Worldview

Treaties are widely accepted to be one of the more effective means to defend our relationships to land. They provide a legal basis to demonstrate Indigenous occupation and actions within our homelands. One of the challenges before us as Indigenous peoples is to continually live into our ancestral relationships with these lands. The 1836 Treaty of Washington offers this challenge as we work to defend what it means to "stipulate for the right of hunting on the lands ceded, with the other usual privileges of occupancy, until the land is required for settlement."[1] Embedded in Article 13 is a worldview, a set of logics that provide a framework of thought for us to understand what it means to be in relationship with Anishinaabe Akiing. The *ogimaag* who signed that treaty were not colonized peoples. They still lived in intimate relationship to the land, enveloped by cyclical time, in a web of relatedness with the rest of life, and always working towards balance. A successful defense of that treaty will provide protections for us to continue that same lifestyle as best we can. A clear articulation of the relationships associated with this worldview is crucial to the reproduction of that worldview in our contemporary negotiations of Anishinaabeg life. Just what were Eskswagenabi and others who fought for Article 13 experiencing with the land? How might we more effectively translate those actions and meanings? How can we describe this

deep sense of cultural difference at the level of worldview in a way that allows for a better understanding of this set of issues?

An Indigenous Genealogy

Considering worldview's more than two-hundred-year history in both Europe and the United States, its multiple definitions are not surprising. With a significant breadth of usage to cover, doing a formal genealogy could easily get out of hand. Luckily, others have already done some of the philological and genealogical work on the term worldview, so I am spared from doing that type of exhaustive work. While I will describe some of the trajectories of the term in academic play in this genealogy, I will focus my attention on Indigenous uses. In this genealogy then, I will demonstrate some of the trajectories of thought on worldview within several disciplines, critique the uses of worldview as a theoretical lens, and begin to build a useful definition of worldview with some critical precision. A critical definition of worldview is necessary to effectively communicate an Anishinaabe relationship to land, and this genealogy is a means to that end.

Weltanschauung

Immanuel Kant was the first person to use *weltanschauung* in his 1790 *Critique of Judgment*, using this new term to mean "the sense perception of the world."[2] From this beginning in Kant, it was first the field of philosophy that embraced this new concept. A brief list of those who deployed weltanschauung in their work would include Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Dilthey, and Nietzsche. Each one of these philosophers used weltanschauung in their own way, nuancing its meaning throughout the nineteenth century. Fichte followed Kant's meaning of the term as the perception of the sensible world, but Schelling makes a shift from the sensory world of Kant to the "intellectual perception of the cosmos."[3] In Hegel, who used the concept of weltanschauung more consistently throughout his writings, we can see a greater development of the word to mean a "shared view which one acquires automatically by participation in the times and society which one forms with one's fellows."[4] Dilthey's work followed the skepticism that there is no ultimate reality that can be found in metaphysics, but there are worldviews that "seek to elucidate the riddle of life."[5] This line of thought ends up in a relativist bind

where one's perspective dictates how one is able to know. Nietzsche takes up this relativist trajectory and uses the concept of weltanschauung to describe a particular perspective on reality, demonstrating that worldviews are "cultural entities which people in a given geographical location and historical context are dependent upon, subordinate to and products of."[6] Nietzsche uses this definition of worldview as a way to show that authority for believing in a certain reality can come simply from the established convention of a particular culture or language. For Nietzsche, no ultimate universal reality exists.

While countless other philosophers and writers contributed to the use and abuse of weltanschauung and worldview in its development, they rarely deviated from the uses that are briefly sketched out here. However, just as important as the philological and conceptual development of worldview is the socio-politico-economic development that was happening in Europe and the rest of the world at the time. It is not surprising that a term like worldview would come into fashion during a time when Europe was solidifying its colonial holdings throughout the world. The worldview of Europe was challenged with each colonial conquest as the realities of other worlds came back to the European homelands in the form of wealth, commerce, and narrative tales of the other. The eurowestern colonial gaze consumed the other and justified the ideology of white supremacy. This white supremacy would be the ideological formulation for a logic of hierarchy that justifies the means by which the wealth of the world was stolen from Indigenous peoples and lands. Unfortunately, the relativist trajectory of worldview that is described above was not attached to a moral or ethical lesson where the Indigenous peoples of the world were allowed to live their own lives. The assumed superiority of whiteness and Christianity was imposed as a universal in the justification of the theft of wealth and lands, and the relativist positions posited by Dilthey and Nietzsche that offered a possibility of understanding the Indigenous perspective on land and life would have to wait for postmodern thinkers to again take up their ideas.

The Evangelicals

A school of thought has been developing among evangelical academics that uses worldview as a concept for understanding Christianity as an all-encompassing cultural entity. I will be looking particularly at three authors, David Naugle, James Sire, and Paul Hiebert. While there are other authors who are also writing on the topic, these three represent some of the titles that most directly speak on the topic

of worldview.[7] Their project is the exposition of a particularly Christian worldview, usually described in contrast and in conflict with a secular world. While their project is different from my own, their use and misuse of the concept of worldview will help to sharpen my own definition and use of the concept.

While Naugle's brief descriptions of the varied uses of worldview as a concept are useful for neophytes along with his bibliography, his project suffers from two problems. First, the cultural difference that he is attempting to describe is actually between two different ideologies, Christianity and secular culture. This limits the depth of Naugle's engagement with the concept of worldview as it allows him to stop his analysis at the level of ideology and renders his engagement with deep cultural differences dead on arrival. However, far more troubling to the usefulness of Naugle's deployment of the concept is the esoteric use and definition that he comes up with.

After eight chapters covering the history of the use of the term worldview, Naugle makes a curious move in his own definition. Rather than drawing from the trajectory of western thought that he just exposed, he turns instead to very specific Christian formulations of the importance of the "heart." He sets up his definition by stating that "all human cultures are under the jurisdiction of a particular sign or set of signs" and that these are "traceable to a series of world-interpreting narratives that provide the individual's 'bottom line' as well as the primary cultural 'given.'"[8] He then moves on to give his definition of worldview as a "semiotic system of narrative signs that creates the definitive symbolic universe which is responsible in the main for the shape of a variety of life-determining, human practices."[9] On the positive side, he does help to give credence to the powerful nature of the "world interpreting narratives," or origin narratives that help to give conscious shape to the worldview; but these are not the worldview itself. Origin narratives are an important element in the cultural expression of worldview, but there is something deeper. Furthermore, Naugle's description of worldview as a "semiotic system of narrative signs" does not effectively distinguish between the conscious ideological formulation of those signs and the deep cultural foundations that give rise to the making of those signs. His definition and use of worldview is not useful for getting to the foundational cultural elements that this project seeks.

