1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	DAVID R. ZARO (BAR NO. 124334) JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO (BAR N MATTHEW D. PHAM (BAR NO. 287 ALPHAMORLAI L. KEBEH (BAR NO. ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP 865 South Figueroa Street, Suite 2800 Los Angeles, California 90017-2543 Phone: (213) 622-5555 Fax: (213) 620-8816 E-Mail: dzaro@allenmatkins.com jdelcastillo@allenmatkins.com mpham@allenmatkins.com mkebeh@allenmatkins.com Attorneys for Receiver	
9	GEOFF WINKLER	
10		ES DISTRICT COURT
11	CENTRAL DISTF	RICT OF CALIFORNIA
12		RN DIVISION
13	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,	Case No. 2:18-cv-05008-FMO-AJRx
14	Plaintiff,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
15	VS.	TWENTY-FOURTH INTERIM
16	RALPH T. IANNELLI and ESSEX	APPLICATION OF RECEIVER, GEOFF WINKLER, AND HIS PROFESSIONALS FOR PAYMENT
17	CAPITAL CORP.,	OF FEES AND REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
18	Defendants.	Date: July 31, 2025
19		Time: 10:00 a.m. Ctrm: 6D
20		Judge Hon. Fernando M. Olguin
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Geoff Winkler (the "Receiver"), the Court-appointed permanent receiver for defendant Essex Capital Corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliates (collectively, the "Receivership Entities" or "Entities"), and his counsel of record, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP ("Allen Matkins" and, together with the Receiver, the "Applicants"), hereby submit this memorandum of points and authorities in support of their concurrently and jointly submitted Twenty-Fourth Interim Application for the Payment of Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses (the "Fee Application").

In addition to this memorandum, the Fee Application is supported by the concurrently filed declaration of Geoff Winkler (the "Winkler Decl.").

I. INTRODUCTION

The Fee Application is the twenty-fourth interim fee application submitted in the above-referenced matter and covers the Receiver's and Allen Matkins' fees and expenses incurred during the period from January 1, 2025 through March 31, 2025 (the "Application Period").

By way of the Fee Application, the Applicants request the Court's approval of 100% of their fees and expenses incurred during the Application Period and further request the interim payment of 80% of such fees and 100% of such expenses, to be paid from the funds of the receivership estate of the Receivership Entities (the "Receivership Estate" or "Estate"). Specifically, the amounts of the Applicants' fees and expenses sought to be approved and paid under this Fee Application are as follows:

Applicant	Fees (Inclusive of Discounts, if any)	Interim Fee Payment Requested	Expenses	Interim Expense Payment Requested
Receiver	\$15,348.10	\$12,278.48	\$1,058.90	\$1,058.90
Allen Matkins	\$34,211.57	\$27,369.25	\$6,697.53	\$6,697.53
	\$49,559.67	\$39,647.73	\$7,756.43	\$7,756.43

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Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP The Fee Application sets forth the services rendered by the Applicants during the Application Period, which form the basis for the fees and expenses requested therein and are more particularly described in the invoices and statements included in **Exhibits 1 through 2** to the Winkler Declaration, containing the billing entries that detail the tasks performed by the Receiver (and his staff) and Allen Matkins, respectively, during the Application Period.

Document 318-3

As discussed below, the Receiver believes that the fees and expenses incurred by the Applicants during the Application Period in connection with the Receiver's pursuit of his duties under the Appointment Order, Order in Aid, and Permanent Injunction (defined below) are appropriate and have benefited the Estate. On that basis, the Applicants respectfully request that the Court approve and authorize the payment of the fees and expenses sought under the Fee Application.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A full recitation of the procedural history of the above-captioned action is unnecessary for the purposes of the Fee Application. That said, the facts relevant to the Fee Application are as follows:

On June 5, 2018, plaintiff the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") filed a complaint against defendants Ralph Iannelli ("Iannelli") and Essex Capital Corporation ("Essex," and together, with Iannelli, the "Defendants") in this Court, commencing the above-captioned civil action. See ECF No. 1. The SEC's complaint alleged that Iannelli, by and through certain entities under his control, committed a number of fraudulent violations of federal securities laws, in furtherance of a Ponzi-like investment scheme. See id.

On December 21, 2018, the Court entered the *Order Regarding Preliminary Injunction and Appointment of a Permanent Receiver* (the "Appointment Order"), by which it appointed the Receiver as the permanent receiver for the Receivership Entities and imposed certain injunctive relief against Iannelli, the Receivership Entities, and anyone acting in concert with them. *See* ECF No. 66. The

Appointment Order vested the Receiver with exclusive authority and control over the Entities and assigned him certain duties, including marshaling and preserving the assets of the Entities (collectively, the "Assets") and preparing and presenting an accounting to the Court. See id.

