

Perspectives from the Field

Leveraging CompStat to Include Community Measures in Police Performance Management

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Letter from the Presidents of the Vera Institute of Justice and the Police Foundation

Dear colleagues,

American policing is facing a legitimacy crisis, especially among minorities who experience the most direct engagement with the police. Most law enforcement agencies already demonstrate efforts to enhance community trust through transparency initiatives such as public data sharing, body cameras, and press conferences. But in the world of social media, where people are increasingly able to publicize their perspectives and experiences, we now understand that the public seeks more than just transparency: They seek an active role in the co-production of public safety.

Given the level of public interest, discourse, and advocacy that currently surrounds the topic of policing, now is a pivotal moment. As law enforcement agencies modernize and shift from reactive, serious incident-focused policing to proactive, community-inclusive initiatives, it will be important to measure—and reward—steps taken in this direction and their impacts through the performance management systems already embedded within the fabric of these agencies, such as CompStat. The process of infusing community-focused values in an enhanced CompStat—or rather, “CompStat 2.0”—can only be strengthened by incorporating insights from a wide variety of stakeholders including researchers, practitioners such as police management and rank and file and their lived experiences, other public agencies and their insights regarding the root causes of crime, and community members and the values they hope to see infused within policing.

Together, the Vera Institute of Justice and the Police Foundation are well positioned to cultivate these unique perspectives. In addition to sharing an extensive history including common benefactors, board members, and goals, both organizations are highly committed to developing and promoting innovative ways of strengthening the ties between police and the community. We are pleased to have produced this publication with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and are especially proud to have collaborated with such a diverse selection of experts in generating this compendium. Each paper offers insightful recommendations for how CompStat 2.0 might be developed, based on a combination of academic research and police department experiences. We trust that this report will provide a valuable foundation for those who aspire to further the development and measurement of community-police relations.



Nicholas Turner, President, Vera Institute of Justice



Jim Bueeremann, President, Police Foundation

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank the COPS Office for providing us with the opportunity to document these perspectives on CompStat 2.0, its potential future directions, and its relevance to community policing. In particular, we would like to thank our program manager, Sarah Estill, for her consistent support throughout this project. We hope that this resource, developed jointly by researchers and practitioners, will serve as a useful tool for law enforcement agencies as they consider what, why, and how of performance measurement in the era of 21st century policing.

We wish to thank Jeremy Travis for his early guidance on this initiative. A number of other individuals contributed to the CompStat 2.0 recommendations put forth in these white papers by way of sharing their research, experiences, and insights. We would especially like to thank the participants of the Vera and Police Foundation's 2016 Developing CompStat 2.0 Symposium and Megan O'Toole for her beautifully written introduction and executive summary and her tireless efforts in making sure this report reached the field.

Finally, we thank all of the authors who contributed white papers to this report. Their perspectives on police performance measurement, problem solving, and community engagement are incredibly valuable. Our hope is that police departments throughout the country can use this content to inform their efforts to adopt a version of CompStat 2.0 that encourages evidence and community-based policing.

Executive Summary

As the adage goes, what gets measured is what matters. But community metrics—essential in infusing community policing practices into law enforcement agencies—are not systematically measured to the same extent as crime and enforcement statistics. Since its development in 1994, CompStat has proven to be a valuable measurement and decision-making tool for law enforcement administrators and is widely accepted as one of the most important policing innovations in the last century. Yet the lack of community-focused measures within this tool has contributed to potentially harmful byproducts such as rapid response policing, short-term crime solutions, and limited community engagement.¹ In this era, communities want and expect to play an active role in the co-production of public safety. So it is imperative that our management of law enforcement agency resources, priorities, and responses—using powerful and well-ingrained tools such as CompStat—evolve to incorporate a wider variety of community concerns beyond serious crime incidents. Agency leaders also need to hold themselves and their agencies accountable for responding to these problems in ways that create trust and satisfaction within the communities served.

It is our premise that leveraging and infusing the CompStat management model with the values, inputs, and outcomes of community policing provides a new and powerful tool—a CompStat 2.0—to do just that. The white papers featured in this report draw upon relevant research and practitioner experiences to provide recommendations for organizations as they begin to integrate community policing with CompStat. In July 2016, with the support of a grant from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), the Vera Institute of Justice and the Police Foundation convened a symposium of law enforcement and community leaders, scholars, researchers, and others to identify and discuss the challenges and opportunities involved in leveraging CompStat in this way. Vera and the Police Foundation identified a number of symposium participants who could offer unique perspectives on the idea of integrating community policing into CompStat and asked them to author brief white papers representing their views. The authors include law enforcement leaders, rank and file representatives, police and crime scholars and researchers, community leaders, and others. The papers were provided to symposium participants in advance of the meeting and informed the discussions throughout the day.

