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
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Protecting Identity: Violence and Its Representations in  
France, 1815–1830

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# Protecting Identity

## Violence and Its Representations in France, 1815–1830

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**A**fter Napoleon's final defeat of 1815 and before the beginnings of the second great wave of French colonialism in the 1830s, during a period of great internal political crisis, French society produced an object called *The Death of Sardanapalus*. This painting represented what was then a somewhat familiar figure, the "Oriental," an outsider behaving badly and set to die for it.

Based on the mimetic theory, this essay argues that in the relation it determines with its viewers, this painting's representation of violence is a form of ritualistic activity, one that allows for contained and predictable events of unifying violence against outsiders. Among the effects of the French political conflicts was a crisis in such ritualistic containments. An analysis of the scandals surrounding the works of Géricault and Delacroix and comparisons with Ingres's more successful forms of containment shall serve to apprehend it.

The essay further argues an underlying unity of both symbolic and real external acts of violence during that period and that both were responses to the same political context. At about the same time that Delacroix was showing his work, preparations for the war of Algiers were underway. The war, which

was eventually carried out in 1830, was consciously and explicitly an attempt to recreate the lost political unity of France through a unifying act of external violence.

#### POLITICAL AND AESTHETIC CRISES OF 1815–1830

The French political conflicts of 1815–1830 were the context of changes in the art world that structured form and subjects of artworks and forced artists into new strategies of communication.

The Restoration under Louis XVIII had brought about a period of relative but very precarious stability. Until 1820, the King was somewhat anxious to appear willing to compromise. A constitution was put in place by the victorious allies and contained limited recognition of some of the liberties gained by the French people. To facilitate his own return to the throne and placate opposition from the bourgeoisie, Louis XVIII consented to a parliamentary system similar to that of Britain, with a Chamber of Peers named by the King and a House of Commons elected by the wealthy section of the population. These members of the upper bourgeoisie were desperately looking for stability,<sup>1</sup> and in 1815, after Napoleon's Hundred Days, the first parliamentary elections brought about an overwhelmingly Royalist chamber, indicating the bourgeoisie's support for the new government and the relief they felt at the demise of the Empire.

The Ultra-Royalists in the chamber quickly organized themselves as the first official party. Proponents of an absolute monarchy, they believed it was possible to return to the political system that was in place before the French revolution. Being "More royalist than the King,"<sup>2</sup> they wanted to go much further than Louis XVIII thought he could. They agitated in favor of confiscating all the lands that were taken from the aristocracy and the clergy during the Revolution, forcing the King, who was afraid that such an act would lead to revolution, to disband the chamber and call for a new election in 1816. From 1816 to 1819 the Liberals were able to consistently increase their gains in the House of Commons. Their share of 10 deputies in 1816 became 30 in 1819, causing great anxiety among the Ultra-Royalists.

When the Comte d'Artois became King Charles X in 1824, reactionary policies were introduced. He increased the influence of the clergy and enacted laws that punished acts of sacrilege with death. But he soon met with strenuous opposition. His attempt to enact a medieval law, thumb mutilation before the execution of a death sentence for sacrilege,<sup>3</sup> met with horrified and vocal

opposition and was successfully blocked. He also attempted to reintroduce other outdated laws such as that of primogeniture, giving rights of inheritance exclusively to eldest sons. This law, which was conceived to protect the large agricultural domains owned by the aristocracy from fragmentation through successive inheritances, was not adapted to the bourgeoisie's predominantly merchant economy. It met with great liberal resistance. Other policies included earmarking a billion francs as compensation for the aristocrats who were displaced and dispossessed during the Revolution and the Empire. He also placed clergy in key positions within departments of education and enacted laws that severely limited the already limited freedom of the press.

These policies reinforced the division in France between the Ultra-Royalists and what historians now very loosely call the "Liberals": an amalgam of opposition parties including Republicans agitating for universal suffrage, Parliamentary Royalists such as the Doctrinaires and the Orléanistes looking to tie the King to a clear charter, and a residue of Bonapartists. Most had in common a strong commitment to the limitation or abolition of the power of the monarchy, an opposition to the increased influence of the clergy, and a commitment to policies that favored the Bourgeoisie's economic activities. Because of the clumsy policies of Charles X, by the end of the 1820s, the relief that the high bourgeoisie felt at the end of the Napoleonic wars was but a distant memory, and despite their great differences, Orléanist, Doctrinaires, Republicans, and Bonapartists became united, finding it convenient to avoid fighting each other and to concentrate on the Ultra-Royalists.

The same political crisis affecting French society was convulsing its art world. A battle between the Ultra-Conservatives and the Liberals was raging over the control of the institutions of French artistic life. Its spread from politics into artistic life is described by Arnold Hauser as the "politicization of art and not merely in the sense that artists and writers join political parties, but also that they carry on party politics within artistic life itself."<sup>4</sup>

Prior to the relative democratization of the Salon in the XIXth century, the experience of high art was determined by the painter/patron relation.<sup>5</sup> In essence the aristocracy, through the academy, acted as main gatekeepers, and art produced served a unified conception of society. The Revolution and the Empire, however, had consolidated the middle class as the leading public of the visual arts,<sup>6</sup> and during the Restoration the Salon became the battleground between an Aristocratic and a Bourgeois conception of both art and society.

The aristocratic conception was defended by the powerful Academy, which explicitly conceived of itself as the aristocracy of the art world. It lobbied for

government or church-sponsored productions geared toward religious or history painting. The Salon was thus conceived as a means of elevating the morality of the population. This “elevation” of course implied social peace through adherence to political authorities financing the artworks.

The vast majority of artists were not members of the Academy and did not have the same state support academicians enjoyed. Given that the state could no longer absorb the vast numbers of artists that the educational system was producing, the original mandate for the Academy, that of the centralization and state control of the arts, could no longer be achieved. To those working outside the Academy, the Salon had become the most important venues where they could show their work. Exclusion from it would destroy the careers of a large majority of working artists.

The Academy’s constant attempts to limit the number of shows it was organizing in the Salon or the number of artworks exhibited were met with great resistance by these artists, which also expressed itself, perhaps unwittingly, as a subversion of the hierarchy of genres as formalized in 1667 by André Félibien, the great theoretician of French classicism.

In that hierarchy, history painting was considered the highest. It included religious scenes, and historical, mythological, or literary ones. Other genres such as portraits and those depicting contemporary life came next, whereas paintings of animals, landscapes, and inanimate objects were viewed as being of decreasing order of importance. This hierarchy of genres also implied a corresponding hierarchy of dimensions, as history painting tended to be executed on large or monumental scale.

In order to gain acceptance to the Academy, candidates had to present a work in a given genre. The hierarchical position of the genres upon which they gained entry determined their standing and prestige within the Academy itself. Thus, the highest positions in the Academy were occupied by those painters specializing in history painting.

In addition, the monumental dimension of history painting necessitated huge costs, whereas small easel-sized dimensions were used for still lifes with far lesser costs. Due to these exorbitant costs, history painting needed state sponsorship. Thus, a conception of art privileging that genre implied an art world containing a limited number of state-sponsored artists. Because of their financial dependence, these artists would be closely aligned with political power. The struggle for or against history painting implied a struggle for or against an aristocratic conception of economic and political distribution of power in the art world, one where only a limited number of artists would have access to the financial means necessary to produce it.

