

SECTION FOUR

Database of Contributed Papers Regarding Remote Viewing



"Structure Energetic—Hommage a Beethoven"

LOUISE JANIN

Oil on canvas. 188cm x 149cm, 1960

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W elcome.

The topic of **remote viewing** surfaced in 1973 when it became known that the CIA and other intelligence communities were interested in it and began funding appropriate research at Stanford Research Institute (now SRI International.)

Since that time the topic of remote viewing has been subjected to a gigantic amount of distorting media and other attention -- with the result that its nature, substance and functions are among the most confused and confusing topics of this century. Certain writers in the Internet and elsewhere have taken advantage of this confusion to further distort not only the essence and meaning of remote viewing, but its historical facts as well.

Some references to this confusion will be found in the database which comprises [Section One](#) of this site. [Section Two](#) of this site is devoted to serializing **Remote Viewing -- The Real Story**, authored by myself, and in which many of the reasons for the distortions will be detailed and set in perspective.

To help offset the many distortions, I have decided to formalize Section Four in this site and include in it only papers authored by others regarding remote viewing, its history, and its meaning and importance.

Section Four is not designed to serve as a debating platform regarding remote viewing or the circumstances which surrounded it, but rather to illuminate the knowledge of others regarding it and to stabilize its facts as well as can be done.

Contributed papers along these lines should be collected, stored and made available as a separate database file -- at least for posterity beyond our **now**, and for the possible interest of those who chance to come across them.

Remote reviewing is one aspect of our species superpower faculties, an aspect which under other names was identified in the very distant past and has been present in various formats throughout the millennia. The modern format of remote viewing was researched under very strenuous and strict scientific oversight committees. And so there is little tolerable reason to permit its history to remain confused and confusing.

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Please also note that the opinions and other information presented within the papers are those of their authors, and may not reflect my own agreement or that of anyone managing

this site. Section Four is being compiled as an historical archive of selected source materials and nothing more.

Best wishes,

Ingo Swann

Amplified Mind Power Research In The Former Soviet Union

by Martin Ebon

NOTE OF INTRODUCTION

Martin Ebon is a well-known figure in parapsychology circles. From 1953 to 1965 he was administrative assistant of the Parapsychology Association in New York set up by the world-famous medium and clairvoyant, Eileen Garrett. While occupying this post, he had more than adequate opportunity to meet the outstanding personalities in psychical research and parapsychology. He traveled extensively on behalf of the Association's research endeavors. His lectures, reviews, research reports, articles in magazines, and his books (over sixty of them) all reflect serious treatment of the field. His expertise, historical and otherwise, of the official and unofficial aspects of the field is enormous.

There is another aspect of Martin, though, which in my opinion makes him one of a kind, for he is much more than just a parapsychologist. He speaks several languages, and is also a lifelong researcher/writer/analyst regarding political and scientific developments of Eastern European countries, the former Soviet Union, and post-Communist Russia. His expertise in this regard also extends to the People's Republic of China and Asia.

His credentials along these lines are impressive. Following service with the U.S. Office of War Information in World War II, he then worked on the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, and with the U.S. Information Agency during the Korean War. Traveling widely and in direct contact with many sources, he was ultimately called upon by many agencies to present briefings, and for many years acted as analyst/consultant in this regard. As a free-lance writer, his articles were broadly published inter alia the NEW YORK TIMES, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, and the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. He lectured at universities on world affairs in general, but also specialized in tracking and examining the nature and directions of Russian and Soviet security services.

His deep interests in parapsychology, plus esteem of him as an exacting political journalist, made him a "natural" when official suspicions arose that the Soviet Union was engaging in mind-control and parapsychology research. For example, he was in Washington giving a briefing on telepathy to a top intelligence agency on 17 April 1961 when the ill-fated "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba was launched. Other sources and clues also establish the existence of official intelligence interest in "psi" matters at least a decade prior to 1971 when the American intelligence agencies were forced to

acknowledge and attempt response to the possible threat potential of "psi" research in the Soviet Union - and which, among other effects, resulted in the Remote Viewing project at Stanford Research Institute in 1973.

In addition to Martin's many books on matters parapsychological, he published: *WORLD COMMUNISM TODAY*; *MALENKOV: STALIN'S SUCCESSOR*; a biography of *ERNESTO ["Che"] GUEVARA*; *PSYCHIC WARFARE* (1983); *THE ANDROPOV FILE* (a biography of the former head of the KGB); and *THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA MACHINE* (1987).

His most recent book is *KGB: DEATH AND REBIRTH* (1994), which examines and documents the evolution of the new Russian "KGB" after the old Soviet KGB was officially pronounced dead in October 1991. As the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "We don't have illusions about the Russians. We understand that the intelligence service may have changed its name - but it has probably not changed its method of operation." [See Martin Ebon, *RUSSIA'S NEW SPY NETWORK. THE AMERICAN LEGION*, June 1995.]

In my long-term experience of him, Martin has never been pro or con political enthusiast of any kind. He has always been a non-emotional documentarian of the first water, aided by a dignified, penetrating mind and vast experience in world, European and East European affairs. He and I had often discussed the "gap" in American awareness regarding the nature of Soviet mind-research, a gap made enduring because of Western intelligence agency and media reluctance to fair open knowledge about that research or its evolutionary background.

Although it took some doing on my part, Martin finally agreed to provide this paper for this website after I impressed on him that no one else could, would or was qualified to do so for the sake of posterity. Of all the essays and papers in this *biomind* database, this one is of signal importance - for it provides the historical, causative link as to why the intelligence agencies, antipathetic to psi research, were eventually forced into responding.

This paper was to go beyond the Cold War years and into what has happened to the KGB-sponsored research since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reorganization in Russia. Unfortunately, Martin's wonderful wife tragically passed away after an illness, and he has since been unable to proceed. We have decided to put this much of the paper in the database, to be followed by a Part Two when Martin is again up to the exacting work needed to extend it beyond the Cold War years.

I must now take this opportunity to express my deepest and most enduring gratitude to Martin and his fabulous, equally knowledgeable wife, Chariklia Sophia Ebon (1921-1996), who put up with me for so many years since I first met them in 1971. Your friendship would have been more than enough. But your mentorship in all respects, and including so very many difficult situations and decisions I was forced to make, prevented

me from making far more mistakes than I did. So, Martin and "Koutsie", you have deeply honored me with your countless kindnesses and often did so far beyond the call of duty.

-- Ingo Swann

AMPLIFIED MIND-POWER RESEARCH IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Soviet Cold War Biophysics and Biocommunications Research

By Martin Ebon

TOPICAL AREA: Developmental psi/Cold War psi warfare gap

KEY TERMS: Consciousness, psychic research, bio-physics, bio-communications, telepathy, mind enhancement, KGB, CIA, mind-boosting, amplified mind power

ABSTRACT: The background of the Soviet Cold War psi-research effort is summarized under the headings of: The Toth Incident; The American Fear of Psychic Warfare and the Credibility Gap; A Brief History of the Soviet Research Machine; The Novosibirsk Connection; The KGB Takes Control; Centers of USSR Psi Studies; Three Major Directions Within the Soviet Research Machine (Code by Telepathy, Boosting the Human Brain, Amplified Mind Power); Washington's Dilemma; Outline of 1952 CIA Project on ESP; Congressional Response, 1981.

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THE TOTH INCIDENT

In Moscow on June 11, 1977, Los Angeles Times correspondent Robert C. Toth was arrested and detained on a charge of illegally obtaining papers that disclosed "state secrets". The papers had been given to Toth by a Soviet scientist, Valery G. Petukhov.

Toth had first met the Russian biophysicist earlier in the year. While Petukhov seemed eager to show his scientific findings to Toth, the correspondent felt that his work was "only theory and far too complicated" for a newspaper story.

Toth reported that, as best as he could recall, Petukhov asserted that certain particles of living cells "are emitted" when such cells divide, that they can be "detected and measured and that these radiating

particles can carry information." Their function could "explain the basis for telepathy" and related phenomena.

*

To Toth, Valery Petukhov seemed "like a serious scientist." According to a card he handed the reporter, he was Chief of the Laboratory of Bio-Physics at the State Control Institute of Medical and Biological Research.

He had been recommended to Toth by a dissent Soviet scientist who later emigrated. At their first meeting, the Los Angeles Times man told Petukhov that, once the scientists had proved this theory, he would be interested in writing about it.

*

Months passed. In mid-June 1977 Petukhov phoned Toth. The biophysicist told Toth that his experiments had succeeded. He planned to describe them in a formal scientific paper; but, as Soviet authorities would certainly refuse to publish his work, he wanted to translate the paper into English and give it to Toth for publication in the West.

At the rendezvous, Petukhov took a manuscript from his briefcase. It contained over twenty typewritten sheets, complete with charts and photos of charts. It looked like a complex, comprehensive scientific paper, well-documented, appropriately technical.

*

Toth never managed to get a real look at the paper; for it was at that moment a melodrama began, when a Soviet-made Fiat braked sharply at the curb.

The car was filled with five plainclothesmen who jumped out and quite unceremoniously pulled Toth inside.

Robert Toth's account stated: "Our car drove through red lights and down one-way streets the wrong way to a militia (police) station. My captors were firm and polite, offering me cigarettes.

I was ushered into a room with an inspector who declined my requests to phone the U.S. Embassy but said a Soviet Foreign Ministry official would be called."

*

In addition to the Foreign Ministry official and a KGB agent, a man named Sparkin, the police inspector summoned a senior researcher of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Professor I.M. Mikhailov. Mikhailov was asked to provide expert testimony on the paper Petukhov had given to Toth, which the police were now treating as "evidence."

Specifically, Professor Mikhailov stated: "The article beginning Petukhov, Valery G., from the word of 'micro-organism self-radiation' to the words 'by means of vacuum particles in space' states that within the content of living cells are particles . . . and these particles are grounds for discussing the fundamental

problems of biology in the context of biology and parapsychology. There is also information about the uses of such particles. This material is secret and shows the kind of work done in some scientific institutes of our state."

*

It was this last sentence that raised the eyebrows among observers of Soviet parapsychological studies throughout the world.

Earlier, Moscow authorities on various levels had several times denied that parapsychology was being researched in the Soviet Union. A year before, Leningrad writer Vladimir Lvov had published an article in the leading French daily, LE MONDE, in which he asserted categorically: "The truth is simple: parapsychology is not accepted as a legitimate and official branch within Soviet science. No institute or center or research in the Soviet Union is devoted to telepathy, psychokinesis, etc."

Yet the Mikhailov testimony in the Toth incident directly contradicted the Lvov statement.

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Professor Mikhailov's testimony on the Petukhov paper and Toth's police interrogation at the Pushkin Street Station lasted about two-and-a-half hours.

At last, a representative of the U.S. Embassy, Vice Consul Lawrence C. Napper, was permitted to come to the station. The reporter's account of his meeting with Petukhov was read aloud and translated into Russian. But Toth refused to sign a handwritten Russian version of it. The KGB man Sparkin then told him he was "free to go."

*

Toth's Moscow difficulties were not at an end.

The following Tuesday, Toth had a telephone call from another U.S. Embassy official, Theodore McNamara, who asked him to come to the embassy immediately. The matter, he added, was "serious."

At McNamara's office, Napper and two other officials were waiting. They handed Toth a Soviet note that had been delivered a half hour earlier. It contained the following passages:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is authorized to state the following to the American Embassy:

"On the 11th of June of this year Robert Charles Toth was apprehended at the moment of meeting a Soviet citizen, Petukhov Valery Georgiyevich, which took place under suspicious circumstances. When apprehended, the American journalist was found to have materials given to him by Petukhov, containing secret data.

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs the American Embassy that in conformity with established procedure, Toth will be summoned for interrogation by the investigatory organs, in connection with which his departure from Moscow until the end of the investigation is not desired."

*

Within the hour, a polite KGB agent, wearing a flowered shirt and gray suit, arrived, asked Toth to identify himself, and told him to come to the State Security's Lefortovo center for interrogation. He was advised of Articles 108 and 109 of the Criminal code, and that he did not have diplomatic immunity. After two days of confusing interrogation, Toth was told: "Parapsychology as a whole may not be secret information. But there could be fields of science within parapsychology that are secret. It is not for me, as it's a matter for experts, to say what is secret, and what the scientist has stated that the materials you received are a secret. And you received them under circumstances where your behavior and the information seems to be a breach of our law."

*

After the second interrogation Toth was told that he was no longer needed. The U.S. Embassy received confirmation from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Toth and his family quickly arranged for a flight to the United States.

The Toth incident was reported world-wide, and the WASHINGTON POST and THE NEW YORK TIMES ran accounts of it.

The incident then passed into oblivion, and most were none the wiser. But intelligence analysts understood that Toth had gotten into his hand, if only for a few moments, one of the tips of the enormous iceberg of top secret Soviet research into psychic powers of the human mind.

THE AMERICAN FEAR OF PSYCHIC WARFARE AND THE CREDIBILITY GAP

Some years before the Toth incident, American intelligence analysts had begun noticing a Soviet secret police (KGB) trend, shortly after 1967, indicating serious interest in what is called "parapsychology" in the West.

*

This trend began when the KGB's far-flung operations came under the direction of Yuri Andropov, named General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party in late 1982. But even the KGB, for all of its experience, large staff, skills, and high-priority status, had not developed a clear-cut policy toward psychic experiments; conflicting attitudes within its leadership appeared to have caused erratic actions.

This was well illustrated when agents arrested Toth and thereby revealed that secret research was, in fact, taking place at government institutes.

*

U.S. government officials were jittery that research in parapsychology might cause them to be accused of spending public funds on science fiction projects.

When columnist Jack Anderson reported early in 1981 that a laboratory in the basement of the Pentagon was devoted to parapsychological experiments, his comments were heavy with ridicule and sarcasm.

*

Anderson's assistant, Ron McRae, alleged in an article on "Psychic Warfare" (in THE INVESTIGATOR, October 1981) that "the Pentagon is spending millions on parapsychology in a crash program to end Russia's psycho-superiority."

McRae, who was doing research for a book on U.S. government projects in psychic studies, said the U. S. Secret Service had "commissioned studies on ways to protect the President from the Kremlin's mind control."

He wrote that its agents, as well as CIA staffers, had been "required to take courses in mind control" at universities in the Washington area, to "prevent them," as he put it, "from falling under the spell of Soviet psychics."

Although such claims at the time bore earmarks of exaggeration, they were none the less indicative of intense American interest in psi warfare possibilities.

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But American media accounts of psi warfare spread alarm and amusement, and an ideological battlefield erupted, not only in the United States, but in the Soviet Union also.

On the ideological battlefield of international Marxism, the controversy about parapsychology, by whatever name, had gone on for two decades; it showed no signs of abating.

*

Typical of those who regarded psychic studies as ideological heresy was Soviet mathematician-physicist Dr. Alexander Kitaygorodsky, who had categorized clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis as "supernatural" and thus outside "the domain of the natural sciences." Writing in the Moscow periodical NAUKA I RELIGIA (Science and Religion), an atheistic magazine, Dr. Kitaygorodsky stated as long ago as March 1966: "To me, there is no doubt whatever that those who relate such fairy tales are frauds, mystificators or, at best, grossly deceived. Men have believed in miracles for centuries, and for centuries there have existed charlatan and impostors, conscious or unconscious. And the struggle against such deception of the human mind has gone on for centuries, and in each century it has to begin anew."

*

But in the same magazine, science writer Leonid Fillipov took the opposite view and cited Marxist gospel to prove his point.

He asked: "Does Professor Kitaygorodsky seriously believe that the frontiers of physics have been reached?" He cited scientific breakthroughs in radioactivity, quantum theory, and lasers, and wrote: "What if telepathic phenomena conform to some new, as yet undiscovered laws which do not contradict already known rules governing electrons?" Phillipov added: "Rejecting a priori the possibilities of telepathy and other processes still unfamiliar to science amounts of rejecting Lenin's idea that, on any given level of scientific development, our knowledge of the work remains incomplete."

*

But beyond viewing-with-exaggerated-alarm, ridicule-cum-hyperbole and credibility gap lie the realities of psychic functions, for good or ill.

To obtain the correct perspective, let us keep in mind that parapsychology can play only a supporting role in the Soviet Union's or any other military-scientific complex.

It must, therefore, be seen as one element within a large and diffuse defensive-offensive research apparatus. Psychic elements might well be integrated into, rather than operating separately from, other scientific or military projects.

*

A major attraction for planners is the promise of financial and organizational shortcuts: Why engage in high-cost armaments, for example, if one or several psychics might influence personnel in the enemy's missile silos, as a DIA report suggested? The costs of military hardware are a heavy burden in national economies in the East as well as in the West -- and ESP is cheap.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOVIET RESEARCH MACHINE

The origins of the Soviet research remain a mystery at best, mostly due to gaps in accessible documentation.

In any case, it would be clear that the research and attempted development of specific useful psi powers of mind proceeded at the start under severe ideological difficulties.

Thus it is not easily understandable how, and especially why, the Soviet research machine achieved the monumental extent it did by about 1977.

*

Soviet efforts to harness telepathy (mind-to-mind communication), telekinesis (better known as psychokinesis, the influence of the human mind on matter), or any other psychic ability, needed to overcome strong ideological objections from Marxist theoreticians.

Pragmatists, even those highly placed in scientific or government circles, needed to justify their hopes for psychic experiments in acceptable ideological terms.

Historically, Western parapsychology was rooted in nineteenth-century efforts to find scientific proof for

such traditional religious beliefs such as life after death.

And as psychic phenomena retain the mysterious air of the unknown or unexplored, many Marxists accused Western parapsychologists of propagandizing religio-folkloric "superstition" -- and of advocating soft-headed "idealistic" concepts, in contrast to the strictly "materialistic" approach promulgated by Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin.

*

Such criticisms had been voiced, on and off, for some twenty years in the Soviet Union. During the life of Mao Zedong, Chinese communist ideologues even accused the Soviet Union and the United States of using parapsychology to foster "religion without the cross" in order to distract their citizenry from economic difficulties.

*

As we examine analyses of Soviet research, this continuing ideological conflict must be kept in mind. But there can be little doubt that the extent of the Soviet effort did become enormous. In 1978, an American intelligence report was declassified and released, although it had originally been scheduled for declassification in December 1990.

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The report was entitled "Controlled Offensive Intelligence Agency (DIA), Task Number T72-01-14. In part it read: "The Soviet Union is well aware of the benefits and applications of parapsychology research. The term parapsychology denotes [in the Soviet Union] a multi-disciplinary field consisting of the sciences of bionics, biophysics, psychophysics, psychology, physiology and neuropsychology. "Many scientist, U.S. and Soviet, feel that parapsychology can be harnessed to create conditions where one can alter or manipulate the minds of others. The major impetus behind the Soviet drive to harness the possible capabilities of telepathic communication, telekinetic and bionics are said to come from the Soviet military and the KGB [Committee of State Security; Secret Police]."

*

In continuing, the report of the Defense Intelligence Agency asserted that the Soviet Union enjoyed a "head start" in the field and had provided substantial financial backing. The report concluded that "Soviet knowledge in this field is superior to that of the U.S." It noted that Soviet researchers had explored "detrimental effects of subliminal perception techniques" that might even be "targeted against the U.S. or allied personnel in nuclear missile silos" by "telepathic means."

*

The report stated: "The potential applications of focusing mental influences on an enemy through hypnotic telepathy have surely occurred to the Soviets . . . Control and manipulation of the human consciousness must be considered a primary goal."

*

At this point, the reader should again be cautioned that the ideological controversy about the study and use of psychic potentials in the USSR had created gaps in public knowledge that inevitably led to rumors and unverifiable claims.

"Hypnotic telepathy," of which the DIA report spoke, may well have been one of the target areas of Soviet research, but little current information on its status was available.

*

However, Russia had a long history of hypnosis studies in medicine, education, and psychiatry. Soviet literature reflected on-going and contemporary scientific interest in the stimulation of telepathy, clairvoyance, and psychokinesis, either by drugs or electronic means.

In the past, Russian researchers had experimented with telepathy-at-a-distance, a technique of intriguing potential.

THE EARLY ORIGINS

It was quite likely that the early origins of the Soviet research machine may have begun with the work of Bernard Bernardovich Kazhinsky, a student in Tiflis (now Tbilisi), in the state of Georgia boarding on the Black Sea. His interests apparently were triggered by a telepathic experience of his own.

*

In February, 1922, Kazhinsky was invited to address the All-Russian Congress of the Association of Naturalists, a top scientific organization perhaps equivalent to the American Institutes of Mental health today.

The topic of his lecture was HUMAN THOUGHT-ELECTRICITY, and he quickly published a book under the same title. Having been invited to address the All-Russian Congress, it would be clear that the Congress supported and funded Kazhensky's work, while his research thereafter apparently became classified.

By 1923, he had published his early findings in a book entitled THOUGHT TRANSFERENCE. This book attracted favorable attention among important brain researchers at the time.

*

More visible and easier to document was the work of Professor Leonid L. Vasiliev, later to become

Chief of the Department of Physiology at the University of Leningrad.

