The Self and the Integral Interface: Toward a New Understanding of the Whole Person

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Of all psychology concepts, perhaps none has a more lengthy history or engendered more controversy and ambiguity than that of the self. Indeed, the self has come to mean so many things that it hardly means anything at all. Consequently, there is currently no single theory integrating all the various meanings of the self concept. Therefore, the primary purpose of this paper is to develop an overarching metapsychology by which all aspects of the self can be understood.

To accomplish this purpose, this article engages in a hermeneutic analysis of the self as it appears in cognitive behavior psychology, the psychoanalytic theories of ego and self psychology, and humanistic–existential theories of the self. In so doing, it is possible to identify two principle concepts by which the various aspects of the self can be compared and classified: the *conflation frame*, the collapsing of entity, intellect, and identity into a single rendering of the self; and the *integral interface*, the overriding theoretical framework within which each of these aspects of self can be appropriately differentiated and subsumed.

Over the years, theorists have been at no loss to speculate about the basic principles which govern the operation of the psyche. Perhaps nowhere is this more clearly the case than with theories involving the self. Indeed, a number of even epic edifices now dot the landscape. Certainly, the theorists have not shirked in trying to settle matters, offering their insights liberally. Yet, there is little consistency among these many references:

> The literature of the self is massive and confusing. Terms are not always concepts; sometimes they merely cover vacuums. A redundancy exists: "self," "identity," "identity themes" (along with mysterious hybrids: "ego identity" and "self identity"),

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variously refer to the individual, the mind (phenomenally or noumenally), or even something like a metaphysical fate, as identity themes—enough to fill many volumes (Spruiell, 1995, p. 430).

Additional formulations from fields other than psychoanalysis confuse the situation further. For example: the looking-glass self (Cooley, 1902), conditions of worth (Rogers, 1961), self-guides (Higgins, 1990), possible selves (Markus & Ruvolo, 1989), and autobiographical memory (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). Indeed, esoteric notions of the self coming from the spiritual traditions compound the ambiguity, such as *Atman* or *buddhi* from Advaita Vedanta (Griffiths, 1973; Rama, Ballentine, Ajaya, 1998), or even the idea of "no-self" (i.e., *anatma*; Murti, 1955) seem to suggest an irreconcilable inconsistency. Nondual spiritual precepts, in which the self of ordinary consciousness is transcended in the bliss of the Divine Self, seem to take the discussion beyond the realm of human awareness altogether (see Adi Da, 2001, 2004; Loy, 1998). Transpersonal conceptions based on these spiritual traditions include the self archetype (Jung, 1931/1969), the dynamic ground (Washburn, 1995), and the spectrum of consciousness (Wilber, 2000a, 2000b).

Even this bewildering array of theories and spiritual revelations only scratches the surface of the different accounts of the self present in the literature. The question is whether or not it is possible to make any coherent sense of them. This article will attempt to do so, by suggesting an overriding theoretical framework within which each of these self-concepts can be integrated and subsumed. This objective seems consistent with certainly the latter of two fundamental features by which the field of humanism is usually defined (e.g., Bugental, 1964; Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002):

1. Humanism: Human beings exist in a uniquely human context.
2. Holism: Human beings are greater than the sum of their parts.

Being a whole person is thought to have significant implications for not only understanding the development of human beings, but also the delivery of mental health services. In a statement of recommended principles for the provision of humanistic psychological services, the term "whole person" is defined as follows:

Persons are irreducible to the sum of their parts … . [O]verall we focus on the whole person who is choosing, setting goals, pursuing meaning, establishing and living in relationships, and creating (Bohart et al., 2003, p. 15).

However, there is a subtle inconsistency in this way of viewing the person. The implication is made that the fact that people cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts somehow relates to the functions most closely associated with being a person: choosing, creating, determining meaning, and living in relationships. Yet,

nothing about these functions necessarily follows from the individual being "whole." Indeed, even someone compromised by a divided self (Laing, 1959), false self (Winnicott, 1960), or bad faith (Sartre, 1957) is still obligated to engage in these functions. As can be seen, what is meant by the whole person is not always clear. For example

> Man is divided into a multiplicity of small I's. And each separate small I is able to call itself by the name of the Whole, to act in the name of the Whole, to agree or disagree, to give promises, to make decisions, with which another I or the Whole will have to deal…. It is the tragedy of the human being that any small I has the right to sign cheques and promissory notes and the man, that is, the Whole, has to meet them. People's whole lives often consist of paying off the promissory notes of small accidental I's (Gurdjieff, as quoted in Rowan, 2001, p. 208).