Another evangelical author explicitly writing about worldview as a concept is James Sire. His book *Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept* is an attempt to refine his working definition from his other book on worldview, *The Universe Next Door*. In positing his definition for worldview in his introduction, Sire follows

Naugle by stating that worldview is "a fundamental orientation of the heart," and then adding that "at the deepest root of a worldview is its commitment to and understanding the 'really real' . . . [there is] a consideration of behavior in the determination of what one's own or another's worldview really is . . . and a broader understanding of how worldviews are grasped by story."[10] His desire to get at the deeper nature of worldview is commendable, but as we shall see, he too falls short when his definition is further explained.

In addition to confusing ideology and worldview like Naugle, Sire demonstrates another problem with his exposition of worldview as an application of the concept when it comes to the human individual. According to Sire, in describing the function of worldview in his daily life, "there will be no other worldview in the universe that is identical to my own."[11] Here he breaks with his desire to describe the deep cultural components of worldview and exposes the surface nature of his definition. However, on the positive side, Sire does take seriously the ways in which "our worldview is not precisely what we may state it to be. It is what is actualized in our behavior."[12] This move to show worldview as a lived experience will become helpful when it comes to holding people accountable to their stated worldview and ideology. Considering the powerful effects that capitalist economic systems have on all our lives in the present, the question as to the lived experience of worldview will become a valuable analytical tool when it comes to social change. It also is important because it helps us demonstrate the ways in which our worldview is at play in everyday life.

While Naugle and Sire have chosen a primarily western philosophical trajectory in their definitional understanding of worldview, another evangelical, Paul Hiebert, has chosen a different path. Hiebert is trained as a cultural anthropologist, so his definition and analysis of worldview takes on a different flavor. He defines worldview as the "fundamental cognitive, affective, and evaluative presuppositions a group of people make about the nature of things, and which they use to order their lives."[13] While vaguely written, when he puts this definition into practice, it too offers some potential for exposing the deep cultural nature of worldviews as well as some problems.

By drawing from a different disciplinary trajectory, Hiebert is able to emphasize some different aspects to worldview that Naugle and Sire do not. While philosophy has been primarily interested in the cognitive element of worldview, anthropologists have focused more heavily on the behavior of individuals and groups, and their connections to their material environment. This anthropological trajectory allows

Hiebert to comment that for some cultures, "space is more important than time. Time separates past from present. Space brings them together."[14] This reference to time and space helps to provide distinction between worldview and ideology and focuses the discourse on the logics associated with culture. However, Hiebert then shifts gears and agrees with Morris Opler that "conflicts and power struggles are endemic to all societies, and that different segments of a society seek to oppress the others for their own advantage. It makes us aware, too, that worldviews are often ideologies that those in power use to keep others in subjection."[15] This is problematic on two levels. Not only is he conflating worldview and ideology like Naugle and Sire, he universalizes the power struggles of the eurowest as though they occur in all places and all times. This type of universalizing of the data can only cause confusion and misunderstanding when we apply this type of study to other cultures.

For a brief summary of the evangelicals that have just been discussed, I can say that there are some parts of their discussions of worldview that are helpful. From Naugle we have the emphasis on "myth" or origin narratives as a close descriptor of worldview, and from Sire we have the concept of worldview as acted out in human behavior. From Hiebert we can glean some of the deep cultural questions about time and space that are an important element of worldview. However, I believe that there are some serious limitations in their studies because of their goals. For both Naugle and Sire, their goal is to attempt to legitimize "Christian" scholarship as an academic enterprise. While Naugle's bibliography and breadth of study is helpful, to end up with a concept of worldview being a part of the "human heart" as undefined seriously undermines the efficacy of his study. There is also a significant amount of projecting specific western categories, especially the Manichean dualism of good and evil. Naugle spends an entire chapter discussing the Christian worldview as "spiritual warfare" and the necessity for the forces of Christian discipleship to defeat Satan and his cosmic army of evil.[16] While Sire is not as explicit in his elaboration of cosmic Christian domination, he also relies too heavily on concepts of good and evil in his exposition on worldview. However, Hiebert's project is even scarier than that. He elaborates the deep cultural elements of worldview as a means "to transform them. Too often conversion [to Christianity] takes place at the surface levels of behavior and beliefs; but if worldviews are not transformed, the gospel is interpreted in terms of pagan worldviews, and the result is Christo-paganism."[17] Even though Hiebert and others may have the "best intentions" in mind, their project is simply the continuation of a long history of missionary cultural genocide, wreaking

cultural and physical violence throughout the entire world as part of a project of colonial domination.[18]

Social and Political Theory

Another discipline where worldview has been used as an analytical lens is in the field of social and political theory. Mike Hawkins, in his book *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860–1945*, attempts to use worldview as a lens for understanding the rise and use of social Darwinism on the social and political landscape. This work is helpful for two reasons. First he attempts to define worldview particularly, and at the same time he also defines ideology as separate from worldview. He defines worldview as a "set of assumptions about the order of nature and of the place of humanity within it, and how this order relates to and is affected by the passage of time."[19] He goes on to explain that worldview "usually contains a view of social reality" and shows how this social reality "fits into the overall configuration of nature, human nature and time."[20] Hawkins then moves on to explain how ideology "comprises a theory of human interactions and how these are mediated by institutions."[21] He further explains that "the ideological aspect of a theory thus contains both descriptive and evaluative features which often makes difficult the separation of the empirical and normative claims that are being made."[22] While his attempts at particular definitions are commendable, when we see how they play out in his work, they leave a lot to be desired. Hawkins goes on to state that "Social Darwinism is not, in itself, a social or political theory. Rather, it consists of a series of connected assumptions and propositions about nature, time and how humanity is situated within both."[23] According to Hawkins, because social Darwinism does not give specific elements to human social and mental development or elaborate on "optimal conditions" for human social existence, it lacks the "ideological component" necessary to label it as an ideology.[24] So following Hawkins's logic, since social Darwinism lacks the necessary components to meet his definition of ideology, it must be labeled something else in his scheme of things that is a worldview.[25]

While Hawkins's attempts at defining worldview and ideology fall short for our present purposes, his analysis does offer a deeper look at the concept of time as an element of worldview. Within the eurowestern thought process there is a deep cultural reliance upon the notion of time as a linear progression, and I think Vine Deloria Jr.'s analysis sums it up best as naming it the sin-salvation-eschaton

trajectory.[26] This overwhelming reliance on sin-salvation-eschaton can be most readily seen with the philosopher John Fiske. As a social Darwinist, he believed that progress was the law of history. In short, he followed the traditional Darwinian progressional chart from primitive status where war was the rule of the day (sin), which was elevated to civilization when egoism was supplanted by altruism (salvation), and finally there would be (eschaton) "a future in which individuals existed in perfect harmony with their fellows, united in a World Federation."[27] This was all supposed to be due to the power of natural selection. But, as Hawkins asks, "What form, then, would natural selection take in this period of peace and mutual harmony, and how would progress continue?"[28] Hawkins suggests,