The Academy's defense of history painting ideologically and economically justified its own privileged position. Throughout the 19th century, it strongly resisted a democratization of access to the Salon, which would advantage small easel-sized works and would disadvantage history paintings, whereas independent artists energetically lobbied for it.<sup>7</sup> Thus according to Patricia Mainardi:

Proposals to revise the Salon system came from equally as many conservatives who wanted to create an "aristocracy of art" as from opposition artists who wanted to bring the Salon into alignment with democratic institutions, thus creating a "Republic of the arts." Nor is it coincidental that these two cultural models were identical with the major political alternatives of nineteenth-century France, a monarchy or republic.<sup>8</sup>

This, of course, did not imply that artists producing artworks for the bourgeoisie could not create history painting, or that they could not hold aristocratic views on art. Rather, independent artists were pushed by the force of economic necessity into a free-market practice of their trade, creating small easel works directed toward the new bourgeoisie.<sup>9</sup> In terms of subject matter, these works corresponded to that public's taste, which generally went to "lowest" genres of painting, and as the academies were increasingly incapable of containing the enormous numbers of painters, artists were forced to target their work to the bourgeoisie.

The rise of the bourgeoisie as the most important clientele was related to economic forces privileging a free-market model of art consumption, which in turn, as the pressures to adapt to it increased, encouraged certain genres of art to the detriment of others. Simply put, it was far cheaper and easier to produce and sell a small still life to a Parisian shopkeeper than a huge history painting to the French state. Thus, the same bourgeoisie that filled the ranks of the liberal faction in political life, subverting the aristocratic model of the state, was, by the sheer force of its economic power, undermining the aristocratic model of control on the central artistic venue of France, the Salon.

The experience of viewing art in the Salon was itself a subversion of the aristocratic model in that it weakened social hierarchies.<sup>10</sup> This is vividly captured in a pre-Revolutionary clandestine pamphlet called the "English Spy" and written by Mairobert around 1778:

This enchanting spectacle pleases me even more than the works displayed in this temple of the arts. Here the Savoyard odd-jobs man rubs shoulder with the great

noble in his cordon bleu; the fishwife trades her perfume with those of a lady of quality, making the latter resort to holding her nose to combat the strong odour of cheap brandy drifting her way; the rough artisan, guided only by natural feeling, comes out with a just observation, at which an inept wit nearby bursts out laughing only because of the comical accent in which it was expressed; while an artist hiding in the crowd unravels the meaning of it all and turns it to his profit.<sup>11</sup>

This small text precedes the French Revolution but expresses its underlying causes and some of its consequences: social undifferentiation and resistance to it, conflict over who has the right to formulate opinions, and artists trying to adjust. The social undifferentiation in the Salon was not only an expression of the rising political but also of the cultural power of the lower classes. Their increased access to art, according to Mairobert, was allowing them to formulate “just” opinions on art.

In the 1820s, this undifferentiation of hierarchies was still profoundly destabilizing. By giving access to art, the Salon provided a space where the lower classes could desire what the aristocracy had. Thus, it threatened a social order that determines what each could and could not desire by positioning an object—art—as being possessed ambiguously by all. What was now different was that this undifferentiation had gained specific meanings through the French Revolution, Empire, and the Restoration. Thus, the mixing of social classes in the Salon was now an issue and an expression of a long political struggle.

The scene of that struggle was the Parisian art world, which had become organized around several important functions; these included artists, bureaucrats, gallery owners, academicians, and art critics. The most important of these were to become the scenes of struggle between Ultra-Royalists and Liberals, between artists from within the Academy and those outside of it, between those opposing the public’s access to the Salon and those welcoming it. These struggles were taken up and further politicized in the press. Conservative newspapers and journals such as the *Gazette de France*, the *Journal des débats*, and the *Quotidienne* battled with the more recently established liberal journals such as *Le Censeur*, the *Constitutionnel*, *Le Mercure*, *La Minerve*, and *La Renommée*. Thus, art criticism became a thoroughly political activity.<sup>12</sup>

The young Delacroix, like the artist in the Mairobert passage, had to adjust to very confusing social conditions. For him, taking a position for either Conservatism or Liberalism was a mandatory strategy of survival. In the Parisian art world, political neutrality was not the best option, as artists who were neutral risked being ignored. In the Salon, where each artist was competing with

hundreds of others, being ignored was possibly the worst outcome. Delacroix had to make his mark within the polarized atmosphere of the Parisian art world by expressing and giving meaning to his work through the use of the terms by which this struggle was expressing itself. By doing so he inserted his work within the larger political conversation occurring in France. Adherence to a faction provided a network of de facto allies, the possibility of protection and state financial rewards by like-minded bureaucrats, as well as notice from both opposing and concurring critics, creating controversy and interest around the work. Without these alliances and opportunities, advancement in the Parisian art world was far more difficult.

A range of issues colored by political partisanship provided the subject matter of artistic expressions. For instance, the Greek War of Independence was a subject of ambiguity for Ultra-Royalists, as it was perceived to be uncomfortably similar to the French revolution. Liberals, on the other hand, came out strongly in support of it, lobbying for European intervention.<sup>13</sup> Delacroix's *Massacre of Chio*<sup>14</sup> (Figure 1) was a clear signal of Liberalism. The same goes for Delacroix's gambit of a Byronic depiction of Sardanapalus.

Politics also reinforced the opposition between pictorial Romanticism and Classicism. The rigid separation between the two did not begin until the 1820s and 1830s, when Romanticism became associated with the artistically progressive while classicism became the style of those defending and basing their practice on the authority of David.<sup>15</sup> Thus, two models emerged: one founding its legitimacy on the imitation of an authority figure, that is, a genealogical model of authority, and the other based on the legitimization of personality-centered creativity and innovation. These two models of artistic legitimacy implied two different models of political authority, one aristocratic and authoritarian, the other more in tune with the current weakening of the authoritarian model and the rise of free-market economy.

Thus, although literary Romanticism was at its beginning associated with the Legitimists, by the 1820s it had become associated with Liberalism of all stripes, and although the pictorial Neo-Classicism of David, with its emphasis on reason, was viewed as an expression of the ideals of the Enlightenment and used to defend Republic and Empire, during the reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles X it had become associated with the Restoration. The terms of the struggle could thus shift depending on which ones opposed players appropriated. What was fundamental was the struggle itself. Terms such as Neo-Classicism or Romanticism were simply the way the violent disintegration of French society gained interindividual meaning and created identitarian self-representations. Belief in these terms preserved adherence and unity within each of the struggling



factions and determined representations of the adversaries. The choice over whether to relate Classicism or Romanticism to Republicanism or Monarchism was determined by oppositional self-descriptions, rather than by any inherent quality found in the ideas of the two movements. The emergence of these artistic identities was but a small part of the fragmentation of France into competing political factions, threatening and eventually leading toward a slide of French society into violence. In attempting to contain this violence, French society used several ritualistic strategies.