Born in 1891, Vasiliev had been a student of Leningrad physiologist Vladimir M. Bekhterev who had established the Leningrad Brain Research Institute. His granddaughter, Natalia P. Bekhtereva, had joined the Institute in 1921, and ultimately became its director.

*

Vasiliev became a member of the Committee for the Study of Mental Suggestion the following year. "Mental suggestion," or hypnosis, became central to his interest. In 1928, he visited Paris, as well as other Western European cities. Vasiliev spoke and wrote French fluently, and the Paris Institut Metapsychique International (IMI) remained his major contact with Western psychical research throughout his life.

*

Vasiliev established an ideological basis for the Soviet research in several books, lectures, and articles. His basic thesis was the experimental facts of telepathy, for example, should be examined from a physiological (or material) viewpoint, so that they could not be exploited by advocates of "religious superstition" (or an idealistic view-point). He was criticized as providing a pseudo-scientific framework for a return to idealism under the mantle of Marxist dialectical materialism.

*

His major and influential book **BIOLOGICAL RADIO COMMUNICATION** was published in Kiev by the Ukrainian Academy of Science in 1962.

Kazhinsky concluded that "experimental confirmation of the fact that communication between two people, separated by long distances, can be carried out through water, over air and across metal barrier by means of cerebral radiation in the course of thinking, and without conventional communication facilities."

He added: "One important feature of the above-mentioned experiment is worthy of attention. The electromagnetic waves accompanying the thought-formation process (visual perceptions) in the inductor's brain reached the cells of the indicatee's cortex after having traveled a long distance, not only in the air and through water but also through the hull of a submarine.

"This would justify the following conclusions: 1) these electromagnetic waves were propagated spheroidally, not in a narrow directed beam; 2) these waves penetrated though the submarine hull, which did not block them, that is, it did not act as a `Faraday cage'."

*

Kazhinsky noted that a radio receiver in the marine laboratory of the Soviet scientific research vessel **VITYAZ** had been unsuccessful in intercepting electric waves emitted in the water by the torpedo fish. He added that: "the radio receivers in the submarine did not intercept these waves. This prompts the

conclusion that some electromagnetic waves of a biological origin possess yet another, still unknown, characteristic which distinguishes them from conventional radio waves. It is possible that our ignorance of that particular characteristic impedes further development of research work in that field."

*

Vasiliev noted in another book EXPERIMENTS IN DISTANT INFLUENCE (which first appeared in Moscow in 1962) that while official denials of the shore-to-submarine experiment suggested "a certain caution," nevertheless "This experiment showed - and herein resides its principal value - that telepathic information can be transmitted without loss through a thickness of water, and through the sealed metal covering of a submarine - that is, through substances which greatly interfere with radio communication. "Such materials completely absorb short waves and partly absorb medium waves, the latter being considerably attenuated, whereas the factor (still unknown to us) which transmits suggestion penetrates them without difficulties."

*

Many have claimed that the infamous NAUTILUS story of 1959 in the United States served as the major prod for Soviet bio-communications research.

However, by 1959, some four decades after the Soviet research had already begun, presumably their machine would not have needed such a prod.

The NAUTILUS was the world's first nuclear powered submarine, launched in 1954 and christened by First Lady Mamie Eisenhower, wife of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The NAUTILUS made its first voyage under the North Pole in 1958. Soon afterward, French accounts claimed that while the submarine was cruising deep in Arctic waters it received telepathic messages from a research center maintained by the Westinghouse Corporation at Friendship, Maryland. The U.S. Navy denied that such a test had ever taken place, or that it was otherwise engaged in telepathy experiments.

*

However, several sources in France appeared which claimed otherwise. My own efforts to obtain confirmation of the French reports were unsuccessful.

The reports held that such major U.S. corporations as Westinghouse, General Electric in Schenectady, N. Y., and Bell Telephone in Boston had begun telepathy research in 1958.

The aim was to develop thought transmission by telepathy, to record and produce telepathic signals, and to determine the amplitude and frequencies on which telepathy operated.

*

According to the French sources, President Eisenhower had received a study prepared by the Rand Corporation of Los Angeles, a "think tank" under contract to the armed forces and other U.S.

government agencies.

The report was said to recommend studying the use of telepathy to establish communication with submarines, particularly those cruising in waters under the Polar Ice Cap where radio communication channels were particularly difficult.

*

Westinghouse's Friendship Laboratory allegedly undertook just such an experiment with the U.S.S. NAUTILUS, linking one person on Land (the sender or inductor) with another person in the submarine (the receiver or inductee), while the vessel was submerged. Representatives of the U.S. Navy and Air Force were present during the experiment, according to the reports.

The original French reports fixed the starting date as July 25, 1959. The tests continued daily for a total of sixteen days. The person in charge was identified as Colonel William H. Bowers, director of the Biological Department of the Air Force research institute and the man who directed the experiments at Friendship.

Later accounts identified the sender or inductors as "Smith" a student at Duke University, who was confined in one of the Westinghouse laboratory's buildings during the experimental period.

*

The procedure was designed to have Smith transmit "visual impressions" twice daily at specified times. Using methods developed by J. B. Rhine at the Parapsychology Laboratory, Duke University, Durham, N.C., a controlled timing device shuffled one thousand ESP cards in a revolving drum in such a manner as to drop five cards on a table, one at a time, at one-minute intervals. Smith pricked each card up as it came out of the drum, looked at it, and sought to memorize the image. At the same time, he drew a picture of the symbol (square, cross, star, wavy lines, or circle) on a piece of paper before him. Each test thus produced a sheet of paper covered with five symbols. Smith sealed each paper into an envelope, which Col. Bowers locked into a cage.

*

At the same time, a Navy lieutenant, identified as "Jones," sat isolated in a stateroom on the NAUTILUS, functioning as the recipient of the images Smith sought to convey by telepathy. Twice daily Jones drew five symbols on a sheet of paper, choosing from among the same symbols used by Smith. He placed the sheet inside an envelope, sealed it, and turned it over to his superior, Captain William R. Andersen.

The captain wrote the time and date of the experiment on the envelope and put it into a safe in his own cabin. During the sixteen-day experiment period, Jones saw no one else except for one sailor who brought him meals and performed other routine services.

*

The final segment of these events, as reported in France, began with the arrival of the NAUTILUS at Groton, its cruise completed.

The envelopes were removed from the commander's sarge, sent by car under escort to the nearest military airfield, flown to Friendship Airport, near Baltimore, and then taken to Col. Bowers's laboratory. There the two sets of sheets were taken from their envelopes, dates and times matched with each other, and the results tabulated. In over 70 percent of the cases, the figures tallied: Jones had correctly "guessed" three-fourths of the images seen by Smith.

*

I was put off by these reports, particularly by the high score ascribed to these experimental subjects, and by their all-too-typical American names.

On the other hand, the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE had reported in November 8, 1958, that the Westinghouse Electric Corporation had begun to study ESP using specially designed apparatus. Dr. Peter A. Castruccio, director of the company's newly organized Astronautic Institute, had spoken of the ESP studies as "very promising," with the caution that "a lot more work must be done before we can come up with anything practical."

*

I questioned W. D. Crawford, Staff Section, Air Arm Division of Westinghouse, on the project and he said that "while these studies have scientific value, any conclusion at this time would be premature and inconclusive."

These statements were published in the NEWSLETTER of the Parapsychology Foundation (January-February 1959), as was a report that Bell Telephone Laboratories had considered an ESP research project but had abandoned it.

*

The NAUTILUS story is often referred to as hoax, since the French and other sources remain unconfirmed. However, the telepathic part of the story might have added interest to the Soviet effort, already four decades long by 1958.

*

In any event, in Paris, a prominent member of the Institut Metapsychique International, Raphael Kherumain, collected articles on the NAUTILUS story and mailed them to his long-time professional friend, Leonid Vasiliev.

Whether of fact or hoax, the implications that the Americans MIGHT be conducting ESP experiments did enter into the ongoing monolithic research machine which influenced the lives of countless men and women, and caused expenditures which by 1983 were supposed to amount to \$500 million annually.

THE NOVOSIBIRSK CONNECTION

Across the Ob River from Novosibirsk, a pioneer town in western Siberia, lies Academgorodok, or Science City. For some four years, its Institute of Automation and Electrometry maintained a research unit with the nondescript name of "Special Department No. 8."

The building that housed the department could only be entered if one knew the code, changed each week, that opened the main door's lock.

The "No. 8" operation was devoted to experiments in information transmission by bioenergetic means.

*

As part of its program, physicists sought to discover the nature of "psi particles," the elusive elements that some Soviet scientists regarded as essential to the function of such psychic techniques as biocommunication and bioenergetics.

Novosibirsk was a logical place for such advanced studies. Its Science City was developed, after World War II, with such single-mindedness that even the names of the streets and city squares reflect its nature. For example, one could take a bus down Thermophysics Street, get off at the corner of Calculators Street, and walk across Institute of Hydrodynamics Square. The city contained some forty research centers and housed tens of thousands of scientists and their families.

*

When the No. 8 project was established in 1966, some sixty researchers were brought to Science City from other parts of the USSR.

One of them, Dr. August Stern, provided an account of the department's operation after he migrated to France in 1977.

He told the *NEW YORK TIMES* that the project's director, a Soviet officer, Vitaly Perov, had shown special "deference to two visitors," presumably KGB officers, "who came in the early days" of the project "to check on the installations."

*

Theory and application of psi principles were part of the experiments. Stern dealt with aspects of theoretical physics, designed to solve the enigma of psychic energies flowing between living things.

*

The center's elaborate equipment, he said, had "cost many millions." In line with other Soviet experiments, the Novosibirsk center did such things as applying electric shocks to kittens to see whether their mother, three floors above, would react to their experience in a telepathic way.

This type of experiment was similar to a rumored test in which baby rabbits were taken down below sea

level in a Russian submarine, the killed, while the mother rabbit remained ashore, her reactions monitored by measuring brain and heart functions.

*

Project No. 8 included telepathy-type distance experiments among people. Inductors, or senders, were stimulated in one group of rooms, while recipients were placed elsewhere, their responses monitored on closed-circuit television. The center also undertook the study of electromagnetic forces in person-to-person and mind-over-matter experiments. Among laboratory animals used in the project were monkeys.

*

Stern recalled further details: "There were also experiments with photon waves, in which frogs' eyes were used as a more sensitive measuring instrument than a machine. Another experiment involved putting bacteria on two sides of a glass plate to see whether a fatal disease could be transmitted through the glass. It was reasoned that if this could be done, it would show that photons - light particles - accounted for some inexplicable forms of communication."

*

Stern did not succeed in the project he had been assigned, and which he regarded as a legitimate scientific challenge. In fact, the whole of No. 8 was dissolved in 1969, although it was much too early to achieve definitive results. Stern concluded that the shut-down reflected "a change in attitude of power balance in the Kremlin." Presumably, Moscow authorities had decided on different administrative or research tactics in dealing with psychic studies.

*

Stern's recollections concerning photon waves have since been confirmed. Three researchers at Novosibirsk's Institute of Clinical and Experimental Medicine and at the Institute of Automation and Electrometry (Siberian Section, USSR Academy of Science) are credited with undertaking the key experiment on the problem. They were Vlail Kanachevy, Simon Shchurin, and Ludmilla Mikhailova. Their experiment, designed to establish photon communication between cells of living organisms, has been listed in the State Register of Discoveries by the Committee for Invention and Discoveries, which functioned under the USSR Council of Ministers. An English translation of their paper appeared in the JOURNAL OF PARAPHYSICS (Vol. 7, No. 2, 1973) as "Report from Novosibirsk: Communication between Cells." Their experiment indicated that cells could communicate illness, such as a virus infection, despite the fact the cells were physically separated.

The tests showed that when one group of cells was contaminated with a virus, the adjacent group - although separated by quartz glass - "caught the disease." When regular glass was used to separate the two cell groups, the non-contaminated cells remained healthy.

*

The experimenters linked their idea to the concept prominent in Soviet bioenergetics research: the existence of unknown communication channels in living cells for the transfer of information - "a language of waves and radiation," as Shchurin called it.

The medical researcher added these comments: "Why should information on all the processes of life be necessarily transmitted by chemical means, which are certainly not the most economical methods? After all, any chemical change is primarily an interaction of electrons, complicated formations that carry a reserve of energy. In colliding with a substance, they would either transfer this energy to it or radiate it in the form of photons, or light particles.

"Today there are no methods for studying the specific character of photon radiations, the constant normal radiation or normal cells. We decided to evade the ban imposed by physics by creating an artificial situation. We subjected cells taken from an organism to extreme effects to observe the character of radiations emitted by them, That the cell radiated photons was known. But perhaps the cell was able to perceive them, too? Our experiments provided the answers to this question."

*

The barrier of quartz glass permitted neither viruses nor chemical substances to travel between the two vessels inhabited by the cells. Yet, as Shchurin picturesquely put it, "the affected cells virtually cried out loud about the danger" when they were attacked by the virus, and "their cry freely penetrated the barrier of quartz glass which permitted ultra-violet waves to pass.

Something highly improbable happened. These waves were not only perceived by the neighboring cells, they also conveyed the sickness to the neighboring cells."

*

Although the No. 8 project was shut down and sections of it transferred to other cities, animal research in information transmission continued in Science City.

A Novosibirsk toxicologist, Dr. S. V. Speransky, discovered a form of telepathy between starving and normally nourished mice. He observed that impulses from hungry mice were transmitted in such a manner that the non-starving mice acted as if they, themselves, were famished.

The most complete account of the Speransky experiment appeared in PARAPSYCHOLOGY IN THE USSR (Part III), translated by Larissa Vilenskaya from the researcher's original manuscript.

*

As a toxicologist, Speransky's primary interest was the impact of poisons on living organisms; the mind-

to-mind reaction among the mice was encountered accidentally. Speransky's "upper mice" lived on in the fourth-floor laboratory, while the "lower mice" were kept in the basement.

In some experiments, the upper mice were starved, in others, they were nourished. Out of the thirty experiments, results in twenty-seven were positive: Non-starving mice responded to the suffering of their "friends," who were several stories removed; in only three cases were the results negative.

*

Refining his methodology, Speransky engaged in additional series of experiments, varying sex, weight and other variables.

He found that the "biological significance of the rapid increase in weight if mice which received signals about starvation from their `friends' is clear: a danger of starvation has to give them an additional stimulus to be sated."

In other words, telepathy-like signals warned the non-starving mice that food was short, so they increased food consumption and storage within their bodies.

*

Speransky drew this conclusion: "Undoubtedly, mentioning that the transmission of information occurred beyond ordinary channels of perception will remind the reader of such notions as telepathy, extrasensory perception, and `biological radio-communication.' It is possible to suppose that the transmission of information about starvation pertains to this type of phenomenon? We think so, but cannot strictly affirm it at present. It is only clear that the transmission of information about starvation in conditions of our experiments goes beyond ordinary forms of interaction of animals. Therefore, we propose to call it extraordinary transmission of information."

*

Actually, related phenomena had been recorded by Western researchers. Sir Alister Hardy, Professor Emeritus of Zoology and Comparative Anatomy at Oxford University, had considered the possibility that telepathic communication among animals might even affect evolution and adaptation.

In an essay on "Biology and ESP," Professor Hardy suggested that animal habits might be spread by "telepathic-like means," and that a "psychic pool of existence" might function among members of a species by some method "akin" to telepathy.

*

Speransky linked his findings about communication between mice to work done by Gulyaev with his auragram on humans, by Sergeev in human brain activity, and by Presman on the influence of electromagnetic fields upon living organism. A. S. Presman's work, notably his book **ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS AND LIFE** (New York, 1970), is internationally known.

*

One rare positive reference to parapsychology-related work to appear in (what was) an East German publication was printed in NEUE DEUTSCHLAND, the East Berlin daily published by the Socialist Unity Party, May 15, 1982.

In an article on "Man, Animals and Magnetism," Professor Hans Weiss and Dr. Jurgen Hellebrand discussed the question of whether a correlation between electromagnetic fields and life processes does, in fact, exist. They found that the views of physicists, chemists, and biologists vary greatly.

*

They cited Presman's work, notably his references to the apparent ability of snails and birds to orient themselves through the earth's magnetic field. The two authors denounced popular claims for magnetic healing devices as "clearly humbug," but stated that in such fields as food production further basic research "may permit developments leading to practical applications."

*

As a leading research center, Novosibirsk was a natural contact point for long-distance experiments in telepathy. The top Soviet scientist, Professor Ippolite Kogan, arranged a long-distance test from his Bio-Communication Laboratory in Moscow to the Novosibirsk laboratory.

Kogan reported on this experiment, in absentia, to a meeting at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1969. The test concentrated on the telepathic transmission of the identity of various objects, with Yuri Kamensky in Moscow trying to communicate the images to Karl Nikolayev in Novosibirsk. The methods used corresponded to other long-distance tests.

*

However, Kogan noted that the recipient in the Siberian city, "did not have an assortment of items before him," as was arranged later during the Moscow-Kersh tests, so he "could not give specific names for the object he saw telepathically.

Kogan said that the Novosibirsk recipient was limited to listing "the characteristics" of each item, which restricted statistical analysis of the experimental results to "an approximation."

*

In one such test, the transmitting telepath in the Soviet capital was asked by supervising scientists "to suggest an object they had chosen randomly." Six segments of test were used to transmit images of six different objects. Half of these tests gave positive results.

THE KGB TAKES CONTROL

During the Cold War it became a commonplace observation that the Committee for State Security (KOMITET GOSUNDARSTVENNOI BEZPASTNOSTI, or KGB for short) permeated Soviet society at all levels.

Its role in psi research was, clearly, a minor aspect of KGB activity.

The KGB's uneasy role in psi research illustrated that it was not, and could not have been, a monolithic agency. Its sometimes contradictory aims, as well as its enormous domestic and international scope and diversity, made total efficiency impossible.

*

Western analysts have concluded that the KGB took control of Soviet studies in parapsychology no later than 1970.

More precisely, the agency appears to have taken a serious interest in the field during this period, and its involvement after that became more active and consistent.

*

The KGB's alternately benign and hostile attitude toward psychic studies is well illustrated by the rise, fall, and resurrection of the bioenergetics laboratory attached to Moscow's A. S. Popov Scientific-Technical Society for Radio Engineering, Electronics and Communication (known as NTORES, the acronym of its Russian name).

The original initiative for the Popov lab came from members of its Bionics Section in 1965, who suggested a series of telepathy experiments under the label "biological communication."

*

The new section met on October 11, 1965, and developed a three-point program:

- (1) study and analysis of international literature on the subject;
- (2) a synthesis of spontaneous telepathic phenomena previously observed; and
- (3) a plan for laboratory-controlled telepathic experiments.

*

The resulting Laboratory for Bio-Information functioned on two levels, private and official. The core of the operation was a team of unpaid volunteers, who were permitted to work on premises leased by the Popov institute, and whose activity was "officially authorized."

The little band of parapsychology enthusiasts inside the Bio-Communication Laboratory was well aware that they operated under official scrutiny, that at least one KGB operative was a staff member and other regularly reported to the agency.

Much of their work was clearly visible, such as the long-distance telepathy experiments, but other studies were never published.

*

Among the unpublished studies was the work of Yuri Korabelnikov and Ludmilla Tishchenko-Korabelnikova, a husband-and-wife team who organized more than eight thousand clairvoyance tests. They placed different geometric designs of numbers inside opaque envelopes. According to the group's compilations, the two psychics were able to name about 70 percent of the images correctly, compared to 20 percent expected by probability.

*

In addition to the existence of rival "idealistic" and "materialistic" cliques, there was a continuous effort on the part of publicity-conscious Edward Naumov to push for more research in psychokinesis, while the laboratory's director, Professor Kogan, favored telepathy experiments. Barbara Ivanova, then employed as a government translator, engaged in a series of experiments that included remote-viewing and distant healing. Larissa Vilenskaya, impressed by the performances of Rosa Kuleshova, investigated dermo-optic vision and developed techniques for teaching this ability.

*

One of Ivanova's early students, Boris Ivanov, eventually denounced her as bringing an "idealist" taint to healing research. Ivanov himself specialized in "charging" water with "bio-energy," a technique that had long been examined by a Canadian researcher, Dr. Bernard Grad of McGill University, Montreal. After Ivanov left the Popov laboratory to continue his studies at the Institute of Molecular Genetics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a curtain of secrecy dropped over his work.

*

The KGB reorganized the Popov laboratory in 1978 along lines that favored military-oriented research. The new unit, under the direction of academician Yuri Kobzarev, was established after three years of soul-searching. Professor Kobzarev was considered by Moscow researchers as a sound scientist but, to the degree that this was possible within Soviet society, something of a "political innocent."

*

As such, he occupied the position of an academic figurehead for the new Laboratory for Bio-Electronics, while the day-to-day functions of the unit rested in the firm hands of his deputy, a KGB functionary who had been active within the old laboratory and was instrumental in its eventual dissolution.

*

Debates regarding "inhumane" projects often arose. Determined to avoid these, the authorities did not permit within the unit's secretariat, its council, or the laboratory team, the presence of anyone who might oppose "inhumane" projects.

