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PLATO'S THEORY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

John M. Cooper

EVERYONE knows that in the *Republic* Plato advances the theory that the soul has three independent parts (reason, spirit and appetite, as they are usually called in English). Using this theory he constructs an account of the human virtues: each of the three parts of the soul has its own special role to play in a human being's life, and virtue, for us, consists in each of them playing its own role fully and in harmony with the others. Thus human virtue taken as a whole, according to the *Republic*, is a complex interrelationship among three separate psychological elements, each of which has its own indispensable contribution to make.

Now this theory of virtue contrasts sharply with the Socratic theory found, for example, in the *Protagoras*.¹ According to the Socratic theory virtue is essentially a property of the intellect (and never mind what other parts of the soul there may be). That Plato in the *Republic* is self-consciously rejecting this Socratic theory is by now well accepted; and most philosophical readers no doubt agree that the *Republic's* theory is a distinct improvement. Even if knowledge by itself does motivate action, as Socrates evidently though obscurely assumed, there are surely other motivating factors as well, and being virtuous must therefore partly consist in having these other factors, whatever they may be, in some special condition or other. After all, it will be agreed by all parties that to be virtuous is to have one's practical attitudes and dispositions—whatever it is that affects one's actions and the ways one is inclined to act—structured in some special way; the virtuous person's practical attitudes must be such as always to produce the (or a) virtuous and right action in the given circumstances. And if not only one's *thoughts* about what is good and bad, but also ways one *feels* about things (whether or not those are also ways one thinks about them) constitute practical attitudes affecting the ways one is inclined to act, then obviously virtue must be something more complex than the Socratic theory represents it as being. It must involve not just well-informed, correct thought about what is good and what bad for a person, but also certain specific states of feeling about these matters as well. From this perspective Plato's *Republic* theory can be seen as a stage in the progression from Socratic rationalism to the Aristotelian theory that moral virtue is an interfusion of reason and desire—reason having the truth about the ends of life and how to achieve them, and desire embodying

these truths so that the person habitually wants just the things that reason says are worth pursuing.

This picture, though I believe it correct as far as it goes, does push to one side the details of Plato's theory of what motivates human action; his view that there are *three* parts of the soul is treated as an uninteresting oddity, wisely omitted by Aristotle from his account of virtue.² Even Platonic scholars, who as a group are not noted for their sensitivity to Platonic error, sometimes admit to being embarrassed by this part of Plato's theory;³ and it is indeed not easy to resist every clever freshman's impression that Plato held there were precisely *three* parts of the human soul only because he needed three in order to push through the argument launched at the beginning of the *Republic's* second book. Assuming that justice in the state must be the same as justice in the individual, and having plausibly argued that justice in the state requires the recognition of three separate classes of citizen making three different contributions to the social welfare, Plato is committed to there being correspondingly three separate parts of the soul performing three different functions in the organization of the just individual's life. Does he then simply force the facts of human psychology to fit theoretical preconceptions derived from these other parts of his argument? Or does he after all produce cogent independent reasons, based in unbiased reflection on facts about individual human beings, for adopting this theory?

In this paper I want to argue that when understood properly Plato's theory presents in a quite subtle and interesting way undoubted facts about the psychology of human motivation, and that this theory accounts for some central features of human beings better than other later theories are able to do. Though there is no denying that Plato's way of parcelling out the different forms of human motivation seems at first rather primitive, and is at all events somewhat alien to our way of thinking, it has a powerful rationale of its own that is worth exploring. In fact, there is good reason to think that for Plato, despite the order of exposition, the view that justice requires three distinct social classes rather derived support from than gave support to the theory that the soul has three independent parts.⁴ It is the psychological theory that Plato thought more firmly anchored in the facts. If this is right then in reconstructing the argument of the *Republic* one must give the psychological theory pride of place.

II

It is evident that the question "How many distinct parts has the soul?" can only have a clear sense and receive a definite, non-arbitrary answer if it is understood against the background of some well-defined theoretical interest. Plato makes clear enough his own point of view when he first raises his question about the parts of the soul (435b-c). He asks whether there are in each of us three things corresponding to the three kinds of person the recognition and proper use of which he has argued is essential to good order in a city. Now it is by what the three kinds of person do or don't

do that the city's corporate life is determined—what it does and doesn't attempt to do, what its overall aims are, what it succeeds or fails in doing, whether for good or ill. Similarly, then, the question how many parts the soul has, and whether it has three parts, as the city does, is the question how many distinct types of psychological input go to determining a person's choices and voluntary actions, that is, the pattern of his life in general. Plato's theory that there are three parts is, roughly, the theory that there are three psychological determinants of choice and voluntary action.

Now there is a familiar modern theory, going back to Hobbes,⁵ that a person's actions are the joint product of his (relevant) beliefs and desires and nothing else—desire providing the original motive force and belief factual information about how to act in order to satisfy desire. On this theory there are two sorts of determinants of action, belief and desire, one of which (desire) is the exclusive source of motivation while the other (belief) contributes only factual information, but no additional impulse to action. There is a misleading superficial similarity between this theory and Plato's. For on Plato's theory (as indeed on Aristotle's) in some ways the basic division is between reason on the one side (τὸ λογιστικόν, literally the calculating part) and appetite and spirit together on the other. And since reason is assigned the job in the soul of being wise and knowing the truth (441e 4-5, 442c 5-8) it seems at first sight not unnatural to think of it as playing the same role as belief plays on this modern theory; Plato would then be admitting *one* source of information but (surprisingly) dividing motivating desires into two classes, the appetitive ones and those issuing from "spirit."

