


Voters Organized for Trusted Election Results Visit: VoterGa.org




UNPLUG GEORGIA

with

SECURE PAPER BALLOTS

HAND MARKED and
HAND COUNTED

...at the polls



UN-PLUG GEORGIA

- Serialize Paper Ballots
- Hand Mark Votes
- Cast Ballots Secretly
- Hand Count Publicly at Polls
- Decrease Election Costs

FOR ALL UN-BALL

- Make Ce Ballots P
- Make Count Verifiable
- Make Fraud Detectable
- Protect Chain of Custody

ALL BALLOTS
PUBLIC RECORD


Confidence in elections. Real Ballot under UV Light

PAPER HAND MARKED BALLOTS HAND COUNTED PLEASE



GEORGIANS FOR TRUTH.ORG

Americans used hand marked, hand counted paper ballots for 200 years




Then we turned to machines because we wanted instant results

The image shows a Scantron test form, labeled "PART 1". It includes a "SUBJECTIVE SCORE INSTRUCTOR USE ONLY" section at the top left with a grid for marking scores. Below this is a "KEY" section with 50 numbered rows, each containing a question number and five possible answers (A, B, C, D, E). The form also features several instructional boxes: "IMPORTANT" with a checklist for test takers, "SHORT ESSAY • COMPLETION • MULTIPLE CHOICE • MATCHING" for the test types, and a "TEST RECORD" section with fields for NAME, SUBJECT, DATE, TEST NO., PERIOD, PART 1, PART 2, and TOTAL. A "SCANTRON" logo is visible in the center, and a "FOR USE ON TEST SCORING MACHINE ONLY" label is at the bottom right.

We thought the machines were accurate and safe – like a Scantron at school





Mountains
of evidence
suggest we
have all
have been
duped.


2020 Election Inaccuracies –Coffee Co.

1. Coffee Co. voting system produced 39 new votes during 2020 recount with **no change in ballots cast**
2. Voting system then failed to count 185 new ballots **twice**

2020 Election Inaccuracies –Coffee Co.

DISCREPENCIES IN THE NOVEMBER 3, 2020 GENERAL ELECTION AND RECOUNTS

Date	Activity	Action #	Trump	Biden	Jorgensen	Write-IN*	Total Votes	Internal Delta
11/3/2020	Election Day 1	1	10578	4511	125	23	15237	
11/17/2020	Hand Recount	2	10578	4511	126	NA	15238	
	Compare 2 to 1		0	0	+1		+1	+1
11/30/2020	Electronic Recount	3	10597	4520	136	0	15258	
	Compare 3 to 1		+19	+9	+11			+39
	Compare 3 to 2		+19	+9	+12			+40
11/30/2020	2nd uploaded 185 BALLOTS	4	NO CHANGE	NO CHANGE	NO CHANGE	0	NO CHANGE	
The tabulated Electronic Recount revealed the above discrepancies								
Investigation revealed we negelected to run 185 balltos: we then ran these ballots								
we reviewed the resultsbut there was No Change in Vote Count Despite 185 Ballots Added								
The on Site Dominion Rep could not explain why system would not update votes								
The Dominion Rep directed the Board of Elections to make a decision about what to do.								
FOR SOME REASON NO WRITE-IN COLUMN PRINTED ON THE RECOUNT SUMMARY								
THERE WAS NO EXPLANATION OR SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM								
12/2/2020	Prepare to Certify	5	10597	4520	136	5	15258	
	Compare 5 to 1		+19	+9	+11			+39
	Compare 5 to 2		+19	+9	+12			+40
There is a discrepancy between Electronic Recount and total votes for both 1 & 2								
Stated Differently after 3 counts a clear inconsistency exists as one compares the orgional election counts, the hand recount, and the electronic recount.								
Anomilies in software recounts create irreconciable difference in vote count which leaves the Board with no clear guidance as to which count to certify.								
* Write-IN and NO Votes are NOT included in the Total Votes								



Investigation revealed we neglected to run 185 ballots: we then ran these ballots we reviewed the results there was no change in vote count despite 185 ballots added.

