

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAL DIVISION
APO 716

SECRET
Auth: CG Amer Div
Date: 10 Dec 43
Init: W.H.B. AG

10 December 1943

MOVEMENT ORDER)

NO.....1)

1. In compliance with instructions from higher headquarters, the Americal Division will proceed by GWT to CHERRYBLOSSOM.

a. First echelon begin embarkation 17 December 1943:

UNIT	Approximate	
	OFF	EM
(1) Det, Div Hq, Americal Div	21	48
(2) Det, Sp Tr to include:		
(a) Det, Hq Sp Tr	1	2
(b) Det, Hq Co, Americal Div	2	70
(c) Det, 26th Sig Co	4	80
(d) Det, 125th QM Co	2	65
(e) Det, 721st Ord Co	2	10
(f) Det, MP Plat, Americal Div	2	45
(3) 164th Inf	141	3159
(4) Co C, 57th Engr Combat Bn	5	170
(5) Co A, 121st Med Bn	5	97
(6) 1st Plat, Co D, 121st Med Bn	6	50
(7) Det, Americal Div Arty to include:		
(a) Det, Hq & Hq Btry, Americal Div Arty	7	70
(b) Det, 245th FA Bn	12	17
(8) Det, Hq & Hq & Sv Co, 57th Engr Combat Bn	2	50
(9) Det, Hq, 121st Med Bn	3	3
(10) Det, 182d Inf	8	12
TOTAL	223	3943

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

CANCELLED

AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

William D. Top 17th AGO

WINGS ADJUTANT COMMITTEE 18 June 46

31 JAN 1944

Inch #6

300-3.18-Movement Order-Bougainville-Americal Div 10 Dec 43-4 Jan 44

23278
112228
112228

SECRET

Movement Order No. 1 - continued

b. Second echelon begin embarkation 20 December 1943:

<u>UNIT</u>	Approximate	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
(1) 182d Inf	123	3076
(2) 245th FA Bn	17	474
(3) Co B, 57th Engr Combat Bn	5	170
(4) Co B, 121st Med Bn	5	97
(5) Det, Americal Div Arty to include:		
(a) Hq & Hq Btry, Americal Div Arty (less Det)	7	38
(b) Det, 246th FA Bn	9	17
(c) Det, 247th FA Bn	8	17
(d) Det, 221st FA Bn	2	6
(6) Det, Sp Tr to include:		
(a) 721st Ord Co (less Dets)	4	65
(b) 125th QM Co (less Dets)	3	35
(c) 26th Sig Co (less Det)	2	55
(7) Det, 132d Inf	8	12
TOTAL	193	4112

c. Third echelon begin embarkation 1 January 1944:

<u>UNIT</u>	Approximate	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
(1) 132d Inf	127	2951
(2) 246th FA Bn	15	513
(3) Co A, 57th Engr Combat Bn	5	170
(4) Hq & Sv Co, 57th Engr Combat Bn (less Det)	13	55
(5) Co C, 121st Med Bn	4	97
(6) Det, 221st FA Bn	7	11
(7) Det, 21st Rcn Tr, Mecz	2	10
TOTAL	173	3807

d. Fourth echelon begin embarkation 4 January 1944:

<u>UNIT</u>	Approximate	
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
(1) Det, Div Hq, Americal Div	24	94
(2) Det, Sp Tr to include:		
(a) Hq, Sp Tr (less Det)	1	9
(b) Div Hq Co, Americal Div (less Det)	2	71
(c) Med Sec, Sp Tr	2	10
(d) Americal Div Band	2	57
(e) MP Plat (less Det)	2	48