> Here, once again, we encounter the dilemma which the determinism and univer-salism of Social Darwinism posed for thinkers like Fiske who believed in moral progress and the triumph of civilization. These could be shown to be the work of natural laws such as the struggle for existence. But the complete realization of these ideals implied a future state in which the laws of nature were no longer applicable to humans. And unless these laws were suspended, the harmonious ideal appeared unrealizable.[29]

While this is a good analysis of the situation, I believe Hawkins misses a chance at a deeper analysis of worldview because he fails to recognize the ways in which these largely non-Christian people (or at least marginally Christian) continue to demonstrate an inherently Christian ideal of linear time.[30] Because the concept of the linear progression of time is a deeply held belief at the level of worldview, it is difficult to think of other methods of organizing time, or in the case of Fiske, it is difficult to recognize when your thought process becomes logically inconsistent. The sin-salvation-eschaton conceptual schema is so deeply engrained at the level of worldview that thinkers like Fiske were unable to see the failings of their own ideological formulations of social Darwinism.

Weltansicht and Linguistics

There is also a trajectory of thought that discusses worldview in the field of linguistics that can be traced to Wilhelm von Humboldt. In the early nineteenth century he coined a term similar to weltanschauung, using *weltansicht* to describe the "capacity which language bestows upon us to form the concepts with which

we think and which we need in order to communicate."[31] Humboldt's use of weltansicht, which James Underhill translates as worldview, is concerned with the way that language "shapes the perspective and conception we have of the world and to a large extent shapes the way we negotiate our way through the course of life on a day-to-day basis as we converse with others."[32] Here we can see an early association of language and culture in the development of the idea of worldview. James Underhill demonstrates that Humboldt's ideas have been glossed over in the English-speaking world, representing a missed opportunity to consider the medium of language as an important analytical aspect of worldview.[33]

While there is little evidence of the direct connection from Humboldt to twentieth-century linguistics, the notion that language is intimately involved in the concept of worldview is discussed early in the century.[34] The ethnographic work of Franz Boas represents the early stages of these developments, which were negotiating the "confrontation with the very different cultures and languages of North America that forced linguists (used to working within the frameworks of Indo-European languages) to reevaluate some of their fundamental premises about language."[35] This confrontation of cultures, which in the early twentieth century meant the intended destruction of Indigenous peoples, helped to call into question the presumption of eurowestern universality. Edward Sapir helped to sharpen some of this discourse on language and culture, working towards a better articulation of the relationship between language and culture. He negotiated the complexity of language as associated with culture, differentiating that "culture may be defined as what a society does and thinks. Language is a particular how of thought."[36] However, according to Underhill, Sapir's work leads towards a contradiction in that "language, as the product of human usage, governs thought, but then [he] rejects the seemingly implicit consequence that thought will condition the culture we create."[37] Sapir's research, while pushing boundaries of linguistics, was not a clear articulation by the time of his death. A student of Sapir, Benjamin Whorf, took this work and extended it to connect language and culture to everyday behavior. Whorf used a comparative analysis of English and Hopi languages to negotiate the relationships between language, thought, and culture. In relation to worldview, he provided evidence of particular cognitive orientations for each language and culture "by describing specific, observable patterns of behavior in the two associated cultures."[38] This connection to lived experience is a useful trajectory as it provides concrete manifestations of the conceptualizations associated with language and thought. However, in part because of the untimely deaths of both Sapir and Whorf, it seems

their research was not able to reach maturity and rid itself of some of the internal contradictions.[39] Hence, as this linguistic work was taken up among other theorists, it would eventually be reduced to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. This reduction would come to rest with the notion that Sapir and Whorf are suggesting that language determines thought and culture. The discourse of much of linguistics and linguistic anthropology would then be about proving or disproving the hypothesis of linguistic and cultural relativity.

The rest of the twentieth century would see this discourse on relativity split into two primary camps of anthropology and cognitive linguistics. On the anthropological side there is a discussion of the extent to which language affects worldviews, and on the cognitive side the "dispute was whether a series of facts about linguistic differences necessarily entailed 'incommensurable' conceptual structures."[40] While it may seem that these lines of discourse would be beneficial to a theory of worldview, there are three problems. First, following the discourse of modern linguistics has meant overly emphasizing the technical minutia of language and concepts, losing the connections to larger cultural issues. For worldview to be a useful category to demonstrate cultural difference, it must be related to more than language. Secondly, this failure to get at the depths of cultural difference in the discourse stems from a problematic starting place. The bulk of linguistic studies use the Sapir-Whorf relativity hypothesis as a jumping-off place and work to prove or disprove its tenets. These theoretical and methodological approaches limit the scope of the studies, and they fail to speak to the many problems facing Indigenous communities. Lastly, this emphasis on language tends to overly determine the relationship to worldview, often equating language and worldview. This precludes the possibility of different languages, say Indigenous languages, sharing the same or a very similar worldview. While the discourse has helped to push back against some of the universalizing tendencies of colonialism, it still lacks the depth of analysis to reach the questions that are guiding this development of worldview as an analytical lens. This problem can be seen in the work of James Underhill in his example of the difference between weltansicht and weltanschauung. In trying to elaborate Humboldt's position about weltansicht, or "worldview as the configuration of concepts which allow conceptual thought," he uses an example of capitalist and communist worldviews as occupying different weltanshauungs (ideology and metaphysics) within the same language.[41] This example helps to demonstrate that his negotiation of cultural difference, in my own terms, stops at the level of ideology and does not take into consideration further depths of

cultural difference. This begs the question, if capitalism and communism are the same worldview, then how do we talk about the differences between capitalism, communism, and Indigenous cultures? What word do we use to conceptualize these deeper differences? If we allow worldview to conceptualize all of these differences, it works to erase the particularities of Indigenous cultures by presuming an equal footing with the ideological nuances inherent in eurowestern political discourse.