The day-long discussion was intended not to produce consensus but to identify the opportunities brought about through a CompStat 2.0 approach and the challenges to its successful development, implementation, and sustainability. Our discussions focused on the utility of CompStat, the relevance and importance of community policing, the necessity of a decentralized decision-making process, prospective measures that reflect the values of community policing, and tools for measuring and focusing on what matters most to communities. While our work on this initiative will continue and a model for Compstat 2.0 is not anticipated until later in 2017, the white papers authored in conjunction with the symposium are thought provoking and informed and provide valuable insights on their own. It is with this in mind that we share these perspectives with the field so that further thinking and input can be gained as we look towards the development of CompStat 2.0.

1. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Tammy R. Kochel, “The Co-Implementation of CompStat and Community Policing,” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 38 (2010): 969–980, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235210001479>.

Nola Joyce and Sean Smoot first explore whether CompStat's current principles align with the recommendations set forth by the Task Force on 21st Century Policing established by then President Barack Obama in 2014. They conclude that CompStat is an important tool in that it promotes accountability and measurement within law enforcement, but challenges arise when these principles are prioritized above others such as legitimacy and community policing. When officer performance is evaluated on the basis of easily measured outputs (e.g., arrest and clearance rates), community policing goals are hindered by limited time for engagement and problem solving, hot spot policing by officers unfamiliar with neighborhood dynamics, and the falsification of data to suggest adequate performance. This is particularly problematic in today's social climate, as civilians seek not just transparency but also an active voice in policing decisions. To integrate 21st century community policing principles into CompStat 2.0, Joyce and Smoot suggest that police departments will need to open their strategy conversations to community members; develop new measures that are valid, sustainable, and community focused; and create technologies capable of supporting these initiatives. While these proposed changes will likely pose some difficulties, several model departments have already successfully begun this process and can be looked to as examples.

Stephen Mastrofski and James Willis next describe how CompStat may benefit from incorporating more diverse perspectives in its crime problem-solving process. CompStat's current emphasis on middle management and accountability through arrests often leads to practices that are at odds with community policing such as rapid-response policing, goal displacement, low officer morale, and limited community engagement. CompStat 2.0 should continue analyzing statistical trends as a means of recognizing problems; however, once a problem is identified, temporary task forces consisting of community partners, researchers, and rank-and-file officers should convene to explore its root causes and implement empirically based solutions. In addition, CompStat 2.0 should feature multiple indicators, new mechanisms of data collection oversight, and publicly accessible data.

Robert Worden and Sarah McLean suggest that when used correctly, CompStat can be an effective problem-solving tool for large police departments. CompStat meetings should serve as a forum to publicly identify problems, around which middle management can then partner with rank and file to solve using appropriate tactics. Challenges stem primarily from unclear expectations, limited staff follow-up, and data gaps in the area of community policing. In addition, smaller police departments may struggle to collect sufficient data and to incorporate enough feedback loops. The researchers ultimately conclude that while it may not be possible to incorporate elements of community policing into every level of CompStat's decision-making process, CompStat 2.0 should be supplemented with routine community meetings in which a diverse group of officers, civilians, and other professionals collaborate to better understand the causes and solutions of crime and to promote trust and respect across agencies.

Julia Ryan, Suzanne Bergeron, and Cy Richardson raise the question of whether CompStat can simultaneously promote police accountability and encourage community collaboration. For CompStat 2.0 to remain a useful tool in the era of community policing, these two values must be intertwined. Community members, rank and file, and other agencies can all offer meaningful contributions to policing conversations. Because crime intersects with other public issues that are best addressed by non-law enforcement agencies (homelessness, mental illness, etc.), professionals in these fields may be helpful in understanding the causes and long-term solutions of crime. In addition, because civilian distrust in police commonly results in noncompliance and related safety concerns, it is imperative that police legitimacy be measured, managed, and incorporated within the values of police departments. Based on these observations, the researchers provide a series of eight recommendations for CompStat 2.0, which range from examining non-police data as predictors of crime to instituting community policing benchmarks within departments.

