

## Gandhi and World Peace: A Federation of the World



Klaus Schlichtmann  
Faculty Member  
Nihon University, Japan

*“For I dipt into the future, far as human eye could see, Saw the Vision of the world, and all the wonder that would be; Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, Pilots of the purple twilight dropping down with costly bales; Heard the heavens fill with shouting, and there rain’d a ghastly dew From the nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue; Far along the world-wide whisper of the south-wind rushing warm, With the standards of the peoples plunging thro’ the thunder-storm; Till the war-drum throbb’d no longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world. There the common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe, And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapt in universal law.” (Alfred Lord TENNYSON—the ‘Queen’s poet’—in his 1842 poem ‘Locksley Hall’)*

Terror and violence dominate the media; terrorist threats, fundamentalism, as well as social squalor and natural and environmental degradation alarm the international community. A look back into history should help determine and find the causes. The crisis can be an opportunity to effectively deal with these challenges. This could and should be a motivation and opportunity for reforming and restructuring the United Nations, to achieve greater justice and peace, based on Gandhian ideas and principles, which can be the means to correct and avoid the errors and defects of the past. While the two world wars, in which India had taken part, shook the world, political developments on the Indian continent in the first half of the twentieth century appear as precursors and beacons of hope.

What exactly did Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the father of India, and with him the Indian nation have in view, to achieve a safe, non-violent path to world peace?<sup>1</sup>

### Introduction

“World War II has put the cruel science of mass murder into new and sinister perspective ... War has become an all-consuming juggernaut ... if World War III ever unhappily arrives, it will open laboratories of death too horrible to contemplate ... [we must] do everything ... [in our] power to keep those laboratories closed ... We must have collective security to stop the next war, if possible, before it starts; and to crush it swiftly if it starts in spite of our organized precautions.” (San Francisco, 1945)<sup>2</sup>

Gandhi, the “Oriental Saint” as Dieter Conrad called him<sup>3</sup>, was one of the great political figureheads of the twentieth century, and the most influential advocate of non-violent pacifism. His “theory and practice of non-violent political action revolutionized” the traditional idea of an “irresolvable alliance of law, politics and power.”<sup>4</sup> The great Albert Einstein considered Gandhi “the only truly great political figure of our age,” and “the greatest political genius of our time.” He “indicated the path to be taken ... [and] gave proof of what sacrifice man is capable once he has discovered the right path.”<sup>5</sup> An important principle Gandhi persistently committed to was that “the method is more important than the end,”<sup>6</sup> peace is the way and the end. A solution to the problem of war and peace was presented in the “Quit India Resolution” of the Indian National Congress, adopted in August 1942, a year in which, significantly, the Allies too had made plans for the future world peace organization.<sup>7</sup>

In March 1942, after the United States’ entry into the war, the British government sent a mission to India that—while it failed in its objective—resulted in the most remarkable movement during the war, culminating in the ‘Quit India’ Resolution of 8 August. The American sociologist Irving Horowitz in his 1957 *The Idea of War and Peace*

in Contemporary Philosophy maintained that at this decisive moment of India's struggle for independence Mahatma Gandhi put forward a novel and striking solution, meant to "revolutionize the world's outlook upon peace and war."<sup>8</sup> However, to achieve this, India would have to be given its long-fought-for political freedom. To solve the problems of the world, according to Horowitz, this entailed "the development of nationalism in underdeveloped nations to a point of equality as a mode for arriving at a world state."<sup>9</sup> Indeed, Gandhi in 1942 envisaged an international order transcending the nation-state, or as he himself put it, "a world federation established by agreement."<sup>10</sup> This was the key formula based on non-violence and founded on the United Nations.<sup>11</sup>

## I. The Background

*"Men of great faith have always called us to wake up to great expectations, and the prudent have always laughed at them and said that these did not belong to reality. But the poet in man knows that reality is a creation, and human reality has to be called forth from its obscure depth by man's faith which is creative."*  
(Rabindranath Tagore)<sup>12</sup>

Though nominally India had been a founding member of the League of Nations—a fact that is not irrelevant—it joined the international community as a sovereign nation relatively late, unlike other Asian nations like China, Japan, Persia and Siam, who had participated in the international Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907.<sup>13</sup> Before India became a founding member of the League of Nations, in 1917, in a "revolutionary declaration", Edwin S. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, "promised" the country "freedom."<sup>14</sup> Much earlier, in 1858, the year of the dissolution of the East-India Company, the British Queen Victoria (1819-1901) "learned Hindi from an Indian tutor"<sup>15</sup> and "explicitly promised equal treatment to her Indian subjects."<sup>16</sup> Already before the First World War, Indians had been encouraged in their quest for independence and democracy by the 1905 Russian Revolution, the Young Turk Revolution of 1909, and the Chinese Revolution of 1911.<sup>17</sup> With the

October Revolution in Russia in the same year, 1917, the Indian cause received a further boost.<sup>18</sup> From 1917 on India was allowed to participate in the imperial conferences alongside the self-governing dominions.<sup>19</sup> When the Moslems in India started the Khilafat or Califat movement,<sup>20</sup> Gandhi tried to use the Islamic Califat movement as a means of achieving and safeguarding Indian unity.<sup>21</sup>

Protests provided the first opportunity for Gandhi, who had returned from South Africa in 1915, to test non-violent resistance "on a national scale." Events like the random shootings in Amritsar on 13 April, by a British Brigadier, General Reginald Dyer, on an unarmed crowd, killing at least four hundred people, among them women, children and old people, carried the protests much further than originally planned.<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, in 1919 Indians were present at the Paris Peace Conference, and in 1920 India obtained "diplomatic recognition in London through the appointment of a high commissioner."<sup>23</sup> However, with democracy still a long way off, politicians like Jawaharlal Nehru were sceptical.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, while the Chinese were led by Wellington Koo, the "voice of India came, then and for too many years thereafter, not from the vast spaces of the subcontinent but from the dusty corridors of Whitehall."<sup>25</sup> However, in 1924, a delegation was for the first time led by an Indian.<sup>26</sup>

In Kolkata, in December 1929, the Indian Congress passed a resolution demanding Dominion status by 31 December 1929, failing which it would embark on a non-cooperation campaign to obtain full independence. Nevertheless, Mahatma Gandhi conceded that "foreign affairs, political relations and defence [could] be reserved, in some manner to be defined," to the British government, for the time being.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, the British side appeared willing to negotiate, and preparations were made for a conference to discuss the issues. However, when the first Round Table Conference, as it was called, eventually met in London, in spite of the high expectations it accomplished little.<sup>28</sup> Surprisingly perhaps, Gandhi himself did not

attach too much importance to ‘the constitutional niceties’ of Dominion status, saying: “I can wait for the dominion status constitution, if I can get the real dominion status in action, if ... there is a real change of heart ... [This] implies [the] ability to sever the British connection if I wish to ... If I choose to remain in the empire, it is to make the partnership a power for promoting peace and goodwill in the world.”<sup>29</sup> This line of argument corresponds closely to Gandhi’s Presidential Address at the Belgaum Congress in December 1924 about ‘Independence’ from the Crown, whilst preserving the British ‘connection’ “on perfectly honourable and absolutely equal terms.”<sup>30</sup> On this occasion Gandhi stated In my opinion if the British Government mean what they say and honestly help us to equality, it would be a greater triumph than a complete severance of the British connection. I would therefore strive for swaraj within the Empire, but would not hesitate to sever all connection, if severance became a necessity through Britain’s own fault. I would thus throw the burden of separation on the British people. The better mind of the world desires today not absolutely independent States warring one against another but a federation of friendly inter-dependent States ... I see nothing grand or impossible about our expressing our readiness for universal inter-dependence rather than independence. ... I desire the ability to be totally independent without asserting the independence.<sup>31</sup>

The British Commonwealth already bore the seeds of a global federation. Indeed, the general trend in 1924 was to give the League of Nations broader executive powers than it had possessed until then. The Geneva Protocol for the peaceful settlement of international disputes (later not ratified) was supposed to “give teeth” to the organization, i.e. competencies similar to those of a limited world government.<sup>32</sup> In any event it is clear that Gandhi was well aware of India’s future status and responsibility.

