
ATATÜRK İLKELERİ VE CUMHURİYET TARİHİ DEĞERLENDİRMELERİ

Editör: Doç.Dr. Derya ÇİNi ŞİMŞEK

Atatürk İlkeleri ve Cumhuriyet Tarihi Değerlendirmeleri

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yaz
yayınları

2025

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E_ISBN 978-625-8508-22-2

Ekim 2025 – Afyonkarahisar

Dizgi/Mizanpaj: YAZ Yayınları

Kapak Tasarım: YAZ Yayınları

YAZ Yayınları. Yayıncı Sertifika No: 73086

M.İhtisas OSB Mah. 4A Cad. No:3/3
İscehisar/AFYONKARAHİSAR

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"Bu kitapta yer alan bölümlerde kullanılan kaynakların, görüşlerin, bulguların, sonuçların, tablo, şekil, resim ve her türlü içeriğin sorumluluğu yazar veya yazarlarına ait olup ulusal ve uluslararası telif haklarına konu olabilecek mali ve hukuki sorumluluk da yazarlara aittir."

ERKEN CUMHURİYET DÖNEMİNDE BASIN, PROPAGANDA VE KAMUOYU İNŞASI

Ahmet Murat KADIOĞLU¹

1. GİRİŞ

Cumhuriyetin ilanından sonra uzun bir süre Türkiye’de, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin (CHP) tek temsilci olduğu bir tek parti rejimi hüküm sürmüştür. 1924 Anayasası her ne kadar çok partili siyasal hayatı mümkün kılarsa da, uygulamada muhalefet girişimleri sistematik biçimde sınırlandırılmış; siyasi çoğulculuk ve kurumsal rekabet engellenmiştir (Dinçkol, 2015). Bu dönemde devletin ideolojik yönelimi ile siyasal iktidarın yönetim aygıtları iç içe geçmiş, Cumhuriyet rejimi “devlet-parti bütünleşmesi” üzerinden yeniden tanımlanmıştır. Bu bütünleşmenin en belirgin yansımalarından biri, basının doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak devlet kontrolü altında işlev görmesidir.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’ün 1925 yılında Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi’nde yaptığı konuşmada dile getirdiği şu sözler, rejimin basınla kurduğu ilişkinin niteliğini açıkça ortaya koymaktadır: “Cumhuriyet devrinin kendi zihniyet ve ahlâkıyla mütehalli matbâtını ancak Cumhuriyet’in kendisi yetiştirir.” (Turan, 2020). Bu söylem, yalnızca dönemin matbuat anlayışına dair bir eleştiri değil, aynı zamanda Cumhuriyet ideolojisiyle uyumlu bir kamuoyu yaratma amacının açık ifadesidir. Atatürk’ün “eski matbuat”ı “gayr-i kabil-i ıslah” olarak nitelendirmesi, yeni rejimin geçmişin entelektüel ve ideolojik

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mirasıyla radikal bir kopuş hedeflediğini, basını da bu kopuşun taşıyıcı aracı olarak gördüğünü göstermektedir.

Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarında basın, modernleşmeci devletin halka ulaşmasında ve inkılapların meşruiyet kazanmasında bir köprü görevi görmüştür (Oğuzhan, 2009). Ancak bu köprü, devletin çizdiği sınırlar içinde varlık gösterebilmiş, basın özgürlüğü yalnızca rejim lehine faaliyet gösterdiği ölçüde tanınmıştır. Bu durum, gazeteciliği bir “kamu hizmeti” olarak değil, “devlet hizmeti” olarak konumlandırmıştır. Nitekim bu dönemde basın, iktidarın düşünce sistematliğini topluma aktaran, rejimin ideolojik ve siyasal söylemini yaygınlaştıran bir tek yönlü iletişim aracı işlevi görmüştür.

Siyasal düzlemde çok partili yaşama dair girişimler de bu tekçi yapının dışında şekillenememiştir. 1924 yılında kurulan Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve 1930 yılında kurulan Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, kısa sürede feshedilerek siyasi çoğulculuk ihtimali ortadan kaldırılmıştır (Engeloğlu, 2020). Her iki girişim de, rejim tarafından “irtica” ya da “istikrarsızlık” tehdidi olarak algılanmış ve bastırılmıştır (Öztürk, 1994; Şentürk, 2015). Bu bastırma yalnızca partilerin kapatılmasıyla sınırlı kalmamış, bu partileri destekleyen veya rejimi eleştiren yayın organlarına yönelik yoğun bir sansür ve kapatma dalgası da yaşanmıştır. Böylece siyasal muhalefetin bastırılmasıyla birlikte basın alanındaki muhalif sesler de sistematik olarak susturulmuş, kamuoyu, yalnızca iktidarın sesinin duyulduğu dar bir mecraya indirgenmiştir.

Atatürk dönemi Türkiye'sinde basın, demokratik rejimlerde görülen anlamda özgür, çoğulcu ve eleştirel bir yapıdan ziyade, Cumhuriyet inkılaplarının halk nezdinde kabul görmesini sağlayacak bir propaganda organı olarak yapılandırılmıştır (Kadıoğlu, 2024). Bu yapı, kamuoyunun doğrudan halkın iradesiyle değil, iktidarın ideolojik hedefleri

doğrultusunda “yönlendirilmiş” bir bilinçle şekillendirilmesini esas almıştır. Basın böylelikle halkı bilgilendirme ve denetleme işlevinden ziyade, modernleşme ideolojisinin yaygınlaştırılmasına ve devlet merkezli bir ulus kimliği inşasına hizmet eden stratejik bir araç hâline gelmiştir.

2. CUMHURİYETİN İLK YILLARINDA BASININ YAPISAL DÖNÜŞÜMÜ

Cumhuriyet’in ilanını takip eden ilk on yıl, Türkiye’de siyasal rejimin kurumsallaşma sürecine sahne olurken, bu dönemde basın da hem içerik hem de işlev bakımından köklü bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Modernleşme ve merkezileşme hedefiyle şekillenen yeni yönetim anlayışı, basını yalnızca bilgi aktaran bir mecra değil, aynı zamanda rejimin ideolojik inşasını destekleyen stratejik bir araç olarak konumlandırmıştır. Siyasal çoğulculuğun kısıtlandığı bu süreçte, muhalif seslere tahammül gösterilmemiş, özellikle 1924–1930 yılları arasında yaşanan iki kısa süreli çok partili rejim denemesi –Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası deneyimleri– sırasında basın üzerindeki denetim daha da sertleşmiştir. Bu bağlamda, hem hukuki düzenlemelerle hem de doğrudan sansür uygulamalarıyla basının yapısı yeniden şekillendirilmiş, eleştirel yayın organları sistemli olarak susturulmuştur.

4 Mart 1925 tarihinde çıkarılan Tahrir-i Sükûn Kanunu, bu baskı sürecinin yasal temelini oluşturmuş ve hükümete "kamu düzenini tehdit eden" yayın organlarını kapatma yetkisi tanımıştır (Kösedağ, 2016). Bu yasanın çıkarılmasının hemen ardından, 6 Mart 1925’te Tevhid-i Efkâr, Sebülürreşad, Son Telgraf, Aydınlık ve Orak-Çekiç gibi dönemin önde gelen muhalif gazeteleri kapatılmıştır (Topuz, 1973). Bu süreçte, basın özgürlüğü ciddi biçimde kısıtlanmış, fikirlerin serbestçe dolaşımı yerine siyasal

iktidarın görüşlerini yansıtan tek sesli bir medya yapısı teşvik edilmiştir.

Dönemin siyasi ortamında muhalif basına karşı doğrudan ve dolaylı yollarla yoğun baskılar uygulanmıştır. Arif Oruç'un Yarın gazetesi, Zekeriya ve Sabiha Sertel'in yönettiği Son Posta, İzmir'de yayımlanan Hizmet ve Yeni Asır gibi gazeteler sistemli biçimde hedef alınmıştır (Koloğlu, 1992). Bu gazetelerin yöneticileri ve yazarları çeşitli gerekçelerle yargılanmış, sansüre uğramış veya maddi baskılarla yayınlarını sürdürmeleri imkânsız hale getirilmiştir. Basın mensuplarına yönelik fiziki saldırılar, gözetimler ve hapis cezaları, muhalif seslerin kamusal alandan tamamen dışlanmasına hizmet etmiştir.

Muhalif yayın organları susturulurken, iktidar yanlısı basın giderek güçlendirilmiş ve bu yayınlarda toplumun farklı kesimlerinden yükselen eleştiriler "millî iradeye aykırı", "gerici", "bölücü" ya da "rantabl olmayan fikirler" olarak etiketlenmiştir. Bu süreçte basın, devletin ideolojik aygıtı olarak konumlandırılmış; eleştirel habercilik yerine rejimi destekleyen, halkı yönlendiren ve ulusal birliği pekiştiren bir medya modeli benimsenmiştir.

1928 yılından itibaren çıkarılan Basın Kanunları (Matbuat Kanunları), Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) önderliğinde kurulan tek parti rejiminin toplumsal kontrol stratejisinin temel yapı taşlarından birini oluşturmuştur. Bu süreçte basın, yalnızca haber verme ve kamusal tartışma alanı yaratma işlevinden uzaklaştırılmış; bunun yerine devletin ideolojik hedeflerini yaygınlaştıran, yönlendirilmiş bir iletişim aracı olarak yeniden yapılandırılmıştır (Temel, 2020). Bu yeniden yapılandırmanın en önemli hukuki dayanaklarından biri, 25 Temmuz 1931 tarihli Matbuat Kanunudur. Özellikle 50. madde, yürütme organına çok geniş bir takdir yetkisi tanımıştır (Demir, 1994). İlgili maddede şu hüküm yer almaktadır:

“Memleketin umumi siyasetine dokunacak neşriyattan dolayı İcra Vekilleri Heyeti kararı ile gazete veya mecmualar muvakkaten tatil olunabilir. Bu suretle kapatılan gazete veya mecmuanın neşrine devam edenler hakkında 18. madde hükmü tatbik olunur. Bu suretle kapatılan bir gazetenin mesulleri tatil müddetince başka bir isim ile gazete çıkaramaz” (Resmî Gazete, 1931).

Bu maddeyle birlikte hükümet, herhangi bir yayın organını "memleketin siyasetine dokunduğu" gerekçesiyle geçici olarak kapatma, yeniden yayına girmesini engelleme ve sorumlularını cezalandırma yetkisini elde etmiştir. Bu durum, basın özgürlüğü açısından yalnızca fiili bir sansür uygulaması değil, aynı zamanda yayıncıların oto-sansür uygulamalarını da beraberinde getirmiştir (Salimoğlu, 2022). Çünkü kanunun sınırları muğlaktı; hangi haberin “umumi siyasete dokunacağı” hükümetin keyfi yorumuna açık şekilde bırakılmıştı.

1931 Matbuat Kanunu'nun bu otoriter içeriği, 1938 yılında yapılan değişikliklerle daha da sertleştirilmiştir. Söz konusu düzenlemeyle birlikte basın organlarının faaliyet gösterebilmesi için yeniden ruhsat alma zorunluluğu getirilmiş, bu ruhsatların verilmesi veya iptali tamamen devletin takdirine bırakılmıştır. Böylece, yayıncılık faaliyeti yalnızca yasal değil, aynı zamanda siyasal bir sadakat testinden geçmeden mümkün hâle gelmemiştir (Turan, 2020).

Bu süreçte ekonomik araçlar da sansür mekanizmasının ayrılmaz parçası haline gelmiştir. 1930'larda Resmî Gazete'de yayımlanan çeşitli yönetmelikler aracılığıyla, devlete yakın yayın organlarına kâğıt temini, ilan pastasından pay alma, vergi indirimi ve matbaa destekleri gibi imkânlar sağlanmıştır. Bu desteklerin verilmesinde ölçüt, yalnızca teknik yeterlilik ya da tiraj değil, aynı zamanda rejimle olan ideolojik uyum olmuştur (Turan, 2020). Devletten doğrudan veya dolaylı destek alan gazeteler

arasında Cumhuriyet, Milliyet ve Ulus başı çekmiştir (Koloğlu, 1992). Bu gazeteler sadece iktidarın çizgisinde yayın yapmakla kalmamış, aynı zamanda doğrudan siyasal sistemin içinden gelen figürler tarafından yönetilmiştir. Yunus Nadi (Cumhuriyet), Mahmut Soydan (Milliyet) ve Falih Rıfkı Atay (Ulus) gibi isimler aynı zamanda CHP milletvekili olarak görev yapmaktaydı (Kas, 2024). Bu durum, basın ile siyaset arasındaki sınırların kalktığını, medyanın doğrudan devletin ideolojik aygıtı hâline geldiğini göstermektedir (Althusser, 2019).

Basının bu şekilde hizalanması, yalnızca bireysel gazetecilerin tercihleriyle değil, devletin merkezî politikaları ve kurumsal yapılanmalarıyla sağlanmıştır. Özellikle 1933'ten itibaren faaliyet alanı genişleyen Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü (önceki adıyla Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü), hem yayın ruhsatlarını denetlemiş hem de gazetelere gönderilen resmî tebliğler aracılığıyla yayın politikasına doğrudan müdahale etmiştir (Koçer, 2019). Kurum, aynı zamanda günlük basın özetleri hazırlayarak hükümet yetkililerine sunmuş, hangi gazetelerin rejimle ne ölçüde uyumlu olduğu düzenli olarak izlenmiştir.

Bu kurumsal tahkimatın bir diğer halkası da 1935 yılında düzenlenen Birinci Basın Kongresi olmuştur (Üstün, 2020). Bu kongre, görünüşte gazetecilerin meslekî sorunlarını ele almak amacıyla düzenlenmişse de esas olarak, gazetecilere “rejimin bekası için sorumluluklarını hatırlatma” işlevi görmüştür. Kongrede konuşma yapan yetkililer, gazeteciliğin bir meslek olmaktan ziyade bir “millî görev” olduğunu vurgulamış; “rejim aleyhine haber ve yorum yapanların ahlaken ve vicdanen suçlu sayılacağını” açıkça belirtmiştir (Turan, 2020). Böylece basın, bir kamu hizmeti alanı olmaktan çıkarılmış, tek parti iktidarının propaganda ve mobilizasyon aracına dönüştürülmüştür.