But this interpretation is incorrect. On Plato's theory all three of the parts, reason as well as appetite and spirit, are independent sources of motivation; the contrast between reason and the other two is not really akin to the modern theory's distinction between inert, purely factual belief and motivating desire. This fact does not emerge with perfect explicitness until the ninth book, where Socrates advances the claim that "as there are three parts, there are also three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each part, and so with desires" (580d 7-8, tr. Grube). That is to say, there are desires of reason as well as bodily appetites and impulses of a spirited nature. Strikingly, the word for "desires" here, ἐπιθυμῖαι, is the word used throughout the *Republic* as the generic name for the urgent bodily appetites (thirst, hunger and sexual desire) that serve as paradigms for the third part of the soul, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, which is so named after them. The desires of reason are thus implied to be strong impulses of some kind which we experience simply and directly because we possess the power of reason, the power to figure things out (λογίζεσθαι) and know the truth. Socrates specifies one of these desires a little later in the ninth book when he says that "It is obvious to anyone that the part by which we learn is always wholly straining to know where the truth lies" (581b 5-6, tr. Grube). On Socrates' view, then, merely in virtue of having minds—of having the capacity to inquire into and discover the truth—we possess the *desire* to do these things. According to Socrates, the desire to know the truth cannot be

wholly explained as the outcome, say, of our discovery that knowing the truth helps us to advance the goals which our appetites, or other reason-independent desires, incline us toward; nor does it result simply from the discovery that, to use Kantian terminology, our sensibility is so constituted that we happen to find knowing the truth (or thinking we know it) gratifying. One's desire to know the truth might be strengthened in these ways, but there always remains an irreducible desire for knowledge that is not dependent on an interplay between reason and other aspects of our nature. This desire is an original constituent of human nature, as much so as our appetites themselves, or our sensibility in general. Socrates admits that not every person feels it as strongly or as steadily as some people do, and that some people's actions are motivated by it more often than others' are, but it must be active to some extent in everyone's life; the consequence of supposing that someone never experienced this desire would be that that person had no mind at all, and so was not a human being after all.

But intellectual curiosity is not the only desire Socrates attributes to reason. For in the fourth book he assigns to reason a double job: to know the truth and to rule ('ἀρχειν, 441e4, 442c5) in the light of it. For reason to rule here takes the form of its deciding on its own authority what is the best thing to do, issuing injunctions (442c6, τὰυτα παρήγγελεν), and seeing to it that the required action is undertaken. And just as Socrates makes the desire for knowledge—that is, the desire which leads reason to perform one part of its natural job—the direct consequence of our rational nature, so, I believe it can be shown, he also assigns to reason an inherent desire to perform the other part of its natural job, that of ruling.⁶

That according to Socrates human reason has, so to speak, an innate taste for ruling, just as it has an innate taste for knowing, can be most convincingly brought out by considering the way in which he attempts to argue the distinctness of reason from appetite. Notoriously, he thinks that the fact that sometimes reason opposes appetite shows that they must be distinct parts of the soul: his example is an incompletely described case where a man is thirsty, that is (as he says) desires, yearns for, and has an impulse to, drink (βούλεται πιεῖν καὶ τοῦτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὁρμᾷ 439b1), but something else, which comes from reasoning (ἐκ λογισμοῦ d1), pulls him back (ἀνθέλκει, b3) and forbids drinking (κωλύει πιεῖν, cf. c6-7, 9). There are several unclarities about this example (and, indeed, the other cases of conflict that Socrates argues prove that there are distinct parts of the soul.) The text is not explicit as to whether in saying that reason opposes appetite he means merely that the object which appetite goes for reason rejects, or rather that reason in rejecting the object also addresses and opposes the appetite itself. A moment's reflection shows that he had better have in mind the stronger thesis if he is to have any chance of ending up with precisely three parts (and not indefinitely many), and, as we shall see, it is quite clear that this is how he conceives the opposition of *spirit* and appetite (cf. 439e-440a).⁷ So, following T. H. Irwin,⁸ I shall interpret him as claiming that because reason sometimes rejects an appetite—i.e., insists that an appetite is *not* to be acted on, that it does *not* constitute

a reason, say, to drink whatever liquid may be in question— reason and appetite must be distinct. Still, however that may be, the text does make it clear that Socrates is conceiving reason as a *force* which works counter to appetite, pulling the agent back from what appetite pushes him toward. He draws an analogy (439b8-11) between what goes on inside this thirsty man and what happens when an archer draws his bow: just as the archer's one hand pulls the bow to him while the other hand pushes it away, so thirst moves him toward the drink while reason pulls him back from it. This shows that already in Book IV reason is being conceived as itself a source of desires, of motivating conditions. But clearly enough, the desire of reason at work in this case is not plausibly represented as what I've been calling intellectual curiosity; so, apparently, reason has other desires than the desire to know the truth. That the rational desire at work in the thirsty man's case is a form of the desire of reason to *rule*, will emerge from consideration of an objection that might be raised against Socrates's use here of the archer analogy.

It might be claimed that this analogy is misleading, and that whatever can legitimately be meant by saying in a case like this that reason pulls one back, does not justify the attribution to reason of any motivating force of its own, on all fours with that belonging to thirst. For suppose I am thirsty but know the only available water is boobytrapped so that I'll get a painful electric shock upon coming into contact with it. I thereupon hold back because I want to avoid this pain. Here, although it may be fair enough to say that reason restrains me, this does not imply that reason is the original source of any motivating desire not to drink; what motivates me to abstain from drinking is my aversion to pain. If one is to speak in terms of forces here at all, then, the forces that come into conflict are these two physical desires, thirst and the aversion to pain, neither of which has its origin in any capacity for reasoning. If this is an example of the sort of conflict Socrates has in mind, then he is not entitled to treat reason as a motivating force on its own, and so the question doesn't arise, what *kind* of desire of reason is working here.

I think, however, that in the case as just described, Socrates would actually agree that only the aversion to pain motivated abstention; if one takes desires simply as givens and limits oneself to working out how to satisfy them, allowing, for example, whichever is the stronger to determine one's action, or working out and following some scheme whereby the totality of one's desires may be satisfied as fully as possible, then there seems no doubt that one's calculations have not contributed anything to the already existing motives to action. In a similar case (554d9-e1) Socrates speaks of opposed appetites, not a conflict of reason and appetite. Presumably, then, he thinks that not every case of conflict is like this, even if some may be. In fact there seems no doubt that on the *Republic's* scheme reason is taken to be capable of deciding on its own theoretical grounds which ends are worth pursuing, and does not merely (as the calculating just described does) provide the means to, or work out some balance among, appetitively or otherwise given ends.⁹ When it proposes an end on its own authority, Socrates

evidently thinks, reason also, at least sometimes, contributes a *desire* of its own (the desire to achieve that end), and this is an additional motivating force, over and above whatever other kinds of desire may also be operating. Perhaps, therefore, the case Socrates has in mind is one where such a reason-generated desire comes into conflict with an appetite.

