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Small war parties of mobile and seemingly invisible warriors filtered silently south through the Green Mountains, waited patiently until the time was right, then struck without warning, and retreated before defense could be organized or pursuit mounted.

Gray Lock's War

By COLIN G. CALLOWAY

The border skirmishes that occurred in and around Vermont in the years 1722-1727 have received little attention. Dwarfed by the great struggles between England and France (Queen Anne's War, 1702-1713, and King George's War, 1744-1748), this conflict has been known variously as Lovewell's War, Father Rasle's War, and Dummer's War; however, the Vermont and western phase of the fighting should be known as Gray Lock's War, after the warrior chief who dictated its pace and character. Gray Lock's War took place at a time of formal peace between England and France, and Gray Lock's followers operated independently of French allies and neighboring tribes. They fought for their own reasons, waged their own style of guerilla warfare, and held out for peace on their terms, which should dispel the notion that the Indian warriors were merely tools of the French. The war also illustrated the complexities of Indian-white conflict. Colonial governments and Indian tribes not directly involved in the war pursued diplomatic roles while evading actual conflict; warriors from the north raided English settlements, while other Indians served as scouts and emissaries for the English, and even participated in the garrisoning of frontier outposts.

The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought the fighting in America to a close, but did not resolve fundamental issues of Anglo-Abenaki conflict. Population growth in the English colonies in the following years pushed the frontier steadily eastward along the coast of Maine, northward up the Connecticut Valley and westward into the Berkshires and northwestern Connecticut. The Indians became alarmed by the advance of the pioneer farmers and the building of English forts and outraged by the sharp practices of frontier traders. The Anglo-Abenaki conferences of 1717 and 1719 did little to reassure them.¹ After years of increasing tension and hostility, Governor Shute of Massachusetts declared war on the Maine Abenaki

in 1722, proclaiming “the said *Eastern Indians*, with their Confederates, to be Robbers, Traitors and Enemies to his Majesty King George.”² The Indians, of course, saw things from a different perspective; in their eyes the war was the inevitable result of repeated English breaches of faith and sustained encroachment of their lands.³

This war never developed into a full-scale conflict involving the English colonies, the French, and their respective Indian allies. Massachusetts and New Hampshire fought the war and, although New York and other colonies sympathized with their neighbors’ plight, they remained on the sidelines. Lack of unity dogged the English colonial war effort for years and gave encouragement to the Indians.⁴ While the French shared the Abenaki view of the war and recognized that their support was crucial to the future of Franco-Abenaki relations, they were determined not to get involved in the actual fighting. Acting on direct instructions from Louis XV, Governor Vaudreuil of Quebec secretly encouraged the Abenaki war effort, prompted other tribes to support them, and helped keep the Iroquois neutral, all the time reminding the Indians “that the design of the English is to make themselves masters of the entire continent.”⁵

The tribes of the Iroquois confederacy, who still held the balance of power in the northeast, also refused to become entangled in the war. Every colonial government employed Indian auxiliaries at one time or another, and recruitment of local Indians offered a solution both to pressing manpower problems and the difficulties of waging war in the forests. The New England colonies persistently tried to enlist the Iroquois in their confrontation with the elusive northern bands who proved less vulnerable to the search and destroy tactics that had served the colonists well in southern New England. Commissioners from Massachusetts met with the Iroquois in Albany in May 1723, and reminded them that their delegates to Boston had promised to endeavor “to prevent the Merrimack and Meseeskeek Ind^{ns} Confederating or Acting with the Eastern Ind^{ns} against us.” The commissioners clearly wanted the Iroquois to use their influence to “call off” the Pennacook and Missisquoi warriors located on the Merrimack River and on the northern parts of Lake Champlain. The Massachusetts government offered presents, arms, and ammunition, as well as substantial scalp bounties “for the further Encouragement of your Warlike people,” — one hundred pounds in New England currency for the scalps of males aged twelve and over, fifty pounds for all others. The Iroquois were in contact with Indians on Lake Champlain and sent emissaries northward to express displeasure that they had taken up the hatchet against the people of New England and to urge them in turn to dissuade the eastern tribes from waging war. They offered to act as mediators in the conflict but the commissioners had no instructions as to how to respond to such an offer; it was, they said, “forraign to our

Business.” Massachusetts wanted war and wanted the Iroquois to serve as scalp-hunting auxiliaries. But the Iroquois refused to be bought. Like the Albany government, they would mediate in negotiations but they were not prepared to be drawn into a war that was not of their making and not in their interests.⁶