*

To enforce this policy, a strict screening process was established, complete with "Rules for Admittance to Membership in the Central Public Laboratory for Bio-Electronics" (December 7, 1978).

The rules specified that all potential staff members had to be interviewed by the lab's directors, commit themselves in writing to adhere to the rules, file two passport-type portrait photographs, and submit a statement of three to four pages showing "familiarity with bio-electronic problems." The laboratory, in turn, established a file on each individual and issued an identity card.

*

Once admitted to the staff, members were forbidden to give lectures or publish papers "without the laboratory's prior permission." They were not permitted to "engage in any research concerning the structure, or the improved quality of biofields" outside the laboratory, without the prior permission of the Scientific-Technological Section.

*

In order to widen the geographic scope of bio-electronic research, Popov institutes in Leningrad, Kiev, Alma Ata, Kishinev, Taganrog, Minsk, and Tallin were urged to establish similar laboratories and engage psychics for experiments.

In addition to KGB guidance of the Bio-Electronics Laboratory, the military was well represented among its officers. The full extent and purpose of the military interests remains vague due to lack of documentation. The military presence, however, was known to be large.

*

Among eighteen members selected on October 31, 1978, two were senior scientists at the Soviet Ministry of Defense: Jan I. Koltunov and Nikolai A. Nosov; a third, Mikhail A. Sukhikh, was a Candidate of Military Sciences at the Ministry of Defense.

*

An appraisal of the KGB's role in Russian parapsychology must be acknowledge that the agency was an ever-present fact of Soviet life, rather than an omnisciently sinister force. Thus, when we observe that the KGB slowly tightened its hold on psi studies, it simply means that - with a lot of backing and filling - it started to take the psychic potential seriously, examined it more closely, and began to guide its use toward serious application.

*

Evidence for this interest can be found in diverse areas.

When émigré August Stern reported on the carefully guarded operations of a laboratory in Novosibirsk, he made two significant references to the KGB's role in the operation of this unit in particular and in psi studies in general.

He expressed the belief that two visitors who had inspected the Novosibirsk installations during its early days were KGB men, and stated that experiments in Leningrad and Novosibirsk were later reported to have been combined into one Moscow laboratory, operated under KGB auspices.

*

Stern understood in 1974 that all psi tests had been curtailed, except for the "secret KGB laboratory," but when he was told that something "important" and "very dangerous" had been discovered in the course of these laboratory experiments, Stern said, "I never believed it. How can the KGB do effective research? They need real scientists."

Speaking from the elitist viewpoint of a scientists, Stern may well have underestimated the results that can be achieved under police pressure, if not guidance.

*

One American researcher stated bluntly: "The KGB simply discovered or decided that parapsychology phenomena are real, that they work, that all theoretical wrangling be damned, and that the only thing that counts are results - and they just went ahead, full steam, to get more reliable results to suit their "specific aims."

*

The pattern that emerged of the KGB's rule in Soviet psi research was one of increasing secrecy about actual research with the USSR, accompanied by fluctuating tolerance of encouragement of the exposure of peripheral, irrelevant, or even inaccurate information concerning Soviet studies.

Three stages in this process can be identified; they were influenced by the role and policies of Yuri A. Andropov, who held the post of KGB chairman from 1967 to 1982. On November 12, 1982, Andropov was named General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the country's top position, succeeding Brezhnev, who died a few days before.

*

The "golden age" of Soviet psi research, the first stage of its contemporary development, lasted through most of the 1960s.

It began with Professor Vasiliev's spirited advocacy of the research he had long proposed; it became

obscured after Andropov took control of the KGB, which intruded more firmly into scientific activities, including the monitoring, supervision, and actual conducting of experiments.

*

From mid-1968 on, and quite noticeable by 1970, contact between Soviet psi researchers and their colleagues abroad began to dry up. By 1975, the Laboratory for Bio-Communication was disbanded. Publication of findings by such authorities as Professor Kogan ceased, while rumors concerning secret KGB-operated laboratories circulated.

This was a period of transition, with new plans made, blueprints prepared, staff tentatively selected, some projects at least publicly abandoned, and other pursued in an exploratory, probing, and even confused manner.

*

The KGB's influence on scientific research generally had been uneven. While it had the task of assuring maximum ideological and political loyalty among scientists, it had to also encourage optimum productivity.

This called for a relatively open exchange of information, including a monitoring of scientific developments abroad. But the sheer volume of data in science and technology available openly - at meetings, in journals and books - in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan during any given day must have severely taxed the transmission and translation facilities available to Soviet science.

*

Even so, the skilled manpower needed to evaluate, analyze, and apply such data was limited. Soviet scholars found KGB censorship of incoming mail uneven and heavy-handed; publications were often simply stolen in transit and sold on a specialized black market.

*

Soviet science, arts, and literature experienced a "thaw" of several years during the regime of Nikita Khrushchev. When direction of the KGB was taken over by Andropov, controls over Soviet society were tightened; flexibility, unpredictability, and changes in policies thereafter characterized the agency's operations.

*

In 1975, foreign observers detected a distinct tightening-up of KGB and Communist Party control over the academy.

The weekly magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORTS (March 1, 1967) described this development as "one of the most important Soviet internal changes since World War II."

The magazine quoted one analyst as saying "It is right up there with Stalin's death and the reversal of Khrushchev's reforms, because it destroys the only important island of independence left in the country."

CENTERS OF USSR PSI STUDIES

The limited information and massive disinformation available regarding the KGB takeover of Soviet psi research did not in itself contribute to an in-depth analysis of the Soviet psi research machine, especially when its large size was considered, along with the known extent of its multidisciplinary activities. For example, through privileged sources available to me, I was able to confirm by 1983, that the arms and functions of the machine were so extensive as to include all of the following twenty-nine research centers.

A. S. Popov All-Union Scientific and Technical Society of Radio Technology and Electrical Engineering, Moscow; Laboratory of Bio-Information, 1965-1975; Laboratory of Bio-Energetics, established 1978.

Scientific Research Institute of General and Educational Psychology, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, Moscow.

Baumann Institute of Advanced Technology, Moscow; Laboratory of Dr. Wagner.

Institute of Energetics, Moscow; Laboratory of Dr. Sokolov.

Moscow State University; Laboratory of Prof. Kholodov.

State Instrument of Engineering College, Department of Physics, Moscow.

Moscow Institute of Aviation.

I. V. Pavlov Institute, Moscow.

Institute of Reflexology, Moscow.

Moscow University, Department of Theoretical Physics.

Department of Geology, Moscow State University.

Interdepartmental Commission for Coordination of Study on the Biophysical Effect, Moscow (dowsing research).

Adjunct Laboratory of Medical and Biological Problems, Moscow.

University of Leningrad, Laboratory on the Physiology of Labor; Department of Physiology, Laboratory

of Biological Cybernetics.

A. A. Uktomskii Physiological Institute, Leningrad.

Leningrad Polytechnic Institute, Department of Cybernetics.

University of Leningrad, Bekhterev Brain Institute.

Research Institute of Psychology, Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences.

Institute of Problems of Information Transmission of the USSR Academy of Science, Moscow.

Pulkovo Observatory, Leningrad.

Filatov Institute, Laboratory of the Physiology of Vision, Odessa.

Scientific-Industrial Unit "Quantum," Krasnodar.

State University of Georgia, Tbilisi (Tiflis).

Kazakhstan State University, Alma Ata, Kazakhstan.

Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukrainian SSR, Kiev.

Institute of Clinical Physiology, Kiev.

Scientific Research Institute of Biophysics, Department of Cybernetics, Puschino.

Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology, Kharkov.

Institute of Automation and Electricity, Special Department No. 8, Siberian Academy of Science (1965-1969), Novosibirsk.

Institute of Clinical and Experimental Medicine, Novosibirsk.

THREE MAJOR DIRECTIONS WITHIN THE SOVIET RESEARCH MACHINE

Although the full extent of the discoveries and details of the Soviet research have remained shrouded in deep secrecy before and after the end of the Cold War, it has been possible to identify three major directions - **CODE BY TELEPATHY; BOOSTING THE HUMAN BRAIN; and AMPLIFIED MIND POWER.** These early alarmed American analysts, and partially account for the American responses.

CODE BY TELEPATHY

The most spectacular experiments undertaken by the Moscow Laboratory of Bio-Information used the Soviet Union's star telepathists -Yuri Kamensky, a biophysicist, and Karl Nikolayev, an actor. The two men first discovered each other's capabilities in thought transference when they met socially. Even before the Popov research group arranged formal tests, their skills attracted a mixture of curiosity, awe, and doubt in Moscow society.

*

The first long-distance experiment took place in 1966, with Kamensky staying in Moscow, acting as sender of the telepathic signals, while Nikolayev served as receiver in Novosibirsk, the science research center in western Siberia. The Moscow daily KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (July 9, 1966) reported that the experiment consisted of two types.

*

The first, modeled after tests pioneered in the United States by Dr. J. B. Rhine at the Parapsychology Laboratory of Duke University, employed a deck of cards made up of five different geometric symbols: cross, circle, star, wavy lines, and square.

The newspaper account did not provide details on the experiment's design, nor did it publish specific results.

It concluded, however, that "the number of correct identifications of symbols was higher than correct random identifications, as computed according to the theory of probability."

The report said, "The reception of other symbols was disturbed by considerable associative interference," a condition that would be "reduced in the future."

*

The second experiment aimed at the transfer of images of concrete objects. The paper reported that Nikolayev, in Novosibirsk, "received quite clearly" the images of dumbbells and of a screwdriver sent from Moscow by Kamensky.

The Moscow paper commented: "It is quite possible that these results will equally disappoint the most ardent adherents of telepathy and its opponents.

The former, because no miracle occurred, because there were no perfect identifications.

The latter, because the experiment demonstrated the reality of the phenomenon and produced valuable data, both positive and negative, which pointed up the need for continued research."

*

A follow-up experiment, this time between Moscow and Leningrad, took place a year later. It was designed to harness the emotional content of crisis telepathy into a code transmission.

The Popov group set out to design an experiment that would (a) be suited to the skills of its telepathists,

(b) utilize emotional elements, and (c) achieve specific information transmission.

*

The problem faced by the Moscow experimenters is a basic one in efforts to use psychic powers for practical purposes. In designing the Moscow-Leningrad experiment, they had to come up with an answer to the question: "How do you tame a telepathic flash; how do you transform a split-second impression into a meaningful message?"

*

The answer was provided by Dr. Genady Sergeyev, then a staff member of the A. A. Uktomskii Physiological Institute in Leningrad and senior experimenter with Nina Kulagina. Sergeyev, who had been a World War II radio operator stationed in the Baltic region, decided that a short outburst of emotion might have sufficient impact to form the Morse Code equivalent of a letter of the alphabet.

*

The experimental design called for a message of aggressive emotion lasting fifteen or thirty seconds to act as the equivalent of a dot in Morse Code, while a message of forty-five seconds was to be the equivalent of a dash. To generate sufficient violence, Kamensky was instructed to imagine that he was giving Mikolayev a severe beating, lasting wither the short of the long period.

*

The experiment did not assume that Nikolayev would experience the "code beating" consciously or intellectually. Rather, it was designed to be registered by his brain and/or cardiovascular system. To measure these effects of the telepathic transmission, Nikolayev sat alone in a soundproof test chamber in Leningrad University's physiology laboratory. His heart action was monitored by an electrocardiograph, while his brain function was recorded by an electroencephalograph.

BOOSTING THE HUMAN BRAIN

The work of Professor Ippolite M. Kogan, who directed the Bio-Communication Laboratory of the Popov Institute in Moscow until 1975, has disappeared into a fog of silence. But either Kogan or his successors may well have continued this work, The AiResearch Manufacturing Company, in its January 14, 1976 report to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, suggested that "further theoretic and experimental developments along the lines outlined by

Kogan are continuing in the Soviet Union."

The report added: "Kogan posed to many interesting and challenging questions for himself and his colleagues not to have delved into them further. Based on the well-known predilection of Soviet physicists to solve difficult and challenging problems, and their excellent training in modern physics, the possibility that a team of Soviet physicists is at work to systematically uncover and learn the physical mechanisms of parapsychological events is highly probable."

*

The California research group used the term Novel Biophysical Information Transfer (NBIT) to label the telepathic aspects of psi when it stated "Had Kogan not presented such a clear and sound proposal six years ago, one might have wondered if Soviet physicists have any interest at all in novel biophysical information transfer (NBIT) mechanisms. Clearly, if one could find out where Kogan is working and what he is doing, this question would be answered."

*

But Kogan had not been heard from since his Moscow Bio-Information Laboratory was closed down in 1975, and he was not a member of the staff of the laboratory that replaced it three years later.

Kogan's background in the theory and practice of radio-electronics, together with his dramatic tests in long-distance telepathy, made his research particularly significant to studies in the transmission in Very Low Frequency (VLF) and Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) radio waves.

These research areas were of specific interest to shore-to-submarine communications. The AiResearch study made the following points:

"Assuming that the USSR started a special NBIT program sometime in 1970, by now they could have developed some sensitive instruments to detect, monitor and analyze VLF and ELF radiations for possible instrument content, as Kogan suggested should be done.

"Also, they must have been instrumental in developing sensors to monitor fluctuations in the human body's electric and magnetic fields, and they may have a team of scientists studying the properties of bio-organic molecules and their response to electromagnetic ELF/VLF radiation."

*

The report suggested that Soviet researchers were using electronic means for boosting telepathic communications. "The Russians may now be implementing the next logical step," it said, "namely to reinforce, enhance or aid NBIT in certain trained or gifted individuals after having discovered the basic communication carriers."

How could such enhanced telepathic or clairvoyant ability be utilized?

The most dramatic means possible, despite its science fiction connotations, is tuning in on people's minds.

*

Less precisely focused monitoring was well under way. The Soviet Union operated an elaborated an elaborate eavesdropping network, with several monitoring stations on the eastern seaboard of the United States, to record radio-telephone conversations among U.S. government agencies, private corporations, and individuals.

The monitoring of more intimate communications, even "thought reading," can be seen as an extrapolation from these undertakings - particularly if it can extend to the mind-reasoning of prominent decision-making officials.

*

It may be taken for granted that Moscow was interested, on a continuous basis, in monitoring extremely low frequency communications between U.S. navel command posts and submarines at sea, then in an experimental state. Tuning in on the mind processes and decisions of individuals, on ELF/VLF wavelengths, could have been hardly less tempting.

The AiResearch report noted: "If experiments which generate special ELF/VLF waves are being conducted, it may will travel across the world."

It added that these frequencies may be "undetectable by the usual relatively broadband frequency detectors," and commented: "It is rational to assume that the Soviets pursue the investigation of various physical methods that might serve novel biophysical information transmission mechanisms. Whether or not ELF/VLF mechanisms explain parapsychological events may be a moot question, if these mechanisms can be utilized for human information transfer."

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In other words: If it works, who cares what you call it?

*

To discover the "carrier mechanism" of this capacity, the AiResearch team undertook what it called "a short speculative study" and decided that three methods were "compatible with current modern physics." These included:

- (1) Very Low Frequency (VLF) and Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) electromagnetic waves;
- (2) Neutrinos, based on the photon theory of neutrinos;
- (3) Quantum-mechanical ***** (UI - I think the sign is alpha???) waves, based on schizo-physical interpretation of basic QM [Quantum Mechanics] theory.

The report said that experiments in the United States and the Soviet Union in this field point to the ELF/VLF mechanisms, but "the other two possibilities cannot be ruled out."

*

Whether one uses such terms as NBIT, bio-communication, or the handy word telepathy, there is an

awesome fascination in the prospect that a single mind may be monitored, or thought transference between two people intercepted, on an extremely low frequency receiver.

Medical electronics have perfected apparatus that come close to the frontier of such uses.

*

For years, Russian neurologists and psychologist had treated the human mind as little more than a complex electro-chemical apparatus. As such, they felt, it could function as the "recipient" of information or as an "inducer" of energies.

With skill, these faculties might be manipulated: made more sensitive, more powerful, more responsive to outside influence.

*

In his book entitled THOUGHT TRANSFERENCE, Kazhinsky had concluded that the human nervous system incorporates the elements of its own historic evolution.

He wrote: "Like all other parts of the living organism, nerve elements and nerve circuits perform adaptive and protective functions; that is, they adapt the organism to the influence of the environment, as well as to the influences of environmental factors.

"They have undergone changes and improvements for many thousands of years. Nature took care to equip all living matter with highly delicate nerve structures that have resulted in great improvement of all vital functions. Electromagnetic transmission of mental information over a distance is a vital function of the nervous system.

"This leads to a logically justified idea: the human central nervous system (including the brain) is a repository of highly sophisticated instruments of biological radio communication, in construction far superior to the latest instruments of technical radio communication.

"There may exist `living' instruments of technical biological communication still unknown to contemporary radio engineering. A thorough and original laboratory study of such `living' instruments may help us raise radio communication to an unprecedentedly high level, placing entirely new and vastly improved radio facilities at its disposal."

*

Kazhinsky disagreed with those who regarded the telepathic ability as a remnant from man's earlier stages of evolution.

Instead, he maintained that "the phenomenal capacity of a person to exert a mental influence over others from a distance is still in an embryonic stage."

He added: "Those who believe that this brain capacity is moribund, degenerating, etc., are wrong. On the contrary, it is the beginning of a new and higher stage of development of the human mind, on a new and firmer foundation, based on biological radio communication. This hypothesis is confirmed by a simple law of nature: the more a capacity is exercised, the keener it will become and the greater man's power over nature will be."

*

Kazhinsky's concepts were, in several ways, a prototype of some Soviet thinking in this field. He notes the "insignificantly low energy emitted by the brain of the `biological radio transmitter' in the transference of sensations and experiences over distance." He urged that efforts be made to develop instruments that can duplicate the `remarkably delicate and perfect natural instrument" that the brain represents in functioning as such a transmitter. Kazhinsky bolsters his arguments with a quotation from V. I. Lenin, "Sensation is the resulting effect of matter on our sensory organs." (MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM, Moscow, 1953).

*

By 1961, Vasiliev's psychiatric colleague, Professor K.I. Platonov, was able to address a Kharkov meeting on telepathy and recall experiments he had conducted in 1924 at the All-Russian Congress of Psychoneurologists, Psychologists and Teachers in Leningrad. Vasiliev, who was present during the original Congress, published Platonov's account in his book. During a meeting of the Congress's hypnological Section, a female subject, M., sat at the presidential table, facing the audience, while Platonov stood behind a blackboard that hid him from M., although he could be seen by the audience.

*

Platonov had told the audience earlier that, when he silently covered his face with his hands, he would try to put the subject to sleep hypnotically. His report continued: "Having covered my face I formed a mental image of the subject M. falling asleep while talking to Prof. G. [who sat next to her on the dais]. I strenuously concentrated my attention on this for about one minute. The result was perfect: M. fell asleep within a few seconds. Awakening was effected in the same way. This was repeated several times."

*

Platonov's observations included the finding that, when he gave the subject the actual mental suggestion of saying "Go to sleep" or just "Sleep!" he didn't get any results. But when he wanted to conclude the experiment - he had positive results. He noted that the subject woke up suddenly, "within a few seconds after I had started mentally visualizing her awakening." Platonov emphasized that the subject was "entirely unaware of the nature of the experiment."

*

Platonov said that his tests should prompt scientists to take these phenomena "extremely seriously."

He concluded that his findings give researchers "the right to search for means of finding a scientific, materialistic grounding, not only for the phenomena of telepathically inducing sleep, but for many other telepathic phenomena as well.

*

The crucial question was whether hypnosis/telepathy could influence men or women who were unaware of being targets.

Many cases had been reported, similar to Platonov's mental influence on the subject M., which seem to prove that the subject can be hypnotized while unaware of the experiments.

It is likely that the pioneer work done by Soviet scientists in this field has led to more intensive and wider studies.

*

Soviet long-distance telepathy experiments are a matter of record; we may assume that the "reinforcement" or "mind amplification" by hypnosis or drugs, of telepathic senders (inducers) and receivers had been attempted in all types of telepathy tests.

WASHINGTON'S DILEMMA

By 1969, the growing evidence that the Soviets were undertaking research into amplified mind power techniques led to the American dilemma of how to respond to the "psi situation."

The American science community was not predisposed to undertaking a significant step toward "psychic research," and many government and intelligence leaders feared ridicule.

*

But at the very least it had to be determined if there was any "potential threat" to American security if the Soviets had developed an array of amplified mind power techniques.

*

After what may have been a lot of soul searching, the CIA responded in 1973 by funding a classified exploratory project at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) placing it under the guidance of a physicist, Dr. H. E. Putoff.

For years, the CIA involvement remained vague. But in 1996, Puthoff published a report entitled CIA-INITIATED REMOTE VIEWING PROGRAM AT STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE (JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION Vol. 10, No. 1. pp 63-76, 1996.) [NOTE: this document can be found in Section IV of this site.]

*

Up until 1973, it was commonly understood that the American intelligence community had taken no interest in psychic research or ESP. But in 1981, the following document suggesting otherwise was declassified and released.