If so, the conflict Socrates has in mind is of the following sort. The thirsty man has worked out (or any rate holds) on grounds of reason that health is a good thing, a more important good than the momentary gratification of appetite. He also desires to preserve his health *because* it is a good thing, and this desire (a product of reason) conflicts with his thirst; in the case envisaged the desire of reason wins out, and the man abstains. Now presumably Socrates does not hold that the desire for health is part of the original constitution of human nature (as the desire for knowledge is apparently thought to be); it is instead the consequence of a higher-order desire for good, as such, together with the grounds, whatever they are, on which health is thought to be a good. So what is inherent in reason is the desire for good, as such—not the desire for any particular good. And Plato does of course in the *Republic* (e.g., 505d11-e1), as elsewhere, speak of this desire as one which all human beings have. We are now, however, in a position to say something more illuminating about the status of this desire in human life than simply that everyone has it. The desire for the good can now be seen as equivalent to the desire on the part of reason to work out the ends of life on its own and to achieve them. Reason wants to do these things *on its own*, that is, without treating the fact that one has an attachment for a thing grounded in appetite or spirit or any other source of desire there may be as a ground for pursuing it. Thus the claim that the desire for the good is inherent in reason itself amounts to the claim that anyone who possesses the power of reason wants to think out on his own, on purely rational grounds, what goals to pursue in life, and to achieve those goals. He wants, in other words, reason to rule in his life.¹⁰

III

It is as independent influences on action, sometimes in conflict, sometimes in harmony with desires of reason, that appetite and spirit figure in Socrates' theory. Let us consider appetite first. Unfortunately Plato is not careful to give a systematic general description of the sorts of desires that he counts as appetitive; in the fourth book he focuses simply on what he calls the "clearest" (ἐναργεστὰς, 437d3) instances of what he has in mind, thirst and hunger and (he adds a little later, 439d6) sexual desire, allowing his treatment of these examples to substitute for a general account. Indeed, he insists on quite a narrow construction of even these appetites: if I am thirsty for beer or hungry for chocolate these desires are not, he says, correctly classified merely as thirst or hunger (cf. 437d8-e6). They are thirst or hunger modified by some addition (e7-8). He does not indicate exactly what the relevant addition is, but presumably it is an acquired liking for the taste of beer and chocolate respectively (together perhaps, in

the former case, with a liking for the way beer makes me feel). Thirst, just by itself, unmodified by these or other additions, is simply for drink, hunger simply for food.

These examples, and this treatment of them, might suggest that Plato limits the appetitive desires just to the basic recurrent biological urges, and indeed only to that part of them which is primitive and unmodified by the effects of experience. On the other hand even in this passage he refers several times to "other appetites" than these three (439d7, 436a11 f., 437d 2-3);¹¹ and he gives an interesting example of such an appetite when in telling the story of Leontius, he refers to Leontius' "appetite" (ἐπιθυμία, 440a1) to look at some corpses piled by the road. In the same context, arguing that spirit never allies itself with appetite (440b 4-7), he points out that a decent man if he thinks he has been in the wrong cannot become angry even if he is subjected, in just retaliation, to hunger and cold and other such physical deprivations (c1-5)—so that being shivering cold is or gives rise to an appetite with which spirit refuses to ally itself. Later, especially in Books VIII and IX, the love of money is repeatedly treated as an appetite—indeed where we might expect the expression "appetitive part" Plato fairly often in these books writes "money-loving" (φιλοχρήματον) or "profit-loving" (φιλοκερδές) part instead.¹² And the democratic man, whose principle of life is said (561b2-c3) to be to give free and equal scope to each of his appetites, is credited not merely with a large variety of particular appetites for many different kinds of food and drink and sex, but also with appetites for various athletic and political pursuits and even, on occasion, for, as he imagines it, doing a little philosophy (561c-d).¹³ Thus desires that embody modifications of the basic appetites for sex, drink and food (e.g., the desire for lobster) are nonetheless still appetitive desires; likewise physical desires which would not ordinarily be called appetites, such as the desire when cold to be warmed up, or the aversion to pain, count as appetitive, as do ghoulish impulses like Leontius' for looking at dead bodies. So also the love of money and the liking for physical exercise. *Some* kind of liking for such things as political activity and dabbling at philosophy also counts. What principle of unity is Plato relying on here? Is there really one at all?

In considering this question let us begin where Plato does, with the recurrent biological urges for food, drink and sex. Socrates' first concern is to convince his interlocutors that there are *two* independent sources of motivation, reason on the one side and appetite on the other. For this purpose it is essential to choose examples that are undoubted cases of desires motivating action but where there is equally no doubt that these are desires not having reason as their source. Desires for specific kinds of food or drink or acquired likings of any kind will therefore not do: the generation of these desires obviously involves the use of *some* power to reason, at least to the extent of noticing and remembering the effects on oneself of various eaten and drunk objects or various external conditions and activities. And even if, as I believe Plato would ultimately want to argue, these rational powers ought not in such cases to be construed as belonging to the part of

the soul which *he* calls “reason”, to assume that at this point would certainly be confusing. Nor is it necessary for him to do so. There seems no doubt that hunger and thirst, understood as simple urges for food and drink, arise wholly from physiological causes (cf. διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίγνεται, 439d1-2), without any intervention from or detour through reason, not even through these equivocal processes of noticing and remembering. It is equally clear that these things have a direct motivating influence on action, as the fact of conflict to which Plato appeals very clearly indicates. Hence by concentrating on hunger and thirst as his “clearest cases” he can convincingly demonstrate the existence of motivating desires that work altogether independently of reasoning of whatever sort. And that is all he wishes, and needs, to show at this point in the argument.

Once it is established that there *is* such a source of motivating desires, independent of reason, it is not difficult to recognize other desires besides the recurrent biological urges as having essentially the same status. Thus there are other desires besides hunger, thirst, and sexual appetite that are based on physical and physiological causes: e.g., the desire to be warmed up when cold, or, in general, the aversion to pain. And certain other more complex desires can be treated as transformations of these and other such appetites: thus all particular likes and dislikes in food and drink. Some tastes are simply found to be pleasant, and those which are, generate, by straightforward physical causation, desires for them. These desires, in turn, give rise, provided one knows what external objects need to be manipulated in order to get the pleasure, to further desires for those objects themselves. (This is what justifies Plato in counting the desire for money as appetitive: see 580e 5 ff.). So, even though what we (but, as I have indicated, not Plato) would classify as rational powers may be involved in the constitution of such further desires it is not at all events *motivating* reason, but only calculation undertaken in the interest of the appetitive goal of physical gratification. In this way, beginning from simple hunger and thirst, we can explain why thirst for beer or hunger for chocolate should count as desires of the same basic type: all these desires rest ultimately on brute facts about our bodily constitution and about the means by which pleasurable bodily states may be caused.