The Round Table conferences—altogether there were three—by the Act of 1935, gave India a new constitution and anticipated a federal system that would become a reality when a sufficient number of

states, i.e. half the state population of India agreed to join. Unfortunately this only materialized<sup>33</sup> some 15 years later, in 1950, after India became independent.

Nevertheless, even though the Round Table conferences did not succeed, still, as Indologist R. J. Moore stated, “[b]etween 1917 and 1940 India advanced steadily towards freedom.”<sup>34</sup>

## II. Times of War

When in September 1939 the war started in Europe, “the British Government unilaterally committed India to the conflict”, and this “without even going through the motions of consulting Indian politicians about it.”<sup>35</sup> This resulted in a constitutional crisis: all ministers of the Indian National Congress went on strike, cleared their offices and, with Gandhi’s backing, resigned from their posts in the provincial governments.

Because of the advance of the Japanese in Southeast Asia, and as the urgency increased to procure greater Indian cooperation in the war effort, Great Britain was not only forced to finally make a declaration of its war aims,<sup>36</sup> but also to consider a compromise to accommodate India’s political ambitions. The cabinet therefore sent Sir Stafford Cripps, supposedly a friend of Jawaharlal Nehru, on a mission to India in 1942, to negotiate a deal. It was known, however, that Prime Minister Winston Churchill was “an uncompromising opponent” of Indian freedom. When Churchill and U.S. president F.D. Roosevelt proclaimed the Atlantic Charter on 14 August 1941, enunciating “certain common principles,” including “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live,” Churchill determined that this had “no application to India.”<sup>37</sup> To demonstrate his sympathy with the Indian cause, the American President Roosevelt sent his personal emissary, Colonel Johnson, to New Delhi to support the effort.<sup>38</sup>

The Indians anyway hardly believed that Britain was willing to concede anything, one obvious reason being that an earlier request by Burma to

obtain assurances of dominion status after the war had also been denied. Churchill confirmed this view, when in response to the Quit India resolution he said publicly on 10 November 1942:

*“We intend to remain the effective rulers of India for a long and indefinite period ... We mean to hold our own. I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”*<sup>39</sup>

Since the war had started, Gandhi was haunted by the “horror of seeing India militarised.” As the fighting had “ceased to be a distant spectacle” and was coming ever closer to the Indian homeland, the debate among the ranks of the A-ICC over the question of the defence of India intensified.<sup>40</sup> Nehru writes: “At no time, so far as I am aware, was the question of non-violence considered [seriously] in relation to the army, navy, or air forces, or the police. It was taken for granted that its application was confined to our struggle for freedom.” Yet it was “true that it [non-violence] had a powerful effect on our thinking in many ways, and it made Congress strongly favour world disarmament and a peaceful solution of all international, as well as national disputes.”<sup>41</sup> Certain discrepancies that surfaced in the discussions on these issues had in fact in 1940 led to “a definite and public break with him [Gandhi] on the issue” of the future applications of the principle of non-violence in India’s external affairs. Eventually, however, Gandhi had his way, and the A-ICC resolved that it

*firmly believes in the policy and practice of non-violence, not only in the struggle for Swaraj, but also, in so far as this may be possible of application, in free India. The Committee is convinced, and recent world events have demonstrated, that complete world disarmament is necessary and the establishment of a new and just political and economic order, if the world is not to destroy itself and revert to barbarism. A free India will, therefore, throw all her weight in favour of world disarmament and should herself be prepared to give a lead in this to the world ... Effective disarmament and the establishment of world peace by the*

*ending of national wars depend ultimately on the removal of the causes of wars and national conflicts. These causes must be rooted out by the ending of the domination of one country over another and the exploitation of one people or group by another. To that end India will peacefully labour and it is with this objective in view that the people of India desire to attain the status of a free and independent nation.*<sup>42</sup>

Incidentally, just prior to Cripps’ arrival, in February 1942, Gandhi and Chiang Kai-shek, “a friend of Indian self-determination,” had met in Calcutta.<sup>43</sup> At the time it seemed to be “one of those events which may change the course of history,” as John Gunther observed in his momentous socio-political documentary Inside Asia . Chiang Kai-shek who had only recently been sworn in as Supreme Allied Commander of China, “consulted with British officials and also Gandhi and Nehru. His purpose was to encourage the unity of the 450,000,000 people of China and the 388,000,000 people of India in a common war effort, and to stimulate the Indian nationalist movement.”<sup>44</sup> It was their aim for India to be recognized as an equal partner in the fight against Japanese aggression, and participate in the decision-making. And for that Gandhi was willing even to compromise by allowing Indians to actually fight (under certain conditions), and letting the Allied Powers under some kind of treaty “keep their armed forces in India and use the country as a base for operations against the threatened Japanese attack.”<sup>45</sup>

### III. The Cripps Mission

On 23 March Sir Stafford Cripps, “a close friend of both Chiang and Nehru,” arrived in India. Conditions for the success of his mission were favourable, as there had been a reshuffling of the British cabinet, which had become more friendly to the Indian cause. At that time it had been proclaimed that “India would be given a seat in the war cabinet, like the dominions, and on the Pacific War Council.” Also, Lord Cranborne, the “new colonial secretary, stated in the House of Lords that Britain ‘is in favour of India’s political freedom.’” Furthermore, US president Roosevelt



in a statement on 2 February had reassured the Indians that the Atlantic Charter was to apply to “the whole world,” contradicting Churchill’s previous statement.<sup>46</sup>

The Chinese Premier also supported the Indian position, and said:

*I hope Britain, without waiting for any demand on the part of the Indian people, as speedily as possible will give them real political power so they will be in a position to develop further their spiritual and material strength. The Indian people thus would realize that their participation in the war was not merely to aid anti-aggression nations for securing victory but also the turning point in their struggle for their own freedom. For the sake of civilization and human freedom, China and India should give their united support to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and ally themselves against aggression on the ABCD front.*<sup>47</sup>

In the course of the discussions with Sir Stafford, however, it became clear that the British government actually had no intention of giving the Indians any responsible positions in the government or the War Cabinet, for the defence of India. As Nehru later recounts, it suddenly “transpired that all our previous talk was entirely beside the point,<sup>48</sup> as there were going to be no [Indian] ministers with any power.” Following the breakdown of the negotiations, Sir Stafford Cripps “returned to England by air. Political theorist Manabendranath Roy blamed Congress for the failure:

