

A Meditation on Language, Logic, and Groups

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Language

Words such as *cake*, *Paul*, and *rowing* are viewed in light of what they label and in light of their meanings. They are seen as labeling a group (cake is a group), a person (Paul is a person), and an activity (rowing is an activity), and they are seen as having a meaning that is no more than the words that define them. The meaning of cake is not only what it labels. The meaning of cake is a word. The meaning of Paul is not only what it labels. The meaning of Paul is a word. The meaning of rowing is not only what it labels. The meaning of rowing is a word. Thus, cake, Paul, and rowing have an existence independent of what they label. All words defined by the dictionary address what's deemed real in some capacity. Meaning is defined as *what is meant*; meant is the past tense of the verb *to mean*. The verb *to mean* requires a *subject* and unless someone, say, points after saying, "I mean," the what *to mean* addresses is a word; in which case, *what is meant* is merely another word or words. Since meaning as defined exists and meaning as defined can be no more than a definition in cases where, say, pointing isn't involved, and a definition is no more than words, meaning as defined can exist by way of words and words alone independent of what the thing/person, activity, or group meaning is applied to. Thus, meaning is defined as a *language object*; language objects are words seen as being and/or having meaning. Meaning is also seen as a group of language objects, for various language objects are considered meaning; consequently, meaning as it is defined can be no more than words and groups of words.

If meaning, as a language object, is no more than words, it is no more than etchings, sounds because words are no more than etchings, sounds if devoid of a meaning. If meaning can be no more than words and all words have that meaning, then even the words that make up meaning have words for meaning and this can go on infinitely or supposedly stop at the most basic, in terms of composition, words, which themselves can suffer the same issues as all other words for new words can be created to define the most basic word. This bottomless pit of words for meaning is irrational and unnecessary when you understand what the notion of meaning is independent of a dictionary's definition. Meaning is the comprehension of which thing, activity, or group particular images, smells, sounds, tastes, and touches represent. Meaning does not exist outside the mind of an individual; thus, words do not possess meaning.

Infinitely searching for the word defining a word of language objectification parallels infinitely searching for the most basic particle of material things. It's more rational to understand words are merely labels and is more rational (and I argue less irrational) to accept that the most basic particle of what is believed to be material is immaterial, not invisible as forms were proposed to be, but immaterial in a way that cannot be conceived by a human mind. All material existence is a mental construct. Immaterial things are all that objectively exist.

When words/phrases from two different languages resemble each other and are defined as having the same meaning, the sameness of meaning can seem apparent for a commonality based on the resemblance of these language objects can seem apparent. I.e., it may seem apparent how *musica* in Spanish and *music* in

English mean the same thing. They are defined as having the same meaning, and, arguably, resemble each other. But it may not seem apparent how *comida* in Spanish and *food* in English mean the same thing. They are defined as having the same meaning, but, arguably, do not resemble each other.

A fallacy regarding meaning that by around 2013 I learned the entire world mistakenly believed occurs when encountering two different language objects from two different languages that are defined as meaning the *same thing* but do not seem to resemble each other. The statement, "The meaning of table in Spanish," implies there is a meaning independent of the English word *table* and the Spanish word for table, which is *mesa*. But if the meaning is no more than more words with the same issue, what could that meaning be? If you explore the meaning in only one language, this implies only that one language you explore has the meaning of the words from two different languages and the notion of two languages having the same meaning does not mean that same meaning is only in one of the two languages. If you continue to compare two languages while exploring that possible meaning, you end up with a situation like the language objects *table* and *mesa* that, arguably, do not resemble each other enough to acknowledge a common aspect they share that would enable them to be the same word (same meaning). The definition that states the language objects *table* and *mesa* mean the same thing can contradict the notion of group that demands a commonality to exist for two objects to be the same. Based on this contradiction, knowledge of the language objects *table* and *mesa* is knowledge that *table* and *mesa* mean the same thing and do not mean the same thing. The premise those who know more languages have more knowledge by

knowing more meaning logically follows from words such as *table* and *mesa* not meaning the same thing. This premise, however, is false.

A language is not a set of objects with meaning. A language is a set of representations for things/persons, activities, and groups; and the grammar, which is the order of representations along with punctuations for representations.

