



Yūgen Summit'22

DISEC Background Guide

Letter From the Executive board

Dear delegates,

We are very pleased to welcome you to the simulation of the UNGA: DISEC at YUGEN PORPS 3.0. It will be an honour to serve as your Executive Board for the duration of the conference. This Background Guide is designed to give you an insight into the case at hand. Please refer to it carefully. Remember, a thorough understanding of the problem is the first step to solving it.

However, bear in mind that this Background Guide is in no way exhaustive and is only meant to provide you with enough background information to establish a platform for beginning the research. Delegates are highly recommended to do a good amount of research beyond what is covered in the Guide. The guide cannot be used as proof during the committee proceedings under any circumstances.

Finally, we would like to wish you luck in your preparation. In case you have any questions, procedural or otherwise, please feel free to direct them to any member of the Executive Board and we will get back to you as soon as possible. Please do not hesitate to contact us with any queries or concerns. We expect all delegates to be well versed with the various nuances of the agenda, and geared up for an intense debate, deliberations and great fun.

Looking forward to meeting you at the conference!

Regards,

Eswar Chava

Chairperson

UNGA - DISEC

Sanvi Reddy

Vice-Chairperson

UNGA - DISEC

Rishi Krishna

Vice-Chairperson

UNGA - DISEC



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POINTS TO REMEMBER

A few aspects that delegates should keep in mind while preparing:

1. **Procedure:** The purpose of putting in procedural rules in any committee is to ensure a more organized and efficient debate. The committee will follow the UNA-USA Rules of Procedure. Although the Executive Board shall be fairly strict with the Rules of Procedure, the discussion of the agenda will be the main priority. So, delegates are advised not to restrict their statements due to hesitation regarding procedure.
2. **Foreign Policy:** Following the foreign policy of one's country is the most important aspect of a Model UN Conference. This is what essentially differentiates a Model UN from other debating formats. To violate one's foreign policy without adequate reason is one of the worst mistakes a delegate can make.
3. **Role of the Executive Board:** The Executive Board is appointed to facilitate debate. The committee shall decide the direction and flow of debate. The delegates are the ones who constitute the committee and hence must be uninhibited while presenting their opinions/stance on any issue. However, the Executive Board may put forward questions and/or ask for clarifications at all points of time to further debate and test participants.
4. **Nature of Source/Evidence:** This Background Guide is meant solely for research purposes and must not be cited as evidence to substantiate statements made during the conference. Evidence or proof for substantiating statements made during formal debate is acceptable from the following sources:
 - a. **United Nations:** Documents and findings by the United Nations or any related UN body is held as a credible proof to support a claim or argument. Multilateral Organizations: Documents from international organizations like OIC, NAFTA, SAARC, BRICS, EU, ASEAN, the International Criminal Court, etc. may also be presented as credible sources of information.
 - b. **Government Reports:** These reports can be used in a similar way as the State Operated News Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country.
 - c. **News Sources:**
 1. **Reuters:** Any Reuters article that clearly makes mention of the fact or is in contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in council.
 2. **State operated News Agencies:** These reports can be used in the support of or against the State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be used in support of or against any country as such but in that situation, may be denied by any other country in the council. Some examples are – RIA Novosti (Russian Federation), Xinhua News Agency (People's Republic of China), etc.



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******Please Note: Reports from NGOs working with UNESCO, UNICEF and other UN bodies will be accepted. Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia, or newspapers like the Guardian, Times of India, etc. be accepted. However, notwithstanding the criteria for acceptance of sources and evidence, delegates are still free to quote/cite from any source as they deem fit as a part of their statements.***



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UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY- DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

MANDATE:

The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime. It considers all disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower levels of armaments.

Agenda - Preventing the acquisition of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, and Nuclear (CBRN) materials by non-state actors.

With 21st-century warfare going multidimensional, it is imperative that nations adopt multi disciplined approaches to uphold territorial sovereignty and integrity. Since the time immemorial, the world has been a victim of mindless violence perpetrated by various extremist groups. With evolving times, newer and unconventional methods of warfare have taken the centre stage. Today, a war is not just soldiers, guns and bullets. The weapons have evolved into more compact yet formidable forms, capable of bringing unimaginable loss to humankind. Therefore, international peace and security must be given the utmost priority as humankind braces itself to unprecedented technological advancements.