1931 sonrası Türk basını, yalnızca ideolojik olarak hizalanmış değil, aynı zamanda yapısal olarak tek kanallı bir düzene indirgenmiştir. Dönemin gazetelerinde rejimin çizdiği sınırların dışına çıkmak neredeyse imkânsız hale gelmiş, eleştirel haber ve yorumlara rastlamak istisna olmuştur (Oğuzhan, 2009). Alternatif sesler yalnızca sansürle değil, aynı zamanda ekonomik dışlama, hukuki takibat ve meslekten men gibi yöntemlerle susturulmuştur. Bu dönemde Türkiye'de basın özgürlüğünün sistemli biçimde sınırlandığı ve medyanın devlet kontrolüne alındığı bir dönem olarak tarihe geçmiştir. Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu'nun hukuki zemin sağladığı bu otoriterleşme süreci, çok partili yaşama geçişin önünde yapısal bir engel teşkil etmiş ve medyanın tek sesli, merkezîyetçi ve ideolojik olarak yönlendirilmiş bir yapıya dönüşmesine neden olmuştur. Basın, artık farklı görüşlerin çatıştığı bir platform olmaktan çıkarak, iktidarın toplum mühendisliğine hizmet eden bir araç haline gelmiştir.

3. DÖNEMİN BASIN ARAÇLARI VE PROPAGANDA İŞLEVİ

Tek parti rejimi, halkın rejimle özdeşleşmesini sağlamak, modernleşme hedeflerini içselleştirmek ve siyasal sadakati artırmak amacıyla yalnızca basın yasalarını değil, medya araçlarının tümünü kapsayan çok boyutlu bir propaganda stratejisi geliştirmiştir. Bu stratejide gazete, radyo, sinema ve kamuya açık görsel-işitsel araçlar önemli birer ideolojik taşıyıcı olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu araçlar yalnızca haber aktaran mecralar değil, aynı zamanda birer “siyasal eğitim” ve “modern yurttaşlık inşası” aracıdır.

3.1. Gazeteler: Resmî Söylemin Taşıyıcısı

Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşuyla birlikte, yeni toplumsal ve siyasal düzenin inşasında propaganda önemli bir araç olarak

kullanılmıştır. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin modernleşme projesi kapsamında, uygun ekonomik sistemin oluşturulması, toplumsal örgütlenmenin biçimlendirilmesi ve kültürel yapının inşa edilmesi süreçlerinde propaganda stratejileri etkin bir şekilde devreye sokulmuştur. Burada kültürel yapı, Cumhuriyet'in getirdiği yeni düzenin toplum tarafından benimsenmesi ve bu yeni yapılanmanın sürekliliğini sağlamak için oluşturulan sosyal alışkanlıklar anlamına gelmektedir. Bu bütüncül yenilik hareketlerinin büyük kısmı, basın faaliyetlerinde kurumsallaşma ve ideolojik yönlendirme politikaları ile şekillenmiştir. Yeni devletin hem iç hem de dış alanda kendisini tanıtmaya ve rejimini benimsetmesi için geliştirdiği etkili iletişim politikalarının temelinde propaganda yer almıştır (Güngör, 2010).

Bu amaç doğrultusunda en eski ve en yaygın kitle iletişim araçlarından biri olan gazete, erken Cumhuriyet döneminde devletin ideolojik aparatına dönüşmüştür. Türkiye'de gazete yayıncılığı büyük oranda devletin yönlendirmesi ve kontrolü altında yürütülmüş, Cumhuriyet (Yunus Nadi), Ulus (Faliş Rıfki Atay), Milliyet (Mahmut Soydan) gibi gazeteler yalnızca egemen ideolojiyi yansıtmakla kalmayıp, bu ideolojinin halk nezdinde içselleştirilmesinde aktif bir propaganda işlevi görmüştür (Kas, 2024). Gazetelerin çoğunun sahipleri veya yöneticileri doğrudan Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ile bağlantılı kişiler olduğundan, basın "bağımsız dördüncü güç" olma özelliğini yitirmiş, iktidarın düşünsel ve ideolojik aygıtına dönüşmüştür.

1931 Matbuat Kanunu sonrası eleştirel ve muhalif seslerin basında yer alması neredeyse imkânsız hale gelmiş, sayfalar büyük ölçüde resmi bildiri ve hükümet açıklamalarından oluşmuştur. Manşetler, inkılapları yüceltmek, Atatürk'ü kutsamak ve muhalefeti "irticai" ya da "bölücü" olarak yaftalamak üzere düzenlenmiş, gazeteler eğitimden kadın haklarına, giyim-kuşamdan yurttaşlık anlayışına kadar "devletin

öngördüğü yaşam biçimi”ni destekleyen propaganda içerikleriyle şekillenmiştir (Kadioğlu, 2024).

1932 yılında kurulan Halkevleri, rejimin ideolojik tahkimatında medya ile entegre çalışan önemli kurumsal yapılardan biri olmuş ve propaganda işlevi üstlenmiştir. Halkevlerinin yayımladığı Ülkü dergisi (1933–1950) ise Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası ideolojisinin açıklanması ve yaygınlaştırılması açısından kritik bir propaganda kaynağı olarak öne çıkmıştır. Eğitim amaçlı bu dergi, Halkevleri’nin genel politikalarını parti görüşleri doğrultusunda biçimlendirmiştir. Ülkü’nün politik duruşu ve içerikleri editörlerin etkisiyle belirgin şekilde değişmiş; 1936’ya kadar CHP Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker’in editörlüğünde hızlı modernleşme ve radikal reformları destekleyen bir propaganda dili benimsenirken, 1936–1941 arasında Fuad Köprülü döneminde didaktik ve tarihsel tonlar öne çıkmış, 1941’den sonra ise Ahmet Kutsi Tecer’in editörlüğünde edebiyat ve sanatın da dâhil edilmesiyle içerik zenginleştirilmiştir (Karpaz, 1974). Bu süreç, Cumhuriyet ideolojisinin propaganda aracılığıyla toplumda derinlemesine yerleştirilmesine hizmet etmiştir.

3.2. Radyo: Merkezî Sesi Yayın Aracı

Cumhuriyet’in ilanını takip eden ilk yıllarda, modern iletişim araçlarına duyulan ilgi ve bu araçların potansiyelinin devlet tarafından erkenden fark edilmesi dikkat çekicidir. Özellikle radyo, yeni rejimin halkla doğrudan ve etkili bir iletişim kurma hedefi doğrultusunda önemli bir araç olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Bu farkındalığın bir sonucu olarak, 1925 yılında “Telsiz Tesisi Hakkında Kanun” başlığıyla çıkarılan yasal düzenleme sayesinde radyo yayıncılığının hukuki zemini oluşturulmuş ve Türkiye’de radyo aracılığıyla kamusal iletişim imkânı resmen başlamıştır (Gülizar, 1985). Bu gelişme, devletin teknolojik ilerlemeleri yakından takip ettiğini ve iletişim

araçlarını kamu yararı doğrultusunda etkin bir biçimde kullanma iradesine sahip olduğunu da göstermektedir.

Türkiye’de radyo yayıncılığının kurumsallaşma sürecinde önemli bir dönüm noktası olan İstanbul Radyosu, 6 Mayıs 1927 tarihinde saat 17.00’de düzenli yayın hayatına resmen başlamıştır. O dönemde “İstanbul Telsiz Telefonu” olarak adlandırılan bu ilk radyo istasyonunun açılış anonsu, Sadullah Gazi Evrenos tarafından gerçekleştirilmiştir (Dinç, 2000). Bu yayın, yalnızca teknik bir başlangıcı değil, aynı zamanda Türkiye’de kamusal sesli iletişimin yeni bir döneme geçişini simgelemektedir. Devlet kontrolünde yapılan yayınlarda, haber bültenleri, inkılapların anlatıldığı programlar ve resmî nutuklar aracılığıyla halk kitlelerine ulaştırılmıştır. Radyonun erişim kapasitesi ve anlık etkileşim yaratabilme gücü, onu rejim için stratejik bir araç haline getirmiştir.

Bu dönemde radyo, yalnızca bir iletişim aracı olmanın ötesine geçerek, siyasal iktidar tarafından ideolojik yönlendirme ve toplumsal mobilizasyon amacıyla etkin biçimde kullanılan bir aygıt hâline gelmiştir. Devletin radyoya yönelik ilgisi özellikle 1930’lu yıllardan itibaren belirgin şekilde artmıştır. Bu süreçte radyo, “Millî İktisat ve Tasarruf Seferberliği” gibi devlet eliyle yürütülen toplumsal kampanyalarda önemli bir araç olarak değerlendirilmiş, geniş kitlelere ulaştırılmak istenen mesajların taşıyıcısı olmuştur. Aynı şekilde, dönemin ideolojik karakterini yansıtan “Türk Dili” ve “Türk Tarihi” çalışmalarında da radyo, resmi söylemin yaygınlaştırılması ve ulusal kimliğin inşası amacıyla yoğun biçimde kullanılmıştır (Özçağlayan, 2002). Bu dönemde okuryazarlık oranının oldukça düşük olması, yazılı basının erişim gücünü sınırlarken, Cumhuriyet ideolojisinin geniş halk kitlelerine aktarılmasında ve “Cumhuriyet” ile “demokrasi” gibi kavramların toplumsal düzeyde benimsetilmesinde radyoyu etkili ve vazgeçilmez bir iletişim aracı hâline getirmiştir (Kuruoğlu, 2008).

3.3.Sinema: Görsel Hafızanın İdeolojik Kodlanması

Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) hükümeti, sanatı modernleşmenin ve çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine ulaşmanın temel göstergelerinden biri olarak değerlendirmiştir. Atatürk ilke ve inkılâplarının geniş halk kitlelerine aktarılmasında ve ulus-devlet inşa sürecinde sanatın, özellikle eğitimsel ve ideolojik işlevleri nedeniyle önemli bir araç olduğu düşünülmüştür. Bu çerçevede sinema da dönemin siyasal ve kültürel vizyonu doğrultusunda değerlendirilen araçlardan biri olmuş; çeşitli belgelerde sinemanın bir eğitim ve propaganda aracı olarak görüldüğüne dair ifadeler rastlanmaktadır. Ancak uygulama düzeyinde, sinemanın diğer sanat dalları kadar sistemli ve güçlü bir devlet desteği gördüğünü söylemek zordur. Halkevlerinde gösterilen filmler çoğunlukla eğitici, haber içerikli ve propagandaya yönelik yapımlardan oluşmuştur. Hükümet, bir yandan yürürlüğe koyduğu sansür yasalarıyla sinema alanını ideolojik kontrol altına almaya çalışırken, diğer yandan vergi indirimleri yoluyla sinema sektörünün ekonomik olarak desteklenmesini ve halkın sinemaya erişiminin kolaylaştırılmasını hedeflemiştir (Lüleci, 2018).

Tek parti döneminde sinema, yalnızca eğlence aracı değil, bir görsel eğitim vasıtası olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Devlet eliyle çekilen belgeseller, inkılapların tanıtımı, devlet yatırımları, köylere yapılan hizmetler ve Cumhuriyet bayramı kutlamaları gibi içerikleri konu edinmiştir (Turan, 2020). Cumhuriyet'in ilanının 10. yıl dönümünü uluslararası düzeyde tanıtmak ve bu tarihsel olayı görsel bir anlatıya dönüştürmek amacıyla, Türk hükümeti tarafından Sovyetler Birliği'nden sinemacılar davet edilmiştir. Bu iş birliği neticesinde, Sovyet yönetmenler tarafından iki film hazırlanmıştır. Bunlardan ilki, 1933 yılında Sergey Yutkevich ve Lev Arnstam'ın yönetmenliğinde çekilen Ankara: Türkiye'nin Kalbi adlı belgesel filmidir. Söz konusu yapım sürecinde Sovyet sinemacılara, Türkiye'den Reşat Nuri

Güntekin ve Fikret Adil rehberlik ve destek sağlamıştır. Filmde, Sovyet askeri ve sivil heyetinin Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin 10. yıl kutlamalarına katılmak üzere İstanbul'a gelişleri, ardından Ankara'ya geçişleri ve bu çerçevede gerçekleştirilen törenler detaylı biçimde yansıtılmıştır. Ayrıca, belgeselde Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün "10. Yıl Nutku"ndan görüntüler ile Ankara'daki modern kamu kurumları ve kentsel yaşamın unsurları da yer almakta, bu yolla Türkiye'nin modernleşme süreci görsel bir anlatımla sunulmaktadır (Özön, 1995).

Filmde, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluş sürecini ve gerçekleştirdiği dönüşümü vurgulamak amacıyla, 1923 öncesindeki Osmanlı dönemi ile 1923–1933 yılları arasındaki Cumhuriyet'in ilk on yılı sembolik bir karşıtlık çerçevesinde görselleştirilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, eski dönemi temsil eden geleneksel yaşam biçimleri, yapılar ve toplumsal ilişkilerle, Cumhuriyet dönemine özgü modern kurumlar, teknik ilerlemeler ve toplumsal değişimler arasında belirgin bir görsel ve anlatımsal ayırım yapılmıştır. Kullanılan çeşitli görüntü ve metinlerle, Cumhuriyet'in bir kırılma ve yeniden doğuş süreci olduğu vurgulanmış; bu sayede yeni rejimin toplumsal, kültürel ve siyasal alandaki modernleşme iddiası sinematografik bir anlatım aracılığıyla izleyiciye aktarılmıştır (Lüleci, 2014).

İki savaş arası dönemde, propagandanın devletlerin hem iç hem de dış politika hedeflerini gerçekleştirmede yaygın bir araç olarak kullanıldığı dünya konjonktüründe, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ilk hükümetleri de sinemayı hem halkı eğitmek hem de rejimin ideolojik temellerini topluma benimsetmek amacıyla değerlendirmek istemiştir. Ancak 1930'lu yılların sonlarına gelindiğinde, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) Genel Sekreterliği tarafından yapılan bir araştırmaya dayanılarak hazırlanan rapor, sinema alanındaki gelişmelerin beklenen düzeye ulaşmadığını ortaya koymuştur. Söz konusu rapor, dönemin iktidarının sinemaya yönelik tutumunu açıkça

yansıtmasının yanı sıra, sinemanın rejim lehine daha etkili biçimde kullanılabilmesi için kapsamlı ve stratejik öneriler içermesi bakımından da dikkate değerdir (Tekerek, 2020).