The leader of the Missisquoi Indians at the northern end of Lake Champlain, Chief Gray Lock, became Massachusetts’ arch enemy in the western theater of the war. The chief was apparently a Woronoco Indian from the Westfield River in Massachusetts. Massachusetts historian George Sheldon described him as “a chieftain of one of the Pocumtuck confederate clans” and a refugee from King Philip’s War. In the great dispersal of New England tribes that the war produced, Gray Lock probably relocated first to the Indian village at Schaghticoke on the Hudson River and then to Missisquoi. During Queen Anne’s War he was known as a “French Indian” who led small war parties against the settlements on the Connecticut River, and in 1712 he apparently led one of the last raids of the war against the town of Northampton.⁷ By 1723, Gray Lock had attracted a following of refugee warriors, including discontented Schaghticoques, who were determined to resist English expansion. The warriors frequently operated from Otter Creek but Gray Lock established his “headquarters” on a small creek some distance from the main village and fields at Missisquoi. Gray Lock’s separate encampment thus seems to have been a community of warriors, which drew on the main village for manpower.⁸

In the years that followed, Gray Lock left his hideaway time and again to strike his enemies in the south, “and Massachusetts levies, which had done so well in the past against King Philip and the eastern Indians, were quite unable to cope with him.” He harried the frontier, depleting Massachusetts’ resources, tying up its manpower, and eroding the morale of its citizens. Small war parties of mobile and seemingly invisible warriors filtered silently south through the Green Mountains, waited patiently until the time was right, then struck without warning, and retreated before defense could be organized or pursuit mounted. Gray Lock acquired the name Wawanolewat, meaning, “he who fools the others or puts someone off the track,” and the ease with which he eluded pursuit frustrated and demoralized his enemies. During the war Missisquoi became “a truly legendary place” in the eyes of Gray Lock’s enemies. As the major fortified village for the Lake Champlain Abenaki, it was the target for English expeditions, which sought to cripple the enemy by destroying its home base. This strategy had succeeded in the past and would succeed in the future, but Gray Lock and Missisquoi remained elusive.⁹

Early in the spring of 1723, Lieutenant Governor Dummer of Massachusetts, with the military commanders of Hampshire County, at-

tempted to conciliate Gray Lock and other chiefs living near Lake Champlain. Employing Col. Johannes Schuyler of Albany as an intermediary, Dummer sent gifts, including a wampum belt and the offer of favorable trade terms to Gray Lock, but the chief could not be reached and in the following months he made his first raids on the northern settlements, keeping the small garrison at Northfield on almost constant alert. On August 13, Gray Lock and four warriors killed two citizens near Northfield. The next day they attacked Joseph Stevens and his four sons as they were haymaking in a meadow near Rutland (Massachusetts). Stevens, Sr., escaped but two of the boys were killed and the other two captured. The Indians killed another man, a Rev. Joseph Willard, and then hurried north. Gray Lock gave the younger of his captives, Isaac Stevens, to the Caughnawaga Indians, thereby tying them to his interest; the other prisoner, Phineas Stevens, was later redeemed and in King George's War became a hero as the captain in command at the siege of Fort No. 4. When news of Gray Lock's activities reached Boston, Lieutenant Governor Dummer issued orders to Col. Samuel Partridge to impress eighteen able-bodied and well-armed men to serve as scouts at Northfield, Brookfield, Deerfield, and Sunderland.¹⁰

In September, Gray Lock continued the offensive. Initial successes had boosted his following and it is possible that warriors from Caughnawaga had joined him. At 5 P.M. on the evening of September 8, the Albany commissioners sent a dispatch to Massachusetts with


the Surprising news that fifty Indians from Canada were about 8 days ago in the Lake at the Otter Creek with a design to fall on Some of your settlement we think it our Duty to acquaint you with this Intelligence without any Loss of Time, hoping that you may be on your Guard at the frontiers [sic] to frustrate the Barbarous and Bloody Designs of these Inhumane Brutes whose mercy is nothing but Cruelty we shall be glad to hear that this Indian War may soon cease that Christians may not be murdered and fall as a prey to those Savages.¹¹

While the governor put troops on alert throughout the Connecticut Valley, Gray Lock bided his time and then, on the morning of October 9, struck two small forts near Northfield, inflicting a number of casualties and carrying off one captive. Hopes that a force of Indian auxiliaries might intercept the raiders at Otter Creek proved empty: Gray Lock had fled long before this force was dispatched.¹² The raid sparked a series of defensive measures. Colonel Partridge ordered Captain Dewey to move his troops to Deerfield and send half his force to Northfield, and Lieutenant Governor Dummer sent a request for help to Connecticut. In November, Joseph Kellogg was granted a captain's commission with orders to raise a company of soldiers, forty of whom were to be stationed at Northfield, the rest to scout the Connecticut River.¹³

