

2024 Establishing Trust in Our Elections Rick Weible


www.midwestswampwatch.com



Donate and send tips to www.midwestswampwatch.com tips@midwestswampwatch.com

Raising Awareness about Need for Integrity in Minnesota Elections

DIFFICULTY



INNOVATION / AWARENESS





More than 25 highly dedicated individuals meeting weekly since August 2022; researching and identifying election reform strategies for Anoka County

PRESENTERS PROFILES


- Derek Lind—Ramsey, financial analyst
- Brenda Miller—Columbus, election judge, occ. therapist, homeschooler
- Paul Berndt—Coon Rapids, Manufacturing engineering
- Davin Tormanen—Vadnais Heights, 25 yrs. electronics technology
- Robert Kirchner—Coon Rapids, 40 yrs., local gov't. admin.
- Lori Mahowald—Coon Rapids, election judge, operations/project mgmt.

Other Contributors

- Troy Cooper—Ramsey, financial services IT mgmt. & small business owner
- Jeannie Erickson—Coon Rapids, election judge, 30 yrs. Admin assistant
- Lisa Henrickson—Linwood Twp., election judge, 37 yrs. state of MN
- Gary Kemmetmueller—Coon Rapids, electronics technology
- Richard Klabechek—Oak Grove, applied math/manufacturing engineer
- Jonathan Liebsch—Ham Lake, election judge, software developer
- Sue Peterson—Ham Lake, election judge
- Joe Richardson—Andover, election judge, power/energy industry
- Channing Stowell—East Bethel, M.I.T. Sloan School trained data scientist
- Pam Weber—Andover, election judge, physical therapist



MN Statute: Piling System



"It takes approximately 6 seconds to hand count a contest ... including training time, sorting, stacking and counting."

(*Hands-On Elections* by Nancy Tobi, 2010, pp. 92-93)





In November, 2023, a re-count of a AHSD #11 election involving 4,393 ballots took just over 5 seconds to process each vote.





A FEASIBLE STRATEGY

- Use tabulators as mandated by State law
- Conduct Expanded Post-Election Review (PER)
- Hand count votes only for competitive offices

Hand Count Feasibility Study

In the handout is your Hand Count Feasibility Study detailing the time and cost to hand count ballots and votes in the 2024 in your city.



City Council votes 5-0 to hand count all four precincts and all competitive offices

in November Election under Post-Election Review (PER)






There has been a lot of discussion about election integrity over the years and I think it is time to make sure things are being done correctly.

I requested to have this resolution added to the council agenda this past Monday as a discussion item and the resolution passed 5-0!

This signed resolution will be sent to Anoka County requesting they conduct a post-election review on our four precincts this November. It is important to me as your mayor that your vote counts.


I would like to thank the council for supporting this resolution.





City of Ramsey Agenda Regular City Council <u>Tuesday, June 11, 2024</u>

City of Ramsey seeks to hand count votes during the 2024 Post-Election



Ramsey City Council voted 7-0 to hand count 2/3 of their 9 precincts under Post-Election Review (PER) for the 2024 General Election. This will include all offices with more than one candidate, with the exception of judicial offices.

The City Decision Process

- **CONTACT:** in person at open forum, by phone or email, including memes
- REQUEST: 30 minute PowerPoint presentation and Q&A
- PRESENTATION(S): usually work session followed by a regular meeting for a decision
- FOLLOW UP: phone, emails or meetings to address questions or additional information
- LOBBYING: we meet with individual council members; they cannot meet in an unposted meeting
- CONSULTING: communicate with administrators and/or elections manager to address questions
- FLEXIBILITY: Each council is a little different
- PROFESSIONAL: cities evaluate our information and our credibility
- TRUST: Building trust is key

Anoka County
Election Integrity
Team
(ACEIT)

We ask the Anoka County Commissioners, Mayors, City Council and School Board Members to vote for Secure, Transparent and Locally-Controlled Elections

Formation/Organization

- Grassroots formation
- Weekly meetings
- Sub-Teams
 - Networking
 - Marketing
 - Tech
 - Admin
 - Cross-Team Projects



SD35 Convention

• "Duty is Ours, Results are God's" ~John Quincy Adams



Strategies

- MESSAGE: secure, transparent & local control
- NON-PARTISAN: consultant role
- COUNTY: focus at first with speeches
- CITY: focus registered voters & ballot data
- CONNECTIONS: with GOP BPOUs
- GOAL: is local control by County-City cooperation
- FOCUS: on what can be done within existing laws
- PLAN: comprehensive 6-point message

We need transparent, verifiable, and auditable hand counting for public trust.

And send a message:

Don't mess with Anoka County; don't mess with my city.

Process

- RESEARCH: study & analysis—data, diagrams, system analysis
- MARKETING: emails, postcards, memes & trade fairs
- **SPEECHES:** Open forum speeches to County and cities
- LOBBYING: tactful direct interaction with politicians
- CONSULTING: tactful direct interaction with County/city staff
- PRESENTATIONS: to elected officials plus Q&A
- **DOCUMENTATION:** reports, resolutions, USBs




Products/Templates

- 5 Post Cards to distribute or mail
- 82 two-minute speeches to County (online video)
- Presentations to cities via PowerPoint (available in pdf)
- Handouts (available hardcopy and pdf)
- Resolutions (WORD)
- Memes (generic inventory)
- Locally-Controlled Elections Kit to cities (USB of all documents)
- aceit@aceit.vote (email address)
- www.projectminnesota.com/anoka (website)
- anoka county election integrity team Search Results | Facebook

BROCHURE
SUMMARY
FINDINGS
RECOMMENDATIONS
RESOLUTIONS
HAND COUNT COST DATA

ACHIEVING SECURE & TRANSPARENT LOCALLY-CONTROLLED ELECTIONS



Our presentation contains information specific to Linwood Township

Statutory Powers and Potential Actions



USB: Locally-Controlled Elections Kit

- Presentation (pdf)
- Handout Brochure (pdf)
- Hand Count Plan Time/Cost Calculator (Ex
- 11 Resolutions for Action (WORD)
- Oak Grove & Ramsey Resolutions (WORD)

Questions & Answers





2024 Establishing Trust in Our Elections Rick Weible

www.midwestswampwatch.com



Donate and send tips to www.midwestswampwatch.com tips@midwestswampwatch.com

About Rick Weible



- Born and Raised in Minnesota
- B.A. Political Science University of Minnesota
- 14 Years Elected Office 4 Years City Council, 10 Years Mayor St. Bonifacius
- 8 Years MN GOP CD3 Co-Chair and State Exec.
- Certified Network Engineer
- Worked at Help/Systems, the first ISO 9000 Software Company in USA.
- 28 Years of Cyber Security Consulting Experience
- CEO for D3Defense
- Moved to South Dakota 2018
- Manage clients DOD CMMC 2.0 Level 3 Certifications and Audits

Election Integrity – The Gold Standard



Transparency Is The Inoculation To All Conspiracy Theories

MN Gold Standards Let's Review Together

Risks in Minnesota

Building Blocks – MN Constitution

ARTICLE VII ELECTIVE FRANCHISE

Section 1. Eligibility; place of voting; ineligible persons. Every person 18 years of age or more who has been a citizen of the United States for three months and who has resided in the precinct for 30 days next preceding an election shall be entitled to vote in that precinct. The place of voting by one otherwise qualified who has changed his residence within 30 days preceding the election shall be prescribed by law. The following persons shall not be entitled or permitted to vote at any election in this state: A person not meeting the above requirements; a person who has been convicted of treason or felony, unless restored to civil rights; a person under guardianship, or a person who is insane or not mentally competent.

Building Blocks – MN Constitution

- Sec. 2. Residence. For the purpose of voting no person loses residence solely by reason of his absence while employed in the service of the United States; nor while engaged upon the waters of this state or of the United States; nor while a student in any institution of learning; nor while kept at any almshouse or asylum; nor while confined in any public prison. No soldier, seaman or marine in the army or navy of the United States is a resident of this state solely in consequence of being stationed within the state.
- Sec. 5. Elections by ballot. All elections shall be by ballot except for such town officers as may be directed by law to be otherwise chosen.

MINNESOTA VOTER REGISTRATION APPLICATION

Complete lines 1 through 7. Please print clearly.

Pers	sonal Information and Qualifications			Permanent Absente	e Voter
1	Are you a U.S. citizen? Yes 🔲 No 🔲	NOTE: this section is or			
2	Are you at least 16 years old and will you be at I on or before the day of the election in which you If you mark "NO" to either of these questions	I request to have an absentee ballot mailed to the address where I live (residence) before each election in which I am eligible to vote.			
3	Last name or surname	First name	Mid	ldle name	Suffix
4	Address where you live (residence)	Apt. number	City	ZIP code	
	If mail cannot be delivered to the address above	, provide P.O. Box	City	ZIP code	
	If you do not have a physical address, describe where	e you live, with sufficient det	ail that your vo	oting precinct can be determine	ned
	This is the first gate the	ne state has lef	t wide o	pen for fraud.	


https://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/5975/minnesota-voter-registration-application.pdf

MINNESOTA VOTER REGISTRATION APPLICATION


Complete lines 1 through 7. Please print clearly.

6	Mark one box and provide the number that applies to you:
	☐ I have a MN-issued driver's license or MN ID card number:
	☐ I do not have a MN-issued driver's license or MN ID card.
	The last four digits of my Social Security Number are:
	I do not have a MN-issued driver's license, a MN-issued ID card, or a Social Security Number.

Read And Sign Only If All Parts Apply To You.



MN – View your Sample Ballot



https://myballotmn.sos.mn.gov/

MN Election Code

206.57 EXAMINATION OF NEW VOTING SYSTEMS.

Subd. 6. Required certification.

In addition to the requirements in subdivision 1, a voting system must be certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the Election Assistance Commission or appropriate federal agency responsible for testing and certification of compliance with the federal voting systems guidelines at the time of submission of the application required by subdivision 1 to be in conformity with voluntary voting system guidelines issued by the Election Assistance Commission or other previously referenced agency. The application must be accompanied by the certification report of the voting systems test laboratory. A certification under this section from an independent testing authority accredited by the Election Assistance Commission or other previously referenced agency meets the requirement of Minnesota Rules, part 8220.0350, item L. A vendor must provide a copy of the source code for the voting system to the secretary of state. A chair of a major political party or the secretary of state may select, in consultation with the vendor, an independent third-party evaluator to examine the source code to ensure that it functions as represented by the vendor and that the code is free from defects. A major political party that elects to have the source code examined must pay for the examination. Except as provided by this subdivision, a source code that is trade secret information must be treated as nonpublic information, according to section 13.37. A third-party evaluator must not disclose the source code to anyone else.

https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/206.57

MN bypasses the EAC.GOV and has additional versions.

The EAC Standards

- 2002
- 2005 (1.0)
- 2015 (1.1) Never Tested Through EAC
- 2021 (2.0)
- As described in section 3 of the EAC's <u>VVSG Lifecycle Policy</u>, the EAC no longer accepts submissions to test new voting systems to previous major versions 12 months after new major VVSG standards are ready to be used for testing. With the accreditation of the first VSTL to test to VVSG 2.0 on November 15, 2022, VVSG 1.0 and VVSG 1.1 are now no longer used by the EAC to certify voting systems as of November 16, 2023.