3.4. Afiş, Pul ve Broşür: Kamusal Alanın Görselleştirilmesi

Dönemin propaganda stratejilerinde yalnızca yazılı ve işitsel araçlar değil, görsel propaganda araçları da geniş biçimde kullanılmıştır. Okuryazarlığın düşük olduğu bir toplumda, afişler, pullar, broşürler ve posterler rejimin görsel temsilini yaygınlaştırmak için ideal araçlar olarak görülmüştür. Bu perspektiften bakıldığında, dönemin afişlerinde kullanılan yan anlamsal iletilerin, yeni kurulan Cumhuriyet rejiminin ideolojik temalarını yansıttığı söylenebilir. Cumhuriyetin getirdiği modernleşme ve değişim sürecini halka benimsetme amacıyla hazırlanan afişlerde, eski ve yeni yaşam biçimleri, geleneksel değerlerle çağdaş ideallerin imgeleri yan yana konularak izleyicinin zihninde bilinçli bir karşılaştırma ve kavramsal dönüşüm yaratılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu görsel karşıtlıklar, halkın yeni toplumsal normları ve devlet anlayışını kavramasında etkili bir propaganda stratejisi olarak kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca, Harf İnkılabı gibi kapsamlı kültürel reformların ve genel olarak toplumun düşük okuryazarlık seviyesinin göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, afişler gibi görsel kitle iletişim araçlarının, soyut ve karmaşık ideolojik mesajları sade ve erişilebilir biçimde halka ulaştırmada kritik bir rol üstlendiği açıktır. Bu bağlamda, görsel propaganda materyalleri, Cumhuriyet'in ideolojik inşasında ve halkın devlet ile modernleşme projelerine katılımının sağlanmasında temel bir araç olarak ortaya çıkmıştır (Er, 2012).

Posta pullarının, kendi ülkelerinin ideolojisini, kültürünü, milli geleneklerini ve sanatsal ürünlerini tanıtmaya ve propagandasını yapma işlevi taşıdığı; aynı zamanda çağdaşlık

sembollerinden biri olarak kabul edildiği ve ülkenin bağımsızlığını temsil ettiği söylenebilir. Cumhuriyetin ilanını takiben basılan posta pullarında, Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti, Türk Tayyare Cemiyeti, İzmir Enternasyonal Fuarı ve demiryolu gibi modernleşmeyi ve ilerlemeyi simgeleyen birçok tema yer almıştır. Bu temalar çoğunlukla kentsel mekân ve mimari unsurlar aracılığıyla görselleştirilmiştir. Devlet, propaganda ve tanıtım amaçlı ideolojik işlevlere sahip bu posta pullarının basımına büyük önem vermiş; mimari öğeler ve kent mekânı imgeleri, milliyetçi devlet iktidarının görsel vitrini olarak işlev görmüştür. Böylece posta pulları, yalnızca posta hizmetlerinde kullanılan birer araç olmaktan çıkarak, modernleşme, ulus inşası ve devlet söyleminin yaygınlaştırılmasında stratejik bir propaganda aracı hâline gelmiştir (Karaibrahimoğlu, 2023).

Cumhuriyet döneminde yaşanan büyük dönüşüm, posta pullarında dört temel tema etrafında işlenmiştir. Bu temalar kullanım sıklığı açısından değerlendirildiğinde, millî kimlik inşası sürecinde halkın bu kimliğe büründürülmesi ve ulus-devlet formunda şekillendirilen devletin oluşturulması çabalarının ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. Yeni rejim, köklerini kadim uygarlıklara dayandırma isteği doğrultusunda, başlangıçta pullarda Bozkurt simgesi aracılığıyla Ergenekon destanına göndermelerde bulunmuştur. Ancak uluslararası konjonktürdeki değişimler ve revizyonist, saldırgan politikalar izleyen İtalya ile Almanya'nın tutumları ile Sovyet tehdidinin varlığı, genç Cumhuriyet'i Anadolu'daki çok eski kavimlere dayanan köken arayışına yönlendirmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Bozkurt simgesinin yerini Hitit geyiği almış ve böylece millî anlatı, daha derin tarihsel temellere oturtulmaya çalışılmıştır (Yılmaz, 2019).

4. SONUÇ

Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde basın, yalnızca bir iletişim kanalı olmanın ötesinde, yeni rejimin ideolojik, kültürel ve siyasal temellerinin inşasında merkezi bir araç olarak işlev görmüştür. Gazete, radyo ve sinema gibi kitle iletişim araçları, devlet kontrolünde yeniden yapılandırılmış ve kamuoyunun belirli sınırlar içinde şekillenmesine hizmet etmiştir. Bu sürecin başarıyla yürütülmesinde sadece yasal düzenlemeler değil, aynı zamanda kurumsal mekanizmalar ve ekonomik teşvikler önemli rol oynamıştır.

Yürürlüğe konulan sansür uygulamaları ve yayın ruhsatı sistemi, basının sadece düzenlenmesi değil, doğrudan yönlendirilmesi için kullanılan güçlü araçlar olmuştur. Devlet kurumları, gazetelerin içeriklerini sıkı biçimde denetlemiş ve günlük yayın özetleri ile yayın politikalarının belirlenmesini doğrudan sağlamıştır. Buna ek olarak, devlet destekli kültürel yapılar ve topluluklar da basınla koordineli şekilde çalışarak rejimin ideolojik hedeflerine katkıda bulunmuştur.

Basının ideolojik işlevi, özellikle toplumsal dönüşüm süreçlerinde belirginleşmiştir. Dil reformları, kadın hakları, ulusal kutlamalar gibi önemli gelişmeler medyada egemen ideoloji doğrultusunda sunulmuş, muhalif seslerin görünürlüğü sınırlandırılmıştır. Böylece medya, sadece bilgi aktarımı yapan bir organ değil, aynı zamanda rejim pedagojisini yürüten ve toplumun yeni vatandaşlık modeline uygun biçimde eğitilmesini sağlayan bir araç haline gelmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, dönemin rejimi basını kapsamlı bir ideolojik mühendislik aracı olarak kullanmış; hem mevzuat hem de kurumsal yapılarla medya alanını sıkı bir kontrol altına almıştır. Bu durum, basını yeni devletin düşünsel temellerini topluma aktaran kritik bir ideolojik aktör kılmış ve modern ulus devlet inşasının kültürel ve sembolik taşıyıcısı olarak

konumlandırmıştır. Basının bu merkezi rolü, sadece dönemin siyasal yapısını şekillendirmekle kalmamış, aynı zamanda ülkedeki basın özgürlüğü anlayışının da kalıcı biçimde biçimlenmesine neden olmuştur.

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THE GREEK REVOLT (1821–1830)¹

Hasan DEMİRHAN²

1. INTRODUCTION

Although the Ottoman Empire fundamentally exhibited a theocratic character, it never implemented an intolerant or oppressive governance towards minorities. (Şenel, 2006, s. 400) In the territories under its sovereignty, it did not directly interfere with local governments and did not apply religious pressure as long as they fulfilled their financial obligations to the state. Until the Tanzimat Period (1839), the Ottoman Empire consisted of four different nations, which we can describe as Muslim, Greek, Armenian and Jewish nations. Those who remained outside these four nations were included in one of them. (Kutlu, 2007, s. 6) These nations belonged to different religions and were able to perform their worship freely. (Karataş, 2006, s. 270-271) The policy that Fatih Sultan Mehmet pursued among the different religious groups after the conquest of Constantinople, gave the Orthodox Church a great reputation; the position of the Fener Orthodox Church was determined to have spiritual, financial and judicial powers over all Balkan Orthodox. Additionally, Greek merchants became wealthy through maritime trade within the Ottoman Empire and obtained important positions in the

¹ Greek Revolt adlı kitap bölümüm “İngiltere’nin Balkan Politikası ve Yunanistan” adlı doktora tezinden üretilmiştir. (Hasan Demirhan, İngiltere’nin Balkan Politikası ve Yunanistan, İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler enstitüsü, İstanbul 2013)

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bureaucracy. For these reasons, the Greeks (Rum)³ held a privileged status among the minorities in the Ottoman territories. (Örenç, 2009, s. 18)

2. CAUSES OF THE GREEK REVOLT

The Greeks living in the Morea and along the Aegean coasts came under Ottoman rule with the the weakening of the Byzantine Empire, coexisting with the Turks for 433 years. However, this long period did not prevent the Greeks from dreaming of establishing an independent state.

By the eighteenth century, significant changes began to be observed within Greek society. The Greeks, taking advantage of the struggles between the major European powers and the pressures exerted by them on the Ottoman Empire, engaged in intensive commercial activities and rapidly became wealthy. The prosperous Greek bourgeoisie played an important role in the emergence of national consciousness. By building schools, establishing libraries, giving scholarships with the awareness that a stronger community required a greater number of educated individuals, Greek rich people on the one hand ensured that the Greek youth in the Ottoman Empire had access to an increasingly secularised education, and on the other hand facilitated the rapid transmission of the new ideas emerging in Europe to the educated

³ Today, especially abroad, the term “Rum” is commonly equated with “Greek.” As a result, in translations, the word “Rum” is often rendered as “Greek/Yunan.” This interpretation, which is not universally accepted, does not date back more than 80 to 100 years. In essence, the word “Rum” (Roma), which in the Roman/Eastern Byzantine period referred to those who belonged to the same state and church in terms of religion and denomination, later came to be used during the Ottoman period for those affiliated with the Orthodox Church, thus forming the concept of “Rum” that has continued to the present day. Therefore, historically, the word “Rum” is a term derived from “Roma,” used to describe those affiliated with the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Orthodox Church, and it denotes religious affiliation. (Hasan Demirhan, *Büyük Güçlerin Gölgesinde Yunan İsyanı*, İdil Yayıncılık, İstanbul 2016, s.31)

Greek society in the Ottoman Empire. Greek youth, who had previously only had the opportunity to study at the Patriarchal Academy in Constantinople, gained the chance to pursue their education in other places as well with the support of Greek merchants. In Western universities, these young people became acquainted with the main ideas of the Enlightenment,⁴ the French Revolution and romantic nationalism, and realised how much the language and civilisation of Ancient Greece had played a part in the thinking of educated European contemporaries. (Clogg, 1991, s. 40-41)

Among the prominent figures who contributed to the spread of Enlightenment ideas among the people in the Morea, the first to come to mind are M. Anthrakites, E. Boulgares, Benjamin Lesbios, K. Koumas, Th. Kaires, Kh. Pamplekes, Th. Pharmakides, Katartzes, and, among them, the most important were Regas and Koreas. (Millas, 2003, s. 39-40)

In 1782, Regas began working as a secretary for the powerful Phanariot family, the Ypsilantis. Between 1786 and 1790, he gained his first political experience in Wallachia among the Phanariot voivodes. In 1790, Regas went to Vienna, where he was influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution. In Vienna, he published two books: the first was *School for Delicate Lovers*, and the second was *Anthology of Physics*. (Millas, 2003, s. 81-83)

In 1797, Regas published *The New Map of Wallachia*, *The General Map of Moldavia*, and *The General Map of the region*, which he referred to as the "Hellenic World." Among these three works, the most important was the map of the Hellenic region. (Akçura, 2010, s. 20) In October of the same year, Regas

⁴ The fundamental idea of Enlightenment philosophy is that the individual possesses the capacity to determine their own destiny. In this context, Enlightenment thought encouraged the aspirations for freedom among peoples living under the rule of other nations. (Kemal H. Karpat, *The Ottoman Legacy and Nationalism in the Balkans*, İmge Publishing, Istanbul, 2004, p. 32).

published the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* and the *New Political Constitution* in Vienna in order to initiate a revolution similar to the one in France within the Balkans. (These two texts are collectively known as *Regas' Constitution*.) (Millas, 2003, s. 92-93) Regas' Constitution was modeled after the French Constitution dated June 27, 1793". Regas did not advocate for an independent national state. In his works, he described the Ottoman Empire as *the most beautiful state in the world*. His aim was not to bring an end to this state, but to reform it through revolution, giving it a democratic structure like that established in France. Regas aimed for the political changes that had taken place in France to also occur within the Ottoman Empire. (Millas, 2003, s. 92-97)

Another leader whom we can regard as a pioneer of the Greek Enlightenment was Adamantios Korais (1748–1833). Korais was born in Izmir but spent most of his life in Paris. (Clogg, 1991, s. 42-43)

In 1798, Korais immediately wrote *The Doctrine of Fraternity* in response to *The Doctrine of the Fathers*, published by the Fener Orthodox Church. (Millas, 2003, s. 171) A year after publishing *The Doctrine of Fraternity*, Korais published *The War Paean* during Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign, believing that Napoleon would grant the captive peoples their liberation. Korais continued his efforts and in 1801 published his poem *The War Trumpet*. This poem also called upon the Greeks to revolt. In 1803, he delivered his speech *Mémoire sur l'état actuel de la civilisation dans la Grèce* in Paris, a comprehensive and in-depth study written in French. In 1805, he wrote his work *What Should the Greeks Do?*, advising how the Greeks should position themselves against the Russians, the British, and the French. In the same year, with the financial support of the Zosimas Brothers, he published the 17-volume *Hellenic Library*. (Millas, 2003, s. 143-150) The purpose of this work, centered on Ancient Greece, was to remind

the Greeks of their glorious past filled with victories. (Castellen, 1993, s. 269) Alongside this, he also prepared an unpublished Greek-French dictionary and a modern Greek grammar. In addition, there were two other anonymous works that had an influential role before the revolt. *Rusingilizfransız* (Russian-English-French) poem and *Hellenic Nomarchy*. (Millas, 2003, s. 157)

One of the important factors that triggered the uprising in the Morea was the The Fener Orthodox Church. Many Greek clergymen actively participated in the Greek revolt. In addition, from the time of its re-establishment by Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, the Patriarchate pursued a twofold, insidious policy against Turkishness. The first aspect of this policy was its effort to present itself to European public opinion as an oppressed institution that had fallen into the hands of Muslims. The second aspect of the policy pursued was the effort to Hellenize the non-Greek Orthodox subjects, such as the Serbs, Albanians, Vlachs, and Bulgarians, with the aim of reviving the Byzantine Empire. (Şahin, s. 345)

2.1. The Establishment and Activities of the Filika Eteria

The Greeks, who had become wealthy through trade and established colonies in major European commercial centers, initially founded associations in the cities where they lived, in order to conduct their commercial activities and preserve their cultural values. However, the nature of these associations, which had been founded beginning in the 16th century, began to change due to the ideas propagated by the French Revolution of 1789 and the Enlightenment movement that emerged in 18th-century Europe, as well as the longing for Ancient Greece, which was one of its reflections. After the ideas spread by the French Revolution began to dominate Europe, the aim of the associations established

by the Greeks became to create political and ideological unity among Greeks, to lay the groundwork for a future uprising that would lead to an independent Greek state, and to carry out the necessary organization for that purpose. Within this framework, the most significant association established and involved in planning the 1821 Greek Revolt was the Filiki Eteria⁵ (*Society of Friends*), founded in mid-1814.

