movement of trade goods and Indian presents to Oswego by Alexander using bateaux and labor paid for by the British Army (Summer 1755). Alexander attests that the bulk of these goods was for the officer corps, the officers being required to purchase their own provisions, but some trade goods were moved. Entering winter, Col. Mercer had warned Alexander that the amount of Indian goods was low with the suggestion that more were needed (Correspondence of William Shirley, November 30, 1755, Vol. II, Page 335):

Dear Sir,

I send these few lines after Captain More to acquaint you I have seen a Seneca Indian, who the Interpreter Says is of good character, who informs me he has seen the Messenger that was sent to the Messessagues, and who is to be here in a few days. He told me that not only the Messessagues, but the Whole Neighboring Nations have gladly accepted of General Shirley's Invitation, and were it not for the Dangers on the Lake they would have been here before this time, but that we may expect them in Early Spring. I give you this Information that the General may be Apprised of it, that he may Either Send me Instructions or some proper person to treat with them. Let me likewise observe to you, that there are very few Indian presents left in the Store and will be insufficient if great Numbers Come."

I am Sir, Yor Most Obedt., Humble Servt., James F. Mercer

Note: "Messessagues" refers to Mississaugas, part of the Ojibwe People. Their principal villages were on the north shores of Lake Ontario and Lake Erie. This includes the area around Fort Frontenac and the area due west of Fort Niagara. Undoubtedly, the Mississauga frequently came to Oswego to trade. British goods were routinely cheaper and better quality than those offered by the French. Before launching his 1756 Campaign, Shirley intended to negotiate with this tribal group. Johnson and Shirley would have undoubtedly clashed over who had the authority to negotiate with the Mississauga. Throughout 1755, Bradstreet felt free to negotiate with the Indians. If Shirley had remained in command, Bradstreet and Johnson, who so jealously guarded his role as the Indian Commissioner, were on a collision course. Although both men would be needed throughout the remainder of the war, it was best to keep Bradstreet and Johnson away from each other.

But the element missing in all these histories and discussions was the inadequate financial foundation of Shirley's merchant circle. **The key shortcoming was the lack of an independent cash reserve large enough to finance the operation. This was where the logistical framework truly failed.** They relied on British warrants to provide the needed cash to make payments they owed, but the warrants could not be processed fast enough to satisfy those needs. By mid-summer, bills and labor needed to be paid, but there was little or no available cash money. Besides the bulk supplies, carpenters, waggoners, bateaux-men, and tradesmen all required payment. The signed contracting language has the provisions being delivered to Oswego by the contractors (Thayer 1957, Page 33; and Way 2001, Page 74). But then Thayer (1957) waives this fundamental element and does not hold Shirley's circle responsible for this failure; Way (2001) does. At times, the flow of supplies was retarded or simply stopped. Any idea that the deputy paymaster generals would curtail the need for vouchers, signatures, and secondary signatures was unrealistic. Time was needed to run the gauntlet of the "Treasury" and money exchanges. Only with a large cash reserve could the time needed be bought. Any anticipation of the "Treasury" acting as an on-call bank was unconsidered, if not reckless. Employing modern phraseology, the many appearances of ineptness and incompetence were a reflection of a non-functional business model.

In 1755 and 1756, logistical shortcomings hamstringing the British more than any other factor. Braddock had no idea of the difficulties involved with arranging the movement of goods and provisions into the interior of North America, but the colonial governors did. Dinwiddie's bravado, coupled with his unfilled promises, was particularly grievous (Virginia). The availability of wagons and teams was an exasperating and near-endless problem for Braddock, Johnson, Shirley, and even Loudoun. Although the formation of Bradstreet's Bateaux Service was a huge step forward with Bradstreet having the ability to hire his own wagons and build his own boats (January 18, 1756), the number of wagons and horse teams needed still far exceeded the availability. Horses were often smaller in size than their European counterparts with less pull-weight per animal. The lack of fodder was a secondary problem but near constant. The reliance on bateaux to move goods should not be denigrated — internal to Europe, most goods were transported via barge, not roads. In moving supplies from Albany to Lake George, Bradstreet has each barrel handled five times (Pargellis 1933, Page 299).

Peter Way (2001, Page 78) offers: "*David Sanders, Richard Williams, and the other troops at Oswego, despite Loudoun's denial (as being true soldiers), had the misfortune to be soldiers in a poorly thought out, criminally unsupported campaign that brought death, disease and the loss of freedom. They fought a war as much against their officers and the army contractors as against the French and Indians.*"

The entire 1755 New York Campaign, both Lake George and Niagara, fit this characterization of "poorly thought out". This criticism squarely rests on Shirley, but Braddock should have pressed Shirley much harder on how pragmatic and credible the New York Campaigns were. Shirley's "plan" was massively over-extended compared to resources and capabilities. Both campaigns were badly organized with inadequate senior staff and no logistical framework. Johnson proves territorial and difficult (Gipson 1946, VI, Pages 139-148). Johnson's focus was narrow and self-absorbed. Both men were overwhelmed by the difficulties of their tasks. Regardless of the failure of the Niagara Campaign in 1755, Shirley remained married to his "Lake Ontario" strategy. This was his brainchild. Moving into 1756, the creation of Bradstreet's bateaux service was the single

improvement, but those men would no longer accept protracted and delayed payment. In essence, it only functioned if the men were paid — the problem Abercromby faced in July 1756. By May 1756, Shirley finally recognizes the “Lake Ontario” strategy as being unrealistic, but it was then too late to devise a better plan. He is also aware of his being replaced by Loudoun. The time to change strategy was late 1755.

As with Pargellis, Gipson offers his views on what strategies the British should have adopted in the initial stages of the war. In 1755, Gipson has Braddock seizing Fort Niagara (Volume VI, Pages 182-183). For 1756, these views align with Pargellis — foregoing the Lake Champlain Campaign with the goal of seizing the rest of Lake Ontario, Fort Frontenac (Volume VI, Pages 202-203). Reflecting Pargellis, Gipson’s thoughts lack detail. It would take until 1759 for Fort Niagara to fall to the British. Although sacked by Bradstreet in 1758, Fort Frontenac was not occupied by the British until 1760. Amherst would stage his 1760 Campaign against Montreal via Oswego.

The Oswego problem was only solved by the construction of Fort Stanwix at the Oneida Carrying Place. Started in 1758, it was completed in 1762. This was a large, well-designed, four-sided bastion fort, 340 feet per side with storehouses and barracks. It was larger than Fort William Henry. The fort was “textbook” (Figure 10, Page 113). French raiding parties would be ineffective against Fort Stanwix. For the British, this moved the westernmost secured position on the Mohawk River from Schenectady about 80 miles further west. German Flatts was about 30 miles, east. Oswego was only 70 miles, northwest. Fort Stanwix changed the entire logistic puzzle of supplying any position on Lake Ontario, something that Amherst took keen advantage of in 1760. Fort Stanwix was not the trading post desired by the Iroquois, it projected far too much military power and permanence — a French trading post at Niagara and a British trading post at Oswego was the reality desired by the Iroquois.

Shirley arrived in London as a discredited politician with little money. He was treated courteously, but Shirley had no leverage. It was Winter 1756-1757. The government was now fully behind Loudoun. He had angered the Treasury, the Army, and the Board of Trade. Key to his survival, Shirley was successful in clouding the debacle at Oswego. The woeful treatment and conditions at Oswego over the Winter 1755-1756 were non-issues, the rank & file irrelevant in this class and patronage rule. The paper trail needed to “kill” Shirley was largely in North America, not London. Any official questioning of Shirley led to long, rambling speeches that “bored” everyone forced to listen. Because of an incident in Parliament, the patronage connection to Newcastle was temporarily broken (Schuler 1961, Page 245). It takes months for Shirley to repair his relations with Newcastle, but this was done only through the graces of Halifax. In the intervening time, Shirley drifts. The Treasury continues the investigations into Shirley’s accounts with Alexander and Livingston petitioning for payments. But it is “agreed” to leave Shirley out of these reviews. Although sharply critical of Shirley’s military judgment, as a provincial governor, Gipson thinks highly of Shirley’s abilities (1946, Vol VI, Page 210-211). In late 1758, Shirley was made the Governor of the Bahamas, serving from 1759-1768, a non-demanding post. The much more important position, and the one he was rumored for in late 1756, was the Governor of Jamaica — *“I am at present destin’d for the Governmt. of Jamaica and the King hath had thoughts of Mr. Pownall to succeed me in my present Governmt.”* (LO 1807, Shirley to Bradstreet, September 14, 1756). Shirley was granted the rank of Lieutenant General on January 30, 1759. Loudoun had been awarded that same rank on January 22, 1758. Loudoun’s date of recall had been less than a month

earlier, December 30, 1757. For both politicians and the military who rose to high ranks but then failed, this promotion to non-relevancy was the rule rather than the exception, the last element of patronage. In 1761, Webb was commissioned as a Lieutenant General.

From Loudoun to Henry Fox, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, November 22 - December 26, 1756 (CO_5_48_001). Pitt would have assumed that office by the time this letter arrived in England. This letter is exceedingly long, some 51 pages plus attachments. Troop dispositions during the winter of 1756 - 1757 are best explained in this letter. Only a portion of the letter will be transcribed here — about a third of the full letter is presented. Much of the remaining letter deals with the difficulties of quartering troops, securing provincial agreements, and Shirley's administration. Loudoun writes a second letter to Cumberland over the same timeframe, November 22 - December 26 (LO 2262 and MANA, Page 263). Although equally lengthy, these are not duplicate letters. Some topics are shared, others are not. Language and composition are not shared between the letters. The Fox letter is judged as the more informative of the two letters.

Albany 22^d November 1756.

Sir,

The last Packet going from hence, without any Letter to You from me, was no fault of mine, for She had orders not to Sail till my Letters arrived; and without giving me the least notice, She went off whilst I was at Fort Edward; and in reality, She went off the day I received the first certain Intelligence of the motions of the Enemy in consequence of which I made the disposition of Troops here; for which reason I have ordered a Guard to prevent such Accidents for the future; as I have no other way of Governing People at two hundred Miles distance from me.

Since the last letter I had the honor to write You from Fort Edward, October 12th, Captain Rogers, of one of the Ranging Companies, brought us a Prisoner, whom he took within the out Posts at Tienderoga, whose Examination you have enclosed; and by my other Scouting parties, I had Intelligence he gives of the Enemy drawing off their Troops, confirmed; on which, we immediately made the disposition for putting our Troops into Winter Quarters likewise.

The disposition I have made for this purpose is from the 44th & 48th, I have taken the Garrisons for Fort William and Fort Edward; at the first I have posted four Companies, which I have compleated to One hundred Men each, and Appointed Major Eyres, who Fortified the place, to take the Command; And I have given them, two Rangers Companies of Fifty Men each, to get Intelligence, in order to prevent sudden Surprises.

At Fort Edward, I have posted five Companies, compleated likewise to one hundred Men each, with a field Officer to Command; and two more Ranging Companies as above.

The remainder of these two Regiments I bring to Albany.

As the Province of New York have resolved to keep up during the winter, Eight hundred Men of their Regiment, which they reduce into Eight Companies, one of them a Company of Rangers, I have posted them at Saratoga, Stillwater and Halfmoon; by which I propose, not only to keep up the Communication with the Forts this Winter, but likewise to have it in my Power, in case of the Enemy making any Motion to Attack any of the Forts, at once to throw in a Reinforcement of two or three hundred Men, where wanted; which reinforcement can be thrown in, in a day, on receiving Intelligence of the Enemys Motion.

I expect further by these Ranging Companies, and the disposition of the New York Regiment, to prevent the Enemy from making Incursions into Settled Country and hope totaly to prevent Scalping

parties, If we have early enough Intelligence by our Rangers, we shall be strong enough everywhere to meet them, and drive them back and if they should escape us in going down, we must be able to cutt off their Retreat.

The 42nd. Regiment, I quarter at Schenectady from whence they take the Forts on the Mohawk River, at Herkermers, which I have put a Ditch and Palisade about; the Indian Forts at Conajohore and Fort Hunter, amounting to about Two hundred and Fifty Men, with proper Officers to Command in each.

At this place, I keep the 35th Regiment with the remains of the 44th. & 48th. Regiments.

The Royal Americans, you would see by my former Letters, I had been obliged to Collect all into one Battalions and bring them here in order to Afsist us to make a Stand: they are all now returned to New York, where I divided the whole into four Battalions, to be a foundation to recruit from as we collect them, I have fixed their Quarters in the following manner; the 2^d. Battalion at New York; the 4th. in the Jerseys; the 1st. at Philadelphia; and the 3^d. in Maryland, and the lower Counties in Pennsylvania. The remains of the 50th. & 51st. Regiments, which amount to about three hundred, I send to Boston; and shall disperse them in Towns in New England as they encrease in Numbers.

As I have found the Independent Companies, in as bad Condition as Troops can be; and see no Effects any orders my predecefsor may have given for compleating them; I am unwilling to trust them totaly to themselves in Recruiting; therefore I have divided them, and sent them along with different Battalions; the Commanding Officer of which, is to review & approve of their Recruits, and to make me returns of their Succesfs and report their diligence. Captain Gates (Monongahela) goes with the 1st. Battalion of the Royal Americans (Philadelphia); Captain Wraxal with the 3^d. Battalion (Maryland and Pennsylvania); Captain Marshal with the 4th. Battalion (Jerseys); and Captain Richmond, with the 50th. & 51st. Regiments (Boston).

The 35th. , 44th. and the 48th. Regiments, Recruit in the County, from New York to Virginia, both Included, which are the only recruiting Countries we have; and by the Recruiting Officers of those three Regiments, the Royal Americans, and the three Independent Companies, are as full as they can hold; which was the reason of my sending the 50th. & 51st. Regiments & Captain Richmond's Company to New England. I have likewise ordered home the Recruiting Officers from Nova Scotia, on finding them near compleat, and that you had Acquainted Colonel Lawrence by Letter, that drafts ordered from Ireland to compleat them.

As to the Forts, I wish I could make you a better report; that at Lake George is built on a running Sand; which is the case of most of the Ground near it, so that the ditch constantly fills up; and next year, if we cannot push far enough to make it uselefs must be faced up with boards and Fascines: the works are all faced up with Logs bound in; but they have neither been careful to pick good Timber for that purpose, nor secured them well at the Ends; and the Sand is so loose, that I am afraid if it were battered with Cannon, it would run thro' between the Logs; and it is Commanded by a rising ground pretty much near it; and I shall hardly be believed, when I say, I have not yet seen a place for a Fort, that can Command a River, a Lake, or a pafs that is not itself Commanded. The Barracks within will be finished in a few days; I have added a new Casemate to it; those built last year, having taken Wett and Damaged the things in them. I have laid in large Magazines of Provisions, both at this Fort and Fort Edward where the sand is more Clayey and stands better, and all the Timber it is built of, good and well dovetail'd at the Angles: it will not be totaly finished this Season, nor all the Barracks built; but we have fitted up some Wooden houses that were there, for

the Officers, with which they do tolerably well this Winter; the Men will be all in Barracks. In this Fort there are large Casemates. There was work proposed in the Island, to Strengthen it; but I was not able to finish it, I have not begun it.

In a former letter, I said it would be formidable, it will so; but since that I have Surveyed & Measured it, and find there has been great faults in the Construction for they have not taken the proper care of the Line of Defense, by which the Faces of the Bastions are not properly defended, and one of these draws no fire at all from it's opposite Flank. (End on Page 8).....

(Start on Page 27) I am in hopes, that before this the Plan I in general laid before You, for changing the War in this County, from a defensive one (which the extent of your Frontiers and the Situation of the Enemy, renders impossible to maintain without great Expenses and very great losses,) into an Offensive one, by attacking Quebec by the River St. Laurence; had been under Consideration. If that measure be approved of, there will be several things necessary, to make the Measure effectual.

In the first place, you will be so good as to consider the Troops here, and that in effect we have last two Battalions of them; I ought rather to have said, that there are two Battalions, which are reckoned a part of the Force here, amounting to two thousand Men, that never were Soldiers, and are now together not three hundred; that a great part of the other Troops are still to raise, and will require most of the Recruits this Country can furnish in one Year to compleat them.

The next consideration will be a Fleet sufficient to protect those troops in the Transports, for without that, they would probably never arrive at Quebeck: and if they did, and Succeeded in the Siege, they might be blockt up there without a possibility of returning; And if that Fleet is not ready at Halifax early to proceed, the opportunity probably will be lost, and all this Country thrown open to the Ravages of the Enemy. What I call early is the first of May, in order to set out the moment the River St. Laurence is free from Ice.

From all I can learn from the People who have lived in Canada, altho' it is some Years, June, before the Ice is all gone off; it often happens that there is little Ice in it; and this Year, Mr. Montcalm Landed at Quebeck on the 16th. of June. If we are to go, we ought to be there the moment the Ice will permit, otherwise the Lakes will open, and that happens, the Enemy will be at Liberty to pour in their Force into this Country, when we are gone from it; And I will venture to assure You, that whenever it appears the Enemy will be informed of it from this Country.

I hope with this Fleet there will be four bomb Ketches, as they will be very necessary in the Siege: the Town lying on the Side of the River, and part above the Cliff, on the last of which the Attack by Land Forces must begin; but of this Mr. McKellar, if he is arrived, can much better inform You.

There is one more thing I must mention, which is Artillery; here we have no brass Guns larger than 12 pounders, and of them but ten, which are too small for Battering the Walls there, so that I hope you will send us 24 Pounders for that purpose, for altho' we can have Iron ones here, they are liable to so many objection. that I hope you will not trust to them: in the first place, the Ground is extremely Steep, they must be drawn up in order to put them on the Batteries, and they are so heavy, that it is extremely difficult in the City to get them up, and must protect the Siege very much, if we are able to conquer that difficulty, in the next place, they will not bear any degree of Quick Fires without bursting, which must protract the Siege likewise, and make the Gunner very Shy in working them. And a few 13 Inch brass Mortars will be absolutely necessary with their Shells (End on Page 31).....

(Start of Page 45) *I had the honor of a Letter from Lord Barrington, Secretary of War, which I received about a week ago, by a Ship from London, Acquainting me that His Majesty had ordered Major General O'Farels Regiment (22nd) to Nova Scotia and twenty four additional Companies from Ireland, to compleat the Regiments there to the present Establishment, and that those Men are likewise under my Command.*

And I have no particular directions about them, and I do not know, either the Numbers Major O'Farels Regiment consist of at present or are to be on this Establishment, and as the numbers of the three Regiments now in Nova Scotia are greatly changed, as you will see by the returns of the 1st. of October, which are the last returns come to my hands, that they wanted but four hundred Men of being compleat; and as I have an Account of above one hundred Men having Joined Mr. Hobson's Regiment, since that return, and a great many Recruits having Joined the other Regiments.

I propose to prevent such a number of Men being lost to the Service in this Country, where Recruits come in very Slowly at present, to send an Officer to Halifax, to see these Men fairly drafted, and the four Regiments compleated, and to transfer the remainder to the Royal Americans, to afsist in compleating them (End Page 47).....

(Start Page 51) *I perceive in acquainting You with what past with the Commifsioners of Boston, I forget to recommend their case to you, which I promised to do, and now do most earnestly, and if things go well, when I am in Boston, shall beg leave to report it from thence. I have the honor to be with the greatest Respect.*

*Sir,
Your Most Obedient and
Most Humble Servant
Loudoun*

New York December 26th.

Comment: The disposition of the British regulars that would serve under Webb is fully detailed (Winter 1756-1757). To avoid interference from the Governor of New York (Hardy), Loudoun positioned all the Independent Companies outside New York. With regards to Webb's command, only the 35th Regiment was anywhere close to where they would be positioned for the 1757 Campaign Season. The 3rd of the 60th winters in Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. The availability of the New York "winter" provincial regiment allowed Loudoun to keep his regular regiments from being broken into multiple smaller detachments of only one or two companies.

Unlike the 1755 and 1756 Campaigns, Loudoun only advocates a single expedition — Quebec/Louisbourg. The squabbling between competing expeditions would end. Supply would be via ship without reliance on bateaux or primitive roads. Wagons, draft teams, and drivers would be luxury, but not a requirement, at least not in high numbers. The lack of fodder would not be a persistent and nagging problem. Half the army would not be needed to secure supply lines.

Loudoun was fully aware that only by arriving off Quebec in the spring or early summer could his strategy prevent the French from moving south. In repeated emphasis, Loudoun focuses on advancing on Quebec as soon as the *Ice* is off the St. Lawrence River. Loudoun strongly writes that if he is late reaching Quebec and the French advance south, the consequences could be severe.

At this time, Loudoun's focus is on Quebec, not Louisbourg. Although "ice" is not a problem at Louisbourg, fog is. During the summer months, warm moist air from the southwest meets the cold ocean waters with the potential to generate prolonged periods of dense fog. Besides increasing the difficulties and hazards of conducting amphibious operations, the frequent summer fogs made gathering intelligence on enemy naval movements and capabilities often a matter of luck. Hurricane season starts in September. As with Quebec, Louisbourg had to be attacked early in the season.

Loudoun wants only brass guns for the 1757 Campaign. He sees no advantages inherent to the use of iron guns and rejects the idea that iron guns can be fired at a quicker rate than brass guns.

As regards recruiting, the letter is at times confusing, if not contradictory. The letter was written over the course of a month; but in between, there was an unexpected development. Drafts to fill out depleted regiments were being sent from Europe under the assumption that recruiting would remain poor in the Americas. Loudoun shared a similar view. Unexpectedly, the recruiting goes better than anticipated, particularly in Nova Scotia, and Loudoun now needs to make sure that no formation was above authorized levels or there would be insufficient funds to pay those regiments, running foul of the Paymaster General. In case any regiment was over the allotted number of men, Loudoun sends an officer to supervise the transfers making sure that these excess men were not simply the dredges of the parent regiment.

Pargellis (1933, Page 235) indicates that Webb's formations did not benefit from this apparent boon and remained well understrength during Summer 1757. The four Independent Companies had a combined strength of just 243 men; the 3rd of the 60th had only 727 men. If there were excess men, many of these men were likely assigned to the 2nd and 4th of the 60th while they were in Halifax. Evidence of these excess men appears in the December Return of the 35th where some 195 drafts from four other regiments join the 35th (LO 6751 — 17th, 59th, 77th, and 78th). In December 1757, the 3rd of the 60th joins 390 drafts (LO 5249 — 19th, 23rd, 31st, 33rd, 36th, and 56th Foot).

Starting in Fall 1756, Loudoun wrote long and sometimes open-date letters to both the Duke of Cumberland and Henry Fox (Secretary of State, Southern Department). MANA does not offer the LO identifiers.

August 20, 1756 - Loudoun to Cumberland, MANA Page 223.

August 21, 1756 – Loudoun to Fox, LO 1543 A & B.

August 29, 1756 – Loudoun to Cumberland, MANA Page 230; CO 5/47 Part 2 028

October 2, 1756 – Loudoun to Cumberland, LO 1948. MANA Page 233.

October 3, 1776 – Loudoun to Fox, LO 1961; CO 5/47 Part 2 029

October 3, 1756 – Loudoun to Cumberland, LO 1968. MANA Page 239.

November 22 - December 26, 1756. Loudoun to Fox (CO_5_48_001).

November 22 to December 26, 1756. Loudoun to Cumberland, LO 2262. MANA Page 263.

January 5, 1757. Loudoun to Cumberland, LO 2637. MANA Page 290.

March 8, 1757. Loudoun to Cumberland. MANA Page 317. Reportedly, not at the Huntington Library.

From Pitt to Loudoun, LO 2322, December 7, 1756. Received by Loudoun the first week in March (reference LO 3004, Loudoun to Pitt, March 10, 1757).

Whitehall 7th Dec^r. 1756.

My Lord,

The King having been graciously pleased to appoint me to be His Principal Secretary of State for the Southern Department, in the room of M^r. Fox; I am to desire that Your Lordship would for the future, address Your Letters to me, which I shall not fail to lay regularly before His Majesty, & to transmit to Your Lordship, such Orders, and Instructions, as the King shall think proper to give for Your Guidance, and Direction.

Your Lordship will see His Majesty's Sentiments, on the present Situation of Pulick Affairs, expressed in the inclosed Most Gracious Speech, with which the King opened the Parliament on Thursday the 2^d: Instant, I also inclose to Your Lordship, the Addreses which both Houses, have since presented in Answer thereto.

*I am with great Truth and Respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's
most obedient
Humble Servant.
W. Pitt*

P.S. Your Lordship's Letters of Aug^t. 29th. Oct. 3^d. 8th. & 12th. have been received.

Comment: The letters referenced immediately above are from Loudoun to Fox, not Pitt or Cumberland — Loudoun to Fox (August 29th, CO 5/47 Part 2 028); Loudoun to Fox (October 3rd, CO 5/47 Part 2 029); Loudoun to Fox (October 8th, CO 5/47 Part 3 023); Loudoun to Fox (October 12th, CO 5/47 Part 3 037); plus there are three additional letters in this chain, Loudoun to Fox (January 4, 1757; CO 5/48 013), Loudoun to Fox (January 25, 1757; CO 5/48 022) and Loudoun to Fox (February 8, 1757; CO 5/48 023). The most important letter to Fox is the November 22 - December 26th letter, partially transcribed above. Many of the Pitt Letters are found in Kimball (Volume 1, 1906). The letters from Loudoun to Cumberland dated August 29th and October 3rd are found in MANA, Pages 230 and 239, respectively. Loudoun was often writing letters to Fox/Pitt and Cumberland on the same day, but these letters are not duplicates. Pitt had a decidedly dim view of this practice of Loudoun writing to Cumberland, who was not part of Pitt's government.

From Pitt to Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia, December 22, 1756 (Kimball 1906, Page 1):

Sir,

Whitehall, Dec^r. 22^d, 1756.

The Dangers which North America stands exposed has determined the King to take vigorous & effectual Measures to stop the Progress of the Enemy, & to annoy them, if possible, in their own possessions. It is therefore the Kings intention to cause a Squadron of Warships, together with a considerable Land Force, to proceed shortly to North America, whereof 2,000 men will be forthwith sent to Halifax; & I am to signify to you the King's Pleasure, that you do the necessary Preparation for receiving & accommodating the said Troops upon their Arrival in your Government, and that you do follow such Directions, as you shall receive from the Earl of Loudoun, who is more acquainted with the King's Intentions upon this Occasion.

His Majesty Hopes, that with the precautions with the Advice of the Council at Halifax, against any Attempt, that the enemy may take on the Isthmus of Chignecto (on Nova Scotia), by the Detachment of Force from Canada, be sufficient to disappoint it, and that you will continue to exert your Diligence to secure Every Part of your Government, by the proper Application of the Force within it; which you will be better able to do, if Major Hale, whom you mentioned in your Letter of Aug^t. 5^t., to have dispatched to Louisbourg, (but of whom We have since had no account here) has succeeded so far in his Commission, as to discover the real Strength and Designs of the Enemy.

I am etc.

W. Pitt.

P.S. Your Letter of Nov^r. 3^d has been received this Day.

From Pitt to Loudoun, LO 2383, December 22, 1756. Received by Loudoun the first week in March (reference LO 3004, Loudoun to Pitt, March 10, 1757):

Whitehall December 22. 1756.

My Lord,

The King having taken into His Most serious Consideration, the Dangers to which His Majesty's Colonies stand exposed from Our late Losses in those Parts, and the Supplies of Forces, Artillery, Stores, and Provisions, which the French have sent, and are sending to North America, His Majesty thinks it absolutely necessary to cause a Plan of vigorous and offensive Operations to be concerted, without Loss of Time, and executed under your Lordship's Direction, as early as possible, in the ensuing critical and important Campaign. For this Purpose, Orders will be shortly given for an Expedition of Weight consisting, if possible, of 8000 Land Forces with a sufficient Squadron of Ships of War; 2000 of the said Forces will be forthwith sent to Halifax, without waiting for the Remainder, which will follow with the utmost Dispatch: Your Lordship therefore cannot be too early in taking such Steps, as may effectively enable you to supply this Body of Troops, upon their Arrival, with Provisions, and all other Requisites, incident to the Expedition of this Importance and Extent, upon which I shall, probably, very soon receive His Majesty's Commands to send you fuller Explanations and Instructions, as to Its' immediate Object, and Execution: In the mean Time, I cannot delay doing Justice to the various Instances of Diligence and Activity in your Command, which are visible from your Letters, as well as from M^r Pownall's Accounts (Thomas Pownall, Governor of Massachusetts); and acquainting your Lordship, that your Sentiments concerning the fruitless & impracticable Measures of a Defensive War in America; as well as your Opinions, relating to the proper Methods of acting Offensively, with a reasonable Prospect of any effectual & decisive Impressions upon the Enemy there, correspond, in a great Degree, with His Majesty's Views & Intentions.

Your Lordship has judged very well in not taking any Steps for recruiting Shirley's & Pepperrell's Regiments, which, (a few Men excepted) were taken at Oswego, and 400 of which, your Lordship will probably have heard, were, soon afterwards, sent of Board a French Ship, with a Flag of Truce, to England, by the Governor of Canada, but not being any Cartel, or Agreement, for the Exchange of Prisoners, settled between the Two Crowns, the said Ship still continues at Spithead, with that Part of the Garrison above mentioned on Board. The Recruiting and Compleating the other Regiments, it is hoped, will meet with Success; And it is strongly recommended to your Lordship to exert, in a particular Manner, on this Occasion, that Application, and Zeal, for the King's Service, which appear in all your Conduct, in order that all the Corps, now under your Lordship's Command, may be in good Condition to enter vigorously upon Action, very early in the Spring. With regards to the Doubt your Lordship mentions, how far the Mutiny & Desertion Bill extends to the quartering of Troops in America, you may be assured, Care will be taken, this Session, to insert such Words therein, as will entirely clear up this Point: With respect to the Application of the Non Effective Money, I am to acquaint your Lordship, that the Lords of the Treasury having acquainted me with their Opinion upon that Point, it is the King's Pleasure that you should grant Warrants on the Deputy Pay Master General in America, for such Sums, as you shall think proper, and the Service shall necessarily require for the Recruiting of the several Regiments under your Command: This Money is to be issued by the Deputy Pay Master General,

out of the Subsistence of the respective Regiments remaining in his Hands; And, on your Lordship's being satisfied with the Justness of the Accounts given in by several Regiments of the Application of the said Sums, so issued, to the Recruiting Service only; you may in like Manner from time to time, order to be issued such further Sums for Recruiting the said Regiments, as your Lordships shall see proper.

I cannot conclude this Letter, without giving your Lordship the Satisfaction to know, that M^r. Shirley, since his Return to England, has not had any Countenance, or Regards, shewn Him, that can be Injurious to your Lordship, or prejudicial to His Majesty's Service in North America, nor will any partial Representations, He can make, have any Weight, But on the contrary, the Circumstances of His Conduct, mentioned in your Lordship's several Letters, will, I doubt not, soon undergo the Examination, which the Nature of them, in Justice, requires,

*I am with great Truth and Respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's
most obedient
Humble Servant.
W. Pitt*

P.S. I send your Lordship inclosed a Copy of a Letter I have wrote, by the King's Order, to Governor Lawrence.

From Cumberland to Loudoun, December 23, 1756 (MANA, Page 262):

most private,

St James Dec^r 23^d, 1756.

"my Lord Loudoun, I write this private Letter to you to assure you of the thorough Satisfaction your Conduct has given me & will not fail to support you to the utmost, of my Power through the many difficulties you find in the executing of your orders & in opposition to the public Service.

Nothing can be worst that our Situation here at home, without any Plan, or even a Desire to have one. great Numbers talked of to be Sent you, but without any Consideration of how, & whence, without considering what they Should carry with them. But, that you may know what can be done for you, I write in my own Hand, trusting to your Honour that you will burn this as Soon as read.

The King will Spare you five old Battalions from Europe & two thousand new raised Highlanders, which will make 6,000 men, officers included: & I will Send a proper Train of Artillery with them. Prepare your own Plan for one army up the S^t Lawrence River, & for the other to keep your enemy in check, from where your army now is. I will Send you my Thoughts more fully with a Plan of mine for your operations, which you Shall be left at Liberty, either to adopt, in part, or not at all, as you Shall find it proper, from your better Information. I don't doubt a moment of your burning this Letter. So don't answer it; but Send your Plan & Thoughts without taking any Notice of this most private Letter. I remain very Sincerely your most affectionate Friend."

Comment: This letter is Cumberland's response to two letters written by Loudoun in the first week of October. The letters found in *Military Affairs in North America* (Pargellis 1936) are based on manuscripts found among the Cumberland Papers in England. Cumberland served as the General in Chief Command of the British Army from 1745 until October 24, 1757. In all likelihood, this letter is Cumberland's own copy, so it survived the instructions to burn it. Even if authored by Loudoun, these Cumberland Paper manuscripts will not have a LO identifier.

Lord Loudoun in North America (Pargellis 1933) is largely based on Loudoun's Papers housed at the Huntington Library in California. Most manuscripts found cited in *Lord Loudoun in North America* have a LO number attached. This letter does not appear to be within the Huntington Collection. It seems that Loudoun burned his copy as directed by Cumberland.

Copies of the same letters will frequently appear in both institutions, but the spelling and grammar will not be the same in both documents. Passages can often be omitted, and errors will occur, particularly around dates and numbers.

From Pitt to Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia (Kimball 1906, Page 2):

Sir,

Whitehall, Feb^y. 4th. 1757.

*By my letter of 22^d Decem^r., you were informed of His Majesty's Intentions to Send a Considerable Land Force, with a Squadron of Ships of War, to N. America, whereof 2,000 men were to proceed forthwith to Halifax; I have now the King's Command to acquaint you, that the Second Battalion of the Royals, augmented to the Number of 1,000 men, with Six regiments, Mentioned in the Margins, consisting Each of 815 Men, are ordered for Embarkation, and it is hoped will sail for Corke, the last days of this Month, for Halifax, together with a Train of Artillery, Ordnance Stores, Six *** Engineers, and Four Companies of the * Artillery Regiment. You will receive more particular Directions from the Earl of Loudoun, with regard the future Disposition of these troops &c., I am therefore now only to signify to you the King's Pleasure, that you should immediately, upon receipt of this letter, making all necessary Preparations for receiving and accommodating the Forces above mentioned, at, and near Halifax, and that you should particularly collect together, as large a Quantity, as possible, of Provisions, and all other kinds of Refreshments, for the Troops on their Arrival. Care has been taken here, to put on board the Transports for 2,000 of these men, Four Months of Beef and Pork, Ten Weeks of other Species, except Beer & Malt Spirits, of which they have the same Proportion as supplied for the two Regiments sent to N. America, in 1754. The rest of the Transports are victualled with 3 Months Beef & Pork, and 2 Months of all other Species, and Orders are also given for landings with Troops in America, the whole or such part of the Sea Bedding, as shall be required by you, or the Earl of Loudoun, for the use of the Men on Shore.*

The punctual Execution of these Orders, is so very Material, that His Majesty doubts not, from the Zeal and Activity you have hitherto shown, in His Service, but you will exert your utmost Diligence on this Occasion.

I am &c:—

W. Pitt.

The margin note of the Regular Regiments being sent to Halifax has just the names of the Colonels listed: *Richbell's* (17th), *Bragg's* (28th), *Blakeney's* (27th), *Kennedy's* (43rd), *Murray's* (46th), and *Perry's* (55th). The Second Battalion of the Royals is a reference to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Foot (Royal Scots), not the Royal Americans.

From Pitt to Loudoun, LO 2765, February 4, 1757. Received May 1st:

Whitehall 4th Feby 1757.

My Lord,

By my former Dispatch of 22^d December your Lordship will have been informed of The King's Intentions, to send, early in the Year, an Embarkation of Land Forces, consisting, if possible, of 8,000 Men, and a strong Squadron of Ships of War, to N. America.

I am now commanded by His Majesty, to acquaint your Lordship, that the Preparations for this Expedition are making with all Diligence, and that It is hoped, that the Second Battalion of the Royals (2nd Battalion of 1st Foot), augmented to the Number 1,000 Men, and the Six Regiments mentioned in the Margin, consisting Each of 815 Men, Officers included, all which are ordered for Embarkation together with a Train of Artillery, Ordnance, Stores, Six Engineers, and Four Companies of the Regiment of Artillery, will sail from Cork the last Days of this Month, for Halifax. Two Battalions, now raising in the Highlands, consisting of 1000 Men Each, under the Command of Lieut. Colonel Montgomery, and Lieut. Col. Fraser. It is also hoped, will be ready to follow, by the very beginning of April.

As there is the greatest Reason to believe, that the several Corps already under your Lordship's Command, are, or may be very soon, compleat: and that, together with the above Reinforcement, from Ireland, of Seven Battalions, they will form, early in the Spring, an Army of near 17,000 Men, His Majesty doubts not, but with such a Force, supplied with Artillery, and supported with a strong Squadron, your Lordship will find yourself in a Condition to push, with the utmost Vigor, and offensive War, and to effectuate some great and essential Impresions on the Enemy. The King is of Opinion, that the taking of Louisbourg, and Quebeck, can alone prove decisive; but as the Success of both Enterprises may depend on Circumstance, not to be known here, His Majesty is pleased to leave some Latitude to your Lordship's Discretion and Judgement, to decide on the Time and Manner of Carrying these Attempts into Execution: Nevertheless, I am to acquaint your Lordship, that The King depending on your known Ability, and great Zeal for His Service, expects the utmost Activity & Vigour in this critical, & important Campaign: It is therefore His Majesty's pleasure, that your Lordship should forthwith so dispose the Forces, now in America; and make all such necessary Preparations of Victuals, and Transports, and all other Requisites, for the same; as well as obtain, by all possible Means, the best Intelligences, & Informations, relative to Louisbourg, and to the Navigation of the River S^t. Lawrence to Quebeck, as may enable your Lordship, on the Arrival of the Reinforcement from Ireland, immediately to attack Louisbourg with such a Force, by Sea & Land, as may be judged sufficient to carry that important Fortreſs; And as there is the highest Probability, in Case the Troops from Ireland arrive, by the Time intended, in the Month of April, that this Attempt may have It's Issue, by about the End of May, or the Beginning of June, the Season will be then to properest for the Navigation of the River St. Lawrence to Quebeck; To the Attack of which Place, It is the King's Pleasure, your Lordship should, without Loss of Time, next proceed; And as in this arduous & different Enterprise, your Lordship will probably meet the best and greatest Part of the French Forces in America. It is the King's Pleasure, that your Lordship should collect as many of the Troops under your Command, as can possibly be spared from other Services absolutely necessary, in order to go, with an adequate Strength, to this hazardous and decisive Enterprise.

I am further to acquaint your Lordship, it is His Majesty's Pleasure, that you do repair to Halifax, as soon as the several Services under your Care, will allow, in order to be ready, on the Arrival of the Troops from Ireland, to begin forthwith, if the Season permits, the abovementioned Operations of the Campaign; and that you do order such of the Engineers in America, as you shall think proper, to be at Halifax by the same Time. Your Lordship also, will not fail to employ, the most particular Diligence to procure, if possible, Pilots well skilled and experienced in the Navigation of the River S^t. Lawrence, This being a Circumstance of the utmost Importance.

I am likewise commanded by The King to signify to your Lordships His Majesty's Pleasure, at you should immediately send, in the Manner you shall judge most expeditious, either by Sea or Land, under the Command of a proper Officer, to Virginia, a Battalion of Royal Americans, or the like Number of any Regular Forces, which your Lordship shall judge, from their Situation, or other Circumstance, more applicable to this Service, to be employed in such Manner, for the Succour and Defence of the said Province of Virginia, South Carolina, or any other of the Southern Colonies, as the Danger and Exigency may require.

I send you Lordship inclosed Copies of the Circular Letters, I have wrote, by His Majesty's Command, to the several Governments of the Northern & Southern Colonies, by which your Lordship will see the strong and pressing Orders to Them for raising as great a Number of Provincial Forces as possible, for the ensuing Campaign; and His Majesty's doubts not but your Lordship will do every thing that depends upon you, to assist and quicken the Execution of the said necessary Service.

That your Lordship may be informed, as minutely as possible, of every Thing relating to this intended Expedition. I am further to acquaint you, that the Transports for 2000 of the Troops from Ireland, are victualled with four Months of Beef and Pork, Ten Weeks of other Species, except Beer and Malt Spirits, of which they have the same Proportion as was supplied for the two Regiments, sent to North America in 1754. The Rest of the Transports are victualled with Three Months Beef & Pork, and Two Months of all other Species. Orders are also given for Landings with the Troops in America, the whole or such part of the Sea Bedding, as shall be required by your Lordship, or Governor Lawrence, for the Use of Men on Shore.

With regard to the Words, your Lordship wished to have added to the Mutiny Bill, for Quartersing Troops in America, I am to inform you, that it is apprehended the Insertion of any such Words would not effectively answer the Purpose intended by them; and therefore It is now under Consideration, how far a Provision of that Sort may be framed by a separate Act of Parliament.

*I am with great Truth and Respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's
most obedient
Humble Servant.
W. Pitt*

P.S. I send your Lordship inclosed a Copy of my Letter to Governor Lawrence directing Him to make all possible Preparations for the Reception of the Troops from Ireland.

The margin note of the Regular Regiments being sent to Halifax has just the names of the Colonels listed: *Richbell's* (17th), *Bragg's* (28th), *Blakeney's* (27th), *Kennedy's* (43rd), *Murray's* (46th), and *Perry's* (55th). The Second Battalion of the Royals is a reference to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Foot (Royal Scots), not the Royal Americans.

Comment: This is Pitt's letter ordering Loudoun to attack Louisbourg before moving on Quebec, received May 1st. Before receiving this letter, Loudoun's focus is on Quebec, not Louisbourg. The timelines described by Pitt were already in shambles. It was hoped the battalions from Europe would be arriving at Halifax in April; they would not arrive until July. Although Pitt mandates that Louisbourg be attacked first, Pitt does not evaluate the need to reinforce New York.

From Pitt to Governors in North America, February 19, 1757 (Kimball 1906, Page 9):

Sir,

Whitehall, February 19th, 1757.

Having in my Letter of the 4th Instant informed you that it was the King's Intention to send a strong Squadron of Ships of War to North America. I am now to acquaint You, that His Majesty has been pleased to appoint Rear Admiral Holburne to command said Squadron, and it is the King's Pleasure, That in case any Naval Assistance shall be wanted for the Protection of your Government, you should apply for the same to the said Rear Admiral, or to the Commander in Chief for the Time being, of this Majesty's Ships in those Seas, who will send you such Assistance as He may be able to do, consistently with the Service, with which He is charged by his Majesty's instructions; and you will regularly communicate to the said Commander all such Intelligence as shall come to your knowledge, concerning the Arrival of any ships of War, or Vessels having Warlike Stores on Board; and likewise all such Advices as may concern their Motions, and Destination, or in any Manner relate to that part of His Majesty's Service, with which Commanders of King's Ships should be acquainted; And for the better Execution of the Orders sent you in this letter, you will be diligent in Employing proper Persons and Vessels, not only to procure you the earliest Intelligence, but likewise to be dispatched from Time to Time, to the said Commander of His Majesty's Ships with such accounts as you shall occasion to Communicate to Him.

It is also his Majesty's further Pleasure that you use all /t Methods, whenever the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Ships shall apply to you, to raise such a number of seamen from Time to Time, as shall be wanted to recruit the Ships in North America.

I am &c:—

W. Pitt.

From Pitt to Loudoun, LO 2859, February 19, 1757. Received by Loudoun, May 11, 1757 (reference MANA, Page 349):

My Lord,

Whitehall Feb^{ry}. 19th. 1757.

Your Lordship's Letters of the 22^d of November, and 26th December, and the 4th past, were received the 11th instant, and immediately laid before the King.

Your Lordship is, I hope, already informed, by the Letter of the 4th. instant (of which I send a Triplicate by this Conveyance) of the Reinforcement, His Majesty has been pleased to send to North America, in order to enable your Lordship to act offensively, in Consequence of your Lordship's Representations, concerning the Difficulty and Inutility of a Defensive War in those Parts; And the King's Views and Intentions are so fully explained in my Letter above mentioned, that I have Nothing to add on that Subject, but to inform your Lordship that Major Gen^l Hopson has been ordered to command the Battalion, and Six Regiments to be embarked at Cork, during their Passage to America, where he is to act under your Lordship, as Major General. I am also to transmit to your Lordship the inclosed additional Instructions, which His Majesty has been pleased to sign, for your Conduct, in the Execution of the joint Operations to be carried on between the Land and Sea Forces, and Distribution of such Booty as may be taken from the Enemy, in this Expedition: all which have been prepared conformable to what has been the practice on like Occasions. Rear Admiral Holburne, whom the King has been pleased to appoint to command the Fleet in North America, has also similar Instructions; and His Majesty's does not doubt, but there will be that entire Harmony, between your Lordship and the Admiral, as cannot but have the best Effect in the Execution of your joint Commissions.

Your Lordship will see, by the inclosed List of the Artillery, and Ordnance Stores, embarked for this Expedition, that Care has been already taken, for sending a Number of Brafs Cannon of 24 Pounders and 13 Inch Mortars, which your Lordship, in your Letter represents as absolutely necessary: One Bomb Ketch, which was prepared before your Letters were received will proceed with the Fleet; And as your Lordship represents the great Utility of those Vessels, two more Sloops were immediately ordered to be fitted for that purpose, and will follow, as soon as they can be got ready; And as these are the only Vessels, in the King's Service, it is hoped, no material Inconvenience will arise from the Number being one short of what your Lordship desired: And Rear Admiral Holburne being empowered to retain, or discharge, the Transports from England, as he shall in Conjunction with your Lordship, think most expedient, it is hoped, no Delay will arise, tho' you should not be able to procure a sufficient Number of Vessels in America.

The Fleet being so near sailing does not allow me to answer, particularly, some Points contained in your Lordship's Dispatches; but I would not delay giving your Lordship the Satisfaction of knowing, that the King entirely approves your Conduct in the Execution of your extensive Command. The Ranging Companies, your Lordship proposes to keep up, must certainly be of great Use; and His Majesty is pleased to allow your Lordship to raise such a Number of them, as you shall judge necessary for the Service. The King was very glad to find, that your Lordship had been able, on your Arrival at New York, to remove the Difficulties that had arisen, with regard to Quartersing the Troops, and His Majesty hopes the other Provinces will be induced to follow so good an Example, especially as several of them seem, by the Letter your Lordship transmits, to be better disposed to assist the general Service, than they had hitherto shewn themselves to be.

With Regard to the Allowance of two hundred Pounds a Year, Sir William Johnson desires may be given for M^r. Croghan, as his Afsistant; tho' it is much to be wished, that any additional Expençe could be avoided, the King will not finally object to your Lordship's making that Allowance in case you judge it expedient and advisable. And as to the List your Lordship inclosed of Goods for the Indians, which you advise be bought in England, I will take the first Opportunity of talking with the Earl of Halifax on that Subject (President of Board of Trade).

The King very much approves of the Present your Lordship designed to make Colonel Meserve of the New Hampshire Regiment, and if you think it proper, your Lordship may exprefs, to that Gentleman, the gracious Sense the King has of the Zeal and Diligence he has shewed in the Service.

His Majesty was extremely glad to find, that your Lordship had got some Trace of a Person, who may be supposed to have been the Author of the intercepted Letter from America; His Majesty is persuaded your Lordship will exert your usual Diligence on this Occasion, and the King will be impatient to hear the Result of the Inquiry Colonel Stanwix was gone to make at Philadelphia with regard to this Person.

I must not omit to acquaint your Lordship, that the King has thought proper to direct that the two Regiments, late under the Command of Maj^r Gen^l Shirley and Sir William Pepperrell should be broke; But Means having been taken to set at Liberty such part of their Men belonging to them, as had been sent from Canada to England, They will be incorporated into the Battalion and Regiments, ordered to America, from Ireland.

*I am with great Truth and Respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's
most obedient
Humble Servant.
W. Pitt*

P.S. I send your Lordship inclosed Copies of His Majesty's Instructions to Rear Admiral Holburne, & Maj^r Gen^l Hopson.

Comment: This letter contains this curious passage: *The King very much approves of the Present your Lordship designed to make Colonel Meserve of the New Hampshire Regiment, and if you think it proper, your Lordship may exprefs, to that Gentleman, the gracious Sense the King has of the Zeal and Diligence he has shewed in the Service.*

In a letter from Loudoun to Fox, November 22 - December 26, 1756 (CO_5_48_001, Page 11):

"The most useful man I have found among the Provincials, is a Colonel Meserve, who Commands the Regiment from New Hampshire; he is a Shipbuilder, & is an Active Sensible Man that has no Scruples, but is ready to do whatever you desire of him; he has built us a bridge from Fort Edward to the Island; he has built us large flat bottomed boats, for passing rivers and carrying great Loads; he has greatly assisted us in carrying on the Fortifications; and now at last, has got his people to engage by the Piece, to finish some of the Barracks, and to raise one whole face of the Fort five feet, much cheaper than we could have done it; And by him, I have got a large Quantity of Timber cut, to be floated down, here for making carriages for Cannon, which almost all I have seen in this Country stand much in need of; and there is very little to be got, and that very dear; by this means I shall have a very large Stock Provided, at no other Expence, but the Cutting & Floating down; and in a little time, have Season'd Wood, which is a thing not found in this Country at present. As he has received nothing for his labours and Pains (for the Colonel does not scruple to work with an Ax, when he sees other People do not do it to his liking;) I propose to make him a Present of a Piece of Plate of the value of Twenty five or Thirty Pounds, which will make him happy, and I hope, raise an Emulation among the others. This is the only gratuity I have yet proposed to give."

