



SHIMP FOR PRESIDENT 2028

DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER

BUY AMERICAN AND STRATEGIC SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

Presidential Day-One Policy Draft

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ACCOUNTABILITY | INTEGRITY | RULE OF LAW

This campaign discussion draft establishes a government-wide strategy to strengthen American manufacturing, identify dangerous foreign dependencies, secure critical supply chains, improve federal procurement of American-made goods, and build domestic capacity in sectors essential to national security and economic resilience.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

BUY AMERICAN AND STRATEGIC SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Purpose and National Policy.

It is the policy of the United States to strengthen domestic production, protect critical supply chains, expand American manufacturing capacity, support American workers and businesses, and reduce dangerous dependence on foreign adversaries or unreliable foreign sources for goods and materials essential to national security, public health, food production, energy, transportation, communications, and critical infrastructure.

Federal procurement and supply-chain policy shall be administered consistent with laws enacted by Congress, treaty and trade obligations applicable to the United States, national-security requirements, competition, fiscal responsibility, and the need for resilient domestic production.

Sec. 2. Government-Wide Strategic Supply Chain Review.

- (a) Within 30 days, the Secretary of Commerce shall coordinate an interagency Strategic Supply Chain Review with the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Transportation, State, Treasury, Interior, and other appropriate agencies.
- (b) Within 120 days, the Review shall identify goods, materials, technologies, components, and productive capabilities for which excessive foreign concentration creates a material risk to the United States.
- (c) The Review shall distinguish ordinary international trade from dependencies that could materially impair national defense, public health, food security, energy security, transportation, communications, or the operation of critical infrastructure during a crisis.

Sec. 3. Priority Strategic Sectors.

The Review shall give particular attention to pharmaceuticals and essential medical products; semiconductors and advanced electronics; critical minerals and processed materials; transformers and electric-grid equipment; telecommunications equipment; defense components; energy equipment; batteries and energy-storage components; agricultural inputs including fertilizer, seed, crop-protection inputs, and veterinary products; transportation equipment and replacement parts; machine tools; water-system equipment; and other sectors determined to be essential to national security or economic resilience.

Sec. 4. Buy American Federal Procurement.

- (a) To the maximum extent permitted by law, executive agencies shall prioritize American-made products, materials, and components in federal procurement.
- (b) Agency heads shall review waivers, exceptions, and procurement practices that permit acquisition of foreign products when compliant American alternatives are reasonably available.
- (c) Waivers required by operational necessity, unreasonable cost, nonavailability, emergency circumstances, national security, or applicable law shall be documented according to governing procurement requirements.
- (d) Nothing in this order authorizes agencies to disregard competition requirements, appropriations restrictions, trade obligations, or procurement statutes.

Sec. 5. Domestic Manufacturing Capacity.

- (a) The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with other agencies, shall identify significant domestic manufacturing capacity gaps in strategic sectors.
- (b) Agencies shall use existing lawful grant, loan, procurement, research, technical-assistance, and other authorities to support economically sustainable domestic production where doing so materially improves national resilience.
- (c) Programs shall prioritize measurable productive capacity rather than indefinite subsidies unsupported by performance.

Sec. 6. Critical Minerals and Processing.

- (a) The Secretaries of Interior, Energy, Commerce, and Defense shall identify critical minerals and processed materials for which the United States is dangerously dependent on foreign adversaries or highly concentrated foreign supply.

- (b) Agencies shall use existing authorities to facilitate responsible domestic mining, processing, refining, recycling, substitution, and recovery of critical materials, consistent with environmental, worker-safety, tribal, and other applicable laws.
- (c) The Review shall identify opportunities for secure supply from reliable allies where domestic production cannot reasonably satisfy national requirements.

Sec. 7. Medical and Pharmaceutical Supply Security.

- (a) The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall assess foreign dependence involving essential medicines, active pharmaceutical ingredients, medical devices, personal protective equipment, diagnostic supplies, and other products necessary for public-health emergencies.
- (b) HHS shall identify lawful measures to strengthen domestic production, diversify sources, improve visibility into upstream suppliers, and maintain appropriate reserves of critical medical products.
- (c) Procurement policies shall consider supply security and manufacturing resilience in addition to acquisition price where authorized by law.

Sec. 8. Agricultural Supply Chain Security.

- (a) The Secretary of Agriculture shall identify dangerous foreign dependencies involving fertilizer, seed, veterinary medicines, farm machinery and replacement parts, crop-protection products, food-processing equipment, cold storage, and other agricultural inputs.
- (b) USDA shall develop recommendations to expand domestic production, processing, storage, and distribution capacity and to protect farmers from disruptions caused by concentrated foreign supply.
- (c) This section shall be coordinated with the Administration's agricultural independence and food-security policies.

Sec. 9. Energy and Grid Supply Chains.