The Filiki Eteria expressed its purpose as cleansing the nation of its evils and helping its people be absolved of their sins so that they could attain paradise. (Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence (A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833)*, 1930, s. 11) However, the real purpose of the association was; to establish an independent Greek state in the Mora in the first stage. Following this, the aim was to incorporate Central Greece, Western Thrace, Thessaloniki, the Aegean Islands, the Dodecanese, Cyprus, and Western Anatolia into Greece — and ultimately to seize Istanbul and revive Byzantium. (Seyfi, 1934, s. 4)

The founders of the Filiki Eteria initially considered appointing Ioannis Kapodistrias, who had served as foreign minister in Russia, as the head of the society. However, their proposal was not accepted by Kapodistrias. (Paşa, 1301, s. 146-147) Kapodistrias recommended Alexander Ypsilantis, a general in the Russian army and one of the Tsar's adjutants, as a candidate for leadership. Aleksander Ypsilantis seemed to be a good candidate for the leadership of Filiki Eteria. The administrators of Filiki Eteria thought that through Ypsilantis they could gain

⁵ In our literature, *Filiki Eteria* (Philiki Eteria) is mistakenly referred to as *Etniki Eteria* (Ethniki Hetairia). However, these two organizations are distinct from one another. *Etniki Eteria* (National Society) was a society established in the capital of Greece in 1894 by officers, intellectuals, and merchants. Although it appeared to have been founded to 'liberate all ethnic kin under Ottoman rule,' its actual aim was to intervene in the Macedonian issue and combat the Bulgarian committees. (İlber Ortaylı, *The Longest Century of the Empire*, Hil Publications, Istanbul, 1987, p. 65).

Russia's support. For these reasons, he was offered the leadership of the organization. Aleksander Ypsilantis accepted this offer on April 12, 1820 and became the new leader of Filiki Eteria. (Jelavich, 2006, s. 231)

3. THE 1821 WALLACHIA–MOLDAVIA UPRISING AND RELEATED DEVELOPMENTS

The primary obstacle preventing the Greeks, who had long awaited an opportunity to rebel, from taking action was the authority of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha, the governor of Ioannina. Ali Pasha, an important military power, was not letting the Greeks get away with anything. In fact, Ali Pasha was aware of the Greeks' intention to uprising and had informed the Sublime Porte of the matter. (Kara, 1983, s. 111) However, Ali Pasha's words were not taken into consideration due to the attitude of Halet Efendi, who served as seal-keeper to Sultan Mahmud II and was known for his protection of the Phanariote Greeks. (Kara, 1983, s. 111-112) Ali Pasha's attempts to eliminate his rivals in order to increase his own power and influence led to the narrowing of his areas of authority. Subsequently, he was dismissed from his position as vizier. Unable to accept these developments, Ali Pasha initiated an uprising in March 1820. The Ottoman Empire responded immediately, assigning Hurshid Pasha the task of gathering military units from the Morea and the Aegean Islands and marching against Tepedelenli Ali Pasha. This uprising removed the pressure that had been weighing on the Greeks and provided them with the opportunity they had been waiting for. (Baysun, 1995, s. 346)

After being elected as the leader of the Filiki Eteria on April 12, 1820, Alexander Ypsilantis believed that action to initiate the revolt should be taken swiftly, and that the favorable

conditions created by the uprising of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha needed to be utilized. Other members of the Filiki Eteria (Özkaya, 1986, s. 117-118) had also planned for the uprising to begin first in the Morea, due to the region's geographical suitability and the dense Greek population there. However, the preparations for uprising in this region did not progress as quickly as expected, which led to uncertainty for Alexander Ypsilantis regarding where the revolt should begin — ultimately causing him to turn his attention toward Moldavia. Considering the circumstances of the time, launching the Greek revolt in Moldavia appeared to be a wise decision. The Phanariotes within the Ottoman bureaucracy who were connected to the Filiki Eteria were expected to support the uprising, and agreements had already been made with the Boyars in the region. In addition to this, the geographical location of Wallachia and Moldavia was strategically excellent. This was because the Filiki Eteria also wanted to include other Balkan peoples such as the Bulgarians, Serbs and Romanians in the movement. If the initial stage of the uprising succeeded, the uprising forces hoped to march toward the Morea with the support of these groups. It was expected that, during this march, the Balkan peoples would unite in large numbers under the Greek flag. Furthermore, the region bordered Russia, from whom assistance was hoped for. Faith in Russian support was very strong among the insurgents. (Jelavich, 2006, s. 222)

After deciding where the uprising would begin, Alexander Ypsilantis took immediate action to unite the Greeks under his banner, and on October 8, 1820, he invited the prominent Greek figures to join the uprising. For the uprising in Wallachia and Moldavia to succeed, Ypsilantis had to get the support of the local population. Since 1819, members of the Filiki Eteria had been in communication with Serbian leader Miloš Obrenović, making efforts to involve him in the planned uprising. These efforts proved successful, and an agreement was signed with Miloš on

November 4, 1820. Following the alliance agreement with Miloš Obrenović, negotiations also began with Tudor Vladimirescu, who was leading the Romanians, and an agreement was reached with him as well in 1821 for participation in the uprising. (Crawley, *The New Cambridge Modern History*, 1965, s. 568)

Following long preparations and agreements, Aleksander Ipsilantis, the leader of the Philiki Eteria, decided that the time for uprising had come and launched the uprising movement by crossing the Prut River with 3000⁶ soldiers on March 6, 1821. Ypsilantis and his companions reached Iași on the same day. (Philips, 1897, s. 30) In the early days of the uprising, Ypsilantis established a form of order in the city according to his own vision and adorned the Cathedral of Iași with the flags of the Sacred Struggle. (Hatipoğlu, 1988, s. 17) Alexander issued declarations here to address the people of Moldavia. In one of these declarations, Alexander Ipsilantis said: “Hellenes, the hour has struck. The time for revenge for our religion and our homeland has come. Forward! You will see that a very strong state will protect our rights.” (Armaoğlu, 2003, s. 170)

Meanwhile, a group of insurgents united under the command of a bandit named Vasil Karabiya burned and destroyed the town of Galați on March 11, 1821 (6 Jamâziyelâhir 1236) and also sank about twenty Muslim merchant ships at the town's pier. In addition, the property and goods of the Muslims in the area were looted, and the Turks among them were killed in a horrific manner. (Paşa, 1301, s. 185) Alexander Ipsilantis wanted to seize the entire left bank of the Danube by capturing Ibrail and then the

⁶ Many sources indicate that Alexander Ypsilantis crossed the Prut River with 3,000 soldiers; however, in his book *The Unification of Greece*, Douglas Dakin states that the number was 4,500 and that the army included Serbs, Bulgarians, Montenegrins, Moldavians, and about 700 Greek students. Douglas Dakin, *British Intelligence of Events in Greece, 1824–1827: A Documentary Collection*, Athens, 1959, p. 15.

other castles and lands on the Danube coast. However, he was only able to take Galați. (Paşa, 1301, s. 267)

One day after the insurgents burned and destroyed Galați, on March 12, 1821, they marched into Wallachia, arriving in Bucharest on April 9. By the time Alexander Ypsilantis reached Bucharest, the number of soldiers in his army had reached 5,000. Meanwhile, the Romanian leader Tudor Vladimirescu (Hatipoğlu, 1988, s. 18) had arrived in Bucharest on April 2 with an army of 65,000 men. However, before (Jorga, 2009, s. 215) Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu reached Bucharest, a news that would overturn all their plans echoed through the city on March 17, 1821. According to this news, Alexander Ypsilantis had been dismissed from the Russian army by the Tsar and excommunicated by Fener Orthodox Church. (Jelavich, 2006, s. 236) Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu both knew that the uprising they had embarked on would not succeed without Russian support. Russia's stance changed everything. (Anderson, 2001, s. 80) Following this news, tensions began to emerge between Ypsilantis and Vladimirescu, who had now lost the backing of Russia. After a brief political struggle, Ypsilantis managed to have Tudor Vladimirescu executed during the night of June 8–9 as a result of various intrigues. (Jelavich, 2006, s. 237)

The Ottoman Empire was closely following the developments in Wallachia and Moldavia. After making the necessary preparations to intervene in the uprising, it launched a military campaign. Serasker Yusuf Pasha of Berkofça was assigned to the operation, and it was planned that he would attack the insurgents from three directions. Serasker Yusuf Pasha appointed Salih Pasha, his Çerhacı, along with the janissaries under his command, to eliminate the insurgent's redoubt along the Prut River. Salih Pasha drove the insurgents from their shelters along the riverbanks with a successful operation. Following this

success, Salih Pasha also won the battle with the insurgents in the Fotşan area.

The Vidin column of the army crushed a group of 8,000 insurgents commanded by Alexander's brother Nikola in the village of Dağşan, forcing them to flee into the mountains. The Silistre column advanced and recaptured the town of Tergovishte, which the insurgents had captured earlier. (Paşa, 1301, s. 268) After this battle, Alexander Ypsilantis, accompanied by about thirty associates, first went to the town of Rofal, and from there, fled to Austria. (Özkaya, 1986, s. 127)

When Alexander Ypsilantis fled to Austria, his brother Nikola, along with his close companions Lasanis, Orfanos the Pole, and Gaweski, was imprisoned on June 26, 1821. He was in prison in Munkacz and Theresienstadt for six and a half years, and six months after the end of his sentence, he died in Vienna. (Hatipoğlu, 1988, s. 18)

This uprising, which marked the first phase of the Greek Revolt and was led by Alexander Ypsilantis, lasted for approximately four months and was easily suppressed by the Ottoman Empire. Alexander's shortcomings played an important role in this outcome, as well as the lack of support from the Wallachian and Moldavian populations and the recognition by the Great Powers of Europe that the Ottoman Empire's intervention during the uprising was legitimate.⁷ Although the uprising was suppressed in Wallachia, the danger had not yet passed for the Ottomans, because during the same period, the Greek revolt in the Morea was growing stronger with each passing day. The

⁷ When the Wallachian uprising broke out, the Ottoman Empire pursued a prudent foreign policy in responding to the uprising and prevented any possibility of Russian intervention in the region, with whom it had been in conflict for years. Additionally, the support of Austria, the other major power in the area, was also secured. (Valeriu Veliman, "Osmanlı Devleti ve Romen Prenslüklerinde 1821 Senesi Olayları" [The Events of the Year 1821 in the Ottoman Empire and the Romanian Principalities] IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi'nden, TTK, Ankara, 1988, p. 973.)

Ottomans now had to prepare to direct all their attention and power against the separatist Greeks in that region.

4. THE OUTBREAK OF THE MOREA REVOLT

When Alexander Ypsilantis launched the uprising in Wallachia and Moldavia, he had sent several members of the Filiki Eteria to the Morea in order to expand the it across a wider region. This was because the favorable geographical conditions of the Morea, along with its high population density in favor of the Greek cause, would offer a significant advantage for the success of the uprising. In addition, the insurgents believed that they could attract the attention of the European states, who were religious fellow, toward the Morea and thereby obtain political, financial, and military support from them.

When the first uprising movements began in the Morea, there was no Ottoman force present that could control or stop them. The Governor of the Morea, Hurshid Pasha, had taken all able-bodied Muslim men from the region with him to campaign against Tepedelenli Ali Pasha. For this reason, it was not difficult for the Greeks to initiate the first phase of the revolt. (Sezer, 1999, s. 91)⁸In a short time, this uprising ceased to be merely a rebellion against Ottoman rule and took on the character of a massacre directed at Muslims. The insurgents regarded every Muslim — woman, child, or man — as an enemy without distinction, and they annihilated the entire Muslim population of the peninsula.⁹

⁸ Hamiyet Sezer, *The Morea Rebellion and the Independence of Greece (1821–1829)*, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. 2, Ankara, 1999, p. 91.

⁹ The massacre of the Turks is not only documented in works written by Turkish authors but also discussed in the writings of many European authors who either participated in the revolt or closely followed the events of the time. However, it is impossible to determine exactly how many Turks lost their lives during the revolt. This is largely due to the lack of regular population records from that period. Consequently, researchers who study the Greek Revolt provide varying figures regarding the number of Turks who died in the region. Despite these differences,

The Greek insurgents had in fact chosen Easter Day (April 22, 1821) as the date for the uprising. Their plan was to carry out a surprise attack on the Muslims during the night of Easter and massacre them. If they failed, they would claim that Tepedelenli Ali Pasha had deceived them and present him as the reason for the revolt. In order to ensure that all Greeks were informed of this plan, priests were sent to towns and villages. However, in the town of Argos, two drunken men fired shots into the air, causing

the available data offer important clues about the scale of the massacre. Renowned demographer Justin McCarthy, in his book *Death and Exile*, citing George Finlay, presents the following figures: *estimates for the number of Muslim deaths are generally around 25,000. However, due to the absence of population records, it is impossible to determine the exact number of Turks killed in the Morea—even though it is known that nearly all were massacred. Between 26 March and 11 April 1821, 10,000 to 15,000 Muslims were killed without hesitation. In Missolonghi, apart from 22 individuals, all Turks were slaughtered. It is known that in Vrachori, 500 families; in Navarino, all men, women, and children; and in Tripolitsa, more than 2,000 people were killed.* W. Wilson Philip stated that the number of Turks in the Morea at the time was around 25,000 and that none remained. George Castellen, referring to other British authors, wrote that the number of Turks (Muslims) who lost their lives in the Morea was about 40,000. Ali Fuat Örenç, based on contemporary Turkish sources, provided the following figures: *There were 500 families in the fortress of Corinth (Gördes), 100 in the coastal towns of Vostice and Kartina, 170 in Argos, 180 in Navarin, 200 in Koron and Landos, 300 in Guston, 400 in Arcadia and Mezistre, 500 in Menekşe, 750 Turkish and Jewish families in Anabolu, 1,000 in Fenar and 2,000 in Tripolitsa. The population of Balyabadra was around 10,000, and no one survived.* In an article on the Turkish-Greek population issue following the revolt, Nedim İpek stated that the territory on which Greece was founded—Attica and the Morea, as well as the Euboea Peninsula and the Northern Sporades and Cyclades islands—had a population of approximately 933,765 as of 1821. He noted that at least 10% of this population (between 63,000 and 90,830) was composed of Muslims. During the period between 1821 and 1833, some of the Turks were massacred, while others were forced to abandon their lands. As a result, the population of Greece fell to 752,077 by 1838. İpek commented that the killing and expulsion of the local Turks were the main factors behind this population decline. In his article, Aşkın Koyuncu writes that between one-half and three-quarters of the arable land left to Greece had belonged to Muslims before the revolt. In his article, where he states that the Turkish population living in the Morea was estimated to be around 9.1% to 11.9% (63,600–90,830), and that approximately 40,000 to 50,000 Turks lost their lives during the revolt, he also examines the information provided by Greek historians. Based on this information, he notes that the Greek population in the Morea was approximately 360,000 compared to about 40,000 Turks, and that around 25,000 Turks were killed during the revolt. (Hasan Demirhan, *İngilizlerin Balkan Politikası ve Yunanistan [The Balkan Policy of the British and Greece]*, İdil Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2016, s. 173–176)

nearby Greeks to believe that their plan to launch the uprising on Easter had been exposed. They immediately fled into the town. In addition, some of the Greek insurgents who had been hiding in the mountains emerged and began attacking nearby Muslims. Following these developments, the Muslims of Argos abandoned the town and took refuge in the fortress of Nauplion. (Paşa, 1301, s. 213-214) In this way, the true intentions of the Greeks were revealed.