Source: Coffee County letter to Sec. of State Raffensperger
<https://www.scribd.com/document/663729833/Coffee-Election-Issues-Official-Statement-20202>

2022 Primary Election Inaccuracies – DeKalb Co.

DeKalb District 2 Commission results reported on May 24

Candidate	Election Day	Advance Voting	Absentee by Mail	Provisional	Total
Lauren Alexander	2993	1569	304	0	4866
Marshall Orson	3524	1590	413	0	5527
Michelle Long Spears	1029	2194	447	0	3670
Total Votes	7546	5353	1164	0	14063

Includes results from 5 redistricted precincts

District 2 results of audited hand count reported on June 3

Candidate	Election Day	Advance Voting	Absentee by Mail	Provisional	Total
Lauren Alexander	3004	1561	306	7	4878
Marshall Orson	2068	1541	418	5	4032
Michelle Long Spears	4078	2291	450	4	6823
Donald Broussard	53	39	43	0	135
Total	9203	5432	1217	16	15868

System failed to count 1805 votes

System shorted Mrs. Spears 3049 votes, added 1456 unearned votes to Mr. Orson

Accuracy? Remember Michelle Long-Spears in the DeKalb County 2022 Primary?

- Michelle Long Spears finished 3rd in the 2022 DeKalb Co. Dist. 2 Commission primary race but had no votes in the precinct where she and husband voted
- She reported the problem and DeKalb County Elections tried to run a machine recount. It failed
- DeKalb postponed certification to do a hand count audit of the District 2 Commission race.
- The hand count showed that she won and that 1,805 ballots were scanned but not counted.

Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices

**The Halderman
Report is
96-pages of ways to
hack Georgia's
voting machines**

Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of Plaintiffs Donna Curling, et al.
Curling v. Raffensperger, Civil Action No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

Prof. J. Alex Halderman, Ph.D.

With the assistance of Prof. Drew Springall, Ph.D.

July 1, 2021

Source: [Case 1:17-cv-02989-AT Document 1681 Filed 06/14/23](#)

EXPERT

Background

The “Halderman Report” is a **96-page** document authored by Alex Halderman of Michigan State University focused on the vulnerabilities of the Dominion Voting System in Georgia. Halderman is:

- Professor of Computer Science & Engineering.
- Director, University of Michigan Center for Computer Security and Society
- Director, Michigan Computer Science & Engineering Systems Lab.



Prof. Halderman writes that the touchscreens can subvert
ALL security mechanisms – not a few, some or many but
ALL.

1.1 Principal Findings

I show that the ICX ^{touchscreen} suffers from critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited to subvert all of its security mechanisms, including: user authentication, data integrity protection, access control, privilege separation, audit logs, protective counters, hash validation, and external firmware validation. I demonstrate that these vulnerabilities provide multiple routes by which attackers can install malicious software on Georgia's BMDs, either with temporary physical access or remotely from election management systems (EMSs). I explain how such malware can alter voters' votes while subverting all of the procedural protections practiced by the State, including acceptance testing, hash validation, logic and accuracy testing, external firmware validation, and risk-limiting audits (RLAs).

[Haldeman Report Link](#)

Prof. Halderman writes that Georgia voters should have NO CONFIDENCE their votes are counted correctly.

My technical findings leave Georgia voters with greatly diminished grounds to be confident that the votes they cast on the ICX BMD are secured, that their votes will be counted correctly, or that any future elections conducted using Georgia's universal-BMD system will be reasonably secure from attack and produce the correct results. No grand conspiracies would be necessary to commit large-scale fraud, but rather only moderate technical skills of the kind that attackers who are likely to target Georgia's elections already possess. Unfortunately, even if such an attack never comes, the fact that Georgia's BMDs are so vulnerable is all but certain to be exploited by partisan actors to suppress voter participation and cast doubt on the legitimacy of election results.

[Haldeman Report Link](#)



SHARED

Halderman Report Doc 1681 PDF



6.1 Extracting Election Secrets from Poll Worker Cards

Issue: *Anyone with access to a single Poll Worker Card and the corresponding PIN can easily extract secret keys and other values used for securing election data throughout the county.*

The ICX smart card protocol does not authenticate the device reading the card. As a result, anyone with the correct PIN can read the data on the card in a

A single poll worker card can²⁸
be used to compromise an
entire county.