ES&S 5.3.4.0 Modem Issue Risk – MN 2019

Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State-Elections Division

Certification Report and Recommendation

ES&S EVS 5.3.4.0 Voting System

FILED

Prepared by
Elections Division
Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State
State of Minnesota
June 10, 2019

Hardware:	Firmware Version	Hardware Version	os	SBC	PEB
AutoMARK VAT (1)	1.8.6.1	A100 v. 1.0	5.00.20	1.0	1.70
AutoMARK VAT (2)	1.8.6.1	A200 v. 1.1	5.00.20	2.0	1.70
AutoMARK VAT (3)	1.8.6.1	A200 v. 1.3(0)	5.00.20	2.5	1.70
AutoMARK VAT (4)	1.8.6.1	A300 v. 1.3(1)	5.00.20	2.5	1.70
DS200	2.12.4.0	1.2, 1.2.3, 1.3			
Plactic Ballot Boy	NΛ	10 11 12 13			

DS200	2.12.4.0	1.2, 1.2.3, 1.3	
Plastic Ballot Box	NA	1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3	
Collapsible Ballot Box	NA	1.0	
Metal Ballot Box w/Diverter	NA	1.0, 1.1, 1.2	
DS850	2.10.2.0	1.0	
DS450	3.0.0.0	1.0	

Cerberus FTP Server WS_FTP Professional

COTS:	Version	
Cisco A5505 Firewall	9.1.7	
Cisco A5506X Firewall	9.6.4	
Symantec Endpoint protection	14.0.1	
Kiwi Server Log	9.6.3	
Cerberus FTP Server	9.0.3.1	<u>https</u>

12.6.0.3

https://officialdocuments.sos.state.mn.us/Files/GetDocument/119091

ES&S 6.0.4.0 (EAC Certification – not in MN)

- Windows 7 (Support Ended Jan 14th, 2020)
- 22/23 counties have the dell laptops
- Out of date AntiVirus Norton Jan 22nd 2019 is latest date on it.
- FTP Server 10.0.5 is out of date and not supported.
- Laptops on purchase order Latitude 3500 are not certified for use.
- Modems are not EAC certified for use...
- https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_syst em/files/EVS6040_Cert_Scope%28FINAL%29.pdf



1101101101 (2.2)			
DS200	2.17.4.0	1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.3,	Precinct Count
		1.3.11	Tabulator
DCAEG	2440	4.0	e

They Say It....At Least They Are Honest



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Conformance



ES&S EVS 6.0.6.0

The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version 1.0 (VVSG 1.0)*. Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the EAC *Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual* and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.

Product Name: EVS

Model or Version: 6.0.6.0

Name of VSTL: Pro V&V

EAC Certification Number: ESSEVS6060

Date Issued: December 28, 2021

Mona Harrington

Executive Director

Scope of Certification Attached

ES&S 6.0.6.0 (Windows 10 – 2022 Elections)

- Windows 10 4/19/2021
- Windows Defender N/A is version
- Norton Removed
- FTP Server 11.0.07 out of date.
- PostgreSQL 11
- Laptop Hardware not conforming...
- Could have imported the modems....

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Hardware Version	Model	Comments	
DS200	2.21.0.0	1.2, 1.3		Precinct count tabulator that scans voter selections from both sides of the ballot simultaneously	



ES&S 6.0.6.0 (Windows 10 – 2022 Elections)

- Windows 10 4/19/2021
- Windows Defender N/A is version
- Norton Removed
- FTP Server 11.0.07 out of date.
- PostgreSQL 11

COTS Software

Manufacturer	Application	Version
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Server 2016	WIN2016_6060.iso
Microsoft Corporation	Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC	WIN10_6060.iso
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Updates	Package date:
	(Software updates included in	WIN10_6060.iso-4/19/2021
	the OS image)	WIN2016_6060.iso-4/19/2020
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Defender Antivirus	N/A
	(Configured within the OS	
	image)	
Dell	TPM Utility	DellTpm2.0_Fw1.3.2.8_V1_64.exe
Cerberus	Cerberus FTP Server - 11.3.4 (64-bit)	
	Enterprise	
Adobe	Adobe Acrobat	11.0.07
Yubico Login for Windows	Dual Factor Authentication	2.0.3
	YubiKey USB keys for dual	
	factor authentication (optional)	
PostgreSQL	PostgreSQL11	11

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Hardware Version	Model	Comments
DS200	2.21.0.0	1.2, 1.3		Precinct count tabulator that scans voter selections from both sides of the ballot simultaneously

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/ES%26S%20EVS%206060%20Certificate%20and%20Scope%20of%20Conformance%2012_28_21.pdf

ES&S 6.0.6.0 (Windows 10 – 2022 Elections - MN)

- Windows 10 4/16/2021
- Windows Defender N/A is version
- Norton Removed
- FTP Server 11.0.07 out of date.
- PostgreSQL 11

Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State-Elections Division

Certification Report and Recommendation ES&S EVS 6.0.6.0 Voting System

Prepared by
Elections Division
Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State
State of Minnesota
April 6, 2022

Document Number: 222914 Filed: April 11, 2022 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS):

Adobe Acrobat Standard Cerberus FTP Server Operating System – Windows 10 Enterprise LSC (ISO) Operating System – Windows Server 2016 (ISO) Windows Updates

Version

XI 11.3.4 (64-bit) WIN10_6060.iso Win2016_606.iso WIN10_6060.iso-4/16/2021 WIN2016_6060.iso-4/16/2020

6.0.6.0 Hardware Allowed – EAC, Missing MN

COTS Hardware

Manufacturer	Hardware	Model/Version
Dell	EMS Server	PowerEdge T430, T440, T630
Dell	EMS Client or Standalone	Latitude 5580, OptiPlex 5040, 5050, 7020
	Workstation	
Dell	Trusted Platform Module	5.63.3353.0
	(TPM) Chip 1.2 and 2.0	
	(optional)	
Toshiba	EMS Standalone	Tecra A50-C
Innodisk	LISR FDC H2SF (1GR) for	DFFLIH1-01GI72AC1SR

ES&S 6.0.7.0 (Windows 10 – 2022 Elections - MN)

- Windows 10 4/16/2021
- Windows Defender N/A is version
- Norton Removed
- FTP Server 11.0.07 out of date.
- PostgreSQL 11

Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State-Elections Division

Certification Report and Recommendation ES&S EVS 6.0.7.0 Voting System

Document Number: 222920 Filed: April 12, 2022 Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon Prepared by
Elections Division
Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State
State of Minnesota
April 8, 2022

Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS): Version Adobe Acrobat Standard XI Cerberus FTP Server 11.3.4 (64-bit) Operating System – Windows 10 Enterprise LSC (ISO) WIN10_6070.iso Operating System – Windows Server 2016 (ISO) Win2016_6070.iso

Operating System – Windows Server 2016 DATACOMM(ISO) Win2016_6070DC.iso 7/23/2021 Windows Updates WIN10_6060.iso-4/16/2021

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Hardware Version	Model	Comments
DS200	2.21.0.0	1.2, 1.3		Precinct count tabulator that scans voter selections from both sides of the ballot simultaneously

1

So Wait.....Did You Notice the DS200 Models POLITICO



January 7, 2020

Chairwoman Christy McCormick Vice Chair Benjamin Hovland U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1335 East West Highway, Suite 4300 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 cmccormick@eac.gov bhovland@eac.gov

RE: Request to investigate ES&S for misrepresentations regarding EAC certification of voting machines with modems

Dear Chairwoman McCormick,

CYBERSECURITY

Election commission orders top voting machine vendor to correct misleading claims

This isn't the first time Election Systems & Software has faced accusations of making fabricated or misleading assertions about its voting machines.

By **KIM ZETTER** 08/13/2020 05:00 PM EDT










The federal Election Assistance Commission has rebuked the nation's top voting-machine maker over marketing materials that the panel says deceptivel implied the company's voting machines are EAC-certified.

The commission admonished Election Systems & Software over promotional literature and statements on its website that appear to assert, falsely, that voting machines the company sells with embedded modems have been sanctioned by the EAC under its testing and certification program. The statements put ES&S in violation of the EAC's testing and certification rules, the commission wrote in a previously unreported March 20 letter to the company that POLITICO obtained, and directed ES&S to revise the literature and notify customers that the systems are not certified.

Current Risk in the United States

NEW MALWARE AND PUA PER SECOND Last 12 months: 120,899,635 Per month: 10,074,969 Per day: 331,231 Per hour: 13,801 New malware in the I... New malware this year Per second: 3.8 55,786,064 3,346,703 **AXTEST** in 2024 In the last 14 days. ☆ < **-** - -

7.4.2 - Protection Against Malicious Software




7.4.2 Protection Against Malicious Software
 Voting systems shall deploy protection
 against the many forms of threats to which
 they may be exposed such as file and macro
 viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic
 bombs. Vendors shall develop and
 document the procedures to be followed
 to ensure that such protection is
 maintained in a current status.

ES&S 6.0.6.0 & 6.0.7.0 Status (EAC.gov)

COTS Software

Manufacturer	Application	Version
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Server 2016	WIN2016_6060.iso
Microsoft Corporation	Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC	WIN10_6060.iso
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Updates (Software updates included in the OS image)	Package date: WIN10_6060.iso-4/19/2021 WIN2016_6060.iso-4/19/2020
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Defender Antivirus (Configured within the OS image)	N/A

ES&S Electionware 6.0.6.0 MN is At HIGH Risk



Engineering Change Orders 6.0.6.0

ES&S ECO 1141

Date Submitted by Manufacturer

Wednesday, June 8, 2022

05/31/2022

Share >

Date Approved by EAC

Manufacturer

06/08/2022

Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)

Short Description of Changes

Testing Lab

This ECO addresses the Critical Vulnerability CVE-2021-34527, also known as PrintNightmare, in the Windows

Operating System. It also updates antivirus definitions for the applicable EVS systems.

Pro V&V

Additional Documentation

Impacted Device/System

EVS 6.2.0.0, EVS 6.0.6.0 <u>ESS ECO 1141 Approval 6.8.22.pdf</u> (161.7 KB)

Windows 10. Windows Server 2016

ES&S ECO 1141 Analysis.pdf (227.23 KB)

ES&S Electionware 6.0.6.0 MN is At HIGH Risk



ES&S Engineering Change Orders 6.1.1.0


Change ID	Date	Component	Description	Inclusion
ECO 1029	9/24/19	ExpressVote	Upgrade to 8GB Innodisk on EV 1.0	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1034	10/28/19	ExpressVote Voting Booth	Enhanced Voting Booth	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1035	2/13/20	DS200	Improve thermal stability and higher	DeMinimis
			resolution calibration characteristics.	Optional
ECO 1041	10/28/19	ExpressVote XL	Add brace to Wheel Struts	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1043	10/30/19	ExpressVote	Add 16G Innodisk to EV 1.0	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1044	9/13/19	DS200 Ballot Tote	Add ballot Tote Bag	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1047	2/28/20	ExpressVote XL	Aesthetic changes, modifications to	DeMinimis
			cart and curtain hardware.	Optional
ECO 1054	02/14/20	ExpressVote/ExpressVote	Update Ballot Bin	DeMinimis
		XL		Optional
ECO 1055	12/19/19	DS200 Ballot Bin tote	Add Ballot Tote Bag	DeMinimis
				Optional

Dominion 4.14 E – MN Cer

Amended Certification Report and Recommendation Dominion Democracy Suite, version 4.14-E Voting System

Prepared by

Elections Division Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State State of Minnesota January 28, 2016



COTS Software:

o Canon DR-GII30 Scanner

D.S. 4.14-E is a modification to Democracy Suite 4.14-D (D.S. 4.14-D), which is a modification to Democracy Suite