Cultural Anthropology

For Indigenous peoples, there is a distrust and sometimes contempt for the discipline of anthropology. Anthropologists have taken the torch from missionaries and travelers in their attempts to "explain" Indigenous culture, which really means they have used a slightly different eurowestern framework of thought to catalog, explain away, and sanitize the ongoing genocide of Indigenous people. This shift in thought constitutes a shift from missionary justifications of the work of Christ bringing new souls to the Lord (as eurowestern nation states laid waste to native populations) to the "scientific" explanations of the progress of western expansion and assumed superiority over the "primitive races" of Indigenous peoples (as the eurowestern nations continue to lay waste to native lands and populations). As the fight over frameworks of power between science and religion was played out in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the "scientific" explanations of progress used studies of Indigenous peoples as "primitive" to develop their framework of linear progress, "demonstrating" the evolutionary shift of societies from "primitive" to religious to scientific. By playing off of the already pernicious linear thinking in eurowestern cultures, they were able to anoint themselves as the best and the brightest of the "superior" race, and naturalize their rise to and exercise of power as an evolutionary process that not only cannot be stopped, it should be exalted and promoted as the crowning achievement of not only eurowestern culture, but of the entire world.[42]

With that sort of trajectory of anthropological thought, it may sound counterintuitive that this discipline that helped to continually justify its definition of the "dying races" of Indigenous people would also help to develop the thought around worldview. Being confronted by very different cultures had the effect of causing anthropologists to scramble for methods of understanding peoples that were fundamentally different from their own. This confrontation with difference caused them to ask some basic questions about how we as humans negotiate our

lives within the environment. While the development of a theory of worldview has a number of the same shortfalls among anthropologists as it does among other disciplines, it does begin to take more seriously some of the fundamental deep cultural differences that shape the ways in which we negotiate our daily lives.

While a number of anthropologists have used the term worldview to describe various elements of culture, I would suggest that it was the work of Robert Redfield at the University of Chicago that helped to shift the discourse around worldview. According to Redfield, the concept of worldview is "in short, a man's idea of the universe. It is that organization of ideas which answers to a man the questions: Where am I? Among what do I move? What are my relations to these things?"[43] While these questions could be answered in a concrete way, instead Redfield continues on a line of abstraction suggesting that "'World view' may be used to include forms of thought and the most comprehensive attitudes towards life . . . [worldview] can hardly be conceived without some dimension in time, some idea of past and of future."[44] While his abstractions leave a lot to be desired in providing a concise definition with concrete examples, his questions do offer a new direction to study. In this set of questions we can begin to see the possibility of further theoretical development in that he is naming space, time, and relationships as primary understandings of the concept of worldview. However, Redfield himself recognizes the limits of his own study, lamenting that although he believes that worldviews are universal, there is not much to guide an attempt at naming these universals, as "Concepts about world view are hardly developed, and comparative studies are barely begun. So any suggestions now put forward are almost random and are highly tentative."[45] The further development of worldview in the field of anthropology would have to wait for other theorists.

Another cultural anthropologist who is worth mentioning is Clifford Geertz. While his work on worldview was only minor in his published work, he did help to make some important connections that others have followed. Geertz's main contribution to the study of worldview is his recognition of the necessity to connect the "thick description" of ethnographic work to a more comprehensive analytical framework in cultural theory. According to Geertz, cultural theory "is unseverable from the immediacies thick description presents, its freedom to shape itself in terms of its internal logic is rather limited."[46] The job of cultural theory is to "provide a vocabulary in which what symbolic action has to say about itself—that is, about the role of culture in human life—can be expressed."[47] This is an important move as it attempts to connect the worldview of a people and understand it as connected

to and consistent with their lived experience. To connect lived experience with a more comprehensive understanding of culture, Geertz employed two associated concepts that were common in anthropological parlance in the mid-twentieth century, worldview and ethos. He described ethos as the "tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood," and worldview as the "picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order."[48] For Geertz, these two aspects of culture were held together by religion, which helps the social values of a culture to be "coercive." To keep a society intact, "sacred rituals and myths are portrayed not as subjective human preferences but as the imposed conditions for life implicit in a world with a particular structure."[49] Religion provides the narratives necessary to make the structure of society meaningful and compels the members of that society to reproduce the same behaviors and meanings.

While the connection of worldview to the lived behavioral experience (the thick descriptions) of the ethnographer's study is a step in the right direction, Geertz's analysis still suffers from two major shortcomings. First, his definition of worldview as "the picture of the way things in sheer actuality are" is far too abstract to be helpful in making a direct connection between a worldview and a lived experience. He does give several examples of what he means, but it is in these examples that we can see the second problem, the euroforming of Indigenous and other cultures. For example, he quotes a passage from a Lakota informant, discussing the concept of a stone as sacred, then immediately puts this concept of stone in a particular eurowestern framework of thought by stating, "Here is a subtle formulation of the relation between good and evil, and of their grounding in the very nature of reality."[50] Apparently impossible to Geertz, among the rest of the anthropological field, is that the Manichean concepts of good and evil are eurowestern cultural particulars, and they do not apply, like religion, to Indigenous and many other cultures. This preponderance of euroforming the cultures that they study causes their analysis to fall far short of anything other than simply observation and conjecture. Geertz himself recognizes that his work is a very small beginning, calling the concepts of worldview and ethos a "prototheory, forerunners it is hoped, of a more adequate analytical framework."[51] While his work misses the mark in its abstraction and projection of assumed universal cultural categories, it does push the concept of worldview a little further towards a useful analytical lens.

While there was some academic work around worldview in the mid-twentieth century among anthropologists, as recently as 1980, Michael Kearney still

commented that for a term as important as worldview is to cultural anthropology, "no comprehensive model of it has been formulated prior to this effort."[52] He, like Redfield and Geertz before him, suggests that his work towards this comprehensive model of worldview is "a preliminary attempt," and he does make some modest gains in helping to flesh out a more comprehensive model of worldview. In his 1984 book *World View*, Kearney follows Redfield's and Geertz's lead in attempting to connect worldview as an organizational structure in culture with the lived experience of that culture. In this line of thought, Kearney describes worldview as a "dynamic logico-structurally integrated system of knowledge."[53] He begins with five worldview universals of the self and other, relationship, classification, causality, and space and time. According to Kearney, these questions need to be addressed by all societies, but they can and do respond to the questions in different ways. However, what is most important for Kearney is that the response to these universals within a culture is interrelated, therefore a system: "World view is itself ordered by the dynamic interrelationships among its elements, which are the images and assumptions that form the contents of the various worldview universals. These interrelationships are what I have been calling a logico-structural integration."[54] This move is important because it helps to both recognize and begin to decipher some of the complex relationships within a worldview and demonstrate how they are usually logically consistent.