Following the events in the town of Kalavryta, an uprising broke out in the town of Mani on April 2, 1821. (Castellen, 1993, s. 272) One day later, the leader of the Maniots, Petrobey Mavromichalis, laid siege to Kalamata. After capturing the town, the Maniots killed all the men there and turned the women and children into slaves. Once the massacre had ended, twenty-four priests dressed in fine clothing, along with other insurgents, sang victory songs. (Philips, 1897, s. 51) On April 5, 1821, around 5,000 Greeks gathered at a sacred church near Kalamata. (Dakin, 1972, s. 40) The following day, on April 6, 1821, Germanos, the Bishop of Patras ¹⁰(Balyabadra), raised the flag of rebellion at the Agia Lavra Monastery near Kalavryta. He had placed the cross of Saint George upon the flag. (Jorga, 2009, s. 218) Germanos's motto in the uprising was "*Peace to Christians, respect to consuls,*

¹⁰ After starting the revolt in Kalavrita, the Greeks easily throttled the Turks living outside the town; afterward, they began attacking towns and fortresses. During these attacks, the European consuls present in the towns did not refrain from mentioning these dreadful days in their memoirs. One of them, the French Consul Pouqueville in Balyabadra (Patras), wrote the following about the attack that took place on 23 March 1821: "*After that dreadful night, I no longer believed I would ever see the light of day again. Endless screams. A city of twenty thousand people was annihilated. The Greeks set fire to the Turkish quarter. The streets were filled with corpses. Archbishop Germanos bore great responsibility... Greeks came from the villages to Patras, shouting 'Death to the Turks'. Flags with crosses were waving on the mosques. Priests baptized many Turkish children. Greek notables from Vostitsa entered the city. In front of them marched their men, each with five Turkish heads impaled on every spear...*"(Mustafa Turan – Musa Gürbüz, "Yunan Bağımsızlık Düşüncesinin Tarihi Temelleri ve Tropoliçe Katliamı" Uluslararası Suçlar ve Tarih Dergisi, S.1, Ankara 2006, 26–27)(9-43)

death to the Turks.” (Howarth, 1976, s. 28) On April 4, Christian Albanians had also begun their own revolt, and the villagers in Attica and Boeotia joined them. (Dakin, British and American Philhellenes (During the War of Greek Independence 1821–1833, 1955, s. 23)

With the uprising initiated by Bishop Germanos, Greek insurgents descended from the mountains and attacked more than 200 Muslim homes in Kalavryta, killing all the men and taking the Turkish women captive. The massacre¹¹ in the town continued without interruption for two days. (Örenç, 2009, s. 34)

In the three weeks following Germanos’s initiation of the uprising, the movement expanded very rapidly. Although the Greeks achieved considerable success in a short period, in reality, they did not possess a clear plan for the uprising. (Howarth, 1976, s. 28) Nevertheless, by the end of April, the cities of Salona, Livadeia, and Talanti had fallen. (Dakin, British and American Philhellenes (During the War of Greek Independence 1821–1833, 1955, s. 23) In the Morea Peninsula, very few fortresses remained under Ottoman control. Of the fortresses still held by the Ottomans, Koroni was besieged by 2,000 Greek insurgents, while

¹¹ The massacre of Turks in Greece was not one of the usual losses of wartime. “*All Turks, including women and children, were taken and killed by Greek bands; the only exceptions were a small number of women and children who were enslaved. Sometimes, the Greeks carried out the killings in the fervor of the uprising and in the joy of seeing their former masters now defeated, acting on impulse rather than premeditation. But more often, the murders were committed with premeditation and cold-blooded intent. The entire Turkish populations of towns were gathered, marched to suitable locations, and then massacred there. Moreover, it would be inaccurate to portray these murders merely as an outburst of hatred. These were calculated actions. The Turks in Greece were seen as obstacles on the path to creating a Greece that was solely Greek and independent. The insurgents rightly assumed that the loyalty of the Turks in Greece would lie not with a new Greek state, but with the Ottoman Empire. The presence of a Turkish minority would become a focal point for future pro-Ottoman sentiments, and potentially, in the event of a counterattack by the Ottomans, a fifth column working against the Greek revolt. The only solution to these problems was total eradication.*” (Justin McCarthy, *Ölüm ve Sürgün* [Death and Exile], Çev. Bilge Umar, İnkılap Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1995, s. 9–10.)

others were positioned in front of Methoni (Modon) and Navarino (Navarin). Thus, nearly every fortress in the Morea had been besieged by insurgent forces. There were 4,000 Greeks positioned in front of Patras (Balyabadra), and 10,000 insurgents were besieging Tripolitsa. At Monemvasia, 3,000 fierce Maniots were waiting for the fortress to fall so they could loot it. Acrocorinth was placed under siege by 8,000 insurgents. (Philips, 1897, s. 52)

Following these developments in Mora, Ottoman forces took action to suppress the uprising. Serasker Hurshid Pasha dispatched Kapıcıbaşı Mustafa Bey with 3,500 soldiers taken from the army of Ioannina toward Tripolitsa. Mustafa Bey immediately set out and reached the Morea using boats along the coast of Rumelia, where he joined Yusuf Pasha of Serres. Mustafa Pasha, who completed his deficiencies by staying in Serres for two days, moved towards Vestice and reached the region; after a two-hour battle, he neutralized two hundred of the bandits there and made the others surrender. From there, Mustafa Bey proceeded to Gördes (Corinth), and after a three-hour combat, he neutralized about 300 insurgents and captured the town. Following this, he advanced to the town of Argos, where he neutralized approximately 600 insurgents and established control over the town. He later moved on to the fortress of Anabolu (Nauplion) and successfully lifted the siege laid by the Greeks. Mustafa Bey did not accept the offers of the local population's in the castle to be transferred to Anabolu and Badra, considering it more appropriate for them to remain in place. Mustafa Bey stayed in the fortress of Anabolu for seven days, during which he united with 2,000 soldiers arriving from Tripolitsa, and then moved to Tripolitsa. Mustafa Bey managed to reach Tripolitsa; however, he became trapped there due to the siege laid by the Greek insurgents. (Paşa, 1301, s. 215-216)

While the Ottoman forces were dealing with the uprising in the Morea, news arrived that the Christians on the island of

Euboea (Eğriboz) had also risen in uprising. Upon receiving this information, Yusuf Pasha of Serres set out from Ioannina with his troops, advancing toward Euboea via Preveza and Inebahtı (Naupaktos). As Yusuf Pasha approached the fortress of Inebahtı, he was informed that the Christians in the Morea had also uprisen and that the fortress of Balyabadra (Patras) was under siege, and he was requested to provide assistance. Yusuf Pasha, therefore, crossed from Inebahtı to the Morea coast by boat and succeeded in lifting the siege of Balyabadra. Following these successes, Yusuf Pasha was assigned the responsibility of securing the fortresses along the Gulf of Inebahtı.

After driving the insurgents out of the fortress of Balyabadra, Yusuf Pasha reported to Hurshid Pasha that the entirety of the Christian population of the Morea had risen in rebellion and urgently requested that 5,000 soldiers be dispatched to the region to suppress the uprising. In response, Hurshid Pasha informed the Sublime Porte that the importance of the Morea uprising had increased, noting that Mustafa Bey had already been sent with 3,500 soldiers, and that Governor Mehmed Pasha of the Morea would soon arrive with a larger force. He also requested that the Evlad-ı Fatihan corps, adisciplined military units, be deployed to the region. (Paşa, 1301, s. 216)

Following Yusuf Pasha's campaign, the Governor of the Morea, Köse Mehmed Pasha, mobilized in an effort to relieve Tripolitsa. Together with a reinforcement of 800 soldiers sent by Yusuf Pasha, Mehmed Pasha set out toward the Morea via Thessaly (Tırhala). On the way to the Morea, Mehmed Pasha clashed with insurgents between Domokos (Dömeke) and Lamia (İzdin) and succeeded in dispersing these insurgent groups. Continuing his advance, Mehmed Pasha moved to Badraçık, which belonged to Euboea, and saved the district from the insurgents. After Badraçık, he moved to Livadeia, where he won

a battle and captured the city. After saving Livadeia, Mehmed Pasha returned to Lamia (İzdin).

When Mehmed Pasha returned to Lamia, insurgent pirates arrived in front of Gördes (Corinth) were launching attacks. Upon this, Mahmud Pasha, the Mutasarrıf of Tırhala, rushed to protect Corinth. Meanwhile, the uprising had spread to Thessaloniki and Yenişehir (Larissa). Some insurgent groups came to the district of Veletsin, endangering the safety of the road between Yenişehir and Corinth. Mahmud Pasha sent military forces against these insurgents and succeeded in dispersing them. After this success, Mahmud Pasha personally marched against the Christian uprising in the Sanjak of Tarhala and suppressed the them. Some of the insurgents besieging Korent were put to the sword; others were captured and taken to Korent Castle. (Paşa, 1301, s. 217)

Despite all these efforts and endeavors, the insufficiency of the Ottoman army's forces in the Morea, and the inability to send aid due to insurgent vessels at sea, were preventing the suppression of the uprising. From the first days of the uprising, the Benefşe (Menekşe) Fortress was under siege. It was also impossible for the fortress to receive help from outside. The fortress being suitable for defense enabled the people inside to hold out for about five months; however, after this period, hunger began to emerge. The people were forced to eat cats, dogs, and even human corpses found in the city. Thereupon, on August 5, 1821, the people of the fortress decided to surrender by making an agreement with the Greeks. However, after capturing the fortress, the Greek insurgents did not comply with the terms of the agreement. According to the agreement, around 600 Turks who were to be taken to İzmir were placed on three Suluca ships, stripped of all their belongings, and transported to the island of Kasos (Kaşot), where they were abandoned hungry and naked. Ottoman officials later managed to rescue these unfortunate people by chartering an Austrian ship.

The most beautiful port of the Morea, Navarino, surrendered on August 19, 1821. (Kurtoğlu, 1944, s. 22) The Muslims in Navarino had also surrendered the fortress to the Greeks through an agreement, just as had happened at the Menekşe Fortress. However, the Greek insurgents once again did not comply with the terms of the agreement and, instead of transporting the Muslims to the Anatolian coast, they massacred all of them.¹²

In October 1821, the Greek insurgents were positioned in front of Tripolitsa, the capital of the Morea. The population of Tripolitsa was around 5,000. However, after the uprising broke out, many Muslims who had abandoned their villages had taken refuge in Tripolitsa. About 2,000 Albanian soldiers were also present in the city. In addition, a large Ottoman army had arrived there by the order of Hurshid Pasha. Since the city was in a strategically important position, the Greek insurgents were striving to capture it. Due to the increasing population within the

¹² In the fortress of Navarino, as in the rest of the Morea, the Turks faced a brutal massacre. *"Ypsilantis once again sent a representative to the besieged fortress of Navarino, declaring that if the Turks inside surrendered, they would be transported to the African coasts and released. The envoy may have seemed convincing when he spoke, but no one, aside from him, believed there was even a shred of honesty in that agreement. One Greek involved in the agreement told a British colonel that there had only ever been one copy of the agreement, which he had destroyed—meaning no one could ever prove it had existed. The Turks believed in the agreement—or perhaps had no other choice—and agreed to surrender under its terms, opening the gates of the fortress. As soon as the gates were opened, the Greeks stormed in and killed more than 2,000 people. A priest who was present described how Turkish women were stripped, marched to the sea, and thrown into the water as gunfire was opened upon them. Babies were tossed into the sea to drown or beaten to death against the rocks. The Greeks appeared to take pleasure in cutting off the arms and legs of their victims, collecting the severed heads of their enemies, and constructing pyramid-shaped towers with them. Months later, volunteers who arrived in Navarino by sea reported that the town was still filled with corpses, and dogs and birds were feeding on decaying human remains from the city walls. The Greeks, in an effort to impress new foreign arrivals, boasted about how many people they had killed and how they had done it—some even offered the half-naked boys and girls, left alive in the ruins and wandering in horror, to the foreigners to satisfy their own sexual desires."* (David Howarth, op. cit., pp. 55–60)

city, a shortage of grain supplies had begun to arise. Moreover, because of the rivalry between the commanders Salih Agha and Mustafa Bey, a state of disorder was prevailing within the administrative ranks. The repeated failed attacks that Mustafa Bey launched against the insurgents after making sorties from the fortress caused great fatigue and despair among the soldiers. Thereupon, the prominent figures of Tripolitsa held a meeting among themselves and decided to gather the women and children inside the fortress at the center, and to have the Albanian soldiers and the young men of the country fight on either side, in order to march toward Anabolu, which was located twelve hours away on the coast. However, upon the statement of Salih Agha, who was serving as the district governor of the city, that reinforcements from Hurshid Pasha would soon arrive, this plan was abandoned. (Paşa, 1301, s. 25-26)

Meanwhile, the insurgents began to secretly communicate with the Muslims who had taken refuge in Tripolitsa from the direction of Barda. They deceived some of them by promising that they would be allowed to return to their homelands and persuaded them to leave the fortress. However, the Greek insurgents break their word and attacked these Turks on the roads, killing them all. When the shortage of grain supplies in the city reached its peak, it was decided to negotiate terms of surrender with the insurgents. At the end of these negotiations, an agreement was reached. According to the agreement, five million kuruş would be paid to the Greeks in exchange for the transportation of the Turks in the fortress to İzmir. (Örenç, 2009, s. 32) Under the agreement, the Turks of Tripolitsa would first be transferred to the Guston Fortress and then carried to the coasts of Albania and left there. While the negotiations were ongoing, Elmas Agha, the leader of the Albanians inside the fortress, secretly made an agreement with the insurgents. According to this agreement, the Albanians would open the fortress gates and leave on the night of

October 5, 1821. The Albanians complied with the agreement and, upon opening the gates at night, the insurgents suddenly flooded into the fortress. At that moment, the Turks inside the city were confused and did not know what to do. Some were martyred in the streets; some tried to hide in their homes. About three hundred Turks entered the large redoubt at Değirmentepe and sought refuge there. The insurgents who entered Tripolitsa mercilessly massacred the Turks,¹³ and this massacre continued for three days. Although 40,000 men and women in the city begged for mercy and surrendered, they were brutally slaughtered. The Greeks did not stop at killing the living Turks but also dug up Turkish graves, exhumed the corpses, and burned them. (Paşa, 1301, s. 27-28) The Mufti of Tripolitsa, Halim Efendi, was burned alive by having oil poured over him under the pretext that he had incited Muslims to fight. (Kurtoğlu, 1944, s. 23) The city of Tripolitsa was plundered down to the rusty nails. (Jorga, 2009, s. 230) Only 97 people survived the Tripolitsa massacre, among whom were the wives of Ottoman statesmen.