But speaking of the person as a whole in this way is misleading, in two ways. First, the *whole* of this passage is merely the aggregate of possible subpersonalities of the person. Although these subpersonalities certainly comprise the whole of one's identity, they do not act in the name of the one to whom that identity belongs. In a sense, the whole of subpersonalities is actually just one big personality. Still, there is the *one* to whom even that aggregate belongs, which is the individual's living presence, or being (Bugental, 1981; Heidegger, 1927/1962). Put somewhat differently, what *one* means could be thought of in two different ways: either something singular or else a living person. Only the former necessarily equates with being whole, for whatever is singular cannot have any parts left out.

But the *one* that is indicated by a living person suggests qualities that are independent of wholeness. Historically, humanistic psychology offered itself as an alternative to psychoanalysis and behaviorism, claiming they reduced the whole of the person to its parts, with humanism restoring the person to its rightful state of wholeness. However, this appraisal is not entirely accurate. Psychoanalysis and behaviorism did not reduce the whole to parts so much as leave one of the parts out of the whole—*the person* (i.e., presence). In other words, the way that the term *whole person* is typically used is a misnomer, equating the person with the whole. But this commits a category error, confusing set for subset. The person is actually *a part* of the whole.

Rather than speaking of one as a whole person, the arrangement is probably better put this way: *the person's whole*. Although that might sound awkward, consider this common reference: a person's family. In this case, it is understood that the person is part of the family—indeed, an intimate member—but not the family itself. Indeed, it is commonly thought that the family *belongs* to the person, by virtue of their membership (as it also belongs to each other member). In this same manner, the person can be thought of as intimately related to the whole of their psyche, as part of the whole which they possess, but not the whole itself.

As a result, the person could be thought of as engaging life *through* the whole of their psyche. Although the two are intimately related, nonetheless, there is a differentiation to be made as well. Clearly, being a living person or a singular person are in no way the same, never mind that both are critical for any useful definition of human beings. Unfortunately, these two different ways of speaking about the self are frequently confused in theories of the whole person, forcing the reader to interpret which one is meant. More to the point, very different aspects of the psyche are referenced by these two selves, which make understanding the self very difficult unless the two are clearly defined. It is precisely such clarity that this article intends to provide, and in so doing, combine these definitions into a single, integral theory of the self.

Secondly, as can be seen, it is suggested that the idea of a whole person is not meaningful unless the parts are organized into a whole, as is the case with systems generally (Laszlo, 1972; von Bertalanffy, 1969). Although it is commonly accepted that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, the reason for this is not always made explicit: the arrangement of the parts is itself a part of the whole. Relationships exist between each of the parts. Indeed, there is process as well as structure, the engaging of these relationships taking place within a particular sequence, or protocol. Like automobile engine parts lying in a pile, wholeness is meaningless without the proper arrangement. Or, as Wilber (2000a, 2000b) succinctly puts it: heaps are not wholes. But heaping subpersonalities into a simple aggregate is precisely how the whole is described in the earlier passage.

Integral theories have received increased attention over the past decade or so: "Given the rise of publications, journals, and professional societies concerned with psychotherapy integration, it seems that, as Arkowitz (1991) has announced, psychotherapy integration has come of age" (Stricker & Gold, 1996). However, this pronouncement is somewhat premature. Integral psychology is still very much a work in progress. Theories that used to be called *eclectic* are now being referred to as *integral*, primarily, it appears, to avoid the connotation usually associated with that term—being an arbitrary mix of therapeutic interventions (Okun, 1990). But integral therapy must be understood as distinct from clinical practices that would otherwise be thought of as eclectic. The principle distinction between eclectic and integral therapy is twofold

1. Whereas eclectic therapy simply accumulates therapeutic interventions, like a tool belt, integral therapy organizes these interventions into a systemic and interrelated clinical practice—indeed, according to the exact same organization that appears within the psyche.
2. Whereas eclectic clinicians pick and choose those aspects of the psyche to treat that are most appealing or familiar to them, integral therapy addresses *every* aspect of the psyche in clinical practice—regardless of the clinician's preference (as indicated by the therapeutic situation).