Another question that helps to drive Kearney's interest in worldview is: how are worldviews formed? His answer to this question is another area of modest advancement in the anthropological study of worldview. Kearney recognizes a dynamic relationship between the environmental conditions that a group of people live in, and their images of that world that form their worldview. Kearney explains,

> A world view is linked to reality in two ways: first by regarding it, by forming more or less accurate images of it, images that mirror the world; and second, by testing these images through using them to guide action. By being put into action faulty images are corrected and brought more into line with the external world.[55]

In this model, Kearney helps to explain not only the dynamic formation of worldview and lived behavior, but also the possibility of social change. While this model is a step forward in the study of worldview, it needs to be stated that he gets to this model through Marxist notions of historical materialism. This reliance on Marxist thought is a double-edged sword. On the positive side it allows him to break with

what he calls the "idealist" camp of Boas and Redfield, who, according to him, have continued the service of anthropology in liberal bourgeoisie interests and demonstrate the "bias of the intellectual who, secure in his study, analyzes human knowledge apart from the so-called real world in which common human knowledge arises."[56] This idealist model does not take seriously enough the historical materialist environment that the worldview arises in dynamic relationship with. In this sense, Kearney's analysis is helpful. The downside is that, like other anthropologists, his analysis imposes Eurocentric categories of cognition like historicism and peasant, and only understands ideology in its hierarchical imposition of a mode of thought used to coerce subjects into obedience. While his modest advancements in the study of worldview are helpful, his model lacks the linguistic, conceptual sophistication to fully understand the depth of difference between some cultures, such as the differences between Indigenous peoples and the eurowest.[57]

A final anthropologist worthy of note is A. Irving Hallowell. While his work lacks a concise definition of worldview, it is important for two reasons. First, his studies are primarily of Anishinaabeg in Anishinaabe Akiing, so his analysis speaks directly to my project. Second, his method of investigation is far different than most other anthropologists directly speaking to worldview, because he takes very seriously a linguistic conceptual analysis of Anishinaabemowin. It is this emphasis on the structure of language and its meaning in the lived experience of a people that sets Hallowell's study apart. In his own words,

> It may be argued, in fact, that a thoroughgoing "objective" approach to the study of cultures cannot be achieved solely by projecting upon those cultures categorical abstractions derived from Western thought. For, in a broad sense, the latter are a reflection of *our* cultural subjectivity. A higher order of objectivity may be sought by adopting a perspective which includes an analysis of the outlook of the people themselves as a complementary procedure.[58]

By taking the conceptual world of Anishinaabeg seriously, Hallowell was able to break down some of the eurowestern projections that had until that time inhibited anthropological work towards a meaningful deployment of worldview.

As part of this process of conceptual decolonization of anthropological work, Hallowell focused on the animate/inanimate linguistic distinction that is part of Anishinaabemowin. He began with the basic question "what is the meaning of animate in Ojibwa thinking?"[59] For non-Anishinaabemowin speakers, the animate/

inanimate distinction causes a lot of confusion. Usually it is assumed that animate means "alive" in a eurowestern sense and inanimate means "not alive." However, upon investigation, this imposed dualism breaks down when applied to words like *sin*, or stone, which is grammatically animate. Hallowell explains by giving an anecdote from one of his informants, who when asked if all stones were alive, replied, "No! But *some* are."[60] He goes on to suggest that Anishinaabeg do not consider stones as animate (living) more than eurowesterners, but the differences lie in the "cognitive set" that grammatically *sin* is a part of. There is an important origin narrative involving Flint, an important character in Anishinaabe thought who is made from stone and helped to form the world. Furthermore, some stones in Anishinaabe Akiing do manifest animate properties of motion. Hallowell correctly asserts, "The crucial test is experience. Is there any personal testimony available?"[61] To answer this question he gives several examples of informants answering in the affirmative to their own experiences of *sin* moving and demonstrating other animate properties like speaking and keeping implements for people.[62] This foray into the linguistic-conceptual world of the Anishinaabeg helps to demonstrate both the lack of a dogmatic formulation of animate and inanimate in our conceptual world, and the efficacy of demonstrating a much more authentic experience of Anishinaabe culture with his chosen methodology. This example speaks to the hyper-empirical nature of Anishinaabe thought and culture. What is believed to be true and is considered to be true by Anishinaabeg ultimately depends upon the experience of the people.

Another subject within Anishinaabe thought where Hallowell deploys this linguistic conceptual methodology is in the recognition of what "person" can represent. He suggests that "person" in Anishinaabemowin is a much larger category than within eurowestern culture. To understand "person" in Anishinaabe thought, we have to talk about our relationships to entities like *giizis*, or the sun. *Giizis* is not thought of as an object as in eurowestern thought, it is a relative; or as Hallowell puts it, "the sun is a 'person' of the other-than-human class."[63] This "other-than-human class" of person, or *manidoog* in Anishinaabemowin, is an important turn in the work on worldview as it begins to take seriously the web of relatedness that we as Indigenous people live in. Our ancestors, the characters of our origin narratives like Sky Woman, Flint, and the many *manidoog* are all our relatives of this "other-than-human" variety. Hallowell presses the point using the example of "grandfathers." Within a eurowestern construction, only human persons could be called grandfather in its eurowestern usage. However, in Anishinaabe thought,

the four directions and numerous animals who were here when Sky Woman fell from the sky are also considered to be "grandfathers." Anthropologists studying Anishinaabeg and other Indigenous peoples have long imposed this eurowestern framework on us, and hence euroformed our cultures, creating dualisms where none exist. But, as Hallowell points out, "if we adopt a world view perspective no dualization appears. In this perspective 'grandfather' is a term applicable to certain 'person objects,' without any distinction between human persons and those of an other-than-human class."[64] Furthermore, he points out that other anthropologists have often relied upon a natural/supernatural dualism to explain Indigenous thought, with natural meaning human "grandfathers," and supernatural being applied to the characters of the origin narratives and other *manidoog*. However, as Hallowell explains, to apply natural/supernatural to Ojibwa characters "is completely misleading, if for no other reason than the fact that the concept of 'supernatural' presupposes a concept of the 'natural.' The latter is not present in Ojibwa thought."[65] These dualisms like natural/supernatural are a good example of the euroforming of our cultures in anthropological literature, and Hallowell helps us to root out some of these eurowestern imposed categories. By projecting these eurowestern dualisms onto Indigenous cultures, anthropologists have done more to misunderstand and misrepresent our cultures than they have done to create understanding. While Hallowell's work is far from flawless, as he too imposes some eurowestern categories like religion, his work does take more seriously what Indigenous cultures can communicate when we take their linguistic conceptual fields and knowledge more seriously.