### RITUALIZATION OF VIOLENCE

In the 1820s and despite the increased economic liberalization of the art market, history painting was still ideologically considered the most serious genre. Academicians still had enormous prestige. Each artist had to choose between or combine two options, the immediate economic reward that small easel-sized painting provided or the prestige that huge wall-sized history painting could provide. In 1824, for instance, Delacroix wrote in his journal that he was hesitating between the “desire to do small paintings, especially in order to buy something from the Géricault sale,”<sup>16</sup> and the desire to do true and “virile” paintings worthy of Dante.<sup>17</sup> Speaking of this period, Elizabeth Frazer writes:

Scholarship has tended to emphasise exclusively the artist’s large public canvases in the early period of his career. This emphasis has obscured another, equally important part of that career: the smaller works, numbering more than thirty canvases, paid for by private patrons and exhibited in their homes and private collections. Consideration of these paintings forms a more complicated view of Delacroix art. It also reveals the contradictory climate for the arts during the Bourbon Restoration. Heir to the revolutionary notions of public culture, and yet working within a monarchical patronage system, Delacroix had to develop complicated strategies while creating a context and market for his art.<sup>18</sup>

As an ambitious artist, Delacroix had to take into account the contradictory nature of the art world with its incompatible demands. On one side, economic survival pushed him toward small, easily marketable paintings, and on the other, ambition directed him toward large-scale history paintings. Thus, the tension between the aristocratic and the liberal conceptions of the Salon was encouraging hybrid strategies.

Delacroix also had to adjust to the larger political expression of this struggle: namely, the polarization between Liberals and Ultra-Monarchists. This did not imply some simple equivalency where the Ultras stood for history painting on one side and Liberals against it on the other. History painting had its most recent and prestigious models in David, who gave his best work under the Revolution and the Empire. So while a Liberal model of art marketing encouraged small easel sized paintings, the ideology of the Liberals as a group placed great value upon history painting.

Delacroix's *Massacre of Chio* (Figure 1) was a move within that contradictory context. Through it, he placed himself squarely in the Romantic Liberal camp, giving his work meaning within the context of current political debates. The painting itself represents the Ottomans' 1822 massacre of 20,000 inhabitants on the island of Chio during the Greek War of Independence. The artist started the work in 1823,<sup>19</sup> and it was accepted in the 1824 Salon—albeit reluctantly—by a jury composed of Gérard, Girodet, and Gros.<sup>20</sup>

The subject of the painting signaled a clear adherence to a cause popular with Liberals. The Greek cause was very publicly taken up by liberals and romantics such as Byron, and Delacroix was an avid reader of the latter. But cautiously, the artist chose a subject that was by then not a very controversial one with conservatives and Ultra-Royalists. The latter were initially ambiguous with regard to this war. They could not decide whether to favor their religious identity and support the Christian Greeks against the Islamic Ottomans or to favor their class identity and support the Ottoman masters against their Greek subjects. Monarchists did eventually come out in support of the Greeks, and Charles X sent a fleet to participate in the Battle of Navarino in 1827.

Despite, or probably because of, a frequently unfavorable but intense critical reception,<sup>21</sup> Delacroix's *Massacre of Chio* (Figure 1) was an object of great public curiosity. It was awarded with a second class medal in the Salon and bought by the state for 6000 francs.

This state support of Delacroix's work shows the ambiguities characterizing political life during that period. If Delacroix was a "Liberal," that liberalism must not be understood in the modern sense of the word. During the 1820s the term itself was not used as a means of self-description, and today's historians use it to unify a variety of political positions in the 1820s, which only gained a certain amount of unity because of the Ultra-Royalists' heavy-handed attempts at old-regime absolutism.

Delacroix navigated these loose and ambiguous associations quite well. His father Charles Delacroix was a minister of foreign affairs under the



**Figure 1.** Eugène Delacroix, *The Massacre of Chios*, 1824, 417 by 354 cm., oil on canvas, Le Musée du Louvre.

Revolution and a high official under Napoleon; thus, he had prestige within both the Republican and the Bonapartist camps. The painter also established a relationship with Louis Phillip Joseph Duc d'Orléans, head of the Orléanist faction, one of the main opposition figures, and who, after the July Revolution, was declared King of the French. The painter was thus able to present himself as part of the opposition camp without becoming too identified with

any single faction of it. His was cautious ambiguity masquerading as a firm position.

Situating himself within these political and artistic struggles as a “Romantic” and a “Liberal,” Delacroix still had to position himself in the pecking order of the Romantic camp itself, where there was a competition for leadership. After the Salon of 1824 Delacroix was considered a very important representative but by no means this group’s undisputed leader. Historians such as René Hyughe have claimed that the Salon of 1824 inaugurated the rivalry between Delacroix and Ingres and that at the time both were recognized as head of their respective schools.<sup>22</sup> In fact, Andrew Carrington Shelton has pointed out that in 1824, when the famous art critic Etienne Delécluze compared the “Homeric” (i.e., Neo-Classical) school to the “Shakespearean” (i.e., Romantic) school, he did not oppose Delacroix to Ingres as their respective representatives, but Ingres to Vernet. Thus, within the Romantic camp itself, Delacroix was competing with other artists such as Vernet but also Xavier Sigalon, Eugène Devéria, and Alexandre Decamp.<sup>23</sup> Before the Salon of 1824, he was also competing with the extraordinarily talented Géricault, an artist far more successful than Delacroix. Had it not been for his death in January of that year, there is every likelihood that Géricault would have been the head of the “new school” which was then taking shape.

This intra-Romantic competition explains Delacroix’ next big move, the *Death of Sardanapalus* (Figure 2). It imitated Géricault’s and Lord Byron’s communication strategies. What characterizes the latter two in relation to Neo-Classicism is *transgressive violence*. What is meant by this are representations of violence for which the content and form placed them outside the sphere where Neo-Classicalists had ritually contained said violence. As we shall further argue, by *ritual*, we mean predictable and conventionally accepted acts whose function is to contain representations of violence. Thus, a Neo-Classicalist painting representing a mythological tale containing patricide and incest, such as Ingres’s *Oedipus and the Sphinx*,<sup>24</sup> did not cause a scandal, whereas Géricault’s *Raft of the Medusa*<sup>25</sup> (Figure 3), depicting a recent event where cannibalism was rumored to have occurred among Frenchmen, caused a furor. The reasons for this need to be closely examined.

The *Medusa* was a frigate that got shipwrecked off the coast of West Africa in June 1816. The crew piled 150 people on a small raft and left them adrift in the sea. Two weeks later the raft was found with 15 survivors—of these only 10 survived. There were rumors that those who survived were forced to commit murder to keep their place on the raft and that there were occurrences of cannibalism among the shipwrecked. The government kept these events quiet



**Figure 2.** Eugène Delacroix, *The Death of Sardanapalus*, 1827–28, oil on canvas, 392 by 496 cm., Le Musée du Louvre.

until a year later, when the affair became public knowledge. The event caused great uproar and criticism of the government's negligence and corruption, as it turned out that the captain was appointed for his political loyalties rather than his navigational abilities.