OTHE OF THE MININGSOLD SECRETARY OF STATE-FIELDING DIVISION

Section 5: Appendix

Section 1: Introduction

Version History 5.1

Version history and Certification Dates from NTS and OSS of Dominion Democracy Suite

System Version	System Modified	NTS Certification Date	OSS Certification Date
Democracy Suite 4.0	Original	05/10/2012	
D-Suite 4.14	D-Suite 4.0	07/18/2013	01/07/2014
D-Suite 4.14-A	D-Suite 4.14	9/20/2013	
D-Suite 4.14-B	D-Suite 4.14-A	01/07/2014	
D-Suite 4.14-D	D-Suite 4.14-B	11/25/2014	04/07/2015
D-Suite 4.14-E	D-Suite 4.14-D	06/25/2015	TBD

Dominion 4.14 E – EAC Certification

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Hardware Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
ImageCast Central	4.14.17	Canon DR-X10C Canon DR-G1130	COTS	Windows 7 Professional x64
Democracy Suite election management system	4.14.38	N/A (application software)	Windows Server 2008 R2	
Adjudication*	2.4.1.3201	N/A (application software)	Windows 7 Professional x64 or Windows Server 2008 R2	
Server Hardware		Dell PowerEdge R610 or T610	Windows Server 2008 R2	Processor: Intel Xeon E5-2620 2.4 GHz, Memory: 8x 4GB 1333MHz DDR3, Hard Drive Capacity: 2x 500GB
Server Hardware		Dell PowerEdge R620 or T620	Windows Server 2008 R2	Processor: Intel Xeon E5-2620 2.0 GHz, Memory: 2x 4GB 1333MHz DDR3, Hard Drive Capacity: 2x 500GB
Server Hardware		Dell PowerEdge R720 or T720	Windows Server 2008 R2	Processor: Intel Xeon E5-2620 2.0 GHz, Memory: 2x 4GB 1333MHz DDR3, Hard Drive Capacity: 2x 500GB
Client Hardware		Dell Precision T1500	Windows 7 Professional	Processor: Intel Core i7-860 2.8 GHz, Memory: 4x 1GB 1333MHz DDR3, Hard Drive Capacity: 500 GB
Client Hardware		Dell Precision T1700	Windows 7 Professional	Intel Core i5- 4570@3.2GHz, 8GB RAM, 500 GB HD



Date Issued: 07/02/2015

United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Conformance

VYSG 2005 VER. I

Dominion Voting Systems Democracy Suite 4.14-E

The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the 2005 *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (2005 VVSG)*. Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the EAC *Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual* and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.

roduct Name: De	mocracy Suite	
Iodel or Version:	4.14-E	Gled: Reller
Name of VSTL:	NTS Huntsville	
		Chico and Office & Anti- E-mil Disease

EAC Certification Number: DVS-DemSuite4.14-E

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Scope of Certification Attached

Dominion 5.5C – EAC.Gov



The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version 1.0 (VVSG 1.0)*. Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the EAC *Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual* and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.

Product Name: Democracy Suite

Model or Version: 5.5-C

Name of VSTL: Pro V&V

EAC Certification Number: DVS-DemSuite5.5-C

Executive Director

Date Issued: July 9, 2020 Scope of Certification Attached

System Component	Version	Operating System or COTS	Comments
Microsoft Windows Server	2012 R2 Standard	Unmodified COTS	EMS Server SW
			Component
Microsoft Windows	10 Professional	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server
			SW Component
.NET Framework	3.5	Unmodified COTS	EMS Client/Server
			SW Component

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/DVS%20DSuite%205.5-C%20Certification%20and%20Scope%2007-09-2020.pdf

Dominion 5.5C (MN Lies)

Certification Report and Recommendation Dominion Democracy Suite, version 5.5-C Voting System

Prepared by

Elections Division
Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State
State of Minnesota
April 12, 2022

Section 1: Introduction

Dominion Voting Systems (Dominion) submitted an application dated May 10, 2021, and Technical Data Package (TDP) to the Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State (OSS) to certify the Dominion Democracy Suite version 5.5-C (D-Suite 5.5-C) and Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-CS (D-Suite 5.5-CS) voting systems to the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).

The D-Suite 5.5-C is a modification from the previously certified Democracy Suite 4.14-E Voting System (D-Suite 4.14-E). The D-Suite 5.5-C Voting System received a recommendation for certification from Pro V & V, an independent testing authority, on July 7, 2020 and the D-Suite 5.5-CS Voting System received a recommendation for certification from Pro V & V on July 15, 2020. D-Suite 5.5-C is a paper-based optical scan voting system. D-Suite 5.5-C consist of the following major components:

https://officialdocuments.sos.state.mn.us/Files/GetDocument/131606

Dominion 5.5C – EAC.Gov



System Overview:

The D-Suite 5.5-C Voting System is a paper-based optical scan voting system with a hybrid paper/DRE option consisting of the following major components: The Election Management System (EMS), the ImageCast Central (ICC), the ImageCast Precinct (ICP and ICP2), the ImageCast Evolution (ICE), the ImageCast X (ICX) DRE w/ Reports Printer, ImageCast X (ICX) DRE w/ voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), and the ImageCast X ballot marking device (BMD). The D-Suite 5.5-C Voting System configuration is a modification from the EAC approved D-Suite 5.5-B system configuration.

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/DVS%20DSuite%205.5-C%20Certification%20and%20Scope%2007-09-2020.pdf

Dominion 5.5C – EAC.Gov Not a Modification from 4.14



2.1 Revision History

The table below details the version history of the D-Suite 5.5-C System:

Table 2-1. D-Suite 5.5-C System Revision History

System Version	Certification Type	Baseline System	Certification Number
D-Suite 5.0	New System	(Original System)	DVS-DemSuite5.0
D-Suite 5.5	Modification	D-Suite 5.0	DVS-DemSuite5.5
D-Suite 5.5-B	Modification	D-Suite 5.5	DVS-DemSuite5.5-B
D-Suite 5.5-C	Modification	D-Suite 5.5-B	DVS-DemSuite5.5-C*

^{*}Upon grant of certification by the EAC

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Dominion%20Voting%20Systems%20%20D-Suite%205.5-C%20Test%20Report-Rev.%2001.pdf

Dominion 5.5C (Modems)

Certification Report and Recommendation Dominion Democracy Suite, version 5.5-C Voting System

Prepared by

Elections Division
Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State
State of Minnesota
April 12, 2022

The Minnesota Secretary of State's Office (OSS) does not certify modems for transmitting election results. However, if a system contains or uses a modem the OSS tests the system with the modem to ensure that the presence of the modem does not impact the ability of the system being certified to properly and accurately count ballots and provide results. This report details the test results for D-Suite 5.5-C, which does not include a modem for transmission of results. The D-Suite 5.5-CS Voting System has the same components as D-Suite 5.5-C plus it includes the modeming capability. In the process of testing the D-Suite 5.5-C system the D-Suite 5.5-C system the D-Suite 5.5-CS Voting System was also tested to be sure that the modeming capability did not affect the capability of the D-Suite 5.5-C system to properly and accurately count ballots and report the results. As a result, although this report only addresses the recommendation of the certification of D-Suite 5.5-C, the use of D-Suite 5.5-C from properly and accurately counting ballots and providing accurate results.

ES&S Risks & EAC Response

2) With the VVSG 1.0 7.4.2 Protection Against Malicious Software, where it specifically states "Voting systems shall deploy protection against the many forms of threats to which they may be exposed such as file and macro viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs. Vendors shall develop and document the procedures to be followed to ensure that such protection is maintained in a current status." Should counties/states ask for Engineering Change Orders to be able to update the Antivirus definition files of the system before an election, to ensure the security of their systems? I see that many jurisdictions are using ES&S 6.1.1.0, and the antivirus of the laptop and desktops are stuck at March 29th, 2019....

Good morning

In response to your questions submitted yesterday:

- 1. If the laptop is being used as part of an EAC certified voting system, then yes, the county should look to have the vendor submit an engineering change order. Adding new models of laptop to an already certified system with an ECO is very common, and is one of the most frequently used reasons for ECO submissions.
- The ECO process can be used to update antivirus definition files and other security updates to voting systems. This was the subject of a Notification of Clarification (NOC) issued in 2019, which can be found on our website: https://www.eac.gov/noc-19-01

Sincerely,

Paul Aumayr | Sr. Election Technology Specialist
Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200 | Washington, DC 20001
www.eac.gov
| PAumayr@EAC.gov

2022 Case – Test Deck Fail?

Rhode Island reaches settlement with voting machine vendor over primary election errors

Secretary Gorbea Announces Settlement with Election Systems and Software Over Errors in the 2022 Election

by **Ryan Belmore** December 29, 2022









The Rhode Island Department of State has reached a settlement with voting machine vendor Election Systems and Software (ES&S) following programming errors that were discovered during the 2022 primary election.

As part of the settlement, ES&S will provide a credit of \$47,644 for all project management services provided during the election. In addition, the company has agreed to post a public statement (included below) on its website outlining best practices for collaborative Logic & Accuracy testing.

After the discovery of the programming errors in August, the Rhode Island Department of State's Elections Division worked with ES&S and the Rhode Island Board of Elections to develop new collaborative testing protocols to verify the accuracy of voting screens in both English and Spanish, as well as the accuracy of printed ballot cards.

Secretary of State Nellie Gorbea stated, "We have held our vendor accountable for their mistake, and working together we have succeeded in making systemic improvements to pre-election testing across my office, the Board of Elections and ES&S."

Rhode Island reaches settlement with voting machine vendor over primary election errors

Secretary Gorbea Announces Settlement with Election Systems and Software Over Errors in the 2022 Election

by **Ryan Belmore** December 29, 2022

https://whatsupnewp. com/2022/12/rhodeisland-reachessettlement-withvoting-machinevendor-over-primaryelection-errors/ The Rhode Island Department of State has reached a settlement with voting machine vendor Election Systems and Software (ES&S) following programming errors that were discovered during the 2022 primary election.

As part of the settlement, ES&S will provide a credit of \$47,644 for all project management services provided during the election. In addition, the company has agreed to post a public statement (included below) on its website outlining best practices for collaborative Logic & Accuracy testing.

Pre-election testing includes logic and accuracy (L&A) testing. It's the process by which the machines and ballots are publicly tested by jurisdictions before Election Day to confirm that the ballot content is accurate and those ballots will tabulate a voter's selections correctly. L&A testing increases confidence in elections.

ES&S wants to reiterate its recommendation for best practices which are contained on our online customer portal. "L&A testing starts with proofing all of your ballot styles, both paper and touch screen, for accuracy in layout and contests." This will ensure that all touch screens match exactly paper ballots, in every language used for voting.

Furthermore, we have also expressed: "To test your tabulation equipment, use a test deck of ballots and or ExpressVote vote summary cards containing votes for each candidate and questions in all contests, and where the expected results are known." This means that on touch screens, testing should include votes for all candidates and questions in all races. As we have said: "You can create your own test deck independently by manually filling out ballots for all ballot styles in sufficient quantity to vote all candidates/questions in all contests."

Voting machine company settles with RI over Spanish language ballot blunder



Published 2:13 p.m. ET Dec. 29, 2022 | Updated 3:11 p.m. ET Dec. 29, 2022



The election equipment provider in the middle of a <u>blunder on Spanish language</u> <u>ballots</u> in the September primaries has agreed to credit Rhode Island \$47,644, Secretary of State Nellie Gorbea said Thursday.