Our doubts about the usefulness of the Cripps Mission have been borne out. We warned that the hope of the mission succeeding was a forlorn hope. Even more time has been wasted than originally feared. The danger involved in this delay, therefore, may be proportionately greater, unless bold steps and drastic measures are taken to cope with the situation. It would be hypocritical liberalism to say that there is no use apportioning blame. Because, it is evident that a settlement has been prevented only by the intransigence of the Congress

leaders. Had they taken up a positive attitude, the Muslim League would have followed suit. The revised formula regarding the control of the Defence Department should have satisfied all who are really anxious to mobilise the Indian people to resist invasion.<sup>49</sup>

Following his initial ‘Quit India’ call in April, anyway, Gandhi wrote in a letter to the ‘Generalissimo’ on 14 June:

*I am anxious to explain to you that my appeal to the British power to withdraw from India is not meant in any shape or form to weaken India’s defence against the Japanese or embarrass you in your struggle. India must not submit to any aggressor or invader and must resist him. I would not be guilty of purchasing the freedom of my country at the cost of your country’s freedom. That problem does not arise before me as I am clear that India cannot gain her freedom in this way, and a Japanese domination of either India or China would be equally injurious to the other country and to world peace. That domination must therefore be prevented and I should like India to play her natural and rightful part in this. I feel India cannot do so while she is in bondage. India has been a helpless witness of the withdrawals from Malaya, Singapore and Burma. We must learn the lesson from these tragic events and prevent by all means at our disposal a repetition of what befell these unfortunate countries. But unless we are free we can do nothing to prevent it...*<sup>50</sup>

Gandhi was convinced that non-violent resistance against the invading Japanese could be applied and had tried to influence Chiang on this account. Despite Gandhi’s pacifist convictions, at about the same time, in mid-1942, it became possible to close “the gap between Gandhi and most of his Congress colleagues,” when “the apostle of total pacifism, came gradually round to a measure of political realism and agreed that India could not in the event of immediate independence do without the assistance of allied soldiers for her defence.<sup>51</sup>

Of course Gandhi was not so naïve as to believe that Indian security or, for that matter, world

peace and international relations could be based solely on goodwill and non-violence. Peace, justice and security required organization. As Kenneth Boulding had argued:

*Just as war is too important to leave to the generals so peace is too important to leave to the pacifists. It is not enough to condemn violence, to abstain from it, or to withdraw from it. There must be an organization against it; in other words, institutions of conflict control or, in still other words, government. The case for world government to police total disarmament ... seems to me absolutely unshakeable ... In general, we know the main lines of the kind of world organization that can eliminate the present dangers and give us permanent peace. What we do not know is how to get to it ... Where, then, are the new ideas and the new images of the future that look like upward paths? One is clearly the idea of non-violent resistance associated with the name of Gandhi.<sup>52</sup>*

Gandhi had reiterated his stance concerning the necessary conditions for peace and security in an interdependent world in an interview to the New York Times on 22 April 1940,<sup>53</sup> saying he would “welcome a world federation of all the nations of the world. However, he considered a “federation of the Western nations only” would be “an unholy combination and a menace to humanity. In my opinion a federation excluding India is now an impossibility. India has already passed the stage when she could be safely neglected.”<sup>54</sup>

Gandhi's peace efforts included attempts to convince the Axis powers to put an end to their aggressive pursuits. In a letter to Hitler in December 1940 he stressed: “We would never wish to end the British rule with German aid,” and warned the ‘Führer’:

*You are leaving no legacy to your people of which they would feel proud. They cannot take pride in a recital of cruel deed, however skilfully planned. I, therefore, appeal to you in the name of humanity to stop the war. You will lose nothing by referring all the matters of*

*dispute between you and Great Britain to an international tribunal of your joint choice. If you attain success in the war, it will not prove that you were in the right. It will only prove that your power of destruction was greater. Whereas an award by an impartial tribunal will show as far as it is humanly possible which party was in the right.”<sup>55</sup>*

Apparently, however, the letter was never sent. In July 1940 he had written an appeal to ‘every Briton’, “wherever he may be now,” commending that they “accept the method of non-violence instead of that of war for the adjustment of relations between nations”; ‘non-violent non-cooperation’ was a “matchless weapon.” “I have applied it in every walk of life, domestic, institutional, economic and political. I know of no single case in which it has failed.”<sup>56</sup> And now, just prior to the final launching of the Quit India movement, he wrote another appeal, ‘to every Japanese’. In this he “took care to make it plain that the demand for the British to quit India signalled no welcome for the Japanese but quite the reverse: they could expect to meet both allied troops and a resisting population if they invaded an India granted its liberty.”<sup>57</sup> Gandhi wrote:

*I must confess at the outset that though I have no ill-will against you, I intensely dislike your attack upon China. From your lofty height you have descended to imperial ambition. You will fail to realize that ambition and may become the authors of the dismemberment of Asia, thus unwittingly preventing World Federation and brotherhood without which there can be no hope for humanity ... I was thrilled when in South Africa I learnt of your brilliant victory over Russian arms ... It was a worthy ambition of yours to take equal rank with the great powers of the world. Your aggression against China and your alliance with the Axis powers was surely an unwarranted excess of the ambition...”<sup>58</sup>*

Concerning world federation, Gandhi replied to the following question in the question box of his Sevagram Ashram near Wardha in Maharashtra,

where he stayed most of the time: “Instead of striving for India’s freedom why would you not strive for a far greater and nobler end—world federation? Surely this will automatically include India’s freedom as the greater includes the less.” This was his answer:

*There is an obvious fallacy in this question. Federation is undoubtedly a greater and nobler end for free nations. It is a greater and nobler end for them to strive to promote federation than be self-centred, seeking only to preserve their own freedom. ... It has become a necessity while the war lasts and it would be good if they voluntarily pledge themselves now, to remain united even after the war ... Still this won’t be a world federation ... The very first step to a world federation is to recognize the freedom of conquered and exploited nations. Thus, India and Africa have to be freed. The second step would be to announce to and assure the aggressor powers, in the present instance, the Axis powers, that immediately after the war ends, they will be recognized as members of the world federation in the same sense as the Allies.*

And he continued, stressing that world federation

*has to come about voluntarily. I suggest that non-violence is the basis of voluntariness. It is because of all the nations of the world India is the one nation which has a message, however limited and crude it may be, in that direction that it must have immediate freedom to enable it to play its part . ... I hope you will agree with me that India, in seeking first to be free, is not retarding [world] federation. It wants her freedom for the sake of the nations in distress, especially China and Russia and for the whole of humanity...”<sup>59</sup>*

Gandhi’s stance regarding his advocacy for world federation, given expression for the first time already shortly after the First World War, is astounding.<sup>60</sup> While portions of the AICC greatly sympathized with Nazi Germany, Gandhi emphatically resisted the trend of “The enemy of my enemy is my friend,” never once considering

the British an enemy, but only an adversary. Nehru seems to have shared this view, as did others. Manabendra Nath Roy, a Bengali intellectual and political activist,<sup>61</sup> likewise favoured cooperation “with British Democracy, as distinct from British Imperialism, for the common cause.”<sup>62</sup> Congress leaders on the other hand, though by far not all of them, seemed to believe that ideally, “defeated by victorious Fascism, the British Government would be compelled to accept the terms dictated to them.” Obviously, as M.N. Roy pointed out, with this kind of thinking the AICC had gone too far.<sup>63</sup> He was of the opinion that