The reasons the *Raft of the Medusa* (Figure 3) caused such a scandal was not the intensity of the violence it depicted—the *Raft* did not present the violence directly—but rather because it implied violence occurring within the sphere of French identity. By showing this real occurrence of violence among Frenchmen, one that was eventually linked to the political struggles between Ultra-Royalists and Liberals, Géricault transported violence from mythological Greece, where Ingres's Oedipus was placed, to within the sphere of French identity, causing the great scandal of the Salon of 1819.

This is not to say that representations of mythological violence do not have the potential of being highly scandalous—one look at Goya's *Saturn Devouring One of his Children*<sup>26</sup> would convince anyone otherwise. Rather, Neo-Classicists such as Ingres had evolved a code for dealing with the representation

of transgression and its implication of violence that kept it safely outside the sphere of identity. Representations of sexuality, for instance, could imply violence since they implied transgressing part of the ethical code that kept violence at bay within the sphere of identity. A threat to one part of the code is a threat to its totality. The containment of transgression and violence within art involved the idealization of representations containing them. Following the classical rules of theatre, violence and transgression could be suggested but not shown directly—a fence built around them to separate them from proximate everyday reality.

Formal elements also played a role in keeping transgression and violence outside the sphere of identity by differentiating artistic representation from the everyday reality. Thus, arguments over the stylistic oppositions between line and color could elicit enormous passions because these elements were loaded with moral connotations. The emphasis on lines as opposed to color, for instance, implied an emphasis on thought rather than sensuality. The use of lines was a means of differentiating artistic representation from the immediacy of sensual perception, which operated in the here and now, thus keeping any represented violence outside the immediacy of current and proximate



**Figure 3.** Theodore Géricault, *The Raft of the Medusa*, 1819, oil on canvas, 491 by 716 cm., Le Musée du Louvre.

reality. To the mind of some Europeans, linearity insured that nudes could be shown without the danger of violating the sexual ethics of the social order. The separation acted as ritualization of sexual transgressions and violence, giving these a containable predictability through conventionally understood codes of separation from everyday reality. Thus, transgression and violence could be represented and experienced without implying that they were acceptable outside the ritually contained experience of art. An image representing a highly erotic subject, such as Ingres's *La Grande Odalisque*<sup>27</sup> (Figure 4), while drawing harsh criticism for its disregard of anatomical precision, could still be shown without causing a scandal of a sexual nature. The representation of a nude in the 19th century was taken for granted inasmuch as it did not affect the sphere of identity.

Ingres's *Grande Odalisque* (Figure 4) is formally but also thematically outside this sphere. The erotic scene was occurring somewhere else: Geographically it was outside his national and religious identity, faraway in the lascivious Ottoman Empire somewhere; stylistically, these naked women were not presented immediately through the sensuality of color but ideally through the supposedly disincarnating mediation of the line. Ingres's representations of violence and transgressive sexuality were occurring "out there" and/or "long ago" in the idealized linear composition conventionally understood as being less immediate than transgression and violence confronting the senses in the here and now. Ingres's objection to Delacroix's was related to the supposed



**Figure 4.** Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres, *La Grande Odalisque*, 1814, oil on canvas, 88.9 by 162.56 cm., Le Musée du Louvre.

immediacy of the latter's painterly style and its emphasis on the supposed sensuality of color, one that threatened representations of sexuality spreading into the here and now.

Thus, Neo-Classical practices and the ideologies justifying them were a means of representing/practicing transgression and its implication of violence, within contained limits—a fundamental characteristic of their ritualistic nature. Seen from this angle, one could easily understand Ingres's apparently absurd association between morality and a stylistic element such as line, one so dearly held that it led to him screaming at Delacroix during a party that "Drawing, sir, drawing is honesty! Drawing, sir, drawing is honor."<sup>28</sup>

Géricault's work did not transgress the stylistic containment of violence: Formally the work is Neo-Classical. The composition is pyramidal, the brushstrokes smooth, and the treatment of forms highly linear. His transgression occurred on the level of subject matter. Thus, instead of representing violence as occurring in the safe nonidentitarian spheres of ancient Greece or in the distant Ottoman Empire, he showed occurrences of violence within identity itself, in the here and the now. Géricault's construction of a scale model of the raft in his studio added a dimension of pseudo-realism to this work, further distancing it from the realm of ideals and placing it within the sphere of proximate reality. His participation in the Salon of 1819 amounted to the creation of controversy and its use as a means of getting his work noticed. It was very successful, and in the extremely competitive atmosphere of the Salon, with about one thousand seven hundred other works hung next to his, Géricault's painting was the object of intense notice; while it caused a political scandal, it was rewarded with a gold medal by the jury.

This was a relatively new strategy for success in France, one based on the creation of controversy within a saturated art world in order to draw attention toward one's work. Today this strategy is commonplace, but as far as we could tell, Géricault was the first to elaborate and use it so systematically. By explicitly showing the violence occurring within identity, he could have contributed to it, giving voice to the political opposition following the shipwreck and contributing to an eventual resurgence of revolution. This danger of a spread of violence outside the ritualistic space of the painting was what drew the scandalized attention to the work.

It is possible that Delacroix had the events, controversy, and success surrounding the *Raft of the Medusa* (Figure 3) in mind when he painted *The Massacre of Chio* (Figure 1). He was a good friend of the more established Géricault and had even posed for one of the figures in the *Raft*. His *Massacre of Chio*



showed a similar strategy: the use of the monumental proportions of history painting to represent a controversial current event and the use of that controversy to attract attention to his work. While he was not quite as successful as Géricault, he did manage to get his work noticed among the thousands of others present, so that in the Salon of 1824, with its 2180 entries, he got a second class medal and had his work bought by the state.

Delacroix work was less controversial than Géricault's in one very important aspect: If the latter's work represented and connoted events that were causing great internal tensions and political controversy, Delacroix represented violence occurring elsewhere. Politically, Ultra-Royalists were simply ambiguous with regard to the Greek War of Independence, and whatever controversy Delacroix generated had more to do with his painterly technique and its final formal result. While this color-based technique transgressed the protective coolness of the Neo-Classical style by creating, to the mind of his contemporaries, an immediacy of sensual perception, the violence he represented had occurred well outside of the sphere of French identity. It is this underlying model of painterly and sensualistic representation of violence occurring outside this sphere that Delacroix would transpose unto his *Death of Sardanapalus* in 1827–28. This transposition would be based on the use as ritualistic space of an imaginary mental construct: the "Orient."

#### THE ORIENT AS RITUALISTIC SPACE

Representations of Orientals have very ancient roots in Western art. As far back as the 15th century the three magi were depicted as Orientals wearing turbans and exotic attire. During violent interactions between East and West, religious paintings were also used for propaganda purposes; in passion paintings, Orientals were sometimes represented as the ones whipping Christ.

Gentile Bellini was among the first artists to visit the Ottoman Empire in 1479–80 and was commissioned by Mohammed II to paint his portrait. Subsequently, upon his return the artist introduced Orientalizing elements into his paintings. Rubens and Rembrandt, among others, created works involving Orientals or people dressed in Oriental clothes.