On the Receiver's motion, see ECF No. 67, the Court entered the Order in Aid of Receivership (the "Order in Aid") on February 1, 2019, see ECF No. 69. By the Order in Aid, the Court approved and authorized the Receiver's engagement of

Order in Aid, the Court approved and authorized the Receiver's engagement of Allen Matkins as his lead receivership counsel and provided additional guidance and instructions regarding the administration of the instant receivership. *See id*.

Iannelli and Essex subsequently consented to the Court's entry of judgment

against each of them on June 5, 2019, and September 9, 2019, respectively. *See* ECF Nos. 93, 110. The Court also entered the *Order Regarding Permanent Injunction* (the "Permanent Injunction") on September 9, 2019, by which it retained jurisdiction over the Defendants and the subject matter of the receivership. *See* ECF No. 113.

As reflected in the Fee Application, the Receiver continued performing the duties required of him to protect and preserve the value of the Receivership Entities and their Assets, as provided for in the Appointment Order and Permanent Injunction, and operating the viable portion of the Entities' business as a going concern, throughout the Application Period. Having diligently pursued and facilitated the Receiver's duties, the Applicants now request that the Court approve their respective fees and expenses incurred during the Application Period and authorize the payment of such fees and reimbursement of such expenses from the funds of the Receivership Estate, as detailed herein and in the Fee Application.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Receivership Fees and Expenses.

"As a general rule, the expenses and fees of a receivership are a charge upon the property administered." *Gaskill v. Gordon*, 27 F.3d 248, 251 (7th Cir. 1994);

accord Atl. Tr. Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360, 374 (1908). The fees and expenses of a receivership include the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the receiver in administering his or her duties, as well as the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the receiver's professionals in rendering services to the receiver. See Drilling & Expl. Corp. v. Webster, 69 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir. 1934). Decisions regarding the amount and timing of an award of receivership fees and expenses are committed to the sound discretion of the district court. See SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1577 (11th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, "the district court has 'broad powers and wide discretion in crafting relief," including in "distributing receivership assets." Ouilling v. Trade Partners, Inc., 572 F.3d 293, 301 (6th Cir. 2009).

Here, the Fee Application's request for approval and payment of the fees and expenses incurred by the Applicants is a reasonable and appropriate request made to the Court, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court should exercise that discretion and authorize the interim payment of those fees and expenses from the funds of the Receivership Estate.

B. The Requested Fees and Expenses Are Reasonable.

The fees of a receiver and his professionals must be reasonable. *See San Vicente Med. Partners, Ltd. v. Orr (In re San Vicente Med. Partners, Ltd.)*, 962 F.2d 1402, 1409 (9th Cir. 1992). In determining the reasonableness of the fees and expenses requested in connection with a receivership, a court should consider the time records presented, the quality of the work performed, the complexity of the problems faced, and the benefit of the services rendered to the receivership estate. *See SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc.*, 364 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In a practical sense, once it has identified the hourly rate charged by the applicant for comparable services in other matters and determined that the applicant's services were reasonable, the court should multiply the number of hours expended by that hourly rate. *Cf. Sw. Media, Inc. v. Rau*, 708 F.2d 419, 427 (9th Cir. 1983), *superseded in part by statute*, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,

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92 Stat. 2549, as recognized in U.S. Tr. v. Tamm (In re Hokulani Square, Inc.), 460 B.R. 763 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).

Here, the Fee Application describes the nature of the services that have been rendered by the Applicants and, where appropriate, the identity and hourly billing rate of the individual performing each specific task. The Applicants have endeavored to staff matters as efficiently as possible in light of the level of experience required and the complexity of the issues presented. In general, the Fee Application reflects the Applicants' customary billing rates and the rates charged for comparable services in other matters, less agreed-upon discounts and other reductions specifically identified in the Fee Application.