29

GWINNETT COUNTY / CONDADO DE GWINNETT

330-051

OFFICIAL ABSENTEE/PROVISIONAL/EMERGENCY BALLOT
BOLETA OFICIAL AUSENTE/PROVISIONAL/EMERGENCIA

OFFICIAL GENERAL AND SPECIAL ELECTION BALLOT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
BOLETA OFICIAL DE LA ELECCIÓN GENERAL Y ESPECIAL DEL ESTADO DE GEORGIA
NOVEMBER 3, 2020 / 3 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2020

INSTRUCTIONS / INSTRUCCIONES:

To Vote

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Warning

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Do NOT use check marks or 'X' to mark ballot.
Do NOT mark more choices per race than allowed.
Do NOT sign, cut, tear or damage the ballot provided.

Atención:

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NO haga círculo, subraye o marque a través de las opciones.
NO use equis (X) para marcar la boleta.
NO marque más opciones por carrera que las autorizadas.
NO firme, corte o dañe la boleta.

Voter

- 1. Use tinta negra o azul para marcar la boleta.
2. Complete el óvalo vacío a la izquierda del nombre del candidato o de quien elija en todas las carreras electorales en las que desea votar.
3. Si vota por un candidato Por escrito, complete el óvalo vacío a la izquierda de la elección Por escrito, luego escriba el nombre del candidato Por escrito en el espacio provisto.

If you make a mistake or change your mind on a selection:

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B. Mail or return the spoiled ballot and envelope to your county board of registrars; a new official absentee ballot will be mailed to you.
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Si comete un error o cambia de idea en una selección:

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Si decide votar en persona: Entregue la boleta al gerente de elecciones de un sitio electoral temprano dentro de su condado o en el precinto que se le asignó. Se le permitirá entonces votar en una boleta regular.

For President of the United States

Para el Senado de los Estados Unidos (Vote for One / Vote por uno)

- Donald J. Trump - President / Presidente
Michael R. Pence - Vice President / Vicepresidente
Joseph R. Biden - President / Presidente
Kamala D. Harris - Vice President / Vicepresidente
Jo Jorgensen - President / Presidente
Jeremy "Spike" Cohen - Vice President / Vicepresidente

Write-In / Por escrito

For United States Senate Para el Senado de los Estados Unidos (Vote for One / Vote por uno)

- David A. Perdue (Incumbent) (Titular)
A. Wayne Johnson
Jon Ossoff
Shane Hazel

Write-In / Por escrito

SPECIAL ELECTION / ELECCIÓN ESPECIAL

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Matt Lieberman
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Joy Felicia Slade
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Ed Tarver
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Write-In / Por escrito

Ballot 18 link

GWINNETT COUNTY / CONDADO DE GWINNETT

330-051

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Write-In / Por escrito

Ballot 40 link

GWINNETT COUNTY / CONDADO DE GWINNETT

330-051

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Write-In / Por escrito

Ballot 46 link

Source: Gwinnett County Open Records

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GWINNETT COUNTY

330-051

**OFFICIAL ABSENTEE/
BOLETA OFICIAL AUS**

**OFFICIAL GENERAL AND SPEC
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Votar

1. Use tinta negra o azul para marcar la boleta
2. Complete el óvalo vacío a la izquierda de cada opción de candidato o elección

00906_00681_000040.tif



GWINNETT COUNTY / CONDADO DE GWINNETT

330-051

**OFFICIAL ABSENTEE/PROVISIONAL/EMERGENCY BALLOT
BOLETA OFICIAL AUSENTE/PROVISIONAL/EMERGENCIA**

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GWINNETT COUNTY / CONDADO DE GWINNETT

330-051

**OFFICIAL ABSENTEE/PROVISIONAL/EMERGENCY BALLOT
BOLETA OFICIAL AUSENTE/PROVISIONAL/EMERGENCIA**

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[Ballot 18 link](#)

[Ballot 40 link](#)

[Ballot 46 link](#)

Source: Gwinnett County Open Records

What Dominion says about Dominion




- Source: [Dominion v. Fox News](#)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

US DOMINION, INC., DOMINION)
VOTING SYSTEMS, INC., and)
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS)
CORPORATION,) C.A. No. N21C-03-257 EMD
)
Plaintiffs,) CONSOLIDATED
v.)
) REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION
FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC,)
)
Defendant.)
)
US DOMINION, INC., DOMINION)
VOTING SYSTEMS, INC., and)
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS)
CORPORATION,) C.A. No. N21C-11-082 EMD
)
Plaintiffs,)
v.)
)
FOX CORPORATION,)
)
Defendant.)