It does not seem, however, that Plato means to limit the appetitive desires to those whose origin lies in such facts about our bodily constitution. At any rate, Leontius' ghoulish desire to look at dead bodies, or the democratic man's liking for philosophical dabbling might seem poor candidates for this kind of treatment. It might give one pause, however, that when Leontius is overcome by his appetite and his spirit intervenes to chastise him for overruling his reason and gaping at the bodies, Socrates says spirit places the blame on his *eyes*: “Go ahead and look”, Leontius is quoted as saying, “you wretched things; get your fill of that lovely scene” (440a2-3). This might suggest that according to Plato it is the constitution of eyes (at any rate Leontius') that makes looking at corpses so fascinating to him: in the same way as my particular tastebuds are responsible for the fact that I

enjoy the taste of orange juice, Leontius' eyes give him a pleasure caused by the sight of dead bodies. It would be difficult, however, to sustain this suggestion: it seems certain (unless we are to understand Leontius' attraction as straightforwardly sexual) that whatever it is about dead bodies that so interests him has something to do with some way in which he is thinking of them—some thrill-inducing contrast between living, animated human beings and these limp and broken figures, say—and it seems too much to believe that anyone's eyes are naturally so constituted as to be given some pleasure by being exposed to dead bodies *when* so conceived. Leontius' imagination is at work here, and, surely it, rather than the eyes, is the most important source of the pleasure he is seeking.

Still, the workings of the imagination might be thought of as the source of pleasure in the same way as the bodily senses are. A person simply *finds* certain imaginings interesting or amusing or thrilling, just as he simply finds certain tastes appealing; his imagination is so constituted that these things appeal to him, and having found them so he forms the desire to witness them again. The pleasure in question may not be a bodily pleasure, and its source may not be the constitution of his body and its organs; it is nonetheless a brute fact about his way of being affected by the physical world that looking at corpses gives him pleasure, so that if imagination, and not the bodily organs, is its source, still, the desire for that pleasure is independent of reason's desires to know the truth and to rule his life. Whatever precisely the imagination may be it is on Plato's view linked essentially to the world as it *appears* rather than to reason, understood, as he understands it, as devoted to knowing, and governing in accordance with, the truth. This suggests the possibility of taking Leontius' castigation of his eyes as implying not that these bodily organs, but rather, more generally, that attending to the physical world independently of the discipline of reason, is the source of his pleasure. Certainly, reference to vision and its organs, the eyes, often does play this symbolic role in the *Republic*.¹⁴

What then about the democratic man's pleasure in dabbling at philosophy? If this is to be construed as an appetitive pleasure, then it must be sharply distinguished from the corresponding pleasure of the true philosopher, since that is a pleasure of reason. In enjoying philosophizing the philosopher is enjoying the pursuit of the truth; his desire for this pleasure is the expression of his reason's desire to know the truth. The democrat, then, is not led by an interest in the truth to engage in philosophical activity. What does lead him to it? Presumably, he simply finds something appealing about it: the manipulation of words, the process of deduction, the surprise of discovery, or whatever, interests and amuses him. Yet since this is unconnected with any serious pursuit of the truth, philosophy remains only a game—so it is no surprise that, on Socrates' account, the democrat only intermittently plays at it and does not acquire any deeper and more permanent attachment. *His* desire to philosophize, then, counts as an appetite because he attends only to the superficial, "visible" aspects of philosophy, features of it that he happens to find interesting. This interest is for him as much a brute fact about his interaction with the physi-

cal world as Leontius' interest in viewing corpses. Neither of these is a recurrent biological urge, nor even such an urge modified by the addition of likings for particular tastes or smells or bodily feelings. Yet they have their ultimate origin simply in facts of experience, in the fact that the person in question happens to get a certain pleasure from doing these things, and this justifies classifying them together with the bodily appetites. They are independent of reason in the same sort of way, and can be opposed by reason on the same sort of grounds.

IV

We come at last to spirit. Socrates' standard name for the source of this third type of motivation, τὸ θυμοειδές, derives from a Greek word, θυμός, that by Plato's time seems to have been in ordinary use mostly as a name for anger: the word is in fact etymologically the same as our word "fume"—someone in a state of θυμός would be "fuming" about something. But in Homer, where it appears very frequently, the word has a broader usage: it names the part of themselves to which Homeric heroes speak, or which speaks to them, when they are aroused for action, and into which they, or some tutelary deity, pour might and strength when their prowess is about to be put to the test. It is thus the immediate source of action, especially vigorous action, and the seat of emotion, especially those emotions (anger, for example, but also on occasion sexual passion as well) that motivate vigorous and bold action.¹⁵ As we shall see, Plato's theory of θυμός is obviously much indebted to Homer; taking his account of θυμός altogether, the developments in Books VIII and IX together with the initial argument in Book IV, θυμός seems closely connected in Plato's eyes, as in Homer's, with vigorous, competitive action. But in his account in Book IV Plato appeals exclusively to various forms of anger, and not to any of the other desires and emotions that get assigned to θυμός in Homer. His examples cover a fairly wide range: they range from the fury of screaming infants (441a 7-9) and barking dogs (b 2-3), to Odysseus' outrage at the sexual misbehavior of Penelope's maids with her suitors (441b 4-c2), to Leontius' annoyance and disgust with himself for giving in to his ghoulish fascination for corpses and the aroused sense of justice which causes a man to insist on his rights, even though the effort may cost him such deprivation and pain as to seem hardly worth it. Later in the fourth book courage emerges as the specific virtue of this part of the soul (442b 5-c 3), and in Books VIII-IX it is constantly described as the honor-loving (φιλότιμον) and victory-loving (φιλόνικον) part, because, as Socrates says in one place (581a9-10), spirit is "always wholly striving for power and victory and good repute"—i.e., apparently, the reputation for effectiveness, single-mindedness, strength of character and other "executive" virtues. (A reputation for sensitivity and compassion, or wittiness, or brains, or even judiciousness would not count in *this* context as good repute.) So the spirited part expresses itself first of all in ordinary anger of various sorts; secondly in the moral feelings of shame, outrage and the offended sense of justice; and thirdly, in the desire

to assert oneself, to be effective both in one's own private life and in the community's. What is it that in Plato's eyes links these things together—what is the principle of unity here?—and why does he think that together they constitute a third sort of motivation, coordinate with desires of reason and appetitive desires?