NON STATE ACTORS

According to the UN working definition, non-State armed groups are “Groups that have the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; are not within the formal military structures of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental organisations; and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they operate.



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CBRN MATERIALS AND WARFARE

(Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear.)

Chemical agents of warfare are taken to be chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants. Chemical weapons could be used within the zone of contact of opposing forces or against military targets, such as airfields, barracks, supply depots, and rail centres well behind the battle-area itself, or against targets which have no uninucleate connexion with military operations, such as centres of population, farm lands and water supplies.

Bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare are living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in humans, animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.

Nuclear agents of warfare are devices designed to release energy in an explosive manner as a result of nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, or a combination of the two processes. Fission weapons are commonly referred to as atomic bombs. Fusion weapons are also referred to as thermonuclear bombs or, more commonly, hydrogen bombs; they are usually defined as nuclear weapons in which at least a portion of the energy is released by nuclear fusion.

Radiological warfare is a means that disperses radioactive agents to inflict injury or cause contamination or damage. A dirty bomb using a conventional explosion to disperse radioactive contaminants is one such type of weapon, but this could also encompass other ways to disperse nuclear contaminants, such as through a food or water source.

NSAs and CBRN

There is a steadily growing concern about the potential use of these weapons by non-State actors. There are increasing indications that certain types of non-State groups have planned or are planning to carry out attacks using CBRN weapons.

These developments all feed the debate about the security of CBRN weapons and the possibility of them falling into the “wrong hands”, as well as the availability of raw materials, knowledge on handling and weaponizing such materials and tools of dissemination. Chemical weapons seem to be relatively easily obtainable, biological and radiological weapons fall somewhere in the middle, and nuclear weapons are likely beyond the reach of non-State actors.

To carry out CBRN attacks, a non-State actor needs to possess or acquire certain capabilities. A large number of activities need to be conducted, supported by personnel and resources. Nationalist, separatist or irredentist groups and radical religious fundamentalist groups have been identified as potential CBRN weapons users.



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Due to globalisation, which facilitates the spread of knowledge, capabilities and materials, non-State actors may increasingly be able to acquire relevant CBRN weapons-related knowledge and skills. Due to their creative ways of generating funds, several existing groups may have the financial resources to be able to fund a CBRN programme.

With respect to Nuclear weapons, there arise four methods adopted by VNSAs to get hands on to hazardous nuclear material:

- a non-state actor such as a terrorist or criminal or a group of terrorists or criminals could acquire a nuclear weapon from an arsenal of a nuclear-armed state through theft. This has a high probability of arising in poorly secured nuclear parameters.
- NSAs could acquire sufficient fissile material such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium to build an improvised nuclear device (IND). A sophisticated IND is capable of turning huge cities into ashes.
- Poor management of radioactive waste could aid NSAs in procuring radioactive materials for the manufacture of Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD). Radioactive material could be dispersed over a large radius when coupled with conventional explosive devices and thus prove to be lethal.

The radiological terrorism threats are more likely to occur due to the relatively larger number of commercially used radioactive materials and hundreds of nuclear facilities worldwide, but the consequences are much lower than nuclear terrorism because there would not be nuclear explosions but instead dispersal of radioactive materials that emit ionizing radiation. Thus, nuclear terrorism would involve weapons of mass destruction while radiological terrorism would involve weapons of mass disruption

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Over the years, terrorist groups have tested new ways and means to acquire and use more dangerous weapons to maximize damage and incite terror, including weapons incorporating CBRN materials. With advancements being made in technology and the expansion of legal and illegal commercial channels, including on the dark web, some of these weapons have become increasingly accessible



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BIO-WARFARE

Countries that directly engaged in World War II started the mass production of biological weapons(toxins) according to their respective threat perceptions. However, over the years with biological research being funded by private firms, lethal biotechnologies stand for grabs in the International market. The use of hazardous biochemicals by non-state actors to cause mass destruction may be defined as bioterrorism.

International restrictions on biological warfare began with the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use but not the possession or development of biological and chemical weapons. It was considered as a “no first use” policy as several countries were apprehensive about the usage of such materials in retaliation.