Indigenous Philosophy

The final group of authors bring us closer to both an effective methodological approach and conceptual analysis that will help develop a useful definition and theory of worldview. Like cultural anthropologists, Indigenous authors by necessity have to deal with two (or more) very different cultures, both in their theoretical work and possibly in their daily lives. This negotiation of different worlds necessitates a deep understanding of the linguistic and conceptual processes in play. Failure to negotiate this cultural divide successfully will usually mean a confusion of Indigenous thought in eurowestern terms, or as Kwasi Wiredu puts it, "the outcome is likely to do violence (though not premeditatedly) to [our] indigenous categories of thought."[66] Unfortunately, because of the ongoing colonization of Indigenous

cultures by eurowestern powers, many of us have participated in these acts of cultural violence against our own peoples, and this demonstrates the need for our own conceptual decolonization. Both Vine Deloria Jr. and Kwasi Wiredu have done groundbreaking work in the realm of conceptual decolonization, and while neither of them have explicitly worked to precisely define worldview as a concept, their work exemplifies the deep cultural analysis that the concept of worldview is suited for.[67]

While Wiredu rarely uses the term worldview to describe his analytical work, his methods of conceptual decolonization consistently speak to some of the fundamental differences between his Akan culture in Ghana and the eurowest. His work is helpful in demonstrating some of the ways spatiality is thought of differently in the Akan language and culture in comparison to the eurowest.[68] In one exposition, Wiredu takes on the concept of "nature," suggesting that "the way in which the Akans conceptualise that which others conceptualise through the term 'nature' is so different from the latter as not to be susceptible to an equivalent verbalization."[69] Wiredu begins with a brief elucidation of the term nature in the eurowest, showing that it is "the concept of the realm of all those material phenomena (things, events, and processes) that conform to the kind of laws which exist in commonsense thinking as crudely perceived regularities and receive their rigorous and sophisticated formulation in science."[70] He further illustrates that in the eurowest there are two basic camps in regard to this formulation of nature, where naturalists believe that this concept is a full elaboration of nature, and the non-naturalists deny this. While there is not necessarily agreement as to the parameters of the existence of nature between the naturalists and non-naturalists, they do both assume that there is an intelligible distinction between the material and the nonmaterial, the natural and the non-natural, and the natural and the supernatural. But according to Wiredu, "None of these contrasts is intelligible within Akan thought."[71] To get at the unintelligibility of the material/nonmaterial distinctions in Akan, Wiredu returns to Akan origin narratives and to their concepts of their "supreme being." Again, utilizing the Akan language, he shows that while they have many names for the supreme being, when they speak of the creative aspects of this being they use "Borebore" or "Obooade." Both of these terms speak of "hewing out, making, manufacturing, fashioning out," so their name for the supreme being is translated best as "the maker of things."[72] The significance of this formulation cannot be underestimated because it shows that "the notion of ex-nihilo creation (creation out of nothing) cannot be coherently expressed in

Akan . . . since the word for 'create' presupposes raw materials."[73] Furthermore, Wiredu shows how in Akan, even the concept of nothing can only be expressed as "the absence of something *in a given place*."[74] Similarly, the concept of existence in Akan is "wo ho," which translated properly means "to be at some place."[75] Hence, what we see here in the Akan worldview is a fundamental orientation to space as indicated in their linguistic structure, origin narrative, and conceptual framework. This is a radically different orientation to space than in the eurowest, where the concept of space is given a secondary relation to time.[76]

Another way that Wiredu gets at the fundamental differences between his traditional Akan thought and the eurowest is in an examination of the intelligibility/ unintelligibility of the Cartesian dualism of material/spiritual. For the Akan, there is only one universe "of many strata wherein God, the ancestors, humans, animals, plants and all the rest of the furniture of the world have their being."[77] The point here is that the concept of the supreme being is spatially configured so that it cannot be effectively described by what eurowesterns usually impose as a "supernatural" concept. So if the natural/supernatural dualism does not work, how are we to conceptualize an important entity like the ancestors in Akan thought? Wiredu suggests that the material/spiritual dualism here is also unintelligible because of its inability to understand spatiality, not to mention the problem of having no intelligible definition in its own right. Instead, he suggests that a better way of thinking about ancestors or other "unseen" conceptualizations is to think of them as partially material, or "quasi-material."[78] This allows for a spatial conceptualization of these entities, and still allows for their understanding within the Akan spatially configured worldview because the ancestors are thought of living around them in their space. Wiredu then moves to show that if we are to understand the concept of "spiritual," then we would have to have an intelligible definition of that concept as well. However, upon further reflection, no such definition exists. Usually a negative definition is given, where the spiritual is that which is nonmaterial, but this is really unhelpful. As Wiredu asks, "How are we to differentiate between the spiritual and the void?"[79] Others will move to define spiritual as the unseen, or the invisible. But this too is far too broad to be helpful because this description could also be used for something like gravity.[80]

In addition to the lack of a useful definition that would make the material/ spiritual dualism intelligible within the eurowest, Wiredu expounds on the lack of internal coherence of the natural/supernatural dualism. In the eurowest, the idea of nature has its own set of concepts that help to bring an understanding of their

worldview, including the idea that there are laws of nature that are immutable. The idea of supernatural has been applied when those laws of nature have been transcended in some way. As Wiredu explains,

> a supernatural event is one whose occurrence is contrary to the laws of nature. But if the event actually happens, then any law that fails to reckon with its possibility is inaccurate and is in need of some modifications, at least. However, if the law is suitably amended, even if only by means of an exceptive rider, the event is no longer contrary to natural law. Hence no event can be consistently described as supernatural.[81]

Not only is the dualism of natural/supernatural not applicable to the Akan conceptual framework, it is not internally coherent as a way of explaining phenomena in the eurowest. Therefore we can see that the natural/non-natural, material/spiritual, and the natural/supernatural dualisms that are consistently used in the western academy to describe both the eurowest and other cultures are "not a universal feature of human thinking, since the Akans, at least, do not use it. And in any case, its coherence is questionable."[82]

While Wiredu may only rarely use the term worldview to describe the types of differences he is explaining, his analysis is consistent with Indigenous conceptualizations of culture, space, and the distinctions between our Indigenous cultures and the eurowest. However, considering that Wiredu is Akan, and writing about lands and languages that are different from those here in North America, we also have to demonstrate that these ideas are in play here.

I have already mentioned some of Vine Deloria Jr.'s thinking about spatiality and worldview in the introduction, discussing the lands for American Indian people as "having the highest possible meaning."[83] While this statement certainly is true, we are now in a position to take it a step further. To demonstrate the fundamental place in which land functions in an Indigenous worldview, we can show how this relationship helps to organize our cultures. Deloria helps us to think about an Indigenous worldview, as Michael Kearney suggests, as a "dynamic logico-structurally integrated system of knowledge" where several worldview components all work together to create a systemic cultural whole.[84] Deloria points out, largely stating the obvious, that there is an inherent relationship between space and time. However, contrary to eurowestern culture, it is not time that helps to understand space, but "Space generates time."[85] Space, our land, is the basic building block of

a cultural whole, and our living in these specific places gives an understanding of cyclical time. While there are understandings of time as linear, as we grow older and experience more throughout our lives, both communally and individually, these linear understandings are a distant second to the importance of cyclical time, and all are generated by the primacy of the land. *Giizis*, the sun, moves through the sky on a daily run from east to west, *dibiki giizis*, the "night sun," has her own twenty-eight-day cycle by which we mark time, and we move throughout the year to the rhythms of the changing seasons, all to start over again in cyclical fashion the next cycle.