As before, his argument depends upon appeal to the fact of conflict. But his method of arguing from striking examples fails him in this instance. He argues first that θυμός is distinct from appetite, by the example of Leontius, who becomes angry at himself (more specifically at his appetite for corpse-gazing)—here appetite is opposed by anger, so this anger is a desire deriving from another source than appetite. Then he argues that θυμός is distinct from reason: first of all because babies and animals get furious but do not have the power to reason (that is, the power to figure out the truth of things and direct their lives in accordance with the truth), and secondly by the example of Odysseus, whose anger (more specifically, outrage) at the maids is opposed by his reason. Odysseus' anger impels him to punish the maids on the spot, but that would upset his rational plan to kill off the suitors, so his rational desire to do the latter opposes both the action proposed by anger and the anger itself.¹⁶ His anger is therefore a desire deriving from another source than reason. One trouble with this two-stage argument is that it presupposes that all the cases of anger in question are of the same type and derive from the same internal source; but it is not obvious, and certainly requires argument to show, that that is so. One cannot assume just because all these phenomena can be called "anger" that they are in relevant respects all alike. Indeed, it is clear that whatever screaming babies and attacking dogs are feeling is very different from what Leontius feels, and the fact that the latter is no appetite does not imply that the former cannot be. It is conceivable, I think, that all we have here is the opposition between reason and appetite all over again—Leontius' anger being a second desire of reason opposing that ghoulish appetite, the baby's and the animal's fury and Odysseus' outrage being nothing but appetitive desires opposed, in the latter case by reason.¹⁷ What's required, in order to close this gap in Plato's argument, is a closer consideration of how these forms of anger are actually constituted, to see whether they, or any of them, really are a new kind of motivation coming into conflict sometimes with desires of reason and sometimes with appetites.

It will help, I think, in doing this, if we turn first to consider what Plato says about spirit in Books VIII and IX; we can apply what we learn there so as to eke out a satisfactory interpretation of the book IV examples. In Books VIII and IX Socrates develops an account of four kinds of person who lack the virtue of justice as he has defined it, because reason is not in control of their lives. We have seen already that for reason to be in control of a person's life is for him to have worked out on exclusively rational and theoretical grounds what goals are worth pursuing and to have patterned his life around the pursuit of those goals. The four bad kinds of person Socrates describes are conceived by him as people in whom another part of the soul has grown strong, displacing reason and establishing its own control

over them and their lives.¹⁸ So the person whom he calls timocratic is some one in whom θυμός has fixed the goals around which he has patterned his life. Socrates describes the timocratic person as “somewhat self-willed and a little bit on the uncultured side...harsh with his slaves...but gentle with free men and very obedient to authorities, a seeker after public office and public esteem, not thinking himself worthy of office because of his ability as a speaker or anything like that, but because of his accomplishments in battle and military affairs, and a devotee of athletics and hunting” (548e4-549a7); he will be disdainful of money and the pursuit of it, while nonetheless placing a rather high value on having it (549a9-b2, cf. 548a5-b2). In sum, the person dominated by θυμός is “a haughty man and a seeker of public esteem” (ὕψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἄνθρωπος, 550 b7). It is worth emphasizing that Socrates only claims that this kind of outlook results where θυμός-motivations are not only particularly strong in a person but develop freely, without being trained and directed in subordination to other values: he insists that the people who will make the best warriors in his ideal republic must be by nature unusually “high-spirited” (θυμοειδείς, 375a11-12, e10), but the description just quoted will not fully apply to them because they have been educated to respect philosophical values and to seek the good of their fellow-citizens, so that though θυμός governs them *what* θυμός directs them to do will not be the same as for Socrates’ timocratic man. And, of course, where θυμός is subordinated to appetite, as in the person whom Socrates calls oligarchic, it will bring its special motivations in support of the agent’s dominant appetitive values: the oligarchic man does not permit his θυμός to “admire and esteem (τιμᾶν) anything else but wealth and the wealthy or to seek public esteem on any other ground than the possession of money and whatever else contributes to that” (553d 4-7).

The central idea suggested by these and other passages of Book VIII is that θυμός is understood by Plato as that wherein one feels a) the competitive drive to distinguish oneself from the run-of-the-mill person, to do and be something noteworthy within the context provided by one’s society and its scheme of values; b) pride in oneself and one’s accomplishments, to the extent that one succeeds in this effort; c) esteem for noteworthy others and (especially) the desire to be esteemed by others and by oneself. Because competitiveness can be so variously directed, and the bases of self-esteem (and pride and esteem for others) can vary so widely, θυμός, if this is what it is, can in different people support widely different courses of action and ways of life, and this Plato claims it does. But it does not seem to me unnatural to think that someone in whom competitiveness and the desire for esteem and self-esteem were particularly strong should tend toward the athletic, military and political pursuits, to which Plato says the θυμός-dominated person will especially devote himself; these are obvious, as well as traditional, activities in which a man, at any rate, can hope to make himself stand out from others as esteem and self-esteem require and competitiveness implies.

I suggest, then, that the motivations that Plato classifies under the heading of spirit are to be understood as having their root in competitive-

ness and the desire for self-esteem and (as a normal presupposition of this) esteem by others. Can we make sense of Plato's examples of anger in Book IV along these lines? Three of the five fall immediately into place. When Odysseus in disguise comes upon Penelope's maids cavorting with her suitors his immediate impulse is to punish them on the spot: the sight of such disorder in his own household is naturally a blow to his self-esteem (self-respecting noblemen don't permit that kind of thing), and his anger is a response to this affront. It urges him to act immediately to restore order and therewith prove himself deserving of the esteem which he feels is placed in jeopardy by the continuance of this state of affairs. His anger thus represents a traditional view of things to which his continued self-esteem is tied: he will feel bad about himself unless he acts at once to vindicate his honor. Yet his reason does not support this traditional view: from reason's point of view delay does not mean indifference or weakness or cowardly acquiescence, and there is (Odysseus thinks) no *reason* for him to think less well of himself for delaying (in fact, quite the contrary, since he plans eventually *both* to punish the maids *and* to kill off the suitors). But through this is how he *thinks*, it is not how he *feels*. The reaction of his θυμός shows that his self-esteem, the way he feels about himself, is tied up with a certain traditional view of the king's dignity, not with the view implied by his own rational planning. Hence reason and spirit in his case are in conflict over what to do. A bad upbringing, Socrates suggests (cf. 441a 3), has corrupted Odysseus' spirit, causing him to feel differently about things than he thinks.