OUTLINE OF 1952 CIA PROJECT ON ESP

The following text, released by the Central Intelligence Agency under the Freedom of Information Act, deals with a twofold project designed to examine the potential use of extrasensory perception for "practical problems of intelligence."

The author of the memorandum outlined a project of at least three years in length and estimated the cost for its first year. The project was envisioned as aiming at reliability and repeatability among "exceptionally gifted individuals" and at the utilization of "scattered" ESP results through "statistical concentration."

Names, telephone numbers, and other items that might permit the identification of individuals or departments were deleted by the CIA at the time the document was released in 1981, and such deletions are noted in the text.

There are no indications whether the project was actually undertaken, nor is it clear whether the text is an interoffice memorandum between two agency officials or was addressed to a CIA official by a researcher working under a contract or grant outside the agency.

The memorandum is dated January 7, 1952, and its full text follows without quotes:

If, as now appears to us established beyond questions, there is in some persons a certain amount of capacity for extrasensory perception (ESP), this fact, and consequent developments leading from it, should have significance for professional intelligence service. Research on the problems of extrasensory perception (ESP), this fact, and consequent developments leading from it, should have significance for professional intelligence service. Research on the problems of extrasensory perception has been in the hands of a few very workers and has not been directed to the purpose here in mind, or to any practical application whatever. However, having established certain basic facts, now, after long and patient efforts and more resistance than assistance, it now appears that we are ready to consider practical application as a research problem in itself.

There are two main lines of research that hold specific promise and need further development with a view to application to the intelligence project. These two are by no means all that could be done to contribute to that end; rather, everything that adds anything to our understanding of what is taking place in ESP, is likely to give us advantage in the problems of use and control. Therefore, the Rockefeller-financed project of finding the personality correlates of ESP and the excursions into the question of ESP in animals, recently begun, as well as several major lines of inquiry, are all to the good.

The two special projects on investigation that ought to be pushed in the interest of the project under discussion are, first, the search for and development of exceptionally gifted individuals who can

approximate perfect success in ESP test performance, and, second, in the statistical concentration of scattered ESP performance, so as to enable an ultimately perfect reliability and application.

We have something definite to go on in each case, and it is with this in mind that we are inclined to make a serious effort to push the research in the direction of reliable application to the practical problem of intelligence.

First, a word about the "special subject": On a number of occasions, through the years, several different scientific investigators have, under conditions of excellent control, obtained strikingly long runs of unbroken success from subjects in ESP tests. The conditions allowed no alternative. At least one of them occurred with the target cards and experimenter in one building and the subject several hundred yards away in another.

Due to the elusive, unconscious nature of ESP ability, these same subjects could not reliably repeat, and during the years of investigation under the conditions of extreme limitations with which the work has had to be done, it has not been possible to solve the problem of overcoming this difficulty and bringing the capacity under reliable control. We have recently learned of two persons definitely reported to be able to keep up their rate of almost unbroken success over much longer stretches of time. These investigations have been going on in scientific laboratories, and from reports in our hands we have no reason to question their reliability. We have not been able to bring the subjects here or extend our investigation to the laboratories concerned. It looks, however, as if in these two cases the problem of getting and maintaining control over the ESP function has been solved. If it has, the rest of the way to practical application seems to us a matter of engineering with no insuperable difficulties. Even if there is anything wrong with one or both of these cases, this more extended control must come eventually, we think, and we have had in mind many lines of research, designed to try to bring it [about].

I shall not enlarge on the practical and technological developments that would be followed in bringing a capacity, such as that demonstrated in these card tests, of getting information in a practical situation. It will be seen that if a subject under control test conditions can identify the order of a deck of cards, several hundred yards away in another building, or can "identify" the thought of another person several hundred miles away, the adaptation to the practical requirements for obtaining secret information should not give serious difficulty.

The other practice on which research should be concentrated, we believe, is that of developing ways of using small percentages of success in such a way that reliable judgment can be made. While we are still exploring the advantages of this instrument of application, we have gone far enough to see how it is entirely possible and practical to use a small percentage of success, above that expected by chance alone, so as to concentrate the slight significance attaching to a given trial to the point where reliance can be placed upon the final application to the problem in hand. I believe you went into this matter thoroughly enough with [name of individual or unit deleted] that I will not need to review her the actual devices and procedures by which this concentration of reliability is brought about.

If we were to undertake to push this research as far and as fast as we can reasonably well do in the direction of practical application to the problems of intelligence, it would be necessary to be exceedingly careful about thorough cloaking of the undertaking. I should not want anyone here in the [word or words deleted], except [two names apparently deleted] and myself to know about it. We are all three cleared for security purposes to the level of "Secret." I would perhaps feel bound to have confidential discussion on the matter with [name or names apparently deleted]. Funds necessary for the support of the work would understandably carry no identification and raise no questions.

If there is no reason why there could not be, at any time it was justified, a renegotiation of additional needs that might arise that cannot be anticipated at this stage, I should prefer to proceed with some restraint in estimating what such a project would involve in the matter of funds. I shall estimate a research team of five persons working on this project primarily. There will be no careful line drawn. Three will be a great deal of exchange and, of course, no designation in the [several words deleted] a separate unit. For our purposes at the moment, however, the [deleted] can consider that such a test might consist of [names apparently deleted], a well-qualified statistician and two research workers qualified not only to handle groups of subjects but assist in the evaluative procedures as well. The total salary estimate for these five people would be between \$22,500 and \$25,000. In order to take advantage of mechanical aid in the statistical work and such other matters as traveling expenses, it would be advisable to add \$5,000 as a conservative estimate. I think \$30,000 would be well spent on the first year. It is almost anyone's guess as to what the next year would lead us into, but it would almost certainly be more and probably a great deal more. I doubt if it would be profitable to try to fix it at this time.

Frustrated as we have been by having to deal in short-term projects and the wastefulness of effort that accompanies the attempt to do long-term research projects on that basis, I am about ready to say that without pretty definite assurance of at least a three-year program I should not want to try to assemble the personnel, design and research program and put the overall effort into what is really a major undertaking like this.

Much as I feel the urgency of having our country have as much a lead as possible in this matter, I do not think it is advisable to undertake it unless there is a certain amount of confidence on both sides of the agreement, and these short-term grants-in-aid are, after all, usually measures of limited confidence. I might add that, while the Russians have both officially and through their leading psychologists disapproved of our kind of work, as they would have to do because of the philosophy of Marxian materialism, I have seen at least one reference to the fact that they have done experiments on our lines, giving a materialist interpretation. If you can give me any information on this, I would appreciate it. Sometime we might discuss what the Nazis undertook to do ...

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE, 1981

Between 1969 and 1981, classified documentation regarding the Soviet psi research efforts had become abundant - but never released into the public, which remained ignorant of the "threat situation." Congressional leaders, however, were provided copies and extracts of the most sensitive documents. The result was that in June 1981, the Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives issued a staff report that called for "a serious assessment" of parapsychology research in the United States.

*

The report took note of "the potentially powerful and far-reaching implications of knowledge in this field" and observed that the Soviet Union "is widely acknowledged to be supporting such research at a far higher and more official level" than is the case in the United States.

*

The report submitted the following questions "for congressional consideration": "Is funding for such research adequate? What is the credibility of such research in the sciences, humanities, and religions? How does the public perceive the credibility of research in this field from both a subjective and objective point of view? What should the Federal role in such research be and what agencies are or should be involved in such research?"

*

These suggestions and questions were part of a comprehensive SURVEY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES, PRESENT AND FUTURE, commissioned by the committee.

*

In a section on "Research on the Physics of Consciousness (Parapsychology)," it defined the issue this way:

"Recent experiments in remote-viewing and other studies of parapsychology suggest that there exists an 'interconnectiveness' of the human mind with other minds and with matter. This interconnectiveness would appear to be functional in nature and amplified by intent and emotion."

*

The report noted the history of studies in parapsychology generally, and in telepathy and psychokinesis specifically, and said: "Attempts in history to obtain insights into the ability of the human mind to function in as-yet misunderstood ways goes back thousands of years. Only recently, serious and scientifically based attempts have been made to understand and measure the functional nature of mind-mind and mind-matter interconnectiveness.

"Experiments on mind-mind interconnectiveness have yielded some encouraging results. Experiments in mind-matter interconnectiveness (psychokinesis) have yielded less compelling and more enigmatic results. The implications of these experiments is that the human mind may be able to obtain information independent of geography and time."

*

The report acknowledged there could be "no certainty as to what results will emerge from basic and exploratory research" now underway, so that its potential importance and "its implications for the United States and the world at large can only be speculated upon." It then listed several categories on which parapsychological studies might have an impact.

*

One of these categories had to do with national defense.

"In the area of national defense, there are obvious implications of one's ability to identify distant sites and affect sensitive instruments of other humans. A general recognition of the degree of interconnectiveness of mind could have far-reaching social and political implications for this Nation and the world."

*

The congressional report noted that studies in parapsychology had "received relatively low funding." It attributed this to the fact that "credibility and potential yield of such research is widely questioned, although less today than ever before."

It added: "Thus far, the quality of research that even the strongest proponent of such research believe is necessary has been lacking due in part to low funding."

*

Such cautious, obviously well informed appraisal of parapsychology on the part of a congressional body was unprecedented. Until then, Congress as a whole had not taken cognizance of ESP potentials in peace or war.

*

Only one of its members, Representative Charles Rose, Democrat of North Carolina and a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, had shown long-range interest in psychic studies generally and their warfare potentials in particular.

*

Agencies of the Federal government sporadically encouraged ESP research. But, given the ubiquitous nature of government concerns, such efforts often seemed no more than an expression of personal interests, the cautious involvement of "closet parapsychologists" at various levels in one or another agency.

Individuals and groups that might want to follow the ideas expressed by the staff report on science and technology were likely to be held back by fear of ridicule, wither from within Congress or in the Media.

*

As columnist Jack Anderson had phrased it, the Central Intelligence Agency had its "mouth watering" when it looked into Soviet research on remote-viewing.

Anderson wrote on March 20, 1981: "Who'd need a mole in the Kremlin is a psychic sitting at a desk in Washington could zoom-in mentally on a super-secret Soviet missile site or a Politburo meeting?"

*

One of Anderson's researchers, Ron McRae, was alerted to what he interpreted as serious armed forces interest in the psychic when he read Lt. Col. Alexander's article in *MILITARY REVIEW*, late in 1980. McRae told another Washington writer, Randy Fitzgerald, the article had convinced him "there were people in the Pentagon who were really taking it seriously."

Anderson-McRae erroneously claimed that a psychic task force, budgeted at \$6 million per year, had been established in the Pentagon "basement," and that the National Security Agency was examining the use of extrasensory perception in its code-breaking work.

*

Anderson's flippant terminology seemed designed to ridicule his findings or allegations. He wrote of "wacky projects" that covered "ESP weapons that can brainwash or incapacitate enemy leaders by thought transfer, deliver nuclear bombs instantaneously thousands of miles away by psychic energy, or even create a protective 'time warp' to make incoming Soviet missiles explode harmlessly in the past."

He added: "The CIA, though historically less alarmist about the Red Menace than the Pentagon spooks are, also has been monitoring Soviet ESP research and pondering the possibility of less bizarre psychic weapons."

*

While the 1952 ESP project mentioned earlier may never have been undertaken, it seems certain that the Central Intelligence Agency did engage in psychic experiments.

One source of information on this subject is ex-CIA employee Victor Marchetti, who wrote several books based on his fourteen years with the agency.

*

Marchetti, who tended to be critical of the CIA's activities, has said that it once sought to establish mediumistic communication with the spirits of agents who had died.

He recalled that the agency's "scientific spooks" were "progressing into parapsychology, experimenting with mediums in efforts to contact dead agents, with psychics in attempts to divine the intentions of the Kremlin leadership and even with stranger phenomena."

*

Marchetti asserted that the CIA had tried to make contact, through a medium, with Oleg Penkovsky, a colonel in the Soviet Army who had been one of its most valuable contacts during his lifetime. On May 11, 1963, Penkovsky appeared before the Soviet Supreme Court in Moscow, where he was declared guilty of treason and sentenced to be shot to death. As a colonel in the military intelligence

branch of the Soviet Army, he had been assigned to artillery in a "civilian capacity." Penkovsky was a member of the Soviet State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research Activities, with responsibilities in domestic and international technological liaison and development. Penkovsky had been an agent for Western intelligence agencies, presumably British services as well as the CIA.

*

There is a simple kind of logic in trying to keep in touch with such a valuable agent, even after death. It is speculative, of course, whether such contact can actually be established, whether spirit communication can be specific and reliable, could be checked against information from other sources, or merely used to fill gaps in existing data.

*

It may be regarded as imaginative rather than foolish to have tried to reach someone like Penkovsky through a medium (or several mediums, cross-checking any resulting information for correlations and deviations). But the number of qualified mediums is limited; it would be difficult to keep such an assignment secret, even if the mediums concerned did not know whom they were expected to contact.

*

Marchetti said that, after Penkovsky had been executed, someone in the CIA had suggested: "Why don't we contact him?" and that this suggestion had led to the agency's becoming "involved with mediums." He said, "They began to contact our own dead agents, as well as dead agents from the other side."

*

If the project expanded beyond an attempt to get in touch with the spirit of Penkovsky, it may be assumed that at least some of the mediumistic messages had been satisfactory or at least promising to CIA staff members. "There is no indication that they have stopped," Marchetti said, "and no reason why they would." At any rate, Marchetti's recollections suggest that the CIA had been alert to psychic potentials, no matter how unproved, in the service of intelligence-gathering.

WERE THE CIA EFFORTS JUSTIFIED?

The CIA was certainly justified in keeping an eye on Soviet studies. References have earlier been made to a report on Soviet parapsychology commissioned by the Central Agency from the AiResearch Manufacturing Company of Torrance, California.

The research group's experts suggested that, in view of Soviet studies, the U.S. government should initiate developments in what it called Novel Biophysical Information Transfer Mechanisms (NBIT) that "are functional," although "they may have no relationship to common parapsychological phenomena."

*

The report (January 14, 1976) advised that such studies should be interdisciplinary, as this type of research "crosses so many widely different scientific disciplines."

The report noted that on Soviet researcher Professor Gennady Sergeyev of Leningrad, appeared to have perfected a mechanism capable of measuring human brain function from a distance of five meters. The report observed that Sergeyev's instrument was classified and that "no credible description of it is available - only allusions to its existence."

*

The AiResearch report traced reference to the Sergeyev device in Russian scientific literature, while noting that "there is reason to doubt the Russian claim."

It speculated that "it is possible that a sensitive electric or magnetic sensor, or some combination of the two, would detect electrical signals from a human body at a distance of five meters.

"Although it is unlikely that the output of such an instrument would be a direct measure of the EEG, it would provide information of interest to a police interrogator, such as the strength and rate of the heartbeat, the tensing and relaxation of muscles, the depth and rate of breathing, and perhaps the electrical properties of the skin. The uses to which the instrument would be put are reasons enough for official secrecy about its operating principles."

*

The report noted Sergeyev's professional competence, concluded its analysis with the assumption that Sergeyev's remote sensor "does exist: in some form, and examined the possible development of remote sensors by Soviet researchers, "following the indicated lines of investigation."

Where, the report asked, could Sergeyev's findings lead? It made this cautious forecast: "Perhaps the Russians have, in fact, developed such instruments; perhaps they are going to do so. Perhaps they have tried and have not been successful.

Possible sensor developments discussed in the following paragraphs are not meant to be exhaustive; rather, they are speculative and offered as examples of what may or might be:

"A tuneable antenna for detecting low-frequency, very-low-frequency, or extremely-low-frequency electromagnetic radiation could be used. The Russians believe both in mental telepathy and in a prosaic physical mechanism for it. The most probable mechanism is electromagnetic radiation.

"A tuneable antenna could be used in two types of experiments: trying to detect the radiation from the telepathic agent and trying to generate radiation of the right frequency to interfere with telepathic receptions.

"A neutrino detector may be used. Both the Russian Je. Parnov (NAUKA I RELIGIA, No. 3, pp. 44 to

49, 1966) and the American Martin Ruderfer (NEUTRINO THEORY OF EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION, in ABSTRACTS: 1st INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF PSYCHOTRONICS, Vol. 2, Prague, pp. 9 to 13, June 1973) have suggested neutrinos as the means of transmitting thought from one mind to another.

*

One of the collaborators of the present study, J. Eerkens, had a plausible hypothesis about the production and detection of neutrinos that could be experimentally tested by relatively modest expenditures for equipment and labor.

"A magnetic field or field gradient detector could be used. The Russians and other Eastern Europeans are greatly interested in dowsing, or finding ground water. A currently popular theory of dowsing is that the human body is sensitive to small changes (temporal and spatial) in the magnetic field of the earth, such as might be produced by water near the surface of the ground. If the human body can generate as well as sense magnetic fields, such a human magnetism might be the basis of some form of thought transference or psychokinesis."

*

In conclusion, the AiResearch study suggested five areas of research as "the most fruitful lines of investigation," as follows:

1. THE PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF AWARENESS OF NBIT

This area includes such questions as what are the modes of awareness that facilitate NBIT? How to select and train individuals for high resolution and reliable performance? Which of the possible transmission mechanisms can humans utilize for NBIT?

2. TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS

This area includes such questions as what are possible NBIT transmission mechanisms? How is information transmitted from the source to the recipient?

3. THE PHYSIOLOGY AND BIOCHEMISTRY OF HUMAN TRANSDUCER MECHANISMS

In this area, research would be conducted on physiology and biochemistry of reception and receptor mechanism.

4. STATISTICAL DEVELOPMENT

This area includes nonstationary analysis of random data, deviation from normally distributed data, and new developments in communication and information theory with respect to noisy channels.

5. DEVELOPMENT OF NON-CONTACT PHYSIOLOGY SENSORS

This area includes development of MEG, thermography, low- frequency electric field monitors, and other sensors.

Translated from its technical terminology, the report suggested to the CIA, or other U.S. government agencies, that the conditions under which telepathy and related capacities operate should be more fully explored.

Such a study would, of course, be designed to harness, control, boost, and direct telepathic and other psi abilities.

*

Among Washington's superstitious fears was concern over scathing criticism dispensed by Senator William Proxmire, Democrat from Wisconsin.

The monthly DISCOVER (February 1982), which was consistently skeptical of parapsychological claims, spoke of him as "one of the capital's most visible and colorful politicians, and certainly one of the wittiest."

It wrote: "An energetic foe of government waste and boondoggles, Proxmire is perhaps best known for his Golden Fleece of the Month Award, intended to publicize what the senator considers to be examples of foolish federal spending."

The magazine concluded that the senator at times displayed a "know-nothing attitude about science," but credited him with "being bright enough to know that scientific curiosity had been responsible for many of the civilization's greatest advances."

*

Imaginative research was given strong support by President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983, when he advocated intensified studies in so-called "Star Wars" technology.

The President spoke of futuristic means, designed to "eliminate" nuclear weapons. Space-based lasers, particle-beam weapons, and similar devices were publicly discussed. Yet open-ended exploration of antinuclear weaponry might well include "mind amplification" and other psychic warfare elements. Washington's dilemma over psi studies placed it firmly between the recommendations to the Committee on Science and Technology and the real or imagined wrath of Senator Proxmire. It was thus caught squarely between the two Big Cs: Courage and Caution.

CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing At Stanford Research Institute

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Abstract - In July 1995 the CIA declassified, and approved for release, documents revealing its sponsorship in the 1970s of a program at Stanford Research Institute in Menlo Park, CA, to determine whether such phenomena as remote viewing "might have any utility for intelligence collection" [1]. Thus began disclosure to the public of a two-decade-plus involvement of the intelligence community in the investigation of so-called parapsychological or psi phenomena. Presented here by the program's Founder and first Director (1972 - 1985) is the early history of the program, including discussion of some of the first, now declassified, results that drove early interest.

Introduction

On April 17, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order Nr. 1995-4-17, entitled Classified National Security Information. Although in one sense the order simply reaffirmed much of what has been long-standing policy, in another sense there was a clear shift toward more openness. In the opening paragraph, for example, we read: "In recent years, however, dramatic changes have altered, although not eliminated, the national security threats that we confront. These changes provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open Government." In the Classification Standards section of the Order this commitment is operationalized by phrases such as "If there is significant doubt about the need to classify information, it shall not be classified." Later in the document, in reference to information that requires continued protection, there even appears the remarkable phrase "In some exceptional cases, however, the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of

the information, and in these cases the information should be declassified."

A major fallout of this reframing of attitude toward classification is that there is enormous pressure on those charged with maintaining security to work hard at being responsive to reasonable requests for disclosure. One of the results is that FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) requests that have languished for months to years are suddenly being acted upon.1

One outcome of this change in policy is the government's recent admission of its two-decade-plus involvement in funding highly-classified, special access programs in remote viewing (RV) and related psi phenomena, first at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and then at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), both in Menlo Park, CA, supplemented by various in-house government programs. Although almost all of the documentation remains yet classified, in July 1995 270 pages of SRI reports were declassified and released by the CIA, the program's first sponsor [2]. Thus, although through the years columns by Jack Anderson and others had claimed leaks of "psychic spy" programs with such exotic names as Grill Flame, Center Lane, Sunstreak and Star Gate, CIA's release of the SRI reports constitutes the first documented public admission of significant intelligence community involvement in the psi area.