In other words, the essential contribution of integral theory is this: the interface between all other theories, or the overarching framework within which they can each be included. That is, it is the infrastructure overall. It is in this way that the larger systemic context within which the individual exists can be fully articulated, what is usually referred to as psychic structure (Boesky, 1995).

As can be seen, the difference between eclectic and integral can be understood not only therapeutically, but theoretically, and specifically as theory relates to the self. Consequently, the self can be understood according to certain core assumptions of postmodernism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gergen, 1985; Wilber, 1998):

1. Constructivism: Reality is not passively given but actively constructed through an internal process of interpretation.
2. Contextualism: Meaning is dependent on context, and contexts are endlessly changing.
3. Perspectivism: One's perspective is determined by the particular context currently in use.

In other words, reality is not independent, objective, or fixed. Instead, it is codetermined with the mind and, therefore, malleable and dynamic:

the world does not have an intrinsic nature waiting to be discovered and represented by human condition, but discloses itself in a variety of ways partially contingent on the dispositions, intentions, and modes of consciousness of the knower (Ferrer, 2000, p. 22).

Therefore, at least in some sense, the self is also malleable, dynamic, and codetermined. According to these precepts, integration could be understood this way: Self is irreducible and unique to each person, therefore, there is a tremendous diversity of selves and each should be tolerated and, indeed, valued for the sake of its innate distinctness. This is integration in the sense of *eclectic*, as opposed to *integral*.

However, like physical bodies, uniqueness is only one side of the coin. There is ubiquity as well. That is to say, at least certain features are universal, spread among even the innate uniqueness of individual selves. Just as two eyes, two ears, a nose, and a mouth are generally arranged in a descending pattern beneath the forehead and alongside the head, so too are attributes of the self present in every person. The position taken here is that it is imperative for humanistic psychology is to find a place for both—as equal attributes of the whole person.

Yet, this ideal faces opposition:

Gordon Allport (1937) introduced into psychology a basic distinction and a fundamental dilemma with which philosophers had struggled for decades. He borrowed

the terms *idiographic* and *nomothetic* … to describe the apparent conflict between two basic interests of the psychologist…. Lee Cronbach (1957) … called attention to this difference in aims … [and] envisioned a third approach that would unite the aims of the idiographer and the nomotheticist. It will not surprise you that even in the 1990s, Cronbach's vision has yet to materialize completely fruitful results (Monte, 1999, pp. 32–33).

But the uniqueness and ubiquity of self is not an either–or proposition. Rather, the uniqueness and ubiquity of self represents the two possible ways that the self appears within psychic structure, and, therefore, the two possible ways that the self can be depicted in theory. However, no single theory currently represents each side of this equation. Consequently, some assembly is required.

THE CONFLATION FRAME

The first formal attempt to bring some sense of organization to the ambiguity of the self was Freud's (1923/1961, 1933) theory of the tripartite assembly of agencies. Freud initially used the German term *das Ich* in an inclusive manner: to indicate the mind capable of being aware of its own operations, as well as the underlying structure performing these operations. Consequently, the concepts *ego* and *self* were originally thought of as intimately associated with one another. But they can also be seen as strictly distinct from one another as well:

> I would agree with Arlow (1991) who distinguishes ego as theoretical abstraction from self as experiential construct, each with its appropriate realm of discourse … . Modell (1993) makes a similar distinction between the ego as objective and the self as subjective (Meissner, 2000, p. 377).

In other words, the fundamental ambiguity of the self-concept is its differentiation into two aspects: *ego* and *self*. As a result, a variety of views have emerged to account for the relationship between the two (Mitchell & Black, 1995; Spruiell, 1995):

1. The ego and the self are best used as Freud originally intended *das Ich*, a continuum ranging from self as used in its everyday sense—a locus of sentience and volition—to that of a coherent system of psychic functions.
2. Clinically, it is heuristically valuable to separate ego from self, as the ego is an abstract concept that only muddies the water if applied to the phenomenological experience of the individual taking place in the therapeutic situation.

3. Self should not only be distinguished from the ego but even *delineated* from the ego, as a fourth structure of the mind joining and interacting with the id, ego, and superego—perhaps even superordinate to the id, ego, and superego.