In December 1723, Benjamin Wright submitted a request to assemble a command of thirty-five to forty men “to go on the back of this army which came to Northfield as far as Otter Creek, and thence round to White river, and so home by Conn. river,” but nothing seems to have come of the proposal.¹⁴ Two days after Christmas, the Massachusetts legislature voted to build a blockhouse above Northfield “and to post in it 40 able men, English and Western Indians, to be employed in scouting a good distance up Connecticut River, West River, Otter Creek, and sometimes eastwardly above Great Monadnock for the discovery of the enemy coming toward any frontier towns.” The blockhouse was constructed near Brattleboro and named Fort Dummer. The carpenters from Northfield who worked on the fort earned five shillings a day, except for one Stephen Crowfoot who was paid six, “and they all allow that he earned his money by doing so much more work than others.” Efforts to enlist the Maquas or Mohawks as soldiers for the fort’s defense proved largely fruitless, but the original muster roll of 1724 showed that of the fifty-five men who garrisoned the fort under Capt. Timothy Dwight, a dozen were Indians. Some were Mohawks, others, probably Mahicans, came from the Hudson River; and another was from Schaghticoke.¹⁵

Gray Lock’s War developed into a struggle between two fortresses at opposite ends of Vermont. In the north, Missisquoi and Otter Creek served as bases for Indian forays against the English settlements. In the south, Fort Dummer protected the settlements. The English found that the only means of defense against skilled and mobile enemies was to take the offensive and adopt a strategy of scouting out and destroying Indian villages and crops; Fort Dummer became the major base of operations for scouting and punitive expeditions into the Indian country. However, this strategy proved inadequate, especially since the colonial war effort remained plagued by disunity. The best Captain Dwight could do was to try and intercept the enemy and he dispatched scouting parties “up ye West River Mountain and there to Lodge on ye top and view Evening and Morning for smoak, and from thence up to ye mountain at ye Great Falls [Fall Mountain, across the river from Bellows Falls] and there also to Lodge on ye top and view morning and evening for smoaks.”¹⁶

In June 1724, Gray Lock and eleven warriors headed south; two other war parties of thirty and forty Indians followed within a few days of each other. On the twelfth the authorities in Albany informed the Massachusetts frontier that they had received word that “a party of seven Caughnawaga Ind^{ns} were 13 days hence at the Otter Creek in the Lake w^t an Intent to go Skulking to N England,” and were out with several parties of eastern Indians.¹⁷ On the eighteenth Gray Lock attacked a party of men working in a meadow near Hatfield. A hastily organized party of seventeen



A reproduction of an original drawing made of Fort Dummer in 1749. On the right is the Connecticut River, upon which the fort was cornered.

men from the town pursued the raiders as far as Otter Creek, but returned empty-handed and emaciated. Indeed rather than flee northward, Gray Lock retired a short distance to the west and from there spent the summer prowling around the settlements, killing men at Deerfield, Northfield, and Westfield. A company of men under Capt. Thomas Wells went up the Connecticut River to search for the raiders but, finding no trace of them, headed back to Deerfield. A few miles from home, three of the men, "Supposing themselves out of Danger," rode ahead of the main body and fell into an ambush near a swamp. Their companions arrived in time to see the Indians lift the scalps of their victims. After a

brief skirmish, the Indians fled into the swamp. The English “trackt them a considerable way by the Blood of the wounded” but, though they believed they had killed two of the raiders and maimed a third, the men from Deerfield saw no more of the enemy.¹⁸

The Abenaki War was taking its toll of Massachusetts. In July 1724, Lieutenant Governor Dummer wrote to Governor Saltonstall of Connecticut to renew his request for military assistance on the western frontiers:

The Season of the Year being now come on when the Indians suppose they can make their attacks with the greatest advantage to them & the most disadvantage to us, & there being advices from abroad that there is not now an Indian Man to be seen in such places as they use to frequent gives us strong grounds to conclude they are preparing to make a Violent effort on some place or other.

Connecticut had not declared war on the Indians but, Dummer reminded Saltonstall, they were subjects of the same king and needed to defend themselves, “especially inasmuch as our Western Towns are the immediate Barrier & Cover to yours & that if ours should be broken up or drawn off, yours would be exposed to the Fury & Ravages of the Enemy in the same manner as ours now are.” The reinforcements that Dummer had sent to the town garrisons were insufficient “to give the Enemy a warm Repulse” and he requested one hundred men from Connecticut be posted at Northfield, Deerfield, and Westfield until the danger had passed. He asked in particular that some of the men be “trusty Indians” familiar with the woods. Connecticut had two hundred men ready to march but Dummer knew from experience that that kind of strategy was worthless, “for you are sensible that the Indians alwaies make a Sudden onset & then retire forthwith so that if your forces remain as they now are before they can be got together & march to the places attackt the enemy will probably be got out of reach & so it will be too late to follow them.” This time, Saltonstall sent 105 men and 42 Mohegan Indian scouts. Some scouts wore emblems to ensure that they could be distinguished from the enemy.¹⁹

Despite reinforcements from Connecticut that summer, the settlers lived in fear, knowing that the enemy was “lurking about, waiting to shed blood.” Men worked the harvest in groups of thirty or forty, accompanied by armed guards. In July Dummer appointed Edmund Goffe commander of the western frontiers with orders for “Guarding the Inhabitants in their Husbandry & Scouting on the Borders of the sevl Towns in order to Discover & Repel any approaching Enemy.” Goffe was to send scouting parties into the countryside between the Merrimack and the Connecticut to engage any war parties they encountered, “always having a Regard that the Several Towns be left with a Sufficient Number for their Protection.”²⁰ The colonists were hard pressed — on both the defensive and the offensive against an enemy who seemed capable of striking at will.