As a consequence of the above, although I had founded the program in early 1972, and had acted as its Director until I left in 1985 to head up the Institute for Advanced Studies at Austin (at which point my colleague Ed May assumed responsibility as Director), it was not until 1995 that I found myself for the first time able to utter in a single sentence the connected acronyms CIA/SRI/RV. In this report I discuss the genesis of the program, report on some of the early, now declassified, results that drove early interest, and outline the general direction the program took as it expanded into a multi-year, multi-site, multi-million-dollar effort to determine whether such phenomena as remote viewing "might have any utility for intelligence collection" [1].

Beginnings

In early 1972 I was involved in laser research at Stanford Research Institute (now called SRI International) in Menlo Park, CA. At that time I was also circulating a proposal to obtain a small grant for some research in quantum biology. In that proposal I had raised the issue whether physical theory as we knew it was capable of describing life processes, and had suggested some measurements involving plants and lower organisms [3]. This proposal was widely circulated, and a copy was sent to Cleve Backster in New York City who was involved in measuring the electrical activity of plants with standard polygraph equipment. New York artist Ingo Swann chanced to see my proposal during a visit to Backster's lab, and wrote me suggesting that if I were interested in investigating the boundary between the physics of the animate and inanimate, I should consider experiments of the parapsychological type. Swann then went on to describe some apparently successful experiments in psychokinesis in which he had participated at Prof. Gertrude Schmeidler's laboratory at the City College of New York. As a result of this correspondence I invited him to visit SRI for a week in June 1972 to demonstrate such effects,

frankly, as much out of personal scientific curiosity as anything else.

Prior to Swann's visit I arranged for access to a well-shielded magnetometer used in a quark-detection experiment in the Physics Department at Stanford University. During our visit to this laboratory, sprung as a surprise to Swann, he appeared to perturb the operation of the magnetometer, located in a vault below the floor of the building and shielded by mu-metal shielding, an aluminum container, copper shielding and a superconducting shield. As if to add insult to injury, he then went on to "remote view" the interior of the apparatus, rendering by drawing a reasonable facsimile of its rather complex (and heretofore unpublished) construction. It was this latter feat that impressed me perhaps even more than the former, as it also eventually did representatives of the intelligence community. I wrote up these observations and circulated it among my scientific colleagues in draft form of what was eventually published as part of a conference proceedings [4].

In a few short weeks a pair of visitors showed up at SRI with the above report in hand. Their credentials showed them to be from the CIA. They knew of my previous background as a Naval Intelligence Officer and then civilian employee at the National Security Agency (NSA) several years earlier, and felt they could discuss their concerns with me openly. There was, they told me, increasing concern in the intelligence community about the level of effort in Soviet parapsychology being funded by the Soviet security services [5]; by Western scientific standards the field was considered nonsense by most working scientists. As a result they had been on the lookout for a research laboratory outside of academia that could handle a quiet, low-profile classified investigation, and SRI appeared to fit the bill. They asked if I could arrange an opportunity for them to carry out some simple experiments with Swann, and, if the tests proved satisfactory, would I consider a pilot program along these lines? I agreed to consider this, and arranged for the requested tests.²

The tests were simple, the visitors simply hiding objects in a box and asking Swann to attempt to describe the contents. The results generated in these experiments are perhaps captured most eloquently by the following example. In one test Swann said "I see something small, brown and irregular, sort of like a leaf or something that resembles it, except that it seems very much alive, like it's even moving!" The target chosen by one of the visitors turned out to be a small live moth, which indeed did look like a leaf. Although not all responses were quite so precise, nonetheless the integrated results were sufficiently impressive that in short order an eight-month, \$49,909 Biofield Measurements Program was negotiated as a pilot study, a laser colleague Russell Targ who had had a long-time interest and involvement in parapsychology joined the program, and the experimental effort was begun in earnest.

Early Remote Viewing Results

During the eight-month pilot study of remote viewing the effort gradually evolved from the remote viewing of symbols and objects in envelopes and boxes, to the remote viewing of local target sites in the San Francisco Bay area, demarked by outbound experimenters sent to the site under strict protocols devised to prevent artifactual results. Later judging of the results were similarly handled by double-blind

protocols designed to foil artifactual matching. Since these results have been presented in detail elsewhere, both in the scientific literature [6-8] and in popular book format [9], I direct the interested reader to these sources. To summarize, over the years the back-and-forth criticism of protocols, refinement of methods, and successful replication of this type of remote viewing in independent laboratories [10-14], has yielded considerable scientific evidence for the reality of the phenomenon. Adding to the strength of these results was the discovery that a growing number of individuals could be found to demonstrate high-quality remote viewing, often to their own surprise, such as the talented Hella Hammid. As a separate issue, however, most convincing to our early program monitors were the results now to be described, generated under their own control.

First, during the collection of data for a formal remote viewing series targeting indoor laboratory apparatus and outdoor locations (a series eventually published in toto in the Proc. IEEE [7]), the CIA contract monitors, ever watchful for possible chicanery, participated as remote viewers themselves in order to critique the protocols. In this role three separate viewers, designated visitors V1 - V3 in the IEEE paper, contributed seven of the 55 viewings, several of striking quality. Reference to the IEEE paper for a comparison of descriptions/drawings to pictures of the associated targets, generated by the contract monitors in their own viewings, leaves little doubt as to why the contract monitors came to the conclusion that there was something to remote viewing (see, for example, Figure 1 herein). As summarized in the Executive Summary of the now-released Final Report [2] of the second year of the program, "The development of this capability at SRI has evolved to the point where visiting CIA personnel with no previous exposure to such concepts have performed well under controlled laboratory conditions (that is, generated target descriptions of sufficiently high quality to permit blind matching of descriptions to targets by independent judges)." What happened next, however, made even these results pale in comparison.




Figure 1 - Sketch of target by VI




Figure 2 - Target (merry-go-round)

Coordinate Remote Viewing

To determine whether it was necessary to have a "beacon" individual at the target site, Swann suggested carrying out an experiment to remote view the planet Jupiter before the upcoming NASA Pioneer 10 flyby. In that case, much to his chagrin (and ours) he found a ring around Jupiter, and wondered if perhaps he had remote viewed Saturn by mistake. Our colleagues in astronomy were quite unimpressed as well, until the flyby revealed that an unanticipated ring did in fact exist.[3](#)

Expanding the protocols yet further, Swann proposed a series of experiments in which the target was designated not by sending a "beacon" person to the target site, but rather by the use of geographical coordinates, latitude and longitude in degrees, minutes and seconds. Needless to say, this proposal seemed even more outrageous than "ordinary" remote viewing. The difficulties in taking this proposal seriously, designing protocols to eliminate the possibility of a combination of globe memorization and eidetic or photographic memory, and so forth, are discussed in considerable detail in Reference [9]. Suffice it to say that investigation of this approach, which we designated Scanate (scanning by coordinate), eventually provided us with sufficient evidence to bring it up to the contract monitors and suggest a test under their control. A description of that test and its results, carried out in mid-1973 during

the initial pilot study, are best presented by quoting directly from the Executive Summary of the Final Report of the second year's followup program [2]. The remote viewers were Ingo Swann and Pat Price, and the entire transcripts are available in the released documents [2].

"In order to subject the remote viewing phenomena to a rigorous long-distance test under external control, a request for geographical coordinates of a site unknown to subject and experimenters was forwarded to the OSI group responsible for threat analysis in this area. In response, SRI personnel received a set of geographical coordinates (latitude and longitude in degrees, minutes, and seconds) of a facility, hereafter referred to as the West Virginia Site. The experimenters then carried out a remote viewing experiment on a double-blind basis, that is, blind to experimenters as well as subject. The experiment had as its goal the determination of the utility of remote viewing under conditions approximating an operational scenario. Two subjects targeted on the site, a sensitive installation. One subject drew a detailed map of the building and grounds layout, the other provided information about the interior including codewords, data subsequently verified by sponsor sources (report available from COTR)."[4](#)

Since details concerning the site's mission in general,[5](#) and evaluation of the remote viewing test in particular, remain highly classified to this day, all that can be said is that interest in the client community was heightened considerably following this exercise.

Because Price found the above exercise so interesting, as a personal challenge he went on to scan the other side of the globe for a Communist Bloc equivalent and found one located in the Urals, the detailed description of which is also included in Ref. [2]. As with the West Virginia Site, the report for the Urals Site was also verified by personnel in the sponsor organization as being substantially correct.

What makes the West Virginia/Urals Sites viewings so remarkable is that these are not best-ever examples culled out of a longer list; these are literally the first two site-viewings carried out in a simulated operational-type scenario. In fact, for Price these were the very first two remote viewings in our program altogether, and he was invited to participate in yet further experimentation.

Operational Remote Viewing (Semipalatinsk, USSR)

Midway through the second year of the program (July 1974) our CIA sponsor decided to challenge us to provide data on a Soviet site of ongoing operational significance. Pat Price was the remote viewer. A description of the remote viewing, taken from our declassified final report [2], reads as given below. I cite this level of detail to indicate the thought that goes into such an "experiment" to minimize cueing while at the same time being responsive to the requirements of an operational situation. Again, this is not a "best-ever" example from a series of such viewings, but rather the very first operational Soviet target concerning which we were officially tasked.

"To determine the utility of remote viewing under operational conditions, a long-distance remote

viewing experiment was carried out on a sponsor-designated target of current interest, an unidentified research center at Semipalatinsk, USSR.

This experiment, carried out in three phases, was under direct control of the COTR. To begin the experiment, the COTR furnished map coordinates in degrees, minutes and seconds. The only additional information provided was the designation of the target as an R&D test facility. The experimenters then closeted themselves with Subject S1, gave him the map coordinates and indicated the designation of the target as an R&D test facility. A remote-viewing experiment was then carried out. This activity constituted Phase I of the experiment.




Figure 3 - Subject effort at building layout




Figure 4 - Subject effort at crane construction

Figure 3 shows the subject's graphic effort for building layout; Figure 4 shows the subject's particular attention to a multistory gantry crane he observed at the site. Both results were obtained by the experimenters on a double-blind basis before exposure to any additional COTR-held information, thus eliminating the possibility of cueing. These results were turned over to the client representatives for evaluation. For comparison an artist's rendering of the site as known to the COTR (but not to the experimenters until later) is shown in Figure 5.....



Figure 5 - Actual COTR rendering of Semipalatinsk, USSR target site

Were the results not promising, the experiment would have stopped at this point. Description of the multistory crane, however, a relatively unusual target item, was taken as indicative of possible target acquisition. Therefore, Phase II was begun, defined by the subject being made "witting" (of the client) by client representatives who introduced themselves to the subject at that point; Phase II also included a second round of experimentation on the Semipalatinsk site with direct participation of client representatives in which further data were obtained and evaluated. As preparation for this phase, client representatives purposely kept themselves blind to all but general knowledge of the target site to minimize the possibility of cueing. The Phase II effort was focused on the generation of physical data that could be independently verified by other client sources, thus providing a calibration of the process.

The end of Phase II gradually evolved into the first part of Phase III, the generation of unverifiable data concerning the Semipalatinsk site not available to the client, but of operational interest nonetheless. Several hours of tape transcript and a notebook of drawings were generated over a two-week period.

The data describing the Semipalatinsk site were evaluated by the sponsor, and are contained in a separate report. In general, several details concerning the salient technology of the Semipalatinsk site appeared to dovetail with data from other sources, and a number of specific large structural elements were correctly described. The results contained noise along with the signal, but were nonetheless clearly differentiated from the chance results that were generated by control subjects in comparison experiments carried out by the COTR."

For discussion of the ambiance and personal factors involved in carrying out this experiment, along with further detail generated as Price (see Figure 6) "roamed" the facility, including detailed comparison of Price's RV-generated information with later-determined "ground-truth reality," see the accompanying article by Russell Targ in the [Journal of Scientific Exploration](#), Vol. 10, No. 1. [Click here](#) to read the abstract.



*Figure 6 - Left to right: Christopher Green, Pat Price, and Hal Puthoff.
Picture taken following a successful experiment involving glider-ground RV.*

Additional experiments having implications for intelligence concerns were carried out, such as the remote viewing of cipher-machine type apparatus, and the RV-sorting of sealed envelopes to differentiate those that contained letters with secret writing from those that did not. To discuss these here in detail would take us too far afield, but the interested reader can follow up by referring to the now-declassified project documents [2].

Follow-on Programs

The above discussion brings us up to the end of 1975. As a result of the material being generated by both SRI and CIA remote viewers, interest in the program in government circles, especially within the intelligence community, intensified considerably and led to an ever-increasing briefing schedule. This in turn led to an ever-increasing number of clients, contracts and tasking, and therefore expansion of the program to a multi-client base, and eventually to an integrated joint-services program under single-agency (DIA) leadership. To meet the demand for the increased level of effort we first increased our professional staff by inviting Ed May to join the program in 1976, then screened and added to the program a cadre of remote viewers as consultants, and let subcontracts to increase our scope of activity.

As the program expanded, in only a very few cases could the clients' identities and program tasking be revealed. Examples include a NASA-funded study negotiated early in the program by Russ Targ to determine whether the internal state of an electronic random-number-generator could be detected by RV processes [16], and a study funded by the Naval Electronics Systems Command to determine whether attempted remote viewing of distant light flashes would induce correlated changes in the viewer's brainwave (EEG) production [17]. For essentially all other projects during my 14-yr. tenure at SRI, however, the identity of the clients and most of the tasking were classified and remain so today. (The exception was the occasional privately-funded study.) We are told, however, that further declassification and release of much of this material is almost certain to occur.

What can be said, then, about further development of the program in the two decades following 1975?⁷ In broad terms it can be said that much of the SRI effort was directed not so much toward developing an operational U.S. capability, but rather toward assessing the threat potential of its use against the U.S. by others. The words threat assessment were often used to describe the program's purpose during its development, especially during the early years. As a result much of the remote-viewing activity was carried out under conditions where ground-truth reality was a priori known or could be determined, such as the description of U.S. facilities and technological developments, the timing of rocket test firings and underground nuclear tests, and the location of individuals and mobile units. And, of course, we were responsive to requests to provide assistance during such events as the loss of an airplane or the taking of hostages, relying on the talents of an increasing cadre of remote-viewer/consultants, some well-known in the field such as Keith Harary, and many who have not surfaced publicly until recently, such as Joe McMoneagle.

One might ask whether in this program RV-generated information was ever of sufficient significance as to influence decisions at a policy level. This is of course impossible to determine unless policymakers were to come forward with a statement in the affirmative. One example of a possible candidate is a study we performed at SRI during the Carter-administration debates concerning proposed deployment of the mobile MX missile system. In that scenario missiles were to be randomly shuffled from silo to silo in a silo field, in a form of high-tech shell game. In a computer simulation of a twenty-silo field with randomly-assigned (hidden) missile locations, we were able, using RV-generated data, to show rather forcefully that the application of a sophisticated statistical averaging technique (sequential sampling) could in principle permit an adversary to defeat the system. I briefed these results to the appropriate offices at their request, and a written report with the technical details was widely circulated among groups responsible for threat analysis [18], and with some impact. What role, if any, our small contribution played in the mix of factors behind the enormously complex decision to cancel the program will probably never be known, and must of course a priori be considered in all likelihood negligible. Nonetheless, this is a prototypical example of the kind of tasking that by its nature potentially had policy implications.

Even though the details of the broad range of experiments, some brilliant successes, many total failures, have not yet been released, we have nonetheless been able to publish summaries of what was learned in these studies about the overall characteristics of remote viewing, as in Table 5 of Reference [8]. Furthermore, over the years we were able to address certain questions of scientific interest in a rigorous way and to publish the results in the open literature. Examples include the apparent lack of attenuation of remote viewing due to seawater shielding (submersible experiments) [8], the amplification of RV performance by use of error-correcting coding techniques [19,20], and the utility of a technique we call associational remote viewing (ARV) to generate useful predictive information [21].⁸

As a sociological aside, we note that the overall efficacy of remote viewing in a program like this was not just a scientific issue. For example, when the Semipalatinsk data described earlier was forwarded for analysis, one group declined to get involved because the whole concept was unscientific nonsense, while a second group declined because, even though it might be real, it was possibly demonic; a third group

had to be found. And, as in the case of public debate about such phenomena, the program's image was on occasion as likely to be damaged by an overenthusiastic supporter as by a detractor. Personalities, politics and personal biases were always factors to be dealt with.

Official Statements/Perspectives

With regard to admission by the government of its use of remote viewers under operational conditions, officials have on occasion been relatively forthcoming. President Carter, in a speech to college students in Atlanta in September 1995, is quoted by Reuters as saying that during his administration a plane went down in Zaire, and a meticulous sweep of the African terrain by American spy satellites failed to locate any sign of the wreckage. It was then "without my knowledge" that the head of the CIA (Adm. Stansfield Turner) turned to a woman reputed to have psychic powers. As told by Carter, "she gave some latitude and longitude figures. We focused our satellite cameras on that point and the plane was there." Independently, Turner himself also has admitted the Agency's use of a remote viewer (in this case, Pat Price).⁹ And recently, in a segment taped for the British television series *Equinox* [22], Maj. Gen. Ed Thompson, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army (1977-1981), volunteered "I had one or more briefings by SRI and was impressed.... The decision I made was to set up a small, in-house, low-cost effort in remote viewing...."

Finally, a recent unclassified report [23] prepared for the CIA by the American Institutes for Research (AIR), concerning a remote viewing effort carried out under a DIA program called Star Gate (discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume), cites the roles of the CIA and DIA in the history of the program, including acknowledgment that a cadre of full-time government employees used remote viewing techniques to respond to tasking from operational military organizations.¹⁰

As information concerning the various programs spawned by intelligence-community interest is released, and the dialog concerning their scientific and social significance is joined, the results are certain to be hotly debated. Bearing witness to this fact are the companion articles in this volume by Ed May, Director of the SRI and SAIC programs since 1985, and by Jessica Utts and Ray Hyman, consultants on the AIR evaluation cited above. These articles address in part the AIR study. That study, limited in scope to a small fragment of the overall program effort, resulted in a conclusion that although laboratory research showed statistically significant results, use of remote viewing in intelligence gathering was not warranted.

Regardless of one's a priori position, however, an unimpassioned observer cannot help but attest to the following fact. Despite the ambiguities inherent in the type of exploration covered in these programs, the integrated results appear to provide unequivocal evidence of a human capacity to access events remote in space and time, however falteringly, by some cognitive process not yet understood. My years of

involvement as a research manager in these programs have left me with the conviction that this fact must be taken into account in any attempt to develop an unbiased picture of the structure of reality.

Footnotes

1 - One example being the release of documents that are the subject of this report - see the memoir by Russell Targ elsewhere in this volume.

2 - Since the reputation of the intelligence services is mixed among members of the general populace, I have on occasion been challenged as to why I would agree to cooperate with the CIA or other elements of the intelligence community in this work. My answer is simply that as a result of my own previous exposure to this community I became persuaded that war can almost always be traced to a failure in intelligence, and that therefore the strongest weapon for peace is good intelligence.

3 - This result was published by us in advance of the ring's discovery [9].

4 - Editor's footnote added here: COTR - Contracting Officer's Technical Representative

5 - An NSA listening post at the Navy's Sugar Grove facility, according to intelligence-community chronicler Bamford [15]

6 - DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency. The CIA dropped out as a major player in the mid-seventies due to pressure on the Agency (unrelated to the RV Program) from the Church-Pike Congressional Committee.

7 - See also the contribution by Ed May elsewhere in this volume concerning his experiences from 1985 on during his tenure as Director.

8 - For example, one application of this technique yielded not only a published, statistically significant result, but also a return of \$26,000 in 30 days in the silver futures market [21].

9 - The direct quote is given in Targ's contribution elsewhere in this volume.

10 - "From 1986 to the first quarter of FY 1995, the DoD paranormal psychology program received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations requesting that the program staff apply a paranormal psychological technique know (sic) as "remote viewing" (RV) to attain information unavailable from other sources." [23]

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Following are abstracts from the **Journal of Scientific Exploration**, Volume 10, Number 1, in which this article first appeared... To read articles from past issues, and/or for subscription information, [click here](#) to visit their Website.

An Assessment of the Evidence for Psychic Functioning

by Jessica Utts

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Volume 10 Number 1: Page 3.