Hartmann (1939) favored reformulating the ego concept along the lines of a separate ego and self:

> two different sets of opposites often seem to be fused into one. The one refers to the self (one's own person) in contradistinction to the object, the second to the ego (as a psychic structure) in contradistinction to other substructures of personality (1950, p. 84).

Indeed, Freud seemed to acknowledge this fundamental, and essentially overwhelming, arrangement, describing the ego as "a poor creature owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the external world, from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the superego" (1923/1961, p. 46). As a result, the ego ends up caught in the middle, each aspect of which negotiating its own respective sets of demands.

To arrive at a truly integral theory, the ambiguity inherent in these terms can be sorted out by replacing them with a single formulation that incorporates them all. One way of clearing up the confusion is through the interjection of more ordinary nomenclature: *entity, intellect,* and *identity.* As can be seen, Freud conflated all three into a single structure, which he refers to as ego, thereby initiating the conflation frame. Separating out these terms according to their distinct natures is the proposed solution to the conflation frame. To start, it is suggested that *entity* is the appropriate term to use when referring to the phenomenological experience of the individual, especially relative to sentience and volition. These are the attributes usually assigned to the self. The term *ego*, on the other hand, has come to be essentially a synonym for mind or cognition and is, therefore, best referred to as the intellect, especially in the sense of the primary autonomous ego (Hartmann, 1939).

Identity is perhaps the most troublesome aspect of structural theory to understand. The principal reason for this stems precisely from the fact that entity, intellect, and identity are so frequently conflated in theories of psychology. Perhaps even more to the point, entity is typically mistaken *for* identity. Nonetheless, the two can be easily differentiated:

> If you get a sense of your self right now—simply notice what it is that you call "you"—you might notice at least two parts to this "self": one, there is some sort of observing self (an inner subject or watcher); and two, there is some sort of observed self (some objective things that you can see or know about yourself—I am a father, mother, doctor, clerk; I weigh so many pounds, have blond hair, etc.). The first is ex-

perienced as an "I," the second as a "me" (or even "mine"). I call the first the *proxi-mate self* (since it is closer to "you"), and the second the *distal self* (since it is objec-tive and "farther away"; Wilber, 2000a, p. 33; emphasis in the original).

In this way of considering things, entity and identity are simply two junctures along a single self continuum. Indeed, this distinction is not unlike the one used ear-lier: self being subjective and proximate, while ego is objective and distal. As can be seen, the two ways that agency is used—as an intentional executor and a system of enduring attributes (i.e., structure)—aligns to these respective positions.

Yet, in a sense, this clarification only ends up confusing the situation. There is a crucial distinction that can be seen operating between them. The proximate self is not simply closer to you—it *is* you. And the distal self is not simply farther from you—it is *not* you. Rather, it is a representation of you. These representations are committed to memory, through the operation of the intellect, and coalesce over time into a coherent sense of identity. Simply put, identity consists of the attribu-tions deposited into memory of one's abilities, as they are engaged throughout life. But they are not the living person (i.e., entity) of whom they are representations, anymore than a photograph is a distal version of that person.

Take for example any important memory from your life, perhaps one of particu-lar significance: falling in love. Many people report feeling awkward approaching someone for the first time to whom they are attracted. Indeed, if they are rejected, and particularly if the rejection is severe, they may draw the conclusion that their abilities or attributes just are not good enough, which is to say, they are not good enough. Over time, as these conclusions pile up in memory, the individual may even come to expect rejection; after all, they have already decided that they are not good enough. Obviously, this can lead to self-fulfilling prophesies, in which one creates the very circumstances by which the rejection occurs, perhaps even beating the other person to the punch and rejecting them first to get the painful process out of the way. This combination of attributions and expectations is contained within memory, and is the distal version of the self in its entirety.

Although Wilber (e.g., 2000a) does not speak in precisely these terms, it is the living person that is the proximate version of the self. It is this self that experiences the rejection. The intellect presents the experience *to* the self, as a result of some incident taking place at the interface between the organism and environment. Like-wise, it is the intellect that devises the appropriate response to this experience, and ultimately downloads it into behavior. Perhaps the best way to differentiate these aspects of self is as according to the two philosophical categories most pertinent to this level of analysis—ontology and epistemology:

1. Ontology and self.
    a. Entity: *who* you are (i.e., one's living presence, defined as awareness and will).

2. Epistemology and mind.
   a. Identity: *what* you know about who you are (i.e., one's abilities and attributes, as retained in memory), and
   b. Intellect: *how* you know what you know (i.e., the information processing and problem solving of cognition).