Delacroix also had several immediate models when he chose to paint *Sardanapalus*. By 1822, the 175 artists, poets, economists, surveyors, and cartographers who had followed Napoleon's campaign in Egypt had finished producing the 22 volumes of the *Description of Egypt*, fuelling interest in the Orient. Gros

had painted *Bonaparte Visiting the Plague Victims of Jaffa*.<sup>29</sup> Byron had written *Giaour* and *Sardanapalus* and Géricault had issued lithographs based on Byron's work.<sup>30</sup>

Delacroix had also befriended the painter Jules Robert August (1789–1850), a very important, albeit underestimated, figure in the rebirth of the new wave of Orientalism during the 1820s and one of the few artists to have actually visited the Orient in the 1810s and 1820s. Having been to Greece, Egypt, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, and Morocco, he had brought with him artifacts, antiques, and Islamic paintings that Delacroix saw.<sup>31</sup> His Salon in the mid 1820s was the place where those interested in Orientalia met. These included people such as Prosper Mérimée, Stendhal, and Balzac.<sup>32</sup>

But all of these influences do not really explain why Delacroix chose an Orientalist subject in the first place. Why not Ancient Greece for that fateful Salon of 1827–28? Why Sardanapalus burning himself instead of, say, Hercules murdering his own children?

The Orientalist subject of Sardanapalus could have been the result of what F. Orton and G. Pollock have described, with regard to another historical period, as a “search for a new space of representation,”<sup>33</sup> one motivated by a loss of affective meaning in Neo-Classical depictions of Greco-Roman subject-matter. With far too many such depictions, repetition had exhausted their ability to elicit responses.<sup>34</sup> But this can only be a partial answer; repetition does not necessarily imply exhaustion. For instance, Greek icons are very stable both stylistically and in terms of subject matter. Yet one cannot say they are exhausted, as they are still the focus of great piety and emotional response even in the 21st century.

There are several factors that explain Delacroix's move away from classical subjects. The use of orientalist subject matter was a response to the highly competitive context of the Salon where an artist had to adapt to the newly forming context of communications, by differentiating himself from others. An artist could do so on a stylistic level, on the level of subject matter, or in a synthesis of both. Géricault used one of these possible strategies: the creation of controversy through reference to politically contentious recent events. But Delacroix was not a person who would knowingly face the political storm that would follow a gambit such as Géricault's. He was simply too conservative, acutely aware and accepting of social norms. For instance, in his journal entry of May 1823 he describes his agonized indecision over how to publicly react in the presence of a maid he knew and liked.<sup>35</sup> And on his brother's marriage to a woman from a lower socioeconomic class, he writes:

I can only predict with extreme pain the future that awaits him; what a sad thing to not be able to recognize his own wife in the presence of well-bred people, or to be reduced to transforming this calamity into a weapon against what he calls prejudice.<sup>36</sup>

His journals do not show a great transgressive hero in the grips of some ferocious “solitary combat” but an upper-class bourgeois worried about what the neighbors would think if they saw him eating ice cream with the maid.<sup>37</sup> This is a man existentially bemoaning his brother’s marriage to a lower class woman and the stupidity of challenging and embarrassing “well-bred people” with her presence. Delacroix’s transgressive poses never transgress class prejudices.

So for the Salon of 1827, and with his usual ambiguity, he attempted to do two things at the same time: to present work that was violent enough to get noticed and to do it in a fashion that would not actually offend the “well-bred people.” In order to do that, he chose a subject situated in a place and time outside of his current identity where he could practice transgressive representations with impunity, the Orient.

Following Edward Said’s great intuition, by “Orient” we mean that monolithic mental construct unifying under the same denotation disparate geographical spaces and historical times. This unification is of regions considered as other—that is, outside of Western identity.<sup>38</sup> Sardanapalus’s Assyria is part of that great undifferentiated mythological outside. Within that mythological space, separated from his current identity, Delacroix could show the most outlandish transgressions.

The Orient was a place he could accuse with impunity of the sexual violence he was exporting upon it. It would have been far more difficult to make a French public accept these transgressions had they been represented as occurring within Paris. Manet’s *Olympia*<sup>39</sup> caused a scandal even though it was far less explicit than Ingres’s *Turkish Bath*<sup>40</sup> of that same year (1863) because it was interpreted as showing transgression occurring within Paris—in that case, prostitution. The Orient, on the other hand, as Thierry Hentsch puts it,<sup>41</sup> was that great “background” against which the “West,” as an identitarian self-description, could define itself, whereas the West was a space of morality the East would come to be represented as its opposite.

Delacroix chose the very striking story of Sardanapalus for an illustration of this contrast with the Western world. This tale is first told by Herodotus and Ctesias, respectively, in the fifth and fourth century BCE. Ctesias reported

or invented the tale of the effeminate King Sardanapalus, whose debauchery and laziness lost him his Empire. According to this account, Arbaces, a Mede general, contrived to see him and was outraged that such an effeminate man should be his king. He led a revolt and surrounded the king's city for two years. Seeing that defeat was imminent, Sardanapalus decided to commit suicide by self-immolation. Diodorus took up and probably reworked Ctesias' tale in the first century BCE.<sup>42</sup> In 1821 Lord Byron transformed this tale into the theatrical drama *Sardanapalus*.

In 1827 Delacroix decided to use the last scene of *Sardanapalus* for a painting destined for the upcoming Salon. The resulting image was of Sardanapalus lying on his bed, indifferently observing his slaves killing his naked concubines, riches strewn everywhere, gold, bejeweled pots and horses, evidence of this Oriental's enormous wealth. In this representation of the Orient we see what will become typical orientalist themes: the corruption and despotism of the ruler, his frenzied and murderous dark-skinned subjects, and Oriental women as pliant objects of desire. Even while being murdered, the latter are considerate enough to be strategically naked in front of the properly horrified and innocent Parisian viewers.

It must be noted that it would have been unthinkable for Delacroix to depict the murder of Parisian Bourgeois women—members of his own identity—as he depicted the death of these Oriental women. Perhaps, had he chosen to represent Parisian women enduring such violence, their dignity would have been preserved during the moment of their death. Thus, we do not agree with Nochlin's explanation that Sardanapalus's killing of Assyrian women reflected the power relationship between French men and women.<sup>43</sup> It does nothing of the sort. Few Frenchman of the 19th century would have considered it appropriate to represent being done to contemporary French woman what was being done against those Orientals. The only reason Delacroix calculated that it would be acceptable to show such transgression of the ethic governing the relationship between French men and woman was precisely because those depicted in the *Sardanapalus* were not French.

In that sense the painting obeys one of the fundamental laws of the ritual of human sacrifice as proposed by René Girard: namely, that of choosing the victims from outside the social order so that their deaths do not cause scandal, not in the ordinary sense of the word, but potentially degenerating into the violence of vengeance and countervengeance within the sphere of identity as a result of the links of solidarity among its members.<sup>44</sup> Delacroix attempted to avoid the scandal such a transgression of the internal sexual ethic would normally cause

by situating it outside the sphere of French identity, in some distant Orient, implying it had nothing to do with the French onlookers.