**DEFENDANT FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
ITS RULE 56 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

these security failures were “reported about in the news.” *Id.* And just weeks before the 2020 presidential election, Dominion’s Director of Product Strategy and Security, Eric Coomer, acknowledged in private that “our shit is just riddled with bugs.” Ex.H2, Coomer Email (Oct. 30, 2020). Indeed, Coomer had been castigating Dominion’s failures for years. In 2019, Coomer noted that “our products suck.” Ex.H3, Coomer Message (Nov. 5, 2019). He lamented that “[a]lmost all” of Dominion’s technological failings were “due to our complete f--- up in installation.” *Id.* And in another instance, he identified a “*critical* bug leading to INCORRECT results.” Ex.H4, Coomer Email (Jan. 5, 2018). He went on to note: “It does not get much worse than that.” *Id.* And while many companies might have resolved their errors, Coomer lamented that “we don’t address our weaknesses effectively!” Ex.H5, Coomer Email (Sept. 25, 2019).



Internal Dominion documents likewise confirm that Dominion machines suffered several potential glitches in the November 2020 election. After a security expert told the media that Dominion “software should be designed to detect and prevent th[e] kind of glitch” experienced in Antrim County, Michigan during the 2020 presidential election, Coomer told Dominion Vice President Kay Stimson: “He’s not entirely wrong.” Ex.H23, Coomer Email (Nov. 10, 2020). Likewise, in the immediate aftermath of the election, Dominion received complaints from jurisdictions in Georgia noting “irregularities with machine counts” that required Dominion’s employees “to reprogram the machines.” Ex.H24, Daulby Email (Nov. 8, 2020).

MITRE

MP220250
MITRE PRODUCT

**Independent Technical
Review: *Security Analysis of
Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot
Marking Devices***

July 2022

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McLean, VA

Secretary of State Raffensperger cited an [unsigned report from MITRE](#) that refutes Professor Haldeman's 96-page exhaustive report on the total fallibility of Dominion devices. The report was paid for by Dominion.

https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/MITRE_Report.pdf

MITRE's
unsigned
report that
was paid for
by Dominion

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McLean, VA

July 2022

https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/MITRE_Report.pdf



June 15, 2023

JASON PROVIDAKES, PH.D.,
President & Chief Executive Officer, MITRE

Dear Dr. Providakes:

We are researchers and academics who are recognized experts in the fields of cybersecurity and election security. We are writing to call your attention to an **unsigned report** written by the MITRE National Election Security Laboratory (NESL) entitled "Independent Technical Review Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices", and to **urge MITRE to retract this report.**

This **report was commissioned by Dominion Voting Systems in March 2022** and was recently unsealed by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in the matter of *Curling Raffensperger*.¹ **Dominion hired MITRE to write the report** in response to vulnerabilities in Georgia's Dominion voting equipment that were discovered by Prof. J. Alex Halderman of the University of Michigan and Prof. Drew Springall of Auburn University while performing court-authorized security testing for the *Curling* plaintiffs.² **Their findings were confirmed by CISA, which issued a security advisory about the vulnerabilities in June 2022.**³ Dominion has developed updated firmware (Democracy Suite 5.17) that purportedly addresses some of the vulnerabilities.

Unlike Halderman and Springall, **MITRE NESL was not provided access to Dominion's equipment and did not perform any security testing.** Instead, MITRE attempted to assess the risk posed by potential attacks described in Halderman and Springall's expert report without essential access to the source information.

[Source: Letter to MITRE](#)

In July 2023, 29 national experts in cyber security and computer programming demanded that MITRE retract their report due to gross oversights and flaws in the Dominion paid for report.



In July 2023, 29 national experts in cyber security and computer programming demanded that MITRE retract their report due to gross oversights and flaws in the Dominion paid for report.