Nebraska-based Election Systems and Software "will provide a credit for all project management services provided in connection with the 2022 Primary Election," Gorbea said in a news release.

The company also agreed to post a message on its website reminding election workers that it's a good idea to proofread all ballots and test all tabulation machines before voters head to the polls.

"We have held our vendor accountable for their mistake, and working together we have succeeded in making systemic improvements to pre-election testing across my office, the Board of Elections and ES&S," Gorbea said in the release.

https://www.providencejournal.com/story/news/politics/2022/12/29/elections-systems-and-software-settle-with-ri-over-spanish-ballot-mistake/69764706007/



Voting rights groups call for investigation of Election Day problems in Northampton County

BY: PETER HALL - NOVEMBER 14, 2023 5:02 PM

"The county's conflicting messages to the public on Election Day led to confusion, concern, and doubt in the security and accuracy of votes. These mistakes grow into misinformation," said Philip Hensley-Robin, executive director of Common Cause PA.

The voting machine malfunction forced voters in Northampton County to vote via emergency ballots. County election officials said the issue was a "clerical error."

The malfunction occurred in the Superior Court retention race where the voter had to select 'Yes' or 'No' to vote for Judges Jack Panella and Victor Stabile to retain their seats.

"The programming error that occurred in Northampton County should be a lesson for every Pennsylvania county that uses hybrid touch screen voting machines," Marian Schneider, senior policy counsel for voting rights at the ACLU of Pennsylvania, said.

In addition to the investigation and report, the groups called on the county to evaluate voting machine logic and accuracy testing procedures and make adjustments to catch errors; issue public notices to allow observers during the testing, as required by the Election Code; and supply polling places with adequate emergency paper ballots, equal to 50% of the poll's registered voters.

Counties are required to perform logic and accuracy testing of all voting machines. According to the Pennsylvania Department of State, the testing is designed to detect issues with screen calibration, mislabeling and other potential problems to ensure the machines work properly.

"While the county completed some of this testing, it was not completed to adequacy or full compliance; otherwise the issue would have been caught and corrected before Election Day," the voting rights groups said in a statement.

ES&S Issues

- 1.2022 Rhode Island settlement with ES&S, programming errors https://whatsupnewp.com/2022/12/rhode-island-reaches-settlement-with-voting-machine-vendor-over-primary-election-errors/
- 2.2023 Northampton County Errors not caught earlier https://www.penncapital-star.com/blog/voting-rights-groups-call-for-investigation-of-election-day-problems-in-northampton-county/
- 3.2019 article ES&S Systems found on-line by Motherboard https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kxzk9/exclusive-critical-us-election-systems-have-been-left-exposed-online-despite-official-denials
- 4.2022 Monmouth County Election double count of votes, the fact they tried installing software like this is a violation https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases23/2023-0906-Monmouth-County-Investigation-Investigative-Facts-Report-(8-31-2023)-(With%20Exhibits).pdf
- 5.2023 Hinds County (published Aug 31st) Missing tapes from machines, starting at video 20:00 minutes... 26 precincts, DS200, 3 components to verify the vote...1) paper ballot 26/26 of precincts have ballots, machine tapes 26/26 did not include the tapes, media stick (thumb drive) 26/26 precincts did not include the media sticks in the ballot box....DS200 also has another measure, digital imaging, a picture of the ballot, not one digital image...ES&S turned it off....

https://www.wlbt.com/2023/08/31/archie-calls-hinds-co-democratic-chair-step-down-alleging-fraud-party-primary/

- 6.2023 Hinds County Ransomware Attack did happen, \$300,000 paid https://www.wlbt.com/2023/10/03/against-advice-board-attorney-feds-david-archie-reveals-how-much-hinds-county-paid-hackers-after-cyberattack/
- 7.2023 Hinds County start of Ransomware est (early Sept, story is Sept 11th) https://www.wapt.com/article/hinds-county-computer-system-remains-under-ransomware-attack/45053213
- 8.2023 ES&S Vote flips and poor test decks https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2023/11/07/pennsylvania-voting-machine-error-iudge/stories/202311070112
- 9.Remote Access software illegally installed on systems (2018)- (oldie but goodie) https://www.vice.com/en/article/mb4ezy/top-voting-machine-vendor-admits-it-installed-remote-access-software-on-systems-sold-to-states
- 10. Modems in 33,000 machines but didn't disclose where they are (2020) https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/13/election-voting-machine-misleading-claims-394891

What Can We Do?

Transparency Is The Inoculation To All Conspiracy Theories

Election Officials – Testing & Transparency

- Create Standard Test Deck (Logic and Accuracy) The "Control"
 - Use a Prime Number in each race.
 - Every Ballot Option Assigned a Unique Number On The Ballot
- Let Voters Fill Out Ballots and Test Separately
- Publish Test Deck Reports on County Web Site
- Ballots Images and Cast Vote Records Published Night of Election.
- Electronic Poll Book Data Published Night of Election.
- Post Election Audit of 100% of all precincts and races, by hand.

Candidates & Party

- Recruit, Organize & Train Poll Workers and Election Judges.
 - Laws, Rules, and What to Watch For.....chain of custody, signatures, folds, errors.
- Absentee Ballot Boards Ensure Party Balance.
- Recruit, Organize & Train Poll Watchers.
 - Laws, Rules, and What to Watch For.....backpacks, extra ballots, interpretations of bad ballots, use of thumb drives, unsecured areas and processes.
- Reporting of Incidents Ready Made Affidavit Templates
- Understanding Rights and Assemble Legal Teams
- Validate Voter Rolls Mailers & Post Cards Return Mail Service,
 Digital and Door to Door Canvassing

What Voters Can Do?

- Help Your Election Official
 - Attend Public Accuracy Tests
 - Consider Being an Election Judge/Worker
- Help Your Party or a Candidate
 - Attend Public Accuracy Tests
 - Consider Being a Poll Watcher
 - Register Voters
 - Validate Voter Rolls by Canvassing Voters
 - Write Letters to the Editor on How You are Helping to Protect the Election.

What Voters Can Do?


- Help Others Vote
 - Encourage Friends and Family to Vote
 - Register Others to Vote
 - Drive Others to the Polling Place on Election Day
- Verify that no one Voted Absentee for you
 - Some states don't allow you to change your vote on election day.
 - MN Request an absentee ballot and bring it in with you unused....
 - Vote in Person Maintain Chain of Custody
 - No Drop Boxes
 - No Mailing it in



Voting ballots found tossed in ravine miles from where they were mailed; authorities investigating

By Jesse Gary | Published November 14, 2022 6:40pm PST | Election | KTVU FOX 2 |





https://www.ktvu.com/news/voting-ballots-found-tossed-in-ravine-miles-from-where-they-were-mailed-investigation

Party Balance – It Matters – Fight For It

203B.121 BALLOT BOARDS.

- Subdivision 1. **Establishment; applicable laws.** (a) The governing body of each county, municipality, and school district with responsibility to accept and reject absentee ballots or to administer early voting must, by ordinance or resolution, establish a ballot board. The board must consist of a sufficient number of election judges appointed as provided in sections 204B.19 to 204B.22. The board may include deputy county auditors or deputy city clerks who have received training in the processing and counting of absentee ballots. Each member of the ballot board must be provided adequate training on the processing and counting of absentee ballots, including but not limited to instruction on accepting and rejecting absentee ballots, storage of absentee ballots, timelines and deadlines, the role of the ballot board, procedures for opening absentee ballot envelopes, procedures for counting absentee ballots, and procedures for reporting absentee ballot totals.
- (b) Each jurisdiction must pay a reasonable compensation to each member of that jurisdiction's ballot board for services rendered during an election.
 - (c) Except as otherwise provided by this section, all provisions of the Minnesota Election Law apply to a ballot

204B.19 ELECTION JUDGES; QUALIFICATIONS.

Subd. 5. **Party balance requirement.** No more than half of the election judges in a precinct may be members of the same major political party unless the election board consists of an odd number of election judges, in which case the number of election judges who are members of the same major political party may be one more than half the number of election judges in that precinct.

AFSCME – 2020 City and County Employee Union

Campaign Finance & Public Disclosure Board

First Floor South . Centennial Office Building . 658 Cedar Street . St. Paul MN 55155-1603 . 800/657-3889 . TTY 800/657-3529

Report of Receipts and Expenditures for Political Committee or Political Fund

Period Covered: 1/1/2020 through 10/19/2020

Committee Information:

Registration number: 30204

Committee name: AFSCME

Treasurer name: McBride, Elissa A

Treasurer address: 1625 L Street NW

Washington DC 20036

Received by the Board October 25, 2020

AFSCME – 2020 City and County Employee Union

	Co	mmittee Tran	saction Sur	mmary		
		AF	SCME			
Reg	Num 30204				Politi	cal Committee
1	Beginning cash balance 1/1/2020 (shou as the previous year ending cash balance		0.00			
Α	Receipts		Cash		In-Kind	Total
2	Total Contributions Received	Sch. A1 - CR	1,309,222.50		0.00	1,309,222.50
3	Receipts from loans payable	Sch. A2 - LP				
4	Miscellaneous income	Sch. A2 - MISC				
5	Total Receipts	Sum #2 to #4	1,309,222.50		0.00	1,309,222.50
В	Disbursements		Cash	Unpaid Bills	In-Kind	Total
6	Expenditures	Sch. B1 - EXP				
7A	Direct Contributions to candidate committees	Sch. B2A - PCC				
7B	Approved Expenditures for Candidate Committees	Sch. B2B - CAN				
7C	Total Contributions to Candidate Committees	Sum #7A + #7B				
8	Contributions to political parties	Sch. B2 - PTY	800,000.00		0.00	800,000.00
9	Contributions to political committees and political funds	Sch. B2 - PCF	500,000.00		0.00	500,000.00
10	Independent expenditures	Sch. B3 - IND	9,222.50	0.00	0.00	9,222.50
11	Ballot question expenditures	Sch. B4 - BQ				
12	Total Expenditures and Disbursements	Sum #6 + #7C thru #11	1,309,222.50	0.00	0.00	1,309,222.50

AFSCME – 2020 City and County Employee Union

Schedule B2-F11 CO	ntributions to Politica	l Parties	
	AFSCME		
Reg Num 30204			Political Committee
Affected Committee: DFL House Caucus (Registered Id: 20 255 E Plato Blvd St Paul, MN 55107	006)		
Date	Cash	In Kind	Total
09/03/20	400,000.00	0.00	400,000.00
Affected Committee: DFL Senate Caucus (Registered Id: 20 PO Box 7307 St Paul, MN 55107	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,		
Date	Cash	In Kind	Total
Date 09/03/20	Cash 400,000.00	In Kind 0.00	Total 400,000.00
09/03/20			
09/03/20	400,000.00	0.00	400,000.00
09/03/20 Schedule B2-PTY Contributions to Political Parties	400,000.00 Cash	0.00	400,000.00 Total
09/03/20 Schedule B2-PTY Contributions to Political Parties Total of itemized	400,000.00 Cash 800,000.00	0.00 In Kind 0.00	400,000.00 Total 800,000.00

AFSCME – 2022 City and County Employee Union

Campaign Finance & Public Disclosure Board

First Floor South . Centennial Office Building . 658 Cedar Street . St. Paul MN 55155-1603 . 800/657-3889 . TTY 800/627-3529

Report of Receipts and Expenditures for Political Committee or Political Fund

Period Covered: 1/1/2022 through 10/24/2022

Committee Information:

