

2024 Establishing Trust in Our Elections Rick Weible

www.midwestswampwatch.com



Donate and send tips to www.midwestswampwatch.com tips@midwestswampwatch.com

About Rick Weible



- Born and Raised in Minnesota
- B.A. Political Science University of Minnesota
- 14 Years Elected Office 4 Years City Council, 10 Years Mayor St. Bonifacius
- 8 Years MN GOP CD3 Co-Chair and State Exec.
- Certified Network Engineer
- Worked at Help/Systems, the first ISO 9000 Software Company in USA.
- 28 Years of Cyber Security Consulting Experience
- CEO for D3Defense
- Moved to South Dakota 2018
- Manage clients DOD CMMC 2.0 Level 3 Certifications and Audits

Election Integrity – The Gold Standard



Transparency Is The Inoculation To All Conspiracy Theories

WY Gold Standards Let's Review Together

Risks in Wyoming

Building Blocks – WY Constitution

ARTICLE 6

SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS

Sec. 2. Qualifications of electors. Every citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who has resided in the state or territory one year and in the county wherein such residence is located sixty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote at such election, except as herein otherwise provided.

There are no longer durational residency requirements for electors.

Since ratification of the 26th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, twenty-one should read eighteen.

Voter Registration - Issues



Wyoming Voter Registration Application Form Instructions

information is optional.		rnone Number	Email Address			
Wyoming address where you live	5	Residential Address (no P.O. Boxes) I have no fixed residence. This is a location I regula	 Unit/Apt # rly return to. I have also p	City/Town provided a mailing addre	ess in Section 6, if I h	Zip Code
					·	

I have no fixed residence. This is a location I regularly return to. I have also provided a mailing address in Section 6, if I have one.

This is the first gate the state has left wide open for fraud.

WY Tried to Exclude Dumb Voters

ARTICLE 6

SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS

Sec. 9. Educational qualifications of electors. No person shall have the right to vote who shall not be able to read the constitution of this state. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any person prevented by physical disability from complying with its requirements.

*The Federal Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970 prevents the use of a test or device as a condition to voting.

Thank You Federal Government

Building Blocks – WY Constitution

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So how did this change? Why is this not documented?

Building Blocks – WY Constitution

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Sec. 13. Purity of elections to be provided for. The legislature shall pass laws to secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise.

WY Election Code

- 22-11-103. Capabilities required.
 (d) A vendor shall file in the office of the secretary of state an application for certification of an electronic voting system and the secretary of state shall approve the application before any electronic voting system to be used in an election conducted under this code may be distributed, sold or upgraded by the vendor. The application for certification of an electronic voting system shall contain the following documentation:
 - (i) Proof that the electronic voting system has been certified by the United States election assistance commission;
 - (ii) Proof that the electronic voting system meets the voluntary voting system guidelines adopted by the United States election assistance commission;

https://sos.wyo.gov/Forms/Publications/ElectionCode_8.5x11-07012024.pdf

Bad Reference to VVSG (there are 4 versions now)

The EAC Standards

- 2002
- 2005 (1.0)
- 2015 (1.1) Never Tested Through EAC
- 2021 (2.0)
- As described in section 3 of the EAC's <u>VVSG Lifecycle Policy</u>, the EAC no longer accepts submissions to test new voting systems to previous major versions 12 months after new major VVSG standards are ready to be used for testing. With the accreditation of the first VSTL to test to VVSG 2.0 on November 15, 2022, VVSG 1.0 and VVSG 1.1 are now no longer used by the EAC to certify voting systems as of November 16, 2023.

ES&S 6.0.4.0 (2020 - Purchase)

- Windows 7 (Support Ended Jan 14th, 2020)
- 22/23 counties have the dell laptops
- Out of date AntiVirus Norton Jan 22nd 2019 is latest date on it.
- FTP Server 10.0.5 is out of date and not supported.
- Laptops on purchase order Latitude 3500 are not certified for use.
- Modems are not EAC certified for use...
- https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_syst em/files/EVS6040_Cert_Scope%28FINAL%29.pdf



1101101101 (2.2)			
DS200	2.17.4.0	1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.3,	Precinct Count
		1.3.11	Tabulator
0.0400	2440	4.0	ele

6.0.4.0 Hardware

COTS Hardware

Manufacturer	Hardware	Model/Version
Dell	EMS Server	PowerEdge T420, T630
Dell	EMS Client or Standalone	Latitude 5580, E6430
	Workstation	OptiPlex 5040, 5050,
		7020
Dell	Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Chip	R9X21
	version 1.2	
Innodisk	USB EDC H2SE (1GB) for ExpressVote	DEEUH1-01GI72AC1SB

They Say It....At Least They Are Honest



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Conformance



ES&S EVS 6.0.6.0

The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version 1.0 (VVSG 1.0)*. Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the EAC *Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual* and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.

Product Name: EVS

Model or Version: 6.0.6.0

Name of VSTL: Pro V&V

EAC Certification Number: ESSEVS6060

Date Issued: December 28, 2021

Mona Harrington

Executive Director

Scope of Certification Attached

ES&S 6.0.6.0 (Windows 10 – 2022 Elections)

- Windows 10 4/19/2021
- Windows Defender N/A is version
- Norton Removed
- FTP Server 11.0.07 out of date.
- PostgreSQL 11
- Laptop Hardware not conforming...
- Could have imported the modems....

System Component	Software or Firmware Version	Hardware Version	Model	Comments	
DS200	2.21.0.0	1.2, 1.3		Precinct count tabulator that scans voter selections from both sides of the ballot simultaneously	



6.0.6.0 Hardware Allowed

COTS Hardware

Manufacturer	Hardware	Model/Version	
Dell	EMS Server	PowerEdge T430, T440, T630	
Dell	EMS Client or Standalone	Latitude 5580, OptiPlex 5040, 5050, 7020	
	Workstation		
Dell	Trusted Platform Module	5.63.3353.0	
	(TPM) Chip 1.2 and 2.0		
	(optional)		
Toshiba	EMS Standalone	Tecra A50-C	
Innodisk	LISR FDC H2SF (1GR) for	DFFLIH1-01GI72AC1SR	

Dell Latitude 3500 Not Certified for Use

Compact Ballot On Demand Printer	Ballot On Demand Printer	OkiData	C712	\$2,375.00	40	\$95,000.00
Ballot On Demand Laptop with Router	Ballot On Demand Laptop	Del1	Latitude 3500	\$1,320.00	40	\$52,800.00
Rattery Rackup Symantec Endpoint Protection Adobe	EMS System for Reporting Software and Ballot Creation (Where Applicable)	Various	Various	\$3,382.00	22	\$74,404.00

AMENDMENT ONE TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE STATE OF WYOMING, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ELECTION SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE, LLC

So Wait.....Did You Notice the DS200 Models POLITICO



January 7, 2020

Chairwoman Christy McCormick Vice Chair Benjamin Hovland U.S. Election Assistance Commission 1335 East West Highway, Suite 4300 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 cmccormick@eac.gov bhovland@eac.gov

RE: Request to investigate ES&S for misrepresentations regarding EAC certification of voting machines with modems

Dear Chairwoman McCormick,

CYBERSECURITY

Election commission orders top voting machine vendor to correct misleading claims

This isn't the first time Election Systems & Software has faced accusations of making fabricated or misleading assertions about its voting machines.

By **KIM ZETTER** 08/13/2020 05:00 PM EDT










The federal Election Assistance Commission has rebuked the nation's top voting-machine maker over marketing materials that the panel says deceptivel implied the company's voting machines are EAC-certified.

The commission admonished Election Systems & Software over promotional literature and statements on its website that appear to assert, falsely, that voting machines the company sells with embedded modems have been sanctioned by the EAC under its testing and certification program. The statements put ES&S in violation of the EAC's testing and certification rules, the commission wrote in a previously unreported March 20 letter to the company that POLITICO obtained, and directed ES&S to revise the literature and notify customers that the systems are not certified.

Current Risk in the United States

NEW MALWARE AND PUA PER SECOND Last 12 months: 120,899,635 Per month: 10,074,969 Per day: 331,231 Per hour: 13,801 New malware in the I... New malware this year Per second: 3.8 55,786,064 3,346,703 **AXTEST** in 2024 In the last 14 days. ☆ < **-** - -

7.4.2 - Protection Against Malicious Software




7.4.2 Protection Against Malicious Software
 Voting systems shall deploy protection
 against the many forms of threats to which
 they may be exposed such as file and macro
 viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic
 bombs. Vendors shall develop and
 document the procedures to be followed
 to ensure that such protection is
 maintained in a current status.