¹³ The greatest massacre of the Greek Revolt took place in the city of Tripolitsa. The city fell into the hands of the Greeks on 5 October 1821. The Greek insurgents took full control of the town within two days. Over 1,000 Turks were killed. European soldiers were horrified by the gruesome scenes. Captives were subjected to unbearable torture on suspicion of hiding money. Their arms and legs were cut off and slowly roasted over fire; pregnant women had their bellies slashed open, children were decapitated, and dogs' heads were placed between women's legs. From Friday to Sunday, the entire city echoed with screams and laughter. Amid this brutality, one Greek boasted of having killed 90 people. The city's Jewish population also suffered systematic torture like the Turks. Nearly 2,000 Jews—mostly women and children—were stripped, marched out of the city, and killed. Human bones remained visible in the area even seven years later. A few weeks later, starving Turkish children wandered hopelessly among the ruins of Tripolitsa, and if noticed by the ruthless Greeks, they were either shot or slaughtered with blades. Stray dogs roamed through the burning rubble, devouring the decomposing corpses left where they had fallen. The city was filled with the stench of rotting and burnt human flesh. Even the city's water wells had been contaminated by bodies thrown into them. After the plundering of Tripolitsa, many Greeks became wealthy. For instance, the Greek insurgent leader Kolokotronis became very rich by collecting 52 loads of money, weapons, and jewelry during the looting, which he later transferred to banks in the Ionian Islands. (William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free*, Oxford University Press Newyork-Toronto, 1972, s. 45).

The main reason why these 97 were spared by the Greeks was the expectation of ransom. After being held by the insurgents for four months, these 97 individuals were released in exchange for three hundred people and four hundred pouches of akçe provided by Hurshid Pasha through the mediation of the British consul. They were taken to Badıra, from where they were boarded onto a British ship and transported to the Ioannina military encampment via Preveza. (Paşa, 1301, s. 28)

There were also some European Philhellenes who participated in the siege of Tripolitsa and in the massacre carried out by the Greeks. These Philhellenes witnessed how brutally the Greeks behaved in Tripolitsa and recorded and revealed these events through their writings. Among those known are the British Philhellenes Humphreys, Persat, and Voutier, and the French Philhellenes Raybound, Lavillasse, Blondel, and Palestra. (Dakin, British and American Philhellenes (During the War of Greek Independence 1821–1833, 1955, s. 29)

As the uprising in the Morea spread rapidly and the Ottoman soldiers failed to achieve success, it was considered necessary to increase the number of Ottoman troops in the region. First, efforts were made to incorporate Albanian soldiers, who did not belong to any military unit, into the army. Within ten days, more than ten thousand soldiers were registered. Additionally, to reinforce the number of soldiers in the Morea, attempts were made to send reinforcements from Anatolia as well. It was planned to gather a force of 2,000 soldiers from the Sanjaks of Teke, Hamid, and Aydın and to transfer them from the Port of Antalya to the Morea. However, due to the activities of Greek pirates in the Aegean, this plan could not be carried out. (Paşa, 1301, s. 216)

In 1822, the struggles between the insurgents and the Ottoman forces continued. In this year, Seyid Ali Pasha was

appointed as the Serasker of the Morea and subsequently went to İzdin (Lamia). However, he had no other soldiers at his disposal except those in his ownretinue. Meanwhile, when it was heard that the insurgents, whose number had reached ten thousand, would attack the town of Bardacık, Mahmud Pasha of Drama was sent there. Mahmud Pasha won the battle against the insurgents in Bardacık and put the insurgents to the sword. About 3,000 insurgents were neutralized, while the rest fled by boarding ships.

After the suppression of the Ali Pasha of Tepelena Rebellion, Hurshid Pasha also came to the Morea. As soon as Hurshid Pasha arrived, he dismissed Seyid Ali Pasha, the Serasker and Governor of the Morea, and appointed Mahmud Pasha of Drama in his place. With the arrival of Hurshid Pasha in the Morea, his entourage also joined the army, and the number of soldiers reached 25,000. This army, upon the order of Hurshid Pasha, set out toward the Fortress of Corinth in the month of July. Due to the heat of the weather, shortage of grain supplies, and illness, the army was able to reach the town of Korent with heavy losses. At that time, the besieged Fortress of Anabolu was reached and the siege lifted; from there, the town of Argos was reached and was liberated from the insurgents. Mahmud Pasha also intended to march on Tripolitsa, but due to the lack of grain and certain disturbances within the army, he abandoned this idea and returned to Corinth. Meanwhile, thanks to three grain ships that arrived from Egypt, the hunger in the army was alleviated — even if only for a short time. (Kurtoğlu, 1944, s. 15)

One of the significant conflict in 1822 also took place in front of Athens. The insurgents, who wanted to capture Athens, which was considered the cradle of European civilization, achieved this goal on 21 June 1822, and, except for a few individuals who were rescued by the consuls, all of the Muslims were massacred. (Sonyel, 1998, s. 116)

Although Athens or the Acropolis held great significance for European Philhellenes at that time, they held no value for the Greek insurgents. In fact, the insurgents were unaware of the cultural or historical importance of these places. They had no knowledge of Greek civilization. Most of the insurgents were even illiterate. One of the well-known Klepht leaders, Nikotsaras, resented when he was likened to Achilles, asking: “Who is Achilles? Did his rifle kill many men? “Yet the Philhellenes had believed that they would fight shoulder to shoulder with the captive descendants of Leonidas’s warriors. However, when they saw the reality, they experienced great disappointment. (Koyuncu, 2006, s. 500)

Meanwhile, after the fall of Athens, news of the death of Mahmud Pasha of Dramalı, who had won great successes around Korent, arrived. Upon this, Edip Ahmed Pasha was appointed as the Serasker of the Morea. At the same time, Halet Efendi was executed, and the governorship and seraskership of Rumelia were given to Celal Pasha, the Governor of Bosnia. However, when Celal Pasha died on the way, Köse Mehmed Pasha was appointed in his place. Köse Mehmed Pasha then appointed Yusuf Pasha of Berkofça as the Serasker of the Morea and ordered him to proceed to Yenişehir. (Seyfi, 1934, s. 17)

Following these appointments and the preparations that were made, part of the army first moved toward Missolonghi and the island of Andiliko. During this time, a few Kodjabashis came to the army and reported that the people were in a state of fear and that the insurgents also wished to surrender; they invited the Ottoman army to Galta/Galata for negotiations. However, when the army reached the region, it was attacked, and a battle that lasted for three days began. The insurgents, being unsuccessful, dispersed. Meanwhile, news arrived that Missolonghi and Andiliko had been reinforced by Kolokotronis. The insurgents had landed 6,000 men and 12 ships at Missolonghi. In addition,

they armed the fortress with cannons, dug trenches outside, built new walls around the fortress, and constructed defensive works. When a delegate was sent to negotiate the terms of surrender, the insurgents of Missolonghi responded by saying that they had killed many Muslims so far, that they were aware their repentance would not be accepted, and therefore they would not surrender. (Örenç, 2009, s. 45) When the supplies of the army besieging Missolonghi ran out, no success could be achieved. Thereupon, the army withdrew from Missolonghi and returned to Balyabadra.

The Fortress of Anabolu, one of the strategic locations of the Morea, was under siege by the insurgents from both land and sea. At that moment, there were about 7,500 Muslims present in Anabolu. Due to the siege, there was a severe shortage of food in the fortress. In the following days, the Muslims inside the fortress struggled to survive by eating animal carcasses and shoe leather. Nevertheless, many Muslims died of starvation; so much so that only 2,400 Turks were left alive in the fortress. Eventually, on 22 January 1823, the Muslims were forced to surrender the fortress to the Greeks through an agreement. Some of the Turks who were not killed were loaded onto 10 to 15 Greek boats and transferred to the regions of Kuşadası and İzmir.

The Muslims of Gördüs (Corinth), which was besieged at the same time as Anabolu, and whose population numbered around 7 to 8 thousand, were also debating whether or not to surrender. The situation here was much worse. As winter had arrived and conditions had worsened, the Muslim population was facing death. When the army did not come to their aid, a solution was sought for the evacuation of the people along with 500 soldiers, and there was a stampede. Eventually, some soldiers were left in the fortress, and the population was transported to Badıra by means of the ships. Later, when the remaining soldiers were also withdrawn, Gördüs was left to the insurgents. (Örenç, 2009, s. 45-46)

An important confrontation in 1823 also took place on the island of Euboea. The insurgents had attacked the Fortress of Kızılhisar, located on the island. In response to this attack, Ömer Pasha, the governor of Euboea, immediately came to the fortress and dispersed the insurgents. Although the insurgents regrouped after this defeat and attempted once again to capture the fortress, they were unsuccessful and fled. Meanwhile, the Ottoman navy also arrived at Euboea. The Dalkılıç soldiers, *elite Janissary shock troops specialized in close-combat assaults during sieges*, from among the janissaries on board were deployed to the fortress. Through operations conducted both by land and sea, the insurgents in the region were neutralized. (Paşa, 1301, s. 107-108)

In 1822 and 1823, everywhere in the Morea, except for Patras, Coron, and Modon, had fallen into Greek hands. (Clair, 1972, s. 108) The area stretching from the Gulf of Arta to the Gulf of Corinth was now under Greek control. (Philips, 1897, s. 79) In areas close to the mainland, Greek ships had gained superiority over the Ottoman navy. These developments began to awaken dreams of a Byzantine Empire revival among the Greeks. (Clair, 1972, s. 108)

The struggle carried out by the Ottoman Empire since the first years of the revolt was not enough to suppress the Greek Revolt. Among the reasons for these failures were the small number of soldiers in the army, lack of discipline, insufficient grain supplies and rivalry among the commanders. Following these events, Ottoman statesmen considered seeking assistance from Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Governor of Egypt, and for this purpose, Hüsnü Bey was sent to Egypt to meet with Mehmed Ali Pasha. From that point on, hopes were placed in Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mehmed Ali, and in the Cihadiye soldiers, his regular army. Indeed, with the arrival of Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea, the appearance of the uprising changed, and an entirely new situation began to unfold.

5. THE ARRIVAL OF IBRAHİM PASHA IN THE MOREA AND THE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN MOREA

From the early years of the revolt, the Ottoman Empire had been fighting the insurgents both on land and at sea; however, it was unable to achieve a decisive victory. During the revolt, after the establishment of the assembly in Epidaurus in 1822, disagreements among the Greek insurgents increased, and administrative disorder began. Wishing to take advantage of this situation, the Ottoman Empire decided to request assistance from Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Governor of Egypt, who had gained prestige in Istanbul due to his successful campaigns against the Wahhabis in Egypt. (Shaw, 2000, s. 45)

Upon this request by the Sublime Porte, Mehmed Ali Pasha demanded that, in order to prevent any conflict until the revolt was resolved, the Captaincy of the Navy (Kapudan Pasha) and the Governorship of the Morea be granted to his son, Ibrahim Pasha. (Toprak, 2011, s. 324) He declared that, if these demands were met, he would exert all his strength to rescue the Morea and the islands by sending soldiers and supplies. When Mehmed Ali Pasha's demands—except for the captaincy of the navy—were accepted, Ibrahim Pasha was officially appointed to the Morea Expedition. Ibrahim Pasha was tasked with clearing the Çamlıca and Suluca islands and the Morea of insurgents. Additionally, Kapudan Pasha Hüsrev Mehmed Pasha was assigned the duty of suppressing the uprisings on the other islands in the Mediterranean. (Philips, 1897, s. 190)

The troops that were to move toward the Morea completed their necessary preparations and set sail from Alexandria toward the Morea on 22 Dhu al-Qi'dah 1239 (19 July 1824). However, they encountered many difficulties along the way. Due to storms and attacks by the Greek insurgents, Ibrahim Pasha was able to

reach the Port of Modon in the Morea only on 24 February 1825, with 25 ships, 6,000 Cihadiye soldiers, and 600 cavalry. (Paşa, 1301, s. 118)

After landing at the Port of Modon, Ibrahim Pasha immediately took action and besieged Modon with three thousand regular infantry soldiers, four hundred cavalry, and four cannons; after a brief clash, he captured the town. The storehouses, houses, and mosques of Modon were immediately filled with supplies and ammunition brought from Crete. (Kurtoglu, 1944, s. 50) Following Modon, Ibrahim Pasha moved toward Navarino and laid siege to the fortress by land, while the Turkish and Egyptian fleets blockaded Navarino from the sea. Continuing the campaign, Ibrahim Pasha captured, one by one, the districts of Arcadia, Endrosa, Kalamata, and Pyrgos, along with Nis, Little Maina, and the surrounding areas. He then advanced to Tripolitsa and easily seized it. The recapture of Tripolitsa (13 October 1825) caused great joy in Istanbul, and generous gifts were given to those who brought the good news.

Despite all attacks by Greek pirates and the resistance of the rebels in the fortress, the Fortress of Missolonghi was captured by Ottoman–Egyptian forces on 23 April 1826. At that point, only Athens, Gördes (Corinth), and Anabolu (Nauplia) remained in Greek hands. Ottoman control was re-established over the northern part of the Gulf of Corinth and most of Rumelia. As expected, this great success was met with great joy in Istanbul. The Governor of Egypt and the military commanders were rewarded. (Örenç, 2009, s. 86)

Reşid Pasha, after leaving Veli Agha, the notable of Grebene, and Tüfekçibaşı Giritli Mustafa Agha with a number of soldiers to guard Missolonghi, set out to capture Athens, and along the way, he recaptured Salona, Livadeia, and Istefe. When Reşid Pasha arrived in Athens, he found the city under siege by

12,000 Ottoman soldiers, a siege that had been ongoing for two years.