Similarly for Leontius. On a considered view of things Leontius rejects corpse-gazing as a bad thing or at any rate nothing to take any interest in. Yet he continues to have an appetite for that sort of thing. Unlike Odysseus, Leontius' θυμός is in agreement with his reason: he feels that corpse-gazing is *sordid*, and does not want to be the kind of person who goes in for it; in fact, perhaps, he aspires to be the kind of person who makes the goals of reason his goals and has no others. Hence when he incontinently acts on this rejected desire not only does his reason disapprove of what he has done, but he also suffers a blow to his self-esteem: the anger he feels at himself (it might equally have been shame or simply exasperation) is the natural response to this failure to measure up in his own eyes. The situation is the same with the man who responds with anger to what he judges is unjust treatment: it is natural to think that the perceived injustice is taken by him as a sign that the perpetrator disregards or belittles him and his interests, and his anger is the normal and natural response to such a slight. Not to become angry would be a sign that one acquiesced in the perpetrator's estimation of one's worth or importance, and no one who feels self-esteem could do that. So here too anger expresses the competitive desire to acquire and preserve self-esteem.

The other two examples of θυμός appealed to in the Book IV argument are less easy to accommodate. Screaming two-week old babies and ferocious dogs presumably have no self-conception (I assume the dogs are not even self-conscious) and so though their anger may express some primitive

form of competitiveness, it is at any rate not a form that has anything to do with self-esteem that their anger expresses. But perhaps Plato counts these cases of anger as motivations of the same kind as Leontius' and Odysseus' because he sees them as the central primitive phenomena which get transformed, as we mature, into the full-fledged competitive desire for self-esteem that expresses itself partly in anger like Leontius' and Odysseus', as well as in the admiration and emulation of others, the disdain for anything lowly, and the aspiration for solid accomplishments which we have found attributed to *θυμός* in Books VIII and IX.

If I am right that competitiveness and the desire for esteem and self-esteem lie at the center of what Plato understands by *θυμός* in the *Republic*, it is not difficult to show that *θυμός*-motivation is a different kind of motivation from either the desires of appetite or the desires of reason, as Plato construes them. It is different from appetite because appetites lack the self-reference which is essential to esteem and self-esteem; and it is different from the desires of reason, which may of course be self-referential, because of the way in which it is constituted. There are two aspects to this difference between *θυμός* and reason. What a *θυμός*-desire desires is competitive success and the esteem from others and oneself that comes with it. Like all objects of desire one can, of course, say that in desiring all this, *θυμός* (or the person *qua* experiencing *θυμός*) regards it as good. But that does not mean that a *θυμός*-desire is a desire for good (a "good-dependent" desire) in the way that the desires of reason are. The difference has to do, so to speak, with the order of priority between the desire itself and thoughts about good. In the case of reason, thoughts about what is good come first, a desire being formed for whatever one thinks (rightly or wrongly) is good. But in the case of *θυμός* the desire for competition and esteem comes first (without regard to any antecedent question whether these things really are good, or if they are why they are so), and thoughts about good then follow.

This difference connects with a second one. For although as Plato says a person's *θυμός* tends by nature to support his reason's judgments about good and desires for that, it does not always do so. That is because the *origins* of one's *θυμός*-desires do not in any event lie in rational processes of reflection, but in all kinds of contingencies in one's upbringing and subsequent life. *Θυμός* develops under the influence of how other people (especially one's parents) respond to and treat one. How we feel about ourselves—under what circumstances we experience a blow to our self-esteem, what we aspire to be and do, what competitions we enter—are to a large degree determined by our experiences in childhood, even if as adults we can partly remove or refine the effects of our upbringing so as to make the way we feel about ourselves conform with our rational conceptions of how we ought to live. It is possible, even normal, to find oneself, as Odysseus did, with conflicting conceptions and attitudes, some derived from the influence of events in earlier life in forming the basis of our self-esteem, others the product of considered rational judgment. It is natural, Socrates says, for these attitudes to be in agreement, for a person to feel good and bad

about himself in just the ways that conform to his rational view of how he ought to live.¹⁹ This is the result of the inherent authority of the truth, which is ideally the possession of reason, on which both his rational view of things and the basis of his self-esteem ought to converge. But they do not always do so, and even when they do the basis of a person's self-esteem is to be accounted for not simply by appeal to any rational argumentation he went through but to his personal experience in his developing social relationships.

On Plato's tripartite theory, then, competitiveness and the desire for esteem and self-esteem are an innate form of human motivation, distinct from the appetites and reason itself and equally as basic as they are to human nature. There is certainly no denying that this kind of motivation, in its many guises, does play a very large part in the conduct of any human being. Any plausible theory of human motivation must surely pay special attention to it. It is a considerable merit of Plato's theory of the human soul in the *Republic*, whatever its other shortcomings, that it gives fuller and more explicit recognition to this fact than subsequent theories have done.²⁰

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NOTES

1. In referring in this paragraph to the conception of virtue espoused by the character Socrates in Plato's early dialogues as "Socratic" I follow the by now conventional scholarly practice, according to which this character's central views are attributed to the historical Socrates. Conventions are dangerous things, and this one should certainly not be accepted as uncritically as it often seems to be (for a recent defense if it, see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* III, (Cambridge: 1969), pp. 349-55). It is worth emphasizing in this connection that, though of course he also had other evidence now lost to us to go on (the oral tradition, plus writings of Antisthenes, Aeschines and other Socratics), Aristotle plainly attributes to the historical Socrates essentially the same views on the virtues that one finds Plato's character Socrates espousing in the early dialogues (see esp. *MM* I 1, 1182a15-23; also, *MM* I 20, 1190b28-32; 34, 1198a10-12; *EN* VI 13, 1144b17-21, 28-30; III 8, 1116b3-5; *EE* I 5, 1216b3-8); and at *EN* VII 2, 1145b22-27 and 3, 1147b14-17 verbal echoes with the *Protagoras* (compare 352b8-c2) strongly suggest that he relied directly on Plato's dialogues at least some of the time for his conception of the historical Socrates' philosophical views. So Aristotle's treatment of Socrates confirms the correctness of this convention, however antecedently dubious it might seem.