Registration number: 30204

Committee name: AFSCME

Treasurer name: McBride, Elissa A

Treasurer address: 1625 L Street, NW

Washington DC 20036

Received by the Board October 31, 2022

AFSCME – 2022 City and County Employee Union


	Co	mmittee Trar	saction Sur	nmary		
		AF	SCME			
Reg	Num 30204					Political Fund
1	Beginning cash balance 1/1/2022 (shou as the previous year ending cash balance		0.00			
A	Receipts		Cash		In-Kind	Total
2	Total Contributions Received	Sch. A1 - CR	2,921,680.12		0.00	2,921,680.12
3	Receipts from loans payable	Sch. A2 - LP				
4	Miscellaneous income	Sch. A2 - MISC				
5	Total Receipts	Sum #2 to #4	2,921,680.12		0.00	2,921,680.12
В	Disbursements		Cash	Unpaid Bills	In-Kind	Total
6	Expenditures	Sch. B1 - EXP				
7A	Direct Contributions to candidate committees	Sch. B2A - PCC				
7B	Approved Expenditures for Candidate Committees	Sch. B2B - CAN				
7C	Total Contributions to Candidate Committees	Sum #7A + #7B				
7D	Direct Contributions to local candidate committees	Sch. B2A - LOC PCC				
7E	Approved Expenditures for Local Candidate Committees	Sch. B2B - LOC CAN				
7F	Total Contributions to Local Candidate Committees	Sum #7D + #7E				
8	Contributions to political parties	Sch. B2 - PTY	1,850,000.00		0.00	1,850,000.00
9	Contributions to political committees and political funds	Sch. B2 - PCF	880,000.00		0.00	880,000.00
10A	Independent expenditures	Sch. B3 - IND	191,680.12	0.00	0.00	191,680.12
10B	Local Independent expenditures	Sch. B3 - LOC IND				
11	Ballot question expenditures	Sch. B4 - BQ				
12	Total Expenditures and Disbursements	Sum #6 + #7C thru #11	2,921,680.12	0.00	0.00	2,921,680.12
13	Ending cash balance on 10/24/2022	#1 + #5 - #12	0.00			

AFSCME – 2022 City and County Employee Union

		I Parties	
	AFSCME		
Reg Num 30204			Political Fund
Affected Committee: DFL House Caucus (Registered Id: 2 255 E Plato Blvd St Paul, MN 55107	20006)		
Date	Cash	In Kind	Total
09/21/22	400,000.00	0.00	400,000.00
10/13/22	125,000.00	0.00	125,000.00
Total For: DFL House Caucus	525,000.00	0.00	525,000.00
Affected Committee: DFL Senate Caucus (Registered Id: PO Box 7307 St Paul, MN 55107	20011)		
Date	Cash	In Kind	Total
09/21/22	400,000.00	0.00	400,000.00
10/13/22	125,000.00	0.00	125,000.00
Total For: DFL Senate Caucus	525,000.00	0.00	525,000.00
Affected Committee: Minn DFL State Central Committee (255 E Plato Blvd St Paul, MN 55107	(Registered ld: 20003)		
Date	Cash	In Kind	Total
05/16/22	150,000.00	0.00	150,000.00
09/28/22	600,000.00	0.00	600,000.00
10/13/22	50,000.00	0.00	50,000.00
Total For: Minn DFL State Central Committee	800,000.00	0.00	800,000.00
Schedule B2-PTY Contributions to Political Parties			
	Cash	In Kind	Total
Total of itemized	1,850,000.00	0.00	1,850,000.00
Total of non-itemized	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Cash	In Kind	Total
Totals	1,850,000.00	0.00	1,850,000.00

Constitutional Sheriffs (6/2024)

The Constitutional Sheriffs and Peace Officers Association was active in at least 30 states over the past five years, hosting training, rallies, speeches and meetings. The sheriffs group held formal training on its "constitutional" curriculum in at least 13 states, with six of those approving the course for officers' state-mandated continuing education credit.



Source: Howard Center for Investigative Journalism & Arizona Center for Investigative Reporting, <u>U.S. Census Bureau</u> • <u>Methodology</u> Graphic by Brendon Derr/AZCIR

Reporting by TJ L'Heureux, Adrienne Washington, Albert Serna Jr., Anisa Shabir and Isaac Stone Simonelli

Constitutional Sheriff's

- Do not wait for Sheriff's to take action before the election
- Sheriff's do not understand election law or machines
- Sheriff's will make sure there is no intimidation of voters
- Sheriff's will make sure there is no intimidation of workers
- Sheriff's will help election officials keep the elections calm
- Sheriff's may help transport election materials
- Sheriff's may help incase of disaster

MN–206.83 – Testing of Voting Systems


206.83 TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEMS.

At least three days before voting equipment is used, the official in charge of elections shall have the voting system tested to ascertain that the system will correctly mark ballots using all methods supported by the system, including through assistive technology, and count the votes cast for all candidates and on all questions. Public notice of the time and place of the test must be given at least two days in advance by publication once in official newspapers. The test must be observed by at least two election judges, who are not of the same major political party, and must be open to representatives of the political parties, candidates, the press, and the public. The test must be conducted by (1) processing a preaudited group of ballots punched or marked to record a predetermined number of valid votes for each candidate and on each question, and must include for each office one or more ballot cards which have votes in excess of the number allowed by law in order to test the ability of the voting system tabulator and excess of the number allowed by law in order to test the ability of the voting system tabulator and electronic ballot marker to reject those votes; and (2) processing an additional test deck of ballots marked using the electronic ballot marker for the precinct, including ballots marked using the electronic ballot display, audio ballot reader, and any assistive voting technology used with the electronic ballot marker. If any error is detected, the cause must be ascertained and corrected and an errorless count must be made before the voting system may be used in the election. After the completion of the test, the programs used and ballot cards must be sealed, retained, and disposed of as provided for paper ballots.

Test Deck Recommendations

- Each ballot style within a precinct should be tested.
 - Paper Based Oval filled ballots
 - Paper Based ExpressVote Bar Code ballots
- Each option should have a unique number assigned to it.
 - Not repeated within the contest
 - Not repeated on the ballot.
- Prime Number should be used in each contest.
 - Example at https://uscase.org/test-deck-chart

Wards	20 lost No 17, 18 9 & 5	21, 22, 24 13, 9	ots 10 ballo 25 13	
PRESIDENTIAL PREF		lyh U	1111	The
REPUBLICAN U			III	194
OVER VOTE				0
UNDER VOTE II	-	101	11	60
DEMOCRATIC PARTY			111 /	81
BIDEN []]	- 2	HILL	-	3+
PHILLIPS [V	h V	1	
UNINSTRUCTED	V	1 /		12
WRITE IN 11	V	11 V		4
OVER VOTE				-
UNDER VOTE 1	V		1 /	2
REPUBLICAN PARTY		10000		
CHRISTIE	V	1 y		12
RAMASWAMY	~	II v		3
DESANTIS	V	1 /		12
HALEY	~	H V	1	3
TRUMP []]	- 1	THE V	111	-1
UNINSTRUCTED	1	T V		12
	-	1 4		
WRITE IN	V			1
OVER VOTE				
UNDER VOTE	1	10	1 1	12+
COURT OF APPEALS				
KLOPPENBURG IN T	1	WI V	1	1
WRITE IN LAT	V	II V	11	7
OVER VOTE	1	-	1	-
UNDER VOTE DE IL	-	1	1	
SHOCK TOTE ON 11	1	MM	JHT :	71



UNDER VOTE	11 V		1 V	2+1
REPUBLICAN PARTY	RESERVE AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IN COLUMN TO ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TO ADDRESS OF	CHICAGO CO.		
CHRISTIE	1 1	1 Y		2
RAMASWAMY	1	II v		3
DESANTIS	LV	1 /		12
HALEY	· ·	11 1	1 1	3+1
TRUMP	M /	III /	1111	7+3
UNINSTRUCTED	1	IV		1
WRITE IN	/			1
OVER VOTE				
UNDER VOTE	1	1 /		2+1

Results with Full Decimal Places

All races are correct

3 RACES W	ITH PRIME		Total	Percent	Percent	Precent	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.0508475	0.6101695	0.3389831		3 36	20
5	35	18	58	0.0862069	0.6034483	0.3103448		5 35	18
7	34	16	57	0.122807	0.5964912	0.2807018		7 34	16
11	33	15	59	0.1864407	0.559322	0.2542373	1	1 33	15
13	32	14	59	0.220339	0.5423729	0.2372881	1	3 32	14
17	30	12	59	0.2881356	0.5084746	0.2033898	1	7 30	12
19	28	10	57	0.3333333	0.4912281	0.1754386	1	9 28	10
23	27	9	59	0.3898305	0.4576271	0.1525424	2	3 27	9
29	26	8	63	0.4603175	0.4126984	0.1269841	2	9 26	8
31	24	6	61	0.5081967	0.3934426	0.0983607	3	1 24	6

Results with 1 Decimal Place

• 27 errors and only 3 races are correct.

3 RACES W	VITH PRIME		Total	Precent 1	Precent 1	Precent 1	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.1	0.7	0.4	6	41	24
5	35	18	58	0.1	0.7	0.4	6	41	23
7	34	16	57	0.2	0.6	0.3	11	34	17
11	33	15	59	0.2	0.6	0.3	12	35	18
13	32	14	59	0.3	0.6	0.3	18	35	18
17	30	12	59	0.3	0.6	0.3	18	35	18
19	28	10	57	0.4	0.5	0.2	23	29	11
23	27	9	59	0.4	0.5	0.2	24	30	12
29	26	8	63	0.5	0.5	0.2	32	32	13
31	24	6	61	0.6	0.4	0.1	37	24	6

Results with 2 Decimal Places

• 7 errors and 23 are correct

3 RACES W	ITH PRIME		Total	Percent 2	Percent 2	Percent 2	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.06	0.62	0.34	4	37	20
5	35	18	58	0.09	0.61	0.32	5	35	19
7	34	16	57	0.13	0.60	0.29	7	34	17
11	33	15	59	0.19	0.56	0.26	11	33	15
13	32	14	59	0.23	0.55	0.24	14	32	14
17	30	12	59	0.29	0.51	0.21	17	30	12
19	28	10	57	0.34	0.50	0.18	19	29	10
23	27	9	59	0.39	0.46	0.16	23	27	9
29	26	8	63	0.47	0.42	0.13	30	26	8
31	24	6	61	0.51	0.40	0.10	31	24	6

Results with 3 Decimal Places

All are correct

3 RACES W	ITH PRIME		Total	Percent 3	Percent 3	Percent 3	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.051	0.611	0.339		3 3	6 20
5	35	18	58	0.087	0.604	0.311		5 3	5 18
7	34	16	57	0.123	0.597	0.281		7 3	4 16
11	33	15	59	0.187	0.56	0.255		11 3	3 15
13	32	14	59	0.221	0.543	0.238		13 3	2 14
17	30	12	59	0.289	0.509	0.204		17 3	0 12
19	28	10	57	0.334	0.492	0.176		19 2	8 10
23	27	9	59	0.39	0.458	0.153		23 2	7 9
29	26	8	63	0.461	0.413	0.127		29 2	6 8
31	24	6	61	0.509	0.394	0.099		31 2	4 6