Despite all the support from the Europeans, Reşid Pasha succeeded on 6 June 1827 in capturing first the suburbs of Athens, and then the Athens Fortress and the Acropolis. (Seyfi, 1934, s. 26) Following the capture of Athens by the Ottoman Empire, the Greek Revolt in the Morea Peninsula appeared to be nearly over. The Ottoman army, with the assistance of Egyptian forces, had suppressed the uprising.

6. PROTOCOL OF ST. PETERSBURG (4 April 1826)

By 1826, Ibrahim Pasha was on the verge of ending the revolt in the Morea, and the numbers of the Greek forces had greatly diminished.¹⁴ The Greek insurgents had no hope of winning the war. Meanwhile, the internal disputes among the insurgents continued, and the country was experiencing a complete political crisis. In fact, the Greek insurgents were hoping that the European powers would intervene, rescue them, and grant them independence. This assistance, which the Greeks had long awaited, would soon come about as a result of the conflicting interests of the European powers.

Russia failed to gain an influential role in the Greek question. In the two conferences it organized in 1824 and 1825. After these unsuccessful attempts concerning Greek question, Tsar Alexander decided to revise Russia's policy. (Anderson, 2001, s. 83) However, shortly after making this decision, Alexander passed away on December 1, 1825, and was succeeded by his brother Nicholas (Crawley, *The Question of Greek*

¹⁴ "Letter from General Ponsonby to Wellington, sent from Corfu on 15 June 1826," *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, K.G.*, Vol. 3, p. 338.

Independence (A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833), 1930, s. 52) I. Nicholas's character stood in sharp contrast to that of Alexander. With a firm will and strong memory, the new tsar was a man of resolute determination and supported the idea of governing the state in a military fashion. Furthermore, he held ambitions to either completely dismantle the Ottoman Empire or bring it under Russian control. (Armaoğlu, 2003, s. 176)

Having taken full control of British foreign policy, George Canning aimed to learn in detail the decisions and plans of Russia concerning the Greek question following the death of Tsar Alexander.¹⁵ In Canning's view, the disrupted balance system in Europe should be used and turned to the benefit of Britain. Canning would try to prevent Greece from coming under Russian influence as an autonomous province by using the fear that Russia had created among the Turks.¹⁶ For this purpose, he decided to send Wellington to St. Petersburg in order to offer congratulations to Nicholas I, who ascended the throne in December 1825. Thus, George Canning would also begin to implement his new policy. Canning asked Wellington to approach the new Tsar without prejudice. Wellington would learn the Tsar's intentions and seek a way to reach an agreement with him. (Crawley, The Question of Greek Independence (A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833), 1930, s. 54)

Russia, on the other hand, delivered an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire through its chargé d'affaires Mihaliki on 17 March 1826. In response to this ultimatum, the Ottoman Empire decided to begin Akkermann negotiations with Russia. This ultimatum caused great alarm in Britain. Upon this development,

¹⁵ "Letter from British Foreign Secretary George Canning to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Strangford, dated 14 October 1825," (A.P.G.Q.), Part IV, No. 2, p. 38, F.O. 421/2.

¹⁶ "Letter from British Foreign Secretary George Canning to Granville, dated 13 January 1826, "George Canning and His Times, John W. Parker and Son, London, 1859.

George Canning proposed to Nicholas that Britain act as a mediator between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and that both Russia and Britain jointly act as mediators between the Ottoman Empire and the Greeks. Nicholas's response to the first proposal was rather harsh: Russia could not allow any power to intervene in matters that concerned only itself and the Ottoman Empire. As for the Greek issue, Russia pledged that it would take no action without first consulting Britain. (Armaoğlu, 2003, s. 177) The Tsar's reply brought George Canning a degree of relief.

After Russia's ultimatum of 17 March, Wellington, aiming to prevent Russia from going further, signed a protocol with Russia on 4 April 1826.¹⁷ This protocol was to be notified to France, Austria, and Prussia, and efforts were to be made to obtain their approval as well. Additionally, these states would be asked for their opinions on whether the compliance of the Turks and the Greeks with this protocol should be placed under Russia's guarantee. Britain, however, would not provide any guarantee.¹⁸

With the St. Petersburg Protocol signed between Russia and Britain, the other European powers, in addition to Russia and

¹⁷ Articles of Agreement: The Greeks would form an autonomous structure under the Ottoman Empire, paying an annual fixed sum as tribute. They would elect their own leaders, but the candidates would require approval from the Ottoman government. The Greeks would be entirely independent in their internal affairs and trade. II. To ensure complete separation between the two peoples living in Greece, Muslims residing on the Greek mainland and islands would have their properties purchased by the Greeks. III. The British ambassador in Istanbul would make the necessary diplomatic approaches on behalf of the mediation between the Ottoman Empire and the Greeks, and the Russian ambassador would support him. IV. If the Ottoman Empire refused to accept the protocol, Britain and Russia would jointly or separately exert pressure on the Sublime Porte to secure its acceptance. V. The final borders of the autonomous Greek state and other related matters would be determined through future negotiations. Britain and Russia would not pursue territorial expansion, new commercial privileges, or unilateral efforts to increase their influence in the region at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. (*Protocol Relative of Greece, Signed at St. Petersburg, April 4, 1826, Parliamentary Papers, p. XXVII*)

¹⁸ Protocol Relative of Greece, Signed at St. Petersburg, April 4 1826, Parliamentary Papers, p. 35.

Britain, found the opportunity to become involved in the Greek question. (1923, s. 94) Through this agreement, the Greek issue had now gained an international dimension. In this way, the Holy Alliance established in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars also began to weakened. In a sense, the St. Petersburg Protocol marked the end of the period known as the Congress System. (HaroldTemperly, 1966, s. 356)

The terms of the St. Petersburg Protocol were conveyed to the Ottoman Empire for the first time by Britain's ambassador in Istanbul, Strangford Canning, on 23 January 1827, approximately ten months after it had been signed. The Ottoman Empire rejected the protocol, stating that it regarded the Greek revolt as a internal matter.¹⁹

7. THE TREATY OF LONDON (6 July 1827)

The St. Petersburg Protocol, signed by Britain and Russia in 1826, had only been ratified by France among the European powers. Austria and Prussia, by not approving the St. Petersburg Protocol, demonstrated that they were opposed to the agreement. After the protocol failed to gain broader recognition, Britain, France, and Russia decided to convene again and prepare a new draft treaty concerning the Greek question. Each of the contracting states had different aims in doing so:

- France aimed to control Britain and Russia through this treaty,
- Britain aimed to restrain Russia in the Greek issue,
- Russia aimed to prevent Britain from taking the lead in the Greek issue and increasing its influence

¹⁹ "Letter from the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Strangford, to British Foreign Secretary George Canning, dated 8 February 1827," (A.P.G.Q.), Part IV, No. 13, p. 46, F.O. 421/2.

through the Greek state that would be established.
(Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence (A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833)*, 1930, s. 77)

As a result of the efforts made, the treaty text was signed on 6 July 1827 in London by Britain's Foreign Secretary Dudley, France's ambassador to London Prince Polignac, and Russia's ambassador to London Prince Lieven. In the preamble of the treaty, it was stated that the Kings of France and Britain, along with the Tsar of Russia, had resolved to work toward the establishment of an official peace between the parties—so that the uprising that had emerged in the provinces and islands of Greece would not harm the commerce of all Europeans and their own subjects, that no further blood would be shed in response to the Greeks' proposal for mediation, and in consideration of the law of humanity and the interests of Europe.

The signing of the Treaty of London came to the aid of a dying revolt and to the insurgents who were on the brink of annihilation. The signatories of the treaty had declared that they would not hesitate to use force to resolve the Greek Revolt by assuming it as a European internal issue. The guarantees given by the powers, along with the declarations in the secret articles stating that harsher measures would be taken if the terms were not accepted by the parties, clearly indicated that these states were now considering military intervention in the developments to come.

The Ottoman Empire was first officially informed of the treaty signed by the European powers through the Austrian ambassador.²⁰ Later, on 16 August 1827, the British, Russian, and French ambassadors jointly visited the Sublime Porte and

²⁰ The transcript of the meeting with the Austrian Ambassador regarding the treaty signed in London by the Allied Powers, BOA. H.H. 39272.B, 39279.

presented the terms of the treaty to the Ottoman government. A period of 15 days was given for a response.²¹

After rejecting the appeals made on 16 and 31 August, the Ottoman Empire delivered a memorandum to the British and French ambassadors. In this memorandum, it was expressed that the treaty concluded by the Contracting Powers regarding the Greek question was received with sorrow by the Ottoman State, and that this issue would be resolved in a just manner within the framework of the Empire's own laws and regulations. According to the Ottoman view, the support of Britain and France for granting independence to the Greek insurgents was deemed entirely mistaken.

8. THE NAVARINO DISASTER

When the Contracting Powers were unable to have the Treaty of London, signed on 6 July 1827, accepted by the Ottoman Empire through political pressure, they decided to implement certain coercive measures. Among the measures taken by the Contracting Powers were: preventing Ibrahim Pasha's operations, which had achieved great success in the Morea thanks to the naval forces in the Mediterranean; cutting off supplies sent to the Pasha from Egypt and Istanbul; and applying a blockade to the coasts of the Morea and the Aegean Islands. The Contracting Powers, in fact, were also afraid that after suppressing the Greek revolt in the Morea, Ibrahim Pasha would establish a state. Such a state could be the end of their policies in the Mediterranean. (Ortaylı, 1987, s. 66)

²¹ "Letter from the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Strangford, to the Commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Edward Codrington, dated 17 August 1827," *Protocols of Conferences Held at Constantinople, Between the Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia, Parliamentary Papers*, Protocol No. 1.

The admirals of the states that had signed the Treaty of London had, in fact, begun to implement the strict measures outlined in the treaty's secret clauses because they did not want to cause any conflict in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the Greeks declared on 2–3 September that they accepted the Treaty of London.²²

On 25 September, Codrington and Rigny came together with Ibrahim Pasha and held a meeting that lasted approximately three hours. At the end of the meeting, it was decided that the Ottoman central and Egyptian provincial ships would remain in Navarino and that the war would be halted until Ibrahim Pasha received orders from Alexandria or Istanbul. On 19 October, a French ship entered the Bay of Navarino under the pretext of delivering a letter to the French officers serving in the Egyptian provincial fleet and carried out reconnaissance on the position of the Ottoman central and Egyptian provincial fleets in the harbor. (Kurtoğlu, 1944, s. 179)

Before the battle began on 20 October in the Bay of Navarino, the Ottoman fleet consisted of three ships of the line, fifteen frigates, sixteen corvettes, four brigs, and five fire ships. (Bayrak, 1999, s. 190) In contrast, the fleets of the Allied Powers comprised 27 warships: 12 British, 8 Russian, and 7 French. In accordance with the decision made on 18 October, the Allied fleets began entering the Bay of Navarino on the morning of 20 October to exert pressure on Ibrahim Pasha. The Ottoman fleet was anchored in a crescent formation within the bay, with the heavy and heavily armed ships positioned in the center. (Woodhouse, 1965., s. 100) On the morning of 20 October, as the Allied ships entered the bay, no conflict initially occurred

²² “Minutes of the meeting held in Istanbul on 18 September 1827 by the ambassadors of the Allied Powers,” *Protocols of Conferences Held at Constantinople, Between the Representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia, Parliamentary Papers*, Protocol No. 8, Appendix D, No. 3.

between them and the Ottoman fleet. However, in the afternoon of the same day, two boats, each carrying forty men, were launched from the British frigate Portsmouth under the command of Colonel Fellows. The boats, directed by Captain Fitzroy, moved toward the fire ships. Ottoman soldiers aboard the fire ships warned the approaching boats. However, when they saw that this warning was ineffective and that the British soldiers on the boats continued to advance on them, they opened fire with their rifles. The British captain and most of the soldiers were wounded during this encounter. At approximately 14:20, the Portsmouth frigate began firing cannons, marking the beginning of what would become known as the Battle of Navarino. (Bayrak, 1999, s. 191-192) The battle lasted approximately three to three and a half hours. The outcome was a disastrous loss for the Ottoman Empire. The Allied Powers lost no ships; their combined casualties totaled 174 dead and 475 wounded (including 75 British dead and 197 wounded, 40 French dead and 141 wounded, and 59 Russian dead and 137 wounded). (Woodhouse, 1965., s. 140) On the other hand, the Ottoman fleet lost 52 ships and 6,000 men. Of the destroyed or sunken vessels, three ships of the line, thirteen frigates, seventeen corvettes, and four brigs—totaling 37 vessels—belonged to the central Ottoman fleet, while three corvettes, four brigs, two schooners, and three fire ships belonged to the Egyptian provincial fleet. (Bostan, 2006, s. 442) This battle was a complete disaster for the Ottoman navy.

The Battle of Navarino was an absolute catastrophe for the Ottoman and Egyptian provincial forces. The Ottoman Empire, which extended across three continents and possessed nearly 16,000 miles of coastline, suddenly found itself without a navy. Its most powerful warships and elite sailors were entirely lost in the waters of Navarino. With this, the authority Ibrahim Pasha had established in the Morea was also undone. Prior to Navarino, the Greek Revolt had been nearing its end, and the Ottoman state was

preparing to deliver the final blow by reclaiming the island of Çamlıca from the insurgents, thereby putting an end to the matter. Now, however, everything had changed; with Navarino, the greatest obstacle to the success of the Greek insurgents had been removed.

Codrington set out for Alexandria and met with Mehmed Ali Pasha on 6 August 1828. Following the agreement reached during this meeting, the Egyptian provincial forces began to withdraw from the Morea by ship on 1 October 1828. After Ibrahim Pasha's departure from the Morea, the insurgents once again gained control over the entire region and completely eliminated Ottoman authority there.

9. OTTOMAN RUSSIAN WAR OF (1828–1829)

After the destruction of its fleet at Navarino, the Ottoman Empire anticipated the possibility of war and issued a declaration on 20 December 1827. In this declaration, certain statements made against Russia provoked a strong reaction from the Russian side and giving Russia the opportunity it sought. On 14 April 1828, Russian Foreign Minister Nesselrode informed the Sublime Porte that the Tsar intended to declare war against the Ottoman Empire that the only way for the Tsar to abandon this course of action would be for the Ottoman Empire to accept the Treaty of London signed on 6 July 1827. In addition, the Tsar claimed that Russia had suffered losses due to the Ottoman military operations aimed at suppressing the Greek Revolt and demanded compensation for these damages. (Turan, 1951, s. 114-115)

Despite not having the approval of his allies, Tsar Nicholas I issued a declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire on 26 April 1828 and officially declared war. (Kartal, 1983, s. 119) Following this, Russian forces mobilized and laid siege to the Fortress of Anapa on 7 May.