Girard has shown how it is in the nature of ritual to transgress the ethical codes of a society while accusing and directing those transgression toward some outsider.<sup>45</sup> Thus, while the viewer is participating in the same activity as Sardanapalus, observing, as the potentate is doing, the sexual murder of women, Delacroix is betting that this viewer will be able to justify his own transgression by distinguishing himself from Sardanapalus through racial separation. The viewer thus accuses Sardanapalus of the violence he himself is vicariously participating in, projecting his own guilt upon the potentate. In that sense we agree with Frederick N. Bohrer when he says that while both Sardanapalus and the viewer are participating in the same viewing activity, their correspondence is countered by the infamy associated with the Assyrian king.<sup>46</sup> This identitarian difference/accusation creates a proxy mental space where transgression is practiced by the viewer without contaminating the proximate sphere of his own identity.

Yet Delacroix's work, despite its transgressive poses, was far less destabilizing and far more conservative than Géricault's: a temper tantrum as opposed to a revolution. Delacroix's conservatism is not related to sexual modesty. What is meant by the term is that contrary to Géricault, who had moved the representation of violence away from the safety of the mythological, religious, and historical ritualistic spheres toward the sphere of identity itself, *Sardanapalus* was a work that did not threaten the established order in any serious way. In fact, it attempted to reinforce it by ritualistically allowing its members to commit violence in some fictional external sphere, thus exporting its internal tensions and recreating identity's unity. As a ritualistic redirection of internal violence toward the outside it conserved its stability. It is in that sense that this work is conservative. It is no coincidence, then, that by the 1850s, the profoundly conservative Academic Art had completely appropriated Orientalism.

The violence found in *Sardanapalus* is a function of the artwork as an object playing a focal role in ritualistic behavior. The Salon was a place where members of the same identity could experience paintings collectively and see narratives in the face of which they were expected to have similar reactions, thus reinforcing their unity. That narrative was ritualistically controlled, separate in place and time from the sphere of identity. In such a ritualistic space, more violent artwork, although more dangerous to the sphere of identity, could lead to stronger emotional reactions and stronger unified adherence than less violent artwork, given that the strength of unity is proportional to the intensity of similar reactions. It is in this comparative context that Delacroix was operating. Competing

with other ritualists—artists—he increased the violence of his work, attempting to direct attention away from other works surrounding his and inviting stronger adherence to his own.

Delacroix's *Sardanapalus* is thus structurally similar to human sacrifice, attempting to do the same thing in the same way: the creation of social solidarity among the spared through unifying violent catharsis. There are in fact two narratives in this painting, that of the subject matter and that found on the pragmatic level of the public's ritualistic experience. On the level of subject matter, the painting is about a man committing murder-suicide. On the pragmatic level, however—that is, on the level of the relationship of the viewer to the painting as Delacroix had planned it—this is a narrative of a man and women getting killed and whose death is experienced as a pleasurable spectacle by a mob of viewers.

Delacroix's gambit did not work. The critical reaction to his work was extremely unfavorable. The artist was made to understand, by the Director of the Beaux-Arts, that if he expected continued state support, he would have to change his style. But the opposition to Delacroix was not that he was showing violence. After all, Poussin's *Massacre of the Innocents*<sup>47</sup> also showed violence, so did David's *The Sabine Women*,<sup>48</sup> and even Ingres's *Oedipus* suggested transgressive sexuality and violence. The problem with Delacroix was that he was containing violence in a relatively new way, which, for his contemporaries, could wrongfully be interpreted as not containing it at all. The public and critics saw outlandish transgression depicted without the conventionally understood Neo-Classical forms of ritualistic containment. And as this containment did not work and the representation spread to the sphere of identity, the little *frisson* Delacroix wanted to give his public muted into horror. They perceived themselves being burned and butchered in the manner shown. They did not fully understand that this violence was occurring elsewhere, outside the sphere of obligations and sympathy—in the outer sphere of dehumanization. With time, of course, Delacroix's genius would triumph over these petty objections and the Orient would live to become the space where Gérôme could show his *Snake Charmer*.<sup>49</sup>

#### A SIMILAR STRATEGY

French society, going through internal crises, engaged in forms of collective violence on both symbolic and real levels. What Delacroix faced in the art world, Charles X faced in politics: a power struggle between Ultras and Liberals. And while he was on the opposite side of this struggle, his strategy was essentially

similar to that of Delacroix: engaging in one form or another of external collective violence so that the factions within identity are reconciled through their unanimous aggression against outsiders.

The King's government had instituted highly unpopular policies. It disbanded the National Guard after cries against the Jesuits were heard during one of its reviews: a direct offence to the bourgeoisie who made up most of this guard's members. It increased the influence of the clergy in education. Even an Ultra such as Chateaubriand had by 1827 become a dissenter, opposed to the growing influence of the clergy. There were even rumors that the King might reinstate the tithe. Further rumours were circulating that the King, in response to the Ultras' demands, was about to restore the confiscated possession of the aristocracy with full feudal rights.

The King understood that sooner or later a showdown with the opposition was inevitable and that he would have to use his power to disband the Chamber and call for new elections. In the autumn of 1827, during a period of tension with the Liberals and as it became evident that the Chamber of Deputies was to be disbanded, the Minister of War, Marquis de Clermont-Tonnerre, proposed in a report to the King to escalate a preexisting conflictual situation with Algiers, declare war, and use this for French electoral purposes:

It is generally desirable that these events, which would give great strength to the government and present to the spirit of the people salutary nourishment, coincide with periods of political uncertainty. The expedition against Algiers, if your Majesty undertakes it now, would end during a period when the King can use his prerogative to renew the Chamber of Deputies<sup>50</sup>

This passage is extremely interesting in that it explicitly shows a strategy of recreating unity through war against outsiders and the instrumentation of that war for internal political purposes. In other words, the unity against the enemy, which leads to unity within identity, was to be used by the government to create unity behind the King.

Underlying all of this is the principle of violence outside identity and peace within, since the object against which this collective violence was to be practiced was an outsider against which victory was assured. Despite the real dangers of warfare, the resolution of violence was believed to be predetermined. This is due to the perceived weakness of Algiers. The cabinet thought—quite rightly, it turned out—that Algiers had become far too weak to pose any real threat. Having a predetermined ending, the war could then become a narrative,

circumscribed by predictability, with a beginning, a middle, and a satisfying resolution.

The war had to be adjourned due to British opposition. So Charles X's next move against the Liberals in the Chamber of Deputies had to be executed without the aid of a war. On November 6, 1827, the King promulgated three ordinances: First, he named 76 new members to the Chamber of Peers chosen exclusively from the Ultra camp; second, he dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, and third, he called for an election on the 17th and 24th of November. Contrary to Charles X's expectations, the election produced a large majority for the opposition.

Soon, the moderately liberal positions of the cabinet met with the King's disapproval. So on August 6, 1828, the King dismissed the Martignac cabinet and invited the Ultra-Royalist Prince de Polignac to form a government. It soon became clear that another confrontation with the Chamber of Deputies was in the works. So Charles X reactivated Clermont-Tonnerre's plan of using a military victory against Algerian to create support behind him, which would allow him to dismiss the Chamber of Deputies and reaffirm his power.