ES&S 6.0.6.0 Status

COTS Software

Manufacturer	Application	Version	
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Server 2016	WIN2016_6060.iso	
Microsoft Corporation	Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC	WIN10_6060.iso	
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Updates (Software updates included in the OS image)	Package date: WIN10_6060.iso-4/19/2021 WIN2016_6060.iso-4/19/2020	
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Defender Antivirus (Configured within the OS image)	N/A	

ES&S Electionware 6.0.6.0 WY is At HIGH Risk



Engineering Change Orders 6.0.6.0

ES&S ECO 1141

Date Submitted by Manufacturer

Wednesday, June 8, 2022

05/31/2022

Share >

Date Approved by EAC

Manufacturer

06/08/2022

Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)

Short Description of Changes

Testing Lab

This ECO addresses the Critical Vulnerability CVE-2021-34527, also known as PrintNightmare, in the Windows

Operating System. It also updates antivirus definitions for the applicable EVS systems.

Pro V&V

Additional Documentation


Impacted Device/System

EVS 6.2.0.0, EVS 6.0.6.0 <u>ESS ECO 1141 Approval 6.8.22.pdf</u> (161.7 KB)

Windows 10. Windows Server 2016

ES&S ECO 1141 Analysis.pdf (227.23 KB)

ES&S Electionware 6.0.6.0 WY is At **HIGH** Risk



ES&S Engineering Change Orders 6.1.1.0

Change ID	Date	Component	Description	Inclusion
ECO 1029	9/24/19	ExpressVote	Upgrade to 8GB Innodisk on EV 1.0	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1034	10/28/19	ExpressVote Voting Booth	Enhanced Voting Booth	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1035	2/13/20	DS200	Improve thermal stability and higher	DeMinimis
			resolution calibration characteristics.	Optional
ECO 1041	10/28/19	ExpressVote XL	Add brace to Wheel Struts	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1043	10/30/19	ExpressVote	Add 16G Innodisk to EV 1.0	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1044	9/13/19	DS200 Ballot Tote	Add ballot Tote Bag	DeMinimis
				Optional
ECO 1047	2/28/20	ExpressVote XL	Aesthetic changes, modifications to	DeMinimis
			cart and curtain hardware.	Optional
ECO 1054	02/14/20	ExpressVote/ExpressVote	Update Ballot Bin	DeMinimis
		XL		Optional
ECO 1055	12/19/19	DS200 Ballot Bin tote	Add Ballot Tote Bag	DeMinimis
				Optional

ES&S Risks & EAC Response

2) With the VVSG 1.0 7.4.2 Protection Against Malicious Software, where it specifically states "Voting systems shall deploy protection against the many forms of threats to which they may be exposed such as file and macro viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs. Vendors shall develop and document the procedures to be followed to ensure that such protection is maintained in a current status." Should counties/states ask for Engineering Change Orders to be able to update the Antivirus definition files of the system before an election, to ensure the security of their systems? I see that many jurisdictions are using ES&S 6.1.1.0, and the antivirus of the laptop and desktops are stuck at March 29th, 2019....

Good morning

In response to your questions submitted yesterday:

- 1. If the laptop is being used as part of an EAC certified voting system, then yes, the county should look to have the vendor submit an engineering change order. Adding new models of laptop to an already certified system with an ECO is very common, and is one of the most frequently used reasons for ECO submissions.
- The ECO process can be used to update antivirus definition files and other security updates to voting systems. This was the subject of a Notification of Clarification (NOC) issued in 2019, which can be found on our website: https://www.eac.gov/noc-19-01

Sincerely,

Paul Aumayr | Sr. Election Technology Specialist
Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200 | Washington, DC 20001
www.eac.gov
| PAumayr@EAC.gov

2022 Case – Test Deck Fail?

Rhode Island reaches settlement with voting machine vendor over primary election errors

Secretary Gorbea Announces Settlement with Election Systems and Software Over Errors in the 2022 Election

by **Ryan Belmore** December 29, 2022









The Rhode Island Department of State has reached a settlement with voting machine vendor Election Systems and Software (ES&S) following programming errors that were discovered during the 2022 primary election.

As part of the settlement, ES&S will provide a credit of \$47,644 for all project management services provided during the election. In addition, the company has agreed to post a public statement (included below) on its website outlining best practices for collaborative Logic & Accuracy testing.

After the discovery of the programming errors in August, the Rhode Island Department of State's Elections Division worked with ES&S and the Rhode Island Board of Elections to develop new collaborative testing protocols to verify the accuracy of voting screens in both English and Spanish, as well as the accuracy of printed ballot cards.

Secretary of State Nellie Gorbea stated, "We have held our vendor accountable for their mistake, and working together we have succeeded in making systemic improvements to pre-election testing across my office, the Board of Elections and ES&S."

Rhode Island reaches settlement with voting machine vendor over primary election errors

Secretary Gorbea Announces Settlement with Election Systems and Software Over Errors in the 2022 Election

by **Ryan Belmore** December 29, 2022

https://whatsupnewp. com/2022/12/rhodeisland-reachessettlement-withvoting-machinevendor-over-primaryelection-errors/ The Rhode Island Department of State has reached a settlement with voting machine vendor Election Systems and Software (ES&S) following programming errors that were discovered during the 2022 primary election.

As part of the settlement, ES&S will provide a credit of \$47,644 for all project management services provided during the election. In addition, the company has agreed to post a public statement (included below) on its website outlining best practices for collaborative Logic & Accuracy testing.

Pre-election testing includes logic and accuracy (L&A) testing. It's the process by which the machines and ballots are publicly tested by jurisdictions before Election Day to confirm that the ballot content is accurate and those ballots will tabulate a voter's selections correctly. L&A testing increases confidence in elections.

ES&S wants to reiterate its recommendation for best practices which are contained on our online customer portal. "L&A testing starts with proofing all of your ballot styles, both paper and touch screen, for accuracy in layout and contests." This will ensure that all touch screens match exactly paper ballots, in every language used for voting.

Furthermore, we have also expressed: "To test your tabulation equipment, use a test deck of ballots and or ExpressVote vote summary cards containing votes for each candidate and questions in all contests, and where the expected results are known." This means that on touch screens, testing should include votes for all candidates and questions in all races. As we have said: "You can create your own test deck independently by manually filling out ballots for all ballot styles in sufficient quantity to vote all candidates/questions in all contests."

Voting machine company settles with RI over Spanish language ballot blunder



Published 2:13 p.m. ET Dec. 29, 2022 | Updated 3:11 p.m. ET Dec. 29, 2022



The election equipment provider in the middle of a <u>blunder on Spanish language</u> <u>ballots</u> in the September primaries has agreed to credit Rhode Island \$47,644, Secretary of State Nellie Gorbea said Thursday.

Nebraska-based Election Systems and Software "will provide a credit for all project management services provided in connection with the 2022 Primary Election," Gorbea said in a news release.

The company also agreed to post a message on its website reminding election workers that it's a good idea to proofread all ballots and test all tabulation machines before voters head to the polls.

"We have held our vendor accountable for their mistake, and working together we have succeeded in making systemic improvements to pre-election testing across my office, the Board of Elections and ES&S," Gorbea said in the release.

https://www.providencejournal.com/story/news/politics/2022/12/29/elections-systems-and-software-settle-with-ri-over-spanish-ballot-mistake/69764706007/



Voting rights groups call for investigation of Election Day problems in Northampton County

BY: PETER HALL - NOVEMBER 14, 2023 5:02 PM

"The county's conflicting messages to the public on Election Day led to confusion, concern, and doubt in the security and accuracy of votes. These mistakes grow into misinformation," said Philip Hensley-Robin, executive director of Common Cause PA.

The voting machine malfunction forced voters in Northampton County to vote via emergency ballots. County election officials said the issue was a "clerical error."

The malfunction occurred in the Superior Court retention race where the voter had to select 'Yes' or 'No' to vote for Judges Jack Panella and Victor Stabile to retain their seats.

"The programming error that occurred in Northampton County should be a lesson for every Pennsylvania county that uses hybrid touch screen voting machines," Marian Schneider, senior policy counsel for voting rights at the ACLU of Pennsylvania, said.

In addition to the investigation and report, the groups called on the county to evaluate voting machine logic and accuracy testing procedures and make adjustments to catch errors; issue public notices to allow observers during the testing, as required by the Election Code; and supply polling places with adequate emergency paper ballots, equal to 50% of the poll's registered voters.

Counties are required to perform logic and accuracy testing of all voting machines. According to the Pennsylvania Department of State, the testing is designed to detect issues with screen calibration, mislabeling and other potential problems to ensure the machines work properly.

"While the county completed some of this testing, it was not completed to adequacy or full compliance; otherwise the issue would have been caught and corrected before Election Day," the voting rights groups said in a statement.