Gray Lock, meanwhile, continued to attract recruits. Indians from Schaghticoke and adjoining areas moved north to Missisquoi where, according to the Albany commissioners, they fell under the influence of "some base Indians" who turned them against the people of New England. The defection of the Schaghticokes was particularly worrying because those Indians knew the valley and the disposition of the settlements so well "that they would be able to take great advantage against our people." The commissioners dispatched Indian emissaries with a wampum belt to invite the deserters to return to Schaghticoke where they could be kept under observation and away from the frontiers.²¹

In August, the colonists inflicted a telling defeat on the eastern Abenakis when they destroyed the village of Norridgewock and killed the influential French priest, Father Sebastian Rasle, who lived among the Indians and encouraged the Abenaki war effort. But the western frontiers enjoyed no respite. Lieutenant Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire reported that, despite the victory at Norridgewock, the Indian war was causing heavy losses in his province. Ten percent of the population were constantly on guard duty and, despite every precaution, someone was killed or taken captive every week. Writing to the Massachusetts agents in London, Captain Kellogg of Northfield reported that Governor Vaudreuil had drawn distant western tribes into the Indian confederacy and that the colony's western frontier had suffered almost continual annoyance, "and although we have had great advantage over ye eastern Indians by such a slaughter of them at Norridgewock as has not been known in any of ye late wars, yet by this junction of the western tribes the enemy is become more formidable than before." The demands of the war had impoverished the whole province and many inhabitants sought refuge in neighboring colonies which, with the exception of New Hampshire and Connecticut, "being in perfect peace and prosperity themselves sit still and see us languishing under all the calamities of war without affording us the succor of either men or money," while the Iroquois continued to find pretenses for not entering the war. The day after Kellogg penned his report, Fort Dummer fended off an attack by a large Indian war party.²²

Early in November, Gray Lock retired to Missisquoi. No longer preoccupied with guarding farmers, Kellogg was able to send his scouting parties farther afield, up to Mount Monadnock and deeper into southern Vermont. But the respite was temporary and the governor ordered every town to ready snowshoe companies to meet renewed threats in January and February when the Indians would be able to raid on snowshoes.²³

The victory at Norridgewock reminded the colonists of what could be accomplished if they struck the Indians at their home base, and Capt. John Lovewell's ambush of an Indian war party east of Lake Win-

nipesaukee in the winter and his Pyrrhic victory over the Pigwackets in the spring of 1725 gave further hope for success if the Indians could be pinned down in battle. As 1725 opened, a number of military expeditions were proposed against the Indian villages, including Gray Lock's fort. However, Massachusetts and New Hampshire had sent a three-man diplomatic mission to Montreal to negotiate for the return of captives, and Col. John Stoddard feared that any such operations would jeopardize the chances of that mission:

if our people had gone to Gray Lock's fort . . . and had made spoil upon the Indians, those that escaped would in their rage mediate revenge upon our commissioners, either in going to or returning from Canada.²⁴

Accordingly, a series of expeditions ventured north in search of Gray Lock after the commissioners had safely returned. In March, setting out on snowshoes, Capt. Thomas Wells led a party of men from Deerfield, Hatfield, and Northampton on what proved to be an abortive mission. After about a month in the wilderness the expedition ended in tragedy: returning home down the Connecticut, three men drowned when their canoe capsized at the falls just below the mouth of Miller's River. As soon as Wells withdrew, Gray Lock's warriors left their winter quarters and traveled south to harry the settlements.²⁵

Captain Benjamin Wright succeeded in recruiting a company of fifty-nine men, and on July 27 left Northfield determined to carry the war to Missisquoi. They mended their canoes at Fort Dummer, carried them around the Great Falls at Bellows Falls, and were at the White River by August 2. From there they journeyed upriver to Cowass and the mouth of the Wells River and, following the path of Indian raiding parties, headed west by northwest through "very bad woods." Delayed by rain and with virtually all provisions gone, the party got no further than the Winooski River. The prospect of further hard traveling to the northern end of Lake Champlain proved daunting and, on August 23, the men turned for home without seeing an enemy. Two days later, as they approached the mouth of the Wells River, they saw three Indians in the distance but mistook them for their own Indian scouts who had gone hunting that morning. By the time they realized their mistake, the enemy had slipped back into the woods. Wright made it back to Northfield at the end of the month, his retreat observed. Late in August, Gray Lock and some 150 warriors left Missisquoi to monitor Wright's movements and to harass the Connecticut River towns.²⁶