Biological Weapons Convention(BWC)

The Biological Weapons Convention(BWC) also called Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BTWC) effectively prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. It was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Formally known as “The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction”, the Convention was negotiated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland. It opened for signature on 10 April 1972 with four signatories and entered into force on 26 March 1975. BWC supplements the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use of biological weapons.

States Parties to the biological weapons Convention undertook “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

1. microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;
2. weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

The BWC requires member states to ensure the relevance and effectiveness of the treaty and to prevent the acquisition of Biological Weapons by Non State Actors(NSAs).



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There have been instances of illegitimate use of CBRN materials in the past by groups having no formal recognition by Governments. Though the biological attacks launched by Non State Actors specifically targeted a group of people in a region, the acquisition of such weapons by NSAs pose a threat to the entire global community. The use of bioweapons by Non State Actors(NSAs) have been reported several times in the past:

- In the 1990s, a Japanese cult Aum Shrinrikyo pursued an extensive biological weapons research program and attempted to weaponize *Clostridium botulinum* (Botulinum toxin) and *Bacillus anthracis* (anthrax).
- Several global reports of 1998 mentioned the interest of Al Qaeda with respect to biological weapons. Despite several attempts by Al Qaeda to procure and synthesise bio weapons, it is still not known if they have procured it.
- In the weeks after the 9/11 attack, a series of letters contaminated with *B. anthracis* (anthrax) were sent to public representatives of the US. Investigations into the issue confirmed that the stain was locally synthesised.
- US Intelligence agencies have determined that ISIS was experimenting with biological weapons during the fall of 2014.

The availability of accessible resources of pathogens further make the task of enforcement challenging, thereby directly threatening International Security. Several multilateral agreements which have aided in improving global biosecurity scenarios. Some of them being:

1. Global Health Security Initiative—The Global Health Security Initiative is an informal multilateral arrangement among the nations of the G-7, plus Mexico and the European Union. The World Health Organisation holds an expert advising role. The GHSI was created after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to better coordinate efforts to strengthen global health security and prevent biological terrorism. These efforts include joint procurement of vaccines, improved linkages between research laboratories, and improved disease surveillance. Member countries' health ministers meet annually to discuss these goals.



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2. The Australia Group- The Australia Group is an informal forum of 42 countries who seek to “harmonise” their export controls on dual-use materials and equipment that could be involved in the production of biological weapons. The Group establishes “common control lists,” and its members deny export licence requests for items on the lists when there is a concern that the items will be used in a biological weapons program.

CHEMICAL WARFARE

The modern use of chemical weapons began with World War I, when both sides to the conflict used poisonous gas to inflict agonising suffering and to cause significant battlefield casualties. Such weapons basically consisted of well known commercial chemicals put into standard munitions such as grenades and artillery shells. Chlorine, phosgene (a choking agent) and mustard gas were among the chemicals used. Chemical weapons since World War I, have caused more than one million casualties globally.

The Cold War period saw significant development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons. By the 1970s and 80s, an estimated 25 States were developing chemical weapons capabilities. But since the end of World War II, chemical weapons have reportedly been used in only a few cases, notably by Iraq in the 1980s against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The World is currently witnessing a steady increase in the diversion and legitimate purchase of chemical precursors used in explosive devices or chemical weapons in order to cause harm around the world.

The use of explosive materials by criminals and terrorist groups poses a significant threat in every country. Attacks using explosives and chemicals endanger public safety on a large-scale, and can severely impact the economic and political stability of countries.

High-profile incidents have affected all regions of the world; the past decade has seen thousands of bombings around the world including in Brussels, Abuja, Boston, London, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai and frequent chemical attacks in Syria and Iraq.

There are multiple classification schemes for chemical warfare agents.. Agents are classified mainly on the basis of the organ system they affect. Traditionally, chemical warfare agents have been classified into lung agents, blood agents, skin or vesicant agents, and nerve agents.



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LUNG AGENTS

Lung agents (exemplified by chlorine and phosgene) are one of the most likely chemical weapons to require critical care. Chemical agents can affect airway, breathing, pulmonary gas exchange, and oxygen transport.

BLOOD AGENTS

Blood agents or asphyxiants (exemplified by hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride) are agents that cause toxicity by interfering with cellular oxygen use. Cyanide is considered one of the most likely agents to be used in a terrorist chemical attack.¹⁴ Cyanide is widely available, inexpensive, requires little knowledge to be used, and is very lethal.