The problem with rotting gun carriages first identified during Johnson's Expedition (1755) has still not been solved. Meserve having "no Scruples" is better thought of as "no Scruples or hesitancy about doing work."

Loudoun gives Meserve a pair of silver sauce boats bearing the inscription: *"From the Right Honorable the Earl of Loudoun, Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America to Col. Nathaniel Meserve of New Hampshire in testimony of his Lordship's approbation of his Good Service at Ft. Edward in 1756."*

On the reverse side is engraved the Crown and *G. II. R.* (Portsmouth New Hampshire Herald, Friday, Jun 17, 1938).

Meserve may have been the shipwright who directed the building of the 1756 Lake George "navy" under John Winslow. With the cancellation of the shipbuilding efforts on Lake George that August, Meserve may then have moved on to Fort Edward and continued his work there. Meserve was with Loudoun in Halifax in 1757. For the 1758 Campaign Season, Loudoun asks that Meserve and his carpenters head to Albany as early in the spring as possible (Kimball 1906, Page 208). Pitt disagreed and had Meserve assigned to Louisbourg. Meserve and the vast majority of his company die from smallpox while at Louisbourg; the disease had spread through the company while shipborne from Halifax. From Pitt to Abercromby, December 30, 1757 (Kimball 1906; Page 150 and CO 5/212, 247):

"The King having been informed, that Meserve, a Gentleman of New Hampshire, And who has, for the Two last Years, commanded the Troops of that Province, was engaged by the Earl of Loudoun to go with Him to Halifax, on the late intended Expedition to Louisbourg, to command and direct a Company of Sixty Carpenters; I am to signify to you His Majesty's Pleasure, that you do forthwith take the proper Steps to engage M^r Meserve to collect the Number of Eighty Carpenters, and to proceed with them, without Loss of Time to Halifax, in order that said Carpenters may be employed, under the Command of M^r Meserve, on such works, as shall be necessary, for the Operations of the

Troops, in the Siege of Louisbourg, or in such other manner as the Commander in Chief of the King's Forces on that Expedition shall judge proper:—And, in case You think it expedient, You will endeavour to prevail on M^r. Meserve to decline accepting the Command of the New Hampshire Troops, the ensuing Campaign, in order that His whole Time and Attention may be employed on the above most essential Service.

I am &c: W. Pitt

P.S. I am further to signify to You the Kings Pleasure that you do procure such a Number of Battoe Men, as You shall judge necessary, for the Service of the Boats Attending the Troops; And Men sufficient for Navigating the Vessels."

The artillery shipped to Halifax is seen as a bottom note in Pargellis (1933, Page 233). From England, Pitt was sending an additional eighteen heavy brass 24-pounders, twelve heavy brass 12-pounders, four light brass 6-pounders, four royal 5 1/2-inch howitzers, two 13-inch mortars, two 10-inch mortars, four 8-inch mortars, and thirty cohorn mortars (4 2/5-inch). These guns were in addition to brass pieces being brought from New York and other brass "salvaged" in Nova Scotia (See Page 136 of the Appendix). Most of these "North American" guns were brass mortars, the largest cannon being light brass 12-pounders for camp defense.

In 1758, Pitt would send a similar ordnance train to Abercromby for his campaign against Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) — six 24-pounders, six light 12-pounders, four royal 5 1/2-inch howitzers, two 10-inch mortars, two 8-inch mortars, and twenty 4 2/5-inch mortars (Nester 2008, Page 77; Pitt to Abercromby, CO_5_213_006). This last list seemingly dates to January 1758 and appears to have been augmented by the time the ship leaves England for North America, supplying Forbes' 1758 Duquesne Expedition as well (See Cubbison 2010, Page 27 for the ordnance stores shipped to Philadelphia in Spring 1758, with the idea that the ship docked in New York first to unload Abercromby's ordnance, seemingly adding heavy brass 12-pounders and possibly royal brass mortars to the trains). However, Abercromby's small arms and tools do not track to this Page 27 list, so additional shipping was needed. Both lists should be read together.

From Loudoun to Pitt, LO 3004, March 10, 1757:

New York March 10th 1757.

Sir,

I had the Honor to receive Your Letters of December 7th, & 22nd, on the Road from Boston.

Allow me in the first place to wish You Joy, on this new mark of His Majesty's favor, he has been pleased to shew You.

Since the Letters I wrote from Boston, the Afsemblies of Mafsachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, have agreed to furnish the proportion I desired of them to compleat the 4000 Men I asked from the four New England Governments: New Hampshire at such a distance, I have not had any returns from them, but have not the least doubt of their Compliance.

I have already ordered 200 of the New Hampshire Men into (Fort) N^o. 4 for the Security of that place; and all the others are to be ready to March by the 25th of this Month.

Since my arrival here, this Province have agreed, to compleat their Men to 1000; And the Afsembly of the Province of New Jersey, are to meet in a day or two to receive my demand of 1000 from them.

In consequence of His Majesty's Orders, and the Information You give me, of a strong Squadron & 8000 Men being to be sent out; for carrying on vigorous & Offensives measures; And that I could not be too early, in taking measures to protect all requisites, for an Expedition of such Importance and Extent; And that 2000 of the said Forces, would be forthwith sent to Halifax; (as I left Governor Lawrence at Boston, where I had Appointed him to meet me to concert the Military Affairs of Nova Scotia, and who was to return with Captain Rouse to his Government). Immediately dispatched an Exprefs to him, with the Copy of your Letter to him, which you had enclosed to me; with Orders, to prepare for the reception of those 2000 Men; and to Acquaint him with the Orders I had given, to Stow in Provisions for them. (John Rous, Royal Navy).

I likewise have given him Orders, to retain & refitt the Transports, in which these Troops come.

I at the same time, dispatched an Exprefs to M. G. Abercromby, at Albany, directing him to meet me at New York, to prepare for the Plan of the Campaign, in consequence of the Orders received from You.

I have in a former Letter, Acquainted the King's Ministers, that the recruiting had not gone in the Winter, in the manner I had reason to Expect, from the Succefs we had in the Summer, which has been principally owing to the Country's being drained of that sort of Men who List; and in the Americans, to the want of Serjeants and Corporals who were fit for the Service. I further Acquainted them, with part of M.G. O'Farrel's Regiment Additional Companies being arrived, with the purposes I proposed to apply those Corps to.

There Sail'd from Cork, 13 Transports, with a Store Ship for Halifax, under the Convoy of the Sutherland and Kennington. There arrived in this Port, Eight Transports, with the Storeship and

the Sutherland. At Philadelphia, there arrived 3 Transports; one of which was taken in her passage, by the Sephire (Zepher), a french frigate of 36 Guns, who took out of her 2 Officers, a Volunteer, their Servants & 59 Men; as they were not able to carry off the remainder, obliged Capt. Gmeeling, to subscribe a Capitulation, for himself & 140 Men, not to serve against the french for one Year; but it appears, only 124 Men remained in the Ship. Many particular Circumstances have attended this affair, of which only part is yet come to my knowledge, but I have enclosed such Affidavits as are some to my hands, Capt. Gmeeling being still at Philadelphia. (Gnielling, 60th Regiment of Foot).

There is one of the Transports got into Virginia, from whom I have yet no return of the numbers of Men: And it is reported, by a Capt. of a Ship, who came from Antigoa, that the other Transport with the Troops, was got in there some days before he left it. The Kennington parted from the Fleet in a Gale of Wind, and put into the Maderias (Portuguese), as reported from there: She has since put into Carolina, and is now on the way hither. In this Situation of things, I have not been able, to make any certain return of the number of Men which came in the Transports. The distribution I first proposed to have made of the Additional Companies was to compleat M.G. O'Farrells, to set aside 300 Men to compleat the Regiments in Nova Scotia; and to put the remainder into the Royal American Regiment.

But on receiving His Majesty's Orders, to break the 50th & 51st Regiments, Commanded by M.G. Shirley and M.G. Sir William Pepperrell, I sent an Order for Governor Lawrence (Nova Scotia), to draft those two Regiments, now at Boston, and to carry them with him, under Convoy of Capt. Rouse, to Halifax; then to turn over the Serjeants, Corporals, Drums and what private Men might be out a recruiting, including the Deserters, (that they might not benefit by the Regiments being broke) to the Royal American Regiment; And a third Order, to break the Regiments and put the Officers on half Pay, and to inform them of His Majesty's further Orders: by which means I shall be able, to throw in the greatest part of the 300 Men, reserved for the Nova Scotia Regiments into the Royal American Regiment, and save the Expence of Transporting these People back here.

I further directed Col. Lawrence, that if he found any danger of mutiny, in breaking those two Regiments, or in their being drafted, that he should send me an Exprefs, with all Accounts of it; in which Care, I would send Troops to put that Order in Execution. I took this precaution, as I dared not run any risk of losing so many Men in our present Situation.

I expect the return of my Exprefs, if it arrived before he Sail'd; or my Letters returned, if he was gone.

In Order to Obey the Orders you have sent me, preparing every thing necessary for the Campaign, I am under a necessity of forming a Plan for it: for the preparations must differ according to the Plan, and what would be absolutely necessary for one, would be uselefs for another.

I have formed this Plan, on the Information you have given me, of His Majesty's Intentions, of sending out 8000 Men, with a sufficient Squadron of Ships of War; And that the Plan I formally proposed, in a great measure Coincides with the Intentions of His Majesty's Ministers, from where I have no doubt, that these Intentions are, an attack on Quebec, by the River St. Lawrence; in which case I propose, for the Security of this Country, under the Command of M^r. Webb, first, for the

Defense of Fort William Henry & Fort Edward, and the Security of the Magazines at Albany, the 35th Regiment, Commanded by Lieutenant Gen^l. Otway, and a Battalion of the Royal American Regiment with the Provincial Troops; And the four Independent Companies on the Mohawk River; And I have provided Carriages for their Provisions, and I think, every thing necessary for their Support.

As soon as this Letter is finished, I go to Philadelphia, to meet with the Southern Governors to concert a Plan for their Security; where I leave another Battalion of the Royal American Regiment under the Command of Col. Stanwix.

A Plan has been proposed to me, of an Attack from that Quarter, on Fort DuQuesne, but a present, it does not appear to me to be proper to Execute; but on my return from Philadelphia, you shall have a full Account of my transactions there.

After the above Destinations, I hope by the time, we embark, the Troops will amount to 5000 Men of which I hope, 4500 will be fit for Service; which Joined with the 8000 to be sent out, and in case of Accidents happening to their coming out, 1000 which may be drawn from Nova Scotia, if the Situation of things at that time will permit, may be sufficient for the Attack of Quebec, if the French are prevented from throwing in Supplies from Europe.

I gave immediate Orders, for throwing in Provisions into Halifax; Also as I had provided Provisions before, for all the Troops here, I have given Orders to augment them in proportion, for those that are to come, and they will be ready.

I have kept and refitted, the Transports that came from Cork; I have ordered Governor Lawrence to do the same, with those that come to Halifax; and have applied to all the Governors from Boston to Virginia, both Inclusive, to lay on a general Embargo, in order to enable me to provide Transports, with which Sir Charles Hardy complied, the day I made the Application for this Port; and has been so good, as to take the Management and direction of hiring and fitting the Transports, which he understands much better then I do and leaves me at more leisure, to push on other parts of the Service. This Port already produced above half of the Ships wanted, but our distress lies, in providing Sailors and Water Casks; but I hope we shall get the better of these difficulties: this has obliged me, to apply to Capt. Falkingham of the Sutherland, to remain here, in order to assist, both in fitting the Transports and securing the Hands, which he has agreed to do; and I imagine, there can be no harm happen from it, as his Orders were to carry home the Virginia Trade, which cannot now go, till we are provided in Transports.

In the end of Your Letter, you have Acquainted me, that words shall be inserted in the Mustering Act, to take away doubt about the right of Quartering extending to America.

Note: The bulk of the remainder of the letter deals only with topics of Quartering and various Monies and Accounts.

When I written on that Subject, I was but just arrived, and the Troops were mostly Encamped; Since that, I have had disputes to Settle all over this Continent, in Settling the Winter Quarters for these Troops; from whence I find that the manner of Quartering in England, as in time of Peace, on Publick Houses only, will in no Shape answer the intent in this Country; further there

are few Publick Houses, and most of them sell nothing but Spirits, where they possess only one room in which they sell the Liquor, where Men cannot be Quartered.

Whilst the War lasts, Necefsity will Justify exceeding that Rule, as Troops must be under Cover, in the places where it is necefsary to post them, for the Security of the Country and carrying on the Service; but as soon as a Peace comes, it will by the English Rule, be impossible to Quarter any number of Troops in this Country, without new Regulation; and the only remedy that occurs to me at present, is adopting the method of Quartering in Scotland; where for the same reasons of there not being Publick Houses sufficient for the reception of the Troops, they are by Law; Quartered on private Houses.

I must beg leave, to give you one instance of the Situation of Quartering here, When I arrived at Albany, I do not believe it was possible to have Quartered fifty Men in that Town, on all the Publick Houses in it; and by taking a full Survey of it, I found, that by Quartering on the private Houses, I could, without incommoding them in the parts of their Houses in which they live, Quarter 1400 Men; and for a short time, in case of Necefsity, I could Quarter 2000. I have mentioned this, to shew you, what the Situation of all the Frontier places in this Country, that are liable to Attacks, must be, if Quartering is literally to be kept to, on Publick Houses only.

The last paragraph of your Letter relates to the Non Effective fund of the Regiments here. I should have chose, to have it put on the same footing that it is in Europe; I find it necefsary for carrying on the Service, and I do assure You, there shall be no abuse of the Power.

I must now lay before You, a Case, in which I must beg directions how to proceed; which is that of the Carpenters, Employed last Year in building the Vessels &c. at Oswego: by such of the Contracts made with them, as have come to my hands, they are to be paid from the day they set out from their Homes (many of whom went from Boston and Rhode Island) till they return and are paid their Wages.

Most of those Men were taken Prisoner at Oswego, and are now in Canada, and their families Starving at home, and as their Wages are high, will come to a large Sum of Money. Part of their Wages were paid in the beginning to their families, by People employed by M^r. Shirley; such as M^r. Livingston, M^r. Richmond in Rhode Island, and M^r. Irwin (?) at Boston; but as those Gentlemen's Accounts, are much too large, and in a Situation that appears unfit for me to meddle with, I have desire they may be remitted home to be Clear'd, where M^r. Alexander, M. G. Shirley's Secretary, one of these partners in the profits that may arise from them, may be able to clear, what to me seems difficult in them, but in the mean time, these Men's families are in great distrefs: the Sum still due will be larger, as is the Clamour on Account of their distrefs: but I am determined, that as far as it is in my power, I will avoid intermixing my Accounts with M^r. Shirleys; And as the partial Payments that have been made to them, make part of those Accounts of M^r. Livingston &c., I do not see how I can interfere with them without particular direction.

Before I leave this Subject, I must acquaint You, that in Consequence of a Letter, I received from M^r. West, when at Boston, of October 26^t. with a Copy of the Pay Master Generals Memorial, and a Copy of the Sums drawn here, by Warrants of M^r. Shirley on the Deputy Pay Masters, with directions to enquire into these Warrants, and how to proceed, in regard to those drawn on Account of the Regiments, I called on Mr. Erwine (John Erving), M^r. Shirleys Son in Law, in whose name

many of these were drawn. He has Acquainted me, that there were two of these Warrants which he received the Money for, and paid it into M^r. Shirleys; and has given me a Copy of M^r. Shirleys Acquittances for the Money receiv'd on them, which I send enclosed. He further informs me, that he believes those Warrants, granted to M^r. Hutchinson and M^r. Temple, the Generals Sons in Law, likewise are of the same Nature.

There is likewise the Sum of £4666.13.4 granted by Warrant, to Lieut. Bartman, for recruits raised for the 50^t. Regiment, who never was employed on the Recruiting Service, and who paid that Money into M^r. Shirleys hands, as soon as he had received it, who gave him a receipt for it, a Copy of which You have likewise enclosed.

I shall only mention the two Warrants, drawn for M^r. Cha. Aphthorp's name, together amounting to £1237; as he declared he never received any Money on them, but at M^r. Shirleys desire, put his name on the back of them, as a thing of Course; but took no Acquittances from him; but as he inform'd me, writ by the same Ship, which carried my Letter to M^r. West of the 28^t. January, to Acquaint M^r. Shirley, that as he knew he had received no Money on these Warrants, and that none was due to him, as he had never furnished any thing on the Governments Account, he would retain has much Money of M^r. Shirleys in his hands, as should indemnify him, till M^r. Shirley should clear him, from any demand from the Government, on account of these Warrants.

I must likewise Sollicit your favorable reception, of the demands will be made to You, from several Governments, concerned in the Expedition last year against Crown Point, part of which, have already been transmitted to London, and the others will soon be sent.

I have the honor to be, &c.

Comment: Born in Massachusetts (1702), John Rous was a provincial privateer during the Siege of Louisbourg (1745) but earned an appointment as a captain in the Royal Navy that same year, September 24, 1745. Admiral Warren sent Rous to England with word of the victory. Returning to North America, he served at Annapolis Royal on the Bay of Fundy, then the colonial capital of Nova Scotia. As captain of a series of frigates, he was both competent and aggressive. He led the naval contingent at the successful Siege of Fort Beauséjour (1755). In 1757, John Rous was captain of the frigate *Success* (24) and then a French prize taken in 1756, *Ar-en-Ciel* (50). In 1758, he was appointed as captain of the *Sutherland* (50). Because of his familiarity with the waters off Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, he was often used in the role of scouting and intelligence gathering. His name is scattered throughout the Louisbourg letters.

Note: Although central to this history, Halifax was only established in 1749, a planned military expedition under Edward Cornwallis with some 2,500 settlers sailing from England. In contrast, Annapolis Royal on the Bay of Fundy was founded in the early 1600s. The ability of Halifax to support the British Military was limited.

From Pitt to Loudoun, LO 3076, March 17, 1757. Received by Loudoun, July 9, 1757:

Whitehall 17th. March 1757.

My Lord,

I have the King's Commands to explain, in this letter, some Parts of the Instructions, that have been lately sent to your Lordship, for your Conduct, in the next Campaign.

By my Letter of the 4th: past, your Lordship is directed to begin with an Attack upon Louisburgh, and to proceed, in the next Place, to Quebeck; The King still thinks those two Places the great Objects of Offensive Operations for the Ensuing Campaign in America, and judges that Taking Louisburgh to be the more practicable Enterprize: His Majesty, nevertheless, is pleased to leave it to your Lordship to use your Discretion, with regard to which of the Two abovementioned Attempts, you shall judge it most Advisable first to proceed.

In the 1st: Article of your Lordship's Additional Instructions, dated the 19th; Day of last Month, mention is made of Councils of War, and the several Officers, of whom They are to be composed. are therein recited; And tho' it is scarcely to be supposed, that your Lordship will have any Doubt, with regard to the Meaning of the Article, His Majesty has, however, commanded me to acquaint your Lordship, that it is not thereby intended to enjoin you to take the Opinion of a Council, before you proceed on any Operations, but only in such Cases, wherein your Lordship, or the Admiral shall think the same expedient with regard to any joint Operations of the Land and Sea Forces.

Tho' the Two Additional Instructions signed the 19th: of last Month, transmitted to your Lordship in my Letter of the same Date, with regard to the Distribution of Booty, were agreeable to the former Precedents, yet It being apprehended, that some Inconveniencies may arise from Them, It is the King's Pleasure revoke said Instructions; and your Lordship will, therefore, forthwith return the same, in order that They may be cancelled.

*I am with great Truth and Respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's
most obedient
Humble Servant.
W. Pitt*

From Major William Eyre to the Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Forces at Albany; Fort Wm. Henry, March 20, 1757 (CO_5_48_037; Pages 349/175).

An Account of the Attack made upon Fort Wm. Henry

Copy

Sir,

Yesterday morning about two o'clock, a noise of Axes were heard at some distance from the Fort, and a light was seen upon the Lake. This gave the Alarm, some time after this The Enemys approach was heard very distinctly upon the Ice, and this was followed by an Attempt, to set on Fire our Largest Sloop, as Also the most remote Batteaus lying on the side of the Lake; This drew upon them a Smart Fire, both of our Artillery and Small Arms, which prevented their design; other Efforts were made to Accomplish it, before daylight appeared, in which they failed likewise.

After this the Enemy retired, and a few men were sent to see, what the Enemy had been doing, who found two or three Scaling Ladders, and several Small Emplements for setting the Vefsels Fire, one of which I send down; At this time we Scarsely knew any thing of the Number of the Enemy; but the Ladders being found, shewed Plainly this was more than a Scouting Party, and soon shewed them in great numbers on the Lake, and on the East side of the Lake about two Miles down, and by degrees this appearance grew Formidable.

Early in the morning we got everything in Readinefs to Provide against an Afsault, as the Enemy on each side of us appeared in great Bodys. There was a very heavy & continual discharge of small Arms kept up by the Enemy, from behind some Rocks about 500 Yards, on the Right of the Fort, which seem'd Cheifly Intended to Cover the Rear, who went from time to time to set fire to the Batteaus, and which burned but Slowly. We had five or Six men Slightly Wounded on the Ramparts; We Returned their fore both with Shott and Shells, whenever we discovered many of them together, which I believe had good Effect, as we perceived them carrying off several Men. The firing on the Enemys side Ceased towards Sun Set, and they seemed to file off as going homewards, but Returned after it was dark, and about midnight renewed their attack, and under cover of darknefs set fire to One end of the line if Batteaus, which soon consumed them entirely; At or about the same time they set Fire to our Pile of Chord Wood, and made Several Attempts to set fire to the large Sloop, but were beaten off by our Continual Fire.

The Enemy Retired this morning at some distance, and a party went out and Extinguished the fire of the Pile of Wood.

About Ten o'clock this morning the Enemy crofsed the Lake, seemingly as if they were going off; about two miles from the Fort; they then appeared very numerous to us, and no sooner the Principal Body of them had crofsed the West side of the Lake than we espied a Small Party coming towards the Fort with a Red Flag; I sent an Officer with a Flag to meet them, and

Received a Letter from Mon^s. Rigaud de Vaudreuil Commander of the French Forces by Mon^s. Mollner (Captain Francois Le Merciere) principal Officer of the Artillery, the Purpose of which was to Offer the Garrison honorable Terms, and to march out with the honours of War, otherwise that as he had received a Succour lately, he was determined to Afsault the Fort by Escalade, I desired

him to Return my Resolution to his Commander which was, to defend his majesty's Fort to the last Extremity; He told me by way of Caution, That he could not answer for the Treatments, we might Receive from the Indians, it being determined to Storm the Fort Immediately.

*Fort Will^m. Henry, Sunday March 20th
2 O'Clock afternoon*

*I am
Sir,
Your most Obedient and
most Humble Servant
Will. Eyre.
Maj. to 44th Regiment*

In the E. of Loudoun's Letter of April 25th

Comment: This is the first of a series of letters from Eyre written during and shortly after Rigaud's Winter Raid on Fort William Henry. There are at least seven letters in the complete chain, all seven of the letters are included here. The letter of March 20th was written during the Siege itself. The last letter in the chain is dated April 6, 1757. Included are two letters detailing the intelligence provided by two French prisoners captured during the Siege. These prisoner descriptions provide a wealth of detail and color not found in the other sources. Small tidbits of information relating to the construction and characteristics of Fort William Henry are quietly scattered throughout these letters.

There are several companion French documents and letters, these are found in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York: Procured in Holland, England and France; Vol. X.* (O'Callaghan, Vol. X, 1858; Pages 542-572); available online. Several letters are written by Montcalm and have a different tone from those of Vaudreuil. There is a brief biography of William Eyre on Page 545. In at least one of these letters, Lawden = Loudoun.

Though Bougainville was not this action, the Bougainville Journals contains a narrative of the action, Pages 95-98. Interestingly, Eyre using the parley with Mercier to buy the time needed to improve his defensive situation including the removal the roofing from the North Storehouse without interference from the French.

The letters by Eyre and the corresponding French letters are reasonably good matches. There are no glaring disputes regarding the events; however, the damage done to the two smaller sloops is much less than reported by either Eyre or by the French. Several of the letters are central to most histories, but a few are largely ignored or unknown.

From Rigaud Vaudreuil to William Eyre, March 20, 1757 (CO_5_48_37; Pages 345/173):

Letter from Mons^r Vaudreuil to Major Eyre

*Au Camp, devant Le Fort George
Le 20^e Mars. 1757*

*Au Commandant
Du Fort Géorge.*

Monsieur,

Je vous dépêche Monsieur Le Chev^r Merciere, Commandant de l'Artillerie, qui vous fera Part de mes Résolutions. Vous pourrez donner entière Croyance à ce qu'il aura l'honneur de vous dire de ma Part.

J'ai celui d'être

Monsieur

*Votre très humble et très
Obéissant Serviteur
Rigaud de Vaudreuil
Command^t l'Armée Française
Sur le Lac S^t Sacrement*

The Substance of the Message sent by Le Chev^r Merciere, Commanding Officer of the Artillery, by Order of Monsieur Vaudreuil, Commander of the French Army, to the Commandant of Fort William Henry, the 20th March 1757. (Note: The rest of letter does not date to March 20, 1757).

Monsieur Merciere being introduced into the Fort blindfolded, and brought into the Commanding Officer's Apartment, where all or most of the Officers of the Garrison were, after a few Civilities past, delivered his Message from the Commander of the French Army, the Substance whereof is as follows.

That Mons^r de Vaudreuil, Governor of the Trois Rivières, Commander of the French Army on Lac S^t Sacrement, and Brother to the Governor of Canada had Commanded him to acquaint the Commandant with his Resolution; that he was averse to the Carrying on a War, in these Parts, & regretted much the Miseries that attended it, but that as we had made Incroachments on His most Christian Majesty's Territories, & built Forts on them, to prevent the Miseries attending the Carrying on War, & to save the Effusion of Blood, desired that he might, in a peaceable Manner, deliver up this Fort, & that the Garrison shou'd have Liberty to march out with all the Honours of War, the Officers permitted to Carry their most valuable Effects with them, that some Things might only be left by the Officers to please & gratify the Indians, & that they need not be under any apprehensions of Mischief from the Savages, for that they had a sufficient Number of Regulars to protect the Garrison against any Sort of Violence, that might be offer'd to them, & that they shou'd be conducted to any Place they desired; but he was particularly directed by His General to observe to the Commandant that not agreeing to these Terms, & determining to defend the Fort might be attended with Circumstances very fatal & Calamitous to the Garrison, & which in Case of Succeeding in the General Assault, that they were then immediately preparing to put in Execution that the Garrison might very probably bring Calamities upon themselves, that wou'd be unavoidable, considering what Sort of People composed Part of their Army, & that in Case of Success, however, much they might be inclinable to Lenity & Compassion, the Cruelties of the Savages cou'd not altogether be prevented.

There is one Circumstance worth Notice that Mons^r. Merciere, in his Meflage, observed, that a fresh Reinforcement had joined the Army which more immediately determined the General to storm the Garrison, which does not appear by the Deposition of the Prisoners, therefore was no more than a Finefse, as they had actually made two Attempts before.

Copy

In the E. of Loudoun's Letter of April 25th. 1757

This letter continues, but these last two paragraphs are separated from CO_5_48_37 (from the Colden Papers, Volume V, Pages 133-135).

The Major further told me that the french Encampment was about 3 Miles down y^e Lake upon a point of Land, that on their March thence toward y^e Fort there was observed a small light like that of a dark Lanthorn which seemd to advance along y^e East iSide of the Lake & often return a Little way back & at times entirely disappear, This was one trying the Ice with an Ax in the front of their Army And when they began to cross y^e Lake towards y^e fort the Noise of their Creepers or Ice Spurs was heard very distinctly.

That there was an Advanced Centinel at y^e Sluice upon y^e Lake about 150 Yards without y^e fort who stood till y^e Enemys Line was near, he then fired his piece among them which made them stop & then he run back to y^e fort. After that they advanced very briskly till they were Challenged from y^e Walls & received a very smart fire from y^e Garrison both with great Guns & small Arms. That having Just finished y^e drawbridge but not yet put it up, he caus'd it to be compleated on y^e Saturday in y^e face of the Enemys fire, which was so hott, that the Man who fix'd y^e Ropes to y^e bridge usely (for they had no Chains) was oblig'd to lye on his belly, till he had them fixt & then y^e bridge was drawn up—That the provincials having built a Store house close to that Curtain which faces the Lake he had very fortunately pecqucted it in; and was obliged moreover to allott 30 Men for its defence, for had it been set on fire, the whole garrison must have been consumed. This the french General was so sensible of that he offered a doubloon to each man [who] should set fire to it. Its preservation was greatly owing to y^e Gallery leading to y^e necessary house over y^e Lake which had been made Musquet proof with Loop holes, from hence too y^e Enemy were greatly annoyed while sitting fire to y^e Sloops & Chord wood all which were near the fort & in view of this Gallery, That when y^e Store house in y^e front of y^e fort was on fire he was obliged to cause y^e Roof to be cut down in face of y^e Enemys fire, because the flames mounted so high as to endanger the Fort. That when M^r Mercier was brought to y^e Fort, he was introduced by one of the Embrazerers with the Assistance of one of his own scaling Ladders; and that he offer to deliver his Errand in writing to y^e Commandant in private or before y^e Garrison. That to y^e Major's Answer he reply'd it is spoke like a Soldier & what I expected. That he spoke extraimly well & behav'd very politely, he deliverd a Bundle of Letters from our prisoners in Canada who he assured us were treated with great Respect

Comment: The French segment of the letter was written by Rigaud Vaudreuil, commander of the raid and brother to the Governor General of Canada. The bulk was appended by Eyre or another officer. This letter adds color, but the last paragraph holds additional interest. The first part of this letter was delivered to Eyre by Mercier following two failed general assaults. The French attempt a crude deception by falsely telling the British that they have been reinforced in hopes that the British will now surrender. Eyre rejects the terms. The French try a third general assault, but this again fails. Following this last failure, the French were successful in burning the large sloop on the stocks and withdrew.

Elements relating to the need to satisfy Indian sensitivities as regards spoils are near prophetic, undoubtedly understood by both the experienced officers of the 44th and the French Canadians.

At some point, a covered gallery or walled walkway was built leading from the northeast bastion to a privy over Lake George (Castle 2013, Page 44 with map). The walls of the gallery were cut with musket ports. The British were able to defend the North Storehouse from this position (Barack, The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden, Volume V, 1755-1760. Collections of The New-York Historical Society for the Year 1921; Printed 1923; Pages 133-135; online. This is nearly identical to CO_5_48_37 transcribed above, March 20, 1757, but it is not fragmented, the last two paragraphs are included only in the Colden Papers. Loudoun attaches this correspondence to one of his own letters dated April 25, 1757. Confusing histories, only the very first segment is of French origin, the remaining six paragraphs of the letter are British, seemingly an officer in Eyre's command).

From: William Eyre to Commanding Officer of His Majesty's Troops in their March from Albany;
March 24, 1757 (CO_5_48_037; Pages 353/177):

To the Commanding Officer of H. Mys. Troops in their March from Albany

*Fort Wm. Henry March 24th 1757
2, Morn.*

Sir

Since Sunday at Two A Clock in the afternoon, at which time I sent You an Exprefs from hence, the Enemy have Continued round the Fort, and kept a Continual Fire of small Arms upon us, and on our Part we did the same at Night upon them, as Likewise of Artillery & Shells, whenever we heard or could discover them approaching us, which they were Continually Attempting under the Cover of darknefs, This has been the Case these three Nights past, every hour of each of them we Expected to be Afsaulted in every Quarter; This You will find was Attempted at different times by the declaration of two Prisoners we took this Morning, but they were luckily disconcerted and obliged to Retire.

The Enemy not being able to Succeed in this, our store Houses & Sloops that were at some distance from the Garrison, were sett on Fire, Likewise the Battoes; The whale Boats and Scows have only Escaped, by what I can Learn, the Enemy's Attempt Last night, was only to burn the Sloop in the Stocks, or any thing else that was with outside the Ramparts.

Last Sunday Night the Rangers Hutts in the Picquetted Fort were on Fire on one Side at the same time the Store Houses were all in Flame on the other, beside a Provincial Store House, and an old Hospital where Levie the Jew Lived; These were burning all Round us, at once, so Violently, as gave me most Terrible Apprehensions, of having our Barracks set on Fire, Yet happily by proper care & vigilance withinside, every thing is still well & safe. I got the Roofs off the two Large Provincial Store Houses Cutt down, in Face of the Enemys Fire, which I believe Contributed a good deal to hinder the Flames from doing Mischief.

Since day light the French have disapear'd, and the Prisoners tell us, they believe they are gone back as their Provisions are Exausted as Likewise their Amunition; This seems to be the real Case but I shall have the same Look out as usuall untill I am Certain of it.

We took three Prisoners this Morning, one of whom died as soon as brought into the Hospital; They inform us they said four or five Men Killed by our Artillery. We have but Seven Wounded Slightly & the rest of the Garrison, Except the Sick are in great Spirits

NB The above is a Copy of the Exprefs I sent You Yesterday at Four 'Clock in the afternoon, since which time, we have not heard or seen any thing of them nor can we make any discovery that any Enemy are near

*The Intelligence of the
Two Prisoners I Sent You
With my Last letter*

*I am
Sir
Your most Obedient
Humble Servant
Wm. Eyre
Major to the 44th Regiment*

In the E. of Loudoun's Letter of April 25th

Comment: On Wednesday the 23rd, the French start their march back to Carillon. The two large sloops have been successfully burned. Laramie (2012, Page 267) argues that Vaudreuil was given very specific orders to burn the British "navy" but take as few casualties as possible. If the fort could be taken in a surprise escalade attack, do so. If not, the raid would be a success as long as the "navy" was eliminated. Bellico (2010, Page 100) is not in full agreement with this assessment of intent.

This is the only British letter or map that places a "hospital" outside the fort walls. The French recognizing the "old hospital" as a hospital in their letters may simply reflect the information supplied by the two British traitors that accompanied the French. In a minor oversight, Eyre fails to mention the loss of the sawmill (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Page 572 and Parkman 1922, Page 450).

Levi was a sutler merchant, possibly the only merchant present that March. Levi's storehouse was relatively secure, clustered amid the ranger huts. Among the goods provided by Levi to the garrison would be tobacco, sugar, coffee, and rum. Lieutenant John Stark, commanding the Rangers, anticipated that the 35th Foot, being an Irish Regiment, would be celebrating St. Patrick's Day (17th). To prevent a garrison-wide "drunk", Stark had ordered Levi not to serve his rangers any alcohol on the eve of or on Saint Patrick's Day itself (Loescher 1946, Page 151). The French arrived early in the morning of the 19th, not on the 18th as reported in some histories.

In each of Eyre's letters, we learn more of the events of this raid. Unfortunately, we have nothing comparable for August 1757, a near paucity under the pen of the "British Army". If Colonel Young wrote his mentor, those letters might have been deemed personal by Loudoun and are lost. A full chapter in Ben Hughes' volume is devoted to this unsuccessful attempt to storm Fort William Henry (Hughes 2011, Pages 41-55). It is a wonderfully colorful and detailed narrative weaving the materials from multiple sources including the Colonial Office Papers, the War Office, and the Bougainville Journal.

From Major William Eyre to Lord Loudoun, March 26, 1757 (LO 3179; and CO_5_48_037; Pages 357/179 as March 25, 1757):

Fort ^{Wm.} Henry
26th. March 1757

My Lord,

Last Saturday being the 19th. Instant about one O'clock in the Morning, a Noise of Axes was heard that seem'd to be about three Miles from the Fort; And a small light was Seen upon the East Side, and a very Considerable Way down the Lake. This gave the Alarm. Two hours or more after this the Enemys approaches were heard very distinctly Upon the Ice, with their Whole Army. This we afterwards learn'd, and also that they had 800 Scaling Ladders, and all the Apparatus necessary for a General Afsault; This drew upon them a Small fire of Artillery, and Small Arms which obliged the Main Body to retire. After this they attempted to set on fire one of our Sloops and the Battous but were prevented; Other Efforts were used before Day light to accomplish this Affair, Which they likewise failed in. At the Break of day the Enemy withdrew, and a few men were sent out to See what they could discover, who found a few Scaling Ladders, and Several Other Implements, to set the Vessels & Boats on Fire.

By Prisoners we afterwards took, we found the Enemy were very Numerous, one of their Accounts is that they were 1650, an other upwards of 2000, consisting of Regulars, Colony Troops (or their Independent Companys), Canadians and Indians.

The Enemy Soon after they disappeared, began to Shew themselves again on the Lake, and on each Side of it; and by degrees their appearence grew more formidable; They were filing off in large Bodys to surround Us, and at the Same time kept a heavy fire of Small Arms upon the Garrison. The fire of our Artillery Chequed their approach, and by what we could discover, made their different Detachments retire, for they made no Attempt that day, only fired Smartly with Musketry. The next Morning, being the 20th. An Other Attempt was made by their Whole army to Storm the Place, but by the heavy fire from the Garison, were drove back; This happened very Early: Not Succeeding, they set on fire two Sloops, and burnt almost all our Battous; and when Day light appeared drew off. About Mid Day their Army were seen marching a Crofs the Lake in regular Bodys, and Seemed very Numerous as if Returning towards Tyconderoga; but presently after, a few Men were Seen coming towards the Fort, (with a Red Flag) on the Ice, whom made Signals at half a Miles distance to have someone Sent to speak to them. I complied with this, and Sent An Officer and four men, with an Other flag to meet them: presently after one of our ~~Men~~ own People brought me a Letter which was from Monsieur d' Vaudreuil Commander of the french Army, a Copy of which I inclose, In Consequence of the Letter, I sent an Other Officer to bring in Monsieur L Mercear (Le Mercier) Blindfolded. The Substance of whose Mefsage I have likewise inclosed.

I desired him to make my Compliments to His Generals, and tell Him, my fixt Resolution was, to defend His Majesty's Garrison to the last Extremity. upon this he carried back blindfolded as he came, and Soon after their Army were Seen to move towards us. Everything was in readinefs for a General Afsault; and tho' we were Sickly, a General Firmnefs could be discovered by the behavior of the Troops, so as to give great hopes they would do their Part. The Officers behaved with the greatest Diligence, Care and Resolution. The Enemys fire was soon Renewed, by some detached

Partys; The main Body kept at a Distance. That Night or Early the next Morning, a third general Afsault was undertaken, which likewise failed in. They not Succeeding set on Fire two Store Houses, (in one of them a good deal of Provisions) on one Side; a Provincial Store House, and all the Rangers Hutts (within Side their Picketted Fort) on the other. These different Fires burnt with such violence, so as to make one apprehend at on Side of the Fort, that the Other or opposite Quarters were in Flames; Yet happily by proper Care and Vigilance within side, no damage was done, In this Situation we continued the most Part of the Night. A Perfect Silence was observed, and a Constant Fire kept upon the Enemy, when ever we could make Any Discovery by means of the Fires, or before they were made by Listening with the utmost Attention. The Different times that the Enemy Intended a General Afsault under the Cover of Darknefs, they were wholly baffled, by Steadily keeping up to this last Method, for our Eyes at these times were of no Use to us, being Excefsively Dark.

The next Day being Monday the 21st. The Enemy withdrew at Day-break, in their usual Way. This Morning, very few of their Straglers remain'd, and about 9 or 10 o'clock it began to Snow, and continued so the Whole Day And Night, during which time the Fire on both sides in a great Measure ceased, and we could not discover the attempted any thing during that time. Tuesday the 22nd. Early in the Morning, the Enemy seem'd resolved to burn the Sloop upon the Stocks; several times they were beat off, but still preserved and by means of Combustibles and Dry Faggots, which they brought from their Encampment, at last effected their Design. During the whole time, they frequently attempted to set Fire to our Picketted Store House, that is next to the Lake, but were always bravely beat off; the last Efforts must have been used to preserve this Place, as it could not fail of setting the Garison in Flames if they had Succeeded. The Sloop upon the Stocks continued blazing until Broad Day on Wednesday, when we discovered a man in the Swamp Seemingly wounded, a Small Party was ordered to bring Him in; at which time an other of the Enemy was found behind a Pile of Chord Wood, which last I apprehend was afraid of going off after the Sloop was in a Blaze, as no Body could move thereabouts, but must have been discover'd; these are the Prisoners we now have, a third was brought in, who had Scarcely life when taken into the Hospital. A little time after this the Enemy wholly disappeared.

The Whale Boats, Scows or Gundales & Bay Boats, have escaped the Conflagration. We have had only Seven Men Slightly Wounded. The Prisoners tell us, our Artillery had Good Effect.

*P.S.
I send the Intelligence &
Declaration of the Two Prisoners,
and likewise a List of Things
they inform me their Army were provided
for this Expedition.*

*I am
My Lord
Your Lordship's most
Obed^t humble Servant,
Will. Eyre
Major to the 44th. Reg^t. with*

*Strength of the Garrison of Fort
Wm. Henry, When the Enemy Came before it.*

Regular fit for Duty 274

Rangers ditto 72

Total Well..... 346

Sick, Regular & Rangers..... 128

Total Sick and Well 474

*Letter from Maj. Eyre of the 44th Regiment to the Earl of Loudoun
Fort Wm. Henry 26th March 1757
An Account of the Attack upon Fort Wm. Henry*

Comment: The source for this transcription is LO 3179 from the Huntington Library in California. A quick comparison with the copy from the Colonial Office Papers, London Archives, suggests over two hundred differences in spellings, capitalizations, and punctuation between these two versions of this letter (CO 5/48 037).

In none of his letters, does Eyre identify the number of companies assigned to his garrison. However, in Loudoun to Fox while describing Fort William Henry (November 22 - December 26, 1756; CO 5/48 001): "*at the first I have posted four Companies, which I have compleated to One hundred Men each, and Appointed Major Eyres, who Fortified the place, to take the Command; And I have given them, two Rangers Companies of Fifty Men each, to get Intelligence, in order to prevent sudden Surprises*". Five companies of the 48th were posted to Fort Edward plus two additional companies of Rangers.

Again, the damage to the two smaller sloops is much less than reported by either Eyre or the French. Both sloops were captured by the French during the August Siege and taken north. Histories rely heavily on this letter.

A copy of LO 3179 follows. The handwriting in Figure 2 is fully consistent with LO 3179, the conclusion being Figure 2 was indeed prepared by Eyre.

My Lord

Fort Wm Henry
26th March 1757

Last Saturday being the 19th ^{the 19th} about one o'clock in the Morning, a noise of Axes was heard that seem'd to be about three Miles from the Fort; and a small light was seen upon the East Side, and a very considerable Way down the Lake. This gave the Alarm. Two hours or more after this the Enemys Approaches were heard very distinctly upon the Ice with their whole Army. This We afterwards learnt, and also that they had 800 Scaling Ladders, and all the Apparatus necessary for a general assault. This drove upon them a smart fire of Artillery and small Arms which oblig'd the Main Body to retire. After this they attempted to set on fire one of our Sloops, and the Batter but were prevented; Other efforts were used before Day light to accomplish this affair, which they likewise failed in. At the Break of Day the Enemy with drew, and a few Men were sent out to see what they could discover, who found a few Scaling Ladders, and several other Implements to set the Bussels & Boats on fire.

By Prisoners we afterwards took, we found the Enemy were very numerous, one of their Accounts is, that they were 1650, an other upwards of 2000, consisting of Regulars, Colony Troops, (or their Independent Companies) Canadians, and Indians.

The Enemy, soon after they disappear'd, began to shew themselves again on the Lake, and on each Side of it, and by degrees their appearance grew more formidable: they were filing off in large Bodies to surround us, and at the same time kept a heavy fire of small Arms upon the Garrison. The fire of our Artillery chequ'd their approach, and by what we could discover, made their different Detachments retire, for they made no attempt that Day, only fired smartly with Muskettry. The next Morning being the 20th an other attempt was made by their whole Army to storm the Place, but by the heavy fire from the Garrison were drove back; This happen'd very early: Not succeeding, they set on fire two Sloops, and burnt almost all our Batter; and

To The R. Hon. The Earl of Loudon

when

When Day light appeared I was off. About Mid Day their Army were seen marching across the Lake in regular Batches, and seemed very Numerous as if returning towards Tycondago; but presently after, a few Men were seen coming towards the Fort (with a Red Flag) on the Ice, who made Signals at half a mile distance to have some one sent to speak to them. I complied with this, and sent an Officer and four Men with an other Flag to meet them; presently after one of our ~~own~~ own People brought me a Letter which was from Monsieur d'Andoeuil Commander of the French Army, a Copy of which I inclose. In consequence of the Letter, I sent an other Officer to bring in Monsieur le Mueor Blindfolded, the Substance of whose Message I have likewise inclosed.

I desired Him to make my Compliments to His General, and tell Him, my first Resolution was, to defend His Majesty's Garrison to the last Extremity. upon this he was carried back blindfolded as he came, and soon after their Army were seen to move towards us. Every thing was in readiness for a general Assault, and tho' we were Sickly, a general Formidability could be discovered by the behaviour of the Troops, so as to give great hopes they would do their Part. The Officers behaved with the greatest Vigilance, Care, and Resolution. The Enemys fire was soon renewed by some detached Parties; the main Body kept at a Distance. That night, or early the next Morning, a third general Assault was undertaken, which they likewise failed in. They not succeeding set on fire two Store Houses, (in one of them a good deal of Provisions) on one Side; a Provincial Store House, and all the Rangers Huts (within side their Ditched Fort) on the other. These different Fires burnt with such violence, so as to make one Apprehend at one Side of the Fort, that the other or opposite Quarters were in Flames; yet happily by proper Care and Vigilance within side, no damage was done. In this Situation we continued the most Part of the Night. a perfect Silence was observed, and a constant Fire kept upon the Enemy, whenever we could make any Discovery by means of the Fires, or before they were made by Listening with the utmost Attention. The different times that the Enemy Intended a general Assault under the cover of Darkness they were

were wholly baffled, by steadily keeping up to this last Method, for our Eyes at these times were of no Use to us, being so excessively Dark.

The next Day being Monday the 21st, the Enemy withdrew at Day-break in their usual way. This Morning very few of their Straglers remained, and about 9 or 10 o'clock it began to snow, and continued so the whole Day and Night, during which time the Fire on both sides in a great Measure ceased, and we could not discover they attempted any thing during that time. Tuesday 22^d. Early in the morning the Enemy soon resolved to burn the Sloop upon the Stocks; several times they were beat off, but still persevered, and by means of combustibles, and Dry Faggots which they brought from their Encampment, at last effected their Design. During the whole time, they frequently attempted to set fire to our Picketed Store House, that is next to the Lake, but were always brought off; the last Efforts must have been used to preserve this Place, as it could not fail of setting the Garrison in Flames if they had succeeded. The Sloop upon the Stocks continued blazing until Broad Day on Wednesday, when we discovered a Man in the Swamp seemingly wounded, a small Party was ordered to bring him in, at which time an Officer of the Enemy was found behind the Pile of Chord Wood, which last I apprehended was afraid of going off after the Sloop was in a Place, as no Body could move thereabouts but must have been discovered; these are the Prisoners we now have, a third was brought in who had scarcely life when taken into the Hospital. a little time after this the Enemy wholly disappeared.

The Whale Boats, Scaus or Gundalas, and Bay Boats have escaped the Conflagration. We have had only seven Men slightly wounded. The Prisoners tell us, Our Artillery had good Effect.

I am, my Lord,

with Great Respect,

Your Lordships most
Obed^t. humble Servant,

Will: Lyne
Major to the 44th Reg^t.

P.S.
I send the Intelligence &
Deliverance of the two Prisoners,
and likewise a List of the Things
they inform^{me} their Army were provided
with for this Expedition.

Strength of the Garrison of Fort-
 Henry, when the enemy came
 before it.

Regulars fit for Duty	274
Rangers D ^o	72
Total with	346
Sick, Regulars & Rangers	428
Total Sick & With	474

Letter from Maj. Lewis of the 11th Regt
 to the Govt of Louisiana.

at New Orleans 20 March 1837.

Outline of the attack made upon Fort Henry
 Henry

From Major William Eyre to Lord Loudoun, assuming March 26, 1757 (Attachment to Previous Letter, CO_5_48_037; Pages 373/187 as March 25, 1757):

Information of John Victor and Guillaume Chafse, two French Prisoners.

Fort William Henry, March 25th 1757

John Victor, a French Prisoner, being examined with Regard to several particulars concerning the late Expedition, under the Command of Mons^r. de Vaudreuil against Fort William Henry, Says,

That he was at Montreal during the Winter till the 19th of Feb^{ry}, & for several Months before, it was the Common Talk there, about an Expedition before the Winter was over, against the English Forts. The Army for this Expedition was plentifully supplied with every necessary of Cloathing &ca. at the King's Expence.

Each Man had two pair Mocasans, or Indian Shoes, 1 P^r. Indian Stockings or Leg Pieces, One P^r. woolen Sox, One thick red woolen Cap, besides their Hatts, One Flannel Waistcoat with Sleeves, a blue Cloath Vest & Breeches, One upper Coat, One WatchCoat or GreatCoat with a Cap, One fine Blanket.

And every Man in the Army had a Bearskin, Likewise each Man had three Knives given him. viz. two small Knives for the Pocket, and one large Knife in a Case, to hang at their Breast, with which, he says, You are to fight as he was told; one Tomahawk, one Pair of SnowShoes, a Pair of Iron Creepers to walk on the Ice, a Steel and Flint, a Comb, a Shoe Awl, Six Needles and a Quantity of Thread, & half a Pound of Tobacco, in a Bag.

The Grenadiers only had Sabres.