ES&S Issues

- 1.2022 Rhode Island settlement with ES&S, programming errors https://whatsupnewp.com/2022/12/rhode-island-reaches-settlement-with-voting-machine-vendor-over-primary-election-errors/
- 2.2023 Northampton County Errors not caught earlier https://www.penncapital-star.com/blog/voting-rights-groups-call-for-investigation-of-election-day-problems-in-northampton-county/
- 3.2019 article ES&S Systems found on-line by Motherboard https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kxzk9/exclusive-critical-us-election-systems-have-been-left-exposed-online-despite-official-denials
- 4.2022 Monmouth County Election double count of votes, the fact they tried installing software like this is a violation https://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases23/2023-0906-Monmouth-County-Investigation-Investigative-Facts-Report-(8-31-2023)-(With%20Exhibits).pdf
- 5.2023 Hinds County (published Aug 31st) Missing tapes from machines, starting at video 20:00 minutes... 26 precincts, DS200, 3 components to verify the vote...1) paper ballot 26/26 of precincts have ballots, machine tapes 26/26 did not include the tapes, media stick (thumb drive) 26/26 precincts did not include the media sticks in the ballot box....DS200 also has another measure, digital imaging, a picture of the ballot, not one digital image...ES&S turned it off....

https://www.wlbt.com/2023/08/31/archie-calls-hinds-co-democratic-chair-step-down-alleging-fraud-party-primary/

- 6.2023 Hinds County Ransomware Attack did happen, \$300,000 paid https://www.wlbt.com/2023/10/03/against-advice-board-attorney-feds-david-archie-reveals-how-much-hinds-county-paid-hackers-after-cyberattack/
- 7.2023 Hinds County start of Ransomware est (early Sept, story is Sept 11th) https://www.wapt.com/article/hinds-county-computer-system-remains-under-ransomware-attack/45053213
- 8.2023 ES&S Vote flips and poor test decks https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2023/11/07/pennsylvania-voting-machine-error-iudge/stories/202311070112
- 9.Remote Access software illegally installed on systems (2018)- (oldie but goodie) https://www.vice.com/en/article/mb4ezy/top-voting-machine-vendor-admits-it-installed-remote-access-software-on-systems-sold-to-states
- 10.Modems in 33,000 machines but didn't disclose where they are (2020) https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/13/election-voting-machine-misleading-claims-394891

What Can We Do?

Transparency Is The Inoculation To All Conspiracy Theories

Election Officials – Testing & Transparency

- Create Standard Test Deck (Logic and Accuracy) The "Control"
 - Use a Prime Number in each race.
 - Every Ballot Option Assigned a Unique Number On The Ballot
- Let Voters Fill Out Ballots and Test Separately
- Publish Test Deck Reports on County Web Site
- Ballots Images and Cast Vote Records Published Night of Election.
- Electronic Poll Book Data Published Night of Election.
- Post Election Audit of 100% of all precincts and races, by hand.

Election Officials – Voter Rolls

- National Change of Address (NCOA) Review Monthly.
 - 3 Year look back
- Clerk of Courts Should send a list to County Auditor each month:
 - County Auditor to remove individuals any individual called for jury duty who is excused from jury duty because the individual:
 - Has Moved
 - Has Been Identified as mentally incompetent
 - Has Been Sentenced to imprisonment in the federal penitentiary system
 - Deceased voters published in an obituary, reported by a county coroner, or recorded in the death records maintained as vital statistics records by the Department of Health
 - Those who are not citizens of the United States

Candidates & Party

- Recruit, Organize & Train Poll Workers and Election Judges.
 - Laws, Rules, and What to Watch For.....chain of custody, signatures, folds, errors.
- Recruit, Organize & Train Poll Watchers.
 - Laws, Rules, and What to Watch For.....backpacks, extra ballots, interpretations of bad ballots, use of thumb drives, unsecured areas and processes.
- Reporting of Incidents Ready Made Affidavit Templates
- Understanding Rights and Assemble Legal Teams
- Validate Voter Rolls Mailers & Post Cards Return Mail Service,
 Digital and Door to Door Canvassing

What Voters Can Do?

- Help Your Election Official
 - Attend Public Accuracy Tests
 - Consider Being an Election Judge/Worker
- Help Your Party or a Candidate
 - Attend Public Accuracy Tests
 - Consider Being a Poll Watcher
 - Register Voters
 - Validate Voter Rolls by Canvassing Voters
 - Write Letters to the Editor on How You Are Helping to Protect the Election.

What Voters Can Do?


- Help Others Vote
 - Encourage Friends and Family to Vote
 - Register Others to Vote
 - Drive Others to the Polling Place on Election Day
- Verify that no one Voted Absentee for you
 - Some states don't allow you to change your vote on election day.
 - MN Request an absentee ballot and bring it in with you unused....
 - Vote in Person Maintain Chain of Custody
 - No Drop Boxes
 - No Mailing it in



Voting ballots found tossed in ravine miles from where they were mailed; authorities investigating

By Jesse Gary | Published November 14, 2022 6:40pm PST | Election | KTVU FOX 2 |






https://www.ktvu.com/news/voting-ballots-found-tossed-in-ravine-miles-from-where-they-were-mailed-investigation

Test Deck Recommendations

- Each ballot style within a precinct should be tested.
 - Paper Based Oval filled ballots
 - Paper Based ExpressVote Bar Code ballots
- Each option should have a unique number assigned to it.
 - Not repeated within the contest
 - Not repeated on the ballot.
- Prime Number should be used in each contest.
 - Example at https://uscase.org/test-deck-chart

Wards	17, 18 9 & 5	21, 22, 24 13, 9	oto 10 ballo 25 13	,
PRESIDENTIAL PREF		Juh U	1111	The
REPUBLICAN LA		DAL IIII V	/10	194
OVER VOTE				0
II STOV REGINU	-	101	11 /	6+
DEMOCRATIC PARTY		101	111	81
BIDEN []]]	-	h V	1	3+
UNINSTRUCTED	-	1 /		12
	-			4
WRITE IN 1		1		
OVER VOTE			1 1/	12.
UNDER VOTE	_ V		- X	
REPUBLICAN PARTY				12
CHRISTIE	¥	1 Y		3
RAMASWAMY	· ·	II V		- 60
DESANTIS	V	1 /		12
HALEY	V	11 /	1	3
TRUMP	1	III /	111	1
UNINSTRUCTED	V	IV		1
WRITE IN	1			-
OVER VOTE				
UNDER VOTE	1	1 22		1
		10	1	72+
KLOPPENBURG UPT	10	Wi V	H	1
WRITE IN UNTI				
	V	111	11 0	- 0
OVER VOTE	1	1	1	7
UNDER VOTE DAT IT	1	UN UN 1	UHT C	1



UNDER VOTE	11 V		1	2+1
REPUBLICAN PARTY	RESERVE AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NAM	CHARLES		
CHRISTIE	1 1	1 Y		2
RAMASWAMY	1	II v		3
DESANTIS	l v	1 /		2
HALEY	· ·	11 1	1 1	3+1
TRUMP		III /	111	7+3
UNINSTRUCTED	1	IV		1
WRITE IN	/			1
OVER VOTE				
UNDER VOTE	1	IV		2+1

Results with Full Decimal Places

All races are correct

3 RACES W	ITH PRIME		Total	Percent	Percent	Precent	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.0508475	0.6101695	0.3389831		3 36	20
5	35	18	58	0.0862069	0.6034483	0.3103448		5 35	18
7	34	16	57	0.122807	0.5964912	0.2807018		7 34	16
11	33	15	59	0.1864407	0.559322	0.2542373	1	1 33	15
13	32	14	59	0.220339	0.5423729	0.2372881	1	3 32	14
17	30	12	59	0.2881356	0.5084746	0.2033898	1	7 30	12
19	28	10	57	0.3333333	0.4912281	0.1754386	1	9 28	10
23	27	9	59	0.3898305	0.4576271	0.1525424	2	3 27	9
29	26	8	63	0.4603175	0.4126984	0.1269841	2	9 26	8
31	24	6	61	0.5081967	0.3934426	0.0983607	3	1 24	6

Results with 1 Decimal Place

• 27 errors and only 3 races are correct.