From these two components of a worldview, space and time, Deloria then also elaborates how spatial thinking is connected to two other elements of an Indigenous worldview. As we gain our sustenance, we must inevitably participate in acts of violence against our other living relatives so that we can eat and live. A good portion of our ceremonial life has to do with keeping the balance of creation intact as we provide food for our communities. In this way of living, "spatial thinking requires that ethical systems be related directly to the physical world and real human situations."[86] Here, Deloria helps us to make the connection between spatiality and the rest of life with which we share a particular space. As we live in a web of relatedness in our space, and we have to participate in acts of violence to survive, we must participate in a ceremonial life that helps to restore a sense of balance with our relatives with whom we share that space. As a number of our narratives tell us, if we fail to follow through these ceremonies and the wishes of our relatives, then they may no longer be around to provide us sustenance. From these four "logico-structurally integrated" elements of an Indigenous worldview (intimate relationship to space, cyclical time, living in a web of relatedness, and the balance of those relationships), we can see the primary importance that space (land) plays in Indigenous life. Our ethical systems "must relate to the land, *and it must dominate and structure culture*. It must not be separated from a particular piece of land and a particular community, and it must not be determined by culture."[87] The space in which we live is the basic building block of our worldview. Our entire culture stems from the space that we occupy and our relationship to the rest of life with which we share that space. If removed from the land, we cease to exist in the same way that we had. This represents the gap in communication between the Indigenous people, who are trying to protect their essential relationships to the land, and the United States Government, which fails to recognize that relationship to land for Indigenous peoples. When removed from the land, we simply do not

have the same relationships that we once had. We do not have an ontology that is temporally located, that primarily exists in a discursive history of events, assumed to be universal. Ontologically we are intimately related to our places, and cutting us off from those places, whether that is removal to distant lands, physical destruction of those lands from mining and lumber industries, or the occupation of those lands by recreational interests, all constitute acts of cultural genocide.

Worldview: A Definition

From this Indigenous genealogy of worldview as a concept, we can see an emphasis on certain topics that can help give direction for a definition. From recent evangelical developments (Naugle) we can see a consistent use of origin narratives as a way of understanding worldview. Also from an evangelical viewpoint (Sire) as well as anthropology (Geertz and Kearney) we get a theoretical desire to connect lived experience to a deeper cultural theory. From most everyone involved there is recognition of the importance of worldview helping to orient humans to space and time, including Vine Deloria Jr. Hawkins helps in his attempts to separate worldview and ideology. Finally, methodologically Hallowell and Wiredu develop a linguistic-conceptual analysis that allows us to ground the concept of worldview in a particular system of thought.

Thus far, there is a lack of a cogent definition of worldview that can be utilized as a method for cross-cultural analysis. This lack of a critical definition continually allows for the term worldview to be used by many people with differing, usually undefined, meanings and applied in a variety of ways ranging from deep cultural organization to individual "outlooks" on the world. With this lack of critical refinement, the term worldview could remain an ineffective conceptual tool. However, this long and sordid journey of weltanshauung to worldview across time and numerous academic disciplines also suggests a deeply held desire to develop a useful, critically accurate method of investigating cultural differences. Considering that there is at present a lack of critical concepts useful in demonstrating cultural differences, I am developing this definition and theory of worldview to fill that void. By coming to a more precise definition and useable theory, more accurate cross-cultural translations can be attained in the field of Indigenous studies. Furthermore, it can yield more accurate descriptions of our cultural traditions,

and hopefully, better understanding for the project of protecting our lands and our relationships to those lands.

An accurate depiction of Anishinaabeg culture using a theory of worldview will begin with a precise definition of worldview. I define worldview as an interrelated set of cultural logics that fundamentally orient a culture to space, time, the rest of life, and provides a methodological prescription for relating to that life. In this definition there is a brief description of what a worldview is (interrelated set of cultural logics) and four components to which those logics associate (relationships to space, time, the rest of life, and a methodological prescription to relate to life). With this definition I am positing that each culture has a set of logics that allows its constituents to negotiate the world. These logics orient the culture to a consistent trajectory of thought organized around relationships that must be addressed to be able to build a meaningful life. Each culture must have some type of relationship to the lands that they occupy, to time, to the rest of life, to be able to live in the everyday.

The four logics that relate culture to space, time, life, and prescribe how to relate to that life, work together to give a footing to the culture. That is, they are a "dynamic logico-structurally integrated system of knowledge."[88] Since we have to negotiate our life on the earth, there has to be a conceptualization of what that space is like and a prescription for negotiating that space. Spatiality, as defined by Vine Deloria Jr., is the land on which we live. For Indigenous people it is not land in a general sense, but an *intimate relationship with a localized space*. Furthermore, it is this space, which allows for life to exist, that gives rise to time. To negotiate life on earth necessitates learning and memory, which presumes time. Cyclical and linear conceptualization of time are the two primary logics that help to structure culture. Both Indigenous and eurowestern cultures use cyclical and linear time. It becomes a worldview logic when it structures thought and culture. Another logic of worldview that is associated with space is a relationship to life. We are obviously not alone in this world, so we have to figure out a way to relate to the life with which we share our space. This structure of relatedness for Indigenous people means living in a web of relatedness where all of life is interconnected. For example, since we rely on our other-than-human relatives for food, we have to find a way of keeping those relationships intact. Minding our relationships to the rest of life, especially those whom we rely on for food, leads us to our fourth component of worldview, the methodological prescription for relating to life. Our relationships to our relatives, both human and other-than-human, must be kept in balance. Balance is how we understand life to function, and it is this concept that

drives much of our behaviors, such as offering tobacco and performing ceremony for hunting, planting, and harvesting.

With this brief definition in mind, worldview is a framework for organizing culture. It is a mooring for culture, which keeps it organized along a consistent path. A worldview logic prescribes a parameter of responses to living on this earth that gives direction for daily activities. While worldview is an essential building block, it is important to also describe the limits of worldview. The conscious narratives that we tell each other, such as origin narratives that give voice to the worldview, are no longer the worldview itself. Origin narratives begin the conscious building of culture from its worldview foundation along the particular trajectories that the orientating logics have to offer. Once we enter the realm of the conscious, we leave the arena of worldview.