The projected violence against Algerians had the added advantage of being easily incorporated into a preexisting identitarian narrative, one that reinforces a form of identity that justified Charles's political power, namely, a narrative of the Crusades, which tied in nicely with the legitimizing genealogy of the Bourbon. The tale of Saint Louis dying in the Maghreb during a crusade against Muslims was one of the main legitimizing narratives of French monarchic power. Within the radically pro-Catholic atmosphere of Charles's cabinet, representing the King as a crusader was both a return to a premodern form of legitimization and a narrative with which to oppose the tales of Napoleonic military triumphs.

This Crusader narrative was never far from the surface. For instance, in 1829, Polignac conceived of a plan to finance Muhammad Ali in a conquest of the Maghreb. Trying to convince Charles of this unlikely scheme, he writes:

These shores, that have been sanctified by the death of Saint Louis, will be delivered and under the reign and by the actions of Charles X, of piracy and of the barbaric regime that had transformed them into the horror and epidemic of the Mediterranean.<sup>51</sup>

The King himself, when justifying this projected war to the parliament, couched it in terms of Christian identity. While never explicitly describing himself as a



crusader, the projected war was placed in the Christian/Muslim identitarian opposition:

I can no longer leave unpunished the insult done to my banner; the redress that I want to obtain by satisfying the honor of France, will occur with the help of the almighty for the profit of Christianity.<sup>52</sup>

A war waged “with the help of the almighty for the profit of Christianity” is a good definition of a Crusade. It is possible that Charles truly believed his own rhetoric. However, there is very little doubt that Charles conceived this crusade as a means to a second objective: creating the support that would allow him to dismiss the Chamber of Deputies and assure an Ultra-Royalist victory in the consequent elections. This is explicitly stated by the foreign minister, the Baron de Damas, in a book written after the July Revolution. On the Cabinet’s reaction to the liberal opposition he wrote in his *Mémoires*: “In these circumstances, we thought of the conquest of Algiers, predicting that such an important expedition would divert the attention of the public and give friends of the throne force and union.”<sup>53</sup>

And unlike in 1827, Britain, going through its own crisis, was unable to object. On May 25, 1830, under the command of Comte de Bourmont, 675 boats carrying 37,000 soldiers sailed from Toulon. They reached Algiers in June 14 after a crucial delay due to a storm. Using a plan prepared under Napoleon, they debarked on the Beach of Sidi-Fredj. They met an extremely ill-prepared Algerian army under Agha Ibrahim. The ferocious fighting that ensued lasted three weeks. By July 4, the Dey Hussein sent his secretary, the Bach-Kateb Sidi Mustafa, to negotiate the surrender of the city, and by July 5, the war was officially over.

But in the meantime, on July 3, a new Chamber of Deputies had been elected with a large Liberal majority. The Ultras in the Cabinet, including the Prince de Polignac, pushed Charles X to use the article XIV of the charter, which allowed him to use dictatorial powers in case of emergency. Twenty-one days after the victory in Algiers, on July 26, Charles attempted the first step toward the restoration of an absolute monarchy. He published four ordinances: the dissolution of the Chamber of deputies; the abolition of the freedom of the press; the modification of election laws; and the adjournment of new elections to September. Charles was trying to use the “glory” of the Algerian victory to pass these laws. It did not work.

What followed seems to have been a genuinely popular revolt far removed from the elite Liberal opposition which subsequently appropriated it. On

July 27, workers in printers, worried about what the ordinances against the press would mean to their livelihood, started calling all the members of other professions to revolt. The revolution spread like wild fire. It started with people throwing stones at the Gendarmes. By July 28 barricades were set up throughout Paris. By July 29 a part of the army had switched sides with the insurgents and the revolution had won. On August 2, Charles X abdicated and the liberal opposition replaced him with the more liberal Louis d'Orléans, who became King Louis-Philippe the First.

### WHAT FOLLOWED TWO FAILURES

The reaction to an increase in the potential of internal political violence was an increase in ritualistic and real violence against Oriental outsiders. Both the actions of Eugene Delacroix in painting the death of these "Orientals" and the Restoration's war against Algiers are similar reactions to similar circumstances: two ways of exporting internal violence from within identity to without. Those artistic representations where fictitious Orientals died had the same objectives as the war of 1830 where real Orientals had died: the protection of identity.

Both failed—for a time. In one instance people were simply not yet used to perceiving the Orient with the same radical otherness needed for Delacroix's ritual act to succeed. Without the Orient as a fully constituted mythological and ritual space, the people dying in that Salon of 1827 looked too much like real human beings. In the other instance, the war against these real outsiders was met with indifference. The Liberals were simply too aware of the regime's calculations to adhere to this war and successfully countered Charles's gambit of unifying violence. Charles's attempt at creating unity through collective violence simply did not work.

But that was a temporary failure. Pictorial productions or other ritualized aesthetic occurrences organized into self-justifying identitarian discourses became essential for the emergence of colonialism and played a fundamental role in the building of much-needed public support for its expansion. Even works such as *The Death of Sardanapalus* were subsequently revalorized through the labels of "masterpiece" and contemporary opposition to the work explained as reaction to genius-inevitably-misunderstood.

Both Orientalism and Colonialism are mechanisms for preserving identity and its space of nonviolence. That they should have subsequently influenced each other and worked together toward the same objectives is not really

surprising. The period between 1815 and 1830 is one when they had not yet fully coordinated their efforts. Structurally similar to each other, they were not yet completely aware of their mutual potentials. Given this relative independence, the similarity of their strategy in recreating unity through violence is striking and points to a universal of human behavior: varied exteriorizations of violence as a condition of identity.

## NOTES

1. Due to this economic discrimination, only 14,548 Frenchmen had a right to vote. Jean Meyer, Jean Tarrade, Annie Rey-Goldeiguer, and Jacques Thobie. *Histoire de la France coloniale; des origines à 1914* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), 321–22.
2. “Plus royalistes que le roi” as the French expression goes.
3. Laurent Louessard, *La révolution de Juillet 1830* (Paris: Spartacus, 1990), 24.
4. Arnold Hauser, *The Social History of Art: Rococo, Classicism and Romanticism*, introduction by Jonathan Harris (New York: Routledge, 1999), 177.
5. Thomas E. Crow, *Painters and Public Life in Eighteenth Century Paris* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 2.
6. Hauser, *The Social History of Art*. 148.
7. Patricia Mainardi, *The End of the Salon: Art and the State in the Early Third Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 17.
8. Mainardi, *The End of the Salon*, 20–21.
9. Mainardi, *The End of the Salon*, 31–32.
10. Thomas E. Crow, *Painters and Public Life In Eighteenth Century Paris*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 4.
11. Mathieu-François Pidansat de Mairobert, “*L’Observateur Anglais*, Amsterdam, 1778–79, in *Painters And Public Life In Eighteenth Century Paris*,” ed. Thomas E. Crow (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 4.
12. Mairobert, *L’Observateur Anglais*, 10.
13. Grimaldo Grigsby Darcy, “Whose Colour Was not Black nor White nor Grey, but an Extraneous Mixture, which no Pen Can Trace, Although Perhaps the Pencil May”: Aspasia and Delacroix’ *Massacre of Chios*,” *Art History* 22, no. 5 (December 1999): 678–79.
14. Eugène Delacroix, *The Massacre of Chios*, 1824, 417 by 354 cm, oil on canvas, Le Musée du Louvre.
15. Hauser, *The Social History of Art*, 144–45.
16. This sale occurred after Géricault’s death in 1824.
17. In Elisabeth A. Fraser, “Uncivil Alliances: Delacroix, the Private Collector, and the Public,” *Oxford Art Journal* 21, no. 1 (1998): 102.