As can be seen, there is a critical difference between *who* and *what* you are, which follows the difference between ontology and epistemology. People generally confuse the two, mistaking the contents of their memories and identity for who they actually are. This distinction could also be put this way: Entity exists exclusively in the present (i.e., here and now), without any reference to past or future. Although identity exists *in* the present, its references are actually *of* the past; and intellect combines present experience with past memories, precisely to predict the future. Keeping the distinction clear, and not allowing the ambiguity of the word self to confuse the two, allows a truly integral theory of the self to emerge.

THE INTEGRAL INTERFACE

Behaviorism and psychoanalysis posit that the fundamental operations of the individual are foundationed in the body, that is, drive impulse and environmental stimulus (Freud, 1915/1957; Skinner, 1953). Piaget (e.g., in Gruber & Voneche, 1977) also suggests something similar with his concept of the sensorimotor period of cognitive development. For Piaget, the *sensori* of the sensorimotor period is really nothing other than stimulus. Sensori is meant to include any and all experiential phenomenon for the individual. Likewise, *motor* is really nothing other than response, or at least those internal operations of the body leading to behavior.

However, interventions based on the body are not limited to behaviorism. Indeed, the interventions of behaviorism are not rightly thought of as engaging the body at all. Rather, they are directed toward the *environment*, not the organism, which in turn interacts with the organism, thereby producing its effect. Interventions that engage the organism directly primarily involve psychiatry, the branch of medicine involved with the study, diagnosis, and treatment of mental disorders (Berrios, Porter, & Berrios, 1999). Although prescription drugs represent the sine qua non of psychiatry, they are not the only way to introduce chemistry into the brain. Virtually everything ingested is digestible, including one's ongoing diet, including vitamins, herbs, and supplements, not to say, any recreational drugs toward which the individual might be inclined (e.g., alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, etc.).

Yet, numerous other therapeutic modalities also intervene directly with the body, albeit at a far more subtle level and far less invasive manner, such as body work, yoga, meditation, acupuncture, and the numerous martial arts disciplines of

oriental spirituality (see Goldberg, Anderson, & Trivieri, 2002). In other words, according to these theoretical orientations, attenuating the physical body is another aspect of the human being given very little regard or attention in Western models of medicine: the etheric body (see Batie, 2003). Indeed, perhaps the most significant determinant of mental health is contained within this aspect of the human being: emotion. Even staunchly behavioral treatment programs take emotions into account (e.g., Linehan, 1993). As a result, the organism must be thought of in a more expanded manner than that addressed by psychiatry. Consequently, psychiatry is perhaps best thought of in such an expanded manner, addressing a larger domain than that of merely brain or body states.

The interaction between the focal points of psychiatry and behaviorism—that is, the body and the world—can be thought of as the "exterior loop" of one's interpersonal relations. Consequently, the person depicted by the behavioral characterization does not involve a self so much as the bodily substrate of the individual, as situated within an ecological system.

Intellect

Unfortunately, however, the exterior loop is too simplistic to account for all aspects of human behavior. In other words, there is an internal core of operations at work behind the individual's interpersonal relations. In other words, it is common to hear people describe their interpersonal relations this way (see Eggert, 1994):

1. Something bad happens (i.e., trigger).
2. They feel bad about it.
3. They do something about it.
4. Then someone does something back to them, which becomes another trigger, starting the whole cycle all over again.

But this leaves out an essential piece between steps 1 and 2: Some thought has occurred that makes them feel the way they do (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1994). This portion of the sequence could be thought of as the "interior loop" to one's interpersonal relations. As cognition processes one's sensual and perceptual experience (i.e., stimulus), this understanding prompts a further experience in one's emotions, which triggers the sequence all over again, impelling one toward their ultimate behavior. As a result, the individual is informed by two sources of input, first the sensations and perceptions of the body, and then the emotions. Both of these sources of information are processed by cognition.