The issue is that this war is going to decide the fate of the world, including India, for many years to come. We want a revolution, which means, we want to create a new world order. Revolution may be a necessity, but we should not forget that it is not an inevitability. To-day, when we say that the fate of the world is in the balance, we mean that revolution, or a new and better world order is no more likely than a relapse of humanity into barbarism. Therefore, we must throw our weight into the balance on the side of the force fighting barbarism; and that means co-operation; we cannot help it; we must want it.<sup>64</sup>

#### IV. The Quit-India Resolution

The original Draft by Gandhi of the ‘Quit India’ Resolution is dated 27 April 1942. The resolution<sup>65</sup> strongly disapproved of the British “policy of mistrust,”<sup>66</sup> discarded the “plea that they should remain in India for the protection of the Indian princes,” and spelled out the “principles of nonviolent non-cooperation.” This, however, was at first rejected by the All-India Congress Working Committee in favour of a modified version submitted by Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru. Another resolution emphasized British policy had “resulted in a rapid and widespread increase of ill-will against Britain and a growing satisfaction at the success of Japanese arms” in certain sections among the Indian population.<sup>67</sup> Gandhi suggested in an interview with Louis Fischer lasting several days, that it was “the Cripps fiasco that inspired the

idea” of asking for the “complete and irrevocable withdrawal” of British power from India.<sup>68</sup> In this way, and in this way only could India truly become part of and help in the United Nations effort to win the war.

The aforementioned Resolution stressed that Congress was “agreeable to the stationing of the armed forces of the Allies in India, should they so desire, in order to ward off and resist Japanese or other aggression and to protect and help China.” Furthermore, the call for withdrawal was “never intended to mean the physical withdrawal of all Britishers from India...”<sup>69</sup>

In his speech to the All-India Congress, introducing the final ‘Quit India’ Resolution, Gandhi on 7 August again stressed the main points, and concluded:

*We do not want to remain frogs in a well. We are aiming at world federation. It can only come through non-violence. Disarmament is possible only if you use the matchless weapon of non-violence. There are people who may call me a visionary, but I am a real bania [shrewd business man] and my business is to obtain swaraj [home rule]. If you do not accept this resolution I will not be sorry. On the contrary, I would dance with joy, because you would then relieve me of tremendous responsibility, which you are now going to place on me. I want you to adopt non-violence as a matter of policy. With me it is a creed, but so far as you are concerned I want you to accept it as policy. As disciplined soldiers you must accept it in toto, and stick to it when you join the struggle.”*<sup>70</sup>

The Resolution finally adopted on 8 August spelled out with precision and lucidity that “the immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom.” This measure would “not only affect materially the fortunes of the war, but will bring

all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the United Nations,” and fill “the peoples of Asia and Africa ... with hope and enthusiasm.”<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, it would have to be “clearly understood that such of these countries as are under Japanese control now must not subsequently be placed under the rule or control of any other Colonial Power.” More specifically, the Committee expressed its opinion that the future peace, security and ordered progress of the world demand a world federation of free nations, and on no other basis can the problems of the modern world be solved. Such a world federation would ensure the freedom of its constituent nations, the prevention of aggression and exploitation by one nation over another, the protection of national minorities, the advancement of all backward areas and peoples, and the pooling of the world’s resources for the common good of all. On the establishment of such a world federation, disarmament would be practicable in all countries, national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary, and a world federal defence force would keep the world peace and prevent aggression.<sup>72</sup> An independent India would gladly join such a world federation and cooperate on an equal basis with other countries in the solution of international problems. Such a federation should be open to all nations who agree with its fundamental principles. In view of the war, however, the federation must inevitably, to begin with, be confined to the United Nations, such a step taken now will have a most powerful effect on the war, on the peoples of the Axis countries, and on the peace to come. ... the A-ICC wishes to make it quite clear to all concerned that by embarking on a mass struggle, it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India.<sup>73</sup>

The resolution had as a direct consequence that Gandhi and the entire Congress Party were arrested and detained. “In the early hours of August 9, 1942, only a few hours after the termination of the climactic session of the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay ... shortly after the many leaders gathered there had returned to their residences, police began arriving at the door,” arresting all of them,<sup>74</sup> many of whom were taken



to Ahmadnagar Fort.<sup>75</sup> Following the arrest of the Mahatma, “a mass struggle on non-violent lines on the widest possible scale” started all over India.<sup>76</sup> Gandhi was taken to Aga Khan Palace near Poona, while subsequently all over the country arrests were made. As the revolution swept across the country, by October in Bihar province alone, “jails were crammed with 27,000 prisoners.”<sup>77</sup> Muslims, however, “kept aloof, offering support neither to the nationalist uprising nor to their supposed British benefactors,” and to the surprise of Lord Linlithgow there was no communal violence.<sup>78</sup>

Interestingly, meanwhile, in what seemed almost like a follow-up to the world federalist ‘Quit India’ Resolution, in the United States a Resolution was passed in the House of Representatives on 21 September 1943, stating:

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) , That the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein through its constitutional processes.*<sup>79</sup>

## V. The United Nations, Hope in an Imperfect World

*“Our object is friendship with the whole world. Nonviolence has come to men, and it will remain. It is the annunciation of peace on earth.” (M. Gandhi)*<sup>80</sup>

It would have been logical and consistent, if India, having been present at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, had participated in the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco United Nations Conferences. In fact there was an Indian delegation dispatched to the San Francisco Conference, consisting of V.T. Krishnamachari, A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, and Sir Firoz Khan Noon, whom the “British Government had nominated”. In his Statement to the Press ( The Bombay Chronicle , 18.4.1945) Gandhi suggested

that this “camouflage of Indian representation through Indians nominated by British imperialism should be dropped. Such representation will be worse than no representation. Either India at San Francisco is represented by an elected representative or represented not at all.”<sup>81</sup> India could then have become one of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, and the European representations reduced to a single seat. As it was, the Five Permanent Members were the same world powers that already at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, in anticipation of things to come, had been in favour of disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes through an international court with binding powers.<sup>82</sup>

On the eve of the United Nations conference held in San Francisco, Gandhi issued the following statement:

*There will be no peace for the Allies and the world unless they shed their belief in the efficacy of war and its accompanying terrible deception and fraud and are determined to hammer out real peace based on freedom and equality of all races and nations. Exploitation and domination of one nation over other can have no place in a world striving to put an end to all wars.*<sup>83</sup>

War, the Mahatma continued, was the

“natural expression of the desire for exploitation and atom bomb its inevitable consequence.”<sup>84</sup>

Gandhi warned there should be “no armed peace imposed upon the forcibly disarmed,” pleading that “[a]ll will be disarmed.” In addition, as indeed the U.N. Charter later stipulated, there will be “an international police force to enforce the highest terms of peace.”<sup>85</sup> In his statement Gandhi again quoted those parts of the ‘Quit India’ Resolution which refer to the world federation and its goals. Gandhi mentioned the atom bomb for the first time on 20 January 1946 in a speech he gave at Cuttack.<sup>86</sup>

Gandhi had replied to a question in his Ashram’s

question box that world federation had to come about “ voluntarily ,” and suggested that non-violent action in order to achieve it was “ the basis of voluntariness. ” This formula—‘by agreement’ or ‘voluntarily’—comprises the essence of how world federation should be brought about, and was frequently used by pacifists. Similarly, Albert Einstein in answer to a young German refugee and pacifist on 20 March 1951 stressed: “Revolution without the use of violence was the method by which Gandhi brought about the liberation of India. It is my belief that the problem of bringing peace to the world on a supranational basis will be solved only by employing Gandhi’s method on a large scale.”<sup>87</sup>

In 1948 a great number of international pacifists, including Aldous Huxley, Rabindranath Tagore, Reginald Reynolds and Jawaharlal Nehru planned a ‘World Pacifist Meeting’ in Santiniketan, “to provide an opportunity for devoted workers for peace all over the world to meet and discuss with Gandhiji the ways of achieving a pacifist World Order.”<sup>88</sup> Before the project could be realized, Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated.