MITRE's entire analysis is predicated on an assumption known to be wrong. As noted on the first page of the document, "MITRE's assessment of the researcher's proposed attacks **assumes strict and effective controlled access** to Dominion election hardware and software." That assumption was ill-considered when it was written, and **it is ridiculous today**, since we now know that the Georgia Dominion software has *already been stolen and widely distributed*⁴ and that election equipment in at least one Georgia county was repeatedly improperly accessed.⁵ In Coffee County, Georgia, the Dominion equipment was "stored in a room with an unlocked door to the outside of the building, a leaking roof, and walls with sunlight streaming through crevices."⁶ Yet MITRE's risk assessment assumes that Georgia perfectly protects the equipment from illicit access across all of its 159 counties.

The lapses that have already occurred in Georgia would be sufficient to let malicious parties develop and test attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities Halderman and Springall discovered, and potentially other vulnerabilities that they missed.

MITRE's analysis isn't simply wrong—it is dangerous, since it will surely lead states like Georgia to postpone installing Dominion's software updates and implementing other important mitigations. Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger recently announced that he will forgo installing Dominion's security patches until after the 2024 presidential election, no doubt acting in reliance on MITRE's misleading risk assessment. **This announcement gives potential adversaries nearly 18 months to prepare to exploit the flaws against real elections in the state.**

[Source: Letter to MITRE](#)

Among the 29 who signed the letter refuting MITRE's report:

Ron Rivest, Institutional Professor, MIT
Andrew Appel, Professor, Princeton University
Prateek Mittal, Professor, Princeton University
Michael Fischer, Professor Yale University
Philip B. Stark, Professor
University of California at Berkeley
Bruce Schneier, Technologist and Lecturer,
Harvard University
Eugene H. Spafford, Professor
Purdue University

[Source: Letter to MITRE](#)

Sincerely,⁷

Josh Aas, Executive Director, Internet Security Research Group

Mustaque Ahamad, Professor, School of Cybersecurity and Privacy, Georgia Institute of Technology

Andrew W. Appel, Eugene Higgins Professor of Computer Science, Princeton University

Duncan A. Buell, Chair Emeritus, NCR Chair in Computer Science and Engineering, University of South Carolina, Columbia

Richard DeMillo, Professor and Charlotte B and Roger C Warren Chair in Computing, Georgia Tech, Atlanta GA

Zakir Durumeric, Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University

Aleksander Essex, Associate Professor of Software Engineering, Western University, Canada

Michael J. Fischer, Professor of Computer Science, Yale University

Robert Graham, cybersecurity expert

Matthew D. Green, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Johns Hopkins University

Harri Hursti, independent security researcher, co-founder Voting Village @ DEF CON

David Jefferson, Computer Scientist, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired)

Douglas W. Jones, Emeritus Associate Professor of Computer Science, University of Iowa

Joseph Kiniry, Principal Scientist - Galois & CEO and Chief Scientist - Free & Fair

Patrick McDaniel, Tsun-Ming Shih Professor of Computer Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Prateek Mittal, Professor, Princeton University, Interim Director, Center for Information Technology Policy (CITP)

Olivier Pereira, Professor, UCLouvain

Ronald L. Rivest, Institute Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Peter Y A Ryan, University of Luxembourg

Peter B. Rønne, Chercheur, CNRS, LORIA, France

Bruce Schneier, security technologist and Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School

E. John Sebes, Chief Technology Officer, OSET Institute

Barbara Simons, Computer Scientist, IBM Research (retired)

Kevin Skoglund, Chief Technologist, Citizens for Better Elections

Eugene H. Spafford, Professor, Executive Director Emeritus, CERIAS, Purdue University

Michael Alan Specter, PhD, Security Researcher

Philip B. Stark, Distinguished Professor of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley

Vanessa Teague, CEO, Thinking Cybersecurity Pty Ltd and Associate Professor (Adj.), The Australian National University

Poorvi L. Vora, Professor of Computer Science, The George Washington University

⁷ Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only and do not indicate endorsement by the institutions mentioned therein.



Over Two Dozen Computer Security Experts Call on MITRE to Retract its Georgia Voting Systems Report

Atlanta, GA (June 20, 2023) – Twenty-nine recognized experts in computer security sent a letter to Dr. Jason Providakes, president and CEO of the MITRE Corporation, urging him to retract a report MITRE produced last year on behalf of Dominion Voting Systems.