3 RACES W	VITH PRIME		Total	Precent 1	Precent 1	Precent 1	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.1	0.7	0.4	6	41	24
5	35	18	58	0.1	0.7	0.4	6	41	23
7	34	16	57	0.2	0.6	0.3	11	34	17
11	33	15	59	0.2	0.6	0.3	12	35	18
13	32	14	59	0.3	0.6	0.3	18	35	18
17	30	12	59	0.3	0.6	0.3	18	35	18
19	28	10	57	0.4	0.5	0.2	23	29	11
23	27	9	59	0.4	0.5	0.2	24	30	12
29	26	8	63	0.5	0.5	0.2	32	32	13
31	24	6	61	0.6	0.4	0.1	37	24	6

Results with 2 Decimal Places

• 7 errors and 23 are correct

3 RACES W	ITH PRIME		Total	Percent 2	Percent 2	Percent 2	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.06	0.62	0.34	4	37	20
5	35	18	58	0.09	0.61	0.32	5	35	19
7	34	16	57	0.13	0.60	0.29	7	34	17
11	33	15	59	0.19	0.56	0.26	11	33	15
13	32	14	59	0.23	0.55	0.24	14	32	14
17	30	12	59	0.29	0.51	0.21	17	30	12
19	28	10	57	0.34	0.50	0.18	19	29	10
23	27	9	59	0.39	0.46	0.16	23	27	9
29	26	8	63	0.47	0.42	0.13	30	26	8
31	24	6	61	0.51	0.40	0.10	31	24	6

Results with 3 Decimal Places

All are correct

3 RACES W	ITH PRIME		Total	Percent 3	Percent 3	Percent 3	Review	Review	Review
3	36	20	59	0.051	0.611	0.339		3 3	6 20
5	35	18	58	0.087	0.604	0.311		5 3	5 18
7	34	16	57	0.123	0.597	0.281		7 3	4 16
11	33	15	59	0.187	0.56	0.255		11 3	3 15
13	32	14	59	0.221	0.543	0.238		13 3	2 14
17	30	12	59	0.289	0.509	0.204		17 3	0 12
19	28	10	57	0.334	0.492	0.176		19 2	8 10
23	27	9	59	0.39	0.458	0.153		23 2	7 9
29	26	8	63	0.461	0.413	0.127		29 2	6 8
31	24	6	61	0.509	0.394	0.099		31 2	4 6

Recommendations

- Each ballot style within a precinct should be tested.
 - Paper Based Oval filled ballots
 - Paper Based ExpressVote Bar Code ballots
- Each option should have a unique number assigned to it.
 - Not repeated within the contest
 - Not repeated on the ballot.
- Prime Number should be used in each contest.
 - Example at https://uscase.org/test-deck-chart

Prime Number Chart

Prime Number	2	3	4	5	6	7
5	4	6				
7	8	9	10			
11	12					
13	14	15	16			
17	18					
19	20	21	22			
23	24	25	26	27	28	
29	30					
31	32	33	34	35	36	

Prime Number	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	Total Ballot Positions
5	4	6											3
7	8	9	10										7
11	12												9
13	14	15	16										13
17	18												15
19	20	21	22										19
23	24	25	26	27	28								25
29	30												27
31	32	33	34	35	36								33
37	38	39	40										37
41	42												39
43	44	45	46										43
47	48	49	50	51	52								49
53	54	55	56	57	58								55
59	60												57
61	62	63	64	65	66								63
67	68	69	70										67
71	72												69
73	74	75	76	77	78								75
79	80	81	82										79
83	84	85	86	87	88								85
89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96						93
97	98	99	100										97
101	102												99
103	104	105	106										103
107	108												105
109	110	111	112										109
113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	123	124	125	126	122

Examples – WY 2020 Primary – 4 Races Rep

Group E Sin	nple Elect	tions 2-10	Options	(with Wri	ite-In)							
2-11 Option	Races											
	Option	Option	Option	Option	Option	Option	Option	Option	Option	Option	Option	Max
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	Marked
												Ballots
												Used
Race 1(11)	5	4	6	8	9	10	12	14	16	15	18	117
Race 2(3)	23	20	21									64
Race 3(2)	19	28										47
Race 4(3)	17	24	25									66
Race 5(3)	11	30	26									67
Race 6(3)	7	32	27									66

Examples – WY 2020 Primary – 9 Races Dem

Race	Candidate Issue A	Candidate Issue B	Candidate Issue C	Candidate Issue D	Candidate Issue E	Max Marked Ballots Used	Max Marked Ballots Used
Group C Sim	ple Elections	2-4 Options	(with Write-	ln)			
2-5 Option R	aces					2 Ovals	Max Ovals
Race 1(5)	3	52	27	12	9	55	103(5)
Race 2(5)	5	51	15	20	10	56	101(5)
Race 3(4)	7	50	26	18		57	101(4)
Race 4(4)	11	49	32	16		60	104(4)
Race 5(4)	13	48	33	8		61	102(4)
Race 6(3)	17	46	39			63	102(3)
Race 7(3)	19	45	38			64	102(3)
Race 8(3)	23	44	36			67	103(3)
Race 9(3)	29	42	35			71	106(3)
Race 10(3)	31	40	34			71	105(3)
	*Over vote	and under v be run as			ed for each r baseline test	and should	

Platte Cost Review

Ballot Coding Cost			
Platte	2020	2020	2020
	Primary	General	Total
	\$6,085.00	\$3,235.00	\$9,320.00
Number of Ballots	3,225	4,963	8,188
Cost per Ballot	\$1.88	\$0.65	\$1.14

Gt	Ballot Coding	Cost 2020
County	Primary	General
Albany	\$4,210.00	\$2,240.00
Big Horn	\$6,085.00	\$3,235.00
Campbell	\$17,315.00	\$9,215.00
Carbon	\$8,425.00	\$4,480.00
Converse	\$8,890.00	\$4,730.00
Crook	\$7,955.00	\$4,235.00
Fremont	\$14,975.00	\$7,970.00
Goshen	\$9,360.00	\$4,980.00
Hot Springs	\$1,870.00	\$995.00
Johnson	\$7,490.00	\$3,985.00
Laramie	\$28,550.00	\$15,190.00
Lincoln	\$7,955.00	\$4,235.00
Natrona	\$22,930.00	\$12,200.00
Niobrara	\$2,810.00	\$1,495.00
Park	\$13,570.00	\$7,220.00
Platte	\$6,085.00	\$3,235.00
Sheridan	\$13,570.00	\$7,220.00
Sublette	\$3,745.00	\$1,990.00
Sweetwater	\$17,315.00	\$9,215.00
Teton	\$8,425.00	\$4,480.00
Uinta	\$4,680.00	\$2,490.00
Washakie	\$2,340.00	\$1,245.00
Weston	\$3,745.00	\$1,990.00
Totals	\$222,295.00	\$118,270.00

Support for Platte County

	Suppo	ort Costs for I	Platte Count	y		
Support Category	Post-Warranty Year 1	Post-Warranty Year 2	Post-Warranty Year 3	Post-Warranty Year 4	Post-Warranty Year 5	Total
Operations Support	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -
Maintenance Support	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$2,205.00	\$11,025.00
Application Support	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$8,300.00	\$41,500.00
SUPPORT SUB-TOTAL	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$10,505.00	\$52,525.00

Hand Count (\$1.13) vs Machines (\$5.40)

					Maintenance		
	Purchase	Qty State	Platte	2020	2021	2022	2023
DS200 w/Box	\$ 5,750.00	310	8	\$ 46,000.00			
DS200 w/o Box	\$ 5,300.00	8	0				
DS450	\$ 49,950.00	9	0				
EMS Hardware	\$ 3,382.00	22	1	\$ 3,382.00			
Ballot on Demand	\$ 5,740.00	40	0				
Ballot Creation & Reporting	\$ 15,500.00	15	1	\$ 15,500.00			
EMS Reporting	\$ 4,375.00	7	0				
-				\$ 64,882.00	\$ 10,505.00	\$ 10,505.00	\$ 10,505.00
							\$ 96,397.00

2020	2020	2022	2022	2023
Primary	General	Primary	General	Special
3235	4963	3751	4043	1862
			Total Ballots	17854
				\$ 5.40
			W/Ballot Design	\$ 6.54
	Primary	Primary General	Primary General Primary 3235 4963 3751	Primary General Primary General 3235 4963 3751 4043 Total Ballots

Hand Count (\$1.13) vs Machines (\$5.40)

2022 Gene	eral Election								
Precinct	Total Ballot	s Tab	les	People	\$20	/hr	3 hrs	Tota	al
1-1	1118		5	20	\$	20.00	3	\$1	,200.00
1-2	147		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
1-3	136		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
1-6	1413		6	24	\$	20.00	3	\$1	,440.00
2-1	466		2	8	\$	20.00	3	\$	480.00
2-2	208		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
3-1	344		2	8	\$	20.00	3	\$	480.00
4-1	211		1	4	\$	20.00	3	\$	240.00
	4043								
			19	76	\$	20.00	3	\$4	,560.00
				Hand Cour	nt C	ost/Bal	lot	\$	1.13

See the Difference

INSTANT TRUST

Public Counting – Voter Intent Decided, Can ascertain how they counted ballots



Public Counting – Can observe with our own eyes and ears.