SKIN OR VESICANT AGENTS

The term “blister” agent is a euphemism for the vesicant agents (exemplified by sulphur mustard and lewisite) as vesicants do have significant systemic toxicity. Sulphur mustard is a strong alkylating agent with its most prominent effect being the alkylation of DNA. At room temperature, HD is a liquid that easily evaporates. Rapidly proliferating tissues (eyes, bone marrow, gut epithelium) tend to be affected the most.

NERVE AGENTS

Nerve agents (example: VX) were weaponized and stockpiled in the 1930s by the German Army but not used during the ensuing conflicts. Only Iraq has used nerve agents against Iran in the 1984–1987 conflict. VX is one of the most toxic agents known to man. A single drop of VX can eliminate several hundred people.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 3 September 1992. The CWC allows for the stringent verification of compliance by State Parties. CWC opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993 and entered into force on 29 April 1997. It is the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally applied international control.

It aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by States Parties. It is on the state Parties to ensure strict prohibition in their respective jurisdiction. Under the CWC, the state parties have created a verification regime to check chemical proliferation from time to time.



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With the entry-into-force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 29 April 1997, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was formally established. The OPCW mission is to implement the provisions of the CWC and to ensure a credible, transparent regime to verify the destruction of chemical weapons; to prevent their re-emergence in any member State; to provide protection and assistance against chemical weapons; to encourage international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry; and to achieve universal membership of the OPCW.

RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Nuclear and other radiological materials have benefited society in areas of medicine, agriculture, industry and the provision of energy. There is a risk, however, that nuclear or other radiological materials could be used in terrorism or other criminal acts.

Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—about 13,400 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date. Disarmament is the best protection against such dangers.

Nuclear terrorism is an act of terrorism in which a terrorist organization detonates a nuclear device. The possibility of terrorist organizations using nuclear is considered plausible as terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon.

The detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND), radiological dispersal device (RDD), or the placing of a radiological exposure device (RED) would lead to serious consequences. Such incidents would damage human health and the environment, create panic, and affect economic and political stability.

A number of multilateral treaties have since been established with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation and testing, thereby reducing the prospects of NSAs acquiring such weapons and promoting progress in nuclear disarmament.



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These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was signed in 1996 but has yet to enter into force, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) , which will enter into force on 22 January 2021.

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The NPT is an international treaty which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the global community and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked to oversee global nuclear cooperation and also to check for violations of the NPT . Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions, whether for military or peaceful purposes. It comprises a preamble, 17 articles, two annexes and a Protocol with two annexes.

Another important text is the Resolution adopted by the States Signatories on 19 November 1996 establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).

It has not come to force yet as eight specific nations have not ratified the treaty.

Obligations under CTBT

-Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.



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-Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

JCPOA

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a detailed, 159-page agreement with five annexes reached by Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (a group known as the P5+1) on July 14, 2015. This nuclear deal was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015.

KEY REQUIREMENTS AND ACTIONS MANDATED BY THE JCPOA

- For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines, total machines is 6,104 IR-1s
- Excess centrifuges (over 13,000) dismantled and stored under IAEA monitoring
- For 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235
- For 15 years enrichment only at Natanz
- For 10 years no production of additional IR-1 centrifuges
- Between years 11-13 Iran can replace IR-1s with the equivalent capacity of IR-6 and IR-8 machines and limits lasting to years 14-15
- For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms)
- Excess enriched uranium sold, shipped abroad for storage, or diluted to natural Uranium Stockpile uranium levels
- For 15 years no heavy-water reactors in Iran
- For 15 years no accumulation of heavy water in Iran
- For 10 years Joint Commission review and approval of changes to the research and development plan
- Remove and disable the original core For 25 years continuous monitoring of Iran's uranium mines and mills
- For 20 years continuous monitoring of Iran's centrifuge production facilities of the Arak reactor
- Replace the core of the Arak reactor to reduce weapons-grade plutonium output, certified by the Joint Commission ,etc



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CPPNM

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) was adopted in 1979 after two years of negotiations, based on a draft prepared by the United States of America. It entered into force on 8 February 1987. Its Depositary is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The CPPNM has a threefold scope of application: the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes during international nuclear transport and storage incidental to that transport; the criminalization of offences; and international cooperation.