Dominion engaged MITRE to provide a expert report provided by Profs. J. Alex Halderman and Drew Springall on behalf of plaintiffs in the longstanding *Curling v. Raffensperger* election security lawsuit in Georgia. Coalition for Good Governance is the organizational plaintiff in *Curling* which it filed in 2017. The case does not allege any election was decided incorrectly.

“MITRE’s report is irresponsible, plain and simple,” said Professor Rich DeMillo, professor and Roger C. Warren chair of computing at Georgia Tech, and a signatory to the letter. “The report’s title leads one to believe it is an independent and technical analysis when it is neither. Buried in a footnote is an admission that MITRE did not examine the Dominion system or use any discernible technical methodology. Commissioned and paid for by Dominion, the MITRE report is a misguided attempt to discredit the Halderman-Springall-CISA findings. In reality, MITRE Election Lab relied solely on representations from the Secretary of State’s Office that physical security measures render the Halderman-Springall vulnerabilities low-risk. In effect, MITRE relied on blind faith, not careful, reviewable scientific reasoning, to create the misleading impression that there is another side to the vulnerability story. In the professional world, that is irresponsible. It skirts the line of unethical conduct.”

Buried in a footnote is an admission that MITRE did not examine the Dominion system or use any discernible technical methodology.

[Source: Letter from Coalition for Good Governance](#)



Because of the gravity of their findings, Halderman and Springall petitioned the court to permit them to submit their report to the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) under the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) program which was created to give security researchers an avenue to responsibly disclose cyber vulnerabilities found in critical infrastructure systems. CISA validated all of the Professors' findings and recommended the vulnerabilities be patched "as soon as possible."

In response, Dominion Voting Systems shared the sealed Halderman report with MITRE- in violation of the Court's Protective Order - and hired MITRE to respond outside of the litigation process to Halderman's findings. Computer security experts have criticized the MITRE report because MITRE issued its assessment without examining the Dominion voting machines. Furthermore, MITRE's unsigned report is predicated on the known false assumption that all Georgia's voting hardware and software are under strict access control, a premise that is belied by the fact that partisan operatives unlawfully accessed, copied and covertly distributed Georgia's voting system software to an unknown number of unauthorized individuals and entities.

Dominion voting systems hired MITRE to write the report.

The United States government validated ALL of Professor Halderman's findings and recommended the vulnerabilities be patched "as soon as possible".

[Source: Letter from Coalition for Good Governance](#)

In *Pearson v. Kemp*, the Secretary of State argued that he had NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY over county election officials. He has no authority to fine ANY COUNTY – It is not in Georgia law.


During the hearing, Defendants' counsel argued that the secretary of state has no lawful authority over county election officials, citing *Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State*, 974 F.3d 1236, 1256–58 (11th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs' counsel responded that Plaintiffs could amend their complaint to add the elections officials in Cobb, Gwinnett, and Cherokee Counties, thus obviating the issue of whether the proper officials had been named as Defendants to this case.

Source: [Pearson v. Kemp, Document 14](#) (Read the document, it is only 4 pages long.)

Brad Raffensperger

Mr. Raffensperger refutes the Halderman Report and offers “the MITRE Report” which is not signed by any computer scientist or anyone at all and Mr. Raffensperger’s background is:

- Civil Engineer educated at the University of Western Ontario, not Computer Science
- He has no computer scientist or programmers on staff at the Sec. of State.





Georgia Law

In support of Georgia counties authority to use hand marked, hand counted paper ballots counted by people at the precinct.

2022 Georgia Code

Title 21 - Elections

Chapter 2 - Elections and Primaries Generally

Article 8A - State-Wide Voting Equipment

§ 21-2-300. Provision of New Voting Equipment by State; Uniform System for All Elections to Be Conducted With Use of Scanning Ballots Marked by Electronic Ballot Markers; Pilot Programs Authorized; County Responsibilities; Education; County and Municipal Contracts for Equipment

Universal Citation: [GA Code § 21-2-300 \(2022\)](#)

- a.
 1. The equipment used for casting and counting votes in county, state, and federal elections shall be the same in each county in this state and shall be provided to each county by the state, as determined by the Secretary of State.
 2. As soon as possible, once such equipment is certified by the Secretary of State as safe and practicable for use, all federal, state, and county general primaries and general elections as well as special primaries and special elections in the State of Georgia shall be conducted with the use of scanning ballots marked by electronic ballot markers and tabulated by using ballot scanners for voting at the polls and for absentee ballots cast in person, unless otherwise authorized by law; provided, however, that such electronic ballot markers shall produce paper ballots which are marked with the elector's choices in a format readable by the elector.