Research on psychic functioning, conducted over a two decade period, is examined to determine whether or not the phenomenon has been scientifically established. A secondary question is whether or not it is useful for government purposes. The primary work examined in this report was government sponsored research conducted at Stanford Research Institute, later known as SRI International, and at Science Applications International Corporation, known as SAIC. Using the standards applied to any other area of science, it is concluded that psychic functioning has been well established. The statistical

results of the studies examined are far beyond what is expected by chance. Arguments that these results could be due to methodological flaws in the experiments are soundly refuted. Effects of similar magnitude to those found in government-sponsored research at SRI and SAIC have been replicated at a number of laboratories across the world. Such consistency cannot be readily explained by claims of flaws or fraud. The magnitude of psychic functioning exhibited appears to be in the range between what social scientists call a small and medium effect. That means that it is reliable enough to be replicated in properly conducted experiments, with sufficient trials to achieve the long-run statistical results needed for replicability. A number of other patterns have been found, suggestive of how to conduct more productive experiments and applied psychic functioning. For instance, it doesn't appear that a sender is needed. Precognition, in which the answer is known to no one until a future time, appears to work quite well. Recent experiments suggest that if there is a psychic sense then it works much like our other five senses, by detecting change. Given that physicists are currently grappling with an understanding of time, it may be that a psychic sense exists that scans the future for major change, much as our eyes scan the environment for visual change or our ears allow us to respond to sudden changes in sound. It is recommended that future experiments focus on understanding how this phenomenon works, and on how to make it as useful as possible. There is little benefit to continuing experiments designed to offer proof, since there is little more to be offered to anyone who does not accept the current collection of data.

Evaluation of a Program on Anomalous Mental Phenomena
by Ray Hyman

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Volume 10 Number 1: Page 31.

Jessica Utts and I were commissioned to evaluate the research on remote viewing and related phenomena which was carried out at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) and Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC) during the years from 1973 through 1994. We focussed on the ten most recent experiments which were conducted at SAIC from 1992 through 1994. These were not only the most recent but also the most methodologically sound. We evaluated these experiments in the context of contemporary parapsychological research. Professor Utts concluded that the SAIC results, taken in conjunction with other parapsychological research, proved the existence of ESP, especially precognition. My report argues that Professor Utts' conclusion is premature, to say the least. The reports of the SAIC experiments have become accessible for public scrutiny too recently for adequate evaluation. Moreover, their findings have yet to be independently replicated. My report also argues that the apparent consistencies between the SAIC results and those of other parapsychological experiments may be illusory. Many important inconsistencies are emphasized. Even if the observed effects can be independently replicated, much more theoretical and empirical investigation would be needed before one could legitimately claim the existence of paranormal functioning. Note: This article is followed by a response from Jessica Utts.

Remote Viewing at Stanford Research Institute in the 1970s: A Memoir
by Russell Targ
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Volume 10 Number 1: Page 77.

Hundreds of remote viewing experiments were carried out at Stanford Research Institute (SRI) from 1972 to 1986. The purpose of some of these trials was to elucidate the physical and psychological properties of psi abilities, while others were conducted to provide information for our CIA sponsor about current events in far off places. We learned that the accuracy and reliability of remote viewing was not in any way affected by distance, size, or electromagnetic shielding, and we discovered that the more exciting or demanding the task, the more likely we were to be successful. Above all, we became utterly convinced of the reality of psi abilities. This article focuses on two outstanding examples: One is an exceptional, map-like drawing of a Palo Alto swimming pool complex, and the other is an architecturally accurate drawing of a gantry crane located at a Soviet weapons laboratory, and verified by satellite photography. The percipient for both of these experiments was Pat Price, a retired police commissioner who was one of the most outstanding remote viewers to walk through the doors of SRI.

*The American Institutes for Research Review of the
Department of Defense's STAR GATE Program: A Commentary*
by Edwin C. May
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Volume 10 Number 1: Page 89.

As a result of a Congressionally Directed Activity, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted an evaluation of a 24-year, government-sponsored program to investigate ESP and its potential use within the Intelligence Community. The American Institutes for Research was contracted to conduct the review of both research and operations. Their 29 September 1995 final report was released to the public 28 November 1995. As a result of AIR's assessment, the CIA concluded that a statistically significant effect had been demonstrated in the laboratory, but that there was no case in which ESP had provided data that had ever been used to guide intelligence operations. This paper is a critical review of AIR's methodology and conclusions. It will be shown that there is compelling evidence that the CIA set the outcome with regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun. This was accomplished by limiting the research and operations data sets to exclude positive findings, by purposefully not interviewing historically significant participants, by ignoring previous DOD extensive program reviews, and by using the discredited National Research Council's investigation of parapsychology as the starting point for their review. While there may have been political and administrative justification for the CIA not to accept the government's in-house program for the operational use of anomalous cognition, this appeared to drive the outcome of the evaluation. As a result, they have come to the wrong conclusion with regard

to the use of anomalous cognition in intelligence operations and significantly underestimated the robustness of the basic phenomenon.

FieldREG Anomalies in Group Situations

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Volume 10 Number 1: Page 111.

Portable random event generators with software to record and index continuous sequences of binary data in field situations are found to produce anomalous outputs when deployed in various group environments. These "FieldREG" systems have been operated under formal protocols in ten separate venues, all of which subdivide naturally into temporal segments, such as sessions, presentations, or days. The most extreme data segments from each of the ten applications, after appropriate correction for multiple sampling, compound to a collective probability against chance expectation of 2×10^{-4} . Interpretation remains speculative at this point, but logbook notes and anecdotal reports from participants suggest that high degrees of attention, intellectual cohesiveness, shared emotion, or other coherent qualities of the groups tend to correlate with the statistically unusual deviations from theoretical expectation in the FieldREG sequences. If sustained over more extensive experiments, such effects could add credence to the concept of a consciousness "field" as an agency for creating order in random physical processes.

*Anomalous Organization of Random Events by Group Consciousness:
Two Exploratory Experiments*

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Volume 10 Number 1: Page 143.

Two experiments explored the hypothesis that when a group of people focus their attention on a common object of interest, order will arise in the environment. An electronic random number generator was used to detect these changes in order. Events judged to be interesting to the group were called periods of high coherence and were predicted to cause corresponding moments of order in the random samples collected during those events; uninteresting events were predicted to cause chance levels of order in the random samples. The first experiment was conducted during an all-day Holotropic Breathwork workshop. The predictions were confirmed, with a significant degree of order observed in the random samples during high group coherence periods ($p = 0.002$), and chance order observed during

low group coherence periods ($p = 0.43$). The second experiment was conducted during the live television broadcast of the 67th Annual Academy Awards. Two random binary generators, located 12 miles apart, were used to independently measure order. The predictions were confirmed for about half of the broadcast period, but the terminal cumulative probabilities were not significant. A post-hoc analysis showed that the strength of the correlation between the output of the two random generators was significantly related ($r = 0.94$) to the decline in the television viewing audience.

Part 1: Bologna On Wry

A Review of the CIA/AIR Report, *"An Evaluation of Remote Viewing: Research and Applications"*

by "Mr. X" (Paul Smith)

This series was written by someone intimately familiar with the various incarnations of our government's remote viewing efforts. His identity is known to Ingo as well as to me. He has stated that he will be revealing himself in the very near future, and uses the *nom de plume* of "Mr. X" for good (but temporary) reasons.

..... THOMAS BURGIN

In the federal budget language for Fiscal Year 1994, Congress directed the Central Intelligence Agency to assume responsibility for a closely-held program then managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Known as Star Gate, the program was mandated to explore and exploit the reputed parapsychological phenomenon known as "remote viewing" in support of the intelligence activities of the United States. Star Gate's mission was three-fold: Assess foreign programs in the field; contract for basic research into the existence and cause-and-effect of the phenomenon; and, most importantly, to see if remote viewing might be a useful intelligence tool.

Before accepting responsibility, the CIA first insisted on a major scientific evaluation to determine if the program had any value, and contracted with the American Institutes of Research, headquartered in Washington, DC to perform the survey. Two heavily credentialed scientists--one a statistician and research specialist, the other a psychologist--were retained to do the assessment of the research part of the program. Jessica Utts, the statistician, is a supporter of parapsychological research; the psychologist, Ray Hyman, a professor at the University of Oregon, is a prominent skeptic. A number of AIR employees and associates were designated to evaluate the operations portion.

By the conclusion of the AIR report, Drs. Utts and Hyman agreed that the experimental portion of STAR GATE indicated some sort of phenomenon existed, but disagreed on whether it had been proved psychic in origin. Utts thought it was, Hyman had no alternative explanations but would not accept that a psi effect was demonstrated. As for the operational side of the survey,

AIR's evaluators had concluded that remote viewing was not, and never had been of operational use. Therefore STAR GATE was not worth wasting further money on.

This verdict was justification enough for the CIA to wash its hands of the Congressional requirement to pursue remote viewing, while at the same time allowing it to integrate the dozen or so personnel spaces it had acquired from STAR GATE into its own structure--a veritable windfall in an era of rampant governmental "downsizing." But was the AIR survey truly the thorough and objective evaluation it pretended to be? After my own assessment of the report, I can only conclude that it was not.

In fact, so skewed were the AIR report's conclusions, that I at first suspected a clever trick by the CIA to give the impression in the public that it had dumped the program, while in reality burying it deep inside the Agency where it could continue to perk along quietly behind the scenes. Prepared to remain silent if a viable remote viewing effort really was still under wraps somewhere in the system, I made a few discreet inquiries among people who were in a position to find out. Alas, it now seems clear that the program, in any incarnation, is indeed deader than a doornail.

Since I know through long experience the value of a properly-run RV program, I was therefore quite offended by the superficiality of the AIR study and the obtuseness of the CIA. The best antidote, it would seem, would be to expose the major faults of the review and let the public sort out what ought to happen next. Consequently, I will explore in this article and in one to follow how AIR arrived at its dubious conclusions.

The Study

To accomplish its three-fold mission, STAR GATE incorporated two separate activities. One was an operational unit with government-employed remote viewers, the purpose of which was to perform training and actual remote viewing intelligence-gathering sessions in support of customers in the U.S. intelligence community. The other activity was an ongoing research program, maintained separately from the operational unit, under the directorship of Dr. Edwin May. The research program resided for several years at SRI-International, but later moved to another California-based defense contractor, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).

In evaluating the program, AIR obviously had to address both operational and research portions. On the research side, evaluators performed an exhaustive review of the reports from the ten most recent experiments Dr. May had conducted.

To evaluate the operational portion, the AIR personnel conducted interviews with STAR GATE's project manager and viewers. Also, certain intelligence community activities were recruited to levy collection tasks on STAR GATE, then evaluate the resulting information. Finally, some of the research material that seemed to apply to operations was reviewed. In the interests of time and space, I will consider in this article only the operational portion of the AIR evaluation. The research portion will be examined at another time.

The Program

To help understand how the AIR study erred in evaluating the operational side of the program, we must first briefly discuss the program's history. STAR GATE traces its direct lineage to the formation of an Army program in 1977, originally created to explore what intelligence an enemy might be able to obtain about the U.S. by using remote viewing. The program's indirect roots go back still farther, to the CIA's flirtation with remote viewing under the SCANATE program in the early Seventies.

By 1978 the original Army program was given a new mission, to experiment with remote viewing as an actual intelligence collection tool. At about the same time, the program also moved under the administrative umbrella of the newly-created GRILL FLAME project, which was a joint effort among several agencies, but with DIA overseeing the overall program. Over the next fourteen years, the remote viewing program went through two more name changes--first in the early Eighties, and then once again in 1986 upon migrating to DIA, after a newly-appointed commanding general of the Army's Intelligence and Security Command was directed by his superiors to divest the Army of the program. In the early Nineties the program's status was changed from that of a SAP ("special access program") to a LIMDIS ("limited dissemination") program and it was re-designated STAR GATE.

Altogether, over forty personnel served in the program under its various iterations, including both government civilians and members of the military.

Of these forty personnel, about 23 were remote viewers. At its most robust (during the mid-to-late Eighties), the remote viewing program boasted as many as seven full-time viewers assigned at one time, along with additional analytical, administrative, and support personnel.

From the early Eighties, two primary remote viewing disciplines were used: The SRI-developed coordinate remote viewing (CRV) method, and a hybrid relaxation/meditative-based method known to program personnel as "extended remote viewing," or ERV. Both methods had been heavily evaluated and refined before being pressed into service on "live" intelligence collection missions.

In 1988 a new and (it turned out) less reliable method, known as WRV--for "written remote viewing"--was introduced. WRV was a hybrid of both channeling and automatic writing. Surprisingly, it was almost immediately adopted as an official method for performing actual intelligence missions--without the same period of careful evaluation that either CRV or ERV had enjoyed. Many of the personnel were dubious of the new method, and in fact a good deal of divisiveness and rancor developed within the unit because of it. Nevertheless, for a several-year period the organization's management made WRV the method of choice. There were a number of reasons for this, which I lack space and time to consider here.

By the summer of 1990, attrition of quality remote viewers was becoming a problem, through retirement, reassignment, or the departure of disenchanted personnel. Unfortunately, the higher echelons at DIA were for the most part uncomfortable with the program and chose not to replace departing employees. At the time of its transfer to CIA in June 1995, STAR GATE was down to three viewers--two using WRV, and one CRV. Further, the program was led by a project manager who had no previous experience in the field, and had been less than successful in gleaning insight from the program's well-documented operational archives.

By 1995, after almost 20 years of operation, the remote viewing program in its various guises had conducted several hundred intelligence collection projects involving literally thousands of remote viewing sessions on behalf of nearly all of the major players in the U.S. Intelligence Community (including, despite its current vigorous disclaimers, the CIA). There were at one point more than a dozen four- and five-drawer security cabinets containing the documentation for these projects and the surrounding history of the program.

After all this, one would think that AIR had a great deal to evaluate before passing judgement on the operational value of the unit: Drawers and drawers of documents to examine, dozens of personnel and several former project managers to interview, and perhaps a score of intelligence consumers to poll. But that is not what happened. Instead, AIR chose to do only three things: 1) The few remaining viewers were interviewed as a group for perhaps two hours; 2) The project manager was interviewed once; and 3) Six intelligence customers were recruited to provide problems for the remote viewers to be targeted against, the results of which would then be evaluated by the agency submitting the request. This operational test took place during an approximately one-year period near the end of STAR GATE's tenure at DIA--a mere 12 months and six projects balanced against a roughly 240-month history and hundreds of collection projects, all well documented in STAR GATE's files! Regrettably, AIR had made the arbitrary decision at the very beginning not to evaluate any of the historic data predating the adoption of the "STAR GATE" project name.

On the surface it might seem that at least the operational test AIR devised would be a reasonable assessment of Star Gate capability and potential. But we must remember that at the time the evaluation was made, only three remote viewers remained of the 23 who had belonged to the unit over the years--and two of these three used the less-effective WRV protocols--one of them even resorting to tarot cards as a collection method. The third viewer, by self-admission, was demoralized and cynical about the management and future of the program, which undoubtedly affected viewing accuracy. The program manager, who performed triple duty as tasker, analyst, and evaluator, was inexperienced and unqualified to fulfill any of those functions.

Indeed, at the time of the AIR evaluation, the tasking methodology had degenerated markedly from past practice. In previous years, to prevent contamination of the data no "frontloading" was permitted. When in the course of a session further guidance might prove necessary, great pains were taken to provide only the most neutral cuing possible--and then only after the viewer had demonstrated unequivocal site contact. Further, operational sessions were conducted as often as possible under double-blind conditions to prevent inadvertent cuing by monitor personnel.

At the time of the AIR investigation, however, viewers were allowed "substantial background information" before their sessions (p. C-12) which often led to viewers "chang[ing] the content of their reports" to coincide with their own preconceptions about the nature of the target and the expectations of the customer (p. C-12, C-13). Complicating the matter still

further, the AIR report indicates that the person providing the tasking, receiving the reports, then providing further guidance was usually one and the same person--the project manager--who was all the while fully informed of the mission and had access to any site-relevant details that were available. This is bad practice for maintaining objective analysis and unbiased viewing results.

Sessions were conducted "solo" (i.e., no monitoring personnel present), and the taskings provided to the viewer usually included the name of the tasking organization and a brief description of the target (p. C-15), a practice compounding the likelihood of contaminated results. It is no wonder that the tasking organizations--even the ones who were enthusiastic about remote viewing--found the results ultimately unhelpful.

One might argue that these were problems endemic to the unit, and that the AIR report fairly assessed the poor utility of the operational organization. However, AIR essentially guaranteed a negative conclusion from the very beginning by focusing on a narrow slice of time, late in the program's existence when operational standards and morale were at their lowest ebb (brought on, by the way, through the ambivalence and even outright antipathy of its parent organization). It would have been a major surprise had AIR come to any other conclusion. In a truly objective study, thorough, responsible evaluators would have recognized the situation, analyzed what was going on, and dug deeper.

It should be clear by now that this ostensibly "scientific" examination of the operational portion of the program was far too superficial and narrowly-based to justify the conclusion that remote viewing had never been of intelligence use. In fact, there is plenty of evidence for collection missions in which remote viewing had been of operational significance. Obvious sources would have been the veteran remote viewers (none, as previously noted, ever interviewed, but most of whom are eager to talk about their involvement), and the final reports for closed-out projects. However, in the historical files there are also a number of customer evaluations from the likes of the Secret Service, NSA, the Military Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and-- ironically--the CIA, reporting (occasionally even in rather glowing terms) the usefulness of remote viewing as an intelligence tool.

To be sure, not all the evaluations are positive; it would have been very suspicious if they were. Remote viewing, like any other intelligence discipline (including, despite popular perceptions, satellite imagery), often falls flat on its face. However, remote viewing was successful often enough to have gained over several years the interest of a number of otherwise

hardbitten intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, AIR with all its resources failed altogether to discover this on its own.

One might draw an analogy with the early days of radio. It's as if on the day of the final official trial, the radio operator assigned to demonstrate the new apparatus mistakenly tunes to the wrong frequency, producing only static-- at which point the judges decide to scrap the whole thing as wasted effort and resources, and go back to the telegraph, which everybody at least understands.

Continued...

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Part 2: A Second Helping

Further Reflections On the AIR/CIA Assessment on Remote Viewing

by "Mr. X" (Paul Smith)

This series was written by someone intimately familiar with the various incarnations of our government's remote viewing efforts. His identity is known to Ingo as well as to me. He has stated that he will be revealing himself in the very near future, and uses the *nom de plume* of "Mr. X" for good (but temporary) reasons.

..... THOMAS BURGIN

In [Part 1](#) of this review I discussed some of the highlights of the AIR/CIA report that was responsible for the demise of the STAR GATE remote viewing program. I focused primarily on the operations half of the unit. As promised, Part 2 will concentrate on the research portion of the program. As Part 1 explained, two experienced scientists were retained to do the evaluation: Dr. Jessica Utts, a nationally-known expert on statistical analysis and supporter of parapsychology research, and Dr. Ray Hyman, a professor of Psychology at the University of Oregon, and among the most widely-known skeptics of parapsychology.

Utts and Hyman were to conduct a thorough review of "all laboratory experiments and meta-analytic reviews conducted as part of the research program," which amounted to about 80 reports, a number of which summarized several experiments each (p. E-2). The scientists would be assisted by a couple of AIR associates, an additional statistics consultant, and AIR's president, Dr. David Goslin.

All experiments available for review were conducted over an approximate ten-year period by Dr. Ed May, who had assumed responsibility for the experimental side of the remote viewing program at SRI-International in the mid-1980's after the departure of Dr. Hal Puthoff, who had lead the program since it's founding in 1971. In the early '90s, May and his experiments moved to Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). On the surface, AIR's review of the research program is a more credible effort than was its evaluation of the operational unit. The review process was to all

appearances well documented, the rationales employed seemed well thought out, and a seemingly equitable point/counterpoint format between pro-psi Utts and anti-psi Hyman adopted in an attempt to bring consensus to the differing conclusions arrived at by the two primary evaluators. However, the evaluation turned out to be nothing so much as a comedy of errors, with both sides--AIR and the STAR GATE researchers--in starring roles. To best sort out this muddled situation, we will explore the shortcomings of the research effort first, to provide a context in which to understand where AIR failed in its evaluation.

The Research Program

Dr. Ed May and I are on the same side on this issue, so it's not overly pleasant to have to criticize the SAIC research. Nonetheless, there are things that must be brought out to understand what really happened during the AIR review.

I will begin with a brief summary of the ten experiments ultimately examined by AIR reviewers. Fortunately, Dr. Utts provided summaries in her portion of the AIR report. In the interest of space I have condensed these summaries still further, but retain the essentials:

Experiment	Purpose	Target	
1	Two-fold: (a) determine if a "sender" (i.e., someone at the site) was necessary to help the viewer access the target or if the viewer could obtain information merely by being focused on the site through a coordinate or other mechanism; (b) Determine whether "static" targets--i.e., the photos--would be easier or harder to perceive than "dynamic" targets--i.e., short video clips.	Photos from the pages of National Geographic sealed in envelopes; alternatively, short video clips.	
2	Discover if viewers can correctly determine computer-generated "binary targets"--"Is it one or is it zero?" "Is it yes or is it no?" If so, this might lead to answering questions such as, "Is there a bomb in this building or not?"	A computer-driven random number generator.	