They were provided at Carrillon (Ticondaroga) the Morning they marched from thence with twelve Days of Provisions, viz. Six Days Brisket, & Six Days bread, and half a pound of Pork a Day, but they had no Allowance of Spirits, Wine, nor Vinegar, only the Indians were allowed Rum.

All the Indians and a Considerable Number of the Troops besides were provided with Skeats.

The Army was provided with three Hundred Scaling Ladders, several Boxes full of Combustibles, with Machines and Implements for Setting on Fire Vessels, Store Houses & ca. and every other thing requisite for the Storming of the Garrison.

As they brought no Horses or Wheel Carriages with them, and every Man had so much Luggage to carry, each man was provided with what he calls a HandSley, and a strong rope to draw it by, & with the Afsistance of these, every Man was enabled with very little Toil or Fatigue to Carry along on the March, all the above Articles of Cloathing, Provisions & other Necefsarys.

He says from the Time the Army left Ticondaroga, till they arrived at the Place of their Encampment, near the Fort, that they marched chiefly in the Night Time. & with great Silence & Circumstances, the Indians always in the Front.

He says, the General is a little Man, thin & Spare, about 36 Years of Age, always marched in the Front and had no other Accommodation than a Soldiers Tent, which was the only one in the Whole

Army. They brought only one Drum along with them, which he says he never heard beat but once, and that was a little before they intended a General Assault.

Being asked if ever the Whole army had surrounded the Fort, he said they had done so the first Morning of their Coming before it, but that on the Firing of our first Great Guns, their Officers ordered them to Retreat again; at This Time, It was the first Day of the Moon, and excessively dark.

He likewise declares, that before he left Montreal, the Garrison had buried a Hundred Men, that died of the Scurvy.

Guillaume Chafse, the other Prisoner, being examined with Regard to the above, confirms every Article, and also says, that every two Men had a large Axe for Cutting Wood, every four Men for Cooking had a Copper Kettle, and likewise a Large Piece of Canvas each for a Covering by Way of a Tent.

*in the E. of Loudoun's Letter of
April 25th 1757*

Comment: This letter is key in providing histories with color and depth in their description of the events around Rigaud's Winter Raid.

From William Eyre to Lord Loudoun, March 26, 1757 (Attachment to the Previous Letter, CO_5_48_037; Pages 367/184):

Declaration of Two Prisoners taken the 23^d March, 1757, at Fort W^m Henry

Fort William Henry March 23^d 1757

Gillaume Chafse a Native of France of the Regiment of Languedoc taken Prisoner this morning being Examin'd

Declares that Mons^r. de Vaudreuil Command^r. of the French Army on Lake S^t. Sacrament and Governor Troés Revier Left Carrillon on Tuesday the 15th Instant, as it was then Reported with an Army of 2000, but since they find their Number only to be Sixteen Hundred and Fifty, which Consists of 250 Regulars of France, 250 or 300 Troupes des Colonies, 800 Canadians and 300 Savages.

2. *He further says that the Troops arrived on Friday the 18th. Instant about 11 O'Clock at night at the Place of their Present Encampment on the Lake and that they were determin'd to afsault the Fort by Escalage before break of day next morning being Saturday the 19th and for that purpose they had brought 300 Scaling Ladders with them.*

3. *The Fort was to be storm'd in three different Places at once by Nine hundred men Consisting of all the Regulars and Canadians supported by the Troupes des Colonies and Indians.*

4. *He says Likewise on the Return of the Flagg Truce it was Reported amongst the Troops that the Garrison refused to Surrender the Fort not so much from a Willingnefs and Resolution to defend it, but on Account that they believed there was a Thousand Indians in the French Army, and that they Expected to be Equally ill Treated whether the Fort was Surrendred upon the Articles of Capitulation or that it was taken by Storm, and for that reason alone they would not give up. In Consequence of which refusal it was believed that they were to make a General Afsault that day, as the Ladders and every other thing for that Purpose was orderd to be in readinefs.*

5. *The reason he say they did not put their design in Execution was owing to their finding the Garrison Alert and so much on their guard.*

6. *Upon his being Examin'd a Second time he declares that the Army were upon their March twice to Storm the Fort on Sunday and Monday mornings before the break of day, but were both times drove back by the Fire from the Fort.*

7. *Being examined with regard to the State of their Provisions at Present, says the whole will be Exausted this day as they brought only eleven days Provisions with them, and that the Indians had eaten more than their Proportion. Likewise that the Indians had left the Camp Yesterday in order to return to Carrillon, and he thinks the whole Army must return back to day.*

Their Army he says left S^t. Johns with everything provided New for this Expedition and with 60 Rounds of Ammunition.

8. *Being Examined with regard to the State of the Garrison of Carrillon says it was healthy, Consisted of 300 men where of about 30 men Sick.*

9. *He says that there are Eight Regiments of French Regulars in North America, Viz., one Battalion at Quebec, one at Montreal, one at Point de Oham de Quebec (? , Beauport), one at Long Point (also Montreal), one at Boucherville, one at Chamle (Chambly) and Two at Louisbourg.*

He says that they have two English men in their Army before the Fort who were taken in the Lake Engagement with Rogers, one of whom is a Serjeant, the other Private; who had undertaken to show them the way to the Garrison, and the most acefsible Places where they would make the Attack with Succesfs, and that in case they made themselves Masters of the Forts, each of them was to have one Thousand Crowns.

He says that if they had discovered any Succours Marching to the Afsistance of the Garrison, they intended to have Put themselves in Ambuscade, between this and the other Fort, and Attackd them, and they had Indian Scouts sent out for that Purpose to Reconnitre the Road between this and Fort Edward.

John Victor, a Swifs, by Birth belonging to the Troupes des Colonies taken this morning in the Swamp, Being Examined says that their Army left Carrillon last Tuesday was Seven night Consisting of 500 Colony Troops, 200, and upward of Regular Troops from France, 1000 Cannadians, and 300 Indians who Join'd them at Carrilong they Likewise draughted 25 men out of each of the Forts of Crown Point and Carrillon, and brought 12 days of Provisions from this last Fort which he says is all Consumed, and agrees with the other Prisoner, that they were obliged to maintain the Indians with their Provisions who appeared very uneasy for two days past, and were eager to return home, by reason of the Extreme Severity of the Weather and their want of Provisions,

He agrees exactly with the other Prisoner in the time their Army arrived at the Present Encampment on Friday the 18th. before mid-Night and that it was resolved to Attack the Fort by Escalades early of Saturday Morning, which they were in hopes to Suprize, the darknefs of the Night favoring their designs, and relying on the Garrison being off their Guard, but says they were disappointed in their Attempts, upon finding the Garrison Alarmed, and that the firing of Our Cannon and small Arms. made them retreat precipitately Leaving some of their Scaling Ladders behind them. and he further says, that they made the same attempt the Sunday and Monday Mornings following, but they still found our People Alert and were drove back by the fire of the Garrison, after being so often Repulsed, he says the same Night, they burnt their Scaling Ladders, it then snowing very hard.

Being asked what Treatment the Garrison was to receive had they made themselves Masters of the Fort, answered that they were to give no Quarters, but so soon as they had Pofsefsion of the Cannon they were to turn them against us.

Copy

In the E. of Loudoun's Letter of April 25th

Comment: As regards the Winter Raid, some elements and dates of the events are easiest understood within this letter. Color is provided within the details. Each man is carrying only 60 rounds of ammunition which had to be spread over four days of heavy fighting. This letter has been overlooked.

The presence of two British traitors with the raiding party is only offered in this letter, as is their reward of 1,000 crowns each, but only if Fort William Henry falls to the French. The letter has these two British traitors being captured at the Battle of La Barbue Creek (January 21, 1757), forcing the conclusion that both men had been in Rogers' Rangers. The description of Richard Baker of the 44th, who was among the seven captured by the French at La Barbue Creek, does not fit either of these individuals (see Loescher 1946, Page 113; and Robert Rogers, CO 5/48 023 an attachment to Loudoun to Fox, January 25 - February 8, 1757). Based on simply rank, Serjeant James Henry of Robert Rogers' Company is a logical fit as one of the traitors. However, the Journal of Thomas Brown has the identities of these two traitors as Privates David Kimble and Benjamin Woodall, both Rogers' Rangers (Bellico 1995, Page 52).

The last letter in this chain dates to April 6, 1757, found later in this Appendix.

From Pitt to Loudoun, March 31, 1757 (Kimball 1906, Page 29):

My Lord,

Whitehall, March 31st 1757.

Your Lordship will have been already informed by Governor Lyttelton (South Carolina), of the Intelligence which he had received of the Designs of the French to make some Attempt on the Southern Parts of His Majesty's Dominions in North America, and the King having taken into Consideration the Dangers to which the same may be exposed, has been pleased to direct the Highland Battalion of Foot (77th Foot), commanded by Lieut^l Col^l Montgomery, to proceed directly to Charles Town in South Carolina I send your Lordship inclosed copies of the Letters I have wrote on this Occasion, by the King's Command, to Gov^r Lyttelton. and Lieut^l Col^l Montgomery, by which you will see the provisional Orders His Majesty has thought proper to give, with regard to the Services, on which those Troops are to be employed, 'till they shall receive any particular Directions from your Lordship, or the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America. The other Highland Battalion, commanded by Lieut. Col. Fraser is directed to be landed at Halifax (63rd Foot, renumbered 78th Foot). And you will see by the inclosed Copy of my Letter to M^r Fraser, that he is only ordered to follow the Directions he shall receive from your Lordship.

Your Lordship's Letters of the 25 Jan^{ry}. & 8th. Feb^{ry}. from Boston, have been received and laid before the King; And His Majesty saw, with great Pleasure, the Favorable Dispositions in which you had found the Northern Governments.

I am etc.

W. Pitt

Comment: This letter first reaches Loudoun on August 4th (CO 5/48 051, Page 515). He receives a duplicate of this letter on September 11th. The 78th would be sent to Boston; Nova Scotia could not support more than six regiments over the coming winter. Apparently, Loudoun had not been consulted as to the assignment of the 77th Foot to South Carolina. He has made no arrangements for their quartering or provisions. How to deal with the sudden appearance of the 77th was just another of Loudoun's unwanted problems. Loudoun sends £5000 pounds to Charlestown for their immediate subsistence (LO 4329 and CO 5/48 054: Page 572). The 77th arrived healthy, but quickly became sickly and suffered with little shelter (Same, Page 586). In June 1758, the 77th would move north to Pennsylvania and join Forbes Campaign against Fort Duquesne (Cubbison 2010, Page 19). Whether Loudoun was angry or just annoyed with the unexpected appearance of the 77th is unclear (see MANA, Page 407).

The remaining letters in this chain between Loudoun and Pitt can be found in Kimball (1906). There is a very long letter from Loudoun to Pitt on April 25, 1757. There are shorter letters from Loudoun to Pitt written on May 3rd, May 30th, and June 17th (1757), but none of these letters offer any insight into the events at Fort William Henry. Pitt's next letter to Loudoun was July 18, 1757. Pitt had lost his position in the Government in the spring but regained it later that summer. From Pitt to Loudoun, July 18, 1757 (Kimball 1906, Page 88):

"On the sixth Instant, I was honored with your Lordship's several Dispatches of the twenty fifth April, & third & thirtieth of May, all of which were immediately laid before the King."

From Major William Eyre to Maj. Gen. Webb, April 6, 1757 (CO_5_48_037; Pages 363/182 — Colonial Papers, National Archives, London):

Sir,

Albany April 6th 1757.

The Enemy, You have found by my Dispatches retired for Fort William Henry the 23d. Ult., being Wednesday, and the Sunday following, I march'd from thence with the old Garrison; Col Monro relieved me with five Companies of the 35th. Regiment. The great Quantity of Snow which fell for 2 Days before the Enemy retreated prevented us from making any Discoveries of their Lofs. The Morning I marched from thence, some of the French were found thrust into a Hole, made in the Ice, one Man stuffed into the pile of Chord Wood, which they had set on Fire, and an Indian that the Enemy had cover'd with Snow, and taken his Scalp off.

The Darnefs of the Nights with the Afsistance of the Snow and Ice, furnished Opportunities enough to conceal their Lofs, but do not doubt when a Thaw happens, many of them will be discover'd. As the Enemy were a Month on their March, from the Time they left Montreal (where they received by Monsr. Montcalm) before they arrived at their Encampment, the Fatigue of that, the very severe Weather which was some part of the Time whilst they were before the Fort, and the Continuance of it since, must have harrafsed & distrefted them so much, as in all probability, have greatly lessen their Numbers. The Vast thicknefs of Snow, which was now partly thawed upon the Ice, obliged them to leave all or most of their HandSleys behind them. We found where they burnt all their Scaling Ladders, not being able to drag them back upon their Sleys. Several Pieces of Canvas, which the Soldiers had by the Way of Tents were scatter'd along the path they made on their Return, & in their Encampment.

I hope before this reaches You, You will be freed from Your Complaints, which I was very much concerned to hear of.

*I am
Your most obt.
humble Servant
Will. Eyre*

Comment: This letter establishes when Monro and the 35th first arrive at Fort William Henry and the strength of Monro's column. The 35th Regiment, the other six companies of the 44th plus five companies of the 48th wintered at Albany. Five companies of the 48th garrisoned Fort Edward. The 42nd Regiment wintered at Schenectady (Loudoun to Fox; November 22 - December 26, 1757; CO 5/48 001).

Loudoun then writes Pitt on April 25, 1757 (Kimball 1906, Page 36 and CO 5/48; Page 275/148).

LO 3474 A & B, April 26th, New York. Webb in “conversation” with Loudoun. This letter may be the work of Captain Christie, Webb’s Aide de Camp, but the script in LO 3474 A is in a beautiful handwriting, not Webb’s or Christie’s. LO 3474 B is in Loudoun’s secretary’s hand, John Appy. The letter format has been radically changed here. The original has the questions and answers in a side-by-side format. Both copies of this letter were used in preparing this transcription, capitalization, spelling, and punctuation vary widely between the two documents (A & B). Throughout the letter, there is a repeated reference to “*the General Instructions at the End*”. Unfortunately, **this key element seems missing**.

Queries from Major General Webb to His Excellency the Earl of Loudoun, General & Commander in Chief of all His Majesty’s Forces in North America & ca & ca & ca.

His Excellency the Earl of Loudoun’s Answers.

1. What to do with 22 draughts of Blakeney’s & 102 of Braggs, Prisoners on Parole?

1. The 22 draughts to go to the Battalion which goes to Albany. The 102 to the First Battalion of the Royal Americans.

2. How far is the Fortification ordered to be Compleated at Albany? Who has the Plan and direction to see it Executed? Who receive & pay the money, & to what extent the Expence go to finish the whole? How far Compleat the Hospital and two Barracks; and if any thing should be done at Schenectady, towards next Winter Quarters?

2. The Fortifications to be carried on at Albany, Mr. Montresor to leave the Plan & directions with Major General Webb. The Hospital & Barracks to be Compleated at Albany. Nothing wanted at Schenectady.

3. Shall we be supplied with Fresh Provisions at Albany, at the Forts and Communication to them, & the Posts on the Mohawk River?

3. Mr. Kilby will deliver what Quantity of Fresh Provisions the General Orders, and the Season of the Year Permits.

4. What Works are still necessary at the Forts; Who our Engineer to compleat them;? and what directions have they already to proceed?

4. Lieut. Henry Gordon Sub Engineer, who all along had the direction of the works at Fort Edward, is left there to Compleat the same; and Ensign Adam Williamson, Practitioner Engineer, who all last Summer had the direction of the Works at Fort William Henry, is continued there to finish the Plan.

5. We are, I presume to Act on the defensive; and take our Camp at Fort Edward; which is the best Situation, & securest manner of Posting our Selves? Can any demonstrations or Attempts be made Towards Wood Creek?

5. You are to Encamp the troops at Fort Edward; And to act Offensively or defensively as the Situation or Intelligence of the Enemy will Pemitt.

6. What Garrison keep at Fort William Henry; and if one Fourth may not be Provincials, in order to their learning discipline? Also some to Albany?

6. *The Garrison at Fort William Henry consists at Present of Six Companies; and you will send a Quota of Provincials who are to Encamp with the Garrison to the North West of the Fort.*

7. *If not best to send the Provincials on detachment by Companies, and in smaller Numbers with their own Officers?*

7. *This referred to General Instructions at the End.*

8. *Send Plenty of Garden seeds to the Forts. Query of what sorts and how soon?*

8. *Plenty of what kinds could be procured in New York are already sent.*

9. *I suppose the Provincials entirely Subject to my Orders, and the discipline of War; And at Regimental Courts Martials to be Tried by their Own Officers, but a General Ones, by Officers of the Regulars & theirs Mixed?*

9. *The Provincials are entirely under the General's Command and Subject to the Articles of War; but in small crimes I should chuse to let them be tried by Provincial Officers: when the Crimes are of a higher Nature, I would have some Provincial Officers mixed with Officers of the Regular Troops.*

10. *As their Field Officers have no Rank; how dispose of them in Point of Command or Precedence?*

10. *This is settled by His Majesty's Regulation.*

11. *How to Regulate the number of Rations of Provisions to the Provincial and other Officers?*

11. *The Provincials to be Victualled as the King's Troops.*

12. *If I am to Provide the Provincials with Ammunition, what means to devise to Prevent their great Waste?*

12. *The Provincials to be Supplied with Ammunition. A few examples for disobedience of Orders will prevent the Waste of Ammunition.*

13. *Such of the Provincials as chuse to go into our Hospitals, are they to have an account kept of the time they stay there, in order to have a Stoppage made as from our Soldiers? Are the Captains of such men to make the Stoppage from their Pay, and to Pay it into the Hospital? This is done mostly to prevent Malingring.*

13. *The Provincials are to provide Surgeons and Medicines for ordinary Cafes. Those that are in such a Condition, as to make if necessary to put them into the Hospital are to be stopped as the Kings regular Troops.*

14. *Who can we have in the Station Meserve is in with Lord Loudoun? He probably should now begin to Engage Carpenters and other Work men, and to provide Materials.*

14. *Captain Worden, who was last year the Principal Man under Col. Meserve, with a Number of Artificers, are allready Engaged and Sailed for Albany.*

15. What Rangers are we to have?

15. Two Companies of 100 Men each.

16. To what Extent Push Provisions up to the Forts?

16. Vide, for the answer to this Querey the Last Paragraph of all.

17. If during the Expedition to the Northward, an attempt should be made towards Pensilvania or New York, how are we to Proceed? If on the more Southern Provinces Nothing I Apprehend.

17. Referr'd to the General Instructions at the End.

18 Get from Mr. Appy all the methods of doing Businefs, but particularly in relation to Paying money. Should I not have somebody Capable of such Businefs; I am so extremely Ignorant of it my self; for I must probably draw Warrants for and pay Large Sums. (John Appy is Loudoun's secretary)

18. Mr. Mortier will send a Proper person to take Charge of the money, and inform the General in the Forms. (Abraham Mortier, Deputy Paymaster General at New York).

19. What Number of Battoes & Battoemen provide on each River; and who to Contract with them? To the Inspection and Payment of them? And what Supposed a reasonable Price.

19. Battoes are ready, when Caulked at Schenectady; Sir Wm. Johnson & Mr. Christie, can advise and Settle the manner of working them.

20. What number of Boats and other Vefsels on Lake George, how can they be most usefully employed? What means are, or are to be, Provided for the management of them. And who has Principal Conductor, all of us being Ignorant of every thing up that way.

20. There are remaining on Lake George 2 Sloops repairable, one of which wants very little to be done to it, with the Rigging and Sails of the whole, 5 big boats, 4 gondolas, and 12 Whale Boats; and its agreed that the Carpenters sent up shall build if the General sees it necefsary, 20 large Boats to carry 30 men each, top with many oars, and to be made more Steady on the Water than Whale Boats, so that men can stand up in them to Fire, and likewise be quarter Galleys, according to Mr. Montersor's Plan, to carry a piece of Ordnance at their Prow, the General will Judge whither his is too much or too Little for the Service and order accordingly.

21. In case of strong presumptive information of an intended attempt on us by a Superior Force, what in Prudence can we do, and what Afsistance call to our Aid? Or if we should hear of a Force on the Mohawks River, too strong for our Troops there, and Likely to Molest Albany, our Communication with it, or retreat to it, what also do?

21. Referr'd to the General Instructions at the End.

22. If I am to grant money to Sir William Johnson, how and in what quantity? or if I am to supply him, or his Indians else where with Provisions? and how far to apply to him to be afsistant to me on either of the Rivers?

22. *You are to supply Sir William Johnson with money, if necessary, keeping that supply within bounds, as much as Possible. You are to supply the Indians that Join you with the Kings Provisions; but as far as Possible without disgusting the Indians, I would throw all other Supplies to them on Sir William Johnson, that their Accounts may be separate from the Army.*

23. *Sir Charles Hardy to give Orders for the Militia of Albany and the Country Adjacent to be ready to march upon any Summons; either into Albany; up the Mohawk's river; or any where else, if thoughts Necessary. Query: who feed them incase they March.*

23. *You must furnish Provisions for Militia; One ration for each Effective Man, Officers included.*

24. *A List of Working Tools to be got from Mr. Montresor and to Provide them immediately.*

24. *Those are Sufficiently Provided.*

25. *To get for Lord Loudoun the Plans of the Forts, and any Maps, or drawings of that Part of the County, His Lordship may think Necessary.*

25. *The Engineers at the Forts can Supply you with the Plans.*

26. *If any of the Provincials should chuse to Inlist in the Regulars or Rangers, may we take them?*

26. *None of the Provincials to be inlisted without the approbation of the Commanding Office of the Province, and that only when they are going to return home.*

27. *Price to be allowed to Working Parties, and upon what footing the Provincials are to be in that respect?*

27. *Mr. Gordon has the Regulation of that as Settled last Year.*

28. *Forms of Returns with directions, how often they should be sent to Lord Loudoun, & by what Conveyance: whether by Boston or New York, or whether the return of the Troops under my Command, should be sent immediately to England.*

28. *The returns should be sent to England, and all sort of information sent to me, when Opportunity Offers.*

29. *Whatever Men of the Battalion of the Royal Americans that is to go with me and are not fit for marching Service, to be turned over to the First Battalion at Philadelphia.*

29. *Such men who are not fit for Service should be discharged, but such who are likely to recover to be left at Albany.*

Answer to the 16th Query (repositioned in 3474 B).

Provisions to be pushed up to the Forts as much as Possible, in order to supply the whole of the Troops destined for this division, incase the Enemy should at any time be able to Interrupt the Communication, or make it necessary to call in the Militia, who must be supplied with the Kings Provisions, if the General orders them, and Likewise to be enabled to Leave Nine Months

Provisions in the Forts, for such Garrison as the general shall think necessary to Leave there during the Winter.

New York April 26th, 1757.

Comment: Regrettably, nothing near the conclusion of this letter seems to equate to “*the General Instructions at the End*”. Any guidance on how to actually employ the troops is missing, answers to Queries 17 and 21. There is no note suggesting a hidden or missing attachment. The letter is unsigned, a distinct rarity. At the same time, the date at the bottom suggests the letter is complete. There is no breadcrumb trail to follow.

Loudoun is advising Webb to be moderate with the Provincial sensibilities and cooperative with Johnson. As regards the militia, some elements are clarified here. If Webb calls up the militia, he would be responsible for their provisioning, but not their equipment. Webb would have to feed them, but not supply blankets, tents, kettles, and other assorted field needs. When called up by Webb, many of the Militia arrived lacking equipment and unprepared for a prolonged stay in the field. In this regard, the militias and provincial governments were lethally deficient and self-defeating. The idea that if one became sick and required a hospital stay, all or a considerable portion of a soldier’s pay would be forfeited to stoppages is chilling. Whether the provincial forces actually adopted this practice is not clear.

Loudoun’s direction at reestablishing the Lake George Navy is weak, bordering on non-existent. The timeline and the urgency for the rebuilding of the Navy were now solely dependent on Webb and his judgment. Webb would have had to issue orders to Montresor, Gordon, and Williamson that rebuilding the fleet was the principal task that needed to be accomplished — forgetting all else; this was not done. Only in the last week of July would the carpenters then at Fort Edward race to Fort William Henry (Gridley 1906, Page 46; and Lyman 1899, Page 59). Pargellis (1933, Page 235) equates “big boats” to bayboats.

Only around finances were Loudoun’s orders firm and not subject to Webb’s judgment. Webb paints a picture of being unfamiliar with Army accounting protocols and requirements. But Webb may simply have wanted to avoid the missteps of Shirley, adopting the “unknowing” façade. Wisely, Loudoun has the “accountants” handle those issues for Webb. Loudoun has Webb separate any of the William Johnson “expenses” from those of the Army, different ledgers.

This letter is not referenced in any other correspondence with the possible exception of LO 4020A, a tenuous connection at best: “*were of Opinion that the Troops encamped on the N.W. Side of the Fort, agreeable to Your Lordship’s former Instructions should be removed to the Rocky Eminence on the S:E: where a Redoubt shou’d be raised*” (LO 4020A, Webb to Loudoun, August 1, 1757, see below). In this letter Query 6 has the Provincials to the “North West”, but there is no mention of moving them to the southeast. The language here is not precise and Loudoun may never had mentioned moving them to the southeast.

From Webb to Loudoun (LO 3590, May 9, 1757):

Albany Monday May 9th 1757

My Lord,

A Saturday in the afternoon nine companys of the 44th. Reg^t. Sailed from hence, and with so fair a wind that (I apprehend) Col. Gage has by this time given your Lordship this information by word of mouth, as also that, till the winds permit the arrival of more Sloops, no more Troops could be embarked. yesterday about Six in the evening the wind Suddenly changed, and brought up so many vefsels in the night that, I hope we shall now have no other delay, then the time absolutely necefsary for the unloading of them, which shall be expedited with all pofsible dispatch, and as a Sloop is cleared, she shall be immediately filled and sent off. the remaining company of the 44th, and my Reg^t. can embark at a moments notice, five Companys of the Highlanders marched in here yesterday, and on the winds changing, I have ordered the other five companys to march this day. So that there can be no delay in the execution of any part of your Lordships orders, what is relative to the Rangers excepted, and to prevent that as much as pofsible, I have sent another exprefs to hasten them, on the receipt of Gen^l. Abercrombies first letter, it is pofsible that Lieut^t. McCarty with 13 men of Rogers's Company may be on a Scout for a prisoner, having set out from Fort Edward to Fort Wm. Henry with that intent, two days before the arrival of the orders for their marching hither, Major Fletcher however immediately dispatched a mefsenger to try to overtake & stop them.

M^r. Saul, M^r. Kelbys substitute, is (as Colonel Gage will inform your Lordship) guilty of such villianys that, it will be impofsible to go on with him, if M^r. Kelby is not prevailed on by your Lordship to force him to follow his own righteous example, the particulars of his trickings are too numerous to trouble your Lordship with at present, I have afsured him of the Provost, & a prosecution if he does not change his ways and intend keeping my promifses as by a letter of Major Robinsons to Capⁿ. Christie, I find young Sinclair appointed afsistant Q^r. master Gen^l. for the expedition. I should be glad to know by the first opportunity if Lesley is also to go, for as he is now at Kinderhook providing Quarters for the mafsachusetts Troops, it will be necefsary he should be positively informed, not having more time then necefsary for his preparation.

Young Waldo who came here yesterday from Kinderhook reports the arraval there of three Companys only of the Mafsachusetts, and that the remainder can not be there in less then nine days more, Col. Fry who Command the whole, is to come up with the last, on 17th. Company. (possibly "or 17th Company"). if by Desartion or otherwise the men of any Colonie deminish, or any sends short of its Quota I should be glad to know if I am to apply to have them replaced.

the Small pox is, & has been almost every where amongst the New York Reg^t. even in the vefsels on their pafsage hither, it has been so favorable that the officers can not prevent the men for puting themselves in the way of receiving the infection, two of Cap: Crookshanks Company have also had it on the pafsage hither, I would wish the New Englanders were not more apprehensive then the others, it would be the best of their (plea?), for it seems almost impofsible to avoid it, however I shall endeavour to think of every thing to contribute towards it, and according to my present intended disposition of the Troops your Lordship will See it, I have ordered 300 of the New York Regt. on the Mohawk river, & disposed as follows, Sixty at Fort Hunter, Sixty at Canajohera (Canajoharie), & the remaining hundred & eighty at Burnetsfields, the other Troops now there are

to march Down to Schenectady to remain further orders. The nine Companys of Connecticut Troops now at Claverack, I have ordered to march up of the East Side of this river as high as Scarticook (Scorticoke, the confluence of the Hudson and Hoosic Rivers; not Schaghticoke, Figure 5A, Page 19), where, I as ajsured they will be cantooned as well as pofsible & all in desarted houses, & will be furnished with their provisions by water, the Mafsachusetts to follow them as Cantoonments can be provided. The Season has been extreamly wet, and the ground actualy so now that, if I do not keep the Troops in Cantoonments as long as pofsible, and yet so near as to be able immediately to join, I fear to lose great numbers by Sicknefs very early in the Campaign, which would totally disable me, considering my condition, this is only a sudden & imperfect scetch, of which I should be glad of your Lordships opinion — Col. meserves (Nathaniel Meserve) men I have not yet Seen not arriving here till this night, our vefsels on the Lakes will therefore be later — Captⁿ McCloud tells me that Captⁿ Ord has stripped us naked, but as there is so great a reinforcement from England he hopes to See many men & things sent back my advice to him, was not to flatter himself, but to prepare to make the most of the little he has. If a stranger is to come to the Command of the 3d. Battalion of Americans, I am very glad to hear is to be Lord Howe. I can not flatter my Self with much expectation for the new ranging Company, none of them, I am told were ever in a wood, and a Groop of ten were brought in here two days ago desarting all together. I am very seriously much concerned for the feeble condition of my own Corps, Col. Burton thinks he shall not embark more then 650 rank and file, at most, the Scurvey had got deeply rooted that, he very much dreads the ill consequences of a relapse at Sea.

If I mistake not your Lordships orders, I am not to supply any Indians with provisions, such excepted only as join the army, or S^r. W^m. Johnson with any provisions for them, Sr. Will^m. is to purchase them, and charge them in his acc^t, I am persuaded there will be a considerable Saving on this Article, first as he can feed them cheaper then our Contractor, & secondly he will be on his guard when such sums must appear on his account — Captⁿ Christie has explained to major Robinson how the number of ox trams have been encreased by a trick of one of the Contractors, I have therefore postponed any payment to them till the return of the post with major Robinsons answer — Cap^t. Crookshanks Company, & some of the north Americas have been eighteen Days betwixt this and New York, & others vefsels near as long. By a letter of Col. Monros of the second Inst., the Ice was Still on the Lake, and it was actualy a Snowing, I shall write to Col. Monro by the first opportunity to make the Stopage from his Chaplain that your Lordship has ordered by Gen^l. Abercrombies letter of the 3d. inst^t to me. I have already told Mr. Oglevie (Chaplain John Ogilvie) of his being appointed to the 3^d. Battⁿ, as also the attendance required by your Lordship from him, he willingly comply'd with every thing your Lordship shall please to order, I asked what the Country thought of our motions & preparations, he says they Sunk terribly at Seeing so many of the regulars leave them I am with writing deaf, dumb & blind & am

*with great respect
your Lordships
most obedient and
most humble Servant
Dan. Webb*

Comment: With one exception, this letter contains little information that is directly related to Fort William Henry, but it may represent the last surviving communication from Webb to Loudoun before the important letter chain started that August. The letters written in late June from Webb to Loudoun are apparently lost. At the time these June letters were written, Loudoun was at sea on his way to Halifax. The handwriting in this letter (LO 3590) appears identical to LO 4198 (Webb to Loudoun, August 11, 1757) and LO 4245 (Webb to Barrington, August 17, 1757); it may be Webb's own hand. The spelling is often unique, the letters n and r are nearly identical.

To an outside reader, this letter contains a somewhat ambiguous passage: "*Col. meserve's men I have not yet Seen not arriving here till this night, our vefsels on the Lakes will therefore be later—*". To Webb and Loudoun this meaning was unambiguous. Nathaniel Meserve was a respected shipwright from Portsmouth, New Hampshire. In 1749, his shipyard built the 44-gun HMS *America*, probably the first British ship of line built in America. Within the New Hampshire Provincial Regiment, Colonel Meserve was the overall commanding officer and senior to Lt. Colonel Goffe (Head 1866). In 1756, his command likely supervised the construction of the Lake George "navy" under Winslow. In 1757, Meserve commanded a special company of shipwrights, carpenters, and artificers. In this letter, Webb is not stating that Meserve himself was expected at Lake George. Instead, a small group of Meserve's men under Captain Ezekiel Worthen was sent to join Webb (LO 3474). Worthen worked closely with Meserve the previous summer, serving in his New Hampshire regiment, essentially second-in-command among the artificers. Webb complains that he was only assigned twelve shipwrights, these were likely Meserve's men (LO 4020). Meserve would not be at Lake George to rebuild the "navy". Captain Worthen supervised the construction of the galliots (LO 4020). Outside of these men, Col. Nathaniel Meserve's Company sailed to Halifax for the 1757 Louisbourg Campaign under Loudoun. Meserve was one of the very few provincial officers respected by Loudoun (LO 2859; Pitt to Loudoun, February 19, 1757; Letter Appendix and Hughes 2011, Page 57). In 1758, Meserve's carpenters and artificers were part of Amherst's Louisbourg Expedition. Unfortunately, his company was particularly hard-hit by smallpox; the disease spreading on board ship while sailing from Halifax then exploding within the carpenter company once on shore (Boscawen 2011, Page 209). Meserve died from the pox. Only sixteen men in his hundred-man company survived (Head 1866; Page 69).

From Loudoun to Webb, June 20, 1757 (LO 3864 AND MANA, Page 371):

My Dear Sir,

Sutherland, June 20th 1757.

It is now ten o'Clock, and we are under Sail with the Fleet, which must make our Correspondence come Slow to one another, for the Remainder of the Campaign; and for that Reason I could not Depart, without giving you my Opinion of the Situation of Things on your Side of the Country.

I am this morning, informed that there is a Serjeant of Capt. Rogers's Company, returned from Montreal with Eight Men, who brings an Account that the Enemy have Changed their first Disposition of Sending their Forces up to the Forts, and that they now drawing their whole Force to Quebec, for the Defence of their Capital; by which means You will have nothing to oppose You at Tienderoga & Crown Point, but the Garrisons, and I imagine very few more for Scouting. This Intelligence only confirms me in my former Opinion, that they wou'd keep their whole Force to defend their Capital, as their whole depends upon it; for when once that is taken, there is an End of all their Forts to the Northward, and of Course of their Influence and Command over the Indians.

Now, My Dear Sir, if you find this Intelligence proves true, which you can easily be certain of by your Rangers and Scouts, who in this Situation I imagine can bring you certain Intelligence; & still to make You the more sure of it, I think you ought to send with them an Officer on whose Accounts you can depend, to reconnoitre the Place and Avenues to it, and bring You an Account of the Numbers they have; then You will Act on a certainty; & in case You find things as I expect, and as this Serjeant informs us, the Method I wou'd advise is to make as little appearance of Your Intentions as possible, till You can fix an Entrenched Post at the landing Place at the lower End of Lake George; If you had 800 or 1000 Men posted there & entrenched, I think if you have nothing but the Garrisons to deal with, Your business is done; for with that head You can support yourselves against all they can do, till You can Reinforce Your Troops, to whatever number You please.

As soon as you are sufficiently strong, I wou'd invest the Place, and then bring up my Artillery; for till the Place is invested, I would carry no Artillery, but a few of the light Field Pieces to secure the Entrenched Camp, in Case they have an Indians with them, as those will keep them in Awe.

I am aware of the Objection that may be made of getting possession of the landing Place at the lower or North End of Lake George, from the Want of Boats, arising from those burnt last Winter by the Enemy; But You have still remaining, one Sloop unhurt, and another that wanted little Repair, with the Bay Boats and Gondolas; And I should hope, that one or two of Your Galleys might be finished by this Time, with those to carry Regular Troops with Your Rangers, and what You can pick out of the Provincials to act in that Shape, to be first carryed down the Lake so far, and then to go by Land, I should think it not difficult to get the necessary force there.

The greatest difficulty that occurs to me, is the supplying Your People with Provisions. To obviate this is as far as possible, it will be necessary to throw in a large Quantity into Fort William Henry, and likewise into Fort Edward, to supply that as it is drawn over; and to secure the Communications with Albany. It will likewise be necessary, to leave a Strong Post at Fort Edward, in Case the Enemy shou'd make an Attack on that by South Bay.

Your Brass Guns and Your large Mortar, are I presume, still at Albany. The Guns are easily moved, & two Ox Carts brought down the Mortar. The Moment You move that, the Enemy will be informed of Your Intentions, therefore I wou'd leave that to be among the last Things I did. I wou'd likewise

keep out large Scouting Parties from No. 4 (Fort Number 4) to Alarm their St. Francis Indians, & prevent their being able to employ them against You.

I am more the eager in my Wishes that this should not be delayd, if You find it practicable, and that the Enemy have kept their Force below, because I am very apprehensive from the Fleet and succours from Europe coming so very late, it will not be in my Power to get to Quebec, and if it shou'd happen, that we are forced, from the Season being so far advanced, to sit down before Louisbourg, the Enemy will then see the Impofsibility of our getting to Quebec; and will be at liberty to turn their whole force against You, and make the End of the Campaign a very troublesome one to You, which will be entirely prevented if you are to take both or either of those Forts.

I have here given you my Thoughts in General, on Your Situation, and what appears necefsary for You to do in it; leaving it to You to Act as Circumstances and your Prudence directs You, and wishing You all Succefs and Honour in the Campaign, both on Account of the Publick and for Your own Sake, I am &ca.

Sir Charles joins me in Good Wishes and Compliments to You All.

Comment: This letter requires a full and careful read. Throughout most of the letter, Loudoun is making the case, supported by his latest intelligence, that the French are pinned in Quebec and that Webb's position is not threatened. Then in the second to last paragraph, Loudoun changes gear. With the delay in the expedition and working under orders to first attack Louisbourg, Loudoun is advising Webb that there is a distinct and real danger that the French will indeed attack south. This scenario was not new to Loudoun, the possibility of this happening is detailed in his correspondence to Cumberland the previous October and his letter to Fox in November, transcriptions above. For a quick end to the War in America, this is the gamble that Loudoun was willing to make.

The troop allocations of both the British regulars and the provincials were based on having a relatively quiet front in New York. On June 20th, Loudoun is leaving New York Harbor for Halifax. This was his last chance to reinforce Webb. Although awkward and a distinct logistical headache, two or three battalions could have been sent back to Albany. An argument can be made that the bulk of this letter seems to be a justification for not reinforcing Webb.

Within his sphere, Webb was given wide latitude and authority, but only within that sphere using the limited resources available.

Webb fully understood the risks that Loudoun was taking in New York. The arrival of this letter could not have given Webb any comfort. Webb had a small five- or six-week window to act, but he fails to improve his position until the frantic rush at the very end of July. Condemning Webb for his non-actions is easy, but Loudoun offers no advice to Webb on exactly what he should do if the French threat proves real. There is no permission or discussion as to the merits of simply abandoning Fort William Henry or what circumstances would allow it.

Note: Fort Number 4 is in New Hampshire on the Connecticut River.

From Loudoun to Webb, July 1, 1757 (LO 3892 A & B). From July 25th to the 29th, Webb was at Fort William Henry engaged in the "Officer Conference". This letter was received by Webb on his return to Fort Edward on July 29th:

My dear Sir,

Halifax, July 1st 1757

You will already know that we saild from the Hook, June 20th and I am now to acquaint You that we arrived here Yesterday Morning. The Returns are not yet made, but I don't yet find that there are any of our Transports misfing, but one of Your Regiment (48th Foot) with Captain Mercer and 108 Men and two more Officers and I expect them every hour; as Sir Charles Hardy took all Pofsible Care of us, I do not see how they cou'd get from us, except by some very great Obstinacy of the Master of the Transport.

Admiral Holburne saild from Cork May 9th with Seven Battalions, the Highlanders were not # # arrived, and he left a Ship of War to take Charge of them.

He likewise dispatch'd one of His Small Ships on the 24th May, who arrived here three days before us to acquaint us that he was then 300 Leagues West of Cape Clare, and that he had # # # an Account of Eight French Ships of War being before him from Europe, Enclosed you have M^r. Holburnes Line of Battle.

Yesterday a Transport with Part of Major Kennedys Regiment (arrived, 43rd Foot), they say they and fourteen more Transports Parted from the Fleet May 30th in a Gale of Wind; that they had at first with them one 20 Gun Ship and a Sloop; that they were in Sight of the Fleet for two days; that the Ships of War work'd Windward and left them & Join'd the Fleet; that they being a bad Sailor lost likewise the other Transports; their People all healthy, as are the Troops with us.

I think from this we may Expect the Fleet from Europe every hour; Till they arrive and I have seen my Letters and Consulted the Admiral, I am unwilling to fix ever in my own mind our Operations, tho' I believe You will see that there is but one Object that the Season will Permit us to go to, and that which in it self was a very easy one, they have by their delays at Home, rendered a very difficult one for they will be very strong.

I take the Opportunity of a Vefsel going to New York to write this note to you. Sr Charles Hardy and Major General Abercromby Join with me in Sincere Compliments and best Wishes to You. If an Opportunity Offers, You see how material a Push will be for making the End of Your Campaign Smooth.

I am

Comment: Even before the arrival of Holburne, Hobson, and Hay from Europe, any real possibility of advancing on Quebec has already been dismissed by Loudoun. Later discussions on this point were simply a formalization of that decision.

The existence of this letter is mentioned as a postscript in Webb to Loudoun, August 1, 1757 - Colonial Office Papers, CO 5/48 055. However, this postscript is absent from the copy of this same August 1st letter housed at the Huntington Library, LO 4020A. Histories often cite LO 4020A as a primary source document, but without the postscript reference, this July 1st letter is simply overlooked and forgotten.

From Webb to Loudoun (LO 4020A - transcribed here; and CO_5_48_055, August 1, 1757), the handwriting is that of a clerk. Montcalm arrives on August 3rd:

Fort Edward, Augst. 1st. 1757

My Lord,

The two last Letters I had the Pleasure to write to your Lordship bore Date the 19th and 22^d of June, both which I hope have before this come safe to Your Hands; In them I acquainted Your Lordship of every thing material that had happened, to that Time, under my Command. On the 23^d we had the Misfortune to lose Capt. Richard Rogers by the small Pox, which still continues amongst us, tho' by taking every Precaution, that cou'd be suggested, we have happily prevented its' becoming universal; His Death Your Lordship must imagine, is no small Loss, as by that means the only Company of Rangers we have, is left without a Head. I have ordered Lieut. Johnson to take Charge of the Company, till it shall be filled up by Your Lordship, as I have likewise a Serjeant of Capt. Rob^t Rogers' Company, who made his Escape from Canada, to act as supernumerary in that Rank, till I shall receive Your Lordship's Orders concerning him; His Name is William Henery; but as Cap^t Rogers is on the spot, he can give Your Lordship a more particular Account of him & his Pretensions. I arrived here the 24th (June) and in Consequence of the Ill Behaviour of Capt. Burgen, and his Company, and Your Lordship's Directions to me, reduced it the 28th.

On my Arrival at Saratoga I met a Party of Indians, returning from a Scout to Crown Point, from which Place they had brought off a French Prisoner de la Marine. The Principal Part of his Information was, that they had a large Number of Boats at Tienderoga, which they talked of putting into Lake George, by carrying them across the Portage, and of laying Planks across two of them to transport their Artillery so, to Attack Fort William Henry; That their Troops were very healthy & that they had a great Number of Cannon there; He also added, that he was at the Attack of Fort William Henry in the Winter, and that it was given out by their Officers, in Case they succeeded, they were not to give any Quarter. He was carried down to S^r. W^m. Johnson by the Indians, and by my Desire taken from them by him, and sent to New York; tho' Sir William is of Opinion, it wou'd be difficult to make them give up every one, they may chance to take, which I have however desired him to do his utmost Endeavours to effect. Sir William Johnson, in one of his Letters, informs me, of some disaffected people having spread several malicious Reports among the Six Nations to alienate their Affections from us; If I can possibly find out any of the Authors, I shall not fail to make proper Examples of them.

July 1st. Capt. Putnam being on a Scout with 50 Men toward South Bay, and having waylaid wood Creek, within a Mile and a Half of the Bay, about eleven o'Clock at Night, discover'd between 20 & 30 Bark Canoes coming up the Creek, with a great many Indians onboard of them, and as soon as they came under his Ambush, gave them the Full Fire of his Party, which he repeated three Times, before they cou'd land upon the opposite Shore, as it was very steep and Rocky; They however being so much superior to him in Number, and most of his Ammunition being Expended, pursued him in the Morning, in which he lost three of his Men who had been wounded the Night before, and cou'd not make their Escape, two of them they carried off, and one was found scalped by the Party, we sent out the Day after in Pursuit of the Enemy. He is a very proper Man for that Service, and is indeed the only person that as yet had done any Thing. He is certain he killed and wounded a great many of them. I have the Pleasure to inform Your Lordship, that the Corporal of

the 3^d Battalion of the 60th Regiment with the Rest who deserted with him, have at last all been taken by our Scouting Parties, in their Way to the French; A Court Martial has been held upon all of them but the Corporal, who was almost dead when taken, and is not yet well enough to be brought to Tryal; And one Peck, a German, suffered Death pursuant to His Sentence, the 31st of July.

July 2^d. four Deserters came into Fort William Henry from Tienderoga, who confirmed all the former Accounts of the Number of Cannon and Boats at that Fort, and further added, they were very busy facing it all round with Stone, of which the Casements & Barracks were built. He likewise informed us that 3 large Ships were arrived at Quebec, with Troops and ammunition on board, and that 600 Canadians were sent to the Ohio.

July 10th. Another French Prisoner was brought in from Crown Point by a Party of Indians; he was also of the Marine; he informed us that the Day he was taken, and some Days before, a large Reinforcement of Troops was gone to Tienderoga; that they had at that Time there 5 Battalions, and one at Crown Point, besides some Canadians and 200 Indians at the former; but that M^r. Montcalm was at S^t. John's, and hourly expected with / as he said / the main Body of the Army; he confirmed the Number of Cannon and Boats at Tienderoga, amongst which were those taken at Monongahela and Oswego; That 4 large Ships were arrived at Quebec with the Regiment de Fisher and Provisions on board. (Circumstance is a better fit for the Regiment de Berry).

The 23^d. Our Covering Party was at attacked in the Woods, on the East Side of this Fort (Fort Edward) by a Body of French and Indians, and, as usual, gave way, and most of them Ran in; A party was immediately sent off from the Camp, who after a smart Fire for about 10 Minutes, drove the Enemy off precipitately. We lost 14 Men besides 6 or 7 wounded in this Skirmish. Our People say they killed several of them, but they were not to be found, amongst the killed on our Side were, were a Serjeant and Corporal of the 35th Regiment who were scalped and terribly mangled, and three of the Independents, the Rest were Provincials.

The same Evening Col.^o Parker set out from Fort William Henry, without my Knowing any Thing of the Matter, till too late to prevent it, with 300 Men and 27 Boats of different Kinds, to what Purpose I really cannot tell; all the Reason they give for it was to take some Prisoners, and at Day Break next Morning fell into an Ambuscade of French & Indians at a Place called Sabbath Day Point about 26 Miles from Fort William Henry; They were fired upon by a large Party of the Enemy on each Side of the Lake, and at the Same Time Attacked by a great Number of Indian Canoes, in which the Enemy shewed so great Resolution, as even to board and overset our Boats, giving to Quarters to the Men, who from being scatter'd became seperately an easy Conquest. Col.^o. Parker and Capt. Ogden, with 4 Whale Boats and about 50 Men, have made their Escape, and got into Fort W^m. Henry, as have about 50 others, who by getting ashore have escaped the Slaughter, and came over the Mountains, Capt. M^cGinnis of the New York Forces, and Capt. Woodward of the Jersey, and all the Rest are still Mⁱssing. By this unfortunate Stroke Your Lordship will perceive the Enemy have at present the Superiority on the Lake, we having now but 2 of the old Sloops, and 5 Whale Boats remaining. I have however given Orders to have 16 others sent up from Albany and Schenectady as soon as pofsible.

The 25th. I went to Fort William Henry, with L^t. Col^o Young, M^r. Montresor, and Capt. Ord, who upon considering the Situations of Affairs and reconnoitring the Ground, were of Opinion that the Troops encamped on the N.W. Side of the Fort, agreeable to Your Lordship's former

Instructions should be removed to the Rocky Eminence on the S:E: where a Redoubt shou'd be raised, and some small Pieces of Cannon mounted on it, under the Fire of which they might encamp without being subject to a surprise from the Enemy, which for the Nearnefs of the Wood, and the Distance of the Fort from the former Encampment they were always liable to. Neither of the Galliot's were yet lanch'd but one was to be ready in a few Days.

On the 28th. I sent out Capt. Putnam and Lieutenant Johnson with three of the remaining Whale Boats to reconnoitre the Enemy, who returned in the Evening, & brought Word that at the first Narrows, they discover'd 3 Canoes with white Flaggs, which on his Approach seemed to run away, to draw him in to pursue, but as he imagined he saw some Men on the Shore each Side of the Lake, he thought it most adviseable to Come back before Night.