Fluency/proficiency in a language is the mental grouping of these representations, enabling a person who knows more than one language not to mix representations designated as one language with another. Two languages with different representations for the same things/persons, activities, and groups can be different in only one other respect: grammar.

Logic

Logic is not language, but language is used to express logic. Logic is the mental navigation of the representations of activities, things/persons, and groups.

(Rhetoric is the listener/reader's aesthetic opinion of that navigation in respect to the representations and the activities, things/persons, and groups labeled by those representations; in short, did he/she find this pleasing or displeasing? Keep in mind, if a person is not familiar with the language used, this can affect how he/she judges that language rhetorically for they may not be able to match the representations used with the activities, things, and groups they label.) The mental navigation of the representations can occur whether those representations are mental pictures that resemble activities, things/persons, or a thing/person or activity within a group or those representations appear as drawings or sounds often referred to as words. Probability gives us assuredness over the occurrence of

activities, persistence of things/persons, and persistence of groups we presume we did not merely imagine. Based on this probability, we determine what “will happen,” what “did happen,” what “would happen,” what “can happen,” and what “is happening.” This belief dictates how we navigate representations of activities, things/persons, and groups in our minds. When that mental navigation of representations for things/persons, activities, and groups matches our belief about the world based on a probability we feel we should be aware of, we refer to that mental navigation as *good logic*; when it doesn’t, we refer to it as *poor logic/illogical*.

Fact is often treated as separate from logic due to its emphasis on data, but the data used for fact is based on probability (even the sun “rising” is highly probable because of previous sun “rises”) and data tells you nothing without logical analysis of it; facts are the conclusions of that analysis. Facts are defined as being true, but all truth claims are theories; thus, facts are theories. Logic is objective, for objectivity is merely what is real and if you accept something exists, existed, will exist, and is capable of acting and being acted upon, you believe in the present, past, future, and powers: all of what logic addresses. One’s capability is termed a power. Let’s say you have the ability (power) to jump 5 feet only in one direction. Various conditionals are results of the power you have. Logic merely acknowledges them: “If a hand is placed 3 feet above you in the direction of your 5 foot jump as you jump to 5 feet, then you will collide with the hand because you can only jump in one direction.” Inherent in your power is not deviating for 5 feet; therefore, your power inherently answers the *what if* regarding a hand at 3 feet in your jump’s direction.

If logic is merely the mental navigation of the representations of activities, things/persons, and groups, then the more representations you have the better your logic if those additional representations assist your mental navigation. But if you acquire a set of representations that you cannot use with the ones you already have, that set does not offer i.e., a broader vocabulary for nothing is being broadened/added to. Representations for two different languages are mentally navigated separately; therefore, knowing two different languages provides no benefit from a more representations to navigate with perspective. And if you combine the two languages, that makes one language by way of combination and ultimately that's no different than using a language that's not a combination of two; not to mention, the combination of the two languages may make a simpler language. Since all languages, assuming that all are on the same level of complexity, have representations for most of the same activities, things/persons, and groups, acquiring another language when you already have one can be of no benefit.

If acquiring a second language strengthened your first, then, to the degree languages improve logic, that second language could improve your logic by way of your first language, but you can strengthen your first language without a second language, and one can tell who has a strong command of his/her first/only language by assessing his/her comprehension of which things/persons, activities, and groups that language's set of representations apply to; furthermore, at a certain point, spending too much time acquiring more than one language takes time away from mastering one. Note: pronunciation has not affect on logic. Also note: the language of the nation a person is born and raised in tends to be his/her first language even if

his/her family's first language is a different one, in which case his/her family's first language tends to be his/her second language.

Calculative Logic

Mathematics is a kind of logic that utilizes a set of symbols and words that together do not communicate anything outside of calculation; therefore, this set of symbols and words combined do not make a complete language by communication standards. The sole purpose of the set of symbols and words in mathematics is calculation, not, say, asking how your day went. No. Just calculation. Adding, subtracting, dividing, square rooting, multiplying, working with fractions, the calculation list goes on and on. So what is calculation? It fits the definition of navigated representations of things/persons, groups, and activities based on probability; thus, calculation is logic. But similar to how the symbols and words in mathematics do not make a complete language, the calculation of mathematics only composes a portion of logic, the portion concerned with combining things, removing things, and the fraction of things. Representing combining, removing, and fractions can get so intricate that it can make what's represented seem even more complex than it is and make the "language" of math appear more complete than it is.