18. Elisabeth A. Fraser, "Uncivil Alliances," 102–103.
19. Delacroix, *Journal, 1822–1863*, introduction by Damish, Hubert, Labourdette, Régis (eds.) (Paris: Plon, 1980), 39.
20. René Hyughe, *Delacroix ou le combat solitaire* (Paris: Édition Laffont, 1990), 83.
21. For a list of other criticisms of that painting see Darcy, "Whose Colour. . ." 696–97.
22. Hyughe, *Delacroix ou le combat solitaire*, 84.
23. Andrew Carrington Shelton, "Ingres Versus Delacroix," *Art History* 23, no. 5 (December 2000), 731.
24. Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres, *Oedipus and the Sphinx*. 1808, oil on canvas, 144 by 189 cm, Musée du Louvre.
25. Theodore Géricault, *The Raft of the Medusa*, 1819, oil on canvas, 491 by 716 cm, Musée du Louvre.
26. Francisco de Goya, *Saturn Devouring One of his Children*, 1819–23, oil on canvas, 146 by 83 cm, Museo del Prado.
27. Jean Auguste Dominique, *La Grande Odalisque*, 1814, oil on canvas, 88.9 by 162.56 cm, Musée du Louvre.
28. "Ingres and Delacroix," *New York Times*, June 17, 1883.
29. Antoine-Jean Gros, *Napoléon visitant les péstiférés de Jaffa*, 1804, oil on canvas, 532 by 720 cm, Le Louvre, Paris.
30. *The Giaour* in 1820 and *The Bride of Abydos* in 1823.
31. Maurice Sérullaz, *Delacroix* (Paris: Fayard, 1989), 94.
32. Hyughe, *Delacroix ou le combat solitaire*, 77.
33. F. Orton and G. Pollock, "Les Données Bretonnantes, la Prairie de la Représentation," *Art History* 3, no. 3 (September 1980), 319.
34. Claude D'Anthena, "Delacroix sur la piste marocaine," *Beaux-Arts Magazine* no. 127 (October 1994), 96.
35. Delacroix, *Journal, 1822–1863*, 37.
36. « Je n'ose prévoir qu'avec déchirement l'avenir qui l'attend ; quelle triste chose de ne pouvoir avouer sa compagne en présence des gens bien nés, ou d'être réduit à se faire de ce malheur même une arme à braver ce qu'il arrive à nommer des préjugés. » Delacroix, *Journal, 1822–1863*, 25 (translation by the author).
37. Delacroix, *Journal, 1822–1863*, 37.
38. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, Pantheon Books), 1978.
39. Edouard Manet, *Olympia*, 1863, oil on canvas, 130.5 by 190 cm, Musée d'Orsay.
40. Jean Auguste Dominique, *Turkish Bath*, 1863, oil on canvas, 108 by 110 cm, Musée du Louvre.
41. Thierry Hentsch, *L'Orient imaginaire* (Paris: Édition de Minuit, 1988).

42. This story is probably a fable. The real Sardanapalus is usually identified with Assurbanipal, the seventh-century Assyrian king who had none of the characteristics described by Ctesius. In fact, he was a ruthless conqueror who ruled Assyria for 40 years, defeated several kings, and destroyed Babylon after it revolted and slaughtered many of its inhabitants.
43. Linda Nochlin, *The Imaginary Orient, The Politics of Vision: Essay on Nineteenth-Century Art and Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), 42.
44. René Girard, Jean-Michel Oughourlian, and Guy Lefort, *Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde* (Paris: Grasset, 1978), 69–70.
45. Girard, Oughourlian, and Lefort, *Des choses cachées*, 70.
46. Frederick, N. Bohrer, “Inventing Assyria: Exotism and Reception in Nineteenth Century England and France,” *Art Bulletin* 8, no. 2 (June 1998), 340.
47. Nicolas Poussin, *The Massacre of the Innocents*, oil on canvas, 147 by 171 cm, Musée Condé.
48. Jacques-Louis David. *The Intervention of the Sabine Women*. 1799, oil on canvas. 385 by 522 cm, Musée du Louvre.
49. Jean-Léon Gérôme, *The Snake Charmer*, c. 1870, oil on canvas, 83.8 by 122.1 cm, Clark Art Institute.
50. « Enfin, Sire, j'ajouterais qu'il est en général désirable que ces événements qui donnent de nouvelles forces aux gouvernements et présentent à l'esprit des peuples un aliment parfois salutaire, coïncident avec les temps de fermentation politique. Or l'expédition d'Alger, si votre Majesté l'entreprend aujourd'hui, sera terminée à une époque où le Roi peut trouver convenable d'user de sa prérogative pour renouveler la chambre des députés. » Marquis de Clermont Tonnerre. *Rapport de Clermont Tonnerre*, in *Le Vérité sur l'expédition d'Alger*, ed. Amar Hamdani (Tours: Balland, 1985), 83 (translation by the author). The idea that the war of Algiers was a way of diverting attention from internal political problems seems to be a point of consensus among historians and is one of Hamdani's central points. See, for example, Jean-François Guilhaum's analysis of historical writings on Algeria, in *Les mythes fondateurs de l'Algérie française* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992). Frederick Quinn, *The French Overseas Empire*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 121; Pierre Montagnon, *La conquête de l'Algérie, les germes de la discorde, 1830–1871* (Paris: Pygmalion, 1986), 66–67; José Cabanis, *Charles X, roi ultra* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), 420; and very numerous others. Even during 1830, the Liberal opposition understood Clermont-Tonnerre's tactic quite well. This common idea leads to Girard's theory of why collective violence successfully diverts attention from internal problems.
51. « Le rivage qui a été sanctifié par la mort de saint Louis, délivré et sous le règne et par l'action de Charles X, de la piraterie et du régime barbare qui le rendaient l'horreur et le fléau de la méditerranée ( . . . ) », in Hamdani, *Le Vérité sur l'expédition d'Alger*, 100 (translation by the author).
52. « Je ne puis laisser plus longtemps impunie l'insulte faite à mon pavillon ; la réparation éclatante que je veux obtenir en satisfaisant l'honneur de la France, tournera avec l'aide du Tout-Puissant au profit de la Chrétienté. » *Speech of the Throne*, March 2, 1830, in Hamdani, *Le Vérité sur l'expédition d'Alger*, 108 (translation by the author).

53. « Dans ces circonstances, on songea à la conquête d'Alger, pensant qu'une expédition si importante détournerait l'attention du public et rendrait aux amis du trône force et union ». Baron de Damas, *Mémoires*, vol. II, 172–73, in Hamdani, *Le Vérité sur l'expédition d'Alger*, 108 (translation by the author).

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