After having made the requisite Disposition, & given the necefsary Instructions to Col^o. Monro, I returned to this place the 29th. And the 30th wrote to Sir William Johnson to join me, as soon as pofsible, with what Indians he cou'd collect, and to the Colonels, to march the Militia of the Province of New York to Albany. I have likewise wrote the Governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, to march the Reinforcements they were to furnish, agreeable to Your Instructions, in Case of Emergency. Forthwith to this Place (Fort Edward). By the Returns I herewith send Your Lordship, You will see our Strength, which by all Accounts is much inferior to that of the Enemy. They have a great Number of Indians, insomuch that were are constantly surrounded with them, and the Avenues to their Forts Waylaid by them, — Col^o. Young sets out tomorrow with a Reinforcement of Regulars and Provincials for Fort William Henry to compleat the Number of Troops there to 2000 — I shall upon any Intelligence of the nearer Approach of the Body of the Enemy, move up with the Remainder of the Army, & endeavor to dispute their landing, or make a Stand with the Whole on some Advantagious Ground, after having Thrown a sufficient Garrison into each of the Forts. Small scouting Parties are sent out daily in each Side of, and a Whale Boat sent down the Lake, for Intelligence. We have set a great many more Hands at work on the Galliot's (there being but 12 Ship Carpenters amongst the 49 artificers under Capt. Worthen) and hope if we can get them out in Time, to recover the Command of the Lake again.

By a Letter from Col^o. Stanwix, he has arrived at Carlisle the 3^d of June, and encamped there with the 5 Companies of the 1st Battalion. We have had several Reports of the French being in Motion at Fort DuQuesne, & preparations by Mifsissippi.

Col^o. Bouquet was arrived at Charles Town the 23^d. He informs me the 2000 Provincials he was to have had, are likely to turn out but 600 and that the Independent Companies of the Province were very weak and extremely bad, of which he had discharged Nineteen.

I do not at present recollect any thing material that I have omitted to acquaint Your Lordship with, Shall therefore conclude this long (and I cou'd wish more argreable) Narrative, by afuring Your Lordship how much I am &cc.

P.S. I had omitted to acknowledge the rect. of your Lordship's Letter from Halifax of July the first, it came to my hands the 29th. (From CO 5/48 055; Page 601/301, but not LO 4020A).

Comment: This letter is reasoned and draws a realistic overview of the situation. The strengths and abilities of the French are correctly noted, as is their intention to attack Fort William Henry, not Fort Edward. This is known and confirmed by July 10th. There is no panic or confusion in the letter. Putnam is the only individual praised by Webb. Monro is bluntly criticized for authorizing Parker's Scout. Yet Webb does not comment on three similar scouting missions ordered earlier in July by Monro. It seems doubtful that Webb was unaware of these other scouting missions. Colonel Goffe's Scout of Ticonderoga simply reported: *"they have a large number of Troops there."* This would have been conveyed to Webb soon after Goffe's return on July 21st. He may not have authorized Parker's Scout per se, but he knew that Monro was aggressively sending out large numbers of provincials on scouting missions. The topic of the Galliot is carefully approached. Montresor is not mentioned. Once Webb had returned from William Henry, he immediately writes letters to Johnson and the various Governors asking for reinforcements. Webb will march to the relief of Fort William Henry, but only after securing Fort Edward. The letter fails to identify any strengths in the British position. It is organized and factual, but shows limited resolve. At the same time is not overtly negative. The tone of the letter itself is difficult to judge without knowing Webb himself. The letters from Webb to Loudoun referenced at the beginning of the letter, June 19th and June 22nd, are not in the Loudoun Papers at the Huntington Library at least under those dates or in the Digital Collection of the Colonial Office Papers. Webb did not leave Albany for Fort Edward until June 23rd (Montresor Journal, Page 17).

On September 19, 1756, Ensign Jeremiah Lincoln was taken prisoner during a scout of the west shore of Lake George — Hodges' Scout, Travers (2015, Pages 123-149). He escaped from Montreal and managed to walk south and reach Fort William Henry on July 1, 1757. Webb makes no mention of Lincoln, his return, or his observations. Webb's focus was on the four French deserters that arrived the next day at Fort William Henry (July 2nd). The story of Lincoln's escape was printed in the Boston Gazette on July 18th. The narrative includes *"and the reason given why the Army was not sent against our Forces sooner, was because they heard at Montreal, that a Fleet and Army was coming up from New-England up the River St. Lawrence to go Against Quebeck; but had given over the Expedition of their Coming now, which was the reason of their sending some of their Forces to the Ohio, and others to Ticonderoga."* (Lucier 2007, Vol. 2, Pages 270-271). Lincoln had left Montreal on June 17th. Loudoun was still at New York Harbor on June 17th, but the French had already concluded that Quebec was safe for the time being.

In all likelihood, both Webb and Monro knew Lincoln's narrative and story. Lincoln's information was not totally new to Webb, but it does lend credence to the interview of the French prisoner at Saratoga that Webb had witnessed in late June. Subsequently, Lincoln's story was confirmed by an interview of French prisoners taken on July 10th.

A short segment of this letter suggests that Loudoun and Webb had additional communications not reported in any of the correspondences transcribed here: *"were of Opinion that the Troops encamped on the N.W. Side of the Fort, agreeable to Your Lordship's former Instructions should be removed to the Rocky Eminence on the S:E: where a Redoubt shou'd be raised, and some small Pieces of Cannon mounted on it"*. What "instructions" is a reference to is unclear. If Loudoun did order the movement, this communication may have been verbal. It is a poor fit for LO 3474 where Loudoun simply directs the provincials to be camped to the northwest of the fort without any mention of the southeast position (April 25, 1757, above).

From Lord Loudoun to Admiral Holburne, August 4, 1757 (CO_5_48_066, Page 759/380):

Halifax 4th August 1757

Sir,

I herewith return to you the Intelligence you have received from Capt. Edwards of His Maj^{tys}. Ship the Gosport, Stationed at New Foundland: by which the former Intelligence we had of the french force at Louisbourg is now corroborated: Upon which I cannot help desiring your Opinion, as soon as possible, whither the Land force united with the Fleet under your Command is Sufficient to attempt this Reduction of Louisbourg with any probability of Success, at this Advanced Season of the Year?

*Copy
Fra: Holburne*

*I am, with the greatest regard,
Sir
Your most Obedient and
Most Humble Servant
Loudoun*

Francis Holburne Esqr. Vice Admiral and Command in Chief of His Maj^{tys}. Ships of War in North America &c. &c.

Comment: Holburne had reached Halifax on July 9th. Pargellis 1933 (Pages 241-243) describes the winds as “foul” between the period of July 13th and August 3rd, only turning “fair” on August 4th. In Pargellis, there is a strong suggestion that this would have prevented the fleet from sailing, now trapped in Halifax, but more expertise is needed than this author can supply. August off Louisbourg is often in dense fog, something that was fully appreciated by the assembled ship captains.

“Any or all these circumstances might have been disastrous, but they never took full effect because overshadowed by the one outstanding factor — the persistently unfavorable weather which kept the main fleet from arriving in America before July, and then confined it helpless in Halifax harbor.” Pargellis (1933, Pages 242-243).

There is nothing in the correspondence between Loudoun and Holburne suggesting animosity between them. Pargellis (1933) does not suggest there was any.

Holburne’s patron was Lord Argyll of Scotland. He also had the support of the influential Lord George Anson, 1st Baron of Anson, and the 1st Lord of the Admiralty (1751 - 1762). Holburne could be both hard and determined. He does not appear to be overly cautious or timid. Holburne served on the board that tied Admiral John Byng for failing “to do his Utmoot” at Minorca in 1756. Byng was executed, something that Holburne endorsed. He would eventually serve as a member of parliament for both Stirling and Plymouth.

An attachment to a letter from Captain R. Edwards to Admiral Holburne — *Gosport* at St. Johns Newfoundland; likely received August 3rd or 4th (CO_5_48_052). The correspondence was written July 17, 1757, but the letter is best placed here within the Letter Appendix.

A List of French Ships of War said to have arrived at Louisbourg under the Command of Mon^r. Da Bois de Lamot (Dubois de La Motte) as by the Information of Jean Dorcabgale Captain & Pierre Mendibouge 2nd. Captain of the Schooner Surprise, who left Louisbourg on the 6th. July 1757.

List from Martinico said to arrive the 20th. or 21st. of June Last.

Monr. Beaufremont Rear Admiral. BLANK Chef de Escadre

	<i>Guns</i>	
<i>Le Tonnant</i>	80	
<i>De Francoeur</i>	74	(Le Défenseur)
<i>L'Inflexible</i>	64	
<i>L'Eveille</i>	64	
<i>Le Diademe</i>	64	
<i>Le Brune</i>	32	

From Brest about two or three days after the Ships from Martinico Arrived (Martinique).

Mon^r. Da Bois de Lamot Vice Admiral. BLANK Rear Admiral

<i>Le Formidable</i>	80
<i>Le Duc de Bourgogne</i>	80
<i>Le Superbe</i>	74
<i>Le Dauphin Royal</i>	74
<i>Le Beliqueux</i>	64
<i>Le Celebre</i>	64
<i>Le Heros</i>	74
<i>La Bizarre</i>	54

From Toulon about four days after the Ships from Brest

<i>Ships</i>	<i>Guns</i>	
<i>Le Sage</i>	64	
<i>L'Achille</i>	64	
<i>These two he could</i>	74	
<i>Not recollect the</i>	74	
<i>Names of</i>		
<i>La Bienacquise</i>	34	(L'Abénaquise or sometimes Abenakis)
<i>La Commete</i>	32	
<i>La Flur de Lis</i>	30	<i>They Cannot say which Squadron These Four Frigates came out in.</i>
<i>La Hermmione</i>	34	

NB.

The Ships from Toulon are those that Engaged with Admiral Saunders off Gibraltar.

There is Four Divisions in the Squadron but he cannot tell the Names of the other Read Admiral or the Chef de Escadre. The Surgeon of the Schooner says that the Ships from Europe brought out Four Regiments of Soldiers; that they have levelled a Rock on which we mounted a Battery when we last besieged Louisbourg (1745), and have raised a Fortification thereon, with several 24 Pounders mounted; and they work day and Night to Compleat the Works for the defence.

The Master of the Schooner says that the Four Regiments of Soldiers which came in Ships from Europe are those of de Berry, Artone, Borgun, and Mailly.

Comment: Twenty-two warships are listed here. *Le Glorieux* (74) sailing from Brest is missing from the list (Bougainville Journals, Page 139). The two unidentified ships from Toulon are *Le Hector* (74) and *Le Valliant* (64). With two exceptions, the ship spellings are very accurate, suggesting names were compared to a roster of French warships. In contrast, the information concerning the French battalions arriving from Europe is inaccurate and the battalion spellings are poor. Some 2,000 troops were sent, but half of these men were used to fill out existing formations. On June 28th, a French letter has 18 warships in the harbor; the Toulon ships have not arrived yet (O'Callaghan 1858, Vol. X, Page 573). At least in 1757 and 1758, the ratio of ships of the line to frigates in the French Navy was close to 2:1; this is not the ratio seen here.

In May 1755, the second battalion of six French Regiments sail for North America — La Reine, Artois, Bourgogne, Languedoc, Guienne, and Béarn (Dunnigan and Cardy 1994, Pages 67-72). Four battalions go to Quebec, but the Artois and Bourgogne (often written as Burgundy) garrison Louisbourg. Two ships were seized in transit by the British, *L'Alcide* and *Le Lis*. Dieskau lost much of his engineering staff when the *L'Alcide* was lost, but four companies of the La Reine and four companies of the Languedoc were surrendered with the *Le Lis*. Other battalions under Montcalm would follow in 1756 — La Sarre and Royal Roussillon.

In 1757, only two new battalions of French regulars were sent to North America, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Berry; these troops had been slated for French claims in India and were redirected to Louisbourg. Additional regulars were being sent to reinforce the two depleted regiments — the La Reine and the Languedoc. Even before the threat to Louisbourg ended, both the Berry battalions and the aforementioned replacements arrive at Quebec, some 1,100 men. The Berry battalions reach Quebec before July 31st, but they have lost 141 men since leaving France due to sickness (O'Callaghan 1858, Pages 594 and 635). At the same time, reinforcements may have been added to the Artois and Bourgogne battalions. The Naval Ministry would have assigned others to the *Compagnies franches de la Marine* (colonial marines administered by the Navy).

In 1758, there were three regiments of French line infantry and a battalion of light troops at Louisbourg — the established Artois and Bourgogne battalions; the 2nd Cambis and the 2nd Battalion of the Volontaires - Etranger would not reach Louisbourg until late May 1758, just a few weeks before Amherst. The garrison also included some 900 colonial marines, plus several hundred militia and ship marines (See Boscawen 2011, Page 357). The Mailly was not sent to North America.

The French commitment to Louisbourg was truly massive. In June 1757, there were only forty-two ships of the line serviceable in the entire French Navy; eighteen of these ships were at Louisbourg — a full 40 percent of the ships. In contrast, there were only some eight fit ships of the line protecting French Atlantic ports and eight others in the Mediterranean. In opposition, the British had ninety-six ships of the line available for duty and were rapidly expanding their fleet (Dull 2005, Pages 87 and 268). With Holburne, there were sixteen ships of the line, four frigates, and four sloops (Holburne to Holderness, August 4, 1757, MANA, Page 389).

Regrettably, the ships from the West Indies carried a variety of tropical diseases north to Louisbourg including malaria, yellow fever, but particularly typhus (lice). Others suffer from scurvy. By September, some 400 sailors were dead and another 1,200 men were sick. When the French fleet arrives at Brest, some 4,000 sailors were classified as sick. The typhus then spreads to the local population and some 5,000 civilians die. By March 1758, nearly 6,000 sailors sent to Louisbourg the previous year have died, just under half the complement (Dull 2005, Page 80). For 1757 and the French Navy as a whole, it is estimated that 8,500 French sailors died or were captured (Boscawen 2011, Page 83). This represents a full 25% of the sailors in the French Navy, a loss that could not be replaced.

Notes on Louisbourg 1758 and the French Navy:

This loss of sailors came as the French Navy was in fact expanding in overall size. Ship losses experienced in 1757 were minimal. Entering 1758, the French Navy had at least four more ships of the line in the overall inventory than they had at the beginning of 1757, a strict number comparison (sixty-four ships of the line on January 1, 1758). But the number of ships of the line that could be deployed in 1758 actually decreased. In mid-January, the *Opiniâtre* (64) and *Greenwich* (50) were wrecked during a storm. Dull (2005) identifies five docked ships that did not sail in 1758 for the lack of crews — *Glorieux* (74), *Dauphin-Royal* (70), *Inflexible* (64), *Saint-Michel* (64), and *Warwick* (64). Several other ships seem to "disappear" in 1758, then reappear in 1759 — the *Tonnant* (80), *Superbe* (70), and *Eveill  * (64). These last three ships could have been in the refitting schedule, but their roles are unclear (See Dull 2005, Pages 86, 118, and 268-274). France itself depended on coastal and river transport to move raw materials and finished goods, not a road network. By mid-summer, the lack of warships to protect the Atlantic coast of France from the pressure of the British Navy was a real problem and contributed an additional burden on an already inefficient economy. With what men could be found, the Naval Ministry chose to fit smaller frigates rather than the larger ships of the line.

French privateers siphoned off many of the best French sailors, but as privateers brought wealth to a port, it was politically impossible to curtail the practice. This routinely left the French Navy unable to crew ships. With typhus hitting the ports hard, the difficulty in recruiting only worsened. The French Navy also suffered from a distinct shortage of cannon. The very regionalized French economy, lacking a national market for iron and other manufacturing goods, was unable to respond to increases in demand (Pritchard 1978). The French government and ministries provided the needed funding, but none of the foundries were able to meet the obligations under their contracts. Although monies were advanced, new foundries were much slower to establish than anticipated. Unfortunately, many of the guns from these new foundries failed proofing. Battle damage and storm damage would also take their toll. This hodgepodge of factors worked hard against the French. On June 1 (1757), some twenty-one ships of the line were unavailable for service, a full third of the total number (Dull 2005, Page 113).

Entering 1758, the French Navy's shortage of experienced sailors had severe consequences. Crew manifests needed to be re-filled, but this took time. Instead of sailing as squadrons, ships were sent out singly or in small

groups, often weeks behind schedule. Per a March accounting, there were sixty-two ships of the line and thirty-two frigates in the French Navy (Boscawen 2011, Page 83). This tally is for all commissioned ships including those needing repair or refit, crewed or not. Still, the Ministry under de Moras sends some twenty ships of the line and twenty-five other warships to North America (Boscawen 2011, Page 116). As in 1757, a full 40 percent of the French Navy was committed to North America; this is true for both the larger and the smaller warships. Between January and the end of May, three ships of the line were captured en route and three more heavily damaged, forcing their return to port. Four smaller warships were lost. By June 1, only twenty-five of the ships of the line remained in service, forty percent of the total number. A full half of these fit ships were already in North America or would be returning to North America later in the year. By the end of 1758, the total number of ships of the line was reduced to fifty-four, ten ships less than at the start of the year (Dull 2005, Page 113).

In the critical first half of 1758, some seventy-one merchant ships travel in nineteen separate convoys, escorted both by warships and privateers. Many of these ships were intercepted or failed to reach North America. Some thirty-five of these merchantmen fall to the British. Additional ships were lost later in the year. For 1758 as a whole, records suggest some sixty-one merchantmen/privateers were hired to transport provisions to Louisbourg and another fifty-six merchantmen/privateers for provisions to Quebec (Boscawen 2011, Page 381). However, how the losses of merchantmen were distributed between ships bound for Louisbourg and those bound for Quebec is jumbled.

Unfortunately, the typhus epidemic of 1757 had not run its full course. In Spring 1758, many warships were sent to sea with crew who still carried typhus. Typhus is a bacterial disease spread by lice, fleas, or chiggers. Once at sea and in close quarters, the disease again exploded. The losses were huge, some ships lost nearly half their complements. The squadrons at both Louisbourg and Port Dauphin suffer.

Colonial possessions were not necessarily a source of income for the parent state. New France was a distinct drain on the French treasury (Nester 2014). As regards the French finances, the only true revenue-making aspect was the fishing industry. Because of the intense corruptness of the ruling class in Quebec, even the fur trade was an overall money drain. In France, there was a glut of furs on the market, lowering prices. More significantly, Quebec was very dependent on France for food, particularly flour; cold-wet weather could easily ruin wheat and other grain crops. From the Bougainville Journals (May 3, 1758; Page 202): *News from Quebec. Great want; the people reduced to two ounces of bread. The soldiers to half-pound instead of a pound of beef or horse meat, a half-pound of salt pork, and a quarter-pound of salt cod.*

On May 19th, at least eight merchantmen and a captured British prize arrive at Quebec from Bordeaux, loaded with between 8,000 - 12,000 barrels of desperately needed flour and salt pork (O'Callaghan, Volume X, Pages 706, 717, and 768 - each letter has a different quantity of flour). Although a saving grace for starving Quebec, there is a suggestion that the convoy's assigned destination was actually Louisbourg (Boscawen 2011, Page 100; CL04). Two other merchantmen arrive on May 26th and another on June 2nd. Bougainville provides needed details on the arrival of the provisions from France (Bougainville Journals, May 22 - June 2, 1758; Pages 206-210).

Only six ships of the line, five frigates, and a single sloop were assembled at Louisbourg before the British were able to blockade the harbor. The intended fleet commander arrives off Louisbourg in late June, sailing on the *Le Formidable* (80). Finding the British blockade solid and his crew suffering badly from typhus, he returns to France. Others seek new destinations. Avoiding entanglements with the British Navy, five other ships of the line and a frigate reach Port Dauphin, 50 miles west of Louisbourg. After unloading their cargo and men (2nd battalion of the Cambis Regiment), these ships do not attempt to reinforce Louisbourg, as ordered by the authorities in Louisbourg, but head to Quebec. Unfortunately, the harbor at Louisbourg proves little more than a trap. Unlike 1757, the British heavily out-gun the French — the British fleet was comprised of twenty-three ships of the line, twelve frigates, five sloops, and two bomb ketches (Boscawen 2011, Page 345-355). Most of the French vessels at Louisbourg were destroyed while at anchor or scuttled in an attempt

to narrow the harbor entrance. After June 10th, only two frigates managed to fully escape, *La Comète* and *Le Aréthuse*.

The governor of Isle Royale (Louisbourg), Drucour - an experienced naval officer, had declined repeated requests to allow the bulk of the French warships to leave. Drucour later offers this rationale: If he had allowed the French ships to leave in early June, the British navy would have forced the harbor and the surrender of Louisbourg would have happened at least six weeks earlier than it did. The British would then have had the opportunity to move on Quebec. What-if questions now abound — How would Vaudreuil and Montcalm react to having both Amherst's and Abercromby's columns moving toward Quebec? Would Montcalm be forced to move his limited army to Quebec rather than meet Abercromby at Carillon? By nature, Amherst was reasoned and methodical, but Boscawen and Wolfe were aggressive. But without river pilots familiar with the difficulties of the St. Lawrence would Boscawen have risked his ships? Drucour's fear is a clear mirror of Loudoun's overall strategy. Speculation is near endless, but Drucour's argument is not without merit (Boscawen 2011, Page 198).

At the very minimum, the French Navy loses eleven ships of the line, seven frigates, and a sloop in support of New France (1758). This is near twice the number of ships than in the harbor itself (June 10th). Other warships were damaged by engagements with the British, storms, or otherwise wrecked. Dozens of merchantmen were captured by the British or lost to storms. Over the duration of the Seven Years' War, France loses some thirty-seven ships of the line and fifty-six frigates - destroyed, captured, or accidental loss (Pritchard 1978, Page 46). Dull lists nine fewer frigates lost (Page 286). Among the ships of the line, a full third of the losses occur in 1758. Louisbourg would fall to the British on July 27, 1758. Louisbourg was taken by the British, it was not abandoned by France or the French Navy (Dull 2005, Pages 105-112).

The loss of so many merchantmen made it difficult to hire ships in 1759, but some twenty ships leave Bordeaux on March 22nd and arrive at Quebec May 13-23, 1759 (Dull 2005, Page 143). Three French naval vessels sail separately, two frigates and a dedicated supply ship. These ships, mostly a mix of privateers and merchantmen, carried between 350 and 600 reinforcements, flour, gunpowder, wine, and lard (candle manufacturing?). Some twenty-two ships reached Quebec (Fauteux 1922). Unlike 1758, the Halifax squadron under Durell was late on post and fails to blockade the approaches to the St. Lawrence River (Brumwell 2005, Pages 188-198). On April 30th, Saunders and the bulk of the British Fleet arrived at Halifax. Durell's squadron was still in the harbor. The previous year, Hardy left Halifax on April 6th (Boscawen 2011, Page 105). The first elements of the British Fleet were not on the St. Lawrence until about May 23rd, only three late-arriving merchantmen were intercepted. Durell's initial performance was a deep disappointment and in direct conflict with Pitt's orders. In defense of Durell, the ice cover at Louisbourg seems to have remained much longer into the spring in 1759 than it did in 1758.

There is considerable confusion as to the level of commitment made by the French Navy to Louisbourg (1758). Simply put, there is a myriad of ways to frustrate any accounting. The bulk of the confusion stems from ships that tried but then failed to reach Louisbourg. These ships are often overlooked in various narratives. At Louisbourg itself, ships successfully slipped in and then out of the harbor, but this happens only rarely after Boscawen arrives with the bulk of the British fleet on June 1. Hardy's squadron arrived off Louisbourg in mid-April and proved very effective under extraordinarily difficult sailing conditions, but he did not have enough ships to fully lock down the harbor.

In the accounting below, ships may be listed in more than one category. Not including the five ships without crew or the three ships that seemingly "disappear", twenty ships of the line are accounted for. In regards to the resupply of New France, some histories include the Mediterranean ships as part of the summary accounting (Boscawen 2011), and some do not (Dull 2005). No attempt is made to account for all the frigates involved. Where possible, the lost frigates are identified. There is no confusion in Dull (2005) or Boscawen (2011). The French fleet was still being ravaged by typhus that had taken hold in 1757, particularly those ships sailing from Brest or Rochefort.

French Ships at Louisbourg, June 10, 1758. Ships of the Line: *Prudent* (74); *Entreprenant* (74); *Célèbre* (64); *Capricieux* (64); *Bienfaisant* (64); and *Apollo/Apollon* (50). Frigates: *Aréthuse* (36); *Echo* (32); *Comète* (32); *Fidelle* (22); *Chèvre* (22). Sloop: *Biche* (16).

Ships that leave before the arrival of Boscawen include the *Aigle* (50), *Brillant* (54), and *Mutine* (24, privateer). On June 8th, the *Bizarre* (64) leaves Louisbourg for Quebec and later reaches France. After June 10th, only the *Aréthuse* (36) and *Comète* (32) successfully escape.

French Ships at Port Dauphin, June 1, 1758. Ships of the Line: *Dragon* (64); *Belliqueux* (64), *Hardi* (64); *Sphinx* (64); and *Brillant* (54, East India Company). Frigate: *Zéphir* (26). Port Dauphin is 50 miles west of Louisbourg. On June 8th and contrary to orders to join the other squadron at Louisbourg, these ships head to Quebec. This element is often badly jumbled or forgotten; incorrect in Clowes (1898, Page 184).

French Ships Captured in Connection with the New France Resupply, 1758. Ships of the Line: *Foudroyant* (80), *Orphée* (64), *Raisonnable* (64), *Bienfaisant* (64), and *Belliqueux* (64). The first two of these ships were captured trying to leave the Mediterranean (February), the middle ship off the coast of Atlantic France heading to Louisbourg (May), the *Bienfaisant* in Louisbourg harbor itself (July), and the *Belliqueux* when returning from Quebec (November). Frigates: Leaving France, the *Galathée* (22) was captured off the French coast. In April, the *Diane* (36) was captured off Louisbourg. The *Rhinoceros* (36) was captured returning from Quebec, but the heavily damage ship was burned. Privateers: In the Spring, several ships were captured by Hardy including the *Favour* (14) and *Foudroyant* (22; duplicate name to the French ship of the line). The *Echo* (32 - privateer) was chased down trying to escape from Louisbourg in mid-June.

French Ships (Fit) that Fail to Reach Louisbourg and Return to France. Ships of the Line: The *Magnifique* (74) arrived off Louisbourg on March 30th, but the harbor was ice-covered. After several futile attempts to enter the harbor, the *Magnifique* leaves. The *Formidable* (80) sails from Brest with the overall fleet commander, De Courbon-Blénac, and arrives off Louisbourg in late June, but the British blockade was by then solid. Both ships suffer badly from typhus and both return to Europe without making port. Blénac was then made port commander of Brest, a sign typical of censorship and demotion. The *Magnifique* loses 342 men on the voyage, most from typhus, but 120 men from hypothermia (Boscawen 2011, Page 91).

French Ships Wrecked in the Resupply. The frigate *Messenger* (22) was lost in a collision with the *Raisonnable* (64) and burned at sea. The *Aquile* (50) reached Louisbourg and then returned to France. In August, the *Aquile* carrying a cargo of provisions destined for Quebec was wrecked on shoals in the north passage leading to the St. Lawrence River, Straits of Belle Isle; only 30 quarters of flour were salvaged.

French Ships Heavily Damage Involved in the New France Resupply, 1758. In January, the frigate *Heroïne* (24) was badly damaged in an engagement with the British off the coast of Atlantic France. The ship managed to return to Brest. At the end of February, sailing with the *Foudroyant* and *Orphée*, the *Oriflamme* (50) was damaged in an engagement with HMS *Monarch* (74) and *Montague* (60). In need of extensive repairs, the ship managed to reach Cartagena and then Toulon. In March, the *Amphion* (50) suffers heavy damage in a storm and limps back to Brest. These 50 cannon ships were still classified as ships of the line (4th Rate), but they were utilized differently than higher-rated ships.

In the first half of 1758, the *Florissant* (74) served in convoy duty in support of Quebec. This effort was fully successful. In November, the *Buckingham* (70) engages the *Florissant*, again serving in convoy escort, this time in the Caribbean. The damage to both ships was extensive. Worn out, the *Florissant* would be struck from the French fleet in 1759. There may be at least one more heavily damaged ship of the line not identified here.

French Ships of the Line without Crews, 1758. *Glorieux* (74), *Dauphin-Royal* (70), *Inflexible* (64), *Saint-Michel* (64), and *Warwick* (64). Several other ships seem to "disappear" in 1758, then reappear in 1759 — the *Tonnant* (80), *Superbe* (70), and *Eveillée* (64). (See Dull 2005, Pages 118, 268-274).

French Losses Unrelated to New France, 1758. The *Greenwich* (50) and *Opiniâtre* (64) were lost returning from the West Indies (storm damage, January 1758). Serving in the Indian Ocean, the *Bien-Aime* (58) was badly damaged in an engagement against the British (April). The ship was subsequently wrecked trying to reach port, but the crew was saved (East India Company). In separate incidents that summer, the *Rose* (30) and *Loire* (44) were lost in the Mediterranean.

British Navy, 1758. In North America, losses were minimal: six hired transport vessels, and a privateer — the *Duke of Cumberland* (10). Outside of North America, three ships of the line were wrecked or accidentally burned — the *Invincible* (74), *Prince George* (90), and *Lichfield* (50). In the Indian Ocean, the *Bridgewater* (24) and *Triton* (24) were trapped by a French squadron and deliberately torched to avoid capture. The *Stork* (10) was taken in the Caribbean. Off Ireland and while returning from Quebec, the *Winchelsea* (20) was briefly taken by the French *Bizarre* (64) but then recaptured a few weeks later. Merchantmen losses are not included here.

The French reinforcement and resupply of New France required many, but not all, warships to sail *en flûte*. The below-deck cannon would be stripped from the gun ports and packed into the hold; the gun decks were then used for cargo or often to transport troops — in this case, French regulars or colonial marines. After reaching their destination and unloading men and cargo, the guns could then be returned to the gun decks. As the number of mounted cannon were reduced, there was an additional option of reducing the number of sailors on board, freeing even more space for cargo or transporting soldiers. The transport need and the volume of cargo determined the extent of the disarming involved. Mounted cannon could be reduced to as little as 25% of the normal number. Shipping lists and correspondence will simply state *en flûte* or *flûte* without any further explanation. However, the gun number in the notation itself will not be reduced. Under the convoy system, some warships sailed with fully mounted cannon, some *en flûte*. Merchantmen would then be assigned to many of the convoys. After breaking out of port and moving beyond the enemy's patrol zones, individual merchantmen would make best speed and the formation would often fall apart.

Note: Any comparative math will be awkward as the French lose several ships between the start of 1758 and mid-year — captured and wrecked. Those heavily damaged, but repairable are not included in some calculations, but they are in others; it is just dependent on the precise wording of the categorization. Plus, there was new ship construction that needs to be included in some, but not all, categories. Here, both the numerators and denominators are constantly changing.

From Admiral Holburne to Lord Loudoun, August 4, 1757 (CO_5_48_066; Page 763/382):

My Lord

Newark in Halifax Harb^r. 4 Aug^t 1757.

I have the honour of your Lordships returning the Intelligence I received from Capt. Edwards of the Gosport, and as this corroborates what we formerly heard of the Enemys Strength at Louisburgh, I have no doubt at a Strong Squadron being there: and as your Lordship is desirous of my Opinion, whether the Land Force under your Lordships Command, united with the Fleet is sufficient to attempt the Reduction of Louisburgh with any probability of Succefs at this advanced Season of the Year? I must acquaint your Lordship that so far as a Sea Officer can judge, considering the Strength of the Enemy, and other Circumstances, It is my Opinion there is no probability of succeeding in an attempt upon Louisburgh at this advanced Season of the Year: And if your Lordship shall determine not to attempt this Service wherein it may be necessary for the Fleet and Army to act in Conjunction, you will please to notify me, that after having appointed a proper Convoy for the Transport protection, I may proceed to Sea with the rest of the Ships, & employ them in the best manner for his Majesty's Service. I am with the greatest Esteem.

Copy

&c. &c. &c.

Fra: Holburne

Fra: Holburne

From the Colden Papers, Volume V, Pages 160-161 (Barack, New-York State Historical Society, 1921; Printed 1923, online). Spelling is as in the original. A similar list dating to September 21st is found in CO_5_048_069, Page 779/390.

July 16th Saturday By the Posts from Boston Learn that on the 28th of June the Hunter Sloop of War Captⁿ Lefoy arrived at Halifax with Dispatches from Admiral Ho[l]burn to Gov^r Lawrence.

The following is a List of Ships under the Command of Admiral Holburn

			<i>Guns</i>	<i>Men</i>
<i>Newark</i>	<i>Adm^t Holburn.</i>	<i>Captⁿ (William) Holburn</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>620</i>
<i>Invincible</i>		<i>Bentley</i>	<i>74</i>	<i>700</i>
<i>Terrible</i>		<i>Lord Collins</i>	<i>74</i>	<i>600</i>
<i>Northumberland</i>		<i>Lord Covill</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>520</i>
<i>Grafton</i>	<i>Com. Holmes</i>	<i>Captⁿ Cornwall</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>535</i>
<i>Orford</i>		<i>Spry</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>520</i>
<i>Captain</i>		<i>Armhurst</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>480</i>
<i>Nassau</i>		<i>Sawyer</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>480</i>
<i>Bedford</i>		<i>Fowke</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>480</i>
<i>Kingston</i>		<i>Parr (Parry)</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>400</i>
<i>Sunderland</i>		<i>McKenzie</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>400</i>
<i>Defiance</i>		<i>Beard (Baird)</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>420</i>
<i>Tilbury</i>		<i>Barnsby</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>400</i>

<i>Windsor</i>	<i>Falkner</i>	60	400
<i>Centurion</i>	<i>Mantell</i>	54	350

Ships not of the Line (Gun Numbers Below this Line, added by this author)

Port Mahon (24) *Bomb Granado* (12) *Speedwell* (8)
Hunter (10) *Hawke* (10)
Bomb Lightning (8) (Bomb) *Furnace* (14) *Gibraltar Prize* (14)

List of Ships at Halifax before the Arival of the Fleet *Success* (24), *Winchelsea* (24), *Baltimore* (14), *Jaimaca* (14) & *Arc en Ceil* (50). **Note:** The *Nottingham* (60) had wintered at Halifax and the *Arc-en-Ciel* (50) was “out of repair” (*The Gentleman’s Magazine*, Vol. 28, 1757, Page 168; online).

Rec^d a letter from Captⁿ Abercrombie Dated Halifax July 1st. June 30th the whole Fleet from New York arrived safe. They Sailed the 20th June from the hook. An hour after they were at Sea it blew very fresh & one of the Transports Carried away her main topmast, the Hospital Ship & another Ship their fore top masts. The Sea ran so high that five of the Pilots were obliged to get on with the Fleet. the 21st and 22d nothing remarkable. 23d the Mesopotamia Transport Sprang her main Mast which oblided the Nightingale (24) to take her in tow. the 25th the Genl Wall Pacquet left the Fleet off of the Nantucket & Sailed for England. 26th & 27th the Nightingale having the transport in tow lost the Convoy till late at night found the Fleet lying too, in a hard Squall which Carried away both the Nightingales top gallant Sails. 28th Saw Land but could not tell what Land ‘till morning, then discover’d were to the East of Halifax 5 leagues. 29th quite Calm. 30th whole fleet go in Safe except one that Carried away her rudder and Part of her Keel Crowding to get before another so Struck upon a Rock however she got up Safe before night. Just as this Fleet was getting into Port one of the English transport Joined them. By a Prize brought in they learnt there were 14 Sail of Capital Ships at Louisburgh & the reason of that Fleets not intercepting this was owing to the master of a Schooner that was taken by Baufremont near Halifax making Affidavit at Louisburgh that there were 20 Ships of the line lying at Halifax besides another Fleet expected from England. (Baufremont = Squadron Commander Joseph de Bauffremont of the French Navy).

a letter of the 3d mentions the troops are all Disembarked & Encamped.

Note: Other warships with the Transport Fleet arriving from New York: *Sutherland* (50) with Loudoun on board, *Nightingale* (24), *Kennington* (20), *Ferret* (14), and *Vulture* (14). *Lightning* (8) was a Fireship, a rare vessel at this time, but was then converted to the role of scouting the harbor at Louisbourg. *Elphingham* (20), a privateer, was also positioned at Halifax. Escorting the 78th Foot, the *Enterprise* (42) reached Halifax on August 28th. The *Enterprise* was then assigned to further troop escorts, moving wintering regiments to Annapolis Royal.

Rumor of the French reinforcement of Louisbourg reached Pitt in England. He sends the *Somerset* (68), the *Eagle* (60), *Devonshire* (70), and *Prince Frederick* (64) to augment Holburne; the first two of these ships arrived on September 5th, the second two on September 15th (Pitt to Holburne, July 7, 1757; Kimball 1906, Pages 85, plus Pages 89, 108, and 109).

Comment: The concern for the "*advanced Season*" is the possibility of a hurricane striking the fleet while they are at sea. Here, Holburne immediately responds to Loudoun's letter of the 4th — Holburne's advice was to cancel the Expedition. The language here suggests that the final decision and authority rests with Loudoun, not Holburne. On the same date as this letter, Holburne starts a longer letter to Holdernes (Secretary of State). The letter was finished on the 6th. As this Holdernes letter was written over three days and with the events moving extremely fast, this letter is somewhat confusing as it relates to Loudoun's decisions (MANA, Page 388). This letter starts with the Expedition not yet canceled but ends strongly "hinting" it has been canceled. Admiral Hardy's synopsis for supporting this decision is found in his August 6th letter to Loudoun (Letter Appendix). Simply put, there was too little time to conduct the operation before the arrival of the hurricane season; the fleet would have to lie off Louisbourg for many weeks in support of the Army, the strength of the French fleet was not a focused consideration for Hardy, the anticipated August fog was. Cruising off Louisbourg in late September, a hurricane severely damages Holburne's Fleet. The *Tilbury* (60) and *Ferret* (14) were sunk and at least nine other ships were dismasted (Boscawen 2011, Page 41). The fleet is forced to retire.

It is easy to view Holburne as an unmitigated curse on Loudoun, more so than even Webb, but there is no evidence of any personal animosity between the two. Holburne seems to lack any ability to mesh into the complexity of a joint Army – Navy operation, but this responsibility may have been given to Hardy. Holburne's early and steady preoccupation with his obvious inability to force Louisbourg's harbor is difficult to understand as this was not a necessary part of the operation (See Pargellis 1933, Pages 237-243). Troops would be landed some miles distant from Louisbourg and approach the city from the "rear". However, there is a chance Holburne believed that with the limited time remaining before the close of the campaign season only a coup de main would allow for the capture of Louisbourg, thus the need to force the harbor. The fear that his ships could not both engage the French fleet and protect the troop transports is more understandable and proved central to his thinking. Holburne was still waiting on reports from some of his sloops and frigates sent north to scout. There is the constant suggestion that his apparent procrastination and his stated desire for ever more intelligence directly led to the cancellation of the Expedition — Holburne's advice needed to have been cast aside weeks earlier than it was, otherwise, the Expedition was inevitably doomed by the calendar. The protracted council of war held at Halifax was Holburne's idea (July 23-31; LO 3982 - forty-six pages). Holburne's attitude and motivations are a difficult read. Not timid, his attitude may have been a stoked anger, deep frustration in view of a perceived impossible situation.

After over a week of testimony and bitter debate, the council of war decided to review the exact language of their own orders as issued from London. It was quickly decided that these orders left no room for debate and that duty required them to proceed against Louisbourg. Loudoun's battalions had been aboard their transports for several days waiting on favorable winds when Holburne's letter of August 4th, advising cancellation, reached Loudoun. Pitt was out-of-office between April 5th and June 29th. New orders from Pitt arrived in September (Letters of July 7th and 18th arriving ≈ September 11th). Kimball (1906) includes a long letter chain between the Secretary of State and Holburne, Pages 84-126, online. However, Holburne's key letter of August 4th to the Secretary of State is not in Kimball (CO_5_48_065 and MANA, Page 388). Sadly, a few passages from these letters are edited out in Kimball, particularly in Holburne's letter of October 13th. Holburne felt compelled by these orders into waiting off Louisbourg in hopes of intercepting the French fleet or following them back to Europe in expectation of pinning them off the coast of France. Pitt very much wanted this French fleet destroyed.

Lt. Col. Young to an unnamed person, August 4, 1757. From Dodge (2007), but without citation (Page 102). The original is likely at the Huntington Library housed with the Loudoun Papers, but it could not be located. Loudoun could have been the recipient. Young was Loudoun's protégé.

*Camp Near Fort Wm. Henry
Augs 4th 1757*

When General Webb detached me from Fort Edward, I had no written instructions, but as I have a copy of inquiries in which the garrison of Fort Edward is fixed at 100 Regulars and 200 irregulars, and as I think the general says an equal number was sufficient for Fort Wm Henry while the communication to the fort was open, therefore I have given it as my opinion that while we have it in our power to throw what troops we please into that fort, the present garrison of about 330 men is full sufficient for the present day.

*John Young Lt Col
Royal American Regt.*

Comment: This is the best estimate we have for the size of the actual garrison within the Bastion. The 330 men reference is likely linked to the rank of sergeant and below, but it is impossible to be certain. Including officers, the Frye Journal lists 308 men from Massachusetts as being in the Bastion plus an additional 91 men from New Hampshire. After adding the other known soldiers, sailors, and carpenters who were positioned within the Bastion to Frye's estimate, the number of men quickly balloons to near or exceeds 500. Per the Frye Journal, the number of officers assigned to the Bastion suggests only two companies from Massachusetts plus a third company from New Hampshire. Together, the two companies from Massachusetts should approach some 165 men in total. The Bougainville Journal (Page 176) suggests this New Hampshire company was smaller than the Massachusetts companies with some 65 men. The Frye Journal makes no mention of sending additional companies to the Bastion as relief or as a rotation. The bulk numbers found in Frye only make sense with some kind of rotation or relief, but then the officer numbers represent the opposite problem and too few are mentioned in the Journal.

Transactions has the garrison "*augmented with Provincials, to about Four hundred*" (LO 6660). Monro's account agrees: "*Gen^l. Webb's orders to Lt Col^t Monro was in case, Fort W^m. Henry, was attack'd the Garrison was to Consist of 100 Regulars, And 300 Provincials; there was in the Fort during the Siege, Above that Number, 2 Officers of the 35th Regm^t and 1 Officer of the Royal Americans, And 30 Sailors.*" (LO 4479; November 1, 1757).

In Summer 1757, the 35th fielded more men per company than the 60th. This may explain Frye's estimate of the British regulars at "*1 captain, 5 subalterns, and 50 men*". In March 1757, Captain Ormsby's company of the 35th had some 72 fit rank & file. In September 1757, there were 64 fit rank & file. There is considerable logic in the idea that Ormsby moved his full company into the Bastion which would be nearer 70 fit men (LO 6751). Members of the Royal Artillery would have brought the number of British regulars closer to 90 men.

Note: The assumption here is the Massachusetts provincials at the Siege were organized into ten companies, other companies were road building. The New Hampshire provincials were in three companies (LO 4004 with attention to July 15th and August 30th Returns; the Frye Journal).

From Webb to Loudoun (LO 4081A & B, August 5, 1757; and CO_5_48_055, Page 607/304; two days into the Siege). There are two duplicate letters in the file, but the first letter in the file bears the wrong date of August 1st. The handwriting is that of a clerk:

Fort Edward August 5th 1757

My Lord,

I wrote to Your Lordship the 1st of this Month after my return from Fort William Henry in which I acquainted your Lordship of the Situation of affairs there, and the French were Masters of the Lake, having brought over the Portage, a great number of Battoes & Indian Canoes, likewise inform'd Your Lordship of the resolution taken / in consequence of a meeting of the Principal Officers and Engineers / to move the Camp from the N.W. side of the Fort, to the Rocky Eminence on the south East as it was universally agreed from the Motions of the Enemy, that a reinforcement of a Thousand Men and some Field Pieces, were necessary to secure the Camp and accordingly the second of this month Lieut. Colonel Young was sent up with 200 Regulars 800 Massachusetts Forces two Brafs Six Pounders, with a detachment of Artillery under the Command of Captain M^cCloud, with which he arrived safe at Night, and Encamped with the Troops before there, amounting in the whole, Including the Garrison 2000 fit for duty exclusive of Artificers Sailors &c.

I am now to acquaint Your Lordship that my apprehensions which I so frequently communicated to Your Lordship upon my being appointed to this Command, the Enemy bending their whole Force this way before Your Lordship could have it in Your Power to make a diversion by the S^t Lawrence River have proved but too true, M^r Montcalm having Landed a very numerous army, on the morning of the Third Instant upon the West Side of the Lake, and invested the Fort, and cut off our Communication with the Camp with a Large body of Canadians and Indians. for the Particulars of what has since Pass'd to date hereof, I refer you to Colonel Monro's Letters, and the Examination of a Canadian Lieut. taken by three of Capt. Putnam's Company on the Evening of the Day of their Landing, of which I send Your Lordship Copies; The Number of Troops remaining under my Command at this Place, excluding the Posts on the Hudson River amounts to Sixteen hundred Men fit for duty, with which Army so much Inferior to that of the Enemy, by the Information of our Scouts, corresponding with that of the Prisoner, I did not think it Prudent to Pursue my First Intentions of marching to their Assistance incase of being attack'd, as this Post must by that means have been entirely deserted, and by that means the whole Country left uncovered, nor could so weak a Reinforcement have been of the Least Service to them; on the approach of the Enemy upon the Lake, I sent Expresses, which have been repeated ever since, to the Governors of the several Provinces, for their Quotas incase of emergency, and to the Colonels of Militias, to Join Immediately with their Regiments, setting forth the Necessity of the Service in the strongest terms, likewise to Sir William Johnston, notwithstanding which I have not yet received the least Reinforcement from them, This is the disagreeable Situation we are at Present in. The Fort by the heavy firing we hear from the Lake is still in our Possession, but fear it can not Long hold out against so warm a Cannonading; If I am not speedily reinforced by a sufficient number of Militia to March to their Relief before it falls into the Enemys hands, I wish I may not be obliged to quit this Post in order to make a stand at some more Tenable Place to Cover the Province, as, should the small remains of the Army that I have here with me be Invested, and the Communication between this and Albany cut off, as no doubt will be the Consequence after the surrender of Fort William Henry, the whole must inevitably submit to the Superior Force of the Enemy. Whatever can be

done, You may depend upon it shall endeavour to do, having a Particular attention, (according to Your Lordship Instructions) to the Preservation of the Colonies. I am &cc.

Neither of the Galliot's were finished when the Enemy Landed.

Comment: This is Webb's most provocative letter. The veiled threat in this letter is so personal that it suggests that the letters were indeed written by Webb, not Bartman. In the second paragraph, Webb warns Loudoun not to attempt to place any blame for the loss of Fort William Henry or any subsequent losses on him or he will defend himself and retaliate in kind. Wisely, Webb offers this judgment and caution only once in his series of correspondences to Loudoun that August. Seemingly, there is no ambiguity with intention. But this interpretation could be wrong. This passage may not be a threat, just a demonstration of sad acceptance mixed with self-protection. Loudoun would have been able to distinguish.

From Loudoun to Cumberland (April 25 - June 3, 1757; MANA, Page 345): *"The next Officer is Colonel Monro. That Battalion is in Mr Webb's Division and requires both Field Officers, tho it is much mended, and Mr Webb thinks himself too weak already, but I hope Your Royal Highness will not be of that Opinion. Either of the Lieut. Colonels of the 44th or 48th Regiments would have done well, but I could not want them from the Regiments, whom I took on as the best Corps I have here."* This passage is on the third page of a nineteen-page letter, as printed in MANA.

Webb then enters a theme of deep resignation. The other three letters can be readily shared. Loudoun may have kept this letter closer, but it was forwarded to London. Loudoun does not open an inquiry into Webb's actions, but he will not support Webb by releasing *Transactions* (LO 6660).

The importance of the Galliot's was not lost on Webb. In 1760, Amherst had five rowed/sailed galliot's with his expedition on the St. Lawrence River. Four were equipped with a single brass 12-pounder plus swivel guns, the fifth with an 8-inch howitzer. When winds were slack or in unfavorable currents, the rowed galliot's could prove more maneuverable than a sailed vessel. In slack wind, Amherst's galliot's were able to defeat a French brig armed with one 18-pounder, seven 12-pounders, and two 8-pounders, the *Outaouaise* (150 tons, August 17, 1760; Cubbison 2014, Page 165).

No reason for the galliot's not being finished is offered. The hulls may or may not have been complete. During Rigaud's Winter Raid (March 1757), all the sails and rigging then positioned at Fort William Henry were likely lost. At Oswego (1756) and at Fort William Henry (1756; Travers 2015, Page 70), ship launchings were delayed by the lack of sails, rigging, and hardware. At Oswego, two of the larger ships were "grounded" in the harbor when Montcalm arrived.

Pargellis characterization of Webb is more outspoken, but not unfair: *"But Webb, the only general officer whom Loudoun could possibly leave in command, exhibited throughout the entire summer the timid self-depreciation of a sick man."* (Pargellis 1933, Page 243).