Overall, cognition can be said to operate in the following manner: it evaluates events and then makes attributions based on those evaluations (Weiner, 1988). In turn, these attributions are used as a base on which the individual can then make further expectations. Having established this platform of expectation, the individ-

ual uses it as the principal means by which they understand their ongoing experience. In this way, attributions and expectations are two sides of the same coin:

> Expectancy-value theories … stress the idea that the probability of behavior depends not only upon the *value* of the goal for the individual but also upon the person's *expectancy* of obtaining the goal (Petri, 1995, p. 217; emphasis in the original).

In other words, we want what we want but we only do what we think we actually *can* do, and this whether consciously or unconsciously. We rely on past successes to indicate our chances of success in the future. If one is used to having their own way, say, by bullying or intimidating others, they might well believe such tactics will work in any situation across the board. Of course, a disillusioning encounter or two with someone willing to (and capable of) calling their bluff might well alter these beliefs. Clearly, employing such a tactic—or any tactic, for that matter—rests on the underlying confidence one has that it will actually work. However, in another sense, what one cannot do might *become* what they will do, in that they might do it later when circumstances allow for it (e.g., saving up for a vacation or getting a good education to get a good job; May, 1969).

Taken together, these elements combine to form an essential feature of the cognitive system: *perspective*, that is, the self of cognitive psychology. Perspective is the aspect of psychic operation that indicates one's expectations. Consequently, the emphasis in cognitive psychology is not so much on how one experiences reality as how they *interpret* the reality thus experienced. Perspective is constructed as a result of verbal exchange, or conversation, between individuals (Bruffee, 1993; Watzlawick, 1984). However, these constructs have meaning only to the extent that they are situated within certain contexts (i.e., frames of reference). Things mean what they mean precisely because of all the relationships and implications that hold between them and the other elements in the overall system with which they share a membership.

These contexts, or subsystems, establish the roles that a person might play in a given situation. People flip through their various systems constantly. They understand things as a consequence of which system is operating at the time. The more systems they have operating, the more varieties of relational exchange are available to them. The individual does not just exist in a single situation. All these systems overlap and intersect within one's memory. The more systems that the individual has familiarity with, and can operate proficiently, the more likelihood of having success within these contexts. They simply have more resources to work with, not to say, more expertise with which to work with them. Consequently, they are able to situate their experience within a larger frame of understanding.

It is precisely the possibility of such subsystems that underlies Freud's (1923/1961, 1933) assertion that there are three broad groupings within the psyche. Overall, Freud's conception of psychic structure can be compared to a tripar-

tite formulation traditionally associated with the psyche: passion, reason, and conscience. Freud comments on this similarity as follows:

> The ego advances from the function of perceiving instincts to that of controlling them … . To adopt a popular mode of speaking, we might say that the ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions (1933, p. 108).

Although many attempts have been made to bring greater precision to the language of this traditional tripartite formulation, it has not been improved thereby. In fact, its essential meaning has only been rendered more abstract and remote instead.

To address these issues, Hartmann (1939) seeks to refine the concept of the ego, introducing the term *conflict-free sphere* of autonomous ego functioning into psychoanalytic nomenclature. In a sense he takes Freud's own assertion that the ego is the agency that interacts with reality even more seriously than he does. However, contrary to Freud, Hartmann sees the primary autonomy of the ego as not only inherently free of conflict—and, therefore, not contingent on some process whereby it becomes free of conflict (e.g., "making the unconscious conscious")—but essentially synonymous with cognition.

Identity

As can be seen, with this differentiation of the ego, Hartmann (1939) separates out intellect and identity from the conflation frame—albeit without separating out entity as well. Masterson posits a similar differentiation, although he refers to the primary autonomous ego as simply the ego, and the secondary autonomous ego in more general terms as the self:

> The self and the ego develop and function … like two horses in the same harness … . One aspect of the self could be viewed as the representational arm of the ego … . Similarly, one aspect of the ego … could be viewed as the executive arm of the self (1985, p. 22).

Kernberg (1976) also notes this distinction between intellect and identity (although without specifically identifying them as such), suggesting the ego comes into existence as a developmental process involving a two-tiered structure:

> At what point does the ego come into existence? Certain ego structures, and functions connected with them, exist from the beginning of life: perception, the capacity to establish memory traces, and the other functions just mentioned. These are essentially functions of the primary autonomous apparatuses (Hartmann, 1939) … . It is suggested that the ego as a differentiated psychic structure, in the sense of Freud's (1923) description, comes about at the point when introjections are used for defensive pur-

poses, specifically in early defensive organization against overwhelming anxiety (1976, p. 35).