Nehru, as also later the Indian president professor Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, repeatedly after independence spoke up for a politically unified world, where peace and justice might be preserved. In a broadcast in September 1946, Nehru said:

*The world, in spite of its rivalries and hatreds and inner conflicts, moves inevitably towards closer cooperation and the building up of a world commonwealth. It is for this One World that free India will work, a world in which there is free cooperation of free peoples, and no class or group exploits another.*<sup>89</sup>

And on 22 January 1947 Nehru said:

We wish for peace. We do not want to fight any nation if we can help it. The only possible real objective that we, in common with other nations, can have is the objective of cooperating in building up some kind of world structure, call it One World, call it what you like. The beginnings of this world

structure have been laid in the United Nations Organization. It is still feeble; it has many defects; nevertheless, it is the beginning of the world structure. And India has pledged herself to cooperate in its work.”<sup>90</sup>

When Nehru travelled in the United States between October and November 1948 he had the opportunity to address the issue not only with US President Harry Truman but with a great number of people including Eleanor Roosevelt, John Dewey, nuclear physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein. In a speech before the Chicago Chamber of Commerce and the Foreign Policy Association he asserted that “World Government must come ... The alternative to a World Government is a disaster of unprecedented magnitude.”<sup>91</sup> The starting point for this much-needed development was the United Nations.<sup>92</sup>

As journalist Arthur Moore pointed out in his contribution to Shantiniketan’s Gandhi Memorial Peace Number : “World government can come about in two ways ... by conquest ... [or] by agreement between sovereign states to delegate some of their sovereign powers to a world state, the Government of which would thereafter derive its mandates from the sovereign will of the people of the world. The form in such an event would be a federal Government.”<sup>93</sup> Similarly, Professor Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan had stated: “The United Nations is the first step towards the creation of an authoritative world order. It has not got the power to enforce the rule of law ... Military solutions to political problems are good for nothing. Ultimately they will leave bitterness behind ... The challenge that is open to us is survival or annihilation ... but what are we doing to bring about that survival? Are we prepared to surrender a fraction of our national sovereignty for the sake of a world order? Are we prepared to submit our disputes and quarrels to arbitration, to negotiation and settlement by peaceful methods? Have we set up a machinery by which peaceful changes could be easily brought about in this world?”<sup>94</sup>

Conclusion

“When we talk of policing the world, this is meant to be a transition from armies to police, from seeing the world as a set of warring national entities to seeing it as one civic unity.”<sup>95</sup>

Gandhi's example remains in the world as a beacon to follow. Indeed, as Mahendra Kumar had pointed out in an early book on peace research in India:

After the attainment of independence by India under Gandhi's leadership, India was regarded for some years as a country placed in a special position to guide the world in achieving permanent peace. ... Gandhi presented elaborate theories of war and peace and he came to know those theories scientifically. Thus Gandhi has significance for peace research not only for the content of his philosophy but also for ... his method.”<sup>96</sup>

Having cast terror on the world twice in the last century, and being the chief responsible party for a few hundred years of colonial exploitation, the effects of which are still felt today, it may be the Europeans who might want to take steps toward a just and peaceful world order, based on the rule of law and the consent of the governed, by conferring on the UN the necessary sovereign powers to function effectively, as its founders had originally planned.<sup>97</sup>

Whatever the subjective intent, the objective fact is clear. The rejection of violent means, the faith in the power of love, the rejection of material gain ... But in so doing, Gandhi revealed an uncomfortable truth, that pacifism became a call to action, to conflict as it were ... just as the individual must transcend his ego, the State must overcome its essentially violent nature, that is, it must abolish itself. In its place is to be 'a world federation established by agreement.' The concrete situation Gandhi faced, however, revealed the existence of sovereign States of unequal power, and nations like his own, without sovereignty altogether. He therefore presented a solution involving the development of nationalism in underdeveloped nations to a point of equality as a mode for arriving at a world state. 'Internationalism is possible only when nationalism becomes a fact, i.e., when peoples belonging to different countries

have organized themselves and are able to act as one man.' Nationalism was to be the vehicle of internationalism ... The universal man is thus to be fulfilled in the universal State.”<sup>98</sup>

The horrifying terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and subsequent fundamentalist activities like those of ISIL have clearly demonstrated that the anarchic nation-state system can no longer ensure the safety of its citizens. The world must unite to face transnational crime and terrorism, social injustices and ecological degradation by forming a genuine political union, following Gandhi's plans for a universal world federal order.<sup>99</sup>

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#### References:

1. The Westphalian nation-state system established in 1815 after the Thirty Years War in Europe is no longer applicable since in 1899 and 1907 the Hague Peace Conferences attempted to bring the world under the rule of law. As this is no longer capable of ordering international relations effectively, today new principles in accordance with the international law established by the United Nations need to be applied.
2. SENATOR VANDENBERG'S REPORT TO THE SENATE ON THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, June 29, 1945, printed in the New York Times.
3. Dieter CONRAD , Gandhi und der Begriff des Politischen. Staat, Religion und Gewalt (Gandhi and the concept of the political. State, Religion and Violence), Munich, Wilhelm Fink 2006, p. 25 .
4. Jan ASSMANN , Zur Einführung (Introduction), in Dieter CONRAD , op.cit. , p. 17 .
5. Albert EINSTEIN, Einstein on Peace , edited by Otto Nathan & Heinz Norden, preface by Bertrand Russell, New York, Schocken 1968, pp. 569 and 584) .
6. Wilhelm Emil MÜHLMANN , MAHATMA GANDHI. Der Mann, sein Werk und seine Wirkung (Eine Untersuchung zur Religionssoziologie und

politischen Ethik) [The man, his work and its impact (An investigation into the sociology of religion and political ethics)], Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1950, p. 212.

7. See for example the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and the work of the Commission for the Organization of Peace, in particular the article by Quincy WRIGHT, Political Conditions of the Period of Transition, International Conciliation , Commission to Study the Organization of Peace – The Transitional Period, No. 379 (April, 1942).

8. H.A. JACK (ed.), Wit and Wisdom of Gandhi , Boston, Beacon Press 1951, p. 165, quoted in Irving Louis HOROWITZ, The Idea of War and Peace in Contemporary Philosophy , with an Introductory Essay by Roy Wood SELLARS, New York, Paine-Whitman 1957, p. 100.