Despite its difficult circumstances, the Ottoman Empire began preparations for war. Soldiers urgently recruited from among volunteers were dispatched to the Rumelia front under the command of Grand Vizier Selim Mehmed Pasha, who had been appointed as the Serdâr-ı Ekrem. Meanwhile, the Russian advance continued. The Russians crossed the Danube²³ and, on 8 June 1828, captured İbrail, the strongest fortress in the region. In the early days of the war, Russian victories followed one after another, and the Ottoman Empire was unable to mount an effective response. Before the end of June 1828, the Russians had captured the most critical positions in Dobrudja, taking control of the entire area from Măcin to Hârşova, including Kuzgun, Constanța, and Mangalia. (Bayrak, 1999, s. 205) On the Anatolian front, Russian forces also continued to advance. By the end of August, they had taken Anapa, Kars, and Akhaltsikhe. Moreover, outbreaks of plague and dysentery within the Russian forces caused severe losses. Although this situation prompted the Russians to propose peace through European diplomatic channels, (Turan, 1951, s. 116) no agreement was reached, and after a temporary lull in the summer of 1828, the war resumed. By the end of that year, Ottoman resistance began to falter, and Russian attacks intensified. As a matter of fact, on July 1, 1829, the Russians besieged Silistre and captured the Castle of Shumnu.

Their decisive victory over the Ottoman army commanded by Grand Vizier Mehmed Reşid Pasha in the region of Kulevcha turned the course of the war entirely in Russia's favor. Russian commander Diebitsch, with a force of approximately twenty thousand soldiers, crossed the Balkans on 23 July 1829 and advanced toward Edirne, which he captured on 22 August 1829.

²³ Britain had aimed to keep Russia north of the Danube during the war and had not consented to the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia. However, with Russia's advance, Britain's plans had also collapsed. "Letter from the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Granville, to Foreign Secretary Lord Dudley, dated 29 February 1828", (A.P.G.Q.) Part V, F.O. 421/3.

On the same day, the Russians also took Kırkkilise (Kırklareli) and Lüleburgaz. (Bayrak, 1999, s. 205) With the fall of Edirne, the Russian army had, for the first time, crossed the Balkans and was now in a position to directly threaten Istanbul.

10. TREATY OF EDIRNE AND THE PROCLAMATION OF THE GREEK PRINCIPALITY

The successive victories of Russian forces during the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War placed Ottoman troops in a very difficult position and forced the Sublime Porte to agree to a treaty without negotiation. The outbreak of epidemic diseases within the Russian army and the resulting heavy losses led General Diebitsch, who had captured Edirne, to propose peace to the Ottoman Empire. In response to this proposal, Sultan Mahmud II convened a Meşveret council to evaluate the situation. In this council, it was decided to accept the proposals put forward by the Contracting Powers regarding the Morea.

They signed the Treaty of Edirne on 14 September 1829. Ten days after its signing, it was ratified by Sultan Mahmud and entered into force. The Treaty of Edirne consisted of 16 articles and 4 supplementary protocols. Article 10 was related to the Greek Revolt. With this article, the Ottoman Empire agreed to the Treaty of London signed on 6 July 1827 between Britain, France, and Russia concerning Greece, as well as the enforcement treaty dated 22 March 1829. After the exchange of certified copies of the treaty, the Ottoman Empire was to appoint a delegate to work with the representatives of Britain, France and Russia to implement the order concerning Greece.²⁴

²⁴ “Letter from the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Robert Gordon, to British Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen, dated 1 October 1829,” (A.P.G.Q.), Part V, No. 52, F.O. 421/3; Ahmet Lütfi Efendi, op. cit., Vols. II–III, pp. 390–400; Şerafettin Turan, op.

11. GAINING THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE

The signing of the Treaty of Edirne caused significant concern in both Britain and France. Britain did not want the autonomous state structure in Greece to be accepted through Russia's military pressure and was worried that it had lost the leadership position it had maintained since the early years of the revolt. Britain now faced with the very scenario it had dreaded—a Greek state under Russian control. From the outset of the revolt, the British had opposed Russia declaring war on the Ottoman Empire and had successfully prevented such a conflict for some time. After Russia declared war in 1828, the British allowed French troops to land in Greece to protect the Morea, aiming to shield the region from Russian invasion and dominance. However, after the Treaty of Edirne was signed, both of these efforts seemed futile. Britain could not tolerate a Russian presence in the Mediterranean. Therefore, it had to act to prevent this outcome and liberate Greece from Russian influence.

After these thoughts and decisions, Britain immediately took action and together with its ally France, decided to hold negotiations in London in the last days of 1829 to resolve the Greek question.²⁵ In these negotiations, Britain would be represented by Foreign Secretary Aberdeen, France by Ambassador Polignac, and Russia by Ambassador Lieven. Following the negotiations, the parties would sign the treaty that would determine Greece's fate and grant its independence on 3 February 1830.

On 3 February, the British envoy opened the meeting by drawing attention to Article 10 of the Treaty of Edirne. He stated

cit. (article), pp. 130–150; Ali Fuat Örenç, op. cit., p. 181; Meral Bayrak, op. cit. (unpublished thesis), p. 220.

²⁵ “Letter from British Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen to the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Robert Gordon, dated 10 November 1829,” *A.P.G.Q.*, Part V, No. 28, F.O. 421/3.

that this article posed no issue for the Contracting Powers and did not contradict the provisions of previous treaties. He then recalled that on 9 September 1829, the British and French envoys had met with Ottoman officials in Istanbul, and that the Ottomans had accepted the terms of the Treaty of London and armistice was signed²⁶. He emphasized that hostilities between the Turks and the Greeks had ceased since that date²⁷ and that, through this treaty, the Ottoman Empire had already accepted the full independence of Greece. After these decisions were notified to the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman statesmen, following consultations held in April, prepared a note declaring their acceptance of the 3 February decisions. This note was delivered to the envoys on 24 April 1830. Thus, the independence of Greece was formally recognized. (Efendi, 1999, s. 484)

After Greece's separation from the Ottoman Empire, one of the key issues that needed to be resolved by the European powers was the selection of a king for the new Greek state. However, determining the royal candidate proved to be a difficult task for the Contracting Powers. According to the protocols signed between the states, the selected candidate was required to have no connection to the royal families of the three Contracting Powers. There were jealousy about the candidacies, and for this reason, the most critical point was that the chosen candidate must be entirely neutral. Throughout the course of the revolt, many names had been proposed. Meanwhile, internal disorder was also ongoing in Greece.²⁸

²⁶ “Minutes of the meeting held on 3 February 1830 by the British, French, and Russian representatives,” *Papers Relative to the Affairs of Greece: Protocols of Conferences Held in London, Parliamentary Papers*, Protocol No. 23, Appendix A.

²⁷ “Minutes of the meeting held on 3 February 1830 by the British, French, and Russian representatives,” *Papers Relative to the Affairs of Greece: Protocols of Conferences Held in London, Parliamentary Papers*, Protocol No. 23, Appendix D.

²⁸ In the process leading to Greek independence, Kapodistrias, who had been striving to govern effectively, was assassinated on 9 October 1831 in Nafplio, while on his

After extensive debate over various candidates for the position of King of Greece, the Contracting Powers, through a treaty signed on 7 May 1832, agreed that Prince Otto, the 17-year-old son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, would become the King of Greece (Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence (A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833)*, 1930, s. 195-202). The borders of the newly established independent Greek state were then defined in the Treaty of Constantinople, signed on 21 July 1832, following negotiations between the envoys of the Contracting Powers and the Ottoman Empire.²⁹

12. CONCLUSION

The Greeks, who had lived in comfort and peace for nearly five centuries under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, became influenced by the liberal and libertarian ideas of the Enlightenment philosophy that emerged in Europe starting from the early 18th century, and were drawn to the idea of establishing an independent Greek state. Alongside their wealth, what encouraged the Greeks in their aspiration for independence was the profound admiration and respect for Ancient Greece that arose as a result of the classical education received by the aristocratic families in Europe. While Europeans based the foundations of their civilization on Ancient Greece, they regarded the Greeks of the 19th century as the descendants of those ancients. From the 16th century onward, Europeans visiting the remains of Ancient Greece increased the interest toward Ancient Greece in Europe through the travel books they wrote. The Greek society, too, learned about their past from the Europeans, and this awareness

way to a church, by brothers George and Constantine Mavromichalis (sons of Petrobey). (*Hasan Demirhan, op. cit.*, p. 30)

²⁹ Treaty signed on 21 July 1832 between the ambassadors of the Allied Powers and the representatives of the Ottoman Empire,” *British and Foreign State Papers (1831-1832)*.

played a role in giving the revolt they launched a nationalist character.

Upon the uprising of Tepedelenli Ali Pasha in the region of Ioannina in 1820, the insurgents organized by the Filiki Eteria—founded in 1814—and local leaders, believing that the conditions had become favorable, decided to initiate the uprising. The first act of uprising began when Alexander Ypsilantis, the leader of the Filiki Eteria and a serving officer of the Russian Tsar, crossed the Prut River and entered the territory of Moldavia. However, this uprising was suppressed by Ottoman forces before it could grow significantly. Around the time this uprising in Wallachia and Taurus was being suppressed, another uprising broke out on 6 April 1821 in the Morea, led by a clergyman named Germanos in Kalamata, and it spread rapidly. This movement quickly spread all over the Morea. The simultaneous uprisings created a favorable environment for the Greek revolt that had begun in the Morea.

The Greek Revolt that began in the Morea did not develop or expand within the framework of any concrete plan or program. Within just a few weeks, the insurgents formed armed bands and attacked Muslim-Turkish villages in the Morea, looting their possessions and mercilessly massacring tens of thousands of Muslims. The slogan “Peace to Christians, respect to consuls, death to Turks”, uttered by Germanos, who started the uprising, clearly revealed the true intentions of the insurgents.

In the early days of the revolt, the major European powers upheld the commitments they had made to one another in the Congress of Vienna (1815) and refused to aid the Greek insurgents. However, as time passed, they transformed what was an internal matter within the borders of the Ottoman Empire into an international issue. On 4 April 1826, the representatives of Britain and Russia convened at the St. Petersburg Conference and

signed a treaty containing certain provisions regarding the Greek question. The two powers expected the Ottoman Empire to accept this treaty, forgive the Greek rebels, and grant autonomy to Greece. The Ottoman Empire, however, firmly rejected the proposal. As a result, Britain and Russia, bringing France into the fold, decided to organize a conference in London to address the Greek Revolt. Following negotiations among the three states, the Treaty of London was signed on 6 July 1827. According to its terms, force would be used if necessary, and an autonomous Greek state would be established.

During the period in which the European powers were holding these meetings regarding the Greek question, the Ottoman Empire had requested assistance from the Governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, in order to suppress the rebellion in the Morea. In 1825, Mehmed Ali Pasha sent his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to the Morea on the condition that he be granted the governorship of Crete. During his approximately two-year stay in the Morea, Ibrahim Pasha successfully suppressed the rebellion and managed to reestablish Ottoman authority in the region. His successes drove the Greek rebels and the European Philhellenes who supported the Greek Revolt into despair. Following Ibrahim Pasha's achievements, which had brought the rebellion in the Morea to the brink of collapse, false claims of massacres of Greeks and cries for help from the rebels began to circulate, appearing in newspapers across Europe. As a result, just when the Ottoman forces were on the verge of ending the rebellion in the Morea, European public opinion overwhelmingly turned in favor of the Greeks and began to pressure their governments. In this climate, the European powers placed military intervention on their agenda to ensure the success of the Greek Revolt. Indeed, by implementing the joint military decision they had taken in the Treaty of London, they destroyed the Ottoman fleet at Navarino Bay on 20 October 1827. The Navarino disaster forced Ibrahim

Pasha—who had reestablished state authority in the Morea—to return to Egypt and allowed the insurgents to regain control of the region.

After Navarino, the Contracting Powers (Britain, France, and Russia) had now become militarily involved in the revolt. From that point on, they began to increase their pressure on the Ottoman Empire even further. While this partnership continued, Russia's declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire in 1828 caused major controversy in Britain. Britain now faced the Ottoman-Russian War that it had tried to prevent since the beginning of the Greek Revolt. At that time, the office of Prime Minister was held by Wellington, who was in fact opposed to supporting the Greek revolt and believed it should be brought to an end as soon as possible. However, he could not disregard the treaties signed before his term or the consequences of Navarino. Under these circumstances, Wellington began to advocate for the establishment of a geographically small and autonomous Greece. His greatest fear was that a Greece with expansive borders would fall under Russian influence. Additionally, Wellington wanted the borders of the future Greek state to remain distant from the Ionian Islands, which were British territory.

During the 1828–1829 Ottoman-Russian War, Russian forces defeated the Ottoman armies and advanced to the gates of Istanbul. The capture of Edirne by the Russian army and their approach to the Istanbul caused great panic in Britain. In response, the British government issued stern messages and demanded that peace be established immediately between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. To prevent Russian intervention in the Morea, Britain permitted French forces to land there. Britain also blocked the Russian navy from launching a military operation against the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. Although Russia had used the Greek Revolt as a pretext for declaring war on the Ottomans, Britain deliberately ensured that the two matters

were treated separately and did not allow Russia to gain influence over the Morea and the Greek rebels.

With the Treaty of Edirne signed at the end of the Ottoman-Russian War, the Ottoman Empire agreed to the establishment of an autonomous Greek state. However, this treaty provoked strong reactions in Britain. Because if the Treaty of Edirne were taken into consideration, the autonomous Greece to be established would owe its existence to Russian intervention. Naturally, a Russian influence—similar to that in the Danubian provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia—would prevail over this autonomous structure as well. Britain sought to prevent this outcome, aiming to block Russia's access to the Mediterranean and thereby secure the so-called "King's Road" to India. Acting on this strategy, Britain invited the representatives of the contracting powers to another conference in London. As a result of the negotiations, Britain persuaded the other powers to abandon the idea of an autonomous, Russian-influenced Greece and instead recognize the establishment of a fully independent Greek state. Thus, Greece officially became an independent country with the signing of the Treaty of London on 3 February 1830. The Ottoman Empire, due to its weakened position, accepted this agreement on 24 April 1830.

Britain was the most influential European power throughout all stages of the Greek Revolt. In line with its policies, it prevented either Russia or France from gaining dominance over the strategically significant Greek state that would be established. The Greek revolt—initially launched by disorganized local leaders with no clear plan and largely motivated by looting—ultimately succeeded with the assistance of Britain and other European powers. Greece became the first state to be founded as a result of a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. Its gaining of independence served as a precedent for other minority groups

within the Empire, thereby accelerating the process of the Ottoman Empire's eventual dissolution.

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