From Webb to Loudoun, August 5, 1757 (CO_5_48_055; Page 615/308):

*Copy Enclosed in M. G. Webb's
Letter to the Earl of Loudoun
of August 5th. August 1757*

Examination taken August 4th. 1757 at Fort Edward

Jacques Vaudry de la Chesnaye within five leagues of Montreal a Retailer of Dealer of Liquors, at present a Lieutenant of Militia of Capt. Gille de Cour's Company of 110 Men each, declared That he left Montreal the 6th of July with about 1,000 Men. And that Mr. Montcalm came soon afterward with 1,000 more. That the Prisoner reports that there has come into Quebec lately at different times from Europe Thirty Sail of Ships loaded with Provisions, Stores and Ammunition with two Regiments besides Miguelets (Militia). That he proceeded directly from S^t. Johns to the Falls, where he Encamped, and where his Brigade was employed in transporting the Cannon over the Portage. And says that they transported about 30 of all natures, and the rest of the Militia & more, which makes 36 cannon & 4 Mortars, with Boats that were all brought cros this Portage. That he set out last Sunday in the afternoon from the Portage and came in a Bark Canoe near the Fort, but that 4,000 Indians, Canadians and marched by Land, under the Command of the two de Cornes, Villiers, and Repentigny and arriv'd in the Night of August 3^d. That he disembarked on the West side with about 4,000 Men to invest the Fort and cut off the Communication. That about 10'O'Clock in the Morning of August 3^d. that those in Camp made a Sortie on the french Indians (their Troops were not yet arriv'd) but that the Indians reputed them, and drove them back to their Intrinchment, and it was reported in their Camp they killed 200, but that he only saw three lying on the road. That this Engagement lasted about half an hour. That he was present when Mo^r. Montcalm visited the Line and told those that were firing in the Intrinchment too far, that it was in vain for them to throw away their Powder at so great distance for if they killed ten men it would be of no Signification and that he would take the Fort the next day with his Cannon. he then sent M^r. Mercier to Summons the Fort to surrender by tomorrow morning or that he would put them to the Sword. but the Fort refused to accept any terms. That he was afsured the French consisted of between 11 and 12,000 men including Indians, Canadians, and regulars. That soon after he went to cut a piece of a Bullock killed by the Indians, and there was taken by three of our Rangers. That the french &c had killed 20 of our Oxen and carried two live parties of ten each with three Horses to Mr. Montcalm, And that he heard it talked in Camp that when the Fort was taken it was to be Razed. And that all the men who were taken to go on this Expedition, were not Excused if under 60 years of Age and not infirm. That they were under no apprehension of Quebec being Attacked, As the English Fleet was repulsed by the French Fleet at the Mouth of the River St. Lawrence and that this Account came to Carillon ten days ago.

Copy of the Examination of a french Prisoner taken at Fort Edward 4th. August 1757.

Enclosed Mr. Webb's Letters to the Earl of Loudoun of August 5th.

in the E. of Loudoun's of Aug^t. 16th. & Oct 17th. 1757.

Comment: This letter is an attachment to Webb's previous letter to Loudoun (LO 4081 A & B). In this letter, Webb is establishing the French strength as between 11,000 and 12,000 men, the actual strength was about 7,600 men. Interestingly per the letter, some 4,000 men march to Fort William Henry and 4,000 travel over water — accounting for only 8,000 men. The Bougainville Journal only has 2,500 men marching under Levis (Page 154); the rest traveled by water. Seemingly, Vaudry amends his account to 12,000 men, but the letter fails to explain the math or remove the contradiction. The Montessor Journal reports 4,500 Indians, 4,000 Canadian Militia, and 3,500 French Regulars (Page 26). A second entry has 4,000 Indians, 4,000 Canadian Militia, and 3,000 French Regulars (Page 38).

Bellico (2010, Page 115) indicates that Vaudry's account was not fully believed. To justify his decision not to march north, Webb fully embraces the 12,000 number but may have quietly suspected that number was closer to 8,000 men. The telling of this event is common to most histories, providing needed color and detail.

Loudoun receives this letter while on board ship while returning to Halifax, probably on August 16th. This express from Webb related the events up to August 5th. Loudoun first learns of the surrender on August 18th in an express from Pownall. While still at sea, Loudoun writes the various Governors between August 18th and 20th (CO 5/48 056). Loudoun never actually quotes Webb's numbers, but the advice given relates to a truly sizeable French Army.

From Loudoun to the Office of the Secretary of State; August 5, 1757 (CO_5_48_050 and 051). This letter seems to have arrived in London during the first week of October, but it could have been earlier:

My Lord,

Halifax August 5th: 1757

Since I had the honour to write from Sea, I have to inform Your Lordship, that I arrived here with Rear Admiral Sir Charles Hardy on the 30th of June, with the Ships of War and Transports Safe.

That on the 9th of July, Admiral Holburne arriv'd here with the Fleet and Transports from Europe, after being five days off the Port, without being able to get in for the Fogs; althou' Sir Charles Hardy had thirteen Ships, Sloops of War and other Vefels out with Pilots to afist in bringing him in.

Sir Charles Hardy, whilst he Commanded & Admiral Holburne, since his Arrival have taken every method to obtain Intelligence of the Strength of the Enemy by sending not only Frigates but fishing Vefels (as being lefs Suspicious) with Rangers on board to endeavor to bring off a Prisoner; all which You will be more fully acquainted with from the Admiral.

All the Intelligence we got from those endeavors was that Captain Gorham in a French fishing Vefsel got near enough to see ten or twelve large Ships of War in the harbour; And a Fisherman Captain Rouse, took off the Island of Cape Breton, confirms the Account of Twelve French Ships of War in the Harbour, and of the Fortifications being enlarged and Strengthened with several New Batteries; which Intelligence, with the certainty of Mo^{nsr}. Beaufremont having got in with his Squadron from the Cape; the Intelligence the Admiral had got at Sea of the ten Ships from Brest; and the Accounts we had of the four French Ships of the Line that had passed the Sheights destined for North America, which I had confirmed by Your Lordships Letter of May 2nd, which I had the honour to receive July 24th; made the Admiral and I think it necefsary to call a Council of War, which was accordingly done; and in consequence of that, it was determined to make an Attempt on Louisbourg, and the Troops immediately Embarked in order to Sail with the first fair Wind that would carry Us out of the Harbour.

This arose from the Construction of Works and the difficulties arising from thence; But from the Accounts of the numbers in the Garrison, and Mo^{nsr}. Beaufremont's Squadron above being in the Port, which secured that against the Fleet by which the Garrison must have been very near equal to the Army I could carry against it, and when there remained so little time, first to carry all the Artillery, Ammunition, & Provisions up to the Town to begin the Siege; and afterwards to reduce the Place, I could See no prospect of Succefs: And as the Wind as well as the Fogs had continued to prevent our Sailing; I was reconsidering this Affair with the Admirals and Generals when a Sloop arrived yesterday from Newfoundland with Letters from Captain Edwards in the Station Ship there to the Admiral, a Copy of which You have enclosed with the Intelligence he got in the Prize he took going from Louisbourg to Old France, confirming the Intelligence we had of all the three Fleets of French Ships of War being arrived with a reinforcement to the Garrison of four Battalions.

On this Confirmation of Our former Intelligence, I made no Hesitation, as the Attempt of Quebec was both too late before the Fleet and Succors arrived here and render'd impracticable for this Season, by the Strength the Enemy had Collected at Louisbourg before Our Fleet arrived in

America, and as by the Force the Enemy now have in Louisbourg if they came out to Engage with Our Fleet, the Transports must be in the greatest danger of being lost; from the Superiority they have in their Frigates, even suppose Our Fleet should get the better of their Capital Ships.

And that the Enemy should make the Security of Louisbourg their main Point, and for that purpose remain in the Harbour; in that Case the Garrison employed in the defence must be greatly Superior to the Besiegers. On which, for the Experience of the Council of War which I held, I determined to return to the method I have followed ever since I had the honor to Command in this Country, to advise first with all there I could get benefit from their Advice and then to determine myself; This I have done and have determined and am now Executing it.

Today aside all thoughts of Attacking Louisbourg; to Provide for the Security of this Province in case of the Enemy's Fleet either getting the better of Our Fleet or Slipping them; and against any attack they might form against Fort Cumberland (Fort Beauséjour); for which purpose,

I leave Major General Hopson in this County, and besides the three Regiments that were here before, I prepare to leave the 2nd Battalion of the 1st or Royal Regiments, the 27th, the 28th, the 43rd and 46th which with Lieut. Colonel Frasers Regiment, when it arrives, I think will be sufficient for the Defence of this Province. Of those, I send two or three Battalions to Fort Cumberland directly to secure that Fort, and to leave the remainder here; And as I cannot cover in the Winter, more than three Regiments in this Province, besides the Troops formerly in it, I have given Orders for the other three to be Transported to Boston when the Campaign is over; and I have order'd the Troops that go to Fort Cumberland to be employed in finishing the Fortifications there; and am Strengthening the fortifications of this Harbour.

There were Seven hundred Men of the three Regiments here, put on board the Fleet which the Admiral still insists on carrying with him this Cruise, as he is obliged to leave his sick behind.

As the Enemy must before this have been informed of the Strength that is Collected at Louisbourg, from which, and the Season of the Year, they must be sure we can make no Attack on Quebec, where they collected all the Force they had in the uppermost of their Country which Strength they will now be at Liberty to Power in on our back Settlements to the Southward, I proceed directly for New York with the remainder of the Troops, which are the 17th, 22nd, 42nd, 44th, 48th, 55th and the Second & fourth Battalions of the Royal Americans, and the Rangers, in order to throw in Success wherever they may be wanted; And if the Situation of Affairs and the Season will permit to make a Push.

Here I have the honor to lay before Your Lordship, a Sketch of my Plan, and by the first Opportunity, I shall give You a more particular Account of the Execution of it, with which I shall transmit a Copy of the Council of War, the Papers annexed to which are not yet Extracted, or I would have sent it now.

I cannot conclude this Letter without observing that had the Fleet and the Success not been prevented by contrary Winds from Arriving in April, as I am informed by the Secretary of State they were intended, my Master might have been in possession of Louisbourg very early in the Season, with a very small loss in His Troops.

And as the Enemy have now Increased & Strengthened the Fortifications so much, and thrown in so large a Garrison, You will find it a difficult Point to carry next Season, even if Your Fleet were to

arrive in time, and before any of the Enemys Ships of War are got in: but if a very small number of Ships are in the Harbour, the Fleet can give no assistance in reducing the Place, but by Covering the Transports and Landing the Men, to draw the Artillery over the Swamps and assist in the Batteries.

Besides the Early Season is the only one proper for an Attack on the Place, as the Fogs come in June and are so thick that Ships are often a fortnight and three Weeks that they dare not look into Land, and the Winds that prevail at this Season make such a Surff on the Shoar that it is very difficult to Land the Troops, Artillery, Ammunition, Stores and Provisions, whereas in the Spring, the Winds are commonly Northernly, and then the Landing is much more practicable: besides, the Fleet, by the best Accounts I can get, cannot remain on the Coast after the latter end of September.

Last Night I had the honor to receive Your Lordship's Letter of ~~May~~ March 31st, with an Account of the destination of the Highlander Battalions; and a number of duplicates of former Letters. (March date is a margin correction in a different handwriting).

The Windsor is just now arrived with the Bomb Ketch that was sent after the Fleet, Captain Faulkner informed us that it was known before he Sailed, that the French had sent Ten Ships of War from Brest to North America with three thousand Land Forces on board, which is the only account I have of it from Europe.

*I have the honor to be with great Respect,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's
Most obedient and Most
Humble Servant
Loudoun*

P.S. I forget to mention to Your Lordship that upon Captⁿ. Edward's Letter and Intelligence, I wrote to the Admiral desiring his opinion with regard to the practicality and prospect of Success in Attempting the Siege of Louisbourg under those Circumstances: a Copy of which Letter I here Enclose together with the Admirals answer thereto. L.

R. 30th by Cap^t. Cotterell.

Schedule of the Paper enclosed, and referred to in the Earl of Loudoun's Letter to the Earl of Holderneſſe, dated Halifax Augst. 5th. 1757.

Copy of a Letter from Cap^t. Edwards to Admiral Holburne bearing the Date 17th July 1757.

List of French Ships of War said to be at Louisbourg, enclosed in the said Letter.

Copy of a Letter from the Earl of Loudoun to Admiral Holburne bearing the Date Augst. 4.

Copy of the Admiral's Answer thereto of the same Date.

Comment: Regarding Louisbourg, Pargellis (1933, Page 337) discusses a key letter received by the London ministers in Fall 1757, but then he fails to fully identify the letter. This correspondence appears to be that letter. This intentionally brief letter summarizes the reasons for the cancellation of the Louisbourg Expedition. In a separate letter to Cumberland on the 6th, Loudoun calls this his "*Publick Letter*" (MANA, Page 391). At the time this was written, Loudoun believed Robert D'Arcy, Earl of Holderness, was Secretary of State for the Southern Department, not Pitt. From 1754-1761, D'Arcy would serve as Secretary of State for the Northern Department. Between April-June 1757, D'Arcy was minister for both departments. On August 20th, Holburne writes Holderness, not Pitt (Kimball, Page 106). Loudoun learns that Pitt was reappointed as Secretary of State, South Department in a letter received on September 11 (CO 5/48 054, Page 571).

This letter raised many questions within the ministry (Pargellis 1933, Pages 337 - 339). There was considerable confusion about the chain of events, who was consulted about the decision, and who among the senior officers at Halifax supported this decision. In this regard, the language in the letter is wanting. There was some thought that Loudoun canceled the expedition based on a single communication from Holburne without consulting anyone (August 4th, CO 5/48 066; transcribed above). Some in the ministry supported Loudoun, others did not. Prime Minister Newcastle and Lord Anson, First Lord of the Admiralty, did not.

There were several enclosures with Loudoun's letter. Hardy writes a memorandum supporting the cancellation. Hardy's memorandum was included as an enclosure in Loudoun's letter to Cumberland (August 6th, Letter Appendix). But Hardy's memorandum is not attached to this letter. The comments of the ministers suggest Hardy's memorandum was not as widely circulated or was never sent to the ministry. This "omission" seems to have provided Hardy with considerable personal cover. This Hardy letter is not in Little (1958), suggesting it was not sent to the Admiralty.

Holburne wrote a longer letter to Holderness (August 4th - 6th, 1757; MANA Page 388). Naval concerns dominated the reason to cancel the expedition and additional detail on the strength of the French fleet was provided. Weather was a key concern both with the approach of the hurricane season and the seemingly incessant fog.

Holburne had a mail packet sloop ready to sail to England. This is why so many letters are dated between August 4th and the 6th. After August 6th, Loudoun fails to write any additional correspondence to the ministry that would arrive before early December, Loudoun's October letters. Pitt views the lack of communication as a personal affront. Loudoun does send Captain William Cotterell of the 45th Foot to London. Cotterell reached London by early October (LO 4606 and LO 4611). This transcribed letter may be a duplicate carried to London by Cotterell.

The Louisbourg Council of War was a series of meetings among the Expedition's senior officers and staff (July 23 - 31). These meetings start a full two weeks after the arrival of Holburne. This delay suggests the keen desire to gather intelligence about the actual strength of the French fleet before determining how to proceed. Sloops and frigates were sent north. Held in Halifax, the minutes are some forty-six pages (LO 3982; See Pargellis 1933, Page 241). After days of deliberations, Hopson suggests that the "*King's orders*" be re-read. The decision was then quickly made to advance on Louisbourg and the troops were actually embarked for that purpose. In March 1757, the British Admiralty executed Admiral John Byng for his failure to "*do his utmost*" at Minorca — a firing squad. This incident weighed over the decision to proceed. Holburne had been on Byng's trial board.

From Admiral Charles Hardy to Lord Loudoun, August 6, 1757 (MANA, Page 387); this correspondence is **not** included in the list of attachments included in the previous letter to the Secretary of State (CO_5_48_050 and 051, August 5, 1757), but it was copied to Cumberland:

*REASONS AND OPPINION DRAWN BY SIR CHARLES HARDY
AGAINST GOING TO LOUISBOURG AUG^T 1757*

1st That the Troop's Stores and Artillery in all probability cannot be Landed in less than ten or twelve days after their arrival at Chapeau-rogue Bay, even if it was attended with more favorable Weather and Circumstances then we have reason to expect near that Coast from this time forward, to Which may be added the Enemy having built a Battery on Black Rock or Cape Noir which annoyee the best and nearest Landing place

2nd That if the Troops Should Land Successfully, it will require more time to draw the Artillery and other Stores thro' the Swamps and bad Ground from the place of Landing. From this Circumstance alone it must be about the beginning of September before the first Battery can be raised

3rd That it also appeared by the examination of Pilots and others that the middle or latter end of September is the latest time their ships can preserve any station off the Port of Louisbourg or on the Coast of the Island of Cape Breton, and even then with the greatest uncertainty, We do therefore Humbly Conceive should the Fleet be forced off the Coast by Gales of Wind and stress of Weather, To Which its Subject, they may not be able to return in time To give any assistance that may be wanted from them

Upon the whole for Reasons with many others that might be drawn from the minutes of The Council (of War) and that under such apparent difficulties and disadvantages as result from a due consideration of the Enemys strength and the forces that can be employed against them, and that the Season will be so far advanced before any progress can be made in the Seige, We cannot advise Attempting The Reduction of Louisbourg this Year is for his Majesty's Service but we can not avoid expressing our Concern in finding ourselves under the disagreeable Necessity of giving this advice as the Fleet and Army for this Service did not arrive in due time and the French Fleet having got into Louisbourg before the arrival of Our Squadron.

Comment: Holburne's writings focus on the strength of the French Fleet as the reason for the cancellation. The more politically astute Hardy moves the reasons for canceling the expedition away from the strength French Fleet to a check that there is now insufficient time to conduct the siege before the campaign window closes. This "letter" was included in the letters sent by Loudoun to Cumberland on August 6th, but not to the Secretary of State, dated August 5th — the rushed sailing of the packet ship may have muddled its inclusion. It is not in Little (1958) — *Dispatches of Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy 1757-1758*. After this packet ship leaves for England on August 6th, the next letters leaving Halifax for England do not discuss the cancellation but focus on troop and transport movements (Holburne to Holderness, August 20, 1757, CO_5_48_067). *The Gentleman's Magazine* offers a surprisingly detailed argument in support of Loudoun and Holburne and the decision to cancel the expedition, incorporating equal measures of both Holburne's and Hardy's reasons (Volume 27, October 1757, Pages 463-464, written September 17th, online).

From Webb to Loudoun, August 11, 1757 (LO 4198A - transcribed and CO_5_48_055, Page 623/312). The copy at the Huntington Library is not the obvious work of a clerk; the handwriting is very similar to that of LO 4050, which is in George Bartman's hand (Bartman/Webb to Monro, August 4, 1757):

My Lord

Fort Edward August 11th 1757

I wrote to your Lordship the 5th of this month acquainting you of the Enemy having laid Siege to Fort Will^m. Henry, and am Sorry to inform you in this that they opened their batteries at five in the morning of the 6th instant, and the Fort and Camp were obliged to Capitulate the 9th at Seven; the army of the French consisted of eleven or twelve thousand men, as I at first learnt from the Canadian Prisoner and this since been confirmed by two Leiut^{ts}. and two soldiers who deserted from them, which put it out of my power to be of any service to the besieged, as (notwithstanding the repeated exprefses which have been sent to the several Provinces) I had not above two thousand of the militia with me at the time of the Surrender, which with the Troops under my Command after having called in the Detachments left at Albany and the other Posts did not amount to above four thousand five hundred men fit for Duty. I can not at present give our Lordship the particulars of the Siege as Col. Monro nor Col. Young are yet arrived, but some of the officers who came in yesterday informed me the Fort being Battered to pieces the Enemy having a battery within fifty yards of it, and six of the largest guns and one mortar being burst they were obliged to come to a Capitulation, the Articles of which were that they should have all the honors of war that were allowed to the Garrison of Minorca, and an escort to prevent any Barbarities of the Indians, which were accordingly by signed by M^r Montcalm, notwithstanding which on leaving the Camp yesterday morning they were striped by the Indians of every thing they had both officers and men, the women and children dragged from amongst them and most inhumanly butchered before their faces, the Party of about three hundred men which was given them as an Escort, were during this time quietly looking on, from this and other circumstance we are too well convinced these Barbarities must have been connived at by the French after having destroyed the women and children they fell upon the rear of our men who running in upon the Front soon put whole to a most precipitate flight in which confusion part of them came into this Camp about ten o clock yesterday morning in a most distressing Situation, and have continued dropping in ever Since, a great many men, and we are afraid Several officers were mafsacred, Col. Monro with those nearest about him we have reason to believe returned with the Party to the French Camp for protection & expect them in this evening. Col. Young being Slightly wounded on the Ankle and not being able to march of foot, was I am informed by the officers, permitted to Stay till he could be Sent here conveniently

I should be guilty of a great piece of injustice did I not give the praises to the behavior of the Regular Troops during the Siege that they realy deserve for none could behave better, the Provincials who made the greatest part of their numbers were rather backward, I suppose owing to their being So little accustomed to that kind of war. By the accounts of the deserters, and other intelligence, we have Some reason to believe the Enemy will not come on any further, and it will be happy for the Province if they should not, as I have now by Sir Will^m. Johnson report scarce above two thousand of the militia of the different Provinces with me, nor are their numbers likely to increase, as more have returned to Albany within these two days then have arrived from thence

The Garrison and Troops encamped at Fort Will^m. Henry were allowed to return on their Parole not to serve for the space of eighteen months

I was favored with the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 12th of last month, yesterday, and have only to acquaint you that Lord How arrived on Saturday the 5th Instant

*I am
With great regard
your Lordships
most obedient and
most humble Servant
Dan. Webb*

Comment: Webb's letter here accurately relates events, but there are distortions. The strength of the French is exaggerated and the closest French earthwork was 150 yards away from the Fort, not the fifty yards described here. No person is offered praise. Webb's own strength is correctly reported. Although decidedly self-protective, the rationale offered by Webb for not marching to the relief of Fort William Henry has distinct merit. The letter concludes that Montcalm will not be marching against Fort Edward, so the tone of resignation found in the previous letter is dropped. The letter does not contain any potential threats.

This letter and the letter of August 17th appear to be in George Bartman's hand, Webb's Aide-de-Camp. How much influence Bartman had in writing these letters is impossible to say. The letters themselves are well reasoned and accurate; however, the reasoned quality of the letters does not seem to align with Hardy's or Loudoun's descriptions of Webb's health seen in the previous winter. From Pargellis (1933, Page 234):

"Hardy says Webb spent much time with him while I was away and says he could neither read nor write a page without making his head turn around so that he did not know what he was doing" HM 1717, vol. 3, March 30, 1757 (Huntington Manuscripts 1717, these are Loudoun Notebooks).

Using these August letters from Webb and the Returns of Provincials found in LO 4004, one can "black box" some numbers and events. From LO 4004, Webb's initial garrison of 1,600 men can be further identified as 1,000 provincials and 600 regulars — roughly 585 from Connecticut, 156 from New York, and 263 from Rhode Island were fit for duty plus officers. The number of British regulars is achieved via a simple subtraction. From the September Return of the 35th (LO 6751), the number of rank & file fit for duty from the four companies of the 35th Foot not at Fort William Henry is about 310 men, 330 men with officers. Some 45 rank & file were "unfit". To reach the needed 600 regulars, about 300 additional men are needed to complete the regulars in the garrison, this suggests four additional companies of the 60th. In 1757, the 3rd Battalion of the 60th was at a lower strength than the 35th Foot with some 73 men per company (Pargellis 1933, Page 235). In mid-July, the numbers suggest that the garrison of Fort Edward included four companies of the 35th, six companies of the 60th, and two Independent Companies. At this time, there were six companies of the 35th and a single company of Rogers' Rangers at Fort William Henry. There is no mention of Howe's arrival on the evening of the August 6th — the only reference identifying Howe as being at Fort Edward is the Montresor Journal.

In this last letter (LO 4198), Webb had assembled 4,500 men at Fort Edward. With an initial garrison of 1,600 men and no more than 2,000 militia, Webb's "math" requires some *additional 900 regulars and provincial troops* to have reached Fort Edward following the summons for reinforcements. On July 15th, the Massachusetts fit for duty was about 1,423 men at Fort Edward (rank & file only). On July 30th, it was 919 men — about 504 men lower. This 919 number includes the Frye Column. Sometime between July 15th and July 30th, Webb sent some 550 Massachusetts provincials south (officer and rank & file). This is the only direction they could have gone as we know they did not go north to Fort William Henry. The Frye Column then moved to Fort William Henry. Following the Siege, Frye's men returning to Fort William Henry were released from duty, as were the other provincials who were at the Siege. At least 360 provincials from Massachusetts sent south had already returned following Webb's summons for reinforcements. Some 115 men remain south or return south and are shown as being "On Command" on the August 30th Return. Although from Massachusetts, these 550 men continue their duty for the remainder of the campaign season and are not released by Webb. The sick and those dying thoroughly muddle any math here.

While the Return for August 30th shows most of these 550 Massachusetts provincials back at Fort Edward, the numbers for the Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York provincials remain steady. These 550 Massachusetts provincials are part of the *additional 900 regulars and provincials troops* referenced above. These steady numbers suggest that no other provincials reached Fort Edward, forcing the conclusion that about 300 or 400 regulars had reached Fort Edward under the summons. Admittedly, this is an assumption, but it is doubtful that Webb would have summoned only provincials to Fort Edward without summoning any regulars. The majority, if not all these men, could only be from the 60th Foot and suggests all four of the remaining companies reported to Fort Edward. Following the summons, nearly all of the 60th was likely at Fort Edward or Fort William Henry. The only other formation of regulars and provincials unaccounted for are two Independent Companies, probably no more than 120 or 130 men; these men likely remained on the Mohawk River (LO 3004; Loudoun to Pitt, March 10, 1757).

Women and black slaves/servants and possibly soldiers were present at the Siege, but there are few specifics and no mention of overall numbers (Bellico 2010, Page 125-128; and Steele 1990). Webb's letter here is among the best evidence. The New England provincials did not have women in their columns, but up to six wives of good character would travel with each company of British regulars to serve as laundresses, seamstresses, cooks, nurses, and herders (Brumwell 2002, Page 123). With six companies of British regulars at Fort William Henry, roughly 35-40 women were likely present. That Fall, the French returned many of the prisoners taken at Fort William Henry. In October 1757, Capt. Faesch of the 60th and Captain Thomas Shaw of the New Jersey Blues reached Halifax by boat from Quebec (LO 4944 and LO 4898). Among the 143 prisoners reaching Halifax were five women and three children (LO 6795; October 18, 1757). Four soldiers died during the passage. Another boat carried an additional 67 prisoners including six women and a child (LO 6678 per Steele, Pages 135 and 228). There was a third boat, but this carried no women or children. Steele 1990 (Page 138) has 304 prisoners, including 11 women and 4 children, reaching Halifax that October, but some were men from Parker's Scout (July 1757) and possibly Oswego (August 1756).

From Colonel Joseph Fyre of the Massachusetts Provincials to Thomas Hubbard, Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, August 16, 1757 (CO_5_18_Part_1_039; Page 309/154):

Albany Aug^t. 16th. 1757.

Sir,

having but a Moments time, the bearer being Just Setting out for Boston have Catch'd my Pen to Inform you that on the 2nd. Inst. Col. Young of the 60th Reg^t. & myself was Order'd to March to Fort Wm. Henry with 200 Regulars & 800 of the Reg^t. I had the Honor to Command to Reinforce that Fortrefs, as it was Apprehended the Enemy was on their March to Attack it, we Arrived there the Evening of the sameday, had not time to pitch our Tents in any Regular Order but just to Screen ourselves from the Damps of the Night, Early the next Morning the French Fleet hove in Sight, upon which we immediately Struck our Tents and March'd within some lines form'd by Logs &c, Upon an hill, South Eastward of the Fort, which was the Ground we Judg'd the Enemy would take for posession of the being the most Commodious for their Purpose, it was but a few minutes before we found Ourselves Surrounded by the Savages who had Either March'd up by Land or been landed sometime before the Fleet came in Sight, Capt. Saltonstall was sent out with 100 men to Reconnoiter them but was soon Attack'd on All sides and Oblig'd to return with all pofsible Speed within the Lines, the Enemy Prejsing hard upon his Rear, Came up in the Swamps near our breast Work and Attacked us we defended our Lines and kept them out; in the meantime the French landed on the West side the Lake the next Day which was the 3^d. we Saw their Trench Open'd from the Lake Running South Westerly as near as I can judge about 300 yards, Ye. 4th. Early in the Morning, they Spoke to us from a Battery of 9 guns, 1 18 pounders & 8 12 Prs. and 1 8 inch Mortar, the 5th. they had Extended their Trench further by which they had got nearer, and Open'd Another Battery of 8 guns & 2 mortars and play'd upon us both these two Batteries Distrejsed both Fort and Camp, the Sixth they got a 13 Inch Mortar to Play upon us, having thus invested the Place and All Communication Cutt off between the Forts and no prospect of any Afsitance we had nothing under god to trust to but our Arms we Stood our Ground till the 9th. Daily had our men Destroyed by their Shot and Shells & Small Arms and by that time they had run a Trench through the Garden Westward of the Fort within Musquet Shot of it where they were Mounting ten Guns more, which with the other two Batteries must have Demolish'd the Fort in a Few Hours which oblig'd us to send for Terms of Capitulation to which Mon^r. Montcalm consented, we were Surrender the Fort & Camp with All the Ordnance, Ordnance Stores and Provijsions, have Carriages to Carry off the Officers Baggage & the Soldiers leave to Carry Off theirs to March out with the Honors of War with Drums beating, Colours flying &c. our Sick and Wounded to be taken due care of but we a little Suspected Mischief was designed by the Indians so did not march till Ye. 10th. at which time the Savages were Let (?) Loose upon us, Strips, kills & Scalps our People, drove them into Disorder, Render'd it imposfible to Rally, the French Guards we were promis'd shou'd Escort us to Fort Edward would not protect us so that there open'd the most horrid Scene of Barbarity imaginable, I was Strip'd myself of my Arms & Cloathing that I had Nothing ie.(?) left but Britches Stockings Shoes & Shirt the Indians round me with their Tomehawks Spears &c threatening Death I flew to the Officers of French Guard for Protection but they Afford me none therefore was Oblig'd to fly and was in the Woods 'till the 12th. in the Morning of which I arriv'd at Fort Edward Almost Famish'd, this was not only my Case but many Others. Since my Arrival at Fort Edward I have heard there was a N^r. of Officers & Men return'd to the Lines & were in Custody of the French God

grant it may be so, what lofs we have Sustain'd by this Mafsacre I am not Able to tell, my Regim^t is Rent to Peices that I can give you no Acct. of It. I am Oblig'd not to bear Arms against the French nor any of us that was in the Siege for 18 Months therefore came here, where I shall Abide till I can get a Return of the Reg^t more Intelligable that at present I have, which I shall send as soon as I can obtain it.

with what of Fatigue Starving &c I am Obliged to break off but as soon as I can Recollect myself shall write to your more fully.

You'll be please'd Sir to Communicate this Letter (if you Judge it fitt) to the Court, and Excuse my writing to the Government as perhaps they may Expect, for the truth is, I am not able either of Body or Mind.

*I am Dear Sir with Esteem
Your most Ob^t Humble Serv^t
Jn^o. Fyre*

Copy of Col Fyre's Letter to the Honble Tho^s. Hubbard Esq^r. Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Albany Aug^t. 16th. 1757.

in Gov. Pownall's Letter of Aug^t. 22^d. 1757.

Comment: This letter is a clear demonstration of the inaccuracies of the timeline in Fyre's writings, but even more so than in the Fyre Journal (CO 5/18 Part 1 038; 142). Here, Fyre correctly has his column marching from Fort Edward on the 2nd, but after that, the timeline in the letter advances a full two days. The first French battery opens on the 6th, not on the 4th as stated in this letter. There is a similar error regarding the second French Battery, which opens on the 7th and not on the 5th. By the end of the letter, the correct date for the surrender has been restored to the 9th. There was no 13-inch mortar at the Siege, neither French nor British. The largest French mortar was a 9-inch (French designation). Incorrectly, the signature has an abbreviation for John, not Joseph.

In 1759 and 1760, Fyre would command a 400-man Massachusetts provincial detachment in garrison duty at Fort Cumberland, Nova Scotia. Anderson's characterization of Fyre is as an enlightened commander (Anderson 1984, Pages 128-130).

In January 1776, Fyre was appointed a Brigadier General in the Continental Army. Following the retreat of the British from Boston, he resigned his commission due to poor health (April 1776). Fyre had served exactly three months and was 64 years old at the time. From George Washington to Major General Charles Lee (May 9, 1776): "*the pay of which he receivd without any kind of compunction, although he had never done one tour of duty, or I believe had ever been out of his House from the time he enterd till he quitted Cambridge.*"

From Lord Loudoun to William Pitt at Sea, August 16 - October 17, 1757 (LO 4239 and CO_5_48_053 and 054). The main body of this letter is over 35 pages in length. The first twenty pages were written to Holderness. On September 11, Loudoun learns of Pitt's reappointment and the remainder of the letter was written to Pitt. The first third of the letter describes Loudoun's 1757 strategy with focus on the late arrival of Holburne's fleet. The letter then enters a discussion of securing New York. The military status of each of the colonies is briefly noted. Matters relating to funds and accounting are found throughout, some dating back to Braddock. There is no discussion of his plans for the 1758 Campaign.

There are two passages relating to the command structure, but they are deep within the letter surrounded by a discussion of the events. In context with the full letter, these passages are not a rebuke or aggressive. Attached to the letter were nineteen additional documents. This partial transcription is from the Colonial Office Papers, National Archives, London (CO 5/48 054, Page 564/282):

"And further, I think it my Duty to observe to Your Lordship, that without a Latitude is left in Orders at this distance, to make such Alterations in the Execution of them as the Change in Situation of thing makes necessary, the Country may be undone by a punctual Obedience to the most prudent Orders at the time they were given, or the Person that has the hour to command, must depart from them with a Halter about his Neck: For as Orders must naturally arise from the Information of the Situation of Affairs, from hence, and before that can reach London, and Orders in Consequence of it return here to be Executed, Six Months at least must be elapsed; and in less time than that, the Situation of Affairs in War, in so wide extended a Continent as this, must be Subject to many Alterations.

And if the person in Command, is not thought proper to be entrusted with the Power of taking such measures as the Change in Situation of things make necessary, he is certainly most improper in His Office, and it is absolutely necessary for the King's Services, that a better should be sent in his Place, in whom it may be fitt to place such Confidence."

Page 580/290:

"If those arguments have not the same Weight with You that they have with me, they will fall to the Ground; for I do assure You that for my own part, if I am to continue in the Command, I would much rather Act by directions than from my own Judgment; for I am sure, could those who give the Orders know the Changes that happen between that time and the Execution, and were on the Spot, to alter those Orders as circumstances may require, they would do it infinitely better than I could, but as that cannot be the case, a punctual Obedience of Orders may Screen the Officer, and at the same time lose the Country"

Comment: Loudoun canceled the Louisbourg Expedition on August 4th. On August 16th, Loudoun received Webb's letters of August 1st and 5th. Loudoun's frustration comes to the surface, but it is tempered. This is not a private letter to Cumberland. It is notated as a "*Publick Letter*."

This letter likely reached Pitt in early December prior to Pitt finalizing the decision to recall Loudoun (Pargellis 1933, Page 345). The first half of the letter is a logic-tree discussion of

Loudoun's strategy. The late-arriving fleet is an early focus and serves as the ultimate rationale for the failure. No blame is attached to any person. As regards pinning Montcalm in Quebec, the letter is weak. There is no discussion of the consequence of adopting Louisbourg over Quebec. There is no criticism of the provincial governments. In this sense, the letter is entirely benign. Though long, the letter itself is simplistic. Loudoun's reasoned complaint of rigidity to orders seems valid, but it is unrealistic as it ignores the underlying politics.

Though not discussed in Loudoun's letter, a pivotal event was the arrival of Pitt's letter directing that Louisbourg be first taken before moving on Quebec (LO 2765, arriving May 1, 1757). Only an attack on Quebec itself would blunt Vaudreuil's aggressive nature. A second letter from Pitt arrived May 11th with more details including the identities of the seven regiments being sent from Europe (MANA, Page 349). Even though Loudoun's timetable for the advance from Halifax was already in shambles and two more regiments were being sent than anticipated (see Cumberland to Loudoun, Dec. 23, 1756), Loudoun refused to reevaluate his troop allocations. At this time, the 42nd, 44th, and 48th were still near Albany. Unfortunately, Loudoun was not told that an additional senior staff officer was being sent, Lord Hay. Through mid-June, Loudoun could have reinforced Webb. At the very least, Webb could have been given orders as it relates to rebuilding the Lake George Navy and the disposition of the large bore mortars (13-inch and 10-inch). He never does. Now with the remaining campaign season cut short, Loudoun failed to adapt to the real circumstances; the rigidity to his own plan was self-imposed.

This letter is an argument mandating a massive alteration in policy. Pitt was already deep into formulating changes in how the war effort would be managed. The removal of Cumberland's authority and influence was a much more pressing matter to Pitt than Loudoun. With the debacle in Hanover, Cumberland loses his position as head of the British Army. John Ligonier partners with Pitt, eliminating any opposition from the British Army. The changes adopted were Pitt's, not Cumberland's or Loudoun's. Pitt's office will deal with the Governors who in turn will deal with their assemblies. The "political" duties of the Command in Chief in North America will be stripped to the bare minimum.

Pitt does learn from the letter. Theater brigadiers would be assigned. Senior staffs would be augmented, and Pitt keeps Amherst in England until the last moment. Amherst leaves Portsmouth on March 16 aboard the *Dublin*, but he was delayed reaching Halifax as the *Dublin* seized a French ship off Brest — a handsome prize of 700,000 pounds of coffee and 40,000 pounds of Red Wood (Amherst to Pitt, March 30, 1758; Kimball 1906, Page 218). The final three weeks of necessary preparation and practice for an amphibious assault were done under the command of Admiral Edward Boscawen (Boscawen 2011). Boscawen had arrived at Halifax on May 9th, but he had left England a full month before Amherst. Boscawen's sailing schedule was not dissimilar from Holburne's a year earlier; but unlike Holburne, Boscawen was not trapped in England for nearly two months waiting on favorable winds. In route, Amherst joins the fleet sailing from Halifax to Louisbourg (May 28, 1758). On May 28, 1757, Loudoun was still in New York.

From Webb to Loudoun, a duplicate letter sent to Viscount Barrington, Secretary of War (LO 4245A, August 17, 1757). Handwriting appears fully consistent with previous letters sent from Webb to Loudoun (LO 3590, May 9, 1757; LO 4198A, August 11, 1757; and from Bartman to Monro — LO 4050, August 4, 1757, part of the Bartman Letters, reproduced in Steele 1990, Page 103 and Castle 2013, Page 66). The handwriting is Bartman's. The structure suggests they were indeed authored or dictated by Webb.

Fort Edward August 17th. 1757

My Lord

I am Sorry the first letter I have the honor of addresing to your Lordship should be to acquaint you of the unfortunate Loss of Fort Will^m. Henry; to give your Lordship as clear an account of which as lies in my power I shall enumerate the most material circumstances that have happened from the first appearance of the Enemy upon Lake George,

Saturday 23^d of July Col. Parker of the New Jersey Regt. Having obtained leave from Lieu^t. Col. Monro who commanded at the Fort set out with three hundred men in 27 boats of different kinds to reconnoitre the advanced guard of the Enemy, and at day break the next morning fell in with the superior number of French and Indians about twenty six miles down the Lake who out of the whole party excepting about fifty who escaped with Col. Parker and about fifty more through the woods; on receiving intelligence of this the 24th at night, I set off the next morning with the principle officers and Engineers for Fort Will^m. Henry and having made the best disposition for the defence of the Place that the situation would admit of, and having sent off two whale boats the 28th to reconnoitre the Enemy who brought word that they were with twelve miles of the Fort; I returned again to Fort Edward the 29th and immediately wrote the most prejsing letters to several Governors, to put their Militia in arms and join me as fast as pofsible

Monday August 2^d L^t. Col. Young with two hundred of the royal Americans and Independents, Six Pieces of Cannon, and a Detachment of artillery under the Command of Capⁿ. M^cCloud marched to Fort Will^m. Henry to join the Troops before there under Col. Monro, and after having thrown in the proper Garrison retrench themselves upon the Eminence on the southeast which entirely Commanded the Fort.

Tuesday 3^d in the evening I received a letter from Col. Monro by a Ranger in which he acquainted me of the Enemy having Landed that morning on the west side of the Lake, that they had cannon with them, and the Ranger acquainted me that the Fort and Camp were entirely surrounded by a large body of French and Indians and that it was with the greatest difficulty he could get by as the woods were full of them, notwithstanding repeated exprefses to the several Government no reinforcement of the Militia as yet arrived, and the Troops remaining under my Command at this place did not exceed sixteen hundred me exclusive of the artificers employed on the works, and the different Commends at Albany and the Posts on the Hudson river, which were immediately ordered up. The Strength of the Camp and Garrison at Fort Will^m. Henry after the Last reinforcement amounted to about two thousand fit for Duty exclusive of Artificers and sailors which were taken from the Troops and were intended the new Galliot that were almost finished but neither of them Launched before the arrival of the Enemy

on the evening of the Enemys landing a scouting party that I sent out in the morning returned with a Prisoner a Leiu^t. of Canadians who was of the investing Party a Copy of whose information I herewith in close your Lordship, by which you will see it was out of my power to give them any assistance at the Fort with the handfull of men that remained with me, and the intelligence he gave with regard to their strength and Artillery proved minutly true

Saturday 6th the Enemy opened a Battery of nine pieces of Cannon on the west end of the Lake, from which they kept a constant fire on the Fort but did not do them much hurt, the Command at the different posts being now come in, augmented our number at this place to two thousand five hundred men comprehending artificers and every man that was able to bear arms; this Day about five hundred of the militia under Sir Will^m. Johnson arrived, and about an hundred and fifty Indians, of different Tribes and Nations; but not to tire you Lordship with unnecessary occurrences, the Enemy having opened another Battery of nine pieces of Cannon on the eighth, and the Garrison of the Fort having all their heavy cannon and two morters burst which were their Principle pieces of artillery, and the Enemy having on the 9th in the morning another Battery ready to open within an hundred and fifty yards of the Ditch, and the inside of the Fort being on fire all the night before with their shells, they were obliged to Capitulate, nor was it ever in my power to march to their relief, as the day of the surrender there were come up but two thousand three hundred of the Militia, with which and the other Troops under my Command, the greatest part of which were Provincials, I did not think it prudent to risque a battle against Such Superior Force, as the consequence of a defeat, must exposed this Fort and the whole Province to the incursions of the Enemy.

Enclosed I send your Lordship the Copy of the articles of Capitulation notwithstanding which, as soon as the Fort was evacuated by our Troops, the Sick and wounded were murdered by the Indians, and altho' both officers and men agreeable to the desire of the French had given up all their baggage and effects to satisfie their Indians, they were attacked in their return to this place Wednesday the 10th, every man striped of the cloaths he had on his back, several men women and children murdered scalped and carried off Prisoners besides others who must have perished in the woods, to which they run for shelter from the barbarities; during this inhuman behavior which was within sight of the Camp the Escort of the French were Looking on, Col. Monro with several other officers and about four hundred men returned to the Fort and put themselves under the immediate protection of M^r. Montcalm and arrived here the 15th the rest who saved themselves by flight have continued coming in daily from the woods, in which many of them must have perished with Hunger.

Two officers and ten private soldiers of the French who have deserted since the Fort was taken, confirm their strength according to the information of the Prisoners and all agree there were not less then two thousand five hundred Indians, M^r. Montcalm in his letter to me calls them three thousand, and every man in Canada that was able to carry arms, was brought upon this expedition.

after having destroyed this Fort and sent off the provisions ammunition and Artillery that remained therein to Carillon, M^r. Montcalm set off yesterday about twelve with his whole army; nor was it ever in my power to attack or molest him, as the greatest number of militia that I could by repeated exprefses collect at this place did not amount to above four thousand men, with such as would stay (and I must do Sir Will^m. Johnson the justice to say he was indefatigable in his endeavors and sollicitations but to no purpose to detain them), I made a stand at this Fort, tho' had the Enemy proceeded to the attack of it, I see nothing could have prevented it falling into their hands.

Col. Monro and all the officers having lost their papers with the rest of their baggage, it is impossible as yet to make out a return of what men we have lost. three officers of the Massachusetts were killed, and Col. Young of the Roy^l americans, Capⁿ Cuningham & Capⁿ Ormsby of the 35 Reg^t wounded, Capⁿ Ormsby as he was not able to travel here is carried to Canada according to the Articles of the Capitulation and Capⁿ Feesch (but with what justice I can not say) taken as hostage the other officers and soldiers I have sent down to Albany, that the Articles may be kept on our side till I shall receive further orders from the Earl of Loudoun in what manner they are to act in consequence of this behavior of the Enemy.

I have wrote to the different Governments to immediatly compleate the deficiencys in that their several Reg^t occasioned by those who were at the siege of Fort Will^m Henry being by the Articles of Capitulation rendered incapable of serving for the present

as an opportunity at this time offered of sending your Lordship a return of the Troops under my Command, I thought it my Duty to give your Lordship as authentic an account of this affair as it is at present in my power to obtain, as well for the Satisfaction of your Lordship as the justification of my own conduct therein, I must at the same time do Col, Monro and the rest of the Regular Troops who were concerned in this siege the justice to say, they behaved extremly well, and wish it was in my power to alledge as much in favor of the Provincials, who made up the greatest part of their strength I am

my Lord &c &c &c

D.W.

Comment: This last letter is again self-protective. Webb sends a copy directly to Viscount Barrington. Provincial troops who served at the Siege are dropped from the rolls, go home, and do not appear on the August or September Returns (LO 4004). Oddly, this is the deficiency being questioned by Webb.

Webb first called for the New York militia on July 30th; there is a companion letter to Major Christie (48th) at Albany (Bartman Letters). Governor Pownall received a letter from Webb dated July 31 calling up the Massachusetts militia (CO 5/18 Part 1 036 contains the full letter chain). Governor De Lancey makes a detailed record and provides a long narrative of the events around the call up of the New York militia (August 24 - 25, 1757; CO 5/18 Part 1 040, included below). By August 11th, Webb was confident that the French will not be advancing on Fort Edward, but he then turns cautious. The militia that had then arrived at Fort Edward was largely from New York. Webb's influence over the militia was limited and he did little or nothing when some units of the militia start leaving on the 11th. Webb complained to Governor De Lancey about the conduct and lack of discipline of the militia that had reached Fort Edward and requested that De Lancey come

north to provide order, but De Lancey decided to remain in Albany to direct the flow of men and provisions heading to Fort Edward. On August 13th and 14th, Webb sends more formal letters requesting that the militia units then on the road to Fort Edward halt, but the next day amends those orders, again asking that the New England militia proceed to Fort Edward (August 15th, CO 5/18 Part 1 036 Page 25). The French were still at Fort William Henry, razing the bastion and organizing the movement back to Carillon. The militias were formally released by Webb on August 17th.

De Lancey's narrative demonstrates that the authority over the militias rested with the Governors and that the gathering of the militia needed to be done with extreme and clear purpose. The strain on the supply and logistic chain was immense, the reason De Lancey remains near Albany. The militia could not be gathered, waiting on need. Pargellis underestimates the difficulty of managing militia as reinforcements.

Here again, Lord Howe might have been of great service to Webb, but strangely, there is no mention of Howe in this letter. Howe was one of the most promising of the younger British officers, but with the prolonged mail delay from Europe to America that Spring, nearly everything about Howe's arrival is muddled. Cumberland writes Loudoun of Howe's appointment to the 60th Foot on March 21, 1757 (MANA, Page 326), but this letter does not appear to be at the Huntington Library. With this delay in the mail, the timelines suggest that Loudoun was in Halifax when he first learns of Howe's appointment, \approx July 9th. Webb might have known nothing of Howe's joining the 60th until his actual arrival at Fort Edward on the evening of August 6th. Although sent to North America by Cumberland, Howe was the single officer "above" the Pitt - Cumberland feud. He was cousin to the King, his mother being the niece of George I. He was charismatic and well-liked. Howe was also a member of the House of Commons (1747 - 1758; Whig Party, as was Pitt). It was hoped that Howe would guide Abercromby in his tactical decision-making. Howe would be killed during the initial stages of Abercromby's 1758 Ticonderoga Campaign.

From Lord Loudoun to Governor Pownall (Massachusetts) at Sea August 18, 1757 (CO_5_48_056; 627/314 – Colonial Papers, National Archives, London):

To His Excellency Thomas Pownall Esq^r. Gov^r. of the Mafsachusetts.

*From on Board His Majestys Ship
Winchelsea at Sea off La Hève
Aug^t. 18th. 1757*

My dear Sir,

As Captain Bradstreet must be with you before this can arrive, I shall say nothing of the change of measures since you left us, but Proceed to acquaint You, that on the 16th. we sail'd with the Squardon for Louisbourg, the Fleet for New York, and the Fleet for the Bay of Fundy, before We got out of the Capes, we met three Expreßes with M^r Webbs Letters of August 1st. & 5th, on which immediately changed my disposition, and took two Regiments destined for the Bay of Fundy with me, which makes Ten in the whole along with me, and ordered back a Sloop of War to Halifax, to take up Braggs Regiment to the Bay of Fundy in Place of the two I had taken.

Yesterday, the Fleet Parted from Us and altho we are doing all in our Power, the Wind being quite a head Prevents our being able to get forward.

I have just now, at ten in the forenoon, received yours of the 13th, with the disagreeable News of the Loss of Fort William Henry, which I doubt is before this, followed by the Loss of Fort Edward; but I would Gladly Hope that great assistance you have so wisely and speedily Ordered, will get up time enough to save Albany, which I Look on, as of the greatest consequence to those Provinces. — I beg you may continue to Push up all the assistance Possible, not only from your own but the Neighboring Provinces, by which I think, You may have great numbers; but those I think will not do in a Pitch'd Battle, therefore if the Enemy advance, You can annoy them more by keeping out of large detachments to harass their Rear, and cutting off their Provisions and supplies of every sort, than by collecting the whole to oppose their Front: And as You must have People well acquainted with the Country, I should think this might be done to advantage. I do most earnestly recommend, the keeping a great Body of the Lightest and Nimblest of Your People in their Rear, the Harass them as much as Possible; And if you can Persuade any of Your People, let the Parties be never so small, to give them Alarms every Night, You will distress them more than by fighting their main Body. — Let this be Your Plan of War, from the beginning, and Particularly be Prepared for it when I come up: And if this is Executed, I hope none of them shall return to Canada the way they came; And this Service, when they come forward, must be done by the People of the high Country.