S E C R E T

PERSONNEL LOADING TABLE

2ND ECHELON

	<u>OFF.</u>	<u>EM</u>
ADAMS: Load at SUVA		
Btry. A, 245th FA.....	6	98
Ser Btry. 245th FA.....	1	25
246th FA.....	3	6
Available to 182nd Infantry.....	48	1141
164th Infantry.....	5	
Hq & Hq Btry. 245th FA.....	11	
	74	1270
 JACKSON: Load at SUVA		
Btry. B, 245th FA.....	5	94
Ser Btry. 245th FA.....	1	25
246th FA.....	3	6
Available to 182nd Infantry.....	52	1094
26th Signal Co.....	2	55
Hq & Hq Btry. Div Art.....	7	38
	70	1312
 HAYES: Load at SUVA		
Btry C, 245th FA.....	5	100
Ser Btry. 245th FA.....	2	24
246th FA.....	3	5
182nd Infantry.....	54	1127
721st Ordnance Co.....	1	30
125th QM Co.....	2	
247th FA.....	2	
132nd Infantry.....	7	8
	76	1294
 TITANIA: Load at LAUTOKA		
Hq Btry. 245th FA.....	3	125
125th QM Co.....	1	85
721st Ordnance Co.....	1	35
182nd Infantry.....		25
247th FA.....	4	9
221st FA.....	2	6
132nd Infantry.....	1	4
	12	289
 ALHENA: Load at LAUTOKA		
Co. B, 57th Engr. Bn.....	5	170
Co. B, 121st Med Bn.....	5	97
247th FA.....	2	8
	12	275

TAB "F"

S E C R E T

MEMO TO: Bn Comdrs
CO, Hq Btry

1. In connection with our movement following are notes and reminders:
2. See Memo No. 62 Hq Amer Div. Study carefully and comply. I understand Div is arranging to have psgr lists made up by sections rather than by rank and alphabetical order to permit quartering by sections etc. Check with AG.
3. Provisions must be made for men to be given ample water and salt during the strenuous work of loading and unloading. Likewise salt must be given during the hot boat trip. Consult Medico.
4. It is imperative that men be full covered during any attack made on a vessel. Clothing will prevent many serious burns from explosions. It is suggested that gloves or a substitute and a towel or rag be in each man's possession to cover hands and part of the face during an attack.
5. Mosquito bars must be available to the man the first night ashore.
6. Provide cleaning and preserving equip for maint of weapons while aboard. Grease arty weapons and, if possible, remove excess grease day before debarking.
7. Btrys, ^(complete) will probably be on different ships.
8. Just prior to departure shake down the outfits for diaries and other items not allowed in combat zones.
9. Have 610's and slip stick codes available for ship to shore communication.
10. Without knowing the loading and unloading scheme, plans can not be definite; however when known the utmost attention must be given to all details to insure proper loading and rapid, quiet and efficient unloading. My major concern is safe arrival on the beach, consequently every detail must be worked out that will allow us to get ashore quickly and in good condition.
Since Bn may be split up on ships, Btry Comdrs responsibility will increase. Even tho the ship troop commander may not do a good job each orgn comdr can do much to get his outfit ashore efficiently.
11. This Div has been out of combat for a long time and the old timers may be a bit rusty. Certainly the replacements haven't the slightest idea of what is ahead. I suggest that thought be given to preparing all personnel mentally for the coming action. Impress them with the idea of the great amount of hard work connected with combat, the absolute necessity of taking cover, maintaining their health and above all the importance of each man doing his job. There is much more you know they need. Lets bring them into the picture and prevent that period of indcision and lack of assurance we are sure to experience if the men are not prepared for it.
12. Outward indications of discipline such as saluting etc. are dropped in combat. However, it will be made clear to all officers and men that those disciplinary matters pertaining to obedience and performance and attention to duty will be more exacting and severe than ever before.

RESTRICTED

GAVAN


2/6/43

The 3rd Marine Division, exhausted because most of the fighting had taken place in its sector, was replaced by the Army's **Americal Division** under Major General John R. Hodge. The 37th Division (Army) was then placed under Griswold's XIV Corps.



The Bougainville Beachhead

Allied forces had established a semi-circular perimeter in the jungle, protecting three precious airfields. The Japanese troops on the island were entrenched further inland, but more importantly, the strong Allied naval and air presence cut them off from resupply and reinforcement. By this point, World War II was going badly for Japan.



The island of Bougainville itself was primitive, remote, and rugged—an easy place for the Japanese to hide. It was covered by dense jungle and several volcanoes, one of which is visible. Earthquakes and torrential downpours were frequent occurrences.



The American mission on the island was to defend the perimeter around the airfields shown, and keep tabs on the Japanese through aggressive patrolling. The jungle was thick, overgrown, and as Jack Morton recalled, “spooky.”