Although Kernberg (1976) regards these two tiers to be simply two aspects of a single ego structure, they are better thought of this way: intellect and identity, albeit the latter of which comprised of a front-end, perspective. In other words, the secondary autonomous ego can be thought of as consisting of perspective, as it interacts with identity (i.e., id and superego). Freud maintains that the ego develops from the id, in some unknown manner borrowing psychic energy (i.e., libido) from the id:

> Thus in its relations to the id it is like a man on horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse, with this difference, that the rider tries to do so with his own strength while the ego uses borrowed forces (1923/1961, p. 19).

However, this way of describing ego development can apply only to secondary autonomy, for the primary autonomous ego (i.e., intellect) exists from the beginning.

The difference between them could be put this way: whereas perspective and secondary autonomous ego consist of one's beliefs, identity and the id and superego consist of what one values. However, values do not always arise from within, as said of the id. Sometimes they are imposed from without, as could be said of the superego. Kohut (1971, 1977) postulates a similar arrangement with his concept of the *bipolar self.* According to his view, the psyche can be most fundamentally described as a bipolar structure; two separate parts joined together. On the one hand, there are ambitions, which are the various interests and objectives originating within the self. On the other hand, there are ideals, which are those admirable qualities in others (i.e., objects) to which the self aspires. Kohut refers to the initial formation of this bipolar conjoining as a nuclear self and thought that it came into being as a result of its various interactions with self-objects (i.e., significant others):

> There are two main constituents of a nuclear self. One is the grandiose-exhibitionistic self that becomes established by relating to a selfobject that empathically responds to the child by approving and mirroring this grandiose self. The other constituent of the nuclear self is the child's idealized parental *imago*. This becomes established by relating to a selfobject that empathically responds to the child, by permitting and enjoying the child's idealization of the parent (St. Clair, 1996, p. 157).

Like the nucleus of an atom, which is comprised of infinitesimal particles swirling around one another in a contained orbit, the bipolar self, likewise, has a central core around which all the attributes of the individual gather and coalesce, forming the basis of identity. Through this clustering of attributes two polar aspects emerge, the first of which indicating the ambitions of the grandiose–exhibitionistic self,

and the second of which indicating the ideals of the child's idealized parental imago. Despite Kohut's (1971) insistence that the bipolar self indicated a separate line of structural development from Freud's tripartite assembly, based on an ever-maturing narcissism (i.e., self-esteem), there is a strong affiliation between the bipolar self and the drive dynamics of the id and the moral strictures of the superego. Consequently, just as perspective is a more ordinary term to refer to the secondary autonomous ego, the id and superego are better conceived of as ambitions and ideals.

Rogers (1951, 1959) also posits a bipolar conception of self-structure, albeit as described this way:

1. Organismic valuing process: An innate "honing in" capacity of the organism to feel its way through making value judgments to find what is in the best interests of the individual; and
2. Conditions of worth: The way that the individual perceives others' perceptions of the individual.

In a sense, like Freud, Rogers posits that the individual fundamentally participates in the pleasure principle, except for an important difference: instead of being simply "a cauldron full of seething excitations" (Freud, 1933, p. 73), the process of valuing organismic pleasure can be trusted. However, unlike Erikson (1993, 1994), basic trust is innate to the organism and does not have to be learned. Put somewhat differently, the organism comes equipped with the essential operating principle that enhances their well-being, provided it operates fully and without undue constraint, such as inimical encounters with one's environment (e.g., parents).

Rogers puts the operation of the organismic valuing process this way:

Experience is, for me, the highest authority … . When an activity *feels* as though it is valuable or worth doing, it *is* worth doing…. [Thus I trust] the totality of my experience, which I have learned to suspect is wiser than my intellect. It is fallible I am sure, but I believe it to be less fallible than my conscious mind alone (1961, pp. 22–23; emphasis in the original).

