

EXHIBIT 9

DECLARATION OF YVONNE NYSTROM

I, Yvonne Nystrom, hereby declare as follows under penalty of perjury:

1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to make this declaration.
2. I am a citizen of the United States and of the State of Arizona.
3. I reside in Mesa, Arizona.
4. From October 31, 2022, through November 15, 2022, and November 20, 2022 and November 21, 2022. I served as a part-time employee of Maricopa County working as a level 1 signature verification worker. It was my job to, among other things, perform signature verification on ballots.
5. To perform our work, we were given the following materials, and were told to follow them:
 - a. Attached as Exhibit A is the “Maricopa County Elections Department, 2022 General Election” manual,
 - b. Attached as Exhibit B is the “Electronic Adjudication Board Procedures,” and
 - c. Attached as Exhibit C is the “Maricopa County Elections Department VRAS System-Research” manual.
6. At my location, there were a total of 24 people reviewing and verifying signatures. We were divided into two rooms. In addition, there was also a night crew, in which I was part of the night crew, of about eight to ten people working 3 p.m. until about 7:30 p.m.
7. The process for signature verification of ballots is as follows:
 - a. There were three levels for signature verification. Level one was composed of part-time employees of the county who compare an image of the ballot envelope

against one to three images of a voter's signature in the voter file which are normally the three most recent images of voter forms.

- b. ballot signatures at level one was either approved or rejected; another word for rejected ballots was "exception."
- c. If a ballot signature was rejected then it was automatically reviewed at level 2. Level 2 signature verification was composed of managers who were more experienced employees of the county. Review at level 2 included the same images as level 1, but level 2 was allowed to see more images of the signature in the voter's file, and was allowed to zoom in on signature images.
- d. There was a level 3 review of signatures as well. It is not clear whether this third level was part of level two or an additional level. In any event, I worked at level one and it was my clear understanding that there were three levels of review, and that each of the above levels had the ability to reverse a rejection of a ballot signature. Level 2 could reverse level 1. Level three could reversed level 1 and/or 2. Level 3 managers also would send the whole managers "que" back to the level 1 part-time employees to review the signatures that had already been rejected by level 1 and 2 personnel to accept the signatures or reject them again.
- e. There were observers watching the review of level 1. Some observers in other rooms were able to see some of level 2 managers. I do know that in my room for the evening shift, the observers were not able to see or observe the managers in my room.
- f. After the above signature review, Runbeck batched ballots into categories for those with approved signatures and rejected signatures. The accepted ballots were

sent to ballot processing and counted and the rejected signature ballots were sent into a process whereby the ballot could be cured.

- g. The curing process was flawed for at least two reasons: (1) inadequate personally identifiable information (“PII”) and (2) an inability for the voter to see and verify that their signature was in fact the signature being viewed by the curing worker. The voter was on the phone and, of course, could not see signature that was being viewed by the curing worker on the actual green envelope.
- h. The process for curing included a person who would call the voter at the number listed on the green envelope. Most of the time, perhaps sixty to seventy (60% - 70%) of the time the person calling the alleged voter only had the name on the ballot, the phone number and the address. This was because the curing worker was not at a computer and was only able to look at the actual green envelope. However, the person who sent the green envelope and ballot was permitted to write a phone number on the green envelope that was mailed in that was different from the one listed in their voter file. This occurred a number of times. There were probably forty percent (40%) of phone numbers on the green envelopes that were different from the number listed in the voter file. Of course, voters do change phone numbers, but this seemed to be a very large number of different numbers. The above struck me and the curing workers as odd.
- i. Observers were allowed into the curing process, but not in some areas. Some of the curing process occurred in the ballot processing room and the observers were only allowed in a designated area in that room and that area was far away from where the curing employees were working.

- j. The part-time employees performing of the curing function were given a batch of stickers to place on a ballot, including stickers indicating that a ballot was: “Letter Sent (LS),” “Left Message (LM),” “Phone Disconnected (PD),” “Wrong Number (WN),” “Verified (VER),” and other statuses. One of the problems with the stickers was that workers were not controlled or kept accountable with access to stickers and placement of stickers. Nothing prevented a worker from accessing many “approved” stickers and placing them on ballots. Once stickers were placed on ballots there was no record on the ballot or elsewhere to determined who placed the sticker there; there were no individual identifying initials or signatures on the sticker. The system was insecure and subject to abuse by permitting false placement of approved stickers without accountability.
8. If a signature was rejected then it would be reviewed by the first level manager which was William, Jeff Beimer, or Andrew George. Those are the three first level managers. If these managers agreed with me and also rejected the signatures, then it went to the next level managers, for second level manager approval. Those second level managers were Aloma Richmond, Michelle Acker, Tony (Antonio) Ortiz, and Celia Nabor. Bill Gates was occasionally there, but I don’t know if he performed signature verification review. Scott Jarrett and Rey Valenzuela were co-elections directors, and they were there every day. I am not sure if Scott and/or Rey performed signature verification of not, but they were third level managers.
9. We had observers watching level 1 signature verifiers such as myself, but they did not watch all level 2/3 managers who also performed approvals and rejections on signature

verification. There were times when my level 1 que of work was worked by a level 2 or level 3 manager above me without observers watching their work.