Brenda Bond and George Kelling begin by describing the history of community policing and how it has grown to replace professional policing tactics in most departments. Today's challenge lies in systematically integrating related measures into organizations to ensure that community policing is being resourced, monitored, and valued. Police are increasingly viewed as guardians rather than warriors, which suggests that current measures of averted crimes must be supplemented with positive measures of community safety perceptions, trust, and well-being. The researchers suggest that we can capture most of this information through data that is already being collected (calls for service, abandoned buildings, substance abuse, complaints against officers, etc.). CompStat 2.0 can further benefit from organizing these measurable outputs (i.e., police activities) and outcomes (i.e., short- and long-term goals) on a scoreboard, which can be used to track and encourage progress in the area of community policing. Community partners will be especially valuable in informing police departments of how various police activities relate to desired outcomes. Furthermore, the successful implementation of CompStat 2.0 will require an organizational shift—primarily a willingness to decentralize the decision-making process—and a reframing of CompStat to the public as a more inclusive conversation.

In their concluding paper, Willis and Mastrofski synthesize the recommendations put forth in these white papers with the feedback of participants who engaged in the July 2016 CompStat 2.0 symposium. No uniform decision was reached regarding the logistics of CompStat 2.0 meetings (e.g., how frequently they should occur, who should be included, what content to relay in person versus online); however, researchers and practitioners agreed that policing measures should be broadened beyond crime statistics to incorporate broader community priorities in terms of outputs and outcomes. Multiple measures from a variety of data sources should be collected to fully capture the values deemed important by police departments and the communities they serve. CompStat 2.0 should incentivize effective problem solving at all levels of policing by including rank and file in CompStat 2.0 conversations, distinguishing between long- and short-term solutions to crime, and measuring internal department problems as well. Last, because crime is a local phenomenon, CompStat 2.0 should incorporate some degree of flexibility so that the values and problem-solving tactics implemented by each department can be tailored to the specific communities served and their specific conditions, needs, and priorities.

Introduction

Since its development by the New York City Police Department in 1994, CompStat has proven to be an incredibly valuable measurement, management, and decision-making tool for law enforcement administrators. In fact, it is widely accepted as one of the most important policing innovations in the last century. Nearly two-thirds of the nation's largest police departments and many smaller agencies currently rely upon a CompStat-like program to highlight crime problems, deploy resources, and track progress.² In fact, because of its widespread success in promoting accountability, CompStat-like programs are gaining popularity in other spheres (such as government officials' offices) as well.

CompStat models generally focus on district or precinct commanders' decisions in responding to serious crime. These middle managers are held accountable for their districts' performance in identifying, understanding, and monitoring responses to crime problems.³ CompStat, as practiced, incentivizes what it measures. In most agencies, the primary indicators of performance are arrests and crime rates, but researchers have found that expanding CompStat to include community policing metrics is possible and could promise greater multiplicative effects.⁴

In 2015, the Task Force on 21st Century Policing appointed by then President Barack Obama in 2014 laid out a blueprint for improved community policing including a collection of recommendations and action items for how police agencies can work to build trust with the communities they serve while effectively reducing crime. Multiple recommendations address the need to infuse community policing practices throughout police culture and practice, including by tracking and measuring changes in the public trust of police over time, engaging community members in identifying problems and managing public safety, deploying nonenforcement activities to engage communities, collaborating with community members to design crime-reduction strategies, engaging with communities that have historically strained relationships with police, creating a culture of transparency and accountability within law enforcement, and refraining from using quota systems for citations and numbers of stops.⁵ Yet although it has been said that what gets measured is what matters, currently community policing—in all of its forms—is not being systematically measured or regularly assessed by CompStat programs to the same or even a similar extent as crime statistics.⁶

2. David Weisburd et al., *The Growth of Compstat in American Policing*, Police Foundation Reports (Washington, DC: The Police Foundation, 2004), <http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/growthofcompstat.pdf>.

3. Willis, Mastrofski, and Kochel, "The Co-Implementation of Compstat" (see note 1).

4. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Tammy R. Kochel, *Maximizing the Benefits of Reform: Integrating CompStat and Community Policing in America* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2010), <https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p178-pub.pdf>.

5. President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

6. George L. Kelling, "Measuring What Matters: A New Way of Thinking About Crime and Public Order," in *Measuring What Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings*, edited by Robert H. Langworthy, 27–35 (Washington, DC: Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, 1999), <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/170610-1.pdf>.