2. Thus Aristotle (*EN* I 13, II 5-6) describes virtue of character simply as the proper coordination between reason on the one side and non-rational desire, in general, on the other. He says nothing in this context about any differences there may be in kinds of non-rational desire. In other parts of his ethical theory, however, Aristotle does in fact preserve the distinctions that led Plato to regard the human soul as having three parts. He regularly divides 'ὁρεξις (desire) into three sub-kinds, βούσις, θυμός and ἐπιθυμία (see *de An* II 3, 414b2, III 9, 432b3-7; *de Motu* 6, 700b22; *EE* II 7, 1223a26-7, 10, 1225b25-6; *MM* I 12, 1187b36-7), and he assigns the first to reason itself (*de An* . 432b5, 433a23-25; *Top.* IV 5, 126a13), making the latter two belong to the "non-rational element" (*de An.* 432b6). Thus

Aristotle holds (with Plato; see below) that reason has a special kind of desires of its own and he divides non-rational desires into the same two species as Plato recognized (see below). His acceptance of the Platonic theory that there are three distinct kinds of desire has important though frequently unappreciated effects on his moral psychology, as can be seen for instance in his concept of προαίρεσις (decision, rational choice): *EE* II 10 makes clear (see 1226b2-5, 1227a3-5), as *EN* III 2-3 does not, that the ὁρεξις that is according to Aristotle a component of προαίρεσις is a βούλησις, i.e., a desire belonging to reason itself, and not any non-rational desire. (J. Burnet, presumably relying on these *EE* passages, attributes this view, correctly in my opinion, to Aristotle in the *EN* too: βούλησις, he says in commenting on *EN* III 3, is “the appetitive element in προαίρεσις,” *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London: 1900), pp. 109, 131, 132.)

3. See most recently T. Penner, “Thought and Desire in Plato,” in G. Vlastos, *Plato II* (New York: 1971), pp. 111-13; also W. F. R. Hardie, *A Study in Plato* (Oxford: 1936), pp. 142-43, and F. M. Cornford, “Psychology and Social Structure in the *Republic*,” *Classical Quarterly* vol. 6 (1912), pp. 262-64.

4. This is certainly suggested by his remark at 435e-436a that if, as the foregoing political analysis has asserted, there are three types of persons suited for three distinguishable kinds of social work, that can only be because there are in each human being three psychological elements or powers, the special strength of one or another of which in a person is what makes him belong to one or another of the three social types. Similarly, at 544d6-e5 (cf. 545d1-3), Socrates argues that what determines the character of a city as timocratic, or oligarchic, or democratic, etc., is the character of those individuals in it who are in command: where people dominated by spirit, concerned about competitive values, govern, the city will be a timocracy (547e1-4, 548c6-7), and so on for the other cases.

5. See for example *Leviathan* ch.8: “For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range abroad and find the way to the things desired.” Bernard Gert argues (Introduction to Hobbes, *Man and Citizen*, (Garden City, N. Y.: 1972), pp. 13-16), that Hobbes does not limit reason to this scouting and spying function, but thinks that in addition it seeks one end not set by passion, viz. the avoidance of one's own violent destruction. On Gert's view not Hobbes but Hume is the originator of this modern view. It seems best, however, to interpret Hobbes as holding that the avoidance of violent destruction is the object of a settled and constant passion experienced by all persons that serves as a background against which varying particular passions arise and decline. On this interpretation Hume's conception of reason as only “the slave of the passions” (*Treatise*, ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 415) is just a reformulation of the Hobbist view; Hobbes deserves the credit or blame for originating the familiar modern view.

6. I have been anticipated in this interpretation by R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley (*Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary*, (London and New York: 1964), pp. 118-19).

7. And cf. 554d-e, where Socrates speaks of a conflict among appetites in the “oligarchic” man's soul; his “better” appetites (his love of money, thriftiness etc.) do battle with and win out over his “worse” ones (his occasional extravagant lusts, thirsts, hungers). This man, Socrates implies, has a kind of self-control, but one that is far from being a virtue, since the appetite that prevails keeps control not (as reason would do) by the logical and rational force of ideas, but by inducing instinctual and irrational fear—the irrational fear of what will happen if money is spent in order to gratify the base appetites. Plato shows no sign of discomfort here in recognizing conflicts within what he continues to think of as a single part of the soul. This is reasonable if he did not mean to argue in Book IV that just any conflict of desires betrays a difference of origin (i.e., a difference of type of motivation) in the desires, but hardly otherwise.

8. *Plato's Moral Theory* (Oxford: 1977), p. 327.

9. Here I mean to attribute to Plato the stronger of two possible models one might have in mind for what it is for reason to rule in our lives. (1) According to the weaker view reason as a ruler accepts desire as the ultimate criterion of value; on this view, that a thing is, or would under certain conditions come to be, desired (whatever the nature and source of the desire in question) is reason's sole basis for assigning actual or potential value to anything and so giving it a weight in its calculations. Given this criterion of value, and the facts about what one desires or might come to desire, reason's role is to work out a best overall scheme of life, with strategies and tactics for dealing with particular problems that may arise, and to decide on appropriate action in individual circumstances. In carrying out this task, reason aims at satisfying one's desires as fully as possible, taking into account how much one wants various things, how distressed one would be without them, how getting or failing to get something one wants affects one's ability to get or enjoy other things one wants, and so on. On this model, for reason to rule is (a) for it to be free to decide, upon an impartial survey of the relevant facts about the world and about one's desires, how one should live and act, and (b) for its decisions to be effective. Once reason decides on an object of pursuit or a mode of action in some situation it may contribute a new desire of its own (the desire to pursue or do that *because* it is supported by reason), but this desire only comes in as a reinforcement of the antecedent desires whose satisfaction reason was previously deliberating about. (2) On the second, stronger model, reason's work, and the desires it gives rise to, are more fundamental. Here, instead of taking desire as the criterion of value in its object, reason presumes to be able to decide by appeal to its own principles what things are good and how good they are; that, as may happen, these are also desired, and the degree to which they are desired, have nothing to do with their value (except to the extent that having a desire may constitute recognition of some antecedent value). It would not be easy to specify what according to Plato these principles might be, but the following example may indicate the general idea. We speak of the good of living things in general (not just animals), and we consider a creature's good to consist, at least in part, in its attaining, and functioning in, its natural mature state. The satisfaction of desire obviously cannot be the basis for such a judgment where plants are concerned, and it is not implausible to exclude it even in the case of animals. We might well expect an animal to find satisfaction for its desires in the natural functioning of its mature state, but if it did not one need not conclude that its good lay elsewhere, but only that, through some perversion, it failed to enjoy its good when it had it. In the *Republic's* theory the function of the form of the Good is to provide the knowledge of those principles of goodness that will permit reason to work out a scheme of ends for an individual to aim at achieving in his life and to make particular decisions as circumstances require (on this see my "The Psychology of Justice in Plato", *American Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 14 (1977), pp. 151-57). Given this knowledge one will know, for example, that and why eating or drinking is a good when it is (because health requires it, and health is a good); but from reason's point of view one's appetites for food and drink themselves provide no reason at all for thinking that these are good things. Similarly for all other non-rational desires.