As to the Train of Artillery You propose to send up, pardon me to say, I know you can have none but Iron guns; they are heavy and will very Cumbersome to You, and I doubt (not?), will be only throwing so many more Cannon into the Enemys hands.

I am still of Opinion, I shall meet the Enemy's Force sooner by New York, than were I to land at Boston, therefore I pursue that Rout. If the wind hangs off when I am past Nantucket, and Prevents my getting into the Hook, I shall run in by Block Island, and Land on Long Island, and make all dispatch Possible.

You have my Permission to open all Letters coming to me, and give orders in Consequence of their of their Contents till I arrive.

Be so good as to forward a Copy of my Plan, of annoying the Enemy, to Governor Delancy.

I am with Sincere Regard and My dear Sir, &cc.

P.S. As Whale Boats be wanted, I must beg You, to dispatch to Nantucket, and the Places Adjacent, to Purchase one hundred for his Majesty's Service, with the Paddles Necefsary for them; and send them directly to New York.

Comment: Loudoun wrote this letter under the false assumption that Montcalm's Army was indeed eleven or twelve thousand men. This is a companion letter to the August 20th letter by Loudoun to Webb (CO 5/48; 646/323 – Colonial Papers, National Archives, London). By this time, the Louisbourg Expedition had been canceled.

The question for Loudoun then becomes where to winter and quarter the sixteen battalions now packed into Halifax. Several regiments would remain in Halifax, but there was nowhere near sufficient barrack space to house all the men or the needed provisions. The Bay of Fundy Transport Fleet was headed to Annapolis in Nova Scotia to disembark several regiments into winter quarters. The New York Fleet was transporting regiments south for winter quarters; they would then be widely scattered across several of the colonies, but most would end up near Albany.

When this letter reached Governor Pownall, the situation had resolved itself following the withdrawal by Montcalm, but portions of this letter may have seemed decidedly odd and not relevant, if not suggesting incompetence. Pownall and Loudoun had a distinctly awkward relationship with Pownall offering to resign his office that November (CO 5/18 Part 2 037; 352/154 as related in this March 15th letter by Pownall). Loudoun did not accept the resignation.

My Dear Sir,

I have this moment received Your Letter of the 11th with an Account of Your Situation and the Capitulation of Fort William Henry with the Villainous & inhuman Breach of it. I am on the Way, with a Force sufficient to turn the Scale of Affairs, with God's Assistance; And then, I hope we shall teach them the Necessity, to comply with the Laws of Nations and Humanity; for altho' I abhor Barabry, the knowledge I have of M^r Vaudreuil's Behavior, In Time of Peace (when In Louisiana) from his own Letters in my Possession; and the Murders committed at Oswego, and now at Fort W^m. Henry, will oblige me Contrary to human Nature, to make those Gentlemen sick of such inhuman Villainy, whenever, it is in my Power.

In the Mean Time I send You enclosed, a Copy of my Letter to Governor Pownall of the 18th. in which You will see my Notion of the Manner of Carrying the Defence till I arrive; and must add to that, in Case this Letter can arrive in Time; that if You are forced to retire from Fort Edward, You will take every Method You can in Prudence to prevent & impede their advancing into the Country, by opposing and retarding them at every Pass You can find it prudent, from the Nature of the Enemy, and the Situation You find the Troops You have with You in breaking down all Bridges and impeding the Roads as much as possible; and if You are drove down to Albany, it is absolutely necessary, that you shou'd defend the Mohawk River from the Sprouts up to Schenectady, which I shou'd hope is a Pass, they cannot force, if You bring down or destroy all Species of Boats, that are above that.

If they will penetrate, in Spite of all You can do, to have Albany, which is in every shape of the greatest Consequence; both as the Loss of it, at once gives up and cuts off from us the whole Mohawks River, gives up All the Magazines, and the key by which to return, to regain all the Country above, and penetrate into the Enemy's Country. As that is the only Post, where a Body of Troops can be put under Cover during the Winter, to be in readiness, either to oppose any Attempt of the Enemy, or make a push from against them.

If you are drove from that, I am absolutely against Your Risking a Battle, till the Regular Troops with me are joined; but that You shou'd retard their Progress as much as possible, and follow the plan of getting the provincials of the different Provinces to cut off their Convoys & harass their Rear, and keep them in Constant Alarm during the Night; which I shou'd hope might be done; as I take it for Granted, the most if not all their Indians are returned home, as I have never heard of any Instance of Indians remaining of either Side, after they have either lost any of their People, or got any Booty; but that they have constantly returned Home.

This at first Appearance, seems a harsh Order for the Country; I do not mean it as such; but I think a few had better suffer, than the Whole; and if You risk a Battle with the provincials, with the Regular Troops of France, let Your Numbers be what they will, I think the Chance is You will be beat; in which Case we shall not be able to bring any of them to look the Enemy in the Face again this Season, and have the whole to depend on the Regular Troops, without any Aid from the Country, even in transporting the Provisions and Ammunition; Whereas by cutting off their Supplies, and getting between them and home, they will lose the Spirits they got by their late Success,

and as they lose it, our people will of Course gain Confidence, and if they have the Hardinefs to come on I shou'd hope it might be in our Power, to prevent any of them from being able to get back; which wou'd again turn the Face of Affairs entirely in our Favor.

I have with me Six Battalions I brought from New York, and four Battalions of 700 each compleate, which I think sufficient to change the Face of Affairs; and must beg to know from You, on my Arrival at New York, the Situation of Things are in, with Your Opinion of the Steps to be taken; and that You will give such Orders, in the mean Time, as are necessary, to have everything in Readinefs against my Arrival, that no Time may be lost.

I must beg You will make my Compliment to Lieut. Colonels Monro and Young and the Rest of the Officers & Troops, and assure them, I will do them the Justice, in my Reports to the King, that their Gallant Behavior in the Service of their Master, so justly deserves.

I have in this Letter, given You my Opinion of what Your Conduct ought to be in the Situation of Affairs, as they occur to me from the Accounts I have received; but as many things may have happened that are not come to my Knowledge, You must be guided by Your own Judgement from the Circumstances that have or may happen; And I am sure You will find a very great relief, from having so able an Affistant and Councillor, as You have in Gov^r. Delancy, near You. I am, &cc.

Comment: Loudoun wrote this letter under the assumption that Montcalm's Army was indeed eleven or twelve thousand men. Among Webb's troops, there would only be some 1,000 regulars remaining — four companies of the 35th, about eight companies of the 60th, and two Independent Companies. The only ranger companies remaining were provincial. This is a companion letter to the August 18th letter written to Pownall and copied by Loudoun to Webb (CO 5/48; 627/314 – Colonial Papers, National Archives, London).

From James De Lancey, Governor of New York to Robert Darcy, Earl of Holderness, Secretary of State Southern Department, August 24, 1757 (CO 5/18 Part 1 040). This letter provides an excellent view of the events during the two weeks following the surrender. Governor Pownall of Massachusetts and Sir William Pepperrell, the head of the Massachusetts Militia, write a similar series of letters not included here; several of Captain Christie's letters relating to the march of the militia are also attached to this packet of letters (CO 5/18 Part 1 036).

My Lord

New York, 24th August 1757.

My last to your Lord was of the 4th Instant, inclosing a Copy of a Letter from General Webb of the July 30th, and acquainting your Lordship that I was set out from Albany the next day, to forward the Militia of this Province to his Afsistance, and declaring my apprehensions of the Event, as the french were said to be 9,000 strong, unless the Militia got up time enough. I have now the displeasure to inform your Lordship that Fort William Henry surrendered to the French the ninth instant, the Particulars of the siege, the perfidy of the French, & the Barbarity of their Indians, contrary to the Capitulation, you will have more authentically from others; but as losses naturally lead to inquiry and examination into the Causes of them, I shall take the Liberty to give a detail of the measures I took to give General Webb all the Aid and Afsistance in my power.

The Plan for the defence of the Northern Part of this province was fixt by my Lord Loudoun, of which you must long since have had an account from his Lordship & Sir Charles Hardy; and General Webb was left with Otways Regiment and the third Battalion of the Royal Americans, & the Provincial troops to oppose Montcalm; the quota of this Province being 1000 men was soon completed, as We had kept up a Regiment of 800 men all Winter; and as I conceived that General Webb was not strong enough in regulars, and that Montcalm would endeavor to play the same game he had done last year, by making an early attack on this Quarter and returning afterwards to Quebec, time enough to oppose any attempt that might be made then by us, where it was supposed the grand push would be in order to Strengthen General Webb, &, on the tenth of June, soon after the administration of this Government devolved on me, issued orders to the Colonels of the Militia of Albany, Dutches, & Ulster to march the Militia of their Counties to the Aid and Afsistance of the Forces under the Command of Major General Webb, on his requisition and to obey his orders, and soon after I gave the like order to the Coll. Of the Regiment of Orange above the Highlands, a Copy of the Letter and order are inclosed, so that the whole Militia of the County of Albany and all the Militia on both sides of the Hudson's River, one Hundred miles below the City of Albany, were ordered to his Afsistance. These men were the steps previous to my going to Albany. I set out for that place the 5th instant in the Evening, as soon as I possibly could after finishing the necessary businefs, and Leaving Orders for 400 men of the Militia of Queens County, & the like number of West Chester County to hold themselves in readinefs to march at an hours warning, and arrived there Monday the 8th at night. I went immediately to Capt Christie Deputy Quarter Master, & then the commanding Officer in Albany, to learn the State of things, he informed me that the Militia of Albany were gone up, and were at Fort Edward, & those of Dutches & Ulster were on their way above Albany, that the Orange Regiment got that day five Miles above Albany, but the Col. was in town to get proviions for his Men. I sent for him early next morning and ordered him to proceed with the utmost dispatch to Fort Edward. Early in the morning I received a letter from General Webb of the 8th instant, giving an Account that the French Army was very numerous, a Prisoner taken the Evening of their landing, affirming it to consist of Eleven or twelve thousand men, and as

two thousand of this troops were at the Lake, he was in no Situation to attack the Enemy till reinforced by a Larger body of Militia than were arrived at that time, and as he had heard others were on the march, he desired I would forward men up to him as fast as I could: accordingly I sent that morning My Brother Oliver, Coll. of the Regiment of the City of New York, & Mr. Dies, as far as Stillwater, with my Orders to spur on the Militia to Fort Edward, that were between that place and Albany: on the tenth I received a Letter from General Webb dated the 9th in which he acquaints me that the Militia begun to murmur, & that he thought if necessary I should come up instantly, as my Presence might perhaps keep them in some awe, in the Postscript he says, that instant he was informed the Fort surrendered at seven that morning, which made my coming more necessary to assist in resolving what measures to pursue, to which I answered by the letter of the 10th, that I was sending expresses for assistance to all the Governments from New Jersey to New Hampshire inclusive, and that I was of Opinion I could be of more service at Albany in forwarding the Militia, that by going to Fort Edward: that the only measures that could be pursued were either to advance and give the Enemy battle, if he thought himself strong enough to drive them from this end of the Lake, or else to wait their Coming to Fort Edward with all his Force; or if this should not be thought advisable; then to leave such strength at Fort Edward and in the Lines as might make a tolerable good resistance, till such time as Posts might be secured to prevent the Enemy's crossing the Mohawks River, & destroying Albany, which is the grand Magazine of Provisions &c. that I thought this last measure should not be taken, till the Enemy forced him to retreat before them, as it would loose all the settlements of the Mohawks River and a great part of the Country. I acquainted him that I had that morning and expresses from Col. Whitney informing me that Fort Edward was sharply attacked at nine the night before; (this was occasioned by a false alarm among the Militia in which great Numbers of Muskets were fired, supposed for the Enemy Indians) I also told him that I had the day before ordered 500 men from the City of New York, 600 from Queens County, & 600 from Westchester, and that day all the Militia of Westchester to march up with the utmost dispatch to Albany, and that I would hasten up Men to his Assistance as fast as they came: on the 12th I received a Letter from the General of the 11th acquainting me that the Militia continued to go back as fast as they came: that the day before about ten, part of the army from Fort William Henry returned in a most distressed Condition, the Indians of the Enemy having fallen upon them and plundered them notwithstanding the Capitulation, and that he had pretty certain intelligence that the Indians & Canadians were to go off for Canada that day, and that the Militia need not be hurried so much as was necessary before, desiring I would provide Clothing for the Soldiers of this Province who had been striped at the lake, and that I would complete the New York regiments by draughts. On the 12th, I wrote the General that as great numbers of Militia were continually passing towards Fort Edward which would occasion an immense consumption of Provisions, and as the loss of 50 teams at the Lake, might Occasion a want of Carriages to transport provisions to Fort Edward in such Quantities as were necessary, I propose to have sixty waggons employed in transportation between Saraghtoga & Fort Edward. that as to the Militias returning back I had ordered all that Came into Albany be Stopt. that I had sent orders to the half-Moon, Stillwater and Saraghtoga to have all taken up there that had not a pass from a proper Officer & sent back by any party going to Fort Edward, & to be reported to him, that I had detained all the Provincials of the New York Regiment and had ordered them to be Cloathed, & that as to the completing the Regiments by draughts, it was not in my power without calling the Assembly which I should do as soon as I could properly leave Albany; & asked whether if the Indians and Canadians were gone off, it would not be a proper opportunity, to take advantage of their absence and make an essay to

recover Fort William Henry? to which, I had an answer of the 13th, that he approved of the measure in regard to the additional carriages. that he desired I would lay before the Assembly the compleating the Regiment of New York by draughts that he would immediately write to several Governors to raise the Quotas of their Forces, and doubted not the Province of New York would set the Example that in regard to take the Opportunity of attacking the Enemy at Lake George, the Objections that Occurred to him were that the main of the Army was Still there, that only a few of the Indians were returned and a party of Canadians with a hundred boats loaded with Provisions, and as the Forces with him were still inferior to the Enemy, he did not think it prudent to attack as superior Force in a retrenched Camp, especially as the greater part of those with him, consisted of Militia, an a defeat would lay the Province open; and that as from the intelligence of the Enemys motions, he did not apprehend he should have occasion for more Militia than were present with him, and on the Road, he thought it better to return those to the lower Counties, and to Stop thofe of New England: on the 14th I wrote him that I would order the additional carriages (which I have done) and that I would endeavour to compleat the New York Regiment as soon as possible (and for this purpose I am to meet the Assembly next Wednes(day) and that I had ordered the Militia of the lower Counties back as he thought it best & did not apprehend he should have Occasion for them; on the 14th the General wrote me that he was sorry to be again Obliged to complain of the Behavior of the Militia of this Province, every man of them except those of Albany having deserted in a most mutinous manner, and threatned to put their Officers to death if they opposed them. That as the french were still at the Lake with their whole Army (excepting the Indians) and that they had destroyed the Fort, he desired I would use my authority to make the Militia return to their Duty; as should the Enemy advance, he was in no condition to oppose them. That he imagined it necessary to send forward the New England Reinforcements that were near Albany & that notwithstanding his instructions of yesterday to the send the Militia of the lower Counties back. If I should find there was not a Body for the several Provinces to make up an army of five or six thousand men, he desired I would put a Stop to their March for the present: to which I returned an answer of the 16th that I was extremely shocked at the Mutinous behavior of some of the Militia of this Province, in deserting the Service before they were discharged, that immediately upon Receipt of this letter I send down orders on both sides of the River, to Require the Militia to return on pain of Death. that I had sent Col. Hoffman to Greenbush on the East side of the River, & Col. Dekay back to the flatts, fiver miles above Albany, with my orders to command the Militia to Halt, & not to Stir till I had spoken to them; I got a party of one hundred Men under Capt. Ogden to go to the Assistance of Col. Hoffman with orders to Stop as many as he could, and in case of resistance to fire on them. I went my self on the West side of the River and stopt about one hundred and put them under the Care of some Officers at the Flatts; and perceiving them to march in great Numbers on the east side of the River. I returned and Crofsed at the Ferry, where the Party under Capt Ogden was and found they had taken between fifty and Sixty, and that one of the Party shot and killed a Serjeant of Militia who refused to Stop; these I ordered into Gaol (jail). This Affair had given me great Vexation, and I am determined if I can discover the Ringleaders to make some examples. I also acquainted the General that in consequence of his Letter of the 13th, I had on the 14th, sent orders to the Militia of the lower Counties to return, & that they were gone back, but that however I had on the 15th, sent for 600 picked men from Westchester, & on the 16th had ordered the Colonels of Dutches and Ulster with some of their Captains to go into their Counties and use their utmost efforts to bring back their men. That upon my meeting and asking the deserters how they could be so treacherous as to leave Fort Edward at a time when the Enemy lay so near, they all answered that they were willing to have

gone against the Enemy, but that must have perished if they lay still, few of them having blankets, no tents or Kettles, to dress their victualls: that I told them they were not the proper judges when it was fit to march against an Enemy, & that their duty to King and Country required their Stay till they were discharged. On the 16th, the General wrote me that the remainder of the Garrison of Fort William Henry with Col. Monro & Col. Young, and the rest of the Officers arrived safe the day before, about three at Fort Edward. that the Enemy were still at the Lake with their whole Force, except part of the Indians, and a Scout who came in that morning, brought Advice that they were there at Sun set the night before, & that they had sent off all the Artillery ammunitions Provisions &c. That as soon as he was certain of their Departure he would send back the Militia, and that as by that means, he should have only two thousand five hundred men, he pressed the necessity of immediately completing the Regiments of several Provinces, & had wrote for that purpose to the several Governors. On the 18th, I received a letter of the 17th from Capt Bartman the Generals Aid de Camp, signifying that he was directed to acquaint me that the General had that day given leave for the Militia to return to their respective provinces, and would be Obligated to me if I could get one hundred men to remain at Still-water & fifty at the Half Moon till the Provincial reinforcements arrive; to which I answered by the Letter of the 18th to General Webb, that I had given orders to send those that were coming up to their Respective Homes, that in the present disposition of the Militia, it would be impracticable for me to get the one hundred and fifty men for those posts, and therefore, I proposed that those who were left as invalids at Albany & were now recovered, should be sent to Still water, & that Lt. Vanveghle with the men of the New York Regiment, who were at Fort William Henry should be placed at the half Moon. That as only Parties of Indians would come as low a half Moon, I thought this Office & these men might bear Arms against them: that I proposed in a day or two to set out for New York to call the Assembly to expedite the recruiting the New York Regiment, reminding the General that the Packet was detained & that I should send her away as his dispatches for England came down. To which I had an Answer on the 19th from the General, approving the disposition I proposed, & acquainting me that he had given orders to Capt. Christie in consequence thereof, and desired I would give directions to Lt. Vanveghle to march to half moon with his Men, & that he had that day sent his dispatches to Mr. Colden the Post master: And by another letter of the same date, he gives me his Opinion that some severe examples seem absolutely necessary to make the Militia useful; that the Provincials Troops desert very fast, and unless some stop be put to it, he shall not have hands to finish the necessary Works, much less to make a Stand against the Enemy. Before I received these last Letters, I had a list of Deserters from Col. Glazier of the New York Regiment and sent Lt. Vanveghle with Lt. Rooseboom to Schenectady to take up some deserters who were said to be in that town, & I sent Capt. Ogden of the New York Regiment down the River with the List to apprehend and secure all deserters; and left Orders in Albany for Lt. Vanveghle as soon as he returned to repair to half Moon with his Men.

Thus My Lord you have a detail of all the Steps I have taken in his affair.

I left Albany the 21st and with a fair Wind reached New York the next day, as soon as I landed, I called the Council and fixt on next wednesday the 31st for the meeting of the Assembly, when I hope I shall be empowered to complete the New York Regiment by draughts and if I am, shall send them with all possible expedition to Fort Edward.

I shall make very few reflections on the Events of this Campaign, the first is that by the Loss of Fort William Henry, we have lost one of the principal Keys to this Province, as it will now be no very

difficult matter for the French to come up the Lake unobserved, with a large body & cut off Schenectady & the settlements on the Mohawk River, for if an army of eleven or twelve thousand men with a very large train of Artillery could move through the narrow pafs between Tionderoga or Carillion and Lake George unnoticed, when we had Fort William Henry within thirty miles of it, what should hinder a lefs body, without Artillery, from coming up the Lake, and penetrating into the Mohawks Country equally unnoticed.

The second reflection is that this Province is in a very dangerous situation unlefs we are supported with a greater number of Regulars. Montcalm has a least six battalions, besides Marines, a kind of Independent Companies, and the Militia of Canada, what was there to oppose these? Otways Regiment & the third Battalion of the Royal American Regiment, & the Provincial Regiments raised in haste: & therefore an unequal match. And it seems to me very probable, that had we two or even one more complete Battalion, that either Montcalm would not have made the attempt against Fort William Henry, or that he might have been disappointed in it.

The third reflection is on the behavior of the Militia: I know the use and Value of our Militia, but do not rate it higher than it deserves; and I know that they may be of great Service in an Emergency, to make a push, but I also know they cannot be held in due Obedience nor be kept long together; But I hope by some instances of severity, to bring them to a better sence of their duty, and make them more useful for the future, than they have been in the last instance: I shall order a strict inquiry into their behavior, & cause the Militia law, which is a very good one, to be Strictly put in Execution.

Before I conclude I must take the liberty to observe to your Lordship, that these Countrys are almost exhausted of Money & men; of money by great annual expences they are at, to raise & support their troops, which cannot be long continued without large Emifsions of paper Currency, which will leave a heavy debt on them: of men they are exhausted by numbers going out in Privateers, numbers inlisted in his Majesty's Troop, numbers in Provincial Service and numbers lost by the Casualties of War. so that there soon will be scarce numbers sufficient left for the ordinary work of husbandry, whence I would observe the Necefsity of sending recruits for his Majesty's Troops from Great Britain or Ireland. I ask your Lordship pardon for detaining you so long. I am with great Regard My Lord

*Your Lordships
Most obedient &, most
Humble Servant
James De Lancey*

Note: The punctuation in the original letter is decidedly awkward, more so than in this transcription. Often sentences will start in lowercase letters. The use of commas is excessive, but then commas are sometimes missing. Colons can end sentences. In a few instances, some of the excessive punctuation has been removed from this transcription and capitalizations added.

Comment: This letter contains several different themes and offers balance to some of Webb's communications. In early June, Hardy steps aside as Governor of New York and joins Loudoun in planning the assault on Louisbourg. As Lt. Governor, De Lancey now assumes the position. First, De Lancey demonstrates his total and complete commitment to following the directions and policies of the Crown and his Ministry (Secretary of State, Southern Department). He is not a "loose cannon" as was Shirley. Outside of not spending money not appropriated by the New York Assembly, he is doing everything he can think of in support of Webb and the British Army. In June, De Lancey directs the colonels of the various New York militias to follow any orders from Webb to raise their men and proceed to Fort Edward in haste without waiting on any secondary orders from De Lancey himself. This eliminated delays and allows authority for Captain Christie to write the needed letters that August.

De Lancey does not criticize Webb. His only real critique that touches on the British Army was his wish that Loudoun had left additional Regulars in New York. Loudoun certainly had the opportunity to do so. However, Webb's repeated vacillations regarding the march of the militias are evident and cannot be viewed in a favorable light.

When reading this letter, the reader needs to be careful. De Lancey will frequently jump between elements relating to the militias and those relating to the provincial regiments. These are distinct and separate. The criticism of the militia is evident throughout, but near the end of the letter De Lancey offers some explanation for their behavior. How to read this is nebulous. In today's light, not having tents, blankets or even cooking kettles available may seem a valid justification for the rank & file to leave. But at the same time, De Lancey is stating that regardless of the lack of support and equipment, simply walking away from the commitment was not an option. No blame for the poor preparation or the overall lack of supplies is shifted toward anyone. De Lancey ignores this element, but it begs asking. Unlike Webb, De Lancey offers no hint at the number of these "deserters", whether the men were leaving Fort Edward in small groups or as full companies with officers.

Pargellis and other historians focus on the timing of the call-up of the militias, ignoring or downplaying the associated difficulties (See Pargellis 1933, Pages 246-247). In this role, the militias were near useless or an actual burden — no logistical tails.

The final topics mentioned in the letter are carefully placed — the financial drain on the colonies and the near exhaustion of the available manpower to meet the needs of the military while keeping the colony functional. These last two issues would have been paramount to the New York Assembly and De Lancey needed to demonstrate that he was conveying those "realities" to London. In contrast, Loudoun shows little sympathy for these concerns. Whatever patience and goodwill that Loudoun might have brought from Europe was quickly lost in dealing with Shirley and the debts accumulated by Shirley, the officer-rank debate, the loss of Oswego, and the winter quartering of regulars. However, Loudoun is still required to deal with the various provincial assemblies as it relates to the provincial forces to be fielded in the next campaign season. Within six months of landing, Loudoun's sole focus is on seizing Quebec.

From Admiral Francis Holburne to Lord Loudoun, August 25th, 1757 (LO 4311); this letter is in Holburne's handwriting:

My Lord,

I hope this will find your Lordship perfect health & recovered from the fatigues of the Sea which I beg leave to congratulate you upon, as likewise the escape I may say the whole army has had for I really am of opinion the whole would been cutt off, every preparation that was possible from aa Polite nation to receive you; I think Providence has been very kind in preserving you & ? Troops, the ships would mostly have fallen too as we must have staid for your protection, and you will see by the inclosed Lines the inequality of our force, I dispatch'd the Speedwell away the 21st with my letters, a Copy I herewith send you just to inform you what I said on this subject, which is very short & leaves them judge to themselves, but I think its to the best of my recollection. I have found my self under the disagreeable necessity of returning from their Port with our Squadron, as they are greatly Stronger then we, besides the great chance of separating in fogs, for w had one in half an hour after we look'd in & was surprised to find us altogether when it clear'd up the next day; what a situation would our Transports been in, onely think my dear Lord of the situation I am in at present not to be able to keep the Sea, but at the greatest risk of the Squadron & this Collony; which I cant say how far its in danger with all my assistance; as the Enemy will most certainly throw in all the Troops, Indians & Canadians on the Bay of Vert (Verte – Fort Beauséjour – Fort Lawrence), which Mr Lawrence shall be advised of to be on his Guard; It will be the greatest satisfaction to hear of your welfare & everything going as you could with on the Continent; I am sure your Lordship ought to have the Thanks of our Good King & Country; This is my second difficult task God knows how it will end; but this you may be assured of I shall act to the best of my Judgement & Capacity for the good of the Service, but you cant imagine how it effects me to find our situation such as has never been in my time. — I blame no body but surely (I am) some one to blame — I flatter my self of haveing the Honour to hear from your Lordship before I leave this country, which will be latter than I expected; had their force been separate we should have taken care to have kept in so, such as Sir Cha^r always said they had some aftergame to play I think is plain; or there was no occasion for all that force in Lewisburgh, It behaves us to look well out often a Cunning & artfull Enemy; I beg Comp^s to Gen^l Forbes & all other friends being with the greatest regard.

*Major Murray I understand
Sends you some particulars
Halifax Agust 25th 1757, we got in last night*

*My Lord
Your Lordships most obed^t —
Faithfull hum^{le} Serv^t
Fra : Holburne*

Comment: In this private letter to Loudoun, Holburne writes the strength of the French Squadron as the reason for canceling the operation against Louisbourg without any mention of the limited campaign season that remained. In August, the gun strength of the French battleline was 1,270 guns, the strength of the British 1,090 guns, 50-gun ships and above, some 86% of the French guns (*The Gentleman's Magazine*, Volume 27, 1757, Page 463) — the *Devonshire* (70), *Somerset* (68), *Prince Frederick* (64), and *Eagle* (60) would not join Holburne until September and the *Arc-en Ciel* (50) was being refit. Draining his strength, Holburne was also obligated to escort the troop transports. Even before this letter, the more politically astute Hardy was embracing the limited campaign window as the reason for the cancellation, secondary was the strength of the French. Holburne was fully aware and accepted that the cancellation would be blamed on him. Holburne never commanded at sea again; he served as the Port Admiral at Portsmouth and a member of Parliament.

From Admiral Francis Holburne, September 10, 1757, CO_5_48_068, Page 779/390:

Line of Battle and Other Vessels at present with Vice Admiral Holburne this 10th Septemr. 1757

<i>Frigates</i>	<i>Rates</i>	<i>Ships</i>	<i>Guns</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Commanders</i>	<i>Division</i>
	4	<i>Windsor</i>	60	420	<i>Capt. Faulkner</i>	<i>Sr. Chas. Hardy</i> <i>XXX. Rear</i> <i>Adml. of ye. Blue</i>
	4	<i>Kingston</i>	60	400	<i>Parry</i>	
	3	<i>Captain</i>	64	480	<i>Amherst</i>	
					<i>Sr. Chas. Hardy</i>	
<i>Hunter</i>	3	<i>Invincible</i>	74	700	<i>Capt. Bentley</i>	
	3	<i>Nafsau</i>	64	400	<i>Sayer</i>	
	4	<i>Tilbury</i>	60	400	<i>Barnsley</i>	
	4	<i>Defiance</i>	60	420	<i>Baird</i>	<i>Fras. Holburne</i> <i>Esq. Vice Adm.</i> <i>of the Blue</i>
<i>Nightingale</i>	3	<i>Northumberld.</i>	70	520	<i>Ld. Colvill</i>	
					<i>Fras. Holburne Esq.</i>	
<i>Lightning fire ship</i>	3	<i>Newark</i>	80	620	<i>Capt. Holburne</i>	
	3	<i>Orford</i>	68	520	<i>Spry</i>	
<i>Gibralters</i>	3	<i>Bedford</i>	64	400	<i>Fowke</i>	
<i>Prize</i>	4	<i>Sunderland</i>	60	400	<i>Mckenzie</i>	
	4	<i>Nottingham</i>	60	400	<i>Marshall</i>	<i>Chas. Holmes Esq.</i> <i>Commodore</i>
	3	<i>Terrible</i>	74	600	<i>Collins</i>	
					<i>Chas. Holmes Esq.</i>	
<i>Ferret</i>	3	<i>Grafton</i>	68	535	<i>Capt. Cornwall</i>	
	3	<i>Somerset</i>	68	520	<i>Hughes</i>	
	4	<i>Centurion</i>	52	350	<i>Mantell</i>	
	4	<i>Eagle</i>	60	420	<i>Pallisier</i>	

Fra: Holburne

The 15th at Noon the Devonshire (70) & Prince Frederick (64) join'd us and I have put the Centurion out of the Line

Fra: Holburne

Comment: The *Cruizer* (8), carrying dispatches from England, joined Holburne in mid-September. The frigate *Hunter* (10) was sent to England on September 17th, letter packet.

From: James Abercromby to Loudoun, September 15, 1757 (LO 4471):

My Lord

Albany 15th Sep^r 1757

By quitting the Sloop and taking a whaleboat I landed yesterday at noon & found two letters from Mr Webb of the 6th and 8th Ins^t requiring four Battalions to joyn him, where three marched early yesterday morning. Offarrels (22nd) still remaining because five companies and an half are not yet come up, this demand of reinforcement was chiefly occasioned from a report that nine hundred of the enemy had set out in battoes for S. Bay which I imagine is not true as he has said nothing of it in a letter of the 12th which I received last night with letters from Coll Whiting (Nathan Whiting, Connecticut Provincials) which I have perused & as he can be of more use at Nk. (New York City - abbreviation) than any where else I conclude your Lord will approve of his continuing there.

I notified my arrival to Mr Webb & acquainted him that in consideration of the difficulty & expence of transporting provisions be I ordered five companies of the Highlanders to halt at Stillwater & the other five at Saratoga ready to march at his requisition if he should judge it necessary, & that in the meantime they are to furnish escorts, covering parties for the hay makers at the deserted Settlements opposite of these two posts, as also be assisting in erecting shades to cover the provisions at these two posts for the want of which a deal had suffered this season, I further told him that a Regiment was to encamp at the Halfmoon for the like services, also under orders to march at his requisition, & surely Forbes's and Blackney's with their Rangers will be such a reinforcement that I am persuaded the enemy will make no attempt on F. Edward especially as all agree that they have neither the Indians or Canadians at present at Carillon & if theirs any truth in their sending at party up S. Bay (South Bay) I should think it was intended agst some of our frontier settlements or against Saratoga or Stillwater where there were none but L^t Baillie with a few Invalids whom I shall recall.

All accounts from Prisoners and deserters have been transmitted to your Lo'ps (Lordship), the latest is Anderson, a Serjt of the Jersey's who was wounded & taken at cls. Parkers affair who with another of the same corps walked off from Tienderouge the 30th Inst & declared that all the Canadians and Indians were gone home, — that Montcalm set out for Montreal the 27th, whose principal interpreter was an Irishman a deserter from Shirley's where he knew at Oswego — he says the Regular troops were still at Tienderouge — and that about 150 of the Jersey men were made prisoner with him, whereof the greatest part were sent to Canada — that he & the other wounded men were daily dressed and attended too till after the affair of F W^m Henry when so many of their own sick & wounded came in, that the french Surgeons seldom visited them.

Lt. Collins of the artillery with about 20 men who were at F W^m Henry embark this day for N York they may relieve the like number there —

I have this minute the honour of your Lo'ps (Lordship) of the 12th the contents of which I shall observe — Capt Rogers only landed last night and as he has several things to provide for himself & his men he will not be able to proceed until to morrow — I am with all duty & respect.

*Nine companies of
the 44th and three
companies of the 48th
are arrived —*

*To
The Earl of Loudoun &cc &cc*

*My Lord
Your Most Obed^t
&
Faithful Servant
James Abercromby.*

Comment: This letter allows some idea of when the British regulars returning from Halifax were able to reach northern New York, mid-September. Instead of sending the returning regiments immediately to Fort Edward, Abercromby has several battalions of regulars positioned to support the needed logistics. Flooding Fort Edward with regulars would only cause the supply chain to collapse. Abercromby's strength was in logistics. The British intelligence concerning the dispositions of the French was accurate. The duties of scouting South Bay would have centered on Captain Israel Putnam of the Connecticut Provincial Ranger. Abercromby was not alarmed.

Abercromby's letter does relate several often-unappreciated realities. Securing the supply link from Albany to Fort Edward required a considerable body of men — here, Abercromby committed two battalions of British regulars. If shipping by boat, at least three portages were required to reach Fort Edward from Albany. Simply establishing stockades at various places along the Hudson was only a portion of the commitment needed. Each of these posts required stables, hay fields to provide the needed fodder for the draft animals, farmers to plant and harvest those fields, craftsmen to make repairs to equipment, and shade structures to curtail provisions from being spoiled under the open sun.

From Admiral Francis Holburne to Secretary William Pitt (CO_5_48_068, Page 787/394):

Sir,

Newark at Sea. 29th Septemr. 1757

I had the honour to acquaint you in my Letter of the 17th, a Duplicate whereof I enclose that I was then cruizing off Louisbourg in hopes of falling in with the Enemy's Fleet near that Port, or in the Passage to Europe, whither intended to follow them close should they Escape me here.

I have now the inexpressible Mortification to acquaint you that on the 24th being Ten Leagues South off Louisbourg, towards the Evening of that Day it began to blow very hard at East, and had the wind continued in that Quarter, we could have done very well, as there was Room enough for the Ships to drive, but veering round to the Southward it blew a Perfect Hurricane, and drove us right onshore, the Wind continued Violent till near eleven the next day, when providentially & happily for us it came round to the Westward of the South, we had just room to wear the Shio clear of Breakers, and saw several Ships at Anchor with most of their Masts gone, without having it in our power to give them the least Assistance in this great Distress, and had the Wind continued to blow onshore but one hour longer every Ship of the Squadron must unavoidably have been lost.

I stood off seven Leagues & brought to, in order to pick up and assist as many Ships as I could, the 26th in the morning we saw sixteen Sail, six of them dismasted, and two of these being a great way to Leeward I sent the Bedford & Defiance to take them in Tow and bring them to Halifax if the Wind & Weather would permitt, but if they should by the Wind's continuing westerly have no Prospect of getting to Halifax they were to proceed with them to Aga Fort in Newfoundland and thence to England.

I am now so far to the Southward as the Isle of Sable, endeavoring to get to Halifax, and have dispatch'd the Lightning to go off Louisbourg with Orders for any of our Cruizers she may find there, and two Transports I had ordered with Water, to leave the Station and return to Halifax, after which Capt. Martin is to look into Louisbourg to observe the Condition of the Enemy, who I have reason to believe have not escaped the Rage of the Hurricane, as for some part of the Time, it blew right into the Harbour.

I cannot enough regret this great & melancholy Disaster to His Majesty's Ships, as after my last Reinforcement I found myself in so good a Condition to watch the Enemy's Motions, and had flatter'd myself they could not well escape me here, or in their Passage to Europe. I inclose a State of the Ships now with me and the best Account I can collect of such as I have not seen since the Storm.

By the time, I have the Squadron fitted for their Passage Home, the Season will be so far advanced that there can be no danger of the Enemy's making any Attempt on Halifax, it is only the Security of that Place that makes me prefer returning to it rather than to take Advantage of the Wind and go directly to Newfoundland. I shall lose no time in fitting the Ships for their Passage Home, and in proceeding with them to England as soon as that can possibly be done. I have the Honour to be the greatest respect.

Sir, Your most obedt. And most Humble Servt.,

Fra : Holburne

Newark at Sea, 29th Sept, 1757

(Received) Nov. 6th by Capt. Hartwell in the Cruizer Sloop

State of the Squadron under the Command of Vice Admiral Holburne 28th September 1757 (gun numbers for the ships of the line per CO_5_48_068, Page 791/396:

Windsor (60)	}	<i>In Company with all their masts Standing</i>
Kingston (60)		
Northumberland (70)		
Newark (80)		
Orford (68)		
Terrible (74)		
Somerset (68)		
Bedford (64)	}	<i>All their masts, sent to Eastward to take two Ships in Tow</i>
Defiance (60)		
Invincible (74)	}	<i>Fore masts and Bowsprits standing, and have raised jury masts to carry them into Port; Are in Tow</i>
Captain (64)		
Sunderland (60)		
Nottingham (60)		<i>Spoke to by the Orford yesterday, wants no Assistance: has a Fore mast, Bowsprit & jury masts</i>
Grafton (68)	}	<i>Have been seen with no masts nor Bowsprits standing</i>
Nafsau (64)		
Devonshire (70)	}	<i>Have been seen with Fore Mast and Bowsprits only standing</i>
Eagle (60)		
Prince Frederick (64)	}	<i>We have no certain accounts of, but some of these must be the Ships the Bedford and Defiance went after</i>
Centurion (52)		
Tilbury (60)		

The Nightingale has lost her mizen mast and main topmast.

It is generally thought that the Tilbury is lost, and every Soul perished; and we are in some pain about the Ferret, as she must have been in the Storm; we had lost Company for two days, and she is a very indifferent Sloop, sails badly, and very crank. The Cruizer (8) who I had sent to Halifax to hasten the (fresh)water out to us was very near floundering, having been under water several times, with the loss of his boats, guns & mizen mast and every one thing above Deck, and three men; he just made shift (cargo) to keep above the water; some of the ships have lost a few men and guns & anchors; Bread and Powder greatly damaged having so much water in the Holds — Booms and Boats many gone (≈ longboats).

Fra : Holburne

Note: With Holburne's squadron was the frigate *Nightingale* (24), and sloops *Gibraltar's Prize* (14), *Ferret* (14), *Cruizer* (8), and *Lightning* (8). Nine other ships, including the *Sutherland* (50), were escorting convoys, moving the army battalions to their winter quarters. Seven of these escorting ships would again return to Halifax — some to winter at Halifax, others to escort transports back to England in October.

From Knox 1769, Volume I, Page 72. Diary entry for October 24, 1757, Annapolis Royal on the Bay of Fundy, Nova Scotia:

The Newark, drove into Halifax, threw eight guns overboard.

The Invincible loft all her masts.

The Sunderland loft her main and mizen masts.

The Captain and Eagle loft all their masts.

The Centurion and Frederick the same.

The Tilbury — loft..... About 175 souls out of 400 were all that could be saved; they were drove ashore on the island and the French took them up, and sent them soon after, under a flag of truce to Halifax.

The Nottingham lost her mizen masts.

The Devonshire was since seen at sea without her masts.

The Nassau and Grafton the same.

The Windsor threw fifteen guns over-board.

The Ferret sloop is missing; it is feared she is lost.

The Cruiser sloop lost her moving mizen mast and all her guns.

Note: For the *Tilbury*, Holburne has 280 men being saved, not the 175 men seen here (Holburne to Pitt, October 20, 1757; CO_5_48_073 and Kimball 1906, Page 120).

The 1914 edition of Knox identifies the “island” as Saint Espirt Island, this places the location thirty miles to the southwest of Louisbourg, about one mile off the mainland coast of Nova Scotia. At the same time, the compass direction given in the 1914 edition is to the southeast of Louisbourg. There are no islands in that direction and at that distance; the compass direction is thought wrong. French accounts have the distance to the island at only 12 miles from Louisbourg, suggesting Guyon Island (see Landry 2008, Page 376).

From Francis Holburne, an attachment to the letter of September 17, 1757, likely written to Pitt (CO_5_48_069, Page 781/391). The September 17th letter is in Kimball (1906, Page 106-110); gun numbers are supplied by this author to allow comparison only, particularly fluid among the sloops and bomb ships:

Other Ships and Vessels under the Command of Vice Admiral Holburne that are not with him this 10th Sept. 1757 and on what Service they are Employed.

Arc en Ciel (50) Unserviceable at present in Halifax Harbor

Sutherland (50) } Gone convoy to Lord Loudoun and the Troops to New York, is to return to Halifax

Kennington (20) } Gone convoy to Lord Loudoun and the Troops to New York, is to return to Halifax
Hawke (8)

Winchelsea (24) } Gone convoy to Lord Loudoun and the Troops to New Yor, goes to her Station in
South Carolina

Jamaica (14) } Gone convoy as above and goes to the Bahama Islands her Station

Success (24) } Gone to Bay of Fundy with Governor Lawrence
Vulture (14)

Enterprize (42) } Gone to Annapolis and to remain there until the first week in October & then
Portmahon (24) } return to Halifax

Granada (12) } Bombs } At Halifax waiting to return to Europe (Likely Granado)
Furnace (14)

When we get all the Transports together to be Convoy'd by the Enterprize, Portmahon, Vulture and two Bombs their heaviest Mortars to be put into the two Frigates and hope they will sail in early October.

Note: The frigate *Port Mahon* can be spelled as one or two words. Holburne's writings will favor one word, but then can slip into two words even in the same document. This atypical spelling might simply be a secretary's or clerk's preference, but it is adopted by Boscawen (2011).

Comment: Starting in mid-September, the British fleet cruises off Louisbourg in hopes of catching French warships sailing back to Europe. No troop transports were with this fleet. There were some twenty ships of the line plus six frigates and sloops. On September 10th, the ships of the line were in three divisions — Holburne (6), Hardy (6), and Commodore Holmes (6). With the joining of the *Devonshire* (70) and *Prince Frederick* (64) on September 15th, the *Centurion* (52) was removed from the battle line.

On September 24th, this British fleet suffered heavy damage in a hurricane and the fleet was scattered and forced to seek port. The *Tilbury* (60) and *Ferret* (14) were lost, but some 280 of the *Tilbury*'s 400-man crew were subsequently rescued by the French (Landry 2008, Page 378). Only nine ships of the line retain all their masts — *Windsor* (60), *Kingston* (60), *Northumberland* (68), *Newark* (80), *Oxford* (68), *Terrible* (74), *Somerset* (68), *Bedford* (64), and *Defiance* (60) (Little 1958, Page 27). Accepting the prevailing winds, Hardy transferred to the *Windsor* and then escorted the more heavily damaged *Invincible* (74), *Captain* (64), *Sunderland* (60), and any other stragglers that could be found to England (Holburne to Pitt, September 30, 1757; Kimball 1906, Page 115). These last three ships only had foremasts and bowsprits standing. In a second storm, the *Captain* and *Invincible* were separated from the other two ships (October 18th). The *Invincible* suffered additional damage to her hull but managed to rejoin Hardy on November 1st. With jury-rigged sails, Hardy reached England November 5th, three ships (Hardy to Pitt, November 5, 1757; CO_5_48_071). The *Prince Frederick* (64) and the *Eagle* (60), also retained only their foremasts and bowsprits. Having received substantial aid and stores from the *Defiance*, the *Eagle* sails directly back to England with the *Defiance* returning to Halifax. The heavily damaged *Prince Frederick*, escorted by the far-less damaged *Bedford* (64) reached harbor in Newfoundland and then seemingly traveled back together to England. The *Nassau* (64) and *Grafton* (68) lost all masts and were forced to jury-rig all sails with the *Grafton* dragging a jury-rigged rudder behind, but neither returned to Halifax. Before returning to England, Holburne speculates that other ships may have made for the harbor at St. John's, Newfoundland. The weighed gamble was to reach England before the worst of the winter weather using jury-rigged sails.

On October 4th, the remainder of Holburne's fleet reaches Halifax with the *Defiance* (60) reaching Halifax on the 7th (Holburne to Pitt, October 13, 1757, CO 5_48_068, Page 799/400). **Temporary** repairs were quickly done; but with Halifax being established less than ten years earlier, the re-rigging was primitive, and the available sail fabric, rope, and chain was far short of desire. Throughout the fleet, many of the wooden tillers had been broken. On the *Windsor*, Hardy snaps two tillers within a 30-minute span and recommends refitting with iron tillers (Hardy to John Cleveland, Secretary to the Admiralty, November 5, 1757, Little 1958, Page 20). Rudders needed to be re-hung on at least three ships including the *Orford*. Longboats were lost. Gunpowder stores and provisions were often found to be soaked with seawater.

Mid-October, the *Nottingham* (60) leads a second convoy of ships returning to England. The heavily damaged *Centurion* (52) arrived at Halifax with Holburne on the 4th but sailed home with *Nottingham*'s convoy. With sloops and small frigates, Holburne continues to watch Louisbourg. On October 13th, nine ships of the line remain in Halifax, but at least eight had been made seaworthy. On November 6th, the *Success* (24) leads a third convoy returning to England, nearly all transports. By November 8th, the *Eagle* (60), *Devonshire* (70), *Nassau* (64) and *Grafton* (68) had reached England, the *Centurion* by November 13th (*The Universal Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure*, Volume 21, November 1757, Page 243, online). Aboard the *Newark* (80) and accompanied by the *Lightning* (8), Holburne sails from Halifax on November 14th arriving in England on December 7th.

Lord Colville remains in Halifax. In hopes of establishing a blockade on Louisbourg in early 1758 and complying with Pitt's very specific orders, the *Northumberland* (68), *Terrible* (74), *Kingston* (60), *Orford* (68), *Arc-en-Ciel* (50), *Sutherland* (50), *Defiance* (60), and *Somerset* (68) overwinter at Halifax (Holburne to Pitt, November 4, 1757, Kimball 1906, Page 125). The *Portmahon* (24), *Hawke* (10) and the provincial schooner, *Monckton*, were the only "small" ships remaining in Halifax. As they could be

sailed from the deck with minimal climbing thus having fewer problems with the dense ice and hard freezes that would foul the rigging and gear of larger ships, the *Monckton* and *Hawke* were key in keeping an early watch on Louisbourg (1758). The eight ships of the line left in Halifax were selected to stay as they required the least repair and were fully masted; the warships returning to England still required substantial repairs, but two-thirds of the ships of the line staged to Louisbourg in 1757 would return to Louisbourg in 1758, \approx fourteen out of twenty-two (50 guns and above). Here, the *Arc-en-Ciel* (50) needs some clarification. Throughout Summer and Fall 1757, the *Arc-en-Ciel* was undergoing refitting and re-masting at Halifax and did not sail with Holburne's squadron. The work continued through the winter. In 1758, the masts of the *Arc-en-Ciel* were removed and used instead to re-mast the *Prince Frederick* which had been dismasted on the voyage returning to Halifax in Spring 1758 (Boscawen 2011, Page 121). The *Arc-en-Ciel* was then used to transport captured French officers to England, October 1758 (Boscawen 2011, Page 302).

Recognizing the keen need, starting in 1758 under Lord Colville, the Admiralty would radically upgrade the port and dockyard facilities at Halifax, transforming Halifax into a first-rate naval depot (see Graham 1948, Page 98). However, wintering in Halifax offered little to the crews and promoted the widespread abuse of alcohol (rum), proving to be a distinct and persistent problem throughout 1758. The change from low alcoholic beer to stronger rums, coupled to months confined to an isolated port, was nearly impossible to manage without some consequence. Bored stiff sailors and the merchant sutlers were a bad mix, especially when there was time to develop relationships and quiet understandings between the two, quiet "smuggling". Drunken crews would be described simply as "sickly". On June 14, 1758, Admiral Boscawen would write Amherst that from the 2,000 seaman on the *Terrible*, *Northumberland*, *Kingston*, and *Defiance*, only three hundred were fit for duty — "the only distemper" being rum, all these ships had overwintered in Halifax (Boscawen 2011, Page 210). On June 18th, Hardy was forced to tell Amherst that planned operations to seal off Port Dauphin, 40 miles northwest of Louisbourg, would need to be delayed, "sickly" (Andrews 2015, Page 29).