A recognized strength of CompStat is that its core processes could be used to promote organizational change, including agency-wide implementation of community policing. By bringing departmental focus to specific aspects of policing, CompStat has the ability to influence departmental priorities. Findings from a 2006 national survey revealed that 59 percent of large police agencies are pursuing CompStat and community policing simultaneously.⁷ Yet today, CompStat and community policing often operate separately in different spheres of the organization with different goals and a different emphasis. While agencies may be proponents of both CompStat and community policing, the integration of CompStat and community policing is thus far insufficient if it occurs at all.⁸

These white papers aim to guide the institutionalization of community policing by expanding the metrics of CompStat to include performance measures associated with community policing, problem solving, and evidence-based practices. Collectively, the authors draw from relevant research and practices of integrating community policing and performance measurement, lessons learned from previous efforts, and considerations of what can and cannot be changed within CompStat 2.0 to generate guidelines for reform.

7. Police Executive Research Forum, *CompStat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in Law Enforcement Agencies* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Compstat/compstat%20-%20its%20origins%20evolution%20and%20future%20in%20law%20enforcement%20agencies%202013.pdf.

8. Willis, Mastrofski, and Kochel, "The Co-Implementation of Compstat" (see note 1).

Aligning CompStat with 21st Century Policing—CompStat 2.0

Nola M. Joyce and Sean M. Smoot

In 2014, then President Barack Obama directed the Task Force on 21st Century Policing to identify the best means to provide an effective partnership between law enforcement and local communities that reduces crime and increases trust in the police. Reducing crime and increasing trust in the police are not new goals for policing. However, the two were seldom thought of in tandem. It tended to be an either-or proposition. One of the major challenges of policing in the 21st century is to accomplish both of these goals at the same time. We must bring what we have learned in recent decades to re-envision police strategies and accountability systems to accomplish these joint goals.

The report of the Task Force on 21st Century Policing

The task force report⁹ covered six areas or pillars—(1) Building Trust & Legitimacy, (2) Policy & Oversight, (3) Technology & Social Media, (4) Community Policing & Crime Reduction, (5) Training & Education, and (6) Officer Wellness & Safety. For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on Building Trust & Legitimacy, Policy & Oversight, and Community Policing & Crime Reduction. Table 1 lists some key themes from these chapters that are relevant to our task at hand.

Table 1. Themes of the report of the Task Force on 21st Century Policing

Chapter	Key themes
Building Trust & Legitimacy	Building trust and nurturing legitimacy is the foundational principal. A culture of transparency and accountability is required. We need to track and analyze the level of trust communities have in police just as we measure changes in crime.
Policy & Oversight	Police policies should be developed in collaboration with community members. Policies should be reflective of community values and not lead to disparate impacts.
Community Policing & Crime Reduction	The absence of crime is not the final goal of law enforcement. Police and residents are responsible for the co-production of public safety. Police enforce the law with the people not just on the people. The obligation for police is not just to reduce crime but do so fairly and while protecting community members' rights.

9. President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* (Washington, DC: Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, 2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

These themes begin to describe the value environment in which 21st century policing must operate. The values of co-production and co-governing, transparency and accountability, fairness, and ensuring constitutional rights are values expressed in conversations not only about policing but also about government in general. One even hears these values creeping into critiques of the private sector. People, especially young people, are demanding that they have a say in how they are policed. This is a very different type of demand from those made in previous generations. It is a claim that challenges the boundaries between police and community, between the professionals and those they serve. The first part of the 21st century is marked by the fall of geographical, social, and political boundaries. Police can no longer operate in a silo of excellence surrounded by a series of impermeable boundaries. Our policies, strategies, and accountability systems must reflect this new reality.

CompStat

CompStat was developed by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 1994. Under the leadership of then Police Commissioner William Bratton and Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple, the four principles of CompStat—(1) timely and accurate information or intelligence, (2) rapid deployment of resources, (3) effective tactics, and (4) relentless follow-up—were operationalized with technology and process. Underlying CompStat was the basic belief that the police can prevent crime. This approach moved policing from reactive to proactive policing. The NYPD credited significant drops in crime to the CompStat program.

CompStat began to spread across the country starting in the late 1990s as a result of the NYPD's crime reduction success. CompStat has been credited with reducing crime, driving organizational change, and increasing accountability. The Police Executive Research Forum surveyed law enforcement executives in 2011 about why CompStat is used by their agency.