Again, the authorities in Albany tried to keep the Massachusetts frontier alerted to dangers even while they refrained from taking an active role in the war. On September 6, Albany sent a message warning Massachusetts "of the Barbarous & Bloody designs of the Indians whom

as we are Credibly Informed this day are with 150 men about three weeks Since on their March towards your fronteers, and probably are yet Skulking or hovering abt to comitt barbarities. . . .” Another body of 140 Indians, who were reported at Chambly, apparently dispersed to their homes; and, a few days later, Albany noted that the 150-strong war party seemed to have moved to the east. Nevertheless, “we are told that one party of nine and another of 14 Indians are out w/ th design to be Skulking about your Western fronteers, of the last gray Lock is Leader.”²⁷ Gray Lock’s growing reputation had increased his ability to attract warriors for his raids and he was no doubt drawing recruits from Caughnawaga and the Abenaki village at St. Francis on the St. Lawrence as well as from the Lake Champlain region. But he wisely adhered to his guerilla tactics, harrying the frontier in mobile raiding parties of ten or a dozen warriors who were able to use the terrain to their advantage, rather than presenting the colonists with an Indian “army” that they could confront in pitched battle. He kept the frontier on edge for yet another summer.

In September, Captain Dwight sent a scouting party of six men out from Fort Dummer. They saw no sign of the enemy and headed for home; again Gray Lock was watching and caught them off guard. His party of fourteen Indians ambushed them just west of the North River, killing two and wounding and capturing three others. The only man to escape said he had seen two Indians fall in the fighting.²⁸

The next month, however, English morale received a boost when Governor Vaudreuil died. The colonists took heart in the belief that the Abenaki war effort would diminish without the guiding hand of the French governor. Reports from Albany and from the Penobscots indicated that the Abenaki were also tiring of the war. In December 1725, the eastern Indians, the Penobscots, made peace at Boston, and the agreement was ratified at Falmouth the following August. From then on the Penobscots urged the other bands to do the same. But Gray Lock did not attend the peace negotiations and the western Abenaki were not bound by the treaty; in the spring of 1726 the intransigent chief was reportedly assembling yet another war party on Otter Creek.²⁹ Lieutenant Governor Dummer reported to the Lords of Trade in England that the war continued to be so expensive “that Unless it shall please God to put a speedy End to it, it will inevitably ruine us. . . .”³⁰

In the fall of 1726 instructions were sent to the commissioners at Albany to try and encourage Gray Lock to come in and parley by sending him presents and messages of good faith.³¹ But nothing came of these efforts. The New York authorities could only try to stem the steady trickle of Indians who left Schaghticoke and the Hudson and headed north, some no doubt to Gray Lock’s community at Missisquoi.³²

As hostilities abated, the frontier communities in the Connecticut Valley

began to relax. The military company at Northfield was dismissed in the fall of 1726 and, during the winter, Dwight's company at Fort Dummer was discharged. Captain Kellogg was ordered to recruit a small company for garrison duty at the fort, where he remained in command until 1740.³³ In January 1727, the Albany authorities sent Gray Lock's brother, Malalemet, to invite the war chief to come to Albany and negotiate. Malalemet, however, reported that his brother could not be found.³⁴ In March, Dummer asked the Penobscots to try and bring the Vermont Abenakis to the peace table. Writing to the Penobscot sachem, Wenungennet, Dummer called upon his "good friend" to render the help he had promised at the 1726 Falmouth treaty. Informing Wenungennet "That an Indian call'd Grey Lock has enticed a Party of Indians about Otter Creek & that they are preparing to come upon our Frontiers with mischievous Designs," Dummer urged the Penobscot to inquire into the matter and "take effectual Care to prevent these Indians from Acting their Ill Purposes & to oblige them to come in & ratify the Treaty as you have done."³⁵

Dummer believed that the best way to prevent Gray Lock from carrying out his planned raids was "to draw him by good Usage," and he instructed Cols. John Stoddard and Samuel Partridge "to get some private Intimations to him" that would encourage the war chief to come in and ratify the treaty. The chief was to be guaranteed safe conduct, and any northern Indians who came in were to receive gifts.³⁶ Partridge forwarded Dummer's instructions to the commissioners at Albany, adding his own request that the commissioners send Indian emissaries to invite Gray Lock and other warring chiefs to negotiate. In addition, the Norridgewock and other eastern tribes promised to do their best "to Flatter or Force Any Ill Minded Indians In or about Canada to Joyne with ym in ye Ratification of Peace."³⁷

The Albany commissioners were ready to do all they could to mediate a peace, although they feared the French would do everything *they* could to prevent it. The commissioners had already sent a wampum belt to St. Francis and they said they would send a message to Gray Lock as soon as the opportunity arose, although they did not have an appropriate wampum belt. The message would be sent in their name so that the Indians would not think it came from Massachusetts. New York would guarantee the Indians safe conduct and good treatment, but the commissioners doubted whether Gray Lock could be persuaded to come to Massachusetts, "for ye Latter has done Much Mischief on ye fronteers & has doubtless a Guilty Conscience."³⁸