3	Using a magnetoencephalograph (MEG), attempt to detect anomalous brain signals of remote viewers.	A flashing light observed by a "sender."
4	Determine if remote viewing can be used in an information-sending capacity.	Specially designed or chosen targets with distinct characteristics. Presence or absence of each characteristic represented either a "1" or a "0." If a characteristic was perceived and reported by the viewer, a "1" was recorded; if the characteristic was not perceived to be present, a "0" was recorded. Binary numbers could thus be constructed by tabulating presence or absence of target characteristics. If successful, information could be "sent" in a manner roughly analogous to Morse code.
5	Test three novices to see if they could remote view.	National Geographic photos placed on a table in another room.
6	Could lucid dreaming be used as a tool to enhance remote-viewing?	National Geographic photos contained in opaque envelopes placed next to the bed where person was attempting to achieve a "lucid dreaming" state.

7	Determine if a person becomes "physiologically aware" of being watched, even though he/she is not consciously aware of being watched.	The subject him/herself. He/she is seated in a room with a video camera aimed at him/her. Galvanic skin response was then measured to determine if it increased during periods of observation.
8	Using an electroencephalograph (EEG), attempt to identify interruptions in alpha brain- waves when a remote viewing target is flashed on a computer screen in another room.	
9	Determine if viewers could describe a target briefly displayed on a computer monitor. <i>This is the remote viewing portion of Experiment 8.</i>	Target (not further described in the report, but perhaps the aforementioned video clips) was displayed briefly on a computer CRT in another room.
10	An improved version of Experiment 1. An equal number of static and dynamic targets were employed, no "senders" were used, and all attempts were done at SAIC in California, instead of from the participants homes, as was the case with Experiment 1.	Selections from a pool of various photos and video clips.

[Summaries were excerpted from pp. 3-33 to 3-41 of the AIR report.]

As listed in the AIR report, the three assigned missions of the STAR GATE-affiliated research program were to: (1) Demonstrate through scientific experiment the existence of the remote viewing phenomenon; (2) Determine the cause and effect mechanism through which the phenomenon functions; and (3) Explore methods and techniques to enhance the operational effectiveness of the phenomenon [p. 2-1]. These goals, incidentally, were essentially unchanged from the days of the GRILL FLAME effort, as enumerated in a report I recently saw dating from 1977. Let us evaluate

these experiments in terms of the three stated missions of the research effort--in effect, the intended purpose for which research money had originally been appropriated.

Mission 1: Demonstrate Existence of the Remote Viewing Phenomenon

As designed, seven of the SAIC experiments would provide useful support to the existence of the remote viewing phenomenon, and one would have been of marginal value. Two would not have given useful support in demonstrating the RV phenomenon. Experiment 3 (which was unsuccessful because of faulty experiment construction) might have been of marginal value but would not in itself have provided unambiguous support for the existence of RV. Had this experiment been a success, any anomalous brain signals detected might still have been the artifact of some other common element in the viewers' experiences, backgrounds, or training. However, isolating and identifying the signal might ultimately have led to useful information which could potentially provide later support to the existence of RV.

Experiment 2, which focused on computer-generated "binary" targets, might demonstrate a paranormal effect, but not in the sense of classic remote viewing. The experiment's results may actually display some sort of "dowsing" effect (though some would argue that RV and dowsing are but different sides to the same coin), or perhaps even a psychokinetic (PK) effect, since it would be difficult to determine if the viewer were merely anticipating the correct answer, or in some way influencing the number generation process.

Experiment 7 could be useful in demonstrating the existence of some sort of paranormal linking effect between observed and observer. But the experiment would not have been useful in supporting the existence of remote viewing. No useable information could be transferred across space and/or time using the demonstrated effect.

Mission 2: Determine Cause and Effect Relationship

None of the SAIC experiments, even when successful, would have provided

any substantial answers to the cause-and-effect relationship for the remote viewing phenomenon. Only Experiments 3 and 8 would have provided even marginal information bearing on cause-and-effect, and they would have merely demonstrated an anomalous effect without identifying a causal linkage.

Mission 3: Develop More Effective RV Operations Methods

Because of their design, seven of the SAIC experiments could have provided no benefit whatsoever in developing new or better operational methods or techniques. Experiment 2 showed potential, were it to lead to a reliable "yes/no" selection technique. However, the experiment only involved trying to "second-guess" a machine. A real-world binary problem, such as, "Is Gen. Dozier in Italy?" or "Will Hezbollah attack the Statue of Liberty tomorrow?" involves much different selection mechanisms than tapping a computer key, is of much different psychic texture than "0"s and "1"s, and has far greater ultimate consequences--and therefore dramatically greater emotional loading in the viewing process--than do yes-or-no type questions on a computer.

Experiment 4, an attempt to use RV to transmit coded information by identifying specific characteristics of a target, uses remote viewing not as an intelligence collection tool, but as a communications method. This would by definition be of no use for operational RV; however, if such a communications ability could be reliably developed, it would have great utilitarian value--to include undetectable transmission of intelligence from a denied area.

As explored in Experiment 6, lucid dreaming might possibly provide added value to the remote viewing process (though I personally have my doubts). Therefore, this experiment at least had the potential to benefit operational remote viewing.

When we tabulate the results, this is what we find:

Mission	Relevant	Maybe	Irrelevant
1 - Proof of phenomenon	7	1	2
2 - Determine cause/effect	0	1	9
3 - Operations enhancement	0	3	7

By far the majority of the ten experiments focus on proving the existence of the phenomenon--the first mission. The other two missions were essentially ignored. In fact, one experiment-- determining whether someone is physiologically aware of being watched--is interesting from a parapsychology standpoint, but has almost nothing to do with remote viewing (one individual prominent in RV research did suggest that the experiment might be a preliminary step toward determining if one could be aware of being targeted by a remote viewer). Another three experiments-- numbers 2, 3, and 4--are only indirectly related to RV, particularly RV as an intelligence collection tool. The research program's first error was fundamental--it failed to evenly address all aspects of this three-fold mission, concentrating instead almost exclusively on the first of the specified goals. This would have been forgivable, had the program indeed successfully proved beyond any doubt the existence of remote viewing as a paranormal phenomenon. However, as demonstrated by Ray Hyman's conclusion that something was happening, but it was too early to assume it was psi [pp. 3-75, 3-76], this goal eluded the program. To be fair, this effect was certainly amplified by AIR efforts (discussed below) to "stack the deck" against STAR GATE. Nonetheless, the whole research emphasis was generally out of sync with the stated purpose of the STAR GATE effort.

Perhaps the rationale was something like this: "Until we can prove the existence of the phenomenon, there's no point in trying to establish the cause-and-effect; and if these first two questions aren't answered, it seems pointless as well to bother much about how to enhance the operational effectiveness of something we haven't proved to exist, nor know how it works." At any rate, the bulk of the experiments focused on trying to convincingly demonstrate an effect, and few went beyond that decidedly preliminary step. While statistically, at least, some remarkable effects were demonstrated, both Utts, the supporter, and Hyman, the skeptic agree that nothing irrefutably conclusive was proven. Utts believed that the effects nonetheless demonstrated the strong possibility of a psi-based effect. Hyman and the AIR researchers concluded there was not enough evidence to say even that.

Would the results have been better had May concentrated more on true RV experiments, and tried more concertedly to address the other two missions? The answer to this is a qualified yes. Notably, the experiments more closely approaching a classical remote-viewing model were the most successful, with Experiment 10 producing quite impressive results. Those which departed most from the model tended to be the least conclusive. Additionally, had more experiments been designed to enhance operational

methods or develop new techniques, they would in and of themselves have provided additional proof for existence of the phenomenon. If RV technique gets good enough to work nearly every time, producing solid information under a variety of conditions, the phenomenon is essentially proved--accomplishing two of the research missions for the price of one. (As they say, nothing succeeds like success.) Cause-and-effect research would, however, have been less productive. Of course, if in some brilliant moment of discovery a verifiable causal relationship were found and demonstrated, the skeptics would have to retreat. But such an event is highly unlikely. Thus far, there is not even a worthwhile hypothesis as to what the phenomenon is in terms of the "physical" world--if it even has such a connection (though there are one or two interesting ideas waiting in the wings to emerge). We do have a pretty good idea what the basic nature of remote viewing is NOT: It is unlikely to be electro-magnetic in any sense, as demonstrated by the successful remote viewings done in electro-magnetically shielded Faraday cages, or those which are precognitive or retrocognitive, seemingly in violation of the accepted laws of physics which radio waves or other electromagnetic phenomena obey. Since we have no other good candidate to account for information transmission of the nature and quality good remote viewing produces, we are pretty much left in the dark as to where to start. It makes far more sense to work on practical applications and leave the fundamental underpinnings for those with more time, money, and no need to answer to a house full of skeptics. Regrettably, the wavering focus of the SAIC effort was inadequate for fair assessment of remote viewing in its own right.

I should point out here that the experimental focus was not entirely up to Dr. May and his team. Representatives for a contracting agency write the statement of work and draft the contract that specifies what will be done in the course of the research. A review of the DIA contracts shows that much of the work performed at SAIC was indeed specified by the DIA representative. Still, there is a lot of behind-the-scenes give-and-take before the formal document is drafted, and the government representative must rely heavily on the expertise and advice of the contractor in the process of deciding what can or should be done in the course of the contract. Further, there is an added degree of flexibility built into the contract to allow researchers to explore promising directions that may not necessarily have been foreseen during the original contracting process. This flexibility is necessary and desirable to allow examination of serendipitous discoveries or unforeseen effects, but it is also a point vulnerable to exploitation by researchers with their own agendas to pursue. Ultimately, both parties share responsibility for the direction a research program takes, right or wrong.

As an additional consideration, the SAIC work was a follow-on to previous research done via a still-classified connection with an agency which mandated more generalized research. Remote viewing was only one of several phenomena to be explored. PK, for example, was always of interest in prior research programs and, as the random number generation experiment shows, some vestiges of interest may have remained in the SAIC experiments. This interest in general parapsychology seems to have bled over into the DIA/SAIC remote viewing research.

May's broader-ranging experimental focus did produce some interesting and perhaps even ultimately useful research. Unfortunately, there was not a more rigorous attempt made to route the SAIC research further away from this general focus and concentrate more intently on what should have been STAR GATE's RV-centered research agenda. Ultimately, the overly-eclectic approach increased vulnerability to pointed criticism which Ray Hyman and AIR were only too eager to provide.

In fact Dr. Hyman does give lip service to Ed May's difficulties in not being "free to run the program to maximize scientific payoff," because May was required to "do experiments and add variables to suit the desires of his sponsors," resulting in "an attempt to explore too many questions with too few resources. . . The scientific inquiry was spread too thin." (3- 46) Of course, as just mentioned, there was much room for negotiation in the contracting process, and May could certainly have argued for a more narrow focus. The evidence suggests it was more the other way around. In fact, several people in a position to know have suggested that Dr. May saw the RV research contracts as an opportunity to explore some of his own parapsychological interests at the same time as pursuing the official purposes for which the research was contracted.

However that may be, Hyman's gratuitous comments are no exoneration in this matter. If Hyman recognized the eclectic nature of the research AIR was to evaluate, he is certainly well- qualified enough as a scientist to realize that the limited numbers of experiments were inadequate to answer the question EITHER WAY as to whether or not remote viewing had any efficacy as an intelligence collection tool. That Hyman persisted (as discussed below) in pretending that they did seems intellectually dishonest.

Protocols

The bias in favor of wider parapsychology research was not the only problem with the SAIC experiments, however. Curiously, May and his colleagues seem to have followed rather anachronistic procedures in conducting even the experiments which were more purely remote viewing in character. My first quarrel is with the target pool.

Remote viewing, both experimentally and operationally, has been pursued for more than two decades. While a lot has been learned, some of the most valuable data--that accumulated by the operational RV unit in its various incarnations--has hardly been considered in the research process. The operational data set includes brilliant successes that point to improved ways of doing things, as well as ignominious failures which can be just as instructive. There was a fair amount of well-structured experimentation at Ft. Meade in targeting and cuing methods, RV data documentation and analysis, accessing target details, and so forth. Unfortunately, the operations activity was kept mostly separate from the research program until after the 1992 transition to STAR GATE, and even then the connection existed primarily to provide subjects for some of the SAIC experiments. The vast database from the Ft. Meade unit of thousands of documented sessions--both training and operational--remains largely unmined.

One pronounced difference between RV targeting in the SAIC research effort and that in operations was that operations focused on "live" targets, while the SAIC experiments used two-dimensional images, both static photographs (pictures gleaned from the pages of National Geographic) and short, live-action video clips. The thinking at SRI was that the video clips might provide increased "change" values, adding variety to the target material, perhaps making it easier for viewers to detect and report. Similarly, photos were selected that displayed significant "change in entropy"--that is, contrast and variety in shapes and in color and value patterns that again theoretically would make detection and reporting easier.

In comparison, daily operational remote viewing missions at Ft. Meade accessed targets in real time "on the ground" (or water, or whatever), not in a photograph. What photos that were provided were not used as targets, but only for later feedback or to guide analysts. There was plenty of evidence that the operational viewers were indeed accessing the sites themselves and not merely the feedback folders (in operations, feedback was usually pretty lean and sporadic anyway). When a viewer accurately describes several significant structural or functional details that are completely lacking from feedback packages yet which are later confirmed to be at the site, it becomes obvious very quickly that "real" remote viewing is occurring. This literally happened scores, even hundreds of times.

However, at Ft. Meade there was some experimentation with photos as actual targets. This was conducted both as an in-house training exercise, and at one or two other times as part of one of the rare instances when the operations unit was asked to participate long-distance in an SRI experimental series during the mid-to-late '80s. Across the board operational viewer results dropped off when targeted against "static" photographic targets. At the time, video clips were not available as an option (or so I presume, as participating viewer received only terse feedback), so I can render no judgement as to whether they would have been more effective.

Indeed, to a remote viewer accustomed to accessing actual sites in four-dimensional space, a static photograph is not a representation of the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor or Mount Pinatubo during an eruption. It is in reality only a colored piece of paper in a manila envelope. It's not surprising that results from operational viewers suffer when targeted under such circumstances.

To be sure, an experienced viewer CAN access a photograph-- the positive results of several of the SAIC's experimental RV sessions demonstrate this. But if the focus had been on "real"-- and therefore naturally dynamic--sites as opposed to two-dimensional representations, May and his colleagues might not have had to bother about testing the use of "dynamic" moving images (the videos) to provide greater change and variety to improve remote viewer detection; or about mapping the "change in entropy" of the static images to enhance researchers' ability to decode viewer results, as was done for these experiments. Perhaps there were experimental control reasons why such a fixed target pool was desired. In my mind, however, the drawbacks far outweigh the possible benefits.

Another troublesome aspect of at least one of the SAIC experiments was the apparent need to experiment further with "senders"--individuals sent to the target site to act as a "beacon" or a "transmitter" for the remote viewer. Indeed, one of the stated purposes of the experiment was to determine if a "sender" was necessary. Senders and beacons were used in the early SRI experiments, and continued to be used for beginner trainees at Ft. Meade, simply as a way of providing a connection with the site that the novice viewer could easily grasp. Both at SRI and Ft. Meade, however, the need for senders in advanced remote viewings was surpassed long ago. The introduction of coordinates as a targeting mechanism, and later (to avoid any hint of contamination) encrypted coordinates, made senders/beacons obsolete. No degradation in response quality resulted, and in fact, accuracy seemed even to be enhanced. The encrypted coordinates provided the added

benefit of defusing one of the most popular (if improbable) criticisms of coordinate-cued RV--that some viewer might just "memorize" what was at the end of all the geographic coordinates in the world, and cheat.

The need for beacon or sender was already discounted by the late '70s and early '80s, and was certainly well established at the time Ed May took over as primary researcher. Though the sender/beacon personnel were dispensed with later in the SAIC ten-experiment sequence, it was puzzling why the researchers felt the need to thus "reinvent the wheel" at the start.

In the end, the main problem with the SAIC experiments was not that they were particularly poor experiments, but that they should have been better. More importantly, the experiments could--and really should--have focused more particularly on remote viewing, guided by the three missions that Congress had decreed when earmarking funds for the program. As it was, the primary consequence of the SAIC program was to provide a very tempting strawman for the AIR bull (at the behest of the CIA) to gore and trample, hoodwinking the general public into believing that AIR had a live matador at its mercy. In reality, the matador wasn't even in town. But now, after I have spent several pages "blaming the victim," it's time to turn my attention to the perpetrator.

(To Be Concluded)

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Part 3: Scraps And Crumbs

Further Reflections On the AIR/CIA Assessment on Remote Viewing

by "Mr. X" (Paul Smith)

This series was written by someone intimately familiar with the various incarnations of our government's remote viewing efforts. His identity is known to Ingo as well as to me. He has stated that he will be revealing himself in the very near future, and uses the *nom de plume* of "Mr. X" for good (but temporary) reasons.

..... THOMAS BURGIN

Note: This is the conclusion of a three-part review of the CIA- sponsored report by the American Institutes of Research of its evaluation of the Government's twenty-four year long remote viewing program. [Part One, "Bologna on Wry,"](#) covered the operational intelligence portion of the program. [Part Two, "A Second Helping of Bologna on Wry,"](#) found that the research reviewed by the AIR was inadequate as a basis for a fair assessment of remote viewing. Part Three examines the AIR's faulty evaluation of that research.

If one is limited only to the information contained in the AIR report, one forms the impression that the evaluators did a reasonably thorough job in assessing the SAIC/SRI experiments and analyzing the results. The ambiguous conclusions (that there is an anomaly, but after 20+ years of research it is still a tentative one, and no cause and effect has yet been demonstrated) leads surely to the AIR conclusion-of-choice that it really doesn't make sense for the government to waste further money on it. But we would be misled. The AIR examination was neither in depth, nor conclusive.

AIR employees themselves focused mostly on their rather cursory evaluation of the intelligence operations part of the STAR GATE program. Though some of them were involved as well with evaluating the remote viewing research program, they contributed little but a brief concluding summation to the final AIR report. Drs. Utts and Hyman, specially engaged by AIR to review the research program, produced by far the bulk of that assessment. Utts' is first sequentially in the report. She starts with a general

discussion of the statistical theory used to gauge experimental success in parapsychology research. She follows this with an instructive discussion about RV experimental design, some history of RV research, and an exploration of the SAIC experiments, augmented by more detailed information in an appendix. She also discusses briefly how the results correlate with earlier work done at SRI (they are consistent with these earlier statistically-significant experiments), and also lists the results of a number of related remote viewing and ganzfeld (a form of remote viewing) experiments conducted at various labs around the world. According to Utts, the effects of these strongly correlate with those achieved in the SAIC remote viewing experiments.

In the course of her remarks she anticipates and answers many of the objections Hyman later brings up in his portion of the review. Even allowing for my own personal bias in favor of her conclusions, I find her assessment to be more rational, well- reasoned, and soundly supported than is that of Hyman.

On the other hand, so general are Hyman's comments that he could handily have written most of his evaluation without ever once having to refer to the remote viewing experiments themselves. Ultimately, he acknowledges that there are significant effects demonstrated, but then spends a good deal of time discussing why in principle he rejects these effects. He admits that he can find no flaws in the experiments, yet says we must wait indefinitely to decide whether they have or have not proved a psi effect so as to allow a lengthy interval for thus- far unidentified flaws to be ferreted out. He warns that given enough time, methodological flaws might turn up that had not yet dawned on anyone. He then cites as his only examples of such methodological flaws two cases that are decades-old and unrelated to remote viewing, where the only "flaws" uncovered were instances of fraud. Meanwhile, Utts has already pointed out that fraud as an explanation is untenable because of the numbers of institutions in diverse locations around the globe that have produced results equally significant as those of the SAIC experiments.

Utts later addresses and disposes of a number of Hyman's other arguments and errors in her rebuttal that follows Hyman's comments in the report. However, there were several other "literary offenses" that Hyman or AIR or both commit that are not discussed. Since Hyman's evaluation is at the heart of the AIR case against the remote viewing research program, I will focus my attention there. In the interests of space--which I consume ever more of as this review progresses--I will only consider a few of the more egregious errors and misjudgments the good doctor makes.

The Baby Out With the Bath

To begin with, Hyman and AIR ignored twenty years of research conducted prior to the SAIC experiments. Despite the AIR's express assignment to thoroughly review "all laboratory experiments and meta-analytic reviews conducted as part of the research program," ultimately only ten experiments were actually reviewed--all of them performed at SAIC in just the last three or four years of the government's program. One reason for this was likely due, as Hyman says, to the "limited time frame [that was] allotted for this evaluation" [p. 3-43, 3-44]. The AIR reviewers were given only a month and a half--from mid-July to the end of August--to conduct a supposedly "exhaustive" review.

Ed May asserts in his own rebuttal to the AIR report ([Journal of Scientific Exploration](#), vol. 10, no. 1, Spring 1996... [click here](#) to read the abstract) that in recognition of this unrealistically short time allotment, someone at AIR requested May provide only the reports from his ten best experiments for evaluation. Quite properly he demurred, since for sound scientific reasons this would skew the results-- in so doing, only successful results would be considered, when to form a fair picture required that poor results should be evaluated as well (selecting only experimental results that show positive effects is known as the "file drawer" effect). As an alternative, May proposed a different procedure that would have allowed examination of all the materials within the time constraints, resulting in a much more thorough and reliable assessment. His suggestion was ignored.

