

# AVSEC 20 BUSINESS NOT AS USUAL



# ICAO AVSEC2021

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## **Hybrid Threats**

#### Attacking aviation systems to facilitate physical harm

Acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation, traditionally physical, increasingly cyber, and now hybrid.

## AVSEC is not just about physical security

Cyber v Physical Security: a different focus but many crossovers

Different reporting lines, models, language, separate risk registers, risk management techniques\*

A tale of 2 silos: limited collaboration, some communication

#### **Attack methods**


Disabling Critical National Infrastructure

Creative targeting of aviation – offset navaids

Disabling CCTV over IP networking

The JamCovid App security incident









#### Identifying warning signals has become more complex Lessons for the aviation sector - and other transport modes

- Identification of 'warning signals' is key
- > The sector has suffered from missed warning signals
- > Hybrid threats increase the risk of warning signals being missed
- Perceived/mis-assessed/wrong assumptions/ threat
- ➤ Industry watch why we need to learn from others
- "Too difficult" box regular monitoring as a minimum
- Pandemic effect distracted, disgruntled and demoralised workforce



Resilience

handshake

## Leveraging available means and capabilities

ICAO Doc 8973 Security Manual

Chapter 9.3: Security Management System

An organized, systematic approach to managing aviation security

- Management commitment and accountability
- Resources (including thirdparty service providers)
- Threat and risk management
- Performance monitoring, reporting and continuous improvement
- Incident response
- SeMS training programme
- Communication



All components can be designed to promote collaboration

## A key lesson from the pandemic

Having a SeMS improved resilience

"We found that organisations with a robust SeMS managed the pandemic impact better than those without"\*

\*A national regulator

#### WHY?

- Warning signals were recognised earlier
- Communication was clearer
- Incident response was ready and was effective
- Escalation to Crisis management was smoother
- Crisis management was ready

#### HOW?

- Processes were robust, understood, practised
- Security as done, not security as imagined

#### A robust SeMS:

- Adapts to reduced resources and everchanging circumstances and constraints
- Leverages available means and capabilities
- Proactively prepared for future emergencies\*

## Thank You

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