INSTANT DOUBT

Machine Counting – Voter Intent Lost, Unable to ascertain how it counted



Machine Counting – Supposed to audit programing by reviewing test decks, ballot images and Cast Vote Records (CVRs)

Hand Count – Statute (Machine Primary)

22-14-114. Counting of ballots.

- (a) For ballots designed to be counted by machine, each individual vote shall be determined by the voting equipment and shall not be determined subjectively by human tabulation except when the intent of the voter is unmistakable but the ballot was received in such damaged, soiled, or other condition that it is rejected by the machine. The secretary of state may promulgate rules establishing standards for counting such ballots. For ballots not designed to be counted by machine, only votes clearly marked, as provided by W.S. 22-14-104 and rules promulgated pursuant to this code, shall be tallied. For write-in votes, names which are misspelled or abbreviated or the use of nicknames of candidates shall be counted for the candidate if the vote is obvious to the board.
- (b) At the request of a county clerk, ballots may be received from a polling place and counted at a central counting center in accordance with rules promulgated by the secretary of state pursuant to W.S. 22-2-121(g).

New Systems

EVS 6.0.6.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2021-12-28
EVS 6.1.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	VVSG 1.0 (2005)	2019-09-24
EVS 6.1.1.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	VVSG 1.0 (2005)	2020-07-27
EVS 6.2.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2021-12-23
EVS 6.3.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2022-11-11
EVS 6.4.0.0	Election Systems & Software, Inc (ES&S)	<u>VVSG 1.0 (2005)</u>	2023-08-18

Official Ballot Partisan Office and Referendum November 8, 2022

Notice to voters: If you are voting on Election Day, your ballot must be initialed by two (2) election inspectors. If you are voting absentee, your ballot must be initialed by the municipal clerk or deputy clerk. Your ballot may not be counted without initials (see end of ballot for initials).

21	without initials (see end of ballot for initial General Instructions	Statewide	Congressional
	If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question, ask an election inspector for help	Attorney General // Vote for 1	District State of Grant State of State
	(absentee voters: contact your municipal clerk).	◆ Josh Kaul (Democratic)	Mike Van Someren (Democratic)
	To vote for a name on the ballot, fill in the oval next to the name like this:	C Eric Toney (Republican)	Scott Fitzgerald (Republican)
	To vote for a name that is not on	O write-in:	o write-in:
40	the ballot, write the name on the line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this: ■	Secretary of State Vote for 1	Legislative - Care Senator - Plantor 15
41	Statewide	 Doug La Follette (Democratic) 	O John Jagler
43	When voting for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, you have one of two choices:	 Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (Republican) 	(Republican) write-in: P72,4w } Z497/
	Vote for candidates on one ticket, or	Neil Harmon (Libertarian)	Propresentative to the Assembly District SB Vote for 1
	Write in names of persons on both write-in lines. A write-in vote for only a	 Sharyl R. McFarland (Wisconsin Green Party) 	Mark L. Born (Republican)
49	Lieutenant Governor candidate will not be counted.	o write-in:	write-in: FTZANK ZAPPA
51		State Treasurer Vote for 1	County
	Governor / Lieutenant Governor Vote for 1	Aaron Richardson (Democratic)	Shortif Vote for 1 Dale J. Schmidt
	Tony Evers / Sara Rodriguez	○ John S. Leiber (Republican)	(Republican)
	(Democratic)	Andrew Zuelke (Constitution)	Clark of Circuit Court Vote for 1
	 Tim Michels / Roger Roth 	O write-in:	Kelly Enright
	(Republican)	Congressional	(Republican)
	Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Independent)	United States Senatur Vote for 1	o write-in:
	(independent)	 Mandela Barnes (Democratic) 	
	write-in: (Governor)	Ron Johnson (Republican)	
		o write-in:	
	write-in: (Lieutenant Governor)		

Cast Vote Record: 16,399		State Sen Dist 13 (280)		
		Vote For: 1		
Poll Place: Iron Ridge Community Cent		Write-in (282)	Counted	(Marked)
Precinct: V Iron Ridge				
Ballot Style: V Iron Ridge [Sheet Number 1]				
Party: Nonpartisan		Rep Assem Dist 39 (290)		
Tabulator CVR: c4cd22611f6b4ab6		Vote For: 1		
Machine Serial: DS200 - 0317350401		Write-in (292)	Counted	(Marked)
Blank Ballot: NO				
Reporting Group: Election Day		Sheriff Dodge Co (310)		
		Vote For: 1		
Contests:		Dale J. Schmidt (417)	Overvoted	
			Overvoted	(Manhard)
		Write-in (312)	07077000	(Marked)
Gov/Lt. Gov (245)				
Vote For: 1		Circuit Court Clerk Dodge Co (320)		
Evers / Rodriguez (367)	Counted	Vote For: 1		
		Kelly Enright (421)	Counted	
		, ,		
Attorney Gen (250)				
Vote For: 1		Ref Instructions with (330)		
Josh Kaul (373)	Counted	Vote For: 0		
		Referendum MPTC (333)		
Sec State (255)		Vote For: 1		
Vote For: 1		Undervoted	Undervoted	
Neil Harmon (381)	Counted	Ondervoted		
State Treas. (260)				
Vote For: 1				
Aaron Richardson (385)	Counted			
US State Sen (265)				
Vote For: 1				
Mandela Barnes (391)	Counted			
Rep Congress Dist 5 (270)				
Vote For: 1				
Mike Van Someren (395)	Counted			

Ballot ID 18399i.pdf has a small mark in the oval for "write-in:" for the County Sheriff race causing the race to be an over vote, and the voter's vote to be lost.

Official Ballot Partisan Office November 8, 2022 Notice to voters: If you are voting on Election Day, your ballot must be initialed by two (2) election inspectors. If you are voting absentee, your ballot must be initialed by the municipal clerk or deputy clerk. Your ballot may not be counted without initials (see end of ballot for initials). General Instructions Congressional If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question, ask an election inspector for help (absentee voters: contact your Josh Kaul Mike Van Someren (Democratic) (Democratic) To vote for a name on the ballot. Eric Toney Scott Fitzgerald fill in the oval next to the name like (Republican write-in: o write-in: To vote for a name that is not on the ballot, write the name on the Legislative line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this: Statewide Doug La Follette (Democratic) John Jagler When voting for Governor and Amy Lynn Loudenbeck Lieutenant Governor, you have (Republican) o write-in: one of two choices: Neil Harmon Vote for candidates on one (Libertarian) Write in names of persons on both write-in lines. Sharyl R. McFarland Maureen McCarville (Wisconsin Green Party) (Democratic) A write-in vote for only a Lieutenant Governor candidate William Penterman will not be counted. (Republican) write-in: County Aaron Richardson (Democratic) John S. Leiber Tony Evers / (Republican) Sará Rodriguez Dale J. Schmidt (Republican) Andrew Zuelke (Constitution) Tim Michels / Roger Roth (Republican) Congressional Kelly Enright Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Republican) o write-in: Mandela Barnes (Democratic) Ron Johnson write-in: (Governor) (Republican) write-in: (Lieutenant Governor) Typ:01 Seq:0071 Spl:01 Continue voting at top of next Continue voting at top of next Page 1 of 2-sided ballot. Ballot continues on other side.

Cast Vote Record: 34,195		
Poll Place: Watertown W1&2		
Precinct: C Watertown W1&2		
Ballot Style: C Watertown W1&2 [Sheet Number 1]		
Party: Nonpartisan		
Tabulator CVR: 45e21200b3ab0caa		
Machine Serial: DS200 - 0317350792		
Blank Ballot: NO		
Reporting Group: Election Day		
Contests:		
Gov/Lt. Gov (245)		
Vote For: 1		
Michels / Roth (369)	Overvoted	
Write-in (247)	Overvoted	(Marked)
Attorney Gen (250)		
Vote For: 1		
Eric Toney (375)	Counted	
Sec State (255)		
Vote For: 1		
Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (379)	Counted	
runy Lynn Loudonbook (676)		
State Treas. (260)		
Vote For: 1		
John S. Leiber (387)	Counted	
US State Sen (265)		
Vote For: 1		
Ron Johnson (393)	Counted	
Rep Congress Dist 5 (270)		
Vote For: 1		
Scott Fitzgerald (397)	Counted	
Scott i itzgeralu (557)		

Ballot image 34195i.pdf is a case of the worst possible outcome, to where a voter who voted absentee by mail, or strictly by mail, voted on a poorly designed ballot, that invalidated a voter's intent on a race in an election. Better design of the ballot could have prevented this from happening.

