Estimating HEMP Damage for Power Utilities

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Outline

- PSE Report with Conclusions
- Geomagnetic Storms, 1859
- Ongoing Review of HEMP Science
- Electrical Description of HEMP
- Threat Potential
- Damage Potential
- References



Figure 1. Areas of Probable Power System Collapse

National Academy of Sciences, 2008: 1 in 100 year geomagnetic storm



FIGURE 1. Minimum HEMP shielding effectiveness requirements (measured IAW procedures of Appendix A).



Extreme Case

Figure 1. Estimated Area Affected by High-Altitude EMP



Source: Heritage Foundation, Jack Spencer, America's Vulnerability to a Different Nuclear Threat: An Electromagnetic Pulse, Backgrounder #1372, May 26, 2000, [http://www.heritage.org/Research/ MissileDefense/bg1372.cfm].





(d) $\sigma = 10^3$ S/m



Fig.3 Coupling currents at the port vary with cable length under the HEMP



Fig.4 Coupling currents at the port vary with cable height under the HEMP





Fig. 1: A braided screen of a cable – "French braid".

The specifications of these two kinds of screens are different, Fig. 2.



Fig. 2: Shielding effectiveness of two kinds of screens.

Absorption



Fig. 3. Typical variations of peak electric fields on the Earth's surface for a high altitude nuclear burst.

TABLE I THE ELECTRIC FIELD PEAK VALUE DISTRIBUTED ON THE GROUND FROM A 100 km HOB, 1 MT YIELD BURST

Location on the Ground	Peak Electric Field
(Projection Point on the	$E_{\psi}(V/m)$
Ground from the Explosion	
Center)	
50 km to the north	2866
26 km to the north	11447
Ground zero	20777
57.7 km to the south	35494
100 km to the south	40042
173 km to the south	40227
247 km to the south	37071
290 km to the south	34802
514 km to the south	30796

Cui Meng, Member, IEEE 1 Mt, 100 km



EPRI



Table 1-2 Results of voltage stability analysis

EPRI

Target Location	Interconnection	Generation Tripped (MW)	Load Tripped (MW)	Simulation Time (Sec)	Simulation Converged (Yes/No)	Voltage Collapse (Yes/No)	
L01	A	12,001	5,440	112	Yes	No*	
L02	A	11,066	5,598	112	Yes	No*	
L03	A	27,543	13,654	112	Yes	Localized Possible**	
L04	A	11,767	22,083	61.05	No	Yes	
L05	A	50,729	60,303	60.87	No	Yes	
L06	A	25,864	13,000	112	Yes	Localized Possible**	
L07	A	15,320	8,309	112	Yes	No*	
L07	В	81,149	25,715	8.33	No	Yes	
L08	В	81,149	25,709	8.33	No	Yes	
L09	С	5,789	4,852	112	Yes	No*	
L10	С	8,162	5,317	112	Yes	No*	
L11	С	10,482	9,749	56.5	No	Yes	
Automatic generation control (AGC) and/or operation of under-frequency load shedding schemes would be							

* Automatic generation control (AGC) and/or operation of under-frequency load shedding schemes would be necessary to maintain system frequency beyond the 112-second simulation period, and the inability to perform these functions could result in instability.
** Simulation results indicate bus voltages would eventually recover, but a large area (the size of a state or more) experienced significant voltage depression (0.5 per-unit or less) at the peak of the E3B. Localized voltage collapse is

nossible







- Nominal elevation 200 km to 400 km (zero at 40 km)
- Blast size ranging from 125 k Ton to 1,000 k Ton
 - 1,200 k Ton device weighs 2,400 lbs
 - WW2 test blast was about 20 k Ton
 - "Suitcase" bomb might be 3 to 5 k Ton



- Generating Facilities
- Transmission Lines
- Distribution
- Sub-stations
- Data Centers and Control Facilities
- Communications Networks

References (page 1)

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