Recommendations

- Each ballot style within a precinct should be tested.
 - Paper Based Oval filled ballots
 - Paper Based ExpressVote Bar Code ballots
- Each option should have a unique number assigned to it.
 - Not repeated within the contest
 - Not repeated on the ballot.
- Prime Number should be used in each contest.
 - Example at https://uscase.org/test-deck-chart

Prime Number Chart

Prime Number	2	3	4	5	6	7
5	4	6				
7	8	9	10			
11	12					
13	14	15	16			
17	18					
19	20	21	22			
23	24	25	26	27	28	
29	30					
31	32	33	34	35	36	

Prime Number	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	Total Ballot Positions
5	4	6											3
7	8	9	10										7
11	12												9
13	14	15	16										13
17	18												15
19	20	21	22										19
23	24	25	26	27	28								25
29	30												27
31	32	33	34	35	36								33
37	38	39	40										37
41	42												39
43	44	45	46										43
47	48	49	50	51	52								49
53	54	55	56	57	58								55
59	60												57
61	62	63	64	65	66								63
67	68	69	70										67
71	72												69
73	74	75	76	77	78								75
79	80	81	82										79
83	84	85	86	87	88								85
89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96						93
97	98	99	100										97
101	102												99
103	104	105	106										103
107	108												105
109	110	111	112										109
113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	123	124	125	126	122

Examples – WY 2020 Primary – 9 Races Dem

Race	Candidate Issue A	Candidate Issue B	Candidate Issue C	Candidate Issue D	Candidate Issue E	Max Marked Ballots Used	Max Marked Ballots Used
Group C Sim	ple Elections	2-4 Options	(with Write-	ln)			
2-5 Option R	aces					2 Ovals	Max Ovals
Race 1(5)	3	52	27	12	9	55	103(5)
Race 2(5)	5	51	15	20	10	56	101(5)
Race 3(4)	7	50	26	18		57	101(4)
Race 4(4)	11	49	32	16		60	104(4)
Race 5(4)	13	48	33	8		61	102(4)
Race 6(3)	17	46	39			63	102(3)
Race 7(3)	19	45	38			64	102(3)
Race 8(3)	23	44	36			67	103(3)
Race 9(3)	29	42	35			71	106(3)
Race 10(3)	31	40	34			71	105(3)
	*Over vote	and under v be run as			ed for each r baseline test	and should	

Platte Cost Review

Ballot Coding Cost			
Platte	2020	2020	2020
	Primary	General	Total
	\$6,085.00	\$3,235.00	\$9,320.00
Number of Ballots	3,225	4,963	8,188
Cost per Ballot	\$1.88	\$0.65	\$1.14

Gt	Ballot Coding	Cost 2020
County	Primary	General
Albany	\$4,210.00	\$2,240.00
Big Horn	\$6,085.00	\$3,235.00
Campbell	\$17,315.00	\$9,215.00
Carbon	\$8,425.00	\$4,480.00
Converse	\$8,890.00	\$4,730.00
Crook	\$7,955.00	\$4,235.00
Fremont	\$14,975.00	\$7,970.00
Goshen	\$9,360.00	\$4,980.00
Hot Springs	\$1,870.00	\$995.00
Johnson	\$7,490.00	\$3,985.00
Laramie	\$28,550.00	\$15,190.00
Lincoln	\$7,955.00	\$4,235.00
Natrona	\$22,930.00	\$12,200.00
Niobrara	\$2,810.00	\$1,495.00
Park	\$13,570.00	\$7,220.00
Platte	\$6,085.00	\$3,235.00
Sheridan	\$13,570.00	\$7,220.00
Sublette	\$3,745.00	\$1,990.00
Sweetwater	\$17,315.00	\$9,215.00
Teton	\$8,425.00	\$4,480.00
Uinta	\$4,680.00	\$2,490.00
Washakie	\$2,340.00	\$1,245.00
Weston	\$3,745.00	\$1,990.00
Totals	\$222,295.00	\$118,270.00

Support for Platte County

Support Costs for Platte County										
Support Category	Post-Warranty Post-Warranty Year 1 Year 2		Post-Warranty Year 3	Post-Warranty Year 4	Post-Warranty Year 5	Total				
Operations Support	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -				
Maintenance Support	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$11,025.00				
Application Support	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$41,500.00				
SUPPORT SUB-TOTAL	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$52,525.00				

Hand Count (\$1.13) vs Machines (\$5.40)

					Maintenance		
	Purchase	Qty State	Platte	2020	2021	2022	2023
DS200 w/Box	\$ 5,750.00	310	8	\$ 46,000.00			
DS200 w/o Box	\$ 5,300.00	8	0				
DS450	\$ 49,950.00	9	0				
EMS Hardware	\$ 3,382.00	22	1	\$ 3,382.00			
Ballot on Demand	\$ 5,740.00	40	0				
Ballot Creation & Reporting	\$ 15,500.00	15	1	\$ 15,500.00			
EMS Reporting	\$ 4,375.00	7	0				
-				\$ 64,882.00	\$ 10,505.00	\$ 10,505.00	\$ 10,505.00
							\$ 96,397.00

2020	2020	2022	2022	2023
Primary	General	Primary	General	Special
3235	4963	3751	4043	1862
			Total Ballots	17854
				\$ 5.40
			W/Ballot Design	\$ 6.54
	Primary	Primary General	Primary General Primary 3235 4963 3751	Primary General Primary General 3235 4963 3751 4043 Total Ballots

Hand Count (\$1.13) vs Machines (\$5.40)

2022 Gene	eral Election								
Precinct	Total Ballot	s Tab	les	People	\$20	/hr	3 hrs	Tota	al
1-1	1118		5	20	\$	20.00	3	\$1	,200.00
1-2	147		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
1-3	136		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
1-6	1413		6	24	\$	20.00	3	\$1	,440.00
2-1	466		2	8	\$	20.00	3	\$	480.00
2-2	208		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
3-1	344		2	8	\$	20.00	3	\$	480.00
4-1	211		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
	4043								
			19	76	\$	20.00	3	\$4	,560.00
				Hand Cour	nt C	ost/Bal	lot	\$	1.13

See the Difference

INSTANT TRUST

Public Counting – Voter Intent Decided, Can ascertain how they counted ballots



Public Counting – Can observe with our own eyes and ears.

INSTANT DOUBT

Machine Counting – Voter Intent Lost, Unable to ascertain how it counted



Machine Counting – Supposed to audit programing by reviewing test decks, ballot images and Cast Vote Records (CVRs)

New Systems

EVS 6.0.6.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2021-12-28
EVS 6.1.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2019-09-24
EVS 6.1.1.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2020-07-27
EVS 6.2.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2021-12-23
EVS 6.3.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2022-11-11
EVS 6.4.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2023-08-18

Official Ballot Partisan Office and Referendum November 8, 2022

Notice to voters: If you are voting on Election Day, your ballot must be initialed by two (2) election inspectors. If you are voting absentee, your ballot must be initialed by the municipal clerk or deputy clerk. Your ballot may not be counted without initials (see end of ballot for initials).

21	without initials (see end of ballot for initial General Instructions	als) Statewide	Congressional
	If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question, ask an election inspector for help	Attorney General Vote for 1	Çibiniçis de la contraction de
	(absentee voters: contact your municipal clerk).	Josh Kaul (Democratic)	 Mike Van Someren (Democratic)
	To vote for a name on the ballot, fill in the oval next to the name like this:	Eric Toney (Republican)	Scott Fitzgerald (Republican)
	To vote for a name that is not on	O write-in:	o write-in:
40	the ballot, write the name on the line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this:	Secretary of State Vote for 1	Legislative State Senator Planta: 15
41	Statewide	Doug La Follette (Democratic)	O John Jagler
43	When voting for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, you have one of two choices:	Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (Republican)	(Republican) write-in: PZANK ZASSA
	Vote for candidates on one ticket, or	Neil Harmon (Libertarian)	Proprosentations to the Assembly District 39 Vote for 1
	Write in names of persons on both write-in lines. A write-in vote for only a	Sharyl R. McFarland (Wisconsin Green Party)	Mark L. Born (Republican)
49	Lieutenant Governor candidate will not be counted.	O write-in:	write-in: FTZANK ZAPPA
51	Will flot be coulled.	State Tressurer Vote for 1	County
	Governor / Lieutenant Governor Vote for 1	Aaron Richardson (Democratic)	Shortif Vote for 1 Dale J. Schmidt
	Tony Evers / Sara Rodriguez	○ John S. Leiber (Republican)	(Republican) write-in:
	(Democratic) Tim Michels /	Andrew Zuelke (Constitution)	Clerk of Circuit Court Vote for 1
	Roger Roth (Republican)	o write-in:	Kelly Enright
		Congressional	(Republican)
	 Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Independent) 	United States Service Vote for 1	o write-in:
	0	 Mandela Barnes (Democratic) 	
	write-in: (Governor)	Ron Johnson (Republican)	
	and the second Course of C	o write-in:	
	write-in: (Lieutenant Governor)		

Cast Vote Record: 16,399		State Sen Dist 13 (280)		
		Vote For: 1		
Poll Place: Iron Ridge Community Cent		Write-in (282)	Counted	(Marked)
Precinct: V Iron Ridge				
Ballot Style: V Iron Ridge [Sheet Number 1]				
Party: Nonpartisan		Rep Assem Dist 39 (290)		
Tabulator CVR: c4cd22611f6b4ab6		Vote For: 1		
Machine Serial: DS200 - 0317350401		Write-in (292)	Counted	(Marked)
Blank Ballot: NO				
Reporting Group: Election Day		Sheriff Dodge Co (310)		
		Vote For: 1		
Contests:		Dale J. Schmidt (417)	Overvoted	
			Overvoted	(M.4 m.l. m.d.)
		Write-in (312)	Overvoted	(Marked)
Gov/Lt. Gov (245)				
Vote For: 1		Circuit Court Clerk Dodge Co (320)		
Evers / Rodriguez (367)	Counted	Vote For: 1		
		Kelly Enright (421)	Counted	
		,g ()		
Attorney Gen (250)				
Vote For: 1		Ref Instructions with (330)		
Josh Kaul (373)	Counted	Vote For: 0		
		Deferred on MDTC (222)		
Sec State (255)		Referendum MPTC (333) Vote For: 1		
Vote For: 1		Undervoted	Undervoted	
Neil Harmon (381)	Counted	Ondervoted	ondervoted	
State Treas. (260)				
Vote For: 1				
Aaron Richardson (385)	Counted			
US State Sen (265)				
Vote For: 1				
Mandela Barnes (391)	Counted			
. ,				
Rep Congress Dist 5 (270)				
Vote For: 1				
Mike Van Someren (395)	Counted			

Ballot ID 18399i.pdf has a small mark in the oval for "write-in:" for the County Sheriff race causing the race to be an over vote, and the voter's vote to be lost.