Mathematics is not a language, but numbers are concepts. Numbers are not considered groups of other numbers. Each supposed number within a number is not defined or understood as having the number they supposedly compose in common. They are seen as adding up to the number they compose, not sharing that sum as a same trait. However, numbers are considered real. Why? The drawings

referred to as numbers are treated as *number objects* that possess the groups they represent: groups of same individuation.

Take the number 4 for instance. 4 does not exist as a number object. 4 is a symbol and symbols are no more than drawings that represent something. 4 is referred to as a symbol. *Four* is referred to as a word. However, 4 and *four* are no more than drawings that stand for something. They do not exist all around us in the world we see as has been suggested. There's no evidence of this and such an existence would make no more sense than saying a kindergartner's finger painting existed all around us but not in the form of a finger painting. Another form would be another thing. 4 does not exist as a number object within material objects deemed *4 things*; and counting to 4 just sequentially lists groups based on individuation. 4 is merely a drawing that labels a group as are all numbers.

The number 5, for instance, represents *IIII* things. There's no 5 independent of these *IIII* things. 5 is just a drawing, a drawing to represent *IIII* things. Now what are those *IIII* things? First, *IIII* is a symbol like 5 is a symbol, a symbol for a group based on individuation. However, 5, like all numbers in math, is merely a symbol incorrectly treated as an object with the ones that compose it as its parts and as *possessing same individuation*. In actuality, the symbols 5 and *IIII* and the word *five*, like all numbers, are merely drawings that *represent same individuation*. Each material thing believed to exist is a material thing believed to have traits, one of those traits is being separate from other material things: individuation, separation. Some groups are based on a series of features the members of the group supposedly share.

Groups that are labeled by numbers are groups based solely on individuation. Because no one has concluded this, numbers that are supposed to be merely labels are treated as what members of a group based on individuation have in common. Take an image of any individually separate things; that image corresponds to a number label used for that image of individuation. I.e., picture individual cats that receive the label 3, individual shirts that receive the label 3, and individual shoes that receive the label 3. What they all supposedly have in common as a group is a plurality of individuation labeled by the symbol 3. Like there's a word for each color, there's a number for each plurality of individuation (to an extent considering infinity) and a number for single individuation: the number 1, and each number represents a group based on individuation. In the example of the group labeled by the number 3, there's no "three-ness" of individuation that unites things in threes known as number 3. There's just images of individuation by way of cats, shirts, and shoes that identically resemble each other and can be said to be in a group labeled by the number 3.

Groups

The Fallacy of Overlapping Objective Groups:

Imagine a Venn diagram with each circle representing an objective group. (Note: To point to a circle you may point to a thing that's said to have that shape but that seeming thing only has an individuation that resembles another's individuation. You can point to a curved line which connects and that's said to be the shape but that would be a curved thing in itself that connects, not a circle. There are no shapes.) Note: this Venn diagram represents groups not based on

proximity/location of group members. Where Group A and Group B overlap is recognized as being *the same*; however, it is recognition that two different groups have something in common, have an area where the two groups are the same. It is not recognition that the area where the two groups are the same is the same group. The members of the group that are located in that overlap of sameness between two groups are still seen as part of the group they are bound to and not the group that intersects with their group despite being located in that intersection. X and y are members located where the two circles intersect. In that intersection, x is closer to the point in Group A farthest from Group B and y is closer to the point in Group B farthest from Group A.

If x is considered a part of Group B and y is seen as a part of Group A, then x is not a part of Group A and y is not a part of Group B despite the fact that x is closer to the point in Group A farthest from Group B than it is to the point in Group B farthest from Group A, same with y regarding Group B. In short, x and y have more in common with the group they are not in but because they are bound to their objective group, they cannot be in the group they have more in common with. It is irrational to say that x and y cannot be a part of each other's groups when they are located where the two groups are the same. As a Venn diagram shows, where two circles intersect, there is no clear delineation for which part of that area belongs to which circle; consequently, particular things in that intersection (such as x and y) do not definitively belong to either circle. This overlap exposes a vagueness that demands groups to be looked at relatively and not objectively in the area where the two groups intersect. However, objectively existing things cannot be partially

relative. The part that is relative wouldn't be a part of them, for objective things are wholly objective. Despite being irrational, overlap between groups unavoidably occurs more often than not. I.e., out of the group *chairs*, there are *chairs* that are no different than a portion of the group *tables* but merely bear the label chair. Out of the group *trees*, there are *trees* no different than a portion of the group *plants* but merely bear the label trees. Clearly, the notion of objective groups is flawed.