9. I.L. HOROWITZ, The Idea of War and Peace , p. 105: Gandhi “presented a solution involving the development of nationalism in underdeveloped nations to a point of equality as a mode for arriving at a world state.” (Emphasis added)

10. The Wit and Wisdom of Gandhi , p. 121, in I.L. HOROWITZ, The Idea of War and Peace , p. 105.

11. This name had been confirmed by the Allied powers in an official Declaration by 26 nations on January 1, 1942.

12. Rabindranath TAGORE, Creative Unity , London, Macmillan 1922, p. 25.

13. Perhaps understandably from an Indian point of view, Pundit NEHRU believed they were “a curious attempt at peace,” where “[n]othing of the least importance was done.” Jawaharlal Nehru, Glimpses of World History , Oxford University Press (Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund) 1982, p. 615.

14. R.J. MOORE, The Crisis of Indian Unity , 1917–1940 , Oxford, Clarendon Press 1974, p. vii.

15. Dietmar ROTHERMUND , Geschichte Indiens: Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart , C.H. Beck 2002, p. 63.

16. H. KULKE and D. ROTHERMUND, A History of India , Psychology Press 2004, p. 278. (Calcutta, Allahabad, Bombay and Delhi, Rupa 1991, p. 270.)

17. Nirad C. CHAUDHURI, The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian , Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad and Chennai, Jaico 1998, p. 261.

18. Judith M. BROWN, Gandhi Prisoner Of Hope , Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, Oxford University Press 1992, p. 104. “British policy aimed at increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of a responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire.”

19. Ibid., p. 7.

20. Romain ROLLAND , MAHATMA GANDHI. The Man Who Became One with the Universal Being , transl. Catherine D. Groth, New York and London, The Century Co. 1924, pp. 78-79: “The European War had placed the Moslems of India in a very painful dilemma. They were torn between their duty as loyal citizens of the empire and faithful followers of their religious chief. They agreed to help England when she promised not to attack the sultan’s or the caliph’s sovereignty. It was the sense of Moslem opinion in India that the Turks should remain in Turkey in Europe and that the sultan should retain not only authority over the Holy Places of Islam, but over Arabia as delimited by Mohammedan scholars with the enclaves of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine. This Lloyd George and the viceroy solemnly promised. When the war was over, however, all pledges were forgotten.” And ibid ., p. 79: “It began October 17, 1919 (Khilafat day), with an imposing peaceful demonstration, which was followed, about a month later (November 24) by the opening of an AU-India Khilafat Conference at Delhi. Gandhi presided. With his quick glance he had realized



that the Islamic agitation might be made into the instrument of Indian unity.”

21. Ibid., pp. 79-80: “The problem of uniting the various races in India was a most difficult one. The English had always taken advantage of the natural enmity between Hindus and Moslems; Gandhi even accused them of having fostered it.”

22. R.J. MOORE, *Crisis of Indian Unity* , p. 4. As a result of the Amritsar Massacre Rabindranath Tagore renounced the knighthood he had obtained in 1915. Luckily, “Gandhi’s influence prevented large-scale outbreaks of violence.” Percival SPEAR, *A History of India* , vol. II, Penguin, 1978, p. 191.

23. R.J. MOORE, *Crisis of Indian Unity* , p. 7.

24. J. NEHRU, *Glimpses of World History* , p. 463.

25. F.P. WALTERS, *A History of the League of Nations* , London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press 1960, p. 117.

26. F.P. WALTERS, *A History of the League of Nations* , p. 414.

27. R. J. MOORE, *Crisis of Indian Unity* , p. 46.

28. Ibid., p. 46.

29. R. J. MOORE, *Crisis of Indian Unity* , p. 97. (Emphasis added)

30. Presidential Address at Belgaum Conference , 26 December 1924, in: CWMG, Vol. XXV, p. 481.

31. Presidential Address , 26 December 1924, CWMG, Vol. XXV, pp. 481-482.

32. Harold BUTLER, *The Lost Peace . A Personal Impression* , New York, Harcourt, Brace And Company 1942, pp. 28-30.

33. Sir Atul Chandra CHATTERJEE, *The New India* , London, George Allen & Unwin 1948, pp. 67-68.

34. R.J. MOORE, *Crisis of Indian Unity* , p. 317.

And *ibid.*, p. 313: They could not overcome the ‘three dualities’ they confronted, i.e. the one “between the Raj and its aspirant successor, the parallel government of the Indian National Congress,” further that “between Hindu India and Muslim India” and at last the one “between British India and the Indian States” that were ruled by the princes.

35. Paul F. POWER, *Gandhi on World Affairs* , London, George Allen & Unwin 1961, p. 31.

36. H. KULKE and D. ROTHERMUND, *A History of India* , p. 297: In fact, it was the American Allies who “finally forced the British cabinet to make a declaration of its war aims so as to obtain India’s full support for the war effort.”

37. J. NEHRU, *The Discovery of India* , pp. 438 and 442.

38. H. KULKE and D. ROTHERMUND, *A History of India* , p. 298.

39. Statement on 10 November 1942. Francis G. HUTCHINS, *India’s Revolution—Gandhi and the Quit India Movement* , Cambridge, Ma., Harvard University Press 1973, p. 143. “Here we are, and here we stand, a veritable rock of salvation in this drifting world.” *Ibid.*

40. J. NEHRU, *The Discovery of India* , p. 443.

41. J. NEHRU, *The Discovery of India* , pp. 442-444.

42. J. NEHRU, *The Discovery of India* , pp. 446-447.

43. P.F. POWER, *Gandhi on World Affairs* , p. 31.

44. John GUNTHER, *Inside Asia* (1942 War edition, completely revised), New York and London, Harper 1942, pp. 219-20. During their five-hour talks Madame Chiang acted as interpreter. Chiang

and his wife also visited Rabindranath Tagore's university Shantiniketan in West Bengal and donated 50.000 Rupees to it. A series of meetings also took place between Chiang and Jawaharlal Nehru. Originally, Chiang had planned to visit Gandhi in his village at Wardha. CWMG, Vol. LXXV, pp.306f. and 313.

45. Letter to CHIANG Kai-shek, Sevagram, 14 June 1942, CWMG, Vol. LXXVI, p. 225. In an interview with Reuter's on 21 June GANDHI stated: "There can be no limit to what friendly Independent India can do. I had in mind a treaty between United Nations and India for the defence of China against Japanese aggression." Ibid., p. 236.

46. J. GUNTHER, *Inside Asia*. p. 506.

47. Quoted in J. GUNTHER, *Inside Asia*. p. 506: "India would be given a seat in the war cabinet, like the dominions, and on the Pacific War Council."

48. J. NEHRU, *The Discovery of India* , p. 463. See also H. KULKE and D. ROTHERMUND, *A History of India* , p. 298: When Cripps had "almost succeeded in getting the Congress leaders into a wartime cabinet with the viceroy acting like a constitutional monarch", the viceroy himself, the ultra-conservative Lord Linlithgow, thwarted the scheme by complaining to the British prime minister that "Cripps intended to deprive him of his constitutional powers. This killed the 'Cripps offer' ... he had obviously offered more than he could deliver."

49. M.N. ROY, *The Atmosphere Clears, Independent India*, April 19, 1942, in M.N. ROY, *India and War* , Lucknow, Dr. A.P Singh, Radical Democratic Party (First Edition. December 1942), p. 455.