Worldview and a Theory of Culture

Thus far, most theories of worldview only take into account what a worldview is, and rarely make the necessary move to describe how worldview is related to other structural elements of culture, such as ideology, institutions, and everyday lived experience. While Geertz and Kearney have pointed to a relationship between worldview and behavior, it is yet to be a developed theory and one that will help bring clarity to both worldview and cultural theory. By defining worldview as an integrated set of cultural logics, it will be essential to demonstrate how a particular set of logics, like that of Indigenous peoples, can structure that specific culture. This elaboration of worldview as structuring cultural theory will help to clarify how the four interrelated logics of worldview orient a group to space, time, life, and prescribe how to negotiate the relationships to that life, and work as an integrated system that gives shape and direction to the ideology, institutions, and daily behavior of people in that culture.

In developing a clearer understanding of the place of worldview in a larger cultural theory comprising the ideology, institutions, and daily experiences of a people, we will have to further define these three other cultural components. First, ideology is not to be considered solely in its political form of domination, but also in its social and philosophical form as a necessary body of ideas that allow a group of people to make sense of their world. Ideology then, as I am defining it here, is "a body of ideas that reflects the beliefs and interests of a nation, political

system, etc. and underlies political action" and "the set of beliefs by which a group or society orders reality so as to render it intelligible."[89] For example, in American culture this would render capitalism and Christianity as ideologies. They are sets of narratives that give direction for the structure of daily living, but they are neither the foundational logics of culture, nor are they the particular norms, customs, or laws that govern behavior. In Anishinaabe culture we can think of the origin narratives around Sky Woman as an ideology. It is a conscious rendering that gives voice to the worldview of the people, but as in the American context, they do not specify the particular customs or rules of institutions or daily behavior. This definition of ideology can be differentiated from worldview in that the former is the conscious articulation of narratives and ideas that give shape to their understanding of their surroundings, whereas the latter is the set of logics that gives the ideology grounding. The worldview provides the parameters within which an ideology can take shape. If we think of a home as a metaphor, the worldview is the foundation buried deep in the ground, giving support, but which cannot be seen. The walls and roof are the ideology, giving shape to the culture within the local environment.

From this basis of a worldview providing a framework for a system of narratives that give a conscious shaping of a culture, we can now move to more specific manifestations of that culture in the form of institutions. An institution is a subcategory of an ideology that gives more specific shape to culture, and can be defined both in its organizational and sociological forms as "an organization or establishment founded for a specific purpose, such as a hospital, church, company or college" and "an established custom, law, or relationship in a society or community."[90] While this definition is self-explanatory, some examples can help to make clearer how institutions function within a larger theory of culture. In the American cultural context we can point to capitalism and Christianity as having institutional apparatus as well. Capitalism is specifically regulated through a number of key institutions like banks, legally through the courts, while simultaneously in a sociological function as the norms around gifting during holidays. Christianity as an ideology has the church as its primary institution, though its actions are also regulated through the courts as well as customs around the liturgical calendar. In Anishinaabe culture we would think about the institutions of *doodemag*, or clans, which help to provide customs and norms for where one lives, how they obtain food, how they are related to other people, and other-than-human people as well. The Midewiwin Society would also be considered an institution, helping to keep balance within society and the world as a whole as keepers of cultural memory and narratives, as well as healing

people when they are sick.[91] In the metaphor of the house, the institutions could be thought of as the inside walls that partition off the house and create different rooms under the ideological roof.

Finally, we come to the everyday lived experience of a group of people, as organized and codified by worldview, ideology, and institutions. This is where the customs, laws, and norms are experienced on a daily basis, and by experiencing them, we reify the ideological and institutional norms on a daily basis. In American culture, capitalism is lived out in a myriad of ways as we purchase goods like food and housing so that we can live from day to day. Capitalism is also lived out in the daily work that everyone does so that they can make the money to purchase what they need and want in the everyday. Christianity as a lived experience is a bit more complex in that the primary behavior involved, going to church, is done on a weekly schedule. However, individuals may participate in daily activities such as prayer or other rituals.[92] For Anishinaabeg, we would perform our *doodem* in a number of ways, from the markings on our clothing; the particular rituals we may partake in, like a morning song or thank you ritual; to the type of food we eat and how we relate to the others in our community. We as Anishinaabeg experience balance in the ceremonies we partake in, the food offerings to *manidoog*, and the manner in which we conduct ourselves in daily interactions with others. In this way, our everyday lived experience has the power to elucidate our ideological manifestations, or it also has the ability to call those ideological and institutional customs and norms into question. The lived experience of the culture is the particulars of the house in the metaphor, the colors of the walls, decorations, and furnishings that we interact with on a daily basis.

With this brief sketch of worldview as part of a cultural theory that also includes ideology, institutions, and everyday experiences, we can move to describe the dynamic interrelatedness of these four components. As presented here, the house metaphor helps to understand the building of a culture, but only in one direction. The worldview provides the foundation, on which the conscious ideologies are built, like the walls and roof of the house. The institutions section off the house into rooms for different purposes. Finally, their everyday experiences provide the color of the rooms, the flooring on which they step, and the décor and furnishings of their culture. While this idea of building the culture from the ground up does work metaphorically and helps to understand the relatedness of the worldview to ideology, to institution, and to everyday experiences, this relatedness is not a one-way street. Each of the four components of this cultural theory also helps

INSTITUTION

IDEOLOGY   CULTURE   EXPERIENCE

WORLDVIEW

FIGURE. This figure demonstrates the interconnected nature of the four components of culture. Together they constitute the dynamic interplay that allows for social change, for better or for worse.

either to reify the preceding component and its categories, or perhaps to call it into question. This dynamic, multidirectional flow of energy provides for the possibility of social change, as everyday experiences can become burdensome, which can allow for the questioning of institutions and even ideologies if enough people are so inclined (see figure). Red Power and other social change movements demonstrate this phenomenon well.

While everyday experiences and institutions can change relatively easily, that is not the case for worldviews. Ideologies do change, usually with quite a bit of resistance, but the conscious articulation of a culture can shift. Again, think about the decolonization of the 1960s around the world, and the many examples of larger national narratives shifting to include more people, or to resist European influence. However, the logics of relationships to land, time, and the rest of life rarely do change. A shift at the level of worldview can happen, but it takes much longer. The

worldview of Anishinaabe *ogimaag* signing the 1836 Treaty of Washington is very much the same as that of the Anishinaabe who still occupy the same lands. While some of the everyday experiences have shifted, as have many of the institutions, Anishinaabeg are still speaking the narratives that hold the ideologies and their embedded knowledge. This project is an attempt to elucidate the Anishinaabe worldview for the ongoing flourishing of life in Anishinaabe Akiing.