The Receiver has reviewed the Fee Application and believes the fees and expenses requested by the Applicants to be fair and reasonable and an accurate representation of the work performed. See Winkler Decl. ¶ 2. The Receiver likewise believes, in his business judgment, that the Receivership Estate has benefited from the services performed during the Application Period. *Id.*

C. The Invoices of the Requested Fees and Expenses Have Been Submitted to the SEC For Review and Comment.

Courts give great weight to the judgment and experience of the SEC with respect to compensation requests. As one court has noted, "[I]t is proper to [keep] in mind that the [SEC] is about the only wholly disinterested party in [this] proceeding and that . . . its experience has made it thoroughly familiar with the general attitude of the Courts and the amounts of allowances made in scores of comparable proceedings." In re Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1945). Indeed, the SEC's positions are not "mere casual conjectures, but are recommendations based on closer study than a district judge could ordinarily give to such matters." Finn v. Childs Co., 181 F.2d 431, 438 (2d Cir. 1950) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And such "recommendations as to fees of the S.E.C. may be the only solution to the very undesirable subjectivity with

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has made the fixing of fees seem often to be upon nothing more than an ipse dixit

basis." *Id.* (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the

Commission's position on a fee request should be "given great weight." Fifth Ave.

Coach Lines, 364 F. Supp. at 1222.

Here, in order to ensure that the fees and expenses requested in the Fee Application are appropriate, and as they have done in connection with every prior fee application filed in this matter, the Applicants submitted their invoices to the SEC for review prior to filing. The SEC has indicated that it does not intend to object to the Fee Application. The SEC is likely in the best position to measure the fees and expenses requested in the instant receivership against those incurred in other, similar proceedings and cases of similar complexity, see Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 61 F. Supp. at 124, and any decision on its part not to object to the Fee Application merits significant deference. Accordingly, the Applicants respectfully request that the Court approve the fees and expenses requested in the Fee Application.

The Receiver Should Be Authorized to Pay the Approved Fees and D. **Expenses from Cash on Hand.**

1. The Receiver Is Holding Sufficient Funds.

As reflected in the Fee Application, the Receiver has further requested that the Court authorize an interim payment of 80% of his requested fees (\$12,278.48) and 100% of his requested expenses (\$1,058.90) for a total proposed payment of \$13,337.38. Likewise, Allen Matkins has requested that the Court authorize an interim payment of 80% of its requested fees (\$27,369.25) and 100% of its requested expenses (\$6,697.53) for a total proposed payment of \$34,066.78. Overall, if the Fee Application is granted in its entirety, the aggregate amount of the fees and expenses to be paid on account thereof to the Applicants would be \$47,404.16. As of the end of the Application Period, the Receiver held

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approximately \$2.7 million in cash on hand on behalf of the Estate, in addition to certain non-cash assets, which may have an aggregate value over \$1 million. *See* Winkler Decl. ¶ 3.

As the Receiver holds funds of the Receivership Estate in excess of the aggregate amount of the compensation sought to be paid in the Fee Application, it is appropriate for the Court to authorize the interim payment of such payment.

2. An Interim Payment Is Appropriate.

Where, as here, the fees requested are reasonable and "both the magnitude and the protracted nature of a case impose economic hardships on professionals rendering services to the estate," an interim award of fees is appropriate. *CFPB v. Pension Funding, LLC*, Case No. SACV 15-1329-JLS (JCGx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187607, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2016). Indeed, interim payments are necessary "to relieve counsel and others from the burden of financing lengthy and complex . . . proceedings." *In re Rose Way, Inc.*, Case No. 89-1273-C H, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 3028, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Mar. 1, 1990) (citing *In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.*, 19 B.R. 125 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981)). Thus, an interim payment of the Applicants' requested fees and expenses is appropriate.

In addition, the Applicants, as is customary in federal receivership matters, have performed services for the benefit of the Receivership Estate ahead of time and may not be compensated until months later. In order to ensure that compensation requests—and their attendant payments—stay relatively current with the services actually performed, the Applicants requested, and the Court agreed per the Order in Aid, that they be permitted to submit fee applications approximately every three months. With the Receiver and Allen Matkins having filed their last fee application on March 26, 2025 (*see* ECF No. 310), an interim payment is further warranted in this case.

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1	IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>							
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	For the foregoing reasons, the Applicants respectfully request that the Court							
3	grant the Fee Application, approve 100% of the fees and expenses incurred by the							
4	Applicants during the Application Period and authorize the payment, on an interim							
5	basis, of 80% of such fees and 100% of such expenses from the funds of the							
6	Receivership Estate held by the Receiver.							
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8	Dated: July 2, 2025 ALLEN MATKINS LECK GAMBLE MALLORY & NATSIS LLP							
9	DAVID R. ZARO JOSHUA A. DEL CASTILLO							
10	MATTHEW D. PHAM ALPHAMORLAI L. KEBEH							
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12	By: <u>/s/ Alphamorlai L. Kebeh</u> ALPHAMORLAI L. KEBEH							
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