50. Letter to CHIANG Kai-shek, Sevagram, 14 June 1942, CWMG, Vol. LXXVI, pp. 223-224.

51. J.M. BROWN, *Gandhi Prisoner of Hope* , p. 323. See also J. NEHRU, *The Discovery of India* , p. 44: "In late months, leading up to August, 1942, Gandhiji's nationalism and intense desire

for freedom made him even agree to Congress participation in the war if India could function as a free country. For him this was a remarkable and astonishing change ... The practical statesman took precedence over the uncompromising prophet."

52. Kenneth E. BOULDING, *Conflict and Defense, A General Theory* , New York, Harper & Row 1963, p. 334, 335-336.

53. The question by the interviewer was: „Have you any views about world federation (Streit's scheme of 15 white democracies with India excluded at present) or about a federation of Europe with the British Commonwealth and again excluding India? Would you advise India to enter such a larger federation so as to prevent a domination of the coloured races by the white?" CWMG, vol. LXXII, p. 11.

54. Interview in the New York Times of 22 April 1940. CWMG, vol. LXXII, p. 11. With that GANDHI rejected the proposal of Clarence K. STREIT, *Union Now . The Proposal for Inter-democracy Federal Union (short version)*, New York and London, Harper 1940. George ORWELL also rejected STREIT's idea, since it would not give the coloured population equal rights. George ORWELL, *Not Counting Niggers*, Adelphi , July 1939, online at <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/o/orwell/george/not-counting-niggers>.

55. CWMG, vol. LXXIII, pp. 254-255. Gandhi had previously also written to HITLER on 23 July 1939, and written to Lord LINLITHGOW on 26 May 1940, that "I am prepared to go to Germany or anywhere required to plead for peace not for this interest or that but for the good of mankind." He added: "This may be a visionary's idea. But as your friend I owe it to pass it to you. Perchance it may be wisdom more than a vision." CWMG, vol. LXXII, p. 101. GANDHI's letter to Hitler is in CWMG, vol. LXXIII, p. 254-255.

56. CWMG, vol. LXXII, pp. 229-30.

57. J. M. BROWN, *Gandhi Prisoner Of Hope* , p.

58. The letter dated 18 July 1942 was apparently published in Japan by three newspapers, the *Nichi Nichi*, the *Yomiuri*, and the *Miyako*. CWMG, vol. LXXVI, pp. 309-12. However, I have so far not been able to verify this. It goes on: "You have been gravely misinformed, as I know you are, that we have chosen this particular moment to embarrass the Allies when your attack against India is imminent. If we wanted to turn Britain's difficulty into our opportunity we should have done it as soon as the war broke out nearly three years ago. Our movement demanding the withdrawal of the British power from India should in no way be misunderstood."

59. Written "on or before" 2 August 1942, while still in Sevagram Ashram. CWMG, vol. LXXVI, pp. 350-51 (emphasis added).

60. A comparison with the Japanese Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA Kijuro may be in place here. SHIDEHARA similarly expressed himself when he was foreign minister between 1924 and 1931. See K. SCHLICHTMANN, *Japan in the World*. Shidehara Kijuro, *Pacifism and the Abolition of War*, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto etc., Lexington Books 2009.

61. ROY founded the Communist Party of Mexico in 1911, but later became a radical humanist. In 1940 ROY helped set up the Radical Democratic Party, "in which he played a leading role for much of the decade of the 1940s. Roy later moved away from Marxism to become an exponent of the philosophy of radical humanism."  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M.\\_N.\\_Roy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M._N._Roy).

62. Manabendra Nath ROY (ed.), *India and War*, p. 35.

63. M.N. ROY (ed.), *India and War*, p. 38.

64. M.N. ROY, Should Anti-Imperialism lead us to Welcome Fascism? Speech at the Bengal Provincial Congress of the R.D.P., Jan 18/19, 1941, in M.N. ROY (ed.), *India and War*, p. 282.

However, already in June 1942 M.N. ROY, *United Nations Day, Independent India*, June 17, 1942, in M.N. ROY (ed.), *India and War*, p. 508, wrote: "New conventions are developing in the relation between Britain and India. India is gaining a new diplomatic status. She has representatives on all the Commonwealth bodies created for the conduct of the war. She has an Agent-General in China. She will, we trust, have direct diplomatic relations with all the Allied countries soon, including the U.S.S.R. particularly, now after the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. She is going to have something very near a War Cabinet, if only her leaders can make it that. India's freedom is thus evolving in practice. It is in the process of making. If she can throw up the leadership to shape this process, the legal recognition of India's freedom will be only a formal step, the recognition of a fact which will be already a reality."

65. Draft Resolution for A.I.C.C. CWMG, vol. LXXVI, pp. 63-65.

66. It may well be that the Allied powers suspected "Bose might bring about reconciliation between China and Japan," and thus "Churchill was particularly apprehensive about it and had a suspicion that China might negotiate a separate peace with Japan and form part of the Pan-Asiatic movement." However, in retrospect anyway it seems to have been a serious mistake of British politics, "offering all possible aid to China to maintain resistance to Japanese aggression," but not to India. Dr. T.R. SAREEN at [http://www.uoregon.edu/~iwata/private/EACS/new\\_page\\_7.htm](http://www.uoregon.edu/~iwata/private/EACS/new_page_7.htm).

67. Appendix VI, Resolutions Passed by Congress Working Committee, 14 July 1942. CWMG, vol. LXXVI, p. 452. See also M.N. ROY, *Cards on the Table, Independent India*, May 10, 1942, in M.N. ROY (ed.), *India and War*, pp. 485-486, who reports:

"Members of the Forward Bloc parade the streets of Bengal towns and villages with the slogan: 'Let us go forward to hail the rising sun of freedom.'"

68 Appendix V, Interview with Louis Fischer, 8

June 1942. CWMG, vol. LXXVI, p. 449.

69 Appendix VI, Resolutions Passed by Congress Working Committee, 14 July 1942. CWMG, vol. LXXVI, p. 453.

70 MOHANDAS K. GANDHI'S SPEECH (EXCERPTS) TO THE ALL-INDIA CONGRESS, Bombay, August 7, 1942, printed in: New York Times , August 8, 1942.

71 The resolution, which was finally adopted on 8 August, CWMG, vol. LXXVI, p. 460, determined in no uncertain terms that "the immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity, both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom." Such a step would "not only affect materially the fortunes of the war, but will bring all subject and oppressed humanity on the side of the United Nations," and "[fill] the peoples of Asia and Africa ... with hope and enthusiasm."

72 On Mahatma Gandhi's idea of a Peace Army, Shanti Sena in Sanskrit, see Mark Shepard, Soldiers of Peace. Narayan Desai and Shanti Sena, the "Peace Army," online at [http://www.markshep.com/peace/GT\\_Sena.html](http://www.markshep.com/peace/GT_Sena.html).

73 CWMG, vol. LXXVI, pp. 460-461.

74 F. G. HUTCHINS, India ' s Revolution , p. 217.

75 See for example F. G. HUTCHINS, India ' s Revolution , p. 217.

76 CWMG, vol. LXXVI, p. 463. Gandhi discarded the charge of being responsible for the disturbances following August 1942 since the Viceroy had "not wait[ed] for the letter which [he] ... had declared he would write before starting any action." CWMG, vol. LXXVII, p. v. See also CWMG, vol. LXXX, p. 65.