KEY FEATURES

- The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) extends the scope of the CPPNM and makes it legally binding for a State party to it to also protect nuclear facilities and nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in use, storage, as well as transport.
- It requires any such State to establish, implement and maintain an appropriate physical protection regime applicable to nuclear material and to nuclear facilities under its jurisdiction, including establishing and maintaining a legislative and regulatory framework for physical protection.
- States parties to the CPPNM must take such measures as may be necessary to establish their jurisdiction and make punishable under their national laws certain offences concerning smuggling of nuclear material and certain deliberate acts against nuclear facilities, as well as acts related to directing and contributing to the commission of such offences.
- CPPNM mandates arrangements for cooperation, assistance and coordination among States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, including points of contact, exchange of information with a view to, among other things, protecting or recovering unlawfully taken nuclear material, addressing credible threats of sabotage of nuclear material or a nuclear facility or in the case of sabotage thereof.



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LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Most of the existing international legal instruments against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism identified above have common features. Generally, they:

- Establish particular acts as offences
- Require States parties to criminalise such acts under their domestic law
- Establish jurisdictional grounds for States parties to prosecute the described offences
- Include an obligation to “extradite or prosecute”, known under the Latin formula *aut dedere, aut judicare*
- Provide legal grounds for cooperation between States parties for extradition and mutual legal assistance purposes regarding the offences they establish

A key feature in many of the international legal instruments against CBRN terrorism is an obligation that generally requires States parties to establish certain offences identified in the instruments as criminal offences in their national law.

One of the main aims of the international legal instruments against CBRN terrorism is to ensure that as many States parties as possible have jurisdiction to prosecute the offences defined by those instruments, in order to avoid the creation of safe havens.

These instruments advance this goal through provisions that obligate States parties to establish jurisdiction over the offences they establish in a variety of circumstances. Generally, under these instruments, States parties are required to establish jurisdiction when the offence is committed in the territory of the State, the offence is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that State or an aircraft registered in that State, or the offence is committed by a national of that State. These instruments also include an obligation to establish jurisdiction over the offences when the alleged offender is present in a State’s territory which does not grant extradition pursuant to a request by another State party that has jurisdiction.

The international legal instruments against CBRN terrorism do not apply to the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law.³ Nor do they apply to the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other rules of international law.



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Given the global dimension of the CBRN terrorist threat, the international legal instruments against CBRN terrorism provide essential judicial tools and mechanisms so that national authorities can effectively conduct cross-border investigations and ensure there are no safe havens for alleged terrorists. Such instruments provide all States parties with a series of legal bases for cooperation that are not limited by geographical concerns.

The United Nations Counter Terrorism Centre(UNCCT) was established to bring greater cooperation in issues of International security. UNCCT's Programme on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Chemical,Biological,Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism seeks to advance Member States' and International Organizations understanding of the level of this threat. It supports threat prevention, preparedness and response efforts.

UNCCT provides capacity-building support, focusing on areas such as border and export control, strategic trade control, illicit trafficking, protection of CBRN materials and critical infrastructure, incident response and crisis management, and CBRN forensics.

Since 2018, several pilot projects have been developed under the Programme:

- 1.Enhancing national capabilities to prevent and respond to chemical and biological terrorist attacks in Iraq. The project jointly implemented with the United States Department of State focuses on biological and chemical security, investigation, intelligence-sharing, security culture in academia and CBRN response.
- 2.Enhancing capabilities to prepare for and respond to CBRN terrorist attack in Jordan. The project includes the identification of Jordan's needs through self-assessment; the delivery of a training course; the organisation of a field and virtual reality exercise and the issuance of recommendations. It is jointly implemented with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in close coordination with the Jordanian authorities.
- 3.Promoting universalization and effective implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). The project, jointly implemented with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and financially supported by the European Union, includes high-level awareness raising activities, trainings for law enforcement, prosecutors and border/customs officials, legislative assistance, and a study on the causes of lack of adherence to the Convention.



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4. Enhancing knowledge about advances in science and technology to combat WMD terrorism. This project, implemented within the framework of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), analyses how advances in science and technology could augment or enhance terrorist capabilities to acquire and/or deploy WMD.