10. My job was to review a scan of the actual green affidavit with the voter's signatures and to match the signature with one of the three (or less) signatures of the voter on file to verify or reject the signature.
11. I worked a total of 16.5 hours in signature verification during the time I was working the election. The other hours were spent in ballot processing, ballot duplication, ballot adjudication and SEB (Special Elections Board).
12. It took me approximately a minute on each signed affidavit envelope to either approve or reject a voter's signature. Some affidavits took much less time due to no signature, obvious wrong signature, a protected signature and such. Those signatures were immediately rejected.
13. From my experience during my time, the rejection rate for bad signatures was approximately thirty-five to forty percent (35% - 40%). The highest rate of rejection was forty percent.
14. I do not know the rejection rate for others in my room, but I do know that a lot of people working in my room said that they were also not verifying numerous signatures because of how bad they were.
15. On November 15th, before we left for the last day of the job, Jacque and I questioned Aloma about the remaining ballots requiring curing because there were still several bins with about two to three thousand ballots to be cured. Aloma told us we were free to go and to not worry about those thousands of ballots since they were only for the managers

to handle. However, it is my understanding that no observers monitored the curing process of the managers.

16. The computer records from EVRT program showed the number of signature rejections by me and the managers. I do not know how many times the managers reversed my rejection of the signatures. I was not able to see that information. I do know that observers were not watching the work of the managers above me who had the ability to change my rejection of signatures. If one of the managers changed by rejection, then that should be recorded under their name in the computer records of the EVRT program.
17. The reversal of signature rejections was handled through a process of curing. This was after the last level of managers still disapproved of the envelope signature it would go to the process of calling the voter to cure the signature. We had a script to talk to the voter or leave a scripted message for them to call the Star Center, which was a third-party contractor that worked completely off-site but had the same access to the voter's file information as we did on the computers at MCTEC, to cure their affidavit signature. My understanding of the Star Center's curing process was to verify information from the voter's file, i.e., the last 4 of their SS #, driver's license #, street address, full name and any other identifying information in their file. It is my understanding that the Star Center was able to cure and did cure ballots, but were not able to see the actual ballot with the signature on it. It is my understanding that the Star Center work was not monitored with observers, whereas my work was required to be monitored by observers. Since they had the ability to cure and reverse the rejection of signatures, I do not know why their work was not monitored by observers.

18. Part of the process for curing ballots that had been rejected for bad signatures, was for the part-time employees to call a number for the voter and speak with a person they thought could be the voter. They would ask for personal identifying information (“PII”) to confirm the person and ask them if they were the voter, but the person who allegedly voted was never able to see the signature to see if it was their signature, they would simply say they were the voter, give some PII, and say they signed the affidavit.
19. There were times that the curing workers called voters that had rejected signatures and those alleged voters would tell us that they never voted. For example, we had some college students who said they never voted and did not sign the ballots. Obviously, we voided those ballots, but as long as the person on the phone said they were the voter, and was able to give some PII, it is my understanding that those ballots were approved and went on to the ballot processing, even if the signature was previously rejected.
20. The permanent employee managers were Tony (Antonio) Ortiz, or Aloma Richmond or Michelle Acker. They had more experience and were trained on curing poor signatures. When they cured a ballot that had been signed by the spouse, it is my understanding they would just put a label on the affidavit with the voter’s name on it that said the husband or wife had signed the affidavit for the other as a type of household signature exchange. The ballot would then go to Runbeck for scanning and the green ballot envelope would go through the same signature verification as any other ballot envelope.
21. On the last day of work, November 15, we were asked by manager Celia to go through perhaps 5,000 to 7,000 ballots, that had already been rejected at levels 1, 2 and 3. We were asked to go to the SHELL program and to only find one signature that matched the green envelope, even if all other signatures in the program did not match the green

envelope. The implication from Celia is that was desperate to get the work complete and that she wanted the ballots approved. These 5,000 to 7,000 ballots had already been through the full level 1, 2, and 3 process and been rejected. Therefore, I do not know why were going through them again, and that is why it seemed that Celia wanted them approved.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

Signed: Yvonne Nystrom
Yvonne Nystrom

Date: 12-7-22