The Folds

EVS 6042 CA Election Management System Chapter 2: Paper Ballot Specifications

2.6.6 Folding Ballots


A folding machine should be used to expedite the process of folding ballots. In addition, roller pressures should be reduced to about 2 – 3X thickness of ballot stock.

Caution



- Do not fold across timing marks, ovals, write-in spaces (marked or unmarked), or arrows, as this may cause tabulation errors.
- Fold as few times as possible.
- When removing from envelopes, place all ballots in the same orientation for proper back-bending.

2.6.7 Perforating and Numbering Ballot Stubs



t that election workers Stubs usually contain at least ification number or number that matches the re been cast. Ballots should

CHAPTER 207—FEDERAL ELECTION RECORDS

Sec.	
20701.	Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with
	custodian; penalty for violation.
20702.	Theft, destruction, concealment, mutilation, or alteration of records or papers; penalties.
20703.	Demand for records or papers by Attorney General or representative; statement of basis and purpose.
20704.	Disclosure of records or papers.
20705.	Jurisdiction to compel production of records or papers.
20706.	"Officer of election" defined.

§20701. Retention and preservation of records and papers by officers of elections; deposit with custodian; penalty for violation

Every officer of election shall retain and preserve, for a period of twenty-two months from the date of any general, special, or primary election of which candidates for the office of President, Vice President, presidential elector, Member of the Senate. Member of the House of Representatives, or Resident Commissioner from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico are voted for all records and papers which come into his possession relating to any application, registration, payment of poll tax, or other act requisite to voting in such election except that, when required by law, such records and papers may be delivered to another officer of election and except that, if a State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico designates a custodian to retain and preserve these records and papers at a specified place, then such records and papers may be deposited with such custodian, and the duty to retain and preserve any record or paper so deposited shall devolve upon such custodian. Any officer of election or custodian who willfully fails to comply with this section shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(Pub. L. 86-449, title III, §301, May 6, 1960, 74 Stat. 88.)

EDITORIAL NOTES

CODIFICATION

Section was formerly classified to section 1974 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to editorial reclassification and renumbering as this section.

§20702. Theft, destruction, concealment, mutilation, or alteration of records or papers; penalties

Any person, whether or not an officer of election or custodian, who willfully steals, destroys, conceals, mutilates, or alters any record or paper required by section 20701 of this title to be retained and preserved shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(Pub. L. 86-449, title III, §302, May 6, 1960, 74 Stat. 88.)







https://www.essvote.com/fags/













Does ES&S support post-election audits?

ES&S is a strong supporter of state and local administrations in their work to provide secure, accurate elections. Post-election audits are a legal process by which election officials verify that votes were counted accurately and is conducted by election officials according to state law. ES&S voting systems support these audits by providing election details (logs, cast vote records, reports, etc.) which election officials utilize for this purpose. ES&S supports the highest standards for security, including strict chain-of-custody protocols for equipment and all applicable laws, regulations and certification requirements.

Ballots anyone








Making Copies

3,000 Dodge County Ballots printed 6 precincts, 2 copiers, 4 hours.

Copiers did not stop them from printing.



10,000 Blank Ballots - Not secure



What is our backup plan?



FBI Director Tells Ohio Sheriff, "There are More Red Flags ... •

Feb 10, 2024 — In response to alarming warnings from the FBI about potential terrorist attacks on the United States, Butler County Sheriff Richard Jones is ...



US says it blocked a China cyber threat, but warns hackers could still disrupt lives of Americans

22-11-107. Failure of automatic tabulating equipment.

If the automatic tabulating equipment fails during the ballot count, the counting board shall use an alternate method of counting the ballots.

By Jennifer Edwards Baker and Ken Brown Published: Feb. 8, 2024 at 4:31 AM CST



That's where FBI Director Christopher Wray told the sheriffs that red flag warnings for terrorism threats against Americans are at their highest ever and the Chinese are ready to American infrastructure like electrical grids and water treatment plants if the U.S. and China ever go to war.

Butler County sheriff changes how it arms, trains deputies after FBI director's ominous warning

Sheriff Jones says he is now convinced a terror attack in the U.S. is imminent by people who are already here living among us.

"We were told by the FBI director it's not a matter of if, it's a matter of when," the sheriff said at a news conference Wednesday.

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Election Research **501c3**



The Folds

EVS 6042 CA Election Management System Chapter 2: Paper Ballot Specifications

2.6.6 Folding Ballots


A folding machine should be used to expedite the process of folding ballots. In addition, roller pressures should be reduced to about 2 – 3X thickness of ballot stock.

Caution




- Do not fold across timing marks, ovals, write-in spaces (marked or unmarked), or arrows, as this may cause tabulation errors.
- Fold as few times as possible.
- When removing from envelopes, place all ballots in the same orientation for proper back-bending.

2.6.7 Perforating and Numbering Ballot Stubs



t that election workers Stubs usually contain at least ification number or number that matches the re been cast. Ballots should

where the voter intent was lost and the vote for that race did not count



Over-Vote



inue voting at top of next	Continue voting at top of next	Continue voting on back of ballot.
	Contag modes	Typ:01 Seq:0034 Spi 01
write-in: (Lieutenant Governor)		
h t distance Course	O write-in:	
In Minels write-in: (Governor)	Ron Johnson (Republican)	
	Mandela Barnes (Democratic)	
Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Independent)	United States Senator Vote for 1	O write-in:
(Republican)	Congressional	(Republican)
Tim Michels / Roger Roth (Republican)	O write-in:	 Kelly Enright
(Democratic)	Andrew Zuelke (Constitution)	Clark of Chrouit Court Vota for 1
Tony Evers / Sara Rodriguez (Democratic)	 John S. Leiber (Republican) 	C: write-in.
超越大型的联系中央	(Democratic)	Dale J. Schmidt (Republican)
Overnor I Instended Governor Last for 1	○ Aaron Richardson	Sheriff Vote for 1
will not be counted.	State Treasurer. Vote for 1	County
A write-in vote for only a Lieutenant Governor candidate	(Wisconsin Green Party)	(Republican) ⇒ wrde-in:
 Write in names of persons on both write-in lines. 	Sharyl R. McFarland	Vote for t := *** Ar Mark L. Born
Vote for candidates on one ticket, or	C Neil Harmon (Libertarian)	Representative to the Assembly District 39
When voting for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, you have one of two choices:	Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (Republican)	(Republican) O write-in
Statewide	Doug La Follette (Democratic)	S John Jagler
line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this:	Vote for 1	Supplemental by the second
To vote for a name that is not on the ballot, write the name on the	O write-in	□ write in Legislative
To vote for a name on the ballot, fill in the oval next to the name like this:	Enc Toney (Republikan)	Scott Fitzgerald (Republican)
(absentee voters; contact your municipal clerk).	☐ Josh Kaul (Democratic)	○ Mike Van Someren (Democratic)
If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question, ask an election inspector for help	Attorney General Vote for 1	Recommendation in Congress
The state of the s	Statewide	Congressional
Notice to votors. If you are voting on a voting absentive, your ballot must be a	lection Day, your ballet must be initialed by nitialed by the municipal derk or deputy cler itials)	two (2) election inspectors if you are
	Official Ballot Partisan Office and Referendun November 8, 2022	

President / presidential candidate will not be counted.	District Attorney Vote for 1	ballot at the request and direction of a voter who is authorized under Wis. Sta
President / Vice President	Melisa Arndt (Democratic)	ballot at the request and direction of a voter who is authorized under Wis. Stat. §6.82 to receive assistance.
Vote for 1	Jon Plumer	
 Joseph R. Biden/ Kamala D. Harris 	(Republican)	Signature of assistor
(Democratic)	write-in:	For Official Use Only
Populd I Trump/	District Attorney Vote for 1	Inspectors: Identify ballots required to be remade:
Donald J. Trump/ Michael R. Pence (Republican)		Overvoted Damaged Other
On Blankenship/	o write-in:	If this is the Original If this is the Duplicate
William Mohr (Constitution)	County	Ballot, write the serial number here: Ballot, write the serial number here:
2 la largement	County Clerk Vote for 1	rig to a feriod access (in the control access in the control acces
Jo Jorgensen/ Jeremy Spike Cohen (Libertarian Party)	Karen J. Gibson (Republican)	Initials of inspectors who remade ballot
○ Brian Carroll/	o write-in:	
Amar Patel (American Solidarity Party)	County Treasurer Vote for 1	
Dengald Trum 2 , write-in: (President)	Patti K. Hilker (Republican)	
michael & Pence	o write-in:	
write-in: (Vice President)	Register of Deeds Vote for	The second of th

Public CVRS

- Dodge County WI
 https://www.co.dodge.wi.gov/departments/departments-a-d/county-clerk/election-information
- Sauk County WI
 https://www.co.sauk.wi.us/countyclerk/election-information-cast-vote-record-cvr-reports