Troops of the 23rd Americal Division riding an abandoned Japanese tractor on Bougainville



Building the Base Camp



Drawing of a US Army Motorpool at Bougainville in 1944



In February, under the threat of Jap artillery, Randolph Scott put on a show with the Americal Dance Band. Scott was one of the leading film actors in starring westerns, and one of the best interpreters of the genre. Its first western classics were *The Last of the*

Mohicans (1936) and Western Union. After the show, Scott headed alone, with an escort, to the frontlines. He met the soldiers who were unable to attend the show.

In March, the **Bob Hope Show**¹ arrived with **Patti Thomas** and **Jerry Colonna**.



The 1970 Version in Camp Eagle



¹ ***On Christmas of 1970 my unit 2/502 of the 101st Airborne had front row seats to the Camp Eagle, Phu Bai, Vietnam version. Unfortunately, the weather prevented my company from being airlifted from the field. The choppers could not fly in the rain and the fog. A real disappointment for myself and my Father.***

A few weeks later, **Jack Benny** arrived to put on a show. He brought his beloved Stradivarius violin and the **Flying Goldbricks**.



Right Side Picture showing the Flying Goldbricks. USO tour, Bougainville, WWII. The Benny Troupe Back Row, L-R: Jack Benny and Larry Adler Front Row, L-R: Jean Brummer, Martha Tilton, Carole Landis.



Jack Benny was followed by singer and dancer Peggy Alexander a few days after. Then, a few days later, Agnes Davis, a soprano from the Metropolitan Opera performed.

I remember my father, David, recalling personally meeting Bob Hope, Martha Raye, Jerry Colonna, and Jack Benny. He said the islands were a

dangerous place, but they came. Japanese forces on Bougainville were still strong and organized in the first months of 1944.


The bravery of the performers was astounding. In Vietnam, I never got to see an American show, but I saw several performers from Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. At any time, at the outdoor theaters enemy mortars and artillery could hit the show. Some performers got killed in Vietnam.

One famous performer in Vietnam was Colonel Martha Raye, who was not only a comedian, singer, and actress but also a trained nurse. She would often relieve nurses in the base hospitals between shows. She was wounded twice and is buried at Fort Bragg.



<https://cherrieswriter.com/2020/05/09/who-was-colonel-maggie/>

In **March**, they launched a massive counterattack against the American perimeter. The battle commenced with a massive artillery bombardment of the entire American sector on the morning of March 8. Their objective was to drive the American forces back into the sea and retake the airfields. But despite the heaviest concentration of artillery support that the Japanese would mount during the entire Solomons campaign, the offensive was doomed. Japanese intelligence greatly underestimated the size of American forces on the island. Allied artillery and airpower struck back to essentially silence the Japanese artillery barrage. The battle began in earnest the following day, and over the next week, three separate Japanese assault groups threw themselves against the semicircular defensive line, as seen on the map.



The Japanese offensive, although outnumbered overall, directed massive forces at key positions in overwhelming numbers. The initial assault on Hill 260, still outside the main American perimeter, consisted of perhaps 1300 Japanese soldiers of the "Muda" group. The defenders on top of the hill, composed primarily of men from the 182nd's Company G, had only 78 men to hold back the



assault. They were quickly overwhelmed. The Japanese advanced up the southeast corner of the hill, throwing themselves across barbed wire when necessary. They promptly took the area around the **OP Tree** (shown in the picture). The Banyan tree, home of the precious **Observation Post**, and the key objective of the battle, lay in ruins after the fighting while small forces of survivors from the original garrison held on desperately.

The orders from on high to the American forces on the hill were clear: "Hold at all costs." Adhering to the orders to hold, officers of the 182nd threw wave after wave of

attacks at the Japanese positions on Hill 260. Occasional success was met with a Japanese counterattack. The fighting went on for days. This report, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Dexter Lowry, commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion, recounts the first two days of the battle in excruciating detail. Men from Company G was lost in the initial Japanese attack, and still more were lost in a failed American counterattack on the hill on 11 March. Numerous men from Company G were awarded medals for bravery during this 11 March attack and subsequent retreat.

As the battle settled into a routine of American counterattack and retreat, artillery support from behind the lines began to take a toll on the Japanese entrenched on top of the hill. Throughout the battle, perhaps 10,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire were dropped on the South Knob of the hill.