10. This interpretation of Plato makes it easy to see how Aristotle might have arrived at his distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Theoretical reason is simply reason used to pursue one of the two ends that according to Plato rational beings qua rational have got, viz. to know the truth; practical reason is reason pursuing its other end, the end of ruling our lives. Hence Aristotle can say that in both employments reason aims at truth (*EN* VI 2, 1139b12)—not truth in the one case and something else (say, good) in the other. For he, just as much as Plato, conceives of reason as having the power to rule in the

stronger of the two senses distinguished above (n.9), and accordingly the desire of reason to rule is for him the desire to achieve and enforce practical truth, i.e., the correctness of ends as well as means.

11. And notice that at 437d11-e2 “modified thirst,” while Socrates insists it is not merely *thirst*, is nonetheless classed as an *ἐπιθυμία*.

12. Plato justifies these epithets at 580e5-581a1 by saying that the principal use of money is to provide the means by which the appetites can be gratified.

13. In developing his account of the various types of unjust person (timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, tyrannical) Plato makes it clear that, just as the “timocrat” (550b5-6) has yielded the governance of his soul to his *θυμός*, so the “oligarch”, the “democrat” and the “tyrant” are all ruled in different ways by appetite. The “oligarch” is said explicitly (553c4-7) to enthrone appetite as his ruler, which means that in his plans and decisions his ultimate aim is constantly and only to gratify appetite; being dominated by appetite, he forces the other parts of the soul to want and get satisfaction only from assisting in this effort (553d1-7). But his pursuit of appetite takes the perverted form of aiming at fulfilling first what Plato calls the “necessary” appetites and, beyond them, only the appetite for the mere accumulation of the *means* (money) whereby these and other appetites might be satisfied. The “democrat” (559d-561e) refuses to follow the oligarch in repressing his other appetites, and ends by establishing equality for all appetites: he allows himself to acquire any and every appetite that his circumstances and nature make it possible for him to acquire, and then he indulges all his appetites in turn, on an equal basis. A consequence of this account is that, as noted in the text, when, in accordance with his scheme, the democrat goes in for athletic, political and philosophical pursuits, the desires for these things that he is bent on indulging must be construed as appetites, desires belonging to the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*, odd as this may seem. They are not desires of spirit or reason.

14. The *ὁρατὸς τόπος* (508c2) described in the analogy of the sun is also the realm of *τὸ γινόμενον τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον*, which if the soul attends to in working out its general conceptions of things, instead of to the *νοητόν*, it will fail to reach any understanding (d6-9); and when a soul does that it is reduced to taking resemblances for reality (476c5-7) and ruling in accord with the false and inadequate conventional standards (479a3, d3-5) that have been developed over time by others who likewise relied on experience without philosophical thought to guide their lives.

15. David B. Claus in the latest discussion of the Homeric usage of soul-words (*Toward the Soul*, (New Haven: 1981) argues that in Homer *θυμός* like *μένος*, *ἦτορ* and *κῆρ*, with each of which it is in many contexts easily interchangeable, has the central meaning of “life-force,” but with a special connection to personal affection (see his ch. 1, esp. pp. 37-42).

16. Notice that in the passage Plato cites from Homer (*Od.* XX, 17; *Rep.* 441b6) Odysseus addresses and reproves his *κράδι*, i.e. his anger or his heart conceived as the seat of it, bidding it to be calm and endure without making a fuss. The conflict in this case, as in that of Leontius where spirit and appetite conflict, involves a direct criticism by the “higher” faculty of the “lower,” and not merely conflicting impulses to action.

17. This is the view taken by Cornford, Hardie, and Penner (see *loc. cit.* n. 3 above).

18. Plato’s highly metaphorical talk of the displacement of reason from its throne and the usurpation of power by *θυμός* or by appetite (550b4-6, 553c4-d7) is potentially very misleading. He does not mean either that reason ceases altogether to function (see 553d) or that the usurper actually begins to perform reason’s functions of calculating out what to do, declaring where the overall good lies and deciding accordingly. What happens instead is simply that, yielding to the importunities of the usurping desires (i.e., accepting the strength or

frequency of these desires as criterion of the value of their objects), the person's reason comes to adopt, as its *own* general view of what *is* good for him, the overall plan of gratifying those desires first and foremost. In doing this reason fails to perform its most essential task, namely to work out on its *own* theoretical grounds where the good actually lies; and that is why Plato says reason is no longer ruling in such a person's life, and why he says that instead those other desires rule, the ones to which reason has abdicated its own responsibility to set goals. But reason continues to be the only part of the soul in which judgments about overall good and those desires for good that follow upon them are located.

19. Thus Socrates says (441a2-3), understandably enough, that θυμός is by nature reason's helper (ἐπίκουρος), and he describes it as entering disputes between reason and appetite or reason and outside agents as the ally (σύμμαχος) of reason (440b2-4, c7-9). It is harder to understand why Socrates so flatly insists (440b4-7) that one *never* finds anyone's θυμός intervening in a dispute between reason and appetite on appetite's side. He himself later describes the oligarchic man as enslaving both his θυμός and his reason to his appetite for money (553d), but just as the dominance of this appetite is not sufficient to prevent spendthrift desires from arising altogether (554b7-c2), so it presumably is not sufficient to prevent reason or θυμός from occasionally rebelling and generating desires not subordinated to the pursuit of wealth. And if, after all, reason and θυμός are independent of one another, why could not a desire of reason (e.g. to spend some money for the public good) arise that conflicts with the master-appetite, only to be opposed by θυμός for that very reason? When, as with the oligarchic person, θυμός has been habituated to support appetite, this is only what one should expect: reason's desire to act generously should be felt by θυμός as disgraceful—soft-hearteded, a sign of weakness or sentimentality, etc. That Socrates does not envisage this possibility in Bk. IV is presumably to be explained by supposing that he assumes there that appetitive gratification is such a simple and easy thing to arrange, or if difficult so obviously in itself nothing to be proud of, that when reason opposes it the love of competition *could* not find any scope for activity except on reason's side (i.e., on the side whose winning out might show that something worth crowing over had been achieved). This thought seems natural enough, and appropriate to the context in Book IV; but it is nonetheless quite naive, as the account of the oligarchic man in Book VIII shows.

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