Cast Vote Records (CVRs)


 Transparency is the inoculation to all conspiracy theories

Cast Vote Record: 34,195

Poll Place: Watertown W1&2 Precinct: C Watertown W1&2 Ballot Style: C Watertown W1&2 [Sheet Number 1] Party: Nonpartisan Tabulator CVR: 45e21200b3ab0caa Machine Serial: D\$200 - 0317350792 Blank Ballot: NO Reporting Group: Election Day Contests: Gov/Lt. Gov (245) Vote For: 1 Overvoted Michels / Roth (369) Overvoted Write-in (247) (Marked) Attorney Gen (250) Vote For: 1 Counted Eric Toney (375) Sec State (255) Vote For: 1 Counted Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (379)

	Official Ballot Partisan Office November 8, 2022	
Notice to voters: If you are voting on Ele voting absentee, your ballot must be init without initials (see end of ballot for initial General Instructions	Statewide	by two (2) election inspectors. If you are erk. Your ballot may not be counted Congressional
If you make a mistake on your ballot or have a question, ask an election inspector for help	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	White
(absentee voters: contact your municipal clerk).	O Josh Kaul (Democratic)	Mike Van Someren (Democratic)
To vote for a name on the ballot, fill in the oval next to the name like this;	Eric Toney (Republican)	 Scott Fitzgerald (Republican)
To vote for a name that is not on	o write-in:	o write-in:
the ballot, write the name on the line marked "write-in" and fill in the oval next to the name like this:	Landon I William I	Legislative
Statewide	 Doug La Follette (Democratic) 	John Jagler
When voting for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, you have	Amy Lynn Loudenbeck (Republican)	(Republican)
Vote for candidates on one ticket, or	Neil Harmon (Libertarian)	Representative to the seeper District 37 Vote for 1
Write in names of persons on both write-in lines.	 Sharyl R. McFarland (Wisconsin Green Party) 	Maureen McCarville (Democratic)
A write-in vote for only a Lieutenant Governor candidate will not be counted.	o write-in:	William Penterman (Republican)
	State Treasurer Vote for 1	o write-in:
Governor / Liketenant Governor Vote for 1	Aaron Richardson (Democratic)	County
O Tony Evers / Sara Rodriguez (Democratic)	John S. Leiber (Republican)	▼ Dale J. Schmidt
Tim Michels /	 Andrew Zuelke (Constitution) 	(Republican) o write-in:
Roger Roth (Republican)	o write-in:	THE PERSON NAMED IN
1 * 0.00 * 1000000000	Congressional	Vote for 1
Joan Ellis Beglinger / No Candidate (Independent)		 Kelly Enright (Republican)
6	Mandela Barnes (Democratic)	o write-in:
write-in: (Governor)	Ron Johnson (Republican)	
	o write-in:	
write-in: (Lieutenant Governor)		
		Typ:01 Seq:0071 Spl:01
Continue voting at top of next column.	Continue voting at top of next column.	


Here are some examples of voter intent the machines would miss.



The Seating of the judges

We recommend having 4 election judges per table, 2 from each party, 2 people for

different parties will review the ballots and call out the name of the winner of each race on the ballot, in order. The other 2 election judges, from each party, will mark their sheets with the candidate receiving the vote. They will review each vote on the ballot, skipping those races without a selection for a candidate, no mark is needed for empty races.






2024 Hand Count Demo Dodge County 2022 Clyman Ballots

Quick Notes for this session

- 1) There are 126 ballots in each folder on the table, the seal number is 759354
- Both types of ballots are here, user filled in and ExpressVote disability ballots.
- One side of the table is the calling team, represented by both parties.
- 4) The other side of the table is the tally team with the binders, represented by both parties.
- 1st You will count to confirm that your team has 126 ballots,
 - a. Separate approximately the pile of ballots in half, one for each side of the table.
 - b. Your 2 teams will count and sort the ballots into groups of 50's, so you should end up with 50-50-26 as final stacks.
- 6) 2nd Your table team will verify that all ballots have the stamp or initials required, in-person ballots should have 2 initials, absentee ballots 1 initial. Any ballot that does not have an initial or stamp...you will set that ballot aside and mark the spoiled section of the master tally totals sheets. Rebalance any stack of 50 ballots by drawing a ballot from the remainder stack....so you may end up with 50-50-25 stack of ballots.
- 7) We will be calling and marking one race at time, the first race should marked be in Blue, with a /
- The next race would be in Red.
- 9) If a recount is needed use the same color and mark with an X, if a 3rd recount is needed, fill in the box.

ELECTION MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES



End-to-End Voting System Acceptance Test

The end-to-end test is sometimes referred to as a test of the election management system (EMS). It tests the election management system itself and tests the ability of the EMS to interface with all the types of components. It also verifies that the EMS correctly tabulates votes and prints reports. Election officials should conduct this test on all newly acquired voting systems and after any event that could have altered the voting system, such as a system upgrade or if the EMS hardware leaves the custody and control of the election authority.


Materials Required: Election officials must know the correct versions of the operating systems and EMS software. In addition, the testers will need the following:

 A complete election management system with all required election management system software installed.

- If Optical Scanners are used:
 - At least one ballot scanner. If different types are used (e.g., precinct-based for polling locations and bulk/ high-speed for central counting), then at least one of each type will be needed.
 - One blank memory device used to load the election definition onto the ballot scanner(s),
 - A memory device for each scanner to store tabulated results and Cast Vote Records.
 - At least one set of pre-marked optical scan test ballots with known results. This can be the same test deck used to conduct acceptance tests on the ballot scanners.

66

U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION



Documentation: If any component of the voting system experiences a failure during any of the above steps that the tester cannot correct, the test should be terminated. The tester should prepare documentation that lists the serial number of the election computer and the serial number or other identifying information for any other component that failed, the persons conducting the tests, the date, and a description of the failure.

Election officials should make two copies of this documentation; one copy for the permanent record and another copy that stays with the failed component of the voting system to assist those making any required repairs. All printouts should be attached to the copy retained for the permanent record.

If the voting system passes all the above tests, election officials should prepare documentation for the permanent record, including the names of those conducting the tests and the date. All printouts should be attached to this documentation.

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Post Election Audit is FAKE in WY

22-11-109. Post election audit.

The county clerk shall conduct a random audit of ballots by processing the preaudited group of test ballots as described in W.S. 22-11-104(b)(iii) on five percent (5%) of the automated tabulating equipment for that county, but on not less than one (1) machine, within thirty (30) days of any election in which the tabulating equipment was used.

Should be auditing the actual voted ballots with a hand count.

Redoing the test deck is invalid, and does not review the real-world ballots that were cast...

County Authorization (Local Control)

22-11-102. Use authorized; purchase or lease.

The board of county commissioners of each county may adopt for use, either experimentally or permanently, in any election in any or all polling places within the county, any electronic voting system authorized by law.

Authority – SOS - Statute

22-11-103. Capabilities required.

- (e) The secretary of state may deny an application for certification of an electronic voting system as required by subsection (d) of this section or withdraw certification of an electronic voting system for any of the following reasons:
- (i) A county clerk notifies the secretary of state of and the secretary of state determines that the electronic voting system fails to meet the requirements necessary for approval of certification or ongoing certification provided in subsection (d) of this section; or
- (ii) The vendor fails to notify the secretary of state of necessary enhancements or adjustments to the electronic voting system;

Authority – SOS Rules

Section 3. Grounds for Denial or Withdrawal of Certification of Voting Equipment.

The secretary of state may deny or withdraw the certification of equipment for any of the following reasons:

- (b) The secretary of state determines that the equipment fails to meet there quirements necessary for approval or continued compliance;
- (d) The vendor fails to notify the secretary of state of significant enhancements or adjustments which are necessary to the equipment;

Still At High Risk



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Conformance



ES&S EVS 6.4.0.0

The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Version 1.0 (VVSG 1.0). Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual 2.0 and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.


Product Name: EVS				
Model or Version: 6.4.0.				
Name of VSTL:	Pro V&V		_	
EAC Certification 1	Number:	ESSEVS6400		
Date Issued: 08/18	8/2023			

St 0.0


COTS Software		
Manufacturer	Application	Version
Microsoft Corporation	Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC	WIN10_6400.iso
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Server 2022	WIN2022_6400.iso
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Updates (Software	Package date:
	updates included in the OS	WIN10_6400.iso - 12/02/2022
	image)	WIN2022_6400.iso - 12/02/2022
Microsoft Corporation	Windows Defender Antivirus	N/A
	(Configured within the OS	
	image)	

6/21/2024 – No Change **Orders for Windows** Updates for 6.4.0.0

ES&S Electionware 6.4.0.0 WY is At **HIGH** Risk



ES&S Electionware 6.4.0.0 WY is At **HIGH** Risk



WY Recommended Changes (3) – Constitutional Amendment Required

1) Unopposed candidate for precinct committee automatically elected.