Whether or not the message ever reached Gray Lock, there was some confusion between Massachusetts and New Hampshire as to the policy to pursue with regard to the chief. In April, Secretary Samuel Willard

wrote to inform the Albany commissioners that Colonel Partridge had mistaken the lieutenant governor's orders and that there never was any intention of sending a message to Gray Lock and the other Indians, "But the good People of the County of Hampshire being more apprehensive perhaps than was Needfull of the bad faith of Greylock they had direction privately to discourse & notifie Him to Come to them to confirme them in his good intents."³⁹

The war was gradually dying out. The French had accurately predicted the way the conflict would go, recognizing that, unless they assisted the Indians, "the Abenakis, tired of the War, will abandon their country, or what is more probable, will, without quitting it, make the best terms they can with the English."⁴⁰ The English attributed the reluctance of the Indian hold-outs to inherent stubbornness and insolence, fueled by French influence.⁴¹ The intransigents from St. Francis and elsewhere were also under pressure to make peace from their eastern Abenaki relatives, who lived closer to the English and who complained that raids by the Canadian warriors exposed all Abenakis to "la boucherie des Anglois." The Canadian Abenakis finally joined the Penobscots in making peace with Massachusetts in July 1727, but neither Gray Lock nor any of his warriors participated.⁴²

Gray Lock remained as shadowy a figure at the end of the war as he had been at the beginning. In April 1727, the Penobscot sachem, Wenungennet, replying to Dummer's inquiry, said: "as to what you mention to me Concerning Gray Lock I nor my old men haue no knowledg of him for we ar not aquainted wth ye Olbeni Indians . . ."⁴³ In the years of peace that followed, the warrior chief of Missisquoi disappeared from view. In 1744, several Schaghticoke Indians returned from a journey to the north where they saw "Gray Lock a Massesqueek Sachem."⁴⁴ Gray Lock had a daughter in 1737 and a son in 1740, and the chief and his wife were both apparently baptized, appearing in the records of Fort St. Frédéric as Pierre Jean, "dit La Tête Blanche," and Hélène. It is thought that Gray Lock died sometime between 1744 and 1753, but the exact circumstances and date of his death, like the place of his burial, are unknown. The descendants of Gray Lock's enemies paid belated tribute to the elusive warrior chief by giving his name to the highest peak in the Berkshire Mountains.⁴⁵

Traditional New England histories that attribute the local Indian wars to French intrigue ignore the reality and complexity of interethnic conflict in colonial North America. Gray Lock maintained connections with the French and with the eastern Abenaki tribes, but, while the French remained neutral and the eastern bands came to terms with the English, Gray Lock carried on his own war, raiding the frontier settlements of Massachusetts and New Hampshire while avoiding hostilities against New

York. While other Indians pursued their own strategies of survival by acting as scouts, emissaries, or auxiliaries, Gray Lock diplomatically avoided giving any offense to the Iroquois that might prompt this powerful confederacy to abandon its neutrality. Gray Lock's reputation grew and with it his ability to assemble powerful war parties, but he never abandoned his successful strategy of draining the colonists' resources by incessant guerilla warfare and the threat of lightning raids. Employing the Green Mountain forests to his advantage, he successfully eluded reprisals, and often turned to inflict further damage on pursuers who struggled to fight back in Indian country. While other Indian strongholds succumbed to English search and destroy missions, Gray Lock's base of operations remained undetected. If Gray Lock did not win his war, neither did he lose it; he remained defiant and undefeated as the Connecticut Valley lapsed gratefully into long years of peace. His war was little more than a holding action to stem the tide of settlement on Indian lands, but when fighting broke out again in 1744 in Gray Lock's twilight years, Missisquoi and Otter Creek served the same function as they had earlier: supplying warriors for raids on the frontier settlements of northern New England.⁴⁶ Long after the struggle for the Champlain Valley was over, the Missisquoi Indian community survived quietly behind the frontier, proving as elusive in peacetime as it had in Gray Lock's War.⁴⁷

NOTES

¹ Douglas Edward Leach, *The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763* (Reprint, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), 131-36; Frederic Kidder, "The Abenaki Indians; Their Treaties of 1713 & 1717, and a vocabulary: with a Historical Introduction," *Collections of the Maine Historical Society* 4 (1859): 229-63.

² Governor Samuel Shute's proclamation, Boston, July 25, 1722, in *Penhallow's Indian Wars* (Boston, 1726; facs. reprint, ed. Edward Wheelock, Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries, 1971), 88-91; Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 165-85.