Compared to the massive losses suffered by the French because of disease at Louisbourg and later in the ports of France itself, the damage to the British Navy was actually minor. By March 1758, nearly 6,000 sailors sent to Louisbourg the previous year had died, just under half the complement (Dull 2005, Page 80). By mid-1758: "*A typhus epidemic brought to Brest by de la Motte's ships in late 1757 was finally diminishing, but the French lost at least 8,500 sailors during 1757 to add to their losses in 1755 and 1756; by 1758 there were only enough seamen to man 25 ships of the line*" (Robson 2016, Page 97). In no way, should Louisbourg 1757 be considered a French victory. It was a disaster, the death knell of the French Navy. There is better justification in calling Louisburg 1757 a major British victory, courtesy of disease, but this would only be exposed by the passage of considerable time.

Note: The numbers associated with the losses and damage suffered by Holburne's fleet varies between histories. One ship of the line and one sloop were sunk. Ten ships of the line were partially or fully dismasted, the *Centurion* (52) is included here. In many tallies, the *Nottingham* (60) is apparently overlooked, reducing the number of ships of the line that were present or dismasted. The *Devonshire* (70) and *Prince Frederick* (64) do not join Holburne until September 15th and can go equally unnoticed. The frigate, *Nightingale* (24), and the sloop, *Cruizer* (8), were partially dismasted. It would be accurate to say, two ships were sunk and at least twelve ships partially or fully dismasted, all sizes.

Holburne's fleet was divided into three divisions — Holburne, Hardy, and Holmes. On station, the divisions were likely separated by some distance to spy any possible sailings of the French from Louisbourg. All three divisions suffered damage and dismasting, but Holburne's notably less than Hardy's or Holmes' divisions. Of the six ships of the line in Holburne's division, five remain fully masted. The *Tilbury* (60), *Nassau* (64), and *Captain* (64) were with Hardy; the *Grafton* (68), *Nottingham* (60), and *Eagle* (60) were with Holmes. At the same time, all three divisions had at least two ships of the line retain all their masts.

Contrary to current usage, at the time of the Seven Years' War, "sloop" simply denoted an unrated vessel with fewer than twenty carriage guns, mast count was not a consideration. Further identifiers could be applied but these are nearly always absent, e.g. a schooner. Depending on use and intent, the word "ship" in naval histories might be restricted to only ships of the line, ignoring any frigates and sloops, but it is nowhere near a hard and fast rule. At other times, ships of the line, ships (50-gun to 20-gun), and sloops might be the descriptors. The reader is then required to muddle this out.

In Holburne's correspondence, 50-gun ships are sometimes grouped with ships of the line, sometimes not. In complying with Pitts orders to winter eight ships of the line at Halifax (1757-1758), two 50-gun ships are listed among the eight ships of the line being left at Halifax (Holburne to Pitt, November 4, 1757; Kimball 1906, Page 125). This not uncommon inconsistency around the classification of 50-gun ships, either as frigates or ships of the line, is especially prevalent in correspondence originating outside of European waters, a real annoyance to readers of naval histories centered on the Seven Years' War (see Boscawen 2011, Page 15). Boscawen (2011, Page 345) includes the two British-built 50-gun ships among the ships of the line at Louisbourg 1758 (*Centurion* and *Sutherland*). However, the French-built capture, *Arc-en-Ciel* (50), is now grouped with the frigates. These last three ships are all Fourth Rate, as were all the 60-gun ships. To extract themselves from this quagmire, some authors will mercifully use four categories in their narratives — ships of the line, 50-gun ships, frigates, and then sloops (see Robson 2016, Pages 96 and 114). Captains, ship ratings, crew size, guns, and divisions for most of Holburne's ships of the line are listed in CO_5_48_068, Page 779/390, the late arriving *Devonshire* (70) and *Prince Frederick* (64) are not detailed.

Note: Holburne is very careful to ensure that the naval dispatches reaching the Secretary of State are indeed his dispatches and not edited copies. The last few sentences or words of each letter and the signature are written in Holburne's choppy hand. Holderness's or Pitt's name is on the bottom of the signature page in the same handwriting as the main body of the letter, a clerk's or secretary's hand. All these naval dispatches would also have been sent to John Cleveland, Secretary to the

Admiralty. Minor variations between the Pitt and Cleveland letters can be expected. The letters to Pitt will offer somewhat less information on the specifics of naval upkeep, but nothing meaningful is being hidden from Pitt. Attachments cover ancillary issues. At the same time, Pitt was not forwarded a copy of every naval correspondence, particularly those relating to stores and upkeep. Palliser's letter of September 25th (*Eagle*) and John Amherst's letter of \approx September 30th (*Captain*) were only sent to Holburne and then copied to the Admiralty, but Pitt was made aware that both ships had been heavily damaged in his letter of the 29th. Anything related to ship movements and intelligence gathering was forwarded to Pitt. Palliser's letter of the 30th was sent to Pitt.

Unfortunately, Holburne's name is very fluid in print – Holbourn is decidedly common. Captain Hugh Pallifser's name offers a similar problem (*Eagle*). The "esh" has been dropped entirely, but it is not replaced by an additional "s" as is customary; histories now use Palliser, a single "s". These types of circumstances make digital scans of libraries and databases decidedly awkward.

Note: For any extended expedition or station, supplying freshwater to ships was a constant logistical headache. In European waters, a low-alcoholic or small beer was used to supply the needed "water" to seaman; it stored longer than water before turning sickly, 1 gallon per day was the standard beer ration (see Robson 2016, Page 113 with reference to Admiral Hawke, July 1759). To limit the consequences of spoilage, naval regulations required that the beer barrels not be reused and had to be made new. But even using small beer, the resupply interval was only about four weeks. In tropical waters and the Americas, stronger spirits were issued, primarily rum at a half-pint per day. The rum could be diluted with water at 3:1 or 4:1 ratios to form a grog. Either the small beer or rum ration was mandatory, but if rum, large quantities of additional freshwater were still needed. To reduce the occurrence of "bad water", skilled coopers were needed to assemble, disassemble when empty, and then reassemble the water casks just prior to refilling. This provided the cooper the opportunity to "clean" and replace "bad" staves and other wood elements that might be problematic. Holburne was dealing with an apparent delay in resupplying his squadron with freshwater when the hurricane hit.

Note: There are at least two different prints of the *Grafton* (68 guns, crew \approx 535) returning to England with jury-rigged sails and a jury-rigged rudder that was dragged behind the ship. However, the description of the “machine” is nearly always absent, the more common print lacks the “lettering key” altogether. This rudder was contrived at sea or possibly at St. John’s, Newfoundland. The “machine” was more than sizable. Here the very frequent “f” has been removed and a “s” substituted in the transcription. From Hervey 1779, Pages 85-86, the second but the more common drawing; and *The Universal Magazine of Knowledge and Pleasure*, Volume 22, March 1758, Pages 155-156 (print source, print on the following page):

a, a david (davit, crane-like), rigged out of the center of the stern from the ward-room; the inner being lashed, cleeted, and stanchioned down to the deck; and the outer end secured by three strong topping lifts from the poop; one perpendicularly, one from each quarter — Over a groove, the outer end which passes

bbb, a cable, where it is well lashed, thence passing, at about eight feet distance, to

cc, two fishes, fifty feet long, which, being nailed together, are woolded (woalded - welded) upon them to the extreme end; beyond which are about twelve fathoms of stray cable, to take the greater hold in the water. — About four feet an half from the outer end, is fixed

d, a square, of eighty (eight seems more correct) feet by seven, made of inch plank doubled, one side perpendicular, the other horizontal, being nailed athwart each other; to the bottom of this, at

e, are lashed three pigs of iron ballast, which serve to depress the machine, and keep it in the proper position. — The two eye-bolts with thimbles, one in the square, the other in the fishes, is fixed a pendant on each side, to the bite of which is bent

f, a hawser (heavy rope); which, which being reeved through a block, at the end of an out-rigger, from the fourth port on the quarter deck, leads thence through another block, lashed to the timber-heads in the gang-way, and to on the quarter deck, where the ship is steered by a single tackle on each side; the falls of both being one rope, it is middled and brought to a crab fixed through the gratings on the head of the capstane (capstan).

g, a head guy on each side, to confine it to its proper center, and prevent its having too much play;

hh, two preventer hawsers (heavy rope – minor printing error corrected here)

N.B. The david (davit) is to prevent the machine from striking against the counters.

The *Grafton* may have retained its foremast. See figure below.



Figure 22. *Engraved for the Universal Magazine for J. Hinton at the Kings Arms in Newgate Street London. 1758*
 The *Grafton* (68), drawn by an officer on board. Besides the trailing “rudder”, the damage to the masts and rigging is pronounced. Sails and lines are jury-rigged. A mast on a ship of the line was constructed in three segments that were lashed and bound together, not a single straight timber. With the front sail grouping, the lower foremast appears present (bottom piece), but the fore topmast (middle piece) and fore topgallant mast (top piece) are missing. The main and mizzen masts appear to be fully jury-rigged. To prevent floundering, the topmasts and topgallant masts could be “cut away”. This was done on the *Eagle* (60), on the *Captain* (64), and probably on many other of Holburne’s ships. Throughout Holburne’s fleet, ship holds and magazines took on considerable water, far beyond what could be pumped — the hold of the *Eagle* was flooded 10-feet deep in water, 9-feet deep on the *Captain*. Stores and cargoes shifted, generating corresponding lists. In some cases, cannon were thrown overboard to correct the listing. To prevent capsizing, the *Windsor* (60) threw 15 guns overboard, suggesting one side of the upper deck was cleared of all guns. Large quantities of provisions, stores, and gunpowder were lost throughout the fleet. Outside of the *Tilbury* (60) and *Ferret* (14), the loss of life was deemed minimal (See Landry 2008, Pages 375-379).

From Captain Hugh Palliser of the *Eagle* (60) to Admiral Francis Holburne (Little 1958, Pages 30-31), an “original” was not found. Italics = Little, including the frequent —(?).

AN ACCOUNT of the Eagle's Situation, and of the Damages She received on the late Gale of Wind Sunday 25th of September 1757

at 2AM: Laying under the Reef'd (reduced) Foresail and Reef'd and balanced Mizen, the wind blowing very hard at ESE the ship made a great deal of Water, at 5 finding the Water was gaining on us, endeavoured to bear up, but She became waterlogg'd and laid on her Beam ends, which obliged us to cut away the Main mast and Mizon mast and to throw overboard Ten of the Lee upper Deck Guns and Five 6 Pounders, by which She righted a little, and this I believe saved her from sinking having then Ten feet Water in her; kept Pumping and Baling and kept her away a little, but durst not put before it knowing we were very near a Lee Shore, at having reduced the Water to about 7 feet, One of the Pump-Chains broke, and the Tiller broke in the Rudder head, got the Iron Tiller Shipped, at about 11 the Wind shifted WSW, and half an hour after it cleared up a little, saw the Breakers under our Lee distant about 2 miles, fortunately the Foremast being standing, we got her wore, and her head off shore, with a Shedding Sail hoisted to the Foremast head, we kept her SSE all Night, the Wind being then at West. Continued pumping and baling and by Monday at 8PM got her free, but she continued to have a great List to Starboard occasioned by things in the Hold and between Decks, being wash'd over to that side, found the Foremast very much sprung in Two places, the Magazine having been quite full of Water, found all the Parrapets, Lockers, etc. brokedown, and every cask was Stove and all the Powder wash'd away, so that we had none left but a few Cartridges in the after Magazine; found all the dry Provisions stowed the Starboard side wet and spoiled, also a good deal of Bread; several of the Orlop Beams (lowest deck) and Carlins worked down (carlines = timber deck planking supports), the Ship strained very much Fore and Aft, a Leak co—(?) foreward but the Fair Weather is not very consid—?

By the Main Mast going away — in (?) with the upper Deck all the Larboard booms were carried away (port side), with the Barge & Cutter and One Man. When we saw 7 or 8 of the Squadron dismasted, four of which appeared to have let gone their Anchors. Two of them—(?) to us to be within the Breakers, and the other Two a little without them. One of the Ships dismasted with her—(?) off shore I knew to be the Invincible her Foremost & bowsprit standing, another without us her head in—(?) with her Main Mast and Bowsprit standing I judge to be either the Nottingham or the Tilbury, She was endeavoring to ware (turn) but had not when we lost sight of her it coming thick again.

HUGH PALLISER

NB. On Monday Morning we saw a Ship to the East from us appear'd to have only Mast standing; I judge She is now far to the Eastward of us.

Comment: This is likely an Admiralty only letter, not forwarded to Pitt. Captain John Amherst of the *Captain* writes Holburne a similar letter, both in content and tone, Admiralty only, transcribed from Little 1958, see below.

From Captain Hugh Palliser of the *Eagle* (60) to Admiral Francis Holburne; (CO_5_048_069, September 30, 1757):

Sir,

*Eagle at Sea, 30th of September 1757
6 O'Clock P.M.*

Inclosed I send you an account of the condition of His Majesty's Ship Eagle under my command during the late gale of Wind and of the damage she received, also of her present state of condition.

Captain Baird of the Defiance came to our Assistance on the 26th at Night, he informed me of your being to the Windward standing to the Southward with part of the Fleet; the next morning he took us in Tow and We have ever since kept the Wind to the Southward with all the Sail we could make in hopes of meeting with you, but seeing nothing of you nor any other Ships and being now East 86 Leagues from Halifax and 55 from Newfoundland I have been at a loss how to proceed, I have considered the condition of the Ship which is unfit for any service, therefore presuming her joining you in this shattered condition can be of no consequence to the service and in this condition I think her by no means fit to Venture upon a dangerous and strange coast to look for a Port where if I should arrive safe and by Chance find you, no such repairs and supplies can be had as a ship wants. I conclude endeavoring to get to either place will be attended with more danger than proceeding directly for England as the bad Season is set in. The Defiance being in good condition and fit for Service, I apprehend it may be of great consequence for her to rejoin you and that as soon as possible, therefore hope you will approve of my detaining her no longer and directing Captain Baird to endeavour to rejoin you wherever he can get intelligence of your being gone and for the above reasons and the condition of this ship considered. I hope will likewise approve of my proceeding directly for England.

I have been supply'd from the Defiance with every thing necessary for compleating jury masts, so that in that respect I shall soon be in pretty good Order.

I rejoice much to hear of your having escaped the danger, upon which give me leave to congratulate you most sincerely.

Be pleased to accept my best wishes for your safe return to England with all your squadron.

*I am Sir,
Your most Obedient & humble servant,
Hugh Palliser*

Comment: This is the second of two letters written by Palliser to Holburne in late September 1757 (see previous page). This second letter describes the much-needed assistance offered by the *Defiance* (60), joining with the *Eagle* on the night of September 26th. On the 30th, The *Eagle* and *Defiance* were near two hundred miles from Holburne. Once the jury-rigging proved successful, the *Defiance* sailed for Halifax, carrying both letters. Holburne attaches Palliser's letter of the 30th to his own letter to Pitt, dated October 13th (CO_5_48_068, Page 799/400). By November 8th, the *Eagle* had reached England.

These two Palliser letters can lead to some confusion. At some point, the middle third of the letter of the 30th was added to the letter of the 25th. This union generates a fully plausible account, but the date of the 25th for the combined letter does not fit well with the added section from the 30th. This combined letter can "safely" appear in histories, there is no change whatsoever to the intent of the narrative. It is not presented here or in Little (1958). This transcription of the 30th letter fully matches Little (1958, Page 32) — the copies sent to Pitt and Cleveland at the Admiralty are "identical".

From Captain John Amherst, aboard the *Captain*, to Admiral Francis Holburne, Little (1958), Pages 25-26. The date of this letter has been changed from the 20th to the 30th. This is an Admiralty only letter:

*Copy of a Letter to Vice Adm'l Holburne
Dated on board the Captain 30th Sept. 1757*

Sir:

As I can't get out a Boat & having hurt my left Shoulder by a Fall I take this Means of letting you know our Condition. Saturday afternoon, I reef'd (reduced) the Courses and provided against a Gale of Wind. Lay'd too under a reef'd Mainsail until half past 2 AM: when a Ship bore right down on me and obliged me to haul up the Mainsails. The Fore Staysail blew away; but the Ship wore (turned) and I got clear of her, a little after three the Mainsail split and I could not get any hands to cut it away, the Ship labour'd very much, but had not much water in until after four, between four and five she gained (so) fast on us that I endeavour'd to ware. The tiller broke in the Ruther (Rudder) head, and a little after five the ship was waterlogged, four Streaks of her quarter deck in the water and little Motion, I ordered the Lee Guns to be thrown overboard, but they could not become at; on which I cut away the Main Mast and Mizen Mast, the Ship righted and had then in her well 9 Feet 8 1/2 of Water, and 9 Feet in the Magazine, the Chain Pumps broke often and the hand Pumps choaked, but with pumping and bailing we gained on her. The Foretopmast blew away. Carried away the Starboard Side of the Top and killed a Man. the Fore Yard broke in three Pieces, very happily for us we had an Iron Tiller on board which was shipped when the Weather cleared up, and we saw the Breakers very near us. I could make no Sail but Ship wore round. I got the Foretop gallant Sail to the Foremast sett (?) the Boats Sails and a Staysail to the Stump of the Mizen Mast, then Steer'd and went off from the Sand faster than I could expect. All my Powder is washed away, and the Casks broke to pieces, as it the Wooden Cases; and have not above two hundreds Cartridges left in the Ship and have only two hundred of Match which My Lord Colville sent us, the Water in the After Hold has been over the Day Provisions and I am afraid I shall find most of it damaged; we find the Foremast Teer the Water has been up as high as three Bags in the Bread Room, of which I will give you a particular Account when I have the Time to look into it. The Surgeons Necessarys are all washed away but the People at present I thank God are pretty healthy. The head of our Foremast complains that I think it not safe to get up the proper Topmast, but with a little Assistance hope in two or three Days to be able to keep Company, the Hold is shifted but am getting her upright, I am

*Sir
Your most obedient
Humble Servant
John Amherst*

Comment: John Amherst is the brother of Jeffrey Amherst who would command the British armies in the defeat of Canada, including the Siege of Louisbourg 1758.

From Admiral Charles Hardy to Lord Loudoun, September 28, 1757 (LO 4541). This letter is extremely faint and decidedly difficult to read; it is in Hardy's hand. Increased errors in the transcription are guaranteed. Hardy's spelling is often problematic, the "esh" /f/ is frequent. As this letter is a rambling read, commas laced everywhere with few defined sentences, it was reluctantly decided to "correct" most spellings.

Invincible to the Southward of the Island of Sable, Sept^r, 28th 1757

My Dear Lord,

I cannot leave the Coast of America, without Informing you of our Motions, since we parted and the fatale End that has attended his Majesty's Fleet in Watching the motions of the Enemy, Upon our return from looking into the Port of Louisbourg, where we found the French Squadrons were all Harbour'd, we held ourselves in Constant Readiness to proceed to Sea on the Shortest Notice of the Enemy being in Motion, for the obtaining of this knowledge the Admiral Employ'd several small Vessels off the Port, & to return to him with what they saw there, In this time, Arrived from England One Ship of 64 (Somerset), & one 60 Guns (Eagle) to Reinforce the Fleet, with Accounts from the Secretary of State, that one Ship of 74 (Devonshire), and one of 64 (Prince Frederick) were to follow them in a few days, the sending of this reinforcement arose, (as appears from the public Orders) from a Conviction that the French Naval Force in the Port at Louisbourg was Equal to what we before knew, & Superior to that of his Majesty in these Seas; Upon the Arrival of the two first Ships, we Sail'd again as soon as they Could possibly be Watered, & put in a Condition to proceed with us, & very fortunately on the day we Sail'd, we discovered that two others mention'd in Mr. Pitt's Letters that were to follow them, the Admiral sent them Orders to follow him, & to Rendezvous on our Cruising Station, but they Joined us before they reach'd Louisbourg, & off which Port we appeared, And there saw the whole of the French Force, from that time to the 24th Instant, we Cruised upon them, Ships in good Order, & people in Good Spirits, & I think I may safely say with a Fleet, so well Mann'd with the Halifax Detachments, & the peoples Spirits raised with the Expectation of meeting the French Fleet in their Attempt to make passage Home, if they were not inclined to meet us to dispute the passage, or Command of these Shoals, that I make no doubt, barring all unforeseen Accidents of Battle, But we should have given a very good Account of them; But alas how soon are the Exalted humbled, for on this 24th of the Month Arouse such a Tempest or Indeed Hurricane, that is hardly to be Described, nor can I figure to you the Distress and Dangers to which the whole Fleet were reduced, the Gale got to the Height about Three in the Morning, began at ES & Eased to the SE directly upon the Shore, to enumerate the Various Incidents, all which added to our distress, as well dangers would be too tedious a Narrative, the Enclosed State of the Fleet will Suffice to show you, xxx what Condition we are reduced, were we together, the Agitations of the Invincible xxx, as well as after the Loss of her masts is not to be described, Only figure to yourself this Ship with her Masts gone, Tiller twice broke in the Ruther Head (Rudder), & xxx in, when we discovered the Land not three miles off, about Eleven a Clock, the Wind right on Shore, & the Ship by the Impaling Force of Wind and Seas, driving not less than two miles an hour right upon the Land, the Billow (Waves) Surging on the Shore, To an Immense Height, I say figure this to yourself, & you may form the truest picture of the Danger his Majesty's Fleet was then in, the Enclosed List shows you the Ships that have lost their Masts, at this time when there was not the least gleam of hopes of being preserved, Prudence whose kind hands is always stretch'd forth to hold up the Afflicted and distress'd, Commanded the Wind to the West and the Weather to Clear up,

as it were in an Instant, this gave us an Opportunity to try to get the Ships Heads off the Land which I Happily Effected with a Top Gallant Sail set upon my only mast left. the Fore Mast & with Wedging the Ruther a little

(difficult section: a Weather ?, this done. what a scene of Distress presented, it xxx to our View ?),

Five Ships at an Anchor Close to the Land, & masts gone, one of which is lost, & believed to be the Tilbury, two Ships to Windwards, & two to Larward of us, Masts gone, but happily their Heads off the Shore, Before this the Admiral and two or three Ships that had their masts Standing had Wore (turned), some almost in the reach of the Breakers, passed me, & the others, without having it in their power to give the least Assistance, Indeed such xxx of distress and danger, and such a providential Escape from almost certain Destruction is hardly to be Equal'd, Such is and I am sure in our Case has been, the Dispensations of the great Ruler of all things, in Heaven, and in the Earth beneath.

With this little Sail we dragg'd off the Land till 6 a Clock when it gave way to the Force of the Wind, in the night it Moderated, & with the half of another Sail we joined the Admiral, as did two other Ships in like Condition with our xxx, & have been ever Since been in Tow, The other Ships, as in the List, I suppose are gone to the Eastward, & I presume with such jury masts as they can get up, will make their way to Europe, the Admiral proposes sending me home with the Crippled, and they can be of no use, & if they Could reach Halifax there is not Sails or Rigging to put them in a better Condition than they are now in with their Jury Masts — I should have added one Circumstance attending most of the Ships, but more in some than in others, particularly the Captain. Captain Amherst who had in the height of the Gale, Ten feet Water in his hold, his Chain pumps often breaking, & hand pumps Choaked, this Ship as such most probably have floundered if they had not Worked hard in bailing her —

Thus has Ended the Expedition, and what must have been our Fate had we been in Gabarus Bay; I need not point out —

It has been great Concern to me not to have heard of you since we parted, but I trust I shall be favor'd with a Line from you in England, where it will make me happy to be informed, that preparations are making in behalf of the Colonies, & that some good Success

(after this point, the letter becomes even more difficult to decipher, but fortunately little factual information is lost)

may attend your Warfare next Campaign, xxx the Interest and Honour of our Country and for your Lordships Glory. If this Narrative of our state seem be any Satisfaction to (? Proper Name ?), I should have first said my good friends the Generals, you will please to Communicate to them. Allow me to tender you my best Services in England, & to assure you I shall at all times Thankfully Obey your Commands. I beg you will (not) be troubled with My best wishes and Compliments to my friends with you, and to assure you I am at all times

Your Lordships.

Earl of Loudoun

*Most faithful
Humble Servant
Charles Hardy*

Comment: The British Fleet was deployed in three divisions in an arc spying escape routes from Louisbourg. When the hurricane hit on the night of the 24th, the Fleet was not far off the coast of Nova Scotia. By the 29th and after raising jury-rigged sails and allowing the sails to take the wind, the bulk of the British Fleet was south of the Island of Sable (Holburne to Pitt, CO_5_48_068, Page 787/394). The Island of Sable is 140 miles due south of Louisbourg and 175 miles east of Halifax. It is isolated and oceanic. On the 30th, Hardy places the Fleet some 216 miles south by east of Louisbourg (*Louisburg then bearing NbW't 72 Leagues*; Hardy to the Admiralty, November 5, 1757, Little 1958, Page 20), broadly suggesting about 250 miles from Halifax. This moved the British ships away from any potential French sortie attempting to engage the now dysfunctional British Fleet. From this position, the most crippled ships sailed for England, some 2,550 miles away, but most ships with standing masts made for Halifax to winter per Pitt's orders. At least two ships reached Newfoundland, the *Bedford* (64) and the *Prince Frederick* (64). Holburne reached Halifax on October 4th. There was no French Fleet waiting off Halifax.

Among the ships dismasted that returned to England, the *Captain* (64), *Prince Frederick* (64), *Devonshire* (66), *Centurion* (50), and *Nottingham* (60) were refitted and joined Boscawen's 1758 Louisbourg Fleet. The less damaged *Bedford* (64) would also sail again for Louisbourg, together with ten ships of the line that had not been with Holburne (See Boscawen 2011, Page 345).

This letter is included here as it seems to be a private letter, not copied to the Colonial Office or the Admiralty; it may only reside at the Huntington Library. It is not in Little (1958). The dispatches, enclosures and lists referenced in this letter were Holburne's; this packet was carried to England by Hardy. In the packet, were letters written by Holburne to the Admiralty and to Pitt on September 30th, neither are transcribed here. The Pitt letter is found in CO_5_48_068, Pages 795/398, and Kimball 1906, Pages 115-116. The Admiralty letter contains more detail (Little 1958, Page 32).

The obscured proper name appears to be Gxxxx Burton; the name does not seem to reference Lt. Colonel Ralph Burton, 48th Foot. It is not Great Britain; Hardy consistently dots his i's.

This is the last communication from Hardy to Loudoun before Hardy reaches England. Hardy was off Spithead on November 5th (CO_5_48_071). Once in England, Hardy first attends admiralty and family needs. In early December, Hardy spends considerable time with Pitt discussing both the military and political situation in America. Having served as the Governor of New York, he had unique perspective that was valued by Pitt. Hardy's assessment of Loudoun was critically honest, but often not supportive of Loudoun, especially of Loudoun's approach to the colonial governments (Pargellis 1933, Pages 344-346 and Calcraft to Loudoun, LO 5140, December 29, 1757, transcribed below with the letters of December 30th). Hardy's views simply reinforced and bolstered Pitt's already established opinions on how the war against France should proceed and how it should be managed. Pitt seems to have welcomed his time with Hardy. He was the perfect neutral, but knowledgeable, sounding board for Pitt.

Note: In Pargellis (1933, Page 242) is the quote "*Thus, sir, ends our Famous Expedition to America in the year 1757*" with the notation LO 4541, Hardy to Loudoun, September 28, 1757, same source document as this transcription. It is not from the Holburne letter of November 10th, LO 4801. In the transcription here, the language is similar but also different — "*Thus has Ended the Expedition, and what must have been our Fate had we been in Gabarus Bay.*" Together, it suggests there is a second copy of this letter at the Huntington Library, but they have become separated.

From Captain William Cotterell to the Earl of Loudoun, October 8, 1757 (LO 4606):

My Lord

Since the last I had the honour to write You (of which I now send a Duplicate) I waited upon Lord Geo. Sackville at Chatham, from whom I met with a very handsome reception, he is of the Opinion that Your Lordship has acted a very proper part in every respect & was inquisitive about the Letter your wrote to the Secretary of State which he said was much blamed (August 5th letter). I told him the Contents of the Letter were no other than a Journal of your proceeding from your Earliest preparations for the Expedition, & that things might appear in their truest light; you had transmitted the Intelligence in the same words you received it, & left it to the Ministry to find out at whose door the blame ought to lie; He said in this point also your Lordship had acted with Your usual Prudence & Propriety; I must inform Your Lordship that the folks who chase to find fault rest their arguments upon these two Points. 1st that the Expedition had been delayed, so as to lose the season, by the Council of War & 2nd that it was odd Your Lordship shou'd not go to Louisbourg after it was voted to be the properest measure by the Council of War.

When I had the Honour to see the Duke of Devonshire he thought every part of your Lordship's Conduct very clear; except the two points above mentioned, I told His Grace that I was extremely happy in being able to Convince him that these difficulties had been invented in London & that they had no foundation but in the most wicked & ridiculous Malice. As to the first it was an absolute falsehood, & sufficiently evinced to be such by M^r Holburne's letter to the Admiralty, in which he declared it was not in his Power to sail sooner had their been no other obstacle but the Weather, & that the second tho' verbally true was as Efsentially false & if Pofsible more imprudent & unjust than the former, because it insinuated that the determination of the Council of War for Louisbourg had been the result of a Question whether an Attack upon Louisbourg wou'd be prudent in the present Circumstance, whereas it was an answer to a Question that arose from your Instructions whether that or Quebec was the more practicable attempt. I was very amply rewarded for my explanation as I found the Duke then clearly saw the matter in its proper light.

I have many thanks to return Your Lordship for your letter to his Grace, he was so kind as to tell me he wou'd take me by the Hand & push any point for me I desired.

The Duke of Cumberland is expected every day & if he does me the honour to admit me to an audience I will lose no time in acquainting your Lordship therewith. I almost forgot to tell Your Lordship that Lord Halifax thinks your Lordship's Conduct not only irreproachable but Highly Judicious.

*Dartmouth Street
Oct. 8, 1757*

*I am
My Dear Lord
with the Highest respect
Gratitude & Esteem
Your Lordship
Most obed^t & humble Ser^t
Wm. Cotterell*

From Admiral Francis Holburne to Lord Loudoun, October 11, 1757 (LO 4801). Writing from Halifax, the script is Holburne's own, not a clerk:

My Lord

By an Expreſs of the 21st of Sept^r from Mr Secretary Pitt I am directed to leave eight ſail of the Line to winter at Halifax, under the Comd. of Sr Chas Hardy; and to return myſelf with the remainder of the Squadron; that remainder happened to be the Newark onely, and with her I ſhall in a day or two leave this Port, the French Squadron having left me at liberty to do ſo by going about the fiſt from Louisbourgh, where no more then two of their Ships of the line and a Frigat remains — The Rear Admiral you know is gone (Hardy); Lord Colvill being the Senior officer, I have acquainted him to Comd the Kings Ships, and the better to enable him to execute the ſervices expected from a Genll officer I have thought it right to give him a Broad Pendant and a Captain; My Lord Colvill is inſtructed to correſpond with your Lordſhip in whatever may be thought conducive to the Publick Service, and I am perſuaded you will have reaſon to be ſatisfied with My Lords Conduct & abilities —

Captⁿ Campbell who carries this did not return before the 28th paſt, & has been fitted with all expedition, that no time might be loſt in ſending him back to his Station, But his orders leaves him at liberty to go to the South and if it ſhould be thought neceſſary; Gov^r Laurence with the Transports made a long Stay in the Bay of Fundi having onely returned the 2nd, and the Ships from Anapolis, but two days before, they having ſtaid at that place a fortnight longer then they were ordered at the requeſt of the Comd^s Officer there, and as could ſee no reaſon to detain the Transports, & Major Genll Hopſon being likewise of that opinion I diſpatched them Home the 7th under Convoy of the Suceſs. I have no other Matters of a Publick nature to communicate; & thoſe had not occur'd I ſhould not have left America without offering my beſt wiſhes for your Healthy Suceſs; Suceſs my Lord is in the Hand of Providence, as the beſt concerned Plans, the wiſett diſpoſitions are often fruſtrated by the moſt unlook'd for, and trivial accident; But tho Fortune ſhould not attend your Banners, I am ſure your Lordſhips Zeal for the Honor of his Maj^{ty}s arms, and your aſſiduous (aſſiduouſ) attention to the welfare of the Publick will never ceaſe to deſerve it; when the diſappointments of this ſhall be loſt in far happier events of future Campaigns, I hope to ſee your Lordſhip returning with the approbation & applauſe of all Honoſt Men; Believe me My Lord none of your Friends wiſhes you a larger Portion of all Good things then I do, I cannot indeed ſay I am wholly diſintrected (diſintereſted ?) in this, ſince I muſt always have great Pleaſure to live in the Friendſhip and Eſteem of the Earle of Loudoun —

What Judgement is likely to paſs on my ſhare of this years Transactions a little time will diſcover. I am apt to think it will not be very favorable, as Suceſs (the onely Teſt of Merritt in theſe Times) has been wanting, But whatever may happen I ſhall always have great Pleaſure in one Reflection, which neither Power nor Prejudice can take away, that the treu (true) intereſt of the Publick, or what I took to be ſo, has at all Times been the ſole rule of my Conduct; I will tire your Patience no longer but that I have the thanks to be with the greateſt regards & eſteem My Lord

Newark Halifax Nov^r 10th 1757

Your Lordſhips
Moſt faithfull and
Moſt obed^t Hum^{le} Serv^t
Fra : Holburne

Lord Loudoun to the Duke of Cumberland (LO 4642 A & B, October 17, 1757). Loudoun privately writes Cumberland on October 17th. This long letter is fully transcribed in MANA, Pages 399-408. Only a segment of the letter is transcribed here, some 30%. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are different than that printed in MANA. This is common to letters with duplicates. Commas are much more prevalent in MANA. The copy in MANA is Cumberland's copy. This transcription is Loudoun's copy from the Huntington Library. It is the last of Loudoun's letters that is included in MANA.

Sir,

New York October 17, 1757

As Major Horgraff is going home, who will take care to deliver my Letters safe, I take the Opportunity of writing to Your Royal Highness a Private Letter.

You will be surprised I have said so little of the Affairs in the back Country. The real Case is I know very little with any Certainty of what past there more than what I have received from Mr. Webb who sent off the Packet two Days before I arrived with his Accounts of it.

The Country make great Complaints of his Conduct and of his Treatment of these People. As to the first, I am told by Mr. Delancy that on Information of the Enemies advancing, he went to Fort William Henry, where he received certain Accounts of it which he concealed and returned to Fort Edward from whence he writ to acquaint Lieut. Col. Monro.

As to the Complaints of his ill usage of the Militia, it rather appears to me that the Militia came very slow up and when they were arrived to the Number of 2000, the Desertion from that time was equal to their acquisition by the Arrival of new Reinforcements. And this Lieut. Govr. Delancy, who was then at Albany took many of them Prisoners and killed one of them who would not be stopt, told me.

As soon as I arrive at Albany, I will inform my self of every particular if I see a cause which I hope will not be the Case. I will order a Number of the principal Officers to examine and report.

I have given your Royal Highness in my Letter several Reasons for not chalking out a Plan for the Operations of the next Campaign, there is one more which remains.

When I arrived here, I was in great hopes with the force I brought with me that I should have been able to have pushed forward to Tienderoga, but when I made a Computation of the time each part of the Operation would take, without Opposition, and the Difficulties I had to overcome I found it impracticable.

I likewise found that the Season would not permit my building a Fort at Fort William Henry that might protect the Vessels I might build to attack Tienderoga in the Spring.

On which it occurred to me that if the Winter proved to be hard Frost, with a good deal of Snow, I could take it much easier in the Winter than I could in the Summer, and that then I should be free of the Bush Fight, in which they have so great an advantage by their Indians and Canadiens.

If I succeed in this, I am then Master to go into their Country by that Road and can save the Govern^t that intolerable Expence of Transports. Besides the Preparations for whatever Operations are to be carryd on will depend on our selves and of course will be ready at the proper time and will not subject us to the Arrival of Fleets which I never expect to see in those Seas in time.

I have been more encouraged to enter into this Plan from the Information I have got from several Prisoners who have made their Escape from the Enemy particularly one who was taken in the

Spring, 1755 at the great Meadows and has been a Servant to a French Officer ever since. (Great Meadows = Braddock's Expedition).

By those I find that the People who attack'd Fort William Henry last Winter did not suffer as I expected, and by Lieut. Cols. Gauge and Burton who both march'd out on that Occasion and lay among the Snow for many Nights without Tents, that it is not so terrible a thing as they expected and I find we had no Men disabled by it.

The Method of lying on those Occasions is as soon as you take up your Ground they make Bush Tents of Pine Boughs two opposite to each other, leaving a Space between them in which they make great Fires (and the men in each of the Tents lie with their Feet to the Fires) in which Situation they are tolerably comfortable.

My Plan is, after I have settled all my Buſineſs above and fixed the Winter Quarters, to return here to give no Suspicion, and as soon as the Frost is hard enough with a good deal of Snow to carry me over every thing, to set out in Slayes as if for Boston but to go directly to Albany where I will have every thing in readyness to set out the next Day.

For this Service I propose to carry 3000 of the regular Troops and 1000 Rangers, both to enable me to send back what I find not able to bear the Cold and fatigue but to be strong enough to oppose any Force that may be able to send to the Relief of the place in case I am discover'd.

As I dare give no previous Notice to equip these Men for such an Expedition, I must find other Pretences to provide the things necessary for it. Such as Shoes, those I have got, warm Stockings, Socks, Mittens and woolen Night Caps, those are ordered for different Regiments and will be ready in a fortnight. Flannel Waistcoats I have; those first I ordered for the Royal Americans were taken at Sea; the Second Set is just arrived. I say the Men are already provided, and I will not put them to the Expense of new ones till those they have are wore out and every Soldier in this County carries a Blanket and I will have some ready in case of accidents. Snow Shoes I can supply by my Rangers, as I will take care they shall have a large provision for themselves and a few Men going with them in Front beats a Path for the others to follow without them & Clamps for walking on the Ice is the most difficult to provide without giving Suspicions, but I think I shall accomplish that.

The next article is Provisions. I shall supply my self at the different Posts till I leave Fort Edward, for which purposes I will take Care that they shall be properly supply'd. From Fort Edward I will carry Biscuit, Pork, some live Cattle, and a little Butter with some Rum and Ginger which last we find of great use, as it prevents bad water from throwing the Men into Fluxes.

For the Transportation of those things I would provide Hand Slays which the Men could draw, but they would discover me at once, therefore I must press Slays with Horses which at that Season of the Year I think I can do in one Day sufficient to serve me as each Slay carries the double of what a Wagon does with the same Number of Horses.

For the Maintenance of them I shall lay in forage at Fort Edward which I can do without Suspicion as ties only taking care to have sufficient Stock to leave when I bring down the Troops at the End of the Season; besides, I can carry Forage from Albany to Fort Edward with those slays that are to carry Provisions from thence.

The Artillery I propose to carry are principally Mortars and a few light Cannon and some Scaling Ladders all which are ready above.

The Road I at present propose is from Fort Edward to Fort William Henry and from thence down Lake George; my People are now employed and before that time I shall know every practicable Path.

If the Frost proves hard with Snow I think I can hardly fail to take a Garrison of 300 or 400 Men in it, if tis open rainy Weather tis impossible to go to it, besides I should lose the whole Troop in attempting it.

In this Expedition I must go myself for neither M.G. Abercromby nor M^r. Webb's Constituion are able to bear either the fatigue or the Cold.

I do not expect to find any Reluctance in the Men to going on this Service, but still further to prevent it, I shall go without a Tent and live as they do.

(Continued)

Comment: The packet in the second paragraph references Webb's letter sent to both Barrington and Loudoun (LO 4245A, August 17, 1757). In the 3rd paragraph, De Lancey is describing Webb's inspection of Fort William Henry in late July. Monro's claim of not being informed of Putnam's Scout has already taken hold (LO 5309). Loudoun's decidedly aggressive nature as a commander is once more seen here. Even after the failure of the Louisbourg Campaign and the loss of Fort William Henry, Loudoun wants to quickly move to the offense. Loudoun intends to mirror Rigaud's Winter Raid. A small artillery train would accompany the column. The light cannon referenced are the four remaining brass light 12-pounders that were assigned to Webb. Two brass 8-inch mortars were at Fort Edward. Rigaud's column suffered heavily from the cold, snow blindness, and sleet (mid-March). The need for secrecy came at the cost of the lack of focus and delays, but considerable preparation was made. Throughout the first half of the winter, Rogers is not fully committed to Loudoun's raid and has very independent thoughts on how to proceed. Lord Howe is given command of the expedition in early February 1758. Quickly, Howe arranges for a test march of a small column including sleighs from Fort Edward to Fort William Henry. Some 150 rangers on snowshoes proceeded the column. The march proved difficult, assumptions about the ability of the rangers to break trail for a larger column were wrong (Loescher 1946, Page 232). At the recommendation of Howe, the expedition was postponed (LO 5584, February 14, 1758, transcribed below; and Bellico 2010, Page 133). The British had little choice, any warm wet weather in March would likely have been catastrophic.

Duke of Cumberland to Loudoun (LO 4907 and MANA, Page 410; transcribed from LO 4907; received March 12, 1758):

Cranbourn Lodge, November 26, 1757

My Lord Loudoun, I have not improved the opportunity of writing to you by Packetboat which has Sailed for North America. Since my arrival in England, because I could not inform you of Particulars relating to myself, which had not yet taken place then, tho' resolved upon by me at that time. The unfortunate Circumstances of the Campaign in Germany & and some other particular Reasons, have induced me to determine to lay down entirely all military Command. I was willing to give you the earliest Information I could, with Propriety, of the Step I have taken; & therefore, I make use of the first Conveyance that I can write to you, to acquaint you of it.

The Multiplicity of Affairs during this Campaign in Germany has been the only Cause which has prevented my acknowledging and answering the Several Letters I have received from you, during that time. I can assure you I have read them all with Satisfaction, your Dispatches have always given me, as these latter ones have afforded me fresh Proof of that Diligence, Care, Prudence & Zeal with which you have all along exerted yourself in His Majesty's Service, Since you have been in North America.

As I am always inclined to promote every Thing in my Power, which may be conducive to your Advantage, I must own to you I am sorry that the Step I have thought proper to take, & which you easily conceive must have been the Result of mature Consideration with myself, deprives me of the Pleasure I should have to assist you, as heretofore, in the arduous & important Task you are engaged in; and which I make no doubt but what you will continue to use the Same constant & active Endeavours to fulfill, as you have done hitherto. But, you may always depend upon my Sincere good wishes; & be assured I remain your very affectionnate, though uselefs Friend,

William

Comment: Cumberland was the third son of George II. In 1757, he was appointed commander of the Hanoverian Army of Observation. In July 1757, Cumberland was defeated at the Battle of Hastenbeck. By early September, Cumberland's army was isolated, and he agreed to the Convention of Klosterzeven. Much of Hanover was ceded to France. Although he had the authority to negotiate for Britain, Cumberland was reputed by his father. Cumberland cannot shield Loudoun. A decade earlier, Cumberland had won the Battle of Culloden (1746); he now permanently retires from the military. This letter reaches Loudoun two days after receiving his recall letter.

Disposition of His Majesty's Forces in North America

Troops destined for the Siege of Louisbourg

	(BLANK)	Maj ^r . Gen ^l .
Staff	{ Lawrence Whitmore Wolfe }	Brigadiers
Corps		Rank & File
Royal (Royal Scots, 2nd/1st Foot)		983
Lascelles (47th)		985
Warburton (45th)		993
Monckton (2nd/60th)		802
Lord John Murray (42nd)		1000
Lawrence (3rd/60th)		1000
Bragg (28th)		700
Webb (48th)		834
Forbes (17th)		695
Hopson (40th)		969
Whitmore (22nd)		992
Amherst from England (15th)		900
Anstruther, Col ^o . from Ireland (58th)		700
Recruits with Col ^o . Whitmore for Lord John Murray's Regim ^t .		300
carried over/brought over		11,853 (Page Break)
Proportion of Recruits with Col ^o . Whitmore for 10 Batt ^{rs} . at 94/Batt ⁿ .		940
Officers, Serj ^{ts} . & Drum ^{rs} .		1092
3 Comp, of Royal Regim ^t . of Artillery, Officers included		330
		14,215
Rangers		600

Col^o. Bastide, Chief Engineer, and a sufficient and proper Battering Train for this Service

Note: On May 24, 1758, some 12,659 of all ranks plus 538 Rangers embark Halifax for Louisbourg, at least 118 transports and 39 warships were in the fleet. Some 1,660 troops remain to secure Halifax and British Nova Scotia (Andrews 2015, Vol. 1, Pages 379-381 with battalion breakdowns).

Troops destined for an Irruption into Canada by way of Crown Point, &^{ca}

Abercromby *Maj^r. Gen^l*

Staff { *Lord Howe* *Brigadier*
 { *Gage* *Colonel*

Corps *Rank & File*

Prevost (4th/60th) 450

Abercromby (44th) 836

Blakeney (27th) 695

Maj^r. Gen^l Murray (46th) 694

Stanwix (1st/60th) 1145

Otway (35th) 1145

Howe (55th) 699

Frazer (63rd renumbered 78th) 1145

Independ^t Comp. at New York 448

Recruits with Col^o. Whitmore
for Frazer's Battⁿ 300

Recruits with Col^o. Whitmore
For Montgomery's Battⁿ to remain
with Frazer's 300

carried over/brought over 7857 (Page Break)

Recruits with Col^o. Whitmore
for 7 Batt^{ns}. at the rate of 94/ Battⁿ.
and 8 over 666

Royal Reg^t. of Artillery, Off^{rs}. incl. 214

Officers, Serj^{ts}. & Drum^{rs} 710

9447
Provincials 20,000

Supposing that 1500 of this Body are left for the Protection of Nova Scotia, there will remain for this operation 7,947 Regulars and & 20,000 Provincials, with a proper Train of Artillery, and Ammunition.

Arms will be sent for 12,000 Men.

Troops destined for the Ohio, Fort Du Quesne, or other Operations to the Southward.

*Colonel Forbes
L^t. Col^o. Bouquet
L^t. Col^o. Montgomery*

L^t. Col^o. Bradstreet Deputy Quarter Master General being perfectly acquainted with the County.

<i>Corps</i>	<i>Rank & File</i>
<i>Prevost's Detachment (4th/60th)</i>	<i>350</i>
<i>Montgomery's (77th)</i>	<i>1145</i>
<i>Independ^t. Comp^s. at S^o. Carolina</i>	<i>345</i>
<i>Royal Reg^t. of Artillery</i>	<i>40</i>
	<hr/>
<i>Total</i>	<i>1880</i>
<i>Provincials</i>	<i>5000</i>

There will be a proper Train of Artillery for this Service also

Disposition of His Majesty's Forces in America, Recapitulation

<i>Louisbourg</i>	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>14125</i>	
	<i>Rangers</i>	<i>600</i>	
<i>Invasion of Canada by Crown Point</i>	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>7947*</i>	<i>(*value of 7847, 1st Page)</i>
	<i>Provincials</i>	<i>20,000</i>	
<i>Nova Scotia</i>	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>1500 **</i>	
<i>Ohio, Fort Du Quesne &^{ca}.</i>	<i>Regulars</i>	<i>1880</i>	
	<i>Provincials</i>	<i>5000</i>	
		<hr/>	
		<i>51,142</i>	

Sent to Maj^r. Gen^r. Abercromby

Comment: In all likelihood, this attachment is the battalion list referenced by Pitt in his letter to Abercromby (December 30th, 1757; CO 5/212, 247; and Kimball 1906; Pages 143 - 151). Pitt's determination to direct Campaigns from Europe is demonstrated here, but much of this work is likely Ligonier's (See Pargellis 1933, Page 342). The date of this document exactly corresponds with the recall of Loudoun. Pitt writes companion letters to each governor detailing their duties and obligations, all dated December 30, 1757 (Kimball 1906; Pages 135 - 143). The letter appointing Abercromby Commander in Chief, North America was written by the King and details responsibilities and instructions as it relates to dealing with governors, colonial assemblies, officer ranks, and Native Americans (December 30, 1757; CO 5/212, 231). Thomas Gage was assigned as Staff Colonel. Amherst had a decidedly low opinion of Gage and his abilities (Cubbison 2014, Page 152).

Pitt's long letter to Abercromby focuses on military matters; the letter is highly supportive of logistical and supply needs. A decidedly aggressive timetable was set for the Louisbourg Expedition, April 20th — "weather permitting". Aware of colonial sensitivities, Pitt has already committed to again fielding a large number of provincial regiments in the 1758 Ticonderoga Campaign, but with the clear understanding that all costs will be borne by London. However, knowing the provincials were slow to assemble, Pitt does not set a timetable for Ticonderoga. Brigadiers were appointed and troop allocations were set. Amongst the regulars, Pitt allows for regular formations to be switched out, but any reduction in relative numbers was minor.

Having the Scottish regiments exceed 1,040 rank & file is expected as the number of companies in these regiments could exceed 10. The 35th and the 1st/60th having such high numbers reflects additional reinforcements, mostly Scots, arriving from Europe in late 1757. The actual December 1757 Return for the 35th lists 989 rank & file with 51 rank & file wanting to complete, the complete number would have been 1,040 (LO 6751). The strength of the Independent Companies ballooned to some 112 rank & file per company, at least on paper.

Several of the battalions that had been at Halifax in Summer 1757 returned to winter quarters further south and would be assigned to the Abercromby's Ticonderoga Campaign in 1758. In Summer 1757, the only regular formations not in Nova Scotia were the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 60th, the 35th Foot, the four New York Independent Companies, the three South Carolina Independent Companies, and one company of Rogers' Rangers.