• Any candidate who has filed a statement of candidacy, as required by § statute having no opposing candidate shall automatically be elected, and after the canvass of the primary shall be so declared.

2) Unopposed candidate automatically nominated--Primary not held if no contest.

• A candidate for nomination to an office, or election to a party office, having no opposing candidate within his party, shall automatically become the nominee of his party or elected party official for said office, and his name shall not be printed on the primary election ballot. If there are no opposing candidates for nomination or election of either state or county candidates in any county, no primary election shall be held in that county, and the candidates shall be automatically nominated or elected.

3) Automatic election of unopposed candidate--Certificate of election.

• Any candidate who has been duly nominated to an elective office except State Legislature, political or nonpolitical, having no opposing candidate at the general election shall automatically be elected and the county auditor or secretary of state, as the case may be, shall, following the official canvass, issue a certificate of election to such candidate and his name shall not be printed on the general election ballot.

Recommended Rule Changes

• 002.0005.6.08262022 Chapter 6: Standards for Counting Damaged Ballots

Section 3. Ballots that Cannot be Tabulated.

- (i) Three (3) Two (2) election judges from different parties shall duplicate the ballot.
- (ii) <u>Both election judges shall review the ballot before duplication.</u> One (1) election judge shall read the vote off the official ballot and the second election judge shall mark a blank ballot with that vote. The third election judge shall witness the duplication process.
- 002.0005.5.08262022 Chapter 5: Accessibility of Polling Places
 - Entire section should be reviewed, and lessened, to first ensure that each polling location is ADA complaint, and eliminate curbside voting. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/Accessibility_Checklist_In_Person_Voting_1.pdf
- 002.0005.12.05212020 Chapter 12: Certification of Voting Equipment

Section 2. Application for Certification of Voting Equipment.

- (c) The vendor shall certify in writing to the secretary of state that the equipment:
- (i) Meets the <u>current</u> federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), to include which version;
- (d) The vendor shall provide the following supporting documentation:
- (i) A report from an accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) certifying the system is in compliance with the VVSG. This report is a third party document and shall not be released by the secretary of state but will be deemed confidential;

Hand Count – Statute (Machine Primary)

22-14-114. Counting of ballots.

- (a) For ballots designed to be counted by machine, each individual vote shall be determined by the voting equipment and shall not be determined subjectively by human tabulation except when the intent of the voter is unmistakable but the ballot was received in such damaged, soiled, or other condition that it is rejected by the machine. The secretary of state may promulgate rules establishing standards for counting such ballots. For ballots not designed to be counted by machine, only votes clearly marked, as provided by W.S. 22-14-104 and rules promulgated pursuant to this code, shall be tallied. For write-in votes, names which are misspelled or abbreviated or the use of nicknames of candidates shall be counted for the candidate if the vote is obvious to the board.
- (b) At the request of a county clerk, ballots may be received from a polling place and counted at a central counting center in accordance with rules promulgated by the secretary of state pursuant to W.S. 22-2-121(g).

General Procedures for Hash Validation

- 1. Your voting system vendor must provide specific instructions on how to generate hashes from your voting system and the voting system equipment, and on how to perform the comparison with the trusted hashes.
- 2. Using the vendor-provided instructions, the general custodian must generate a hash from the system and from a representative sample of the voting system equipment.
- 3. The trusted hashes must be obtained from the SOS or directly from the EAC.
- 4. The general custodian will compare the hashes generated from the system and a representative sample of the voting system equipment to the trusted hashes provided by the SOS or the EAC to verify that those hashes are identical.
- 5. If the generated hash and the trusted hash are identical, then the test is successful.
- **NOTE**: If your voting systems version has not changed from the last time you obtained trusted hashes from the SOS, you may utilize the same files to perform the hash validation testing. You can submit another request if the previous files are unavailable.

Obtaining Trusted Hashes

- 1. In order to compare hashes, you must first obtain your trusted hashes from the SOS or the EAC. When requesting your hashes, please send the following information to the SOS or EAC:
 - a. Voting System Vendor (Hart, ES&S, etc.)
 - b. Vendor Specific Software Version (Verity 2.X, EVS 6.X.X.X, etc.)
- 2. Typically you will receive two e-mail messages. The first one will include an **encrypted**, **password protected** compressed folder. The decrypting passcode will be included in the second e-mail message.
- 3. You must **download** the encrypted file to your computer or an external storage device in order to extract and obtain the folder containing the trusted hashes.
- 4. In order to access the files, you must enter the **passcode provided** on the second e-mail message.
- 5. Once files are available, you must generate your voting systems values for comparison using the tool provided by the vendor or other authorized hashing tool.

Generating Your Hashes

- You must follow your vendor-provided specific instructions when generating your hashes. Hash generation procedures vary depending on the software version, equipment and vendor. Normally, a file containing the hashes is generated on the voting system using a native tool and exported to an external drive for comparison.
- You are not required to generate hashes from every individual voting device, but you are required to perform a hash validation of a representative sample of your voting system equipment. At a minimum, you need to generate a hash from at least one of every type of voting system device owned by your entity, including any voting devices, any precinct or central scanners, and any election management system workstations.

Performing the Comparison

- Once you have received your trusted hashes and have successfully generated hashes from a representative sample of your voting devices, the final step is to compare your trusted hashes against your generated hashes to verify that they are identical. This comparison may be performed either through a visual comparison or by using a comparison tool.
- You can perform your hash comparison by visually comparing the string of characters from your generated hash against the string of characters from your trusted hash. If the two sets of characters are identical, then the hash validation is successful.
- You can also perform your hash comparison by using a software tool to perform the comparison. You should not use a vendor-provided comparison tool for this purpose. For recommendations on comparison tools, please work with the SOS.
- NOTE: Several counties have identified freeware products that have been effective when comparing files for the purpose of hash validation. Such products might not be compatible to use with all voting systems methods of hash comparison. It is your responsibility to verify and investigate software before you install it in your systems. Please consult your SOS security personnel for guidance concerning the use of freeware for this purpose.

Voting Systems Certification

 A voting system that is unable to generate a hash value to verify the programming cannot meet this requirement and therefore should not be certified by the SOS.

Building the Evidence 2024

During Public Accuracy Tests, ask for Ballot Images and CVRs, since there is no identifying information of a voter issue here...so privacy is not an issue at all. (Voters do not fill out ballots for the test decks, that would count in an election)

- 1) Get sample ballots from every precinct
- 2) Get test decks copies, and review where the folds may impact elections
- 3) Evaluate if they tested enough ballots with folds for each test deck
- 4) Get Test Deck Report(s) for each tabulator
- 5) Get the Cast Vote Records
- 6) Get the Ballot Images (there is no Personal Identifying Information)
- 7) Get the log files (system and election)

If they can not provide this, they have not proven they know how to use the election equipment, nor have they proven the systems are secure.

Action Item – Review WY Items

22-11-103. Capabilities required.

- (d) A vendor shall file in the office of the secretary of state an application for certification of an electronic voting system and the secretary of state shall approve the application before any electronic voting system to be used in an election conducted under this code may be distributed, sold or upgraded by the vendor. The application for certification of an electronic voting system shall contain the following documentation:
- (vi) The checksum value associated with the escrowed source code for the electronic voting system and system components for which certification is being sought;
- (e) The secretary of state may deny an application for certification of an electronic voting system as required by subsection (d) of this section or withdraw certification of an electronic voting system for any of the following reasons:
- (i) A county clerk notifies the secretary of state of and the secretary of state determines that the electronic voting system fails to meet the requirements necessary for approval of certification or ongoing certification provided in subsection (d) of this section; or
- (ii) The vendor fails to notify the secretary of state of necessary enhancements or adjustments to the electronic voting system;
 - (iii) The election voting system does not produce accurate results and reports as required by law;
- (iv) Changes are made in the electronic voting system that do not comply with the requirements for certification as required by subsection (d) of this section;
- (v) The electronic voting system is no longer used by any county in Wyoming or is no longer available for purchase or repair from the company.
- (g) Every county in Wyoming shall keep an inventory of all electronic voting systems being used in that county. The inventory shall include the following information:
 - (i) The type of electronic voting system used;
 - (ii) The quantity of each electronic voting system;
 - (iii) The serial number of each electronic voting system;
 - (iv) The software version, if applicable, of each electronic voting system; and
 - (v) The firmware version, if applicable, of each piece of hardware used in an electronic voting system.