The Fallacy of Objective Groups:

To avoid the fallacy of the notion of objective groups, one cannot adhere to how words such as *same* reinforce this fallacy. *Same* signifies a group and, according to its definition, exists wherever the things that are the same exist. *Same* in the dictionary means *identical; same person or thing*. However, one does not say identical thing; one says *same thing*; therefore, *same* is a metaphysical claim about a thing begging the question: What is that *thing* that is the *same*? Only more than one thing can be identical and something can only be *identical* in relation to something else; thus, *same thing* always addresses more than one thing by default. Yet, the word *thing* is singular. Why? Things that are identical, the same have something in common; therefore, the most logical explanation of what *thing* is in *same thing* is thing in same thing is what all the things/activities that are said to be *same* supposedly have in common. *Thing* in same thing is the acknowledged element all the things that are said to be same supposedly share, allowing them to be a group as real as their own individual existence, and if the individual things are objectively real and what they all share is objectively real, then the group they are part of is objectively real. All concepts assert this claim of *sameness*, this belief in objectively

real groups. I.e., *apples* are a concept of things said to be the *same* in regards to sharing the material quality labeled *apple*, and *cancer*, although treated as a thing, is a concept of activities said to be the *same* in regards to sharing the active quality labeled *cancer*. (All concepts are defined as objective groups and are at least in part not based on proximity/location. Even the concept of a crowd is an objective group for all gatherings referred to as crowds, not just one crowd formed from a gathering.) Thus, dictionaries advance incorrect notions of objectively real groups by merely advancing a concept.

Groups only exist in the mind, meaning groups are mental constructs, mental ways of categorizing/organizing things; therefore, groups are relative to the mind that conceives of them, relative to the mind that constructs them. There are no objectively real groups; thus, there are no groups that things or activities are required to belong to. (Subjectivity is existence for things that are real only in the mind of an individual subject. Unless you, say, believe all things exist in God's mind, you must accept Aesthetic/Ethical standards and groups are subjective. It's said, "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder." Well, so are aesthetic/ethical standards and groups. Nothing that externally exists and is deemed a standard exists as a standard independent of an individual applying judgment to it. Therefore, no standards can be objective. However, an individual can have a subjective standard that is identical to another individual's subjective standard to the degree a thing or activity can be identical to another thing or activity.) Thus, all concepts are inherently false. There can be no things/activities that are the *same thing* based on the definition of *same thing*. Resemblance, whether identical or similar, does not necessitate *same thing*, a

bond between individual things or activities. Individual minds not only mentally group things that resemble each other they form a belief that these groups are objectively real. Prominent texts validate this claim, but this is false. If things actually shared something in common, they would form an entity, not a group and, thus, would no longer be separate whole things; they would be parts of that entity, connected by what they all possess.

Whether the group is perceived as not constructed, such as a group known as *mountains*, or is perceived as constructed, such as a group known as a *house*, the group is considered objectively real if it is not considered existing only in the mind. Each house is seen as separate but if they are all the *same thing* they are in the objective group called house; therefore, each supposed house is supposed to share something that makes each one in that group called house. That something does not exist and if it did, all houses would be *one thing*, not the *same thing* called house.

If you say a group is socially constructed, as some may say race is, you are not saying it's psychologically constructed. You're saying it takes a group to create a group, for social refers to more than one. Thus, in speaking of the requirements of one group being constructed, you are affirming the objective existence of another group just by speaking of social construction. You are speaking of society doing something independent of the individuals who compose that society; thus, you are granting the group known as society an objective existence it does not have. Instead, all groups, including race, gender, species, and society, should be seen as psychologically constructed, as existing only in the mind of an individual. Individuals can agree by grouping identically (to the degree things and activities can

be identical); however, no larger society objectively emerges and constructs on its own as a result of these individuals' mental constructions. Merely acknowledging individuals agree upon race for it to be constructed does not address race being psychological. It merely states the process by which the supposed objective group society constructs. No. One must explore the issue deeper to discover there is no objective society doing anything. Only objective individuals.