For 1757, a crude estimate of the number of troops arriving from Britain can be derived using these numbers (See Pargellis 1933, Page 109). Assuming 700 men in the 43rd, the number of troops in the seven battalions that arrived at Louisbourg in July is some 5,166 rank & file plus some 280 officers. The two Scottish regiments arriving in late summer each fielded some 1,000 men plus officers. In addition, there were some 3,600 transfers sent to fill out the existing regiments and 320 members of the royal artillery. Together, this yields some 11,466 men. Using the numbers in Pitt's letter of February 4, 1757, a number of 11,800 men can be estimated. Pitt planned to have a further sizeable reinforcement reach Loudoun by October (Kimball 1906, July 18, 1757, Page 88).

The 15th and 58th regiments were still in Europe and would not arrive in Halifax until Spring 1758. ** Kennedy's 43rd regiment is not accounted for in this document and was already in winter quarters at Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia (Boscawen 2011, Page 119). Six companies of the 35th would head to Louisbourg; the other four companies remained in Halifax under Major Roger Morris. Wanting a more senior officer familiar with Nova Scotia, Amherst quickly orders Colonel Monckton back to Halifax (Andrews 2015, Vol. 1, Pages 379-381). A few regimental assignments would change. Elements of the 1st/60th would join Forbes, instead of the 4th/60th. Frazer's 78th would join the Louisbourg Campaign. The 42nd Foot would head to Ticonderoga along with Gage's newly created 80th Light Foot.

While this letter was in transit and Loudoun's recall orders had still not been received, Loudoun writes Pitt on February 14th, 1758. This long letter of twenty-six pages is partially transcribed in Kimball (1906, Page 183; CO 5/49 001). It outlines Loudoun's plan for the 1758 Campaign including attacks against Louisbourg (5,400 regulars), Fort Duquesne (2,000 regulars), and Carillon (3,000 regulars) plus provincial troops. Pitt was expecting this or a similar letter would have been written the previous October and received sometime in December.

Pitt to Lord Loudoun, December 30, 1757; received March 10, 1758 (Correspondence of William Pitt; Kimball 1906, Page 133):

My Lord

Whitehall, 30th Dec^r. 1757

I am with Concern to acquaint Your Lordship, that the King has judged proper, that your Lordship should return to England: And His Majesty's having been please to appoint Major General Abercromby to succeed your Lordship as Commander in Chief of the King's forces in America (for which purpose the necessary Commissions and Instructions, are sent to Him by this Conveyance,) I am to signify to your Lordship His Majesty's Pleasure, that you do deliver to Major General Abercromby Copies of all the Instructions, and Orders, that have been given, or sent to Your Lordship, since you were appointed Commander in Chief of the King's Forces in North America, together with Copies of all other Papers that may relate to His Majesty's Service, & which may be any way material to enable Major General Abercromby to execute the Command The King is pleased to honor him with. The Lords of the Admiralty has directed the His Majesty's ship the Hampshire to receive your Lordship on Board and proceed with you to England, And the said Ship has orders to wait a month for Your Lordship, by which time it is hoped, You will be able to embark without any Inconvenience.

I am etc: —

W. Pitt

Comment: Loudoun decided to engage in a Byzantine game with an unlocked letterbox. The letterbox was sent to an intermediary, John Calcraft (See MANA, Page 357). Loudoun's letters to Cumberland and his letters to Pitt's ministry were offered to Henry Fox, who previous to Pitt, was Secretary of State. Fox was aligned with Cumberland and a political enemy of both Newcastle and Pitt. Newcastle was Prime Minister. In December, Pitt learned of the letterbox and was furious. Although without merit, Pargellis suggests Pitt viewed the inaction surrounding Halifax as a personal attack and a political maneuver by allies of Cumberland. At this same time, Pitt had badly clashed with a military board and a message needed to be sent affirming civilian control of the war. On December 16th, Pitt bitterly rebukes Loudoun's inaction while at Halifax in a speech before Parliament, checking Cumberland and any military opposition to his office. A few days later, Loudoun was recalled (Pargellis 1933, Pages 345-347). Loudoun's letter of recall reached him on March 10, 1758. Recalling Loudoun in October or November would have been possible, but there would be no gain to Pitt. Pitt needed time to develop a new understanding with the provincial governors and their assemblies. The recall was per Pitt's schedule of needs.

Meeting in June, Pitt and Loudoun disagreed over his August-October letter (LO 4329) and what was or was not communicated by Hardy to Pitt the previous December — including his decision to send no plans for any 1758 Expeditions. Loudoun planned on waiting for orders from London as recommended by Hardy; if none came, Loudoun would act as he saw fit. To Pitt, Loudoun's

planned winter assault on Ticonderoga negated some of that claim. Publicly, this "no plans" was the reason given for Loudoun's recall.

On October 24, 1757, Sir John Ligonier was appointed Commander and Chief of the Army in Britain. Working with Pitt, it was Ligonier who devises the scheme to place younger men in command of the forces in America — Howe, Wolfe, and Amherst. Cumberland's established men would be bypassed. The placement of Howe with Abercromby was designed to absolve one of Cumberland's appointments. But first, Pitt needed to strip the political duties that Braddock and Loudoun held. This took time and Pitt was not in a position until later in the year to recall Loudoun. In the meantime, Ligonier and Pitt developed the plans for the 1758 Campaign. Loudoun would not hold another position under Pitt.

Pargellis (1933, Pages 346 and 366) contains a partial transcript of a passage written by Loudoun that was included as a Notebook Entry (June 6, 1758; Huntington Manuscript 1717, Vol. 5): *"Went to Mr Pitts had a very Gracious reception Then told me that the objection he had to me was that he found out I did not choose to correspond with the Civil Ministers of the King That he had been very fully informed that I was offended with his letter that I received at Halifax and had taken a resolution of not sending any them any plan for future operations that he had very patent (?) information of that That the want of a Plan had putt him to great Difficultys and was obliged the best he could do that on finding I would not correspond with him it was impossible to go one and that in this situation either he must not be minister or I could not be General. For that reason he had given the King the advice he did about recalling me....."* continues in Pargellis (..... added).

This snippet must be read very carefully. Loudoun is only describing what Pitt believes is politically expedient, not necessarily factual. This is June and tempers have had time to cool; it has been three months since Loudoun received his recall letter. There is nothing to gain here by either man, so the meeting is cordial, almost theater-like. Pargellis does not attempt to identify this "Halifax" letter. There are two candidates, Pitt's letters of March 17th and March 31st. We know the March 17th was received at Halifax (MANA, Page 391); the March 31st letter was received on August 4th — a delay of four months (both letters are in the Final Letter Appendix). The March 17th letter allows Loudoun the option of choosing Quebec or Louisbourg as the first target, negating the mandate to first attack Louisbourg per previous instructions. Pitt wanted to emphasize that he still thought it best to attack Louisbourg first, so Pitt's wording is somewhat convoluted. The March 31st letter concerns the arrival of two additional Highland regiments. The 78th arrived in Halifax, but the 77th was being sent directly to South Carolina. Being unaware of the 77th's destination, Loudoun had not made any plans for their arrival. Loudoun sends monies south for their support. The 77th suffered greatly from the want of proper barracks and housing. Which of these letters is the "*offending*" letter is unclear.

The arrival of Webb's letters on August 16th coincides with the awkwardness of the month-long "beaching", the fiasco surrounding Major General Charles Hay's conduct in Halifax, the eventual cancellation of the Louisbourg Expedition, and another change in the government in London. All that is certain is Loudoun and Holburne were both writing the ministry routinely before reaching Halifax, but much less afterward. A "*Publick Letter*" was written on August 5th telling of the decision to cancel the Louisbourg Expedition; but this letter raised more questions within the government than it answered (Pargellis 1933, Page 337). A second "*private letter*" was written to

Cumberland on the 6th (MANA, Page 391). Holburne's next letter to Pitt seems to be September 17th and relates to the French fleet still at Louisbourg (Kimball 1906, Page 106). Pitt is still keen on destroying this fleet. On October 17th, Loudoun sends separate letters to Pitt and Cumberland. These letters are long and Pitt's letter has a starting date of August 16th (LO 4329 and LO 4642/MANA, Pages 399-408, respectively; partial transcription here). These letters are not similar, suggesting each was worked on at different times. Pitt's letter is another "*Publick Letter*". For the remainder of the year, Loudoun sends few, if any, letters to London.

In December 1757, Admiral Hardy spends considerable time with Pitt (Pargellis 1933, Page 344). Hardy would seem to be the logical choice as the source of Pitt's information and characterizations. Hardy has both military and political experience, something that would have proved attractive to Pitt (Governor of New York, 1755-1758). Pitt does not know Loudoun personally, but much of Pitt's evaluation seems to go through the "lens" of Hardy. Either Hardy is bluntly honest and professional, or he is very aware of the direction from where the political wind is blowing and adapts. It is difficult or near impossible to judge. There can be little argument that Loudoun refused to engage Pitt in correspondence, but Pitt's last letter to Loudoun dates to July 18 and then his recall letter of December 30, 1757. Embarrassment may play a part here. The deep uncertainties around Loudoun's Winter Campaign (1757-1758) argued for limited correspondence. Loudoun's decision not to communicate with Pitt had an unforeseen consequence. At cabinet and minister-level meetings, the details concerning the cancellation of the Louisbourg Expedition were unclear and subject to rumor. Was the decision a consensus of the senior officers or was it just Loudoun and Admiral Holdburne? Whether the decision was supported by Hardy was ambiguous, the cabinet did not have all the correspondence (Pargellis 1933, Page 338). Loudoun writing to Cumberland, who was on the European Continent, did nothing to inform London of the nature of events.

Loudoun argues against the idea that Pitt was ignorant of his "no plans" scheme; this approach was communicated to Pitt via Hardy. Loudoun further states that it was Hardy who recommended to him the adoption of the "no plans" scheme (Pargellis 1933, Page 347). Loudoun did send "plans", but this occurred in the gap between the issuance of the recall letter and Loudoun receiving the letter (March 10, 1758). Loudoun forwarded his plans on February 14th, making it near impossible to amend them in London. The 1758 Campaign Plans developed by Pitt reached Abercromby in the same mail packet as Loudoun's recall. At the same time, Loudoun admits to Pitt that the "no plans" decision was a serious mistake by him and that it had put Pitt in a difficult position.

For 1758, Loudoun had four expeditions planned. Loudoun himself would lead an attack on Ticonderoga and Fort Saint-Frédéric. Bradstreet would attack Frontenac. Stanwix would move on Fort Duquesne. The fourth campaign would be against Louisbourg, a mix of regulars and provincials (Pargellis 1933, Page 356). Pitt and Ligonier would develop plans independent of Loudoun. Regimental assignments between the plans would be very different.

Note: John Calcraft is apparently the illegitimate son of Henry Fox. He was very successful as an Army Agent to several dozen regiments and amassed a considerable fortune. Calcraft later served in Parliament. Henry Fox would remain in Parliament, but outside the Pitt government. In 1757, Fox would be appointed Paymaster of Forces. In eight years, Fox accumulates some £400,000 pounds via interest payments on "loans". The principal (Kings money) would still show as being on the books, but any interest paid went to Fox.

John Calcraft to the Earl of Loudoun, December 29, 1757 (LO 5140). This letter is presented one day out of sequence. There are two copies of this letter but with wildly different capitalizations and punctuations:

Dearest Lord,

Dec. the 29th — 1757

By the Secretary of States Pacquet I wrote Your Lordship yesterday a short letter to testify my Respect, which I so worded that if it was open'd, nothing would be known from it, But what I hope You & the whole World are convinced of & that it is my inviolable attachment to Your Lordship.

Your Recall is now the Subject of every Body's conversation, & various are the Reasons a/signed for It; Such as your not writing often to the Ministers or Sending them Plans for the next Years Campaign; the inactivity after You laid aside the Expedition with much more Stuff too trifling to mention ____ The Real Causes I believe are M^r Pitt having made the Speech he did against You in Parliament & Sir Charles Hardy's language respecting American Matters, which is made all pofsible Use of against You; He is every day with the Ministers, & not the lefs Care/s'd (Caress'd) for Disapproving Some of your measures, Such as your preference of Military to civil Power, Having not sufficiently Explored the Country, not making Winter Campaigns, Exerting too much Authority over the People of the Country, not treating the Provincials Troops so well as they deserv'd, Putting Slights on the Governors by writing to others in their Provinces /Frankland (Franklin) I presume the Man meant/ & going in person to the Jerseys — Having no Boats on the Lake, making the Parole be giv'n the Command Officer of the Kings Troops in their own Governm^{ts}, & giving His Excellency when at New York But two instead of three Buffs, when the Guard turned out to him ____ To this is added that M^r Webb was left too weak; a Baker at New York & others sent to the Provosts or threatened with it, & that Your Lordship is Interested ____ Very pretty Reasons for grounding the Recall of a Person looked on by all England the only proper Man for his Command, & all this done before he is heard ____ But My Dear Lord you have the Satisfaction to feel you have acted uprightly & well & the Consciousnefs thereof, will with your Resolution make You despise Such Accusations as can be laid against You & However you may feel at first, I am convinced that in the Your Recall will prove the luckiest Circumstance that cou'd happen, Since the Prospect of a Succes/sful War in America is so very gloomy ____ If I might presume to advise Your Lordship on this occasion, I would wish You to come home with all convenient dispatch, taking care to provide yourself with all pofsible materials for Self defense in case Your Conduct shou'd be Inquir'd into, & finding out if pofsible who have been the Spyes, for such there have been upon You.

You most Expect some Malcontents will on this occasion try to raise Clamour against you. But as Your Succes/sor will discourage Such People, they will not be numerous ____ Loring is the person Sent out with dispatches on this Occasion, I think it is unnece/sary to caution you about him, Tho I will say I don't think him your friend & You shou'd therefore be much upon your Guard with Him. I fancy too his language has chim'd in with S^r Char Hardy's & Lord Halifax's with both of whom he has been very much ____ Poor Col^l Young will amongst many others much lament your departure, My friend Hamilton of the Board of Trade Spoke to Lord Halifax a few days ago in his favour for the Lt. Governor of Virginia, His Lordship Reply'd there was now no thoughts of making a military Government by giving it a good Officer, So that Col^l Young was out of the Question.

The Plan I hear of for the next American Campaign is to Send 4 more Regiments from hence, That three Armys are to be employ'd there. One command by Amhurst, another by Lord Howe, & the

third by Wolfe ____ General Abercromby is made Colonel of The Royal American Regim^t, Stanwix, Forbes, Whitmore, Lord How & Lawrence are made Brigadeers for America only, Gage, Bouquet & Montgomery Col^{ls} there, & ten Blanks Col^{ls} Commifsions of the same kind are Sent out, how to dispos'd of I don't hear ____

Bradstreet is made Deputy Q^r Master G^l with the Rank of Lt. Colonel & Carlton is another Deputy Q^r M^r.

How poor Burton will brook this disgrace I don't know, for a great one it is to have 2 Younger Lt. Col^{ls}. get Rank over him, insomuch that I shall not be Supriz'd if he comes home with You ____ The Duke of Argyle unluckily is Still at Whilton, but every day Expected & the moment he comes I will see him ____ Cotterell has wrote to You as fully as he dare venture by the Secretary Packet & is as true & faithfull to You as Man can be, for which I shall ever Esteem him ____ I do hope the Extract mention'd in my letter of the 25th will be Sent to G^l Abercrombie, & if it is that thereby You will guefs the Author, for I can learn no more Particulars here about it as yet.

Since this Bustle about You, I have thought of nothing, but Your Affairs, & after the most mature consideration can See nothing to be done at present but give you all the Information that is to be gott.

I hope You are to remain Governor of Virginia at least I hear nothing to the contrary & tis Reported that New York is to be given to General Ambercromby ____

I shall be very impatient to hear how Your Lordship Receives this unexpected Recall & to know whether any good Fortune has attend'd You this Winter; That would make your Situation happy indeed, & Nothing cou'd in that Event be so fortunate as Your Return.

Major General Webb is I find recall'd as well as Your Lordship & more Rank given the Provincials so there is almost a total Revolution in America ____ I just hear too that Sir Charles Hardy's is to sail in a few days for America with a large Fleet ____

I am greatly perplex'd about sending my letters with Safety to Your Lordship, No Ships but Loring's being now going; The only Expedient I can hit on is to Send them under cover to Delancey & Watts, & to get Baker to deliver them as his letters to Loring ____ My Dearest Lord Adieu, Be Sure to let me hear from You by the first Opportunity, & Believe me Ever & Most Firmly Yours Whilst

J.C.

Mr. Fox is Still at Goodwood but Returns Saturday: On His Friendship Your Lordship may depend.

Comment: This letter is central to Pargellis (1933; Pages 344-345), but all the information is second-hand. The bulk of Hardy's criticisms are only directed at the "non-military" aspects — nothing even remotely connected to Louisbourg or himself. The "military" changes that Pitt and Ligonier will be making are already in motion. Loring is likely Joshua Loring who commanded the inland naval forces under Abercromby and then Amherst. Although American, some of Joshua Loring's letters are included in the Chatham Papers (Will Pitt, 1st Earl of Chatham; See Bellico 2010). Loring was from Massachusetts. The ____ seen in the transcription is per the original.

From Lord George Augustus Howe, 3rd Viscount Howe to the Earl of Loudoun, February 14, 1758 (LO 5584):

Upon my arrival here comfortable to your Lordships instructions, I applied to Gen^l Abercrombie, who ordered the detachment of Troops, & after settling the proportion of Artillery, Stores, provisions & c, immediately that no time might be lost forwarded them up to Fort Edward. L^t Leslie was sent up to examine the Lake, whole report is inclosed to your Lordship by Gen^l Abercrombie.

From the great depth of the Snow, it appears to me impracticable to march without a great number of snow shoes, of which the quantity at present provided is quite insufficient nor indeed do I well see any means of giving an afsault, or erecting a battery under these disadvantages. However in case Your Lordship should think fit that notwithstanding the present depth of snow an attempt should be made, all the carpenters that can be procured are at work making ladders, of which upon my arrival here, I only found 37.

In case a thaw should come for a few days to melt part of the snow, what is now impracticable might then be very feasible for which reason if your Lordship approves of it, I should by no means think it advisable to lay aside all thoughts of an expedition, but to defer it for some time till the Season is more favorable & renders the sucefs more probable. I am with great respect.

Albany Feb.14, 1758

*My Lord
&^c Lordship's most obedient
& most humble servant
Howe*

Comment: Loudoun's winter offensive is described in a previously transcribed letter (LO 4642, October 17, 1757). Leslie's examination of the Lake was a test march, a distinct failure; trail breaking by the rangers did not work, each soldier needed their own showshoes. This entire episode may seem absurd or part of a myth, especially in light of the difficulties encountered during Rigaud's Raid the previous March. Howe's letter is a simple confirmation that Loudoun's plan for a winter expedition against Ticonderoga was indeed a reality, and it was postponed due to the lack of snowshoes (Bellico 2010, Page 133). Leslie's report is LO 5553; February 8, 1758. Abercromby's letter is LO 5561; February 8, 1758. The expedition is canceled quietly at the end of February.

With Loudoun's recall arriving on March 8th, Rogers escapes any written repercussions for failure to provide snowshoes to the British regulars. However, Lt. Colonel William Haviland of the 27th Foot, who commanded Fort Edward, had a decidedly poor relationship with Rogers. During the first week of March, Haviland orders Rogers to conduct a strong raid against Ticonderoga. Originally, 400 rangers were to accompany Rogers, but Haviland slashes the number to 184 men. Rogers is not happy with these orders and has strong security concerns. Rogers leaves Fort Edward on March 10th. Rogers loses some 124 men, 108 killed and 16 captured (Battle of Snowshoes, March 13-14, 1758; Loescher 1946, Pages 237- 262; Bellico 2010, Pages 135-139).

Howe was one of the most promising of the younger British officers. Cumberland writes Loudoun of Howe's appointment to the 60th Foot on March 21, 1757 (MANA, Page 326), but this letter does not appear to be at the Huntington Library. Loudoun may have been in Halifax when he first learns of Howe's appointment, two month voyage plus the two month sailing delay experienced by Holburne. Unfortunately, Loudoun may never have had the opportunity to integrate Howe into Webb's command, Howe arriving at Fort Edward mid-siege, the evening of August 6th.

Letters of Monro: Outside of the letters written to Webb during the Siege (LO 4040 and LO 4041), Monro leaves very few letters or correspondence. In total, there may only be four additional letters plus two returns (numerical tables). There is a distinct possibility that any earlier letters were lost in the Siege itself, but Monro makes no references to such letters or their content. In LO 3590, Webb refers to a statement from one of Monro's earlier letters (Webb to Loudoun, May 9, 1757; transcribed above). All the transcribed letters below were written by Monro after the Siege. These materials are distinctly repetitive but demonstrate the deep bitterness that Monro holds Webb. The content is massively self-protective of Monro himself. Monro's anger is not hidden. The most pointed letter is LO 5309. The repeated and harsh criticism of the provincials may be more reflective of Monro himself than of the provincials. The only praise offered is to his own regiment. All of Webb's letters from the Siege are included in *The Siege of Fort William Henry: Letters of George Bartman* (Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 12, pp 415-425). There are four letters from Webb to Monro - August 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th. Monro's letters to Webb are not found in *Letters of George Bartman*. Webb's letter of the 3rd is presented here on Page 96, the letter of the 4th is on Page 81, the letter of the 6th is on Page 75, and the letter of the 8th is on Page 82. Many of the Webb/Monro/Loudoun letters from late July and August are found in CO 5/48 055.

Four letters and one return are presented below. LO 4313A *The Return of the Killed, Wounded and Missing* is a return by Monro and is not included here. This document covers only the losses by the British regulars but includes the notation: "*There cou'd be no account from the Provincials, but their number kill'd cou'd not be Lefs than 4 Officers & about 40 Men; and very near as many more Men Wounded.*" These numbers appear reasonable, and not inflated. Alone, the Fyre Journal has 1 officer and 18 rank & file from Massachusetts being killed on August 3rd in a sortie against the French. The intense firefight of August 7th resulted in even more casualties. This is in sharp contrast to the casualties suffered by the British regulars. Together, the 35th, 60th, Independents, and Royal Artillery only suffer 20 dead, all rank & file, and 27 wounded, both officers and men (LO 4313A, August 25, 1757). Among these British regulars, some 124 were listed as missing on August 25th.

Monro's letters to Webb from the Siege are split between LO 4040 and LO 4041. Together, there are seven surviving letters from Monro to Webb, but more were written. Monro leaves no details or guidance as to when and how many times he wrote Webb. Three letters date to the 3rd, one letter to the 4th, two letters to the 6th, and one letter to the 8th. The two letters from the 6th are presented in full starting on Page 37; and the letter of the 8th in full on Page 82. At least one letter written by Monro on the 6th is lost and may not have been received by Webb but is referenced in another of Monro's letters. Unexpectedly, there is no letter from Monro to Webb on the 7th, the date when Montcalm gave the infamous letter of the 4th to Monro. With a minor omission at the conclusion of two of the letters, Dodge (2007, Pages 66 - 72) presents all eleven letters that are known to have passed between Monro and Webb during the Siege. These are presented in chronological order. As it relates to the size of Montcalm's army, at least one of these letters in Dodge contains an error — the original number of "*eleven thousand*" is incorrectly transcribed as "*seven thousand*" (Page 68). The lettering in the original overlaps, fostering the mistake. The 18th-century script for "8" is very different from the current script. Any reference to 10-pounders found in Dodge is incorrect. These guns were 18-pounders.

From Monro to Loudoun (LO 4367, cover page from the Huntington Library has a date of November 1, 1757; Albany, New York):

Strength of Fort W^m. Henry at the time it was attacked, as near as can now be Computed.

<i>Six Companies of the 35th Regiment</i> _ _ _ _ _	540
<i>Detachment of the Royal Americans</i> _ _ _ _ _	100
<i>Independents</i> _ _ _ _ _	100
<i>Massachusetts</i> _ _ _ _ _	800
<i>Jersey's</i> _ _ _ _ _	200
<i>Hampshire</i> _ _ _ _ _	200
<i>Rangers</i> _ _ _ _ _	140
<i>Carpenters & Sailors</i> _ _ _ _ _	60
	<hr/>
	2140

Comment: These numbers are just Monro's broad estimates developed three months after the Siege. The number for the 35th is better matched to the rank & file (Bougainville Journal, Page 176). The Rangers are likely a combination of both Roger's Rangers and the New York Provincial Rangers. There is no entry for the Royal Artillery. Around 25 men plus 4 ordnance clerks would be a reasonable estimate for the Royal Artillery, these men would be split between the Bastion and the Entrenched Camp (Bougainville Journal, Page 177).

Independents is a reference to Independent Companies of British Regulars. Four of these companies had been assigned to New York for decades. The 100 number is exceedingly high for a single Independent Company suggesting two companies were present or combined for the campaign. These troops were often neglected by London. Loudoun court-martials the commander of one company for embezzlement (Captain Hubert Marshall; MANA, Page 347).

From Monro to Loudoun (LO 5275, cover page from the Huntington Library has a date of August 20, 1757; Albany, New York):

Gen^l: Webb's letter dated the 3^d of August, I receiv'd the Evening of that day.

Itis letter dated the 4th of August, I receiv'd the 6th, by Gen^l: Montcalms Aid D'e Camp.

Itis letter dated the 6th of August, was given to me by A Ranger between 8, & 9, O'clock of the 9th August at night the day the Capitulation was sign'd.

Itis letter dated the 8th of August was sent to me, by Gen^l: Montcalm. about 6 O'clock in the Evening, the 9th August after the Capitulation.

N: B: Those were all the letters, I receiv'd during the time of the Siege.

On a separate following sheet:

Within is the dates, of Gen^l: Webb letters, & when receiv'd by me.

Comment: These four letters are all the letters written by Webb to Monro. No letters are missing or undelivered (reference *The Siege of Fort William Henry: Letters of George Bartman*. Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 12, pp. 415-425. Many of these letters are in LO 4041 A, B & C).

From George Monro to Loudoun, received November 1, 1757 (LO 4479). There is a notation on the document cover sheet from the Huntington Library: *The first portion in another hand:*

Upon learning of Parker's losses at Sabbath Point, Webb immediately headed to Fort William Henry. He arrived on July 25th and then leaves on the 29th. On July 27th, the officers first meet to discuss various issues. This conversation is related in the Montresor Journals (Pages 23-24, then see Page 37). In the Montresor Journals, there is a strong focus on rebuilding the "navy"; this topic is completely absent from all of Monro's writings. Montresor and Monro both adopt a similar Question and Answer format in their letters, so it is easy to mix and confuse the discussion of the 27th with that held on the 28th when the officers meet again.

The Question-and-Answer segment below relates to this subsequent discussion held on the 28th. There is a second similar letter with the sole focus being on the Questions and Answers (LO 3994). Notably, this letter expands those present to include Brigade Major Morris and Captain George Bartman, Aide-de-Camp to Webb. In Monro's letters and typical of his self-protective tone, there is no mention of the "navy". The cover page for LO 3994 states that the letter is in Monro's handwriting. Complete transcription of LO 4479:

Remarks upon some Particulars of the Siege of Fort W^m. Henry

The Massachusetts People consisting of 800 Men told Colonel Fry, the Morning of the Capitulation, that they were quite wore out, & wou'd stay no longer; And that they would rather be knock'd in the Head by the Enemy as to stay Perish behind the Breast Work: Upon this being mentioned by Colonel Fry to Colonel Monro; He reply'd, it would be very proper to make an Example of such People; Upon which Colonel Fry answered that he could not condescend upon any Particular Man or Men; for that is was the declaration of the Whole Body in General.

I am sorry to say it, tho' with great truth, that in general, the Provincials did not behave well.

L^t. Colonel Monro ask'd M^r. Montresor Chief Engineer, the Thursday before the Fort W^m. Henry was attack'd: How long he thought the Fort wou'd hold, if properly Defended, to which the Engineer reply'd that in his opinion, it cou'd not hold out twenty four hours, if the French brought Cannon against it.

When General Webb Visited Fort W^m. Henry. He called a Meeting there on Thursday the 28th July; of Colonel Young, M^r. Montresor, M^r. Gordon, M^r. Williamson Engineers, Captain Ord of the Artillery, together with L^t. Colonel Monro who Commanded the Garrison. At which Meeting L^t. Colonel Monro ask'd the Following Questions. ———

Question: In Case Fort Edward shou'd be attack'd by the Enemy, the Signals given & understood accordingly, What Parts am I to Act?

Answer: You are to march to it's relief, with all the Forces under Your Command, Leaving three hundred Men to Garrison the Fort; As soon as We hear you engaged with the Enemy upon the Road, We will send out a Strong Detachment to Your Assistance!

Question: Which of the two Forts is most likely to be Attacked by the Enemy, Fort W^m. Henry or Fort Edward?

Answer: Fort W^m. Henry to be sure! For there was no probability and hardly the possibility attacking Fort Edward with Cannon!

Reply: If it is so; I should think, Fort W^m. Henry ought to have as great a Number of Men as can possibly be spared, for if they are repulsed in their attempt; the Affair will probably be over. I will not Positively say that the Consequence of taking Fort W^m. Henry, will occasion their taking Fort Edward; but I think it will be a great Step towards it; As they will then have a good road for their Cannon!

General Webb replied that a thousand Men was all he cou'd possibly spare from Fort Edward, to reinforce Fort W^m. Henry; Which Reinforcements the General promised to send up to on Saturday the 30 July; Which did not arrive till Tuesday the 2^d of August after Night fall; And the Next Morning early the Enemy appeared, When our Breast Work was not near finished.

Continues on the same sheet of paper, in different hand consistent with Monro's own.

Gen^l. Webb's orders to L^t. Col^l. Monro was in case, Fort W^m. Henry, was attack'd the Garrison was to Consist of 100 Regulars, And 300 Provincials; there was in the Fort during the Siege, Above that Number, 2 Officers of the 35th Regm^t and 1 Officer of the Royal Americans, And 30 Sailors.

The General did once intend, to Command, at Fort W^m. Henry, and to send L^t. Col^l. Monro, down to Fort Edward ——— as I was inform'd, (of?) his scheme of doing so, was between the time of his leaving Fort W^m. Henry, And the Arrival of the reinforcements.

I beg'd of the Generall, if it was Agreeable to him; to let me have the four Companies of the 35th Regm^t. As a part of the reinforcement, he intended for me, he said he cou'd not spare so many Regulars.

*Geo. Monro L^t. Col^l.
35th Regm^t*

Comment: If Monro had asked for an artillery reinforcement in late June or the first half of July, it would seem logical that Monro would have added that grievance to the last paragraph of this letter. But there is nothing.

From Monro to Loudoun (LO 3994; An undated letter that was in all likelihood written after the events). This letter is very similar to a portion of the longer LO 4479:

L^t Col^l Monro's queries to Gen^l Webb, At a meeting, the Gen^l desir'd to have, with the following Gentlemen. L^t Col^l Young, the three Engineers, Montresor, Gordon, & Williamson, Cap^m. Ord of the Train, the Brigade Maj^r Morris, and Cap^m. Bartman, at Fort Wm. Henry July 28 1757

Query: In Case Fort Edward shou'd be Attack'd by the Enemy, the Signals given & Understood of its' being invested, What part am I to Act?

Answer} To be sure, to March to it's relief, leaving 300 Men in the Fort, As soon as we hear you ingag'd with the Enemy upon the road, Wee will send out a Strong detachment to your Assistance.

Query — Whether, of the two Forts is most likely to be Attacked by the Enemy;

Answer— That was out of the Question, for their was no probability and hardly the pofsibility of their Attacking Fort Edward with Cannon.

Answer: If so; I think, Fort W^m. Henry, Ought to have as great a Number of Men, As can pofsibly be spared. Because if they Are repuls'd, in their Attempt, upon Fort W^m. Henry, the Affair will be Over; But if they take it; I won't say that the taking of Fort Edward, will be the Consequence, but I think it will be A great step towards it; As they will then have a road to bring their Cannon.

The Gen^l. said As to the Number of Men to reinforce fort W^m. Henry, the most he cou'd spare was one thousand, one hundred of them to be R: A—s. (Royal Americans) before this reinforcement Arriv'd, Wee had, At Fort W^m. Henry, About 1100 Men, fit for duty. The reinforcement of 1000 Men from Fort Edward were to have been with Us, the Saturday, to have help'd Us, to finish our Breastwork. but they did not come till it was dark on Tuesday Night. the next Morning, being the 3^d of August, the Enemy Attack'd Us, And our breast work, not near finish'd.

Comment: There is no discussion of the Lake George Navy in either of the last two letters. Monro is only reporting those elements that he wants to bring to Loudoun's attention. Together, the disorganization of the Montresor Journals and Monro's snippets begs access to Montresor's "Transactions of the Campaign, June 1 to October 1, 1757" (National Archives in London, War Office 55:283; referenced in Pargellis 1933, Page 244). Whether anything new or useful would be found is only a matter of conjecture, not knowing is a matter of annoyance.

From George Monro to Loudoun, Received November 1, 1757 (LO 5309):

The Mafsachusetts people consisting of 800 Men declared to Col^l Fyr, Very Airly the Morning of the Capitulation, that they were quite wore out, & wou'd stay no longer; And that they would rather be knock'd in the Head by the Enemy as to stay parish (perish) behind the breast work; till that time, they behav'd, And did their duty, better then either the Jerseys, Or Hampshire men, who could never be brought to do their duty, with regularity or resolution.

The Provincials in the Fort, behav'd scandalously, when they were to fire Over the Parapet, they lay down upon their faces and fir'd straight up in the Air; I sent orders to the Cap^m who Commanded in the Fort, to take the first Man, that behav'd in that Manner, And hang him over the Wall to be shot at by the Enemy.

No Men could behave with more coolnefs and Resolution, then the 6 Comp^{ys} of the 35th Regm^t both within the Breast Work, And in the Fort.

Gen^l Webb concealing from me the March of the French to Attack Fort W^m. Henry was thought a very extraordinary thing, As likways the reinforcement that was to have been with Us, the Saturday, Not coming till dark Tuesday night. we were Attack'd airly next Morning, by the Enemy, And our Breast Work, not near finished; which Occasion'd the Lofs of all our Horses, Oxen And Sheep. And lost some Men in skirmishing, with the Enemy, to get Logs to compleat Our Breast work, which they did all in their power to prevent.

The Artillery in the Fort was in very bad condition. from the beginning. The thursday before the Fort attack'd I asked the chief Engineer, how long, he thought the Fort might hold out, he said, in his opinion, it would not hold out 24 hours; If the French brought Cannon Against it.

G: W: never Visited Fort W^m. Henry, till July the 25th in the Evening, And went Away the 29th in the Morning. The Evening before he went away, he got the information of the French being upon their way, to Attack Fort W^m. Henry.

Comment: Monro's statement that Webb concealed the advance of the French is contained here. Loudoun references this "concealment" charge in a letter to Cumberland weeks before the date of this letter (LO 4642; October 17, 1757). Putnam's Scout is referenced in Adam Williamson's Journal on the 29th. In reality, the French had not begun their advance and were still organizing and feasting at the north end of Lake George. The Indian flotilla does not leave the north end of Lake George until the afternoon of July 31st (Bougainville Journal, Page 155).

As protection against fire, Montresor orders the North Storehouse removed. When the French appeared, the British place their livestock behind the picketed fence that once protected this Storehouse, but this location is sandwiched between the two bastions that then engage the French flotilla (Hays Journal, August 2nd). The French were not within range, a useless display of artillery prowess. From the flank embrasures, the British would have been literally firing over the heads of the animals. Immediately, the animals bolt and were lost. Corrals to the east of the Bastion could have been constructed months earlier. Monro's self-protection is placed via this letter.

Notebook of French Siege of Fort W^m Henry. Ensign and Practitioner Engineer Adam Williamson, 6th Foot. Slade Collection. Williamson Family Papers, National Archives of Canada, Microfilm A-573. Spelling is as in the original. The Journal ends in the middle of a page, the only instance where this happens. The next page is then torn at the inner edge. The beginning of nine lines of text are visible, only a few letters of a single word on each line. The pen and ink on the torn page appear to be the same as the preceding pages. With expertise, the final text might be recovered from the following page, the ink bleeding through the paper. The Journal appears to be contemporary to date; complete transcription. However, Bellico (2010, Page 321, Note 125) suggests that it is not contemporary. There are no timeline issues.

Fort W^m Henry

July 1st 1757:

An Exprefs arrived here with the intelligence that Cap^t Putnam and 55 Men from Fort Edward had fired on a party of Indians on Wood Creek he imagined the party to 500 as they reckoned fifty Birch Canoes & the greater part of them with ten or more in them as he discharged three times before the Enemy could land on the opposite side.

Five of Cap^t Putnams men got into Fort Edward on which General Lyman with 300 were immediatly dispatched to Cap^t Putnams relief. The Commanding officer from this Garrison sent 150 Men in whale boats to fall on the Enemys rear. Mohawks brought in two Scalps.

2^d. A party with provision arrived here informed us that Cap^t Putnam was got in safe into fort Edward. His party & himself having fired away all their Amunition were obliged to Make their retreat. Three of his Men are Missing.

This day Four Germans in the French Service made their escape from Ticonderogo. They say they were enlisted at Strasbourg for Huzars in the Dutch Service & were sold to the French. There are four or five hundred (before?) who only want an opportunity of making their escape. There is but 1000 at Ticonderogo, 600 of them at the fort 100 at the Sawmills and 300 at their advance guard & only 80 at Crown point, that they are all starving for want of provision. I expect we shall attack them very soon.

3^d. The Four deserters were sent down to General Webb.

4th/5th/6th. The Party who were sent to Wood Creek returned without seeing any of the Enemy. In moving homeward they were hailed by a man on a point of land the East side of the Lake about four Mile down the Lake. They sent their boats ashore & took him in, he was almost starved & unable to give any account of himself.

7th. A Scout of thirty Men went out.

8th/9th/10th. A boat with three Men returned belonging to the Scout that went out on the Seventh two of the three were left to take care of the Boat, the Other says the party were fired on by the Enemy while they were eating & imagined the whole were taken or killed. two more came in at night by land giving but bad accounts of the affair.

11th. Party of Twenty came in here. They went on a scout from Fort Edward & were perceived by the Enemy at South bay; in crossing a large track they sent three men to reconoitre it who never returned to them, the Enemy pursued the three last days, during which time them crossed several large fresh tracks of the Enemy. From the above Account two hundred Men are immediatly ordered for South Bay.

*th/th. Scout returned from South Bay. No Sign of any Enemy.

16th. Scout of two hundred went down the Lake in Boats to Ticonderogo.

17th. Capt. Macginnis with 100 Men & 15 Indians went on a Scout.

21st. A Serjeant & ten men came in with a wounded Mane from Capt. Magginnis. The party had fired on a boat of the Enemy with 14 or 16 in it who were all rowing they imagine they killed all except four, as the rest fell down in the Bottom of the boat. In the Evening the Scout of the 16th returned nothing done. The Commanding officer Co^l Goffe lay the whole time on an island & dispatched a lieutenant & eight men to reconoitre Ticonderogo. they say they have a large number of Troops there.

22^d/23^d. Col^l Parker with 300 Men went on a Scout to Ticonderogo.

24th. Four Boats of Col^l Parkers Scout came in which were all out of 26 he took with him. *** 20 Miles down the Lake. They missed three of their boats in the night & hearing some shots steered that way & seeing the Enemy on shore they attempted to land but were most of them killed and taken the Enemy seeing them in great confusion surrounded them with boats which were concealed behind a point, & took them all except the four which came in & one that landed on the West Side whose are not Yet come in, there are near 250 Mifsing. This Evening two men came in from Fort Edward giving an account of thirteen men being scalped at Fort Edward the Morning of the 23^d. They were guarding the Workmen. Some of the Centinels were shot with Arrows. The Party Maintained their ground till the Garrison went to their relief who pursued the Enemy but to little purpose only recovering two or three of the Scalps the Enemy had taken & some trifling things belonging to the Indians.

25th. General Webb arrived here. Mohawks brought in two Scalps (say?) the French were very numerous.

26th/27th. Reconoitred the hill on the East Side of the Swamp.

28th. The Troops removed from their Encampment on the hill to the Westward to the other hill on the East Side.

29th. Began the Brestwork round the Encampment. General Webb & Suite went Back to Fort Edward from intelligence received by Capt Putnam of a very large body of the Enemy being up North West Bay & great numbers of boats.

2^d August in the Night two whale boats who were sent on a Scout were chased by some french boats & fired on, the boats made shore as fast as possible, but only five out of thirteen have gotten in.

*3d. In the Morning * whole fleet of the Enemy discovered themselves on the West Side of the Lake moving downwards. They fired several shots from small Artillery out of their Boats. The Alarm guns were fired. In the Evening a flag of truce came from Montcalm, designing us to capitulate & that we should out with all the honors of War. Col. Monro the Commanding Officer rejected the proposals with Scorn. The Indians kept firing round us all day. at Night we lighted fires all round the Camp.*

4th. Perceived the Enemy beginning their approaches. The Enemy fired some Musquetrie on all sides. Burst Seven inch Mortar in pieces no damage done. Pulled down all the Roofs of the Barracks. At Night The Enemy brought down some of their large boats & some other Craft supposed to have their Artillery on board. Very quiet all Night.

5th. The Enemy as Usual kept firing at the Fort & Encampment. An Eighteen pounder burst & wounded several Men. In the Night a boat came close to some of the Sloops with an intent to set them on fire, but was drovs of (drove off) by the fire from the Garrison. The Enemy were heared working all Night.

6th. In the Morning discovered the Enemys Battery of Nine Pieces of Cannon & one Seven Inch Mortar. We fired two shells & one thirty two pounder before the Enemy fired from their Battery. The Enemy from their shot have only one eighteen pounder a fourteen & the rest from twelve to Six.

They fired down our flag(staff in?) a little time & in attempting to replace it a Carpenters had his head shot off. The Enemy continues firing shells till about at 8(?) lcock at Night Many of them came into the Fort.

7th. The Enemy opened another Battery of ten Embrazures and two howitzers. Most of the Shells fell in the Fort.

About 10 o'clock a flag of Truce appeared before the Fort. The Officer who had the letter for the Commandant I brought into the Fort. It was no Summons only a complimentary letter to the Commandant informing him of their having taken an exprefs from General Webb. They Brought the letter with them which they had taken. The Enemy still continue working & carrying on their approaches. The Garrison kept a continual fire both of Shells & cannon till Night, the Shells wounded several more. At Night the Garrison kept a continual watch for fear of an assault.

8th. At Break of day begin firing on both sides with shot & shells.

(END)

The next page is torn from the document, but the first few letters of nine lines are visible. A faint map of the entrenched camp appears on the following page.

From Adam Williamson to Colonel Monro (LO 4061, August 4, 1757); no other similar notes survived the Siege:

Fort W^m. Henry August 4, 1757

Sir,

The Mortar on the North Bastion is burst to pieces which is replaced by a Howitzer. An Eighteen pounder on the East Bastion is split at the Muzzle & extremely Honeycomb'd which I think would be dangerous to fire, so will replace it with a Nine pounder. If You think it proper will have the Barracks unroofed immediatly; The Chimneys I think may stand, as they are built of Brick. Some few of the Enemy seem at time to be working on the West Side of the Lake, but cant discover what they are doing. Imagine they are throwing up a small Breastwork of Logs & Boughs, but nothing of the Battery kind.

*I am Sir Your most humble
Servant,
Adam Williamson*

From the Film, *The Last of the Mohicans* (1992) and then a suggested revision:

Colonel Monro: *The situation is that his guns are bigger than mine and he has more of them. We keep our heads down while his troops dig 30 yards of trench a day. When those trenches are 200 yards from the fort and within range, he'll bring in his 15-inch mortars, lob explosive rounds over our walls, and pound us to dust.*

Colonel Monro: *The situation is that he has more heavy guns than I do. We keep our heads down while his troops dig 100 yards of trench a day. When those trenches are 150 yards from the fort, he'll bring up his 18-pound cannon, pulverize our walls, all the while lobbing explosive rounds on top of our heads. Major Heyward, the Marquis de Montcalm fully intends to pound us to dust.*

or taking it to an absurd extreme where understanding is sacrificed to accuracy:

Colonel Monro: *The situation is that he has more heavy guns than I do. We keep our heads down while his troops dig 100 yards of trench a day. When those trenches are 150 yards from the fort, he'll bring up his 20-pound and 18-pound cannon, pulverize our walls, all the while lobbing explosive rounds on top of our heads. Major Heyward, the Marquis de Montcalm fully intends to pound us to dust.*

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Note: I often find the standard format for citations in histories to be an exercise in intense frustration. Because of the confusion in past histories, it was decided accuracy and traceability were the key considerations. The protocols adopted here are much more closely aligned with the biological sciences. This should allow for easy and immediate identification of the sources for each statement being presented, but it takes away from the flow of the writing — the tradeoff being the ability to quickly judge the reliability of the sources, invaluable in a muddled environment. The most obvious example is the Fyre Journal, a narrative central to the events, but containing many errors and inaccuracies. Fyre and caution are forever married. Where Fyre and French documents seemingly conflict, the reliability of the French documents should not be discounted, dismissed, or ignored. In many instances, the transcriptions of the various correspondence serve in the role of notes.

Where the events are accurately described in previous works, there is little or no discussion. Much of the French role is already solid and well told, so many specifics are skipped here. Previous criticisms of French Army documents being grandiose and inflated are false. As a source, Bougainville is extraordinary. Besides serving as a French Army Officer under Montcalm, he went on to serve as an admiral in the French Navy, noted for his exploration of the western Pacific. Bougainville published a two-volume treatise on calculus and later served as the President of the French Academy of Science.

In contrast, the Americans and British left an incomplete and convoluted trail of correspondence that needs much more explanation. The British Army wanted the incident buried and forgotten, leaving a paucity of writings on the events of the actual siege. Concerning the events of the siege, Loudoun is stone quiet.

The focus of this work was supplying missing pieces and identifying conflicts and inconsistencies between the various documents. Untold elements of the story are still likely contained in the Winslow Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society in Boston — including the missing 1756 storehouse records and commissary records from Fort William Henry (LO 1583) and the possible role of colonial foundries. Additional information on colonial foundries may be tied to unpublished correspondence and records of William Shirley at the Massachusetts Historical Society plus the Stirling Papers at the New York Historical Society, now classified under the Alexander Papers, Series 2, 1744-circa 1786 (Manuscripts).

Shirley first meets with Abercromby in Albany in late June 1756, but what documents were then shared is clouded by interpretation of the language within the cover letter (Correspondence of William Shirley, Vol. II, June 27, 1756, Pages 468-469; and LO 1257):

The Inclosed Copy of the Minutes of a Council of War held in this City the 25th of last May, with the Papers referred to in it, will shew you the unanimous Opinion of that Council concerning the most adviseable manner of employing his Majesty's Troops in the 44th, 48th, 50th, 51st Regiments, and four Independent Companies of New York, and the Irregular Troops rais'd in the four Colonies of New England, and the Provinces of New York, New Jerseys, and North Carolina; Returns of the Strength of all which I have ordered to be lay'd before you, together with returns of the Brigade of Engineers and Train of Artillery now here, and Lists of the Ordnance and Military Stores now at Oswego, and at Forts Edward upon Hudson's River and William Henry at Lake George, and this place; as also of the addition of Artillery and Stores proposed to be provided for the Service upon

the Lake Ontario and Lake George; likewise a State of the Magazines of Provisions now at Oswego and Lake George, with an Account of those daily carrying up there, and to Saratoga.

Some of the information promised is contained in LO 4394 (*A Monthly Return of His Majesty's Forces in North America*, Halkett, June 24, 1756). This second document was likely given to Abercromby at the same time as LO 1257, but there is no information in LO 4394 about the troops or inventories positioned at Fort Edward or Fort William Henry. LO 4394 includes summary returns for the 50th and the 51st Foot, but no ordnance stores for Oswego. LO 1258 (Shirley to Abercromby, June 28, 1756) conveys maps, provides minor information about the 50th and the 51st Foot, and recommends some 500 men be assigned to “on-command” postings in the Mohawk Valley, but little more. Abercromby describes the documents and ledgers given to him by Shirley as “voluminous” (Abercromby to Loudoun, LO 1263 A & B, June 30, 1756), but nothing in LO 1263 indicates that any inventories relating to Fort Edward or Fort William Henry were attached to Shirley’s June 27th letter. Much in the June 27th letter relates to the importance of improving the alliance with the Iroquois and methods to do so. In none of these letters is there any alarm relating to Oswego, Shirley is painting himself as a good steward of the 50th and 51st Foot — Bradstreet arrived at Oswego with 600 bateaux on July 1st. A month later, LO 1356 is provided by Halkett, Shirley’s Brigade Major — *Proportion of Ordnance & Stores at the old Fort Oswego & Fort Ontairo*, Halkett, July 27, 1756. This timeline suggests that the phrase “*Returns of the Strength of all which I have ordered to be lay’d before you*” simply means that Shirley has ordered Halkett to prepare the troop and ordnance inventories, not that they were actually included as “attachments” to the June 27 letter (LO 1257). I was unable to find corresponding inventories for either Fort Edward or Fort William Henry, dating to Summer 1756. Other copies of Shirley’s June 27th letter are housed at the Library of Congress, the Parkman Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society, and in both CO_5_46 and CO_5_47. If they were indeed prepared, there is a chance that the “hinted at” documents are housed in those collections.

Some of the discussions in the appendices are repetitive, but thought needed, in what are very dry subjects. Key “light bulb” moments were only realized by careful and repeated review of these seemingly esoteric elements.

In many ways, this work is more of a reference text and guide for the next historian who will hopefully compose a smooth flowing, yet accurate, history that avoids the many past misrepresentations.