Source: <https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2022/title-21/chapter-2/article-8a/section-21-2-300/>

BMD “ballots”
are nothing
more than
receipts
because they
do not contain
the full ballot
or referendum
questions.

FULTON COUNTY
OFFICIAL BALLOT
GENERAL AND SPECIAL ELECTION
OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
NOVEMBER 3, 2020

"I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law." [O.C.G.A. 21-2-284(e), 21-2-285(h) and 21-2-383(a)]

840-06D



What exactly did the elector vote for? The pre-printed ballot holds the full description while this document is a “receipt”.

For President of the United States (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Joseph R. Biden (Dem)

For United States Senate (Perdue) (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Jon Ossoff (Dem)

For United States Senate (Loeffler) - Special (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Raphael Warnock (Dem)

For Public Service Commissioner (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Robert G. Bryant (Dem)

For Public Service Commissioner (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Daniel Blackman (Dem)

For State Representative In the General Assembly From 57th District (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Stacey Evans (Dem)

For District Attorney of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Fani Willis (Dem)

For Clerk of Superior Court (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Cathelene "Tina" Robinson (I) (Dem)

For Sheriff (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Patrick "Pat" Labat (Dem)

For Tax Commissioner (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Arthur E. Ferdinand (I) (Dem)


For Fulton County Soil and Water Conservation District Supervisor (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for Alan Toney (I)

Constitutional Amendment #1 (NP)
Vote for NO

Constitutional Amendment #2 (NP)
Vote for YES

Statewide Referendum A (NP)
Vote for NO

Atlanta Homestead Exemption - Special (Vote for One) (NP)
Vote for NO



2022 Georgia Code
Title 21 - Elections
Chapter 2 - Elections and Primaries Generally
Article 9 - Voting Machines and Vote Recorders Generally
Part 2 - Voting Machines
§ 21-2-334. Voting by Paper Ballot When Use of Voting Machine Impossible or Impracticable

Universal Citation: GA Code § 21-2-334 (2022)

If a method of nomination or election for any candidate or office, or of voting on any question is prescribed by law, in which the use of voting machines is not possible or practicable, or in case, at any primary or election, the number of candidates seeking nomination or nominated for any office renders the use of voting machines for such office at such primary or election impracticable, or if, for any other reason, at any primary or election the use of voting machines wholly or in part is not practicable, the superintendent may arrange to have the voting for such candidates or offices or for such questions conducted by paper ballots. In such cases, paper ballots shall be printed for such candidates, offices, or questions, and the primary or election shall be conducted by the poll officers, and the ballots shall be counted and return thereof made in the manner required by law for such nominations, offices, or questions, insofar as paper ballots are used.

Source: <https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2022/title-21/chapter-2/article-9/part-2/section-21-2-334/>

2022 Georgia Code
Title 21 - Elections
Chapter 2 - Elections and Primaries Generally
Article 9 - Voting Machines and Vote Recorders Generally
Part 4 - Optical Scanning Voting Systems
§ 21-2-365. Requirements for Use of Optical Scanning Voting Systems
Universal Citation: [GA Code § 21-2-365 \(2022\)](#)

What does the law say about accuracy of the machines?

7. It shall be constructed of material of good quality in a neat and workmanlike manner;
8. It shall, when properly operated, record correctly and accurately every vote cast;
9. It shall be so constructed that an elector may readily learn the method of operating it; and
10. It shall be safely transportable.

2022 Georgia Code

Title 21 - Elections

Chapter 2 - Elections and Primaries Generally

Article 9 - Voting Machines and Vote Recorders Generally

Part 4 - Optical Scanning Voting Systems

§ 21-2-368. Review of Manufacturer's Systems by Secretary of State; Appointment and Compensation of Examiners; Revocation of Approval; Written Verification and Certification Prior to Election or Primary; Penalties; Conflicts of Interest

Universal Citation: [GA Code § 21-2-368 \(2022\)](#)

systems of its kind may be adopted for use at primaries and elections as provided in this chapter.