Official Ballot Partisan Office November 8, 2022 Notice to voters: If you are voting on Election Day, your ballot must be initialed by two (2) election inspectors. If you are voting absentee, your ballot must be initialed by the municipal clerk or deputy clerk. Your ballot may not be counted without initials (see end of ballot for initials). General Instructions Congressional If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question, ask an election inspector for help (absentee voters: contact your Josh Kaul Mike Van Someren (Democratic) (Democratic) To vote for a name on the ballot. Eric Toney Scott Fitzgerald fill in the oval next to the name like (Republican write-in: o write-in: To vote for a name that is not on the ballot, write the name on the Legislative line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this: Statewide Doug La Follette (Democratic) John Jagler When voting for Governor and Amy Lynn Loudenbeck Lieutenant Governor, you have (Republican) o write-in: one of two choices: Neil Harmon Vote for candidates on one (Libertarian) Write in names of persons on both write-in lines. Sharyl R. McFarland Maureen McCarville (Wisconsin Green Party) (Democratic) A write-in vote for only a Lieutenant Governor candidate William Penterman will not be counted. (Republican) write-in: County Aaron Richardson (Democratic) John S. Leiber Tony Evers / (Republican) Sará Rodriguez Dale J. Schmidt (Republican) Andrew Zuelke (Constitution) Tim Michels / Roger Roth (Republican) Congressional Kelly Enright Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Republican) o write-in: Mandela Barnes (Democratic) Ron Johnson write-in: (Governor) (Republican) write-in: (Lieutenant Governor) Typ:01 Seq:0071 Spl:01 Continue voting at top of next Continue voting at top of next Page 1 of 2-sided ballot. Ballot continues on other side.

Cast Vote Record: 34,195		
Poll Place: Watertown W1&2		
Precinct: C Watertown W1&2		
Ballot Style: C Watertown W1&2 [Sheet Number 1]		
Party: Nonpartisan		
Tabulator CVR: 45e21200b3ab0caa		
Machine Serial: DS200 - 0317350792		
Blank Ballot: NO		
Reporting Group: Election Day		
Contests:		
Gov/Lt. Gov (245)		
Vote For: 1		
Michels / Roth (369)	Overvoted	
Write-in (247)	Overvoted	(Marked)
Attorney Gen (250)		
Vote For: 1		
Eric Toney (375)	Counted	
Sec State (255)		
Vote For: 1		
Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (379)	Counted	
State Treas. (260)		
Vote For: 1		
John S. Leiber (387)	Counted	
US State Sen (265)		
Vote For: 1		
Ron Johnson (393)	Counted	
Rep Congress Dist 5 (270)		
Vote For: 1		
Scott Fitzgerald (397)	Counted	
South inagonala (son)		

Ballot image 34195i.pdf is a case of the worst possible outcome, to where a voter who voted absentee by mail, or strictly by mail, voted on a poorly designed ballot, that invalidated a voter's intent on a race in an election. Better design of the ballot could have prevented this from happening.

The Folds

EVS 6042 CA Election Management System Chapter 2: Paper Ballot Specifications

2.6.6 Folding Ballots


A folding machine should be used to expedite the process of folding ballots. In addition, roller pressures should be reduced to about 2 – 3X thickness of ballot stock.

Caution



- Do not fold across timing marks, ovals, write-in spaces (marked or unmarked), or arrows, as this may cause tabulation errors.
- Fold as few times as possible.
- When removing from envelopes, place all ballots in the same orientation for proper back-bending.

2.6.7 Perforating and Numbering Ballot Stubs



t that election workers Stubs usually contain at least ification number or number that matches the re been cast. Ballots should

CHAPTER 207—FEDERAL ELECTION RECORDS

Sec.	
20701.	Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with
	custodian; penalty for violation.
20702.	Theft, destruction, concealment, mutilation, or alteration of records or papers; penalties.
20703.	Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose.
20704.	Disclosure of records or papers.
20705.	Jurisdiction to compel production of records or papers.
20706.	"Officer of election" defined.

§20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation

Every officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of twenty-two months from the date of any general, special, or primary election of which candidates for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate. Member of the House of Representatives, or Resident Commissioner from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are voted for all records and papers which come into his possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election except that, when required by law, such records and papers may be delivered to another officer of election and except that, if a State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico designates a custodian to retain and preserve these records and papers at a specified place, then such records and papers may be deposited with such custodian, and the duty to retain and preserve any record or paper so deposited shall devolve upon such custodian. Any officer of election or custodian who willfully fails to comply with this section shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(Pub. L. 86-449, title III, §301, May 6, 1960, 74 Stat. 88.)

EDITORIAL NOTES

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly classified to section 1974 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

§20702. Theft, destruction, concealment, mutilation, or alteration of records or papers; penalties

Any person, whether or not an officer of election or custodian, who willfully steals, destroys, conceals, mutilates, or alters any record or paper required by section 20701 of this title to be retained and preserved shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(Pub. L. 86-449, title III, §302, May 6, 1960, 74 Stat. 88.)







https://www.essvote.com/fags/













Does ES&S support post-election audits?

ES&S is a strong supporter of state and local administrations in their work to provide secure, accurate elections. Post-election audits are a legal process by which election officials verify that votes were counted accurately and is conducted by election officials according to state law. ES&S voting systems support these audits by providing election details (logs, cast vote records, reports, etc.) which election officials utilize for this purpose. ES&S supports the highest standards for security, including strict chain-of-custody protocols for equipment and all applicable laws, regulations and certification requirements.

Ballots anyone








Making Copies

3,000 Dodge County Ballots printed 6 precincts, 2 copiers, 4 hours.

Copiers did not stop them from printing.



10,000 Blank Ballots - Not secure



What is our backup plan?



FBI Director Tells Ohio Sheriff, "There are More Red Flags ... •

Feb 10, 2024 — In response to alarming warnings from the FBI about potential terrorist attacks on the United States, Butler County Sheriff Richard Jones is ...



US says it blocked a China cyber threat, but warns hackers could still disrupt lives of Americans

22-11-107. Failure of automatic tabulating equipment.

If the automatic tabulating equipment fails during the ballot count, the counting board shall use an alternate method of counting the ballots.

By Jennifer Edwards Baker and Ken Brown Published: Feb. 8, 2024 at 4:31 AM CST



That's where FBI Director Christopher Wray told the sheriffs that red flag warnings for terrorism threats against Americans are at their highest ever and the Chinese are ready to American infrastructure like electrical grids and water treatment plants if the U.S. and China ever go to war.

Butler County sheriff changes how it arms, trains deputies after FBI director's ominous warning

Sheriff Jones says he is now convinced a terror attack in the U.S. is imminent by people who are already here living among us.

"We were told by the FBI director it's not a matter of if, it's a matter of when," the sheriff said at a news conference Wednesday.

www.uscase.org

Election Research **501c3**



The Folds

EVS 6042 CA Election Management System Chapter 2: Paper Ballot Specifications

2.6.6 Folding Ballots


A folding machine should be used to expedite the process of folding ballots. In addition, roller pressures should be reduced to about 2 – 3X thickness of ballot stock.

Caution




- Do not fold across timing marks, ovals, write-in spaces (marked or unmarked), or arrows, as this may cause tabulation errors.
- Fold as few times as possible.
- When removing from envelopes, place all ballots in the same orientation for proper back-bending.

2.6.7 Perforating and Numbering Ballot Stubs



t that election workers Stubs usually contain at least ification number or number that matches the re been cast. Ballots should

where the voter intent was lost and the vote for that race did not count



Over-Vote



inue voting at top of next	Continue voting at top of next	Continue voting on back of ballot.
Name and Address of the Owner,	Territory was a	Typ:01 Seq:0034 Spi 01
write-in: (Lieutenant Governor)		
units in Il instanget (Coupract)	o write-in:	
In Moulb write-in: (Governor)	Ron Johnson (Republican)	
	 Mandela Barnes (Democratic) 	
Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Independent)	United States Senator Vote for 1	O write-in:
(Nepublican)	Congressional	(Republican)
Tim Michels / Roger Roth (Republican)	○ wnte⊣n:	Kelly Enright
(Democratic)	Andrew Zuelke (Constitution)	Class of Christit Court You ker 1
Tony Evers / Sara Rodriguez (Democratic)	 John S. Leiber (Republican) 	C write-in.
	(Democratic)	Dale J. Schmidt (Republican)
Povernor II Insternant Governor	Aaron Richardson	Sheriff Vote for 1
will not be counted.	State Treasurer. Vote for 1	County
A write-in vote for only a Lieutenant Governor candidate	(Wisconsin Green Party)	(Republican)
Write in names of persons on both write-in lines.	C Sharyl R McFarland	Mark L. Born
Vote for candidates on one ticket, or	C Neil Harmon (Libertarian)	Replesentative to the Assembly Obtained 39
When voting for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, you have one of two choices:	Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (Republican)	(Republican)
	Doug La Foliette (Democratic)	♥ John Jagler
line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this: Statewide	Vote for 1	SSECTION BY BUILDING
To vote for a name that is not on the ballot, write the name on the	○ write-in	□ wrtein Legislative
To vote for a name on the ballot, fill in the oval next to the name like this:	e Enc Toney (Republican)	Scott Fitzgerald (Republican)
(absentee voters; contact your municipal clerk).	□ Josh Kaul (Democratic)	○ Mike Var Someren (Democratic)
If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question lask an election inspector for help	Attorney General Vote for 1	President St. Dr. Gongress
	Statewide	Congressional
Notice to votors. If you are voting on voting absentive, your ballot must be	Election Day, your balkit must be initiated by initiated by the municipal derk or deputy cler initiats).	two (2) election inspectors if you are
A Company of the Comp	Partisan Office and Referendum November 8, 2022	

President / presidential candidate will not be counted.	District Attorney Vote for 1	ballot at the request and direction of a voter who is authorized under Wis. Sta
President / Vice President	Melisa Arndt (Democratic)	ballot at the request and direction of a voter who is authorized under Wis. Stat. §6.82 to receive assistance.
Vote for 1	Jon Plumer	
○ Joseph R. Biden/ Kamala D. Harris	(Republican)	Signature of assistor
(Democratic)	write-in:	For Official Use Only
Populd I Trums/	District Attorney Vote for 1	Inspectors: Identify ballots required to be remade:
Donald J. Trump/ Michael R. Pence (Republican)	 Kurt F. Klomberg (Republican) 	Overvoted Damaged Other
○ Don Blankenship/	o write-in:	If this is the Original If this is the Duplicate
William Mohr (Constitution)	County	Ballot, write the serial number here:
2 la larganean/	County Clerk Vote for 1	The second of th
Jo Jorgensen/ Jeremy Spike Cohen (Libertarian Party)	Karen J. Gibson (Republican)	Initials of inspectors who remade ballot
○ Brian Carroll/	○ write-in:	
Amar Patel (American Solidarity Party)	County Treasurer Vote for 1	Cart Cart Cart Cart Cart Cart Cart Cart
Dengla Trum ? , write-in: (President)	Patti K. Hilker (Republican)	Francisco
michael A Pence	○ write-in:	
write-in: (Vice President)	Register of Deeds Vote for 1	Two die gelde deutsche Two die gelde deutsche Two die gelde deutsche deutsche deutsche deutsche deutsche deutsche deutsche deutsche Two die gelde deutsche deut

Public CVRS

- Dodge County WI
 https://www.co.dodge.wi.gov/departments/departments-a-d/county-clerk/election-information
- Sauk County WI
 https://www.co.sauk.wi.us/countyclerk/election-information-cast-vote-record-cvr-reports

Cast Vote Records (CVRs)


 Transparency is the inoculation to all conspiracy theories

Cast Vote Record: 34,195

Poll Place: Watertown W1&2 Precinct: C Watertown W1&2 Ballot Style: C Watertown W1&2 [Sheet Number 1] Party: Nonpartisan Tabulator CVR: 45e21200b3ab0caa Machine Serial: D\$200 - 0317350792 Blank Ballot: NO Reporting Group: Election Day Contests: Gov/Lt. Gov (245) Vote For: 1 Overvoted Michels / Roth (369) Overvoted Write-in (247) (Marked) Attorney Gen (250) Vote For: 1 Counted Eric Toney (375) Sec State (255) Vote For: 1 Counted Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (379)