77 F. G. HUTCHINS, India ' s Revolution , p. 227.

During 1940-41 already, as a consequence of the disobedience campaign Gandhi had announced in October 1940, "30,000 of our leading men and women were sent to prison" having "followed a policy of non-embarrassment ... in the nature of symbolic protest." Nehru, *Discovery of India* , p. 472.

78 F. G. HUTCHINS, India ' s Revolution , p. 237.

79 THE FULBRIGHT RESOLUTION (House Concurrent Resolution 25, Seventy-Eighth Congress. September 21, 1943), printed in: Pamphlet No. 4, PILLARS OF PEACE , Documents Pertaining To American Interest In Establishing A Lasting World Peace: January 1941-February 1946, Published by the Book Department, Army Information School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., May 1946.

80 Romain ROLLAND , Mahatma Gandhi , p. 245.

81 CWMG, vol. LXXIX, pp. 390-391. The Statement continued then quoting the world federalist part in the 1942 'Quit India' Resolution.

82 See Klaus Schlichtmann, Japan, Germany and the Idea of the two Hague Peace Conferences, *JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH* , vol. 40, no. 4 (2003), pp. 377-394.

83 M. GANDHI's declaration on the eve of the UN Conference, in *Bombay Chronicle* , 18.4.1945, quoted in Ramjee SINGH and S. SUNDARAM (eds.), *Gandhi and World Order* , New Delhi, APH Publishing Corporation 1996 (Gandhian Institute of Studies), pp. 236-237. The Statement to the Press is also found in CWMG, vol. LXXIX, pp. 389-90. The last sentence of the quote is, however, not found in the CWMG.

84 *Bombay Chronicle* , 18. 4. 1945.

85 CWMG, vol. LXXIX, p. 390. Also, *ibid.*, "Peace must be just. In order to be that, it must neither be punitive nor vindictive. Germany and Japan should not be humiliated. The strong are never vindictive. Therefore, fruits of peace must be equally shared." The idea of a Peace Brigade or Gandhian Shanti



Sena for non-violent action became part of the program of the Gandhigram Rural University in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu . Activities and support have also spread to Sri Lanka.

86 Collected Works , vol. LXXXI, p. 5.

87 A. EINSTEIN, Einstein on Peace , p. 543.

88 Rajendra PRASAD, Foreword, in Kshitish ROY (ed.), Gandhi Memorial Peace Number , Santiniketan, The Vishwa-Bharati Quarterly, 2 October 1949, p. ix. See also Arthur MOORE, World Government, *ibid.* , pp. 196-203.

89 J. NEHRU, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches , vol. I, Sept. 1946-May 1949, Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Revised Edition, Third Impression, 1967, p. 3.

90 In a debate on the Objectives Resolution in the Constituent Assembly. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches , p. 21.

91 Pandit Nehru's Discovery of America , foreword by Eleanor ROOSEVELT, Madras, The Indian Press Publications (1950?), p.56. Under the leadership of Chicago University president Robert M. HUTCHINS, the Committee to Frame a World Constitution had published its Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution in the same year (1948).

92 See Klaus SCHLICHTMANN, H.G. Wells and Peace Education, *Journal of Peace Education* , vol.4, no.2 (September 2007), pp. 193-206; *idem*, Japan, Germany and the Idea of the two Hague Peace Conferences, *JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH* , pp.377-394. Klaus SCHLICHTMANN, Alfred Hermann Fried (1864-1921) und die Entwicklung des Völkerrechts, in: Guido Grünewald (ed.), Alfred Hermann Fried: "Organisiert die Welt!" Der Friedensnobelpreisträger – sein Leben, Werk und bleibende Impulse , Bremen, Donat Verlag 2016, pp. 125-141.

93 A. MOORE, World Government, p. 196.

94 Sarvepalli RADHAKRISHNAN, Towards a New World , New Delhi, Bombay, Orient Paperbacks 1980, pp. 45, 52 and 135.

95 See Margaret MEAD, And keep your Powder dry , New York, William Morrow 1942 (new expanded edition 1965 and 2000, Berghahn) , p. 248. This book was required reading in the U.S. for anthropology students for nearly two decades after the war.

96 Mahendra KUMAR, Current Peace Research and India , Varanasi, Gandhian Institute of Studies, 1968, pp. 34, 36, and 70. Reginald REYNOLDS, What are Pacifists doing?, *Peace News* , 20 July 1956 (London). M. KUMAR, Current Peace Research and India , Varanasi, Gandhian Institute of Studies 1968, pp. 82, 83, and 85: "[Ashakant] Nimbark holds that even Gandhi's political ideas were caught in the dilemma between what Max Weber called 'ethic of ultimate ends' and 'ethic of responsibility' ... Nimbark is right in pointing out that on the problem of war Gandhi as an ideologist would advocate 'peace at any price', while as a responsible nationalist leader he would accept 'peace, but not at any price'. Thus the dilemma mentioned above is not an indication of a logical inconsistency but a pointer to the need for carrying the Gandhian experiment further... Gandhi believed in a political method, the chief ingredients of which were compromise, conciliation, and cooperation." Ashakant NIMBARK, *Gandhism Re-Examined*, Social Research (New York), vol.31 (March 1964), pp. 94-125.


97. See e.g. Article 24 in the German constitution which stipulates that the country may " by law transfer sovereign powers to international organizations" eventually to "bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world." The drafters chief aim was the U.N. Accordingly, the French constitution of 1946 similarly stipulated: "On condition of reciprocity, France accepts the limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organization and defence of peace." This commitment was confirmed in the 1958 constitution. The condition of reciprocity primarily

refers no doubt to Germany, but is also a generally binding legal principle.

98. I. L. HOROWITZ, *The Idea of War and Peace in Contemporary Philosophy* , pp. 106 and 105.

99. Efforts by the UN in the 1990s, to revise the Charter and reform the Security Council, to adapt to the new challenges, have failed, for lack of a rational, historically reasoned, rational approach. In an article published in 1999 (*A Draft on Security Council Reform, Peace & Change* , vol. 24, no. 4, October 1999, pp. 505-535) I advocated a “skilful surgeon” approach to Security Council Reform, calculated to get maximum results with minimum effort. I criticized the anomaly that two European countries and none from the South are represented on the Security Council as permanent members, recommending a single European permanent representation—arguing that European integration into the world community was an absolute necessity if we are to effectively face the challenges of the twenty first century. The Europeans can make the United Nations work—and fulfil a great historic purpose (while making up for having started two World Wars in the twentieth century)! Although as a second step enlargement of the Council should be supported, the proposal underscores the importance of maintaining the number 5 for its basic composition as a first step because, with the Security Council having the power to decide on war and peace, there should be no chance allowed for such decision to be taken by a majority vote among the ‘ Permanent Five ’. Obviously, the number “ 5 ” is reasonable in an environment that makes it necessary to resolve conflicts by consensus.

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“The human race will cease to exist unless a world government capable of enforcing world law is established by peaceful means. ... The choice is indeed between one world or none.”

ALBERT EINSTEIN  
-Scientist, Nobel Prize winner 1921