³ Eastern Indians' Letter to the Governour, July 27, 1721, *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2d ser., 8 (1826): 259-63; Parolle Des Abenakis au Roy (1721), Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa [hereafter PAC], France: Archives des Colonies, Collection Moreau Saint-Mery, MG1, F3, vol. 2 (2): 499-500; Parole de toute la nation Abnaquis et de toutes les autres nation sauvage . . . au sujet da la terre des Abnaquis dont les Anglois s'emparent depuis la paix (1721), PAC, MG1, F3, vol. 2 (2): 502-07; Conseil: M. de Vaudreuil et Begon, Oct. 17, 1722, PAC, France: Archives des Colonies, Correspondence générale, MG1, C¹¹A, vol. 124: 284; Vaudreuil et Begon to Louis XV, Oct. 8, 1721, Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, 1853-1887) [hereafter *NYCD*], vol. 9: 903-06; Letter from Vaudreuil, Oct. 28, 1723, James Phinney Baxter, ed., *Documentary History of the State of Maine containing the Baxter Manuscripts*, *Collections of the Maine Historical Society*, 2d ser. (Portland, 1896-1916) [hereafter *Baxter MSS.*], 23: 158-59; Extrait d'une lettre par M. Begon, Apr. 21, 1725 au sujet de la guerre des Abenakis avec les Anglois, PAC, MGI, Serie C¹¹A, vol. 47: 208.

⁴ Marcus A. McCorison, "Colonial Defense of the Upper Connecticut Valley," *Vermont History*, 30 (Jan. 1962): 50-62.

⁵ Conseil: M. de Vaudreuil et Begon, 8 August 1721, PAC, MG1, C¹¹A, vol. 43: 266-34; Le ministre à Vaudreuil et Begon à propos de la guerre des Abenakis, Oct. 14, 1725, PAC, MG1, C¹¹A, vol. 45: 5-6; Deliberations du Conseil de Marine, Oct. 28, 1722, PAC, MGI, C¹¹A, vol. 12: 233-34; Louis XV to Vaudreuil et Begon, May 30, 1724, *NYCD*, vol. 9: 936.

⁶ Richard R. Johnson, "The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England," *Journal of American History*, 64 (1977): 623-651; Propositions made by the commissioners of Massachusetts Bay to the Sachems of the five Nations, May 28-June 5, 1723, PAC, Indian Affairs, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 17a-42a, esp. 23a, 24, 31a-33 (also in *Baxter MSS.* vol. 23, esp. 131, 139-44); Vaudreuil et Begon au ministre, 14 8bre 1723, PAC, MG1, C¹¹A, vol. 45: 12; Vaudreuil to the Minister, Nov. 28, 1724, NYCD, vol. 9: 938; cf. *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, 94, 101-02, 107.

⁷ Gordon M. Day, "Gray Lock," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 3 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 265; George Sheldon, *A History of Deerfield, Massachusetts . . . with a special study of the Indian Wars in the Connecticut Valley* (Deerfield, Mass.: E. A. Hall & Co., 1895-96), vol. 1: 397; J. H. Temple and George Sheldon, *History of the Town of Northfield, Massachusetts* (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1875), 194.

⁸ Temple and Sheldon, *History of Northfield*, 194; Walter Hill Crockett, *Vermont, The Green Mountain State* (New York: Century History Company, 1921), vol. 1: 51; Charles Howard McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment of New York Indian Records, 1678-1751* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915), 149.

⁹ Gordon M. Day, "Missisquoi: A new look at an old village," *Man in the Northeast* 6 (Fall 1973), 52; idem., "Gray Lock," 265.

¹⁰ Temple and Sheldon, 195-96, *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, 97; Crockett, *Vermont*, vol. 1: 84.

¹¹ At a meeting of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs in Albany, Sept. 8, 1723, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 57.

¹² Commissioners to Col. John Stoddard, Oct. 14, 1723, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 60; Temple and Sheldon, 196.

¹³ Joseph Kellogg was born in Hadley in 1691. At the age of twelve he was taken captive by Indians in the famous raid on Deerfield and carried to Canada where he learned French and several Indian languages before returning home in 1714, Temple and Sheldon, 196-97, 228; Massachusetts Archives, Boston, vol. 46: 32.

¹⁴ Wright to Dummer, Dec. 5, 1723, quoted in Temple and Sheldon, 198-99.

¹⁵ Mary R. Cabot, ed. and comp., *Annals of Brattleboro, 1681-1895*, 2 vols. (Brattleboro: E. L. Hildreth & Co., 1921), vol. 1: 8-10; Egbert C. Smyth, "Papers relating to the construction and first occupancy of Fort Dummer . . ." *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 2d ser. 6 (1891): 359-71; Temple and Sheldon, 199-201. Captain Dwight's son, born May 27, 1726, is said to have been the first white child born in Vermont.

¹⁶ cf. John K. Mahon, "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 45 (1958-59), 254-75; McCorison, "Colonial Defense of the Upper Connecticut Valley," Cabot, ed., *Annals of Brattleboro*, vol. 1: 11.

¹⁷ Temple and Sheldon, 203; [Commissioners to His Excellency], June 12, 1724, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 74.

¹⁸ Temple and Sheldon, 204; Crockett, vol. 1: 85; *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, 102.