Instead, in a conference call between the AIR evaluators, Hyman got agreement that only the ten latest experiments would be evaluated. It was tacitly recognized that there were both relevant and irrelevant experiments among these ten, but it made for a more manageable evaluation pool, and it avoided the "file drawer" problem.

This is where it gets interesting. As earlier noted, Hyman explains that a limited number of experiments were selected because of lack of time to consider all of those available, and these ten were the most recent. But he also cavalierly dismisses the need to examine the other two decades worth of experiments by alleging that the handful of SAIC experiments selected were "the only ones for which we have adequate documentation" (p. 3-43). Earlier research was discounted as suffering "from methodological

inadequacies" upon which he chooses not to elaborate further in his report. Hyman makes this amazing assertion despite the fact that he had never even looked at the documents of which he is being so dismissive. Sometime back in the mid 1980s, he reportedly saw some of the results from the first few years of SRI experiments when he participated in another flawed "scientific" evaluation of enhanced human performance programs [i.e., the National Research Council's somewhat infamous "Enhancing Human Performance" report].

Still, there remained perhaps ten years' worth of subsequent remote viewing research conducted at SRI and elsewhere to which Hyman had never previously had access. It, along with the ten SAIC experiments, had been classified Secret or higher until the CIA decided to make it all available in support of the AIR study.

Because of the CIA's declassification action, Hyman finally WAS authorized access to the majority of the research, had he chosen to examine it. However, he himself admits he never bothered, since most of the experiments prior to the SAIC era were in the "three large cartons of documents" he was given at the outset of the study but which he freely admits in a recent article he "didn't have time" to look into (Skeptical Inquirer, March/April 1996, p. 22). In short, he couldn't possibly have known whether those experiments really did suffer from "methodological inadequacies."

Still, Dr. Hyman couches his remarks in such a way as to make an unsuspecting reader suppose that the ten experiments reviewed were the best examples available. Though he clearly knew better, he nevertheless claims in the Skeptical Inquirer article that the ten experiments he and Dr. Utts evaluated were the "ten best studies," and "the best [RV] laboratory studies" (p. 22), implying by assumption that they must therefore be sufficient on which to base an adequate assessment of remote viewing. This despite the fact previously explored in Part II of this review that a number of the SAIC experiments had little or nothing to do with remote viewing, and that the remainder were generally not fully state-of-the-art RV experiments.

Nonetheless, a mere two pages after telling us that he and his AIR fellows themselves arbitrarily decided that only ten experiments would be reviewed, he proceeds to deplore the entire two-and-a-half decades of research for producing "only ten adequate experiments for consideration." Hyman writes:

"Unfortunately, ten experiments. . . is far too few to establish reliable relationships in almost any area of inquiry. In the traditionally elusive quest for psi, ten experiments from one laboratory promise very little in the way of useful conclusions." (3-46) He is, of course, absolutely right in the process of being altogether wrong.

Prima Facie Evidence

The arbitrarily limited data base is not the only difficulty with AIR's study. Perhaps more problematic is Hyman's arbitrary exclusion of so-called "prima facie" evidence (3-71). This is introduced in the section where Hyman (without, I might add, any qualifications whatsoever in the field of intelligence) considers whether RV has potential for use in operational intelligence settings. Though in this part of his discussion he is concerned with practical applications, he seems to have carried over this bias against prima facie evidence from his treatment of the research program itself.

Hyman says that he relies on a definition of prima facie evidence that originated with May and Utts. In her remarks (3- 11), Utts describes prima facie RV evidence as a remote viewing result that is so spectacularly accurate that it virtually proves the existence of the phenomenon, though it is beyond the ability of statistics to describe. This meaning is derived from jurisprudence definitions of prima facie evidence as that evidence which clearly proves a fact, if there can be no other explanations for what has occurred.

Prima facie evidence of remote viewing would be unambiguous information produced by a viewer about a target that could not have been obtained in any other way (i.e., fraud, leaky methodology, etc.). This might be in the form of sketches or verbal responses or both. If the target were, for example, the Eiffel Tower, the sketches and/or verbal descriptions would strikingly match the Eiffel Tower.

There was apparently no specific "prima facie" proof in the ten SAIC experiments (though a couple of the RV sessions appear to have come close), so Hyman's embargo of such evidence would seem not to matter much. However, despite his remarks to the contrary, he doesn't seem to be working from the same definition of prima facie evidence to which Utts and May subscribe. Hyman doesn't elaborate further as to what his personal understanding of the term is, but from the context it seems apparent that he

means to exclude all evidence that cannot be statistically evaluated. If someone designated as judge must look at an RV result, compare it to a target, then come to a conclusion based on his/her own opinion as to whether or not it matches, that evidence is unacceptable because it is based on a subjective judgement.

One of the most time-honored evaluation methods in remote viewing research is to provide the judge with the same set of targets used to task the remote viewers, then allow the judge to "blind match" the remote viewer's results against all the possible targets in that pool. Since the judge thus has no idea what the original target was except that it had been selected from the available target pool, the belief is that the better the RV session, the more likely is the judge to correctly match the viewer's results to the actual target. How many times the judge successfully matches a session to its correct target is then quantified with statistics. It's obvious that this is only one step removed from subjective judgement. But it allows the RV data to be turned into numbers, which can then be more easily manipulated.

This procedure works so long as there is a reasonably limited target pool. However, if the target pool is infinite-- i.e., could be any site, person, object, or event in the entire world (as is the case in intelligence operations)--it is virtually impossible for a judge to be able to match an RV session transcript to a given target based only on internal information. If the viewer says the site is the Eiffel Tower, the judge must evaluate the session data, and if it matches the Eiffel Tower, he/she must go with that conclusion. Success or failure cannot be statistically determined in such a situation. Either the viewer accurately and unmistakably describes the site, or he/she doesn't.

Let's say in the case of the "Eiffel Tower" session that the site was actually a missile launch gantry at Vandenberg AFB. Let's say further that the viewer's data was all extremely accurate in describing the gantry, but that the girder lattice-work, the strong vertical orientation, and the metallic construction caused the viewer to subjectively interpret the site as the Eiffel Tower. In a blind-judging situation with an infinite target pool, this session would be judged as a miss.

Obviously, it was not a miss. The data was accurate, but the viewer's subjective interpretation was wrong. It is clear that another option for judging the accuracy of such a session is necessary. The only alternative that I know of would allow the judge to concurrently compare the actual target information with the session data the remote viewer produced to see how close the RV data matches the actual site. Of course, the judge is no longer "blind," so this becomes an exercise in subjective judgement, and

would therefore be rejected out of hand according to Hyman's criteria.

Certainly, there are potential problems with subjective evaluations of this nature. If the data is somewhat ambiguous-- that is, the elements contained in the feedback potentially match several targets--then the human tendency might be for the judge to think he/she sees the target in the data, even though the data itself isn't accurate enough for a truly objective match.

But with "prima facie" evidence, we are not talking about these ambiguous cases, but rather a target and transcript that match unambiguously. Any competent person would recognize that the target folder and the remote viewing data describe the same target. Ray Hyman would, unfortunately, exclude this as evidence.

As justification for this rejection Hyman cites a study done by David Marks and Richard Kamman in 1981 that purports to prove that a psychological phenomenon they call "subjective validation" was responsible for good results shown by early SRI remote viewing experiments. Essentially, Marks and Kamman maintain that a judge may see what s/he wants to see in evaluating any given remote viewing session, since viewers often describe a variety of elements that might be found in more than one target. However, this study centered around blind judging of targets from a limited target pool, some targets of which shared characteristics with other targets in the series.

This does not hold water in relation to the definition that Utts and May had in mind when referring to prima facie evidence. A true "prima facie" session is not ambiguous. There is NO DOUBT that the correct target has been addressed and described, and any reasonable person would be able to make that same judgement.

In effect, Hyman rejects the use of any sketches or other visual data that must be subjectively compared to the target to determine whether there is correspondence or not. If the viewer is targeted (in the blind, of course) against the Eiffel Tower, and during the course of the session draws unmistakably the Eiffel Tower, it is by Hyman's standards still inadmissible as evidence of remote viewing. What Hyman and his colleagues seem to be saying is that even if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and floats like a duck, we must assume that it's NOT a duck until we have something more convincing.

The irony is that if Hyman's strictures were applied to conventional science,

numerous branches of study that rely on subjective comparisons between one thing and another would dry up and blow away--among these, plant and animal taxonomy, paleontology, and comparative biology.

Lost In The Numbers, or "Statistics Ain't Everything!"

Early in his remarks Hyman alleges that "Parapsycholo[gy] is unique among the sciences in relying solely on significant departures from a chance baseline to establish the presence of its alleged phenomenon" (p. 3-51). In other words, parapsychology is the only science that has to prove itself by showing that something consistently happens more often than you would expect by accident.

Hyman is generally right in saying this about statistical proof as far as psychokinesis (PK) research is concerned--no one has yet demonstrated under scientific conditions the moving of lamps or pianos through the air using "mental" power alone. Indeed, most PK research involves microeffects that only manifest themselves as statistical deviations from the chance baseline to which Hyman refers. One of SAIC's experiments--the computer- driven binary-choice experiment--falls into this "deviation from chance" category.

Hyman is wrong, however, in claiming that remote viewing (obviously a parapsychological effect) is provable only by a statistical deviation from chance. Valid remote viewing produces true "macro" effects in the form of word descriptions, drawings, sketches, etc., that provide information directly applicable to the real world. The statistics involved in evaluating RV research are really only an imperfect, after-the-fact attempt to measure how well remote viewing works in a given experiment. The statistical analysis also serves the goal of limiting the subjective judging mistakes to which humans are vulnerable in ambiguous situations.

But the statistical evaluations are not the proof. The proof is the information provided during the session that could not possibly have been obtained through any other known means of communication. Statistics can be extremely useful as an evaluative tool, but relying too much on them can also be dangerous. It is too easy to get lost in the numbers and lose sight of what they represent.

In theoretical terms, it only takes a single successful remote viewing session

to prove once and for all the existence of the phenomenon. If a viewer in isolation provides accurate data about a target, and if ALL other means by which the information could have been obtained can be ruled out--to include both fraud and chance, no matter how unlikely--the only possible conclusion left must be something beyond our current understanding of the physical universe: in other words "paranormal."

We do not, however, live in a perfect world. First, there is always a possibility that through some incredible hiccup of fate the viewer might by accident hit on the correct target. Second, in the real world theoretical perfection in experimental design is approachable but ultimately unreachable; we often cannot conclusively rule out every explanation besides psi for the effects of a given experiment, the first (or even second or third) time around. Therefore, science insists on replication of successful experiments before the phenomenon the experiments were meant to confirm may be accepted as being real.

Let us assume, now, that after much thought, trial, and error, a proposed set of remote viewing experiments have been "hermetically sealed" against external contamination, mistaken analysis, erroneous conclusions, etc. Let us further suppose that the experimental design is excellent, with a virtually unlimited target pool, and constructed such that clear distinctions between accurate and inaccurate data can be made when it comes time to judge results. Let us finally suppose that there is adequate oversight to guarantee against fraud.

Now, what if after one or two experimental sessions, a RV researcher produces an excellent match with the chosen target? This could of course be just wild, hole-in-one luck. Let's say further that after two or three more sessions there is another unmistakable, if uncanny match. Still chance? Yes, but considerably less likely. But what if the viewer continues to have these explicit matches every few sessions--indeed has runs where maybe two or three sessions in a row match significantly-- or even precisely--with the respective targets? At what point do we give up on chance and acknowledge that something is going on that can't be explained in standard physical terms?

These results could not be evaluated statistically--at best one could say 50% of the time the viewer was accurate, or 30% or 72%, or whatever. But these statistics would be completely meaningless. According to Hyman's interpretation of the rules of empirical science, barring a very rare accident of probability the viewer should not be able to describe the target accurately even ONCE. If the viewer is successful in describing the target not just once

but a number of times on an ongoing basis the fact is that it doesn't matter if he or she fails most of the rest of the time. In the paradigm of the physical universe under which Hyman and his AIR friends operate, the viewer should ALWAYS be wrong. This is not proof obtained by statistical "deviation from a chance baseline." Those terms make no sense here. Yet this is indeed proof, though proof that is unacceptable to the skeptics.

Ironically, the requirement for statistical proof that Hyman deplores was imposed on RV research by the skeptics themselves when they rejected evidence that required subjective evaluation of any sort, no matter how obvious. Now, based on Jessica Utts' thorough discussion in the AIR report, it seems clear that the statistical evidence Hyman and his fellows demanded has now been provided. Yet Hyman states that it is premature to accept these figures as proof. We must wait to see if anyone can come up with some way of showing that the data does not say what it obviously does say. In other words, now that we can no longer dispute that it looks, walks, and quacks like a duck, we must now carry out exhaustive genetic tests to prove its ducky heritage. When THOSE tests confirm that it is a duck, then we must wait through a few more generations of technical development in genetic testing to see if we can create a test that WILL prove that it is not a duck.

But this attitude is no surprise. Skeptical evaluation of psi research has often resembled an archery match where during the contest the judges keep moving the target of one competitor while leaving those of all other contestants in place. By refusing to acknowledge that there is now adequate proof that psi exists; by insisting that we cannot make any judgement about the existence of psi based on SAIC's experiments (as well as the others mentioned by Utts); by declining to examine ALL the newly available experimental evidence; and by failing altogether to consider the historical track record of the intelligence operations portion of STAR GATE's predecessors, Hyman and his cohorts have effectively "moved the target" once more. In so doing, he has not preserved the purity of science. He has only demonstrated his apparent intention never to accept ANY proof, no matter how compelling, for the effectiveness of remote viewing or the existence of psi.

Summation

Since at the conclusion of all three parts of this review the discussion is now

quite long and convoluted, I shall summarize the general points below:

- AIR narrowed the scope of its evaluation to focus on only a few years and a few experiments out of more than two decades of RV research and many experiments. As a result, the AIR assessment is useless as a comprehensive and meaningful evaluation of remote viewing and its practical applications.
- The SAIC experiments that AIR reviewed were not themselves a fair test of the remote viewing phenomenon. Yet despite their shortcomings, the experiments still demonstrated a persistent positive result that it seems can only be ascribed to a paranormal cause.
- Though Hyman admits the data shows an effect, he wants to keep the door open indefinitely--never admitting that psi may be involved--in hopes that eventually an alternative explanation to psi can be discovered to account for these effects (by inference, he seems to imply fraud).
- Ultimately, though Utts makes a far stronger case for the existence of some sort of psi phenomenon being evidenced by SAIC results, AIR throws the debate to Hyman, without satisfactorily explaining why his case was deemed more compelling. Based on his flawed evaluation Hyman decides that he has sufficient data and personal expertise to extend his evaluation into the operational arena--and concludes that remote viewing is of no use in intelligence collection.

Of course, the purported motivation for the AIR evaluation that produced in the flawed report for the CIA was to determine whether remote viewing was useful as an intelligence collection tool. By the manner in which the study was conducted and in the way the negative conclusions were reached in the report, it should be clear by now that the evaluation not only failed to honestly determine whether remote viewing was of any intelligence use: It also showed conclusively that there was an unacknowledged, predetermined agenda to produce negative findings as the conclusion to the report.

Presumably, the AIR itself had no particular prior bias against remote viewing. This leaves the contracting agency as the culprit. It would seem that the Central Intelligence Agency gave the AIR its marching orders: To find no merit in the program no matter what the evidence itself showed. In Part One I suggested reasons for this, but at this point that all still remains only speculative. Nonetheless, there does appear to be a smoking gun here; and, as has so often been the case recently, it seems to be lying at the feet of the CIA.

Addendum and Corrections to Mr. "X"'s Review of the AIR/CIA Assessment of Remote Viewing

by "Mr. X" (Paul Smith)

This series was written by someone intimately familiar with the various incarnations of our government's remote viewing efforts. His identity is known to Ingo as well as to me. He has stated that he will be revealing himself in the very near future, and uses the *nom de plume* of "Mr. X" for good (but temporary) reasons.

..... THOMAS BURGIN

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Since publishing the three installments of Mr. "X"'s review of the CIA/AIR report on remote viewing, I have received a number of comments concerning how I described Ed May's research in Part 2. My evaluation concluded that the research selected for evaluation--while interesting from a parapsychological standpoint--was of limited value in (a) establishing the reality of remote viewing, and (b) developing new techniques to improve the efficiency of the operational effort. These two goals were among the three originally mandated for the program by Congress during the GRILL FLAME era, and never officially rescinded.

Based on what is evident in the AIR report, and on peripheral material and knowledgeable sources to which I had access, my assessment of the

research program seemed accurate. The experiments evaluated by the AIR at the behest of the CIA were the ten most recently done by May at SAIC, and were arbitrarily chosen by Ray Hyman and his colleagues at AIR to represent the research done on remote viewing. I still maintain that those ten experiments were inadequate in achieving goals (a) and (b) above. However, this assessment--admittedly based on incomplete, if nonetheless extensive data--may reflect unfairly on Ed May's efforts and intentions in the pursuit of remote viewing and psi research. It is, of course, not Ed May's fault that Hyman and his associates refused to examine other of the program's research that might have more strongly supported the remote viewing phenomenon.

Comments from Joe McMoneagle shed further interesting light on Ray Hyman's actions in the course of the AIR survey. According to Joe, "Hyman sat down with two other members of the AIR staff and two reps from the agency [CIA]," and sorted through "about sixty papers" reporting on experiments done at SRI-I and SAIC. They then "'decided' which ones they would accept for review..."

* * *

This November I had a conversation with Dale Graff, who during his career was one of the primary DIA points-of-contact for the program, and was also branch chief and project manager for the operational unit at Ft. Meade in the early '90s. Dale told me he felt that I had erred in my comments on the research program, and that I had based my analysis on inadequate knowledge of the circumstances under which the research program was conducted.

According to Dale (and he speaks with some authority, since he was often intimately involved in the contracting process throughout much of the program's history until his retirement in 1993), there were many bureaucratic and political factors that went beyond operational considerations in guiding the course the research took. Often, May was forced by agencies and influential individuals with other agendas to pursue specific experimental directions that went beyond supporting the operational remote viewing effort. Neither May, nor Graff and his DIA associates were fully able to dictate the route experiments were to take. Though I discussed this problem in Part 2 of the review, I did not sufficiently recognize the impact it had on the research program.

Dale made a further point in the course of our conversation. He suggested

that even if parapsychology research unrelated to remote viewing per se did not directly affect remote viewing as an intelligence collection tool, nonetheless successful research could still help improve the program's prospects. Strong evidence of any psi effect would undercut the objections of the critics and bolster support for all aspects of the RV program--including the operational unit.

While I myself believe that a research program that more fully concentrated on the remote viewing phenomenon itself could have served much the same purpose, still Dale's point is certainly relevant.

* * *

Other information I received recently also shows May in a more favorable light. According to Joe McMoneagle, "on two occasions, Ed (with myself and others) did the two week circuit in DC, convincing the folks in Congress that the program shouldn't be shut down and it should be funded" (this refers to funding for the operational program; research funding, Joe explains, was a separate issue).

Part 2 of the review also contained some misinformation that I must here clear up. My evaluation of the support received from Ed May and the research program was based on mine and others' perceptions at the "operator level" in the Ft. Meade unit. We saw little or no input from the research folks to show that they even cared that we existed, and concluded they were ignoring us and going off on their own tangent.

Thanks to McMoneagle, I now know that perception to be erroneous. He mentioned in his communications with me that along with the boxes of research passed to the AIR evaluators (and, as I reported, not subsequently "evaluated") were another "nineteen packages of reports, recommendations, and materials from SRI-I and SAIC, [including] collection methodologies," which had been passed to the managers of the operational program over the period 1988 to 1994 and NEVER OPENED. In other words, the research program was indeed attempting to fulfill its obligation to support the operational unit, but was apparently short-stopped by the very people who should have been integrating any promising new techniques or methods developed by the research.

As an operational viewer, I find it outrageous that this material was not at least evaluated, and passed on if it looked useful. Whether or not it could ultimately have been integrated with the other successful methods we used

(and I suspect that much, if not all might have been), I think most of us would have welcomed the opportunity to at least entertain responsible new ideas and approaches--particularly if they shed light on some of the thornier problems with which we often had to deal. I owe Ed May and his team an apology on this one.

Finally, I must reiterate a point I made in Part One of the Mr. "X" review, which McMoneagle has reminded me of. One should have no illusions about the last days of STAR GATE. In its final years, the program suffered from major problems and deficiencies, and provided no little ammunition of its own to be used against it. Uneven and at times outright bad management, poor performance and few accurate results in the latter years, ill-will from upper-echelon bosses, poor unit morale, and divisiveness within the organization tolled Star Gate's death knell. Nevertheless, had the program's high-level management (i.e., from the director and deputy director level on down), (1) wanted the program to succeed, and (2) been doing their jobs properly, the deplorable conditions at the Ft. Meade unit would never have developed.

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