- (a) The Secretary of Energy shall assess supply risks involving transformers, switchgear, generators, nuclear-fuel-cycle materials, pipelines and refinery equipment, batteries, power electronics, transmission components, and other equipment necessary for reliable energy infrastructure.
- (b) Agencies shall identify opportunities to expand domestic manufacturing and strategic inventories of long-lead-time equipment whose shortage could materially delay restoration of critical infrastructure.

Sec. 10. Semiconductors, Telecommunications, and Digital Infrastructure.

- (a) The Secretaries of Commerce and Homeland Security shall assess foreign concentration in semiconductors, telecommunications systems, network hardware, data-center equipment, industrial control systems, and other technologies essential to government and critical infrastructure.
- (b) Agencies shall identify procurement and supply-chain-security measures to reduce unacceptable risks involving foreign control, malicious modification, counterfeit components, or inability to obtain replacement equipment during a crisis.

Sec. 11. Federal Contractor Supply Chain Disclosure.

- (a) Agencies shall review whether existing procurement authorities adequately require contractors supplying critical goods to disclose material foreign dependencies and significant changes in sources of supply.
- (b) OMB shall recommend standardized disclosure requirements where legally appropriate, while protecting classified information, trade secrets, proprietary information, and legitimate small-business interests.
- (c) False statements or fraudulent certifications concerning domestic content or supply-chain origin shall be referred for appropriate administrative, civil, or criminal review under existing law.

Sec. 12. Small and Medium-Sized American Manufacturers.

- (a) The Secretary of Commerce and Administrator of the Small Business Administration shall identify barriers preventing qualified small and medium-sized American manufacturers from competing for federal procurement and strategic supply-chain opportunities.
- (b) Agencies shall improve lawful access to technical assistance, procurement information, manufacturing-extension resources, and applicable financing programs.

- (c) Federal policy shall avoid unnecessary compliance burdens that disproportionately exclude smaller domestic producers without materially advancing safety, integrity, or national-security objectives.

Sec. 13. Strategic Stockpiles and Emergency Reserves.

- (a) Agencies responsible for strategic or emergency inventories shall review stockpile levels, shelf life, geographic distribution, supplier concentration, replenishment capability, and surge requirements.
- (b) Agencies shall identify materials and components for which a limited strategic reserve would substantially reduce the consequences of war, natural disaster, pandemic, cyberattack, transportation disruption, or foreign export restrictions.
- (c) Any expansion requiring new appropriations shall be presented to Congress.

Sec. 14. Protection Against Foreign Adversary Dependence.

- (a) The interagency Review shall identify supply relationships in which control by a foreign adversary presents an unacceptable national-security risk.
- (b) Agencies shall recommend targeted, evidence-based mitigation measures, which may include supplier diversification, domestic production, allied sourcing, procurement restrictions, investment review, stockpiling, or other actions authorized by law.
- (c) Measures shall be tailored to actual security risks and shall not treat lawful foreign commerce as inherently suspect.

Sec. 15. Supply Chain Crisis Response.

- (a) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with Commerce and other agencies, shall establish procedures for rapid interagency coordination when a major supply disruption threatens critical infrastructure, national defense, food, medicine, energy, or transportation.
- (b) The procedures shall identify emergency authorities, alternative suppliers, transportation options, available inventories, and priority requirements.
- (c) Agencies shall conduct periodic exercises involving significant supply-chain disruption scenarios.

Sec. 16. Transparency and Performance Measurement.

- (a) Within 180 days, the Secretary of Commerce shall publish an unclassified American Strategic Supply Chain Report identifying major vulnerabilities and measurable resilience objectives, except where disclosure would threaten national security or reveal protected information.
- (b) Agencies shall measure progress using indicators such as domestic production capacity, supplier concentration, lead times, strategic inventory, geographic diversity, and the availability of qualified alternative suppliers.
- (c) Agencies shall report material progress to the President every 180 days for the first 2 years.

Sec. 17. Recommendations to Congress.

- (a) Within 180 days, the Secretary of Commerce and Director of OMB shall identify supply-chain vulnerabilities that cannot adequately be addressed under existing executive authority.
- (b) The Administration shall submit recommended legislation where necessary concerning appropriations, tax incentives, procurement law, strategic reserves, domestic manufacturing, critical minerals, infrastructure, or other statutory reforms.
- (c) Nothing in this order shall be construed to appropriate funds or alter requirements established by Congress.

Sec. 18. General Provisions.

- (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, an independent regulatory agency, or the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
- (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
- (c) Nothing in this order authorizes discrimination prohibited by law, unlawful seizure of private property, violation of binding trade obligations, or disclosure of classified, proprietary, or protected information.
- (d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, officers, employees, agents, contractors, or any other person.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 20, 2029.

DRAFTING NOTE

This order uses existing executive-branch procurement, national-security, industrial-base, emergency-preparedness, and supply-chain authorities to begin strengthening American production immediately. New mandatory spending, tax incentives, broad statutory procurement changes, or other authorities requiring legislation are reserved for recommendations to Congress.