5. Addressing the Terrorism-Arms-Crime Nexus: Preventing and Combatting the Illicit Trafficking of Small-Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their Illicit Supply to Terrorist – in Central Asia. The project jointly implemented with UNODC in cooperation with the Counter-Terrorism Directorate (CTED) and the United Nations Office on Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), contributes to the enhancement of national legislative, strategic and operational capacities of the target countries to properly prevent, detect and counter the firearms trafficking and consequently the associated activities of terrorism and organized crime, through a series of national trainings and workshops as well as regional conferences and needs and legislative assessments.

6. Ensuring Effective Inter-Agency Interoperability and Coordinated Communication in case of Chemical and/or Biological Attacks – Phase III (Implementation). This project, implemented within the framework of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection in cooperation with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), aims to improve the interagency preparedness and response of international agencies across the humanitarian, health, and security sectors to support Member States request for assistance, relief operations, and victim support as a result of a chemical and/or biological weapons attack.

7. Developing Technical guidelines to facilitate the implementation of Security Council resolution 2370 (2017) and subsequent relevant resolutions, preventing terrorists from acquiring small arms and light weapons (SALW), improvised explosive device (IED) components and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and components. The project is implemented jointly by CTED, UNIDIR and UNOCT/UNCCT, within the framework of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact Working Group on Border Management and Law Enforcement relating to Counter-Terrorism. The project aims to identify key elements of how to comprehensively address existing challenges in the implementation of resolution 2370 (2017) and to contribute to Member States' capacity to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons by developing Guidelines to facilitate the resolution implementation.



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UNSC RESOLUTIONS TO COUNTER CBRN

RESOLUTION 1373

Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Resolution 1373 is not limited to condemning specific manifestations of terrorism in certain parts of the world, but addresses terrorism as a general phenomenon. It establishes a framework for improved international cooperation against terrorism.

The resolution notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) monitors the implementation of resolution 1373, and is assisted by a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). Established by resolution 1373, the CTC is a subsidiary body of the Security Council. Its goal is to facilitate the provision of assistance to States to build capacity to counter terrorism on a national, regional and global level.

RESOLUTION 1540

It is the first Security Council resolution to focus on the potential acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. It affirms that “proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” It deals particularly with those associated with illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials, which the resolution identifies as a new dimension in proliferation.

The resolution requires States to,:

- refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.



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- adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws that prohibit non-State actors to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them.
- take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.

THREATS

AL-QAEDA

Al-Qaeda, since its inception, consisted of a military subcommittee on nuclear weapons and tried to purchase fissile material from the erstwhile USSR. In 1998 Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring that it was his religious duty to acquire and use nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, an FBI informer, confessed that bin Laden paid a Sudanese Armed Forces general \$1.5 million for a cylinder of cinnabar which contained South African uranium in 1993.

It was widely reported that Al Qaeda extremists approached Bulgarian industrialists for the necessary nuclear materials.

Al-Qaeda, along with some North Caucasus terrorist groups that seek to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Russia, have consistently stated they seek nuclear weapons and have tried to acquire them. Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades by attempting to purchase stolen nuclear material and weapons and has sought nuclear expertise on numerous occasions.

Islamic State

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has demonstrated ambition to use weapons of mass destruction. Although the chances of them obtaining a nuclear bomb are small, the group have been trying/suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear dirty bomb. In July 2014, after the fall of Mosul, ISIS militants captured nuclear materials from Mosul University which had the potential of synthesis into Weapons of Mass Destruction.



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In April 2016, European Union and NATO security chiefs warned that ISIS was plotting to carry out nuclear attacks on the United Kingdom and Europe.

North Caucasus extremists

North Caucasus terrorists have attempted to seize a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine. They have also engaged in reconnaissance activities on nuclear storage facilities and have repeatedly threatened to sabotage nuclear facilities. Several counter terrorism operations were carried out against this extremist group, nevertheless they remain committed to launching such a devastating attack within Russia.

Aum Shinrikyo

The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo, which used sarin gas in the 1995 Tokyo Metro attack, has also tried to acquire nuclear weapons.

Questions a resolution must answer:

- How can International conventions be legally binding on NSAs?
- How can the illegitimate movement of CBRN materials be further curtailed?
- How can the transactions over CBRN materials be kept under check?
- How can diversion of radioactive material usage be prevented?

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