- c. No kind of optical scanning voting system not so approved shall be used at any primary or election and if, upon the reexamination of any optical scanning voting system previously approved, it shall appear that the optical scanning voting system so reexamined can no longer be safely or accurately used by electors at primaries or elections as provided in this chapter because of any problem concerning its ability to accurately record or tabulate votes, the approval of the same shall immediately be revoked by the Secretary of State; and no such optical scanning voting system shall thereafter be purchased for use or be used in this state.

Source: <https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/2022/title-21/chapter-2/article-9/part-4/section-21-2-368/>

2022 Georgia Code - Title 21 – Elections
Chapter 2 - Elections and Primaries Generally
Article 9 - Voting Machines and Vote Recorders Generally
Part 6 - Electronic Balloting
§ 21-2-379.24. Examination of Electronic Ballot Markers; Revocation of Approval; Penalty to Vendors for Inappropriate Sale; Improvements or Changes to Devices; Prohibition on Pecuniary Interest; Limitation on Public Inspection **21-2-279 (c)**

- b. The Secretary of State shall thereupon examine or reexamine such device and shall make and file in his or her office a report, attested by his or her signature and the seal of his or her office, stating whether, in his or her opinion, the kind of device so examined can be safely and accurately used by electors at primaries and elections as provided in this chapter. If this report states that the device can be so used, the device shall be deemed approved, and devices of its kind may be adopted for use at primaries and elections as provided in this chapter.
- c. Any device that is not so approved shall not be used at any primary or election and if, upon reexamination, a previously approved device appears to be no longer safe or accurate for use by electors at primaries or elections as provided in this chapter because of an inability to accurately record votes, the approval of the same shall immediately be revoked by the Secretary of State, and no such device shall thereafter be used or purchased for use in this state.

Medium

Conclusions:

- Georgia's system is not accurate
- Georgia's system is hackable
- Counties **CAN take less risk** by switching to paper ballots that will provide greater transparency AND save vast sums of money.



The Constitution says...

“The American empire should rest on the consent of the people. The streams of national power should flow from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority.” and

“...The people delegate power to the government”



UNPLUG GEORGIA

with

SECURE PAPER BALLOTS
HAND MARKED and
HAND COUNTED

...at the polls



**ALL BALLOTS
PUBLIC RECORD**

SECURE PAPER

UN-PLUG GEORGIA

FOR ALL VOTERS
UN-BALLOTS

- Serialize Paper Ballots
- Hand Mark Votes
- Cast Ballots Secretly
- Hand Count Publicly at Polls
- Decrease Election Costs
- Make Count Verifiable
- Make Fraud Detectable
- Protect Chain of Custody

Confidence in elections.

Real Ballot under UV Light



UNSEAL BALLOTS

If ballots are public we can...

**VERIFY ELECTION RESULTS
& DETECT COUNTERFEITS**

SECURITY GRADE PAPER BALLOT

FOR ALL THAT APPLY

UN-SEAL BALLOTS

- Make Certified Ballots Public
- Make Count Verifiable
- Make Fraud Detectable
- Protect Chain of Custody
- Cast Ballots Secretly
- Hand Count Publicly at Polls
- Decrease Election Costs

FOR ALL THAT APPLY

UN-LEASH TRUST

- Shine Sunlight on all Data
- Log All Data Changes
- Require Unique User Passwords
- Clean Voter Rolls Monthly
- Unbridle Poll Watcher Access

Georgia Legislators Must Act Now!!!



UNLEASH TRUST

with

TRANSPARENT ELECTION PROCESSES

SECURITY GRADE PAPER BALLOT

FOR ALL THAT APPLY
UN-BALLOTS

UN-LEASH TRUST

- Make Processes Visible
- Shine Sunlight on all Data
- Log All Data Changes
- Require Unique User Passwords
- Clean Voter Rolls Monthly
- Unbridle Poll Watcher Access
- Make Certified Ballots Public
- Make Count Verifiable
- Make Fraud Detectable
- Protect Chain of Custody



IT'S TIME FOR SOME SUNLIGHT!