	Official Ballot Partisan Office November 8, 2022	
Notice to voters: If you are voting on Ele voting absentee, your ballot must be init without initials (see end of ballot for initial General Instructions	Statewide	by two (2) election inspectors. If you are erk. Your ballot may not be counted Congressional
If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question, ask an election inspector for help	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	White
(absentee voters: contact your municipal clerk).	O Josh Kaul (Democratic)	Mike Van Someren (Democratic)
To vote for a name on the ballot, fill in the oval next to the name like this:	Eric Toney (Republican)	 Scott Fitzgerald (Republican)
To vote for a name that is not on	o write-in:	o write-in:
the ballot, write the name on the line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this:	Landon I William I	Legislative
Statewide	 Doug La Follette (Democratic) 	John Jagler
When voting for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, you have	Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (Republican)	(Republican)
Vote for candidates on one ticket, or	Neil Harmon (Libertarian)	Representative to the seeper District 37 Vote for 1
Write in names of persons on both write-in lines.	 Sharyl R. McFarland (Wisconsin Green Party) 	Maureen McCarville (Democratic)
A write-in vote for only a Lieutenant Governor candidate will not be counted.	o write-in:	William Penterman (Republican)
NEW TOWN	State Treasurer Vote for 1	o write-in:
Governor / Liketonant Governor Vote for 1	Aaron Richardson (Democratic)	County
O Tony Evers / Sara Rodriguez (Democratic)	John S. Leiber (Republican)	▼ Dale J. Schmidt
Tim Michels /	 Andrew Zuelke (Constitution) 	(Republican) o write-in:
Roger Roth (Republican)	o write-in:	THE PERSON NAMED IN
1 * 0.00 * 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00	Congressional	Vote for 1
O Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Independent)		 Kelly Enright (Republican)
	 Mandela Barnes (Democratic) 	o write-in:
write-in: (Governor)	Ron Johnson (Republican)	
	O write-in:	
write-in: (Lieutenant Governor)		
		Typ:01 Seq:0071 Spl:01
Continue voting at top of next	Continue voting at top of next column.	


Here are some examples of voter intent the machines would miss.



The Seating of the judges

We recommend having 4 election judges per table, 2 from each party, 2 people for

different parties will review the ballots and call out the name of the winner of each race on the ballot, in order. The other 2 election judges, from each party, will mark their sheets with the candidate receiving the vote. They will review each vote on the ballot, skipping those races without a selection for a candidate, no mark is needed for empty races.






2024 Hand Count Demo Dodge County 2022 Clyman Ballots

Quick Notes for this session

- There are 126 ballots in each folder on the table, the seal number is 759354
- Both types of ballots are here, user filled in and ExpressVote disability ballots.
- One side of the table is the calling team, represented by both parties.
- 4) The other side of the table is the tally team with the binders, represented by both parties.
- 1st You will count to confirm that your team has 126 ballots,
 - a. Separate approximately the pile of ballots in half, one for each side of the table.
 - b. Your 2 teams will count and sort the ballots into groups of 50's, so you should end up with 50-50-26 as final stacks.
- 6) 2nd Your table team will verify that all ballots have the stamp or initials required, in-person ballots should have 2 initials, absentee ballots 1 initial. Any ballot that does not have an initial or stamp...you will set that ballot aside and mark the spoiled section of the master tally totals sheets. Rebalance any stack of 50 ballots by drawing a ballot from the remainder stack....so you may end up with 50-50-25 stack of ballots.
- 7) We will be calling and marking one race at time, the first race should marked be in Blue, with a /
- The next race would be in Red.
- 9) If a recount is needed use the same color and mark with an X, if a 3rd recount is needed, fill in the box.

ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES



End-to-End Voting System Acceptance Test

The end-to-end test is sometimes referred to as a test of the election management system (EMS). It tests the election management system itself and tests the ability of the EMS to interface with all the types of components. It also verifies that the EMS correctly tabulates votes and prints reports. Election officials should conduct this test on all newly acquired voting systems and after any event that could have altered the voting system, such as a system upgrade or if the EMS hardware leaves the custody and control of the election authority.


Materials Required: Election officials must know the correct versions of the operating systems and EMS software. In addition, the testers will need the following:

 A complete election management system with all required election management system software installed.

- If Optical Scanners are used:
 - At least one ballot scanner. If different types are used (e.g., precinct-based for polling locations and bulk/ high-speed for central counting), then at least one of each type will be needed.
 - One blank memory device used to load the election definition onto the ballot scanner(s),
 - A memory device for each scanner to store tabulated results and Cast Vote Records.
 - At least one set of pre-marked optical scan test ballots with known results. This can be the same test deck used to conduct acceptance tests on the ballot scanners.

66

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION



Documentation: If any component of the voting system experiences a failure during any of the above steps that the tester cannot correct, the test should be terminated. The tester should prepare documentation that lists the serial number of the election computer and the serial number or other identifying information for any other component that failed, the persons conducting the tests, the date, and a description of the failure.

Election officials should make two copies of this documentation; one copy for the permanent record and another copy that stays with the failed component of the voting system to assist those making any required repairs. All printouts should be attached to the copy retained for the permanent record.

If the voting system passes all the above tests, election officials should prepare documentation for the permanent record, including the names of those conducting the tests and the date. All printouts should be attached to this documentation.

www.uscase.org

Election Research



General Procedures for Hash Validation

- 1. Your voting system vendor must provide specific instructions on how to generate hashes from your voting system and the voting system equipment, and on how to perform the comparison with the trusted hashes.
- 2. Using the vendor-provided instructions, the general custodian must generate a hash from the system and from a representative sample of the voting system equipment.
- 3. The trusted hashes must be obtained from the SOS or directly from the EAC.
- 4. The general custodian will compare the hashes generated from the system and a representative sample of the voting system equipment to the trusted hashes provided by the SOS or the EAC to verify that those hashes are identical.
- 5. If the generated hash and the trusted hash are identical, then the test is successful.
- **NOTE**: If your voting systems version has not changed from the last time you obtained trusted hashes from the SOS, you may utilize the same files to perform the hash validation testing. You can submit another request if the previous files are unavailable.

Obtaining Trusted Hashes

- 1. In order to compare hashes, you must first obtain your trusted hashes from the SOS or the EAC. When requesting your hashes, please send the following information to the SOS or EAC:
 - a. Voting System Vendor (Hart, ES&S, etc.)
 - b. Vendor Specific Software Version (Verity 2.X, EVS 6.X.X.X, etc.)
- 2. Typically you will receive two e-mail messages. The first one will include an **encrypted**, **password protected** compressed folder. The decrypting passcode will be included in the second e-mail message.
- 3. You must **download** the encrypted file to your computer or an external storage device in order to extract and obtain the folder containing the trusted hashes.
- 4. In order to access the files, you must enter the **passcode provided** on the second e-mail message.
- 5. Once files are available, you must generate your voting systems values for comparison using the tool provided by the vendor or other authorized hashing tool.

Generating Your Hashes

- You must follow your vendor-provided specific instructions when generating your hashes. Hash generation procedures vary depending on the software version, equipment and vendor. Normally, a file containing the hashes is generated on the voting system using a native tool and exported to an external drive for comparison.
- You are not required to generate hashes from every individual voting device, but you are required to perform a hash validation of a representative sample of your voting system equipment. At a minimum, you need to generate a hash from at least one of every type of voting system device owned by your entity, including any voting devices, any precinct or central scanners, and any election management system workstations.

Performing the Comparison

- Once you have received your trusted hashes and have successfully generated hashes from a representative sample of your voting devices, the final step is to compare your trusted hashes against your generated hashes to verify that they are identical. This comparison may be performed either through a visual comparison or by using a comparison tool.
- You can perform your hash comparison by visually comparing the string of characters from your generated hash against the string of characters from your trusted hash. If the two sets of characters are identical, then the hash validation is successful.
- You can also perform your hash comparison by using a software tool to perform the comparison. You should not use a vendor-provided comparison tool for this purpose. For recommendations on comparison tools, please work with the SOS.
- NOTE: Several counties have identified freeware products that have been effective when comparing files for the purpose of hash validation. Such products might not be compatible to use with all voting systems methods of hash comparison. It is your responsibility to verify and investigate software before you install it in your systems. Please consult your SOS security personnel for guidance concerning the use of freeware for this purpose.

Voting Systems Certification

 A voting system that is unable to generate a hash value to verify the programming cannot meet this requirement and therefore should not be certified by the SOS.

Building the Evidence 2024

During Public Accuracy Tests, ask for Ballot Images and CVRs, since there is no identifying information of a voter issue here...so privacy is not an issue at all. (Voters do not fill out ballots for the test decks, that would count in an election)

- 1) Get sample ballots from every precinct
- 2) Get test decks copies, and review where the folds may impact elections
- 3) Evaluate if they tested enough ballots with folds for each test deck
- 4) Get Test Deck Report(s) for each tabulator
- 5) Get the Cast Vote Records
- 6) Get the Ballot Images (there is no Personal Identifying Information)
- 7) Get the log files (system and election)

If they can not provide this, they have not proven they know how to use the election equipment, nor have they proven the systems are secure.

Action Item – Review MN Items (NEW 2024)

206.58 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE.

Subdivision 1. Municipalities

(a) The governing body of a municipality, at a regular meeting or at a special meeting called for the purpose, may provide for the use of an electronic voting system in one or more precincts and at all elections in the precincts, subject to approval by the county auditor. Once a municipality has adopted the use of an electronic voting system in one or more precincts, the municipality must continue to use an electronic voting system for state elections in those precincts. The governing body must disseminate information to the public about the use of a new voting system at least 60 days prior to the election and must provide for instruction of voters with a demonstration voting system in a public place for the six weeks immediately prior to the first election at which the new voting system will be used.

Action Item - Review MN Items

206.58 AUTHORIZATION FOR USE.

Subdivision 1. Municipalities

(b) A municipality must not adopt or use a system unless it has been approved by the secretary of state pursuant to section $\underline{206.57}$.

Subd. 2. May use experimental systems.

The governing body of a municipality may provide for the experimental use of an electronic voting system in one or more precincts without formal adoption of the system. Use of the system at an election is as valid for all purposes as if the system had been permanently adopted.

If the governing body of a municipality decides to use an electronic voting system, it shall, at a regular or special meeting held not less than 30 days before the election, prescribe suitable rules and instructions consistent with sections 206.55 to 206.90 for using the system and shall submit the rules and instructions to the secretary of state for approval. When approved, a printed copy of the rules and instructions must be posted prominently in the polling place and must remain open to inspection by the voters throughout election day.

2024 Primary to do list (Spring Training)

1) Verify County Systems

- 1) Version Number of System
- 2) Determine if any Change Orders Submitted for Update to AntiVirus
- 3) Serial Number of each tabulator
- 4) Verify each tabulator is tested before election, otherwise can't use
- 5) Ask for Accuracy Test Results to be posted on County Web Site

2) Absentee Ballot Boards

- 1) 203.B121 Ask county to pass resolution to ensure party balance (General Election)
- 2) Ban use of County and City Employees, they have other work to do
- 3) The City and County union only donates to the DFL
- 4) We must have balanced party oversight, party must validate

3) Absentee and Mail Precincts

- 1) No mailing in ballots and No Drop Boxes...Don't Risk Your VOTE
- 2) Vote in person, Drop off in person

4) Help Others Votes

1) Drive elder neighbors to polling location, can register at polling location if needed.