¹⁹ Dummer to Saltonstall [July 1724] *Baxter MSS.*, vol. 10: 209-11; Temple and Sheldon, 204-05.

²⁰ Temple and Sheldon, 205; Dummer to Goffe, July 27, 1724, Newberry Library, Chicago, Ayer MSS, 576.

²¹ At a meeting of the Commissioners of the Indian Affairs in Albany, Aug. 17, 1724, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 86a; Meeting of Commissioners of Indians Affairs, Nov. 21-22, 1723, with the Indians living at Schaakhook, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819: 65-66a; Temple and Sheldon, 203.

²² Lt. Gov. Wentworth to the Lords Commrsrs for Trade and Plantations, Sept. 12, 1724, *Baxter MSS.*, vol. 10: 222; Letter to Mass. Agents in London, n.d., *Baxter MSS.*, vol. 10: 227-29, reprinted as Kellogg to Mass. agents, Oct. 10, 1724 in Temple and Sheldon, 206; Cabot ed., *Annals of Brattleboro*, vol. 1: 11.

²³ Temple and Sheldon, 206-07; Crockett, vol. 1: 100-01.

²⁴ *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, 110, 112-16. For an account of the delegation of Colonels William Dudley and Samuel Thaxter of Massachusetts and Mr. Theodore Atkinson of New Hampshire, see Begon to Count de Maurepas, Apr. 21, 1725, NYCD, vol. 9: 941-45. The delegates endured great hardships in their journey, traveling over frozen Lake Champlain, and were gone four months, *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, 108-10. Temple and Sheldon, 208-09; Massachusetts Archives, vol. 38A: 86-88.

²⁵ Temple and Sheldon, 209; Crockett, vol. 1: 86; Massachusetts Archives, vol. 38A: 93-94.

²⁶ "A true Journal of our march from N-field to Mesixcouk bay under ye command of Benj. Wright Captain, begun July 27, A.D. 1725" reprinted in Temple and Sheldon, 210-12.

²⁷ From Henry Holland et al, Sept. 6, 1725, and H. Holland et al to Partridge & Stoddard, Sept. 10, 1725 *Baxter MSS.*, vol. 10: 334, 337; To the Justice of Peace at Westfield, Sept. 10, 1725, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 145a.

²⁸ Temple and Sheldon, 213; *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, 122.

²⁹ Temple and Sheldon, 214; *Penhallow's Indian Wars*, 122-27; 130-32; Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 187-90.

³⁰ Dummer to Lords of Trade, March 25, 1726, *Baxter MSS.* vol. 10: 369.

³¹ Temple and Sheldon, 214; Crockett, vol. 1: 88-89.

³² The Governour's Speech to the River and Schaakook Indians, Sept. 13, 1726, *NYCD*, vol. 5: 798-99; see also 868-69, 969-70.

³³ In 1740 Kellogg was appointed Interpreter to the Indian Nations, in which capacity he attended the historic Fort Albany conference in 1754, two years before his death. Temple and Sheldon, 215, 228.

³⁴ Commissioners to Partridge and Stoddard, March 27, 1727, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 177a-78.

³⁵ Dummer to Wenungennet, March 14, 1726 / 27, *Baxter MSS*, vol. 10: 358.

³⁶ Dummer to Stoddard and Partridge, n.d., *Baxter MSS*, vol. 10: 359.

³⁷ Partridge to the Commissioners at Albany, March 22, 1726 / 27, *Baxter MSS*, vol. 10: 364-65.

³⁸ Commissioners to Partridge & Stoddard, March 27, 1727, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1819, Reel C-1220: 177a-78; *Baxter MSS*, vol. 10: 371-73.

³⁹ Willard to Commissioners for Indian Affairs, April 13, 1727, *Baxter MSS*, vol. 10: 381.

⁴⁰ Memoir on the Present Condition of the Abenakis, 1724, *NYCD*, vol. 9: 940.

⁴¹ Capt. Joseph Heath to Dummer, June 12, 1727, *Baxter MSS*, vol. 10: 402.

⁴² Memoir touchant les Abenakis et le fort de Saint François [1727], PAC, MG1, F3, vol. 2: 560-61; Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 189-90.

⁴³ Capt. John Gyles to Dummer, April 8, 1727, *Baxter MSS*, vol. 10: 378.

⁴⁴ Meeting of Commissioners with several Schachhook Indians . . . July 13, 1744, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1820, Reel C-1220: II291A-II292.

⁴⁵ Day, "Missisquoi," 54; idem., "Gray Lock," 266; "Les Registres de Fort St. Frédéric," in Pierre-Georges Roy, *Hommes et Choses du Fort St. Frédéric* (Montreal: Les Éditions du Dix, 1946), 271.

⁴⁶ Commissioners Meeting, Nov. 9, 1744, PAC, RG 10, vol. 1820, Reel C-1220: 308A.

⁴⁷ John Moody, "Missisquoi: Abenaki Survival in Their Ancient Homeland," (1978: Unpublished manuscript in author's possession).

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