In the event this process operates unimpeded, self-actualization of the individual will inevitably occur. Otherwise, the individual is sure to draw certain erroneous, or incongruent, conclusions about their experience and their environment. Notable among these are what Rogers (1959) calls "conditions of worth." Over time, the individual draws conclusions about the predictability and consequences of their experiences—especially those that indicate whether the individual has value or worth. It is precisely these estimations that ultimately comprise one's sense of self. To the extent that they accurately mirror reality, they are thought to be congruent. Otherwise, they are thought to be incongruent. Indeed, the individual

can come to develop a kind of selective interpretation relative to experience, seeing events so as to be congruent with one's self rather than to the event itself:

> Experiences which are in accord with his *conditions of worth* are *perceived* and *symbolized* accurately in *awareness*…. Experiences which run contrary to the *conditions of worth* are *perceived* selectively and distortedly as if in accord with the conditions of worth, or are in part or whole, *denied to awareness* (Rogers, 1959, p. 226; emphasis in the original).

As can be seen, these two domains do not exist independently from one another, but are related reciprocally in a manner that can be thought of as *"reflected appraisal"* (see Hewitt, 1994; Sullivan, 1953). This means that the self exists within and is, at least partially, determined by the context of others. Although intersubjectivity is typically thought of as arising out of one's interactions with others in an intersubjective field (Jacobs, 1992; Stolorow, Brandschaft & Atwood, 1987), its real significance lies in a different contextual arrangement: identity, especially when internalized (Bacal & Newman, 1990; Hamilton, 1992). In this sense, intersubjectivity is not merely the joining of two subjectivities into a single, overall awareness. Rather, it is the *contextualizing* of one of these subjectivities within the other.

In this way, identity can be thought of as the *"ulterior loop"* of psychic processing, for each side of identity exists as context for the other, influencing the other from outside its own sphere of operation. Technically speaking, perspective is better thought of as part of the interior loop, the front-end to identity. Cognitive therapy typically intervenes at the point of one's intellect and perspective with reframes that challenge one's attributions and expectations (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1994), relying on the process to trickle back, so to speak, into deeper layers of the identity system. These arrangements can be incorporated into the integral interface in Figure 1.

In sum, experience is processed by the intellect, the joint processes of imagery and memory (see Achterberg, 1985; Anderson, 2000), and intuition and reasoning (i.e., primary and secondary process; Freud, 1900/1953). Yet, at any time, this processing can be interceded and influenced by the contents of memory: perspective and identity, the latter of which comprised of two aspects, ambition and ideals (i.e., the bipolar self). Further, influence coming from any part of this assembly can perhaps originate within the unconscious. Consequently, the therapeutic objective of psychoanalysis is straightforward: make the unconscious conscious (see Mitchell & Black, 1995; Moore & Fine, 1995). It is in this manner that the individual is able to become aware of deep-rooted conflicts, providing them with the material necessary for insight and transformation. However, in the end, a question still remains: To *whom* does this consciousness occur?

FIGURE 1   The Integral Interface.

CONCLUSION

Few theorists have even attempted to integrate the multifarious aspects of the self into a comprehensive theoretical system. But making the self the repository of so many different features and functions is sometimes thought to burden the concept with an unwieldy, even impossible ambiguity. Yet, this can only be the case if there is no integral framework by which each aspect of the self might be appropriately placed. Indeed, this can only be the case if theorists make the decision to prefer their respective positions over others, rather than allowing them to be subsumed within a more overarching whole. In other words, currently, each conception of the self tends to highlight its own particular orientation, while at the same time omitting certain other aspects from consideration. Therefore, the real difference between the various orientations to the self comes down to this: those aspects of the self that happen to be emphasized in the moment.

However, the profession of psychology seems poised for reconciliation. A principal contention of this article is that there is no point in isolating out any one aspect of the psyche and attempting to make a comprehensive theory of it—the remaining aspects will only beg for admission (Watkins & Watts, 1995). Indeed, the clamor from these excluded aspects demands the distortion of theory, precisely to account for what is left out. Consequently, the guiding principle of integral theory

could be put this way: *whatever is left out distorts the rest*. Such a principle naturally leads to an admonition for inclusion, or, as Allport put it: *"Do not forget what you have decided to neglect"* (1968, p. 23; emphasis in the original). Only when the differences between various viewpoints can be integrated into a common vision will each side engage in a meaningful dialogue, where one embraces the other. That is, the only way to account for any aspect of the psyche is to, at the same time, account for *every* aspect of the psyche. Clearly, such a project can be initiated in only one field: where the whole person is valued above all else.

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