Their top five responses were:¹⁰

1. To identify emerging problems
2. To coordinate the effective deployment of resources
3. To increase accountability of commanders and managers
4. To identify community problems and develop police strategies
5. To foster information sharing within the agency

Although agencies have adapted CompStat to their operations and needs, the four original principles and the top five reasons listed by executives still guide the vast majority of the CompStat processes in police departments.

10. Police Executive Research Forum, *CompStat*, 8 (see note 7).

Critiques of CompStat

CompStat is useful in analyzing crime patterns and in determining what strategies work and the efficient assignment of resources. However, heavy reliance on CompStat can have some very concerning and unforeseen consequences.

Excessive reliance on CompStat can result in less community engagement and relationship building. Rather than being accountable and responsive to the needs and expectations of the community, officers focus on the production of activities. Activities that are easily captured by police administrative systems, like arrests, clearance stats, stops, and the reduction of serious crimes, are counted and reported.

This counting approach, coupled with evidence on the effectiveness of hot spot policing, leads to high concentration of police resources in high crime areas. Tactical or crime suppression units are often deployed into these neighborhoods en masse when crime rates spike. These units, which are relatively mobile and therefore relatively unfamiliar to the community, can be perceived by residents as “occupation armies.” While community members welcome police activities aimed at reducing violent crimes, they are more concerned with minor quality-of-life violations and also resent being “overpoliced” (especially for very minor violations). Ironically, it is in these same communities targeted for intensive enforcement that the police are in the most need of relationships built on trust and mutual respect.

Another unintended consequence of CompStat is the temptation to “cook the books.” Overreliance on CompStat as a management paradigm can result in unrealistic expectations and the intentional underreporting of crimes. This phenomenon has been observed in several major cities.¹¹

CompStat as a leadership accountability model typically does not involve lower ranks of the police department. The police officer on the street only knows about CompStat by the way it is communicated down the command structure. The importance of the CompStat principles and how each principle relates to the way an officer does his or her work is not usually taught to officers.

11. Graham Rayman, “The NYPD Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct,” *The Village Voice*, May 4, 2010, <http://www.villagevoice.com/news/the-nypd-tapes-inside-bed-stuys-81st-precinct-6429434>; Graham Rayman, “The NYPD Tapes Confirmed,” *The Village Voice*, March 7, 2012, <http://www.villagevoice.com/news/the-nypd-tapes-confirmed-6434290>; David Bernstein and Noah Isackson, “The Truth About Chicago’s Crime Rates,” *Chicago Magazine*, April 7, 2014, <http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/May-2014/Chicago-crime-rates/>; David Bernstein and Noah Isackson, “The Truth About Chicago’s Crime Rates: Part 2,” *Chicago Magazine*, May 19, 2014, <http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/June-2014/Chicago-crime-statistics/CompStat/>; David Bernstein and Noah Isackson, “New Tricks – Special Report: One Year Later,” *Chicago Magazine*, May 11, 2015, <http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/June-2015/Chicago-crime-stats/>; Joseph M. Ferguson, *Report of the Office of Inspector General: Chicago Police Department Assault-Related Crime Statistics Classification and Reporting Audit* (Chicago, IL: Office of Inspector General, 2014), <https://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/OIG-Crime-Stats-Audit.pdf>; Ben Poston and Joel Rubin, “Times Investigation: LAPD Misclassified Nearly 1,200 Violent Crimes As Minor Offenses,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 9, 2014, <http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-crimestats-lapd-20140810-story.html>; Ben Poston, Joel Rubin, and Anthony Pesce, “LAPD Underreported Serious Assaults, Skewing Crime Stats For 8 Years,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 15, 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/local/cityhall/la-me-crime-stats-20151015-story.html>.

Finally, not everyone agrees that CompStat brought the benefits attributed to it. Some have argued that to solely credit CompStat with crime reductions in New York City and elsewhere fails to recognize the complexity of crime and its causes.¹² Weisburd and colleagues ask whether the rapid acceptance of CompStat by policing was more of an effort to maintain and reinforce the bureaucratic, paramilitary model of policing than reform it.¹³

It is clear that CompStat brought a higher level of measurement and accountability to policing. It is used by many police departments to focus resources, address organizational issues, attack crime problems, and internally share information. It was a significant advancement in police administration. The question before us is whether the principles of CompStat can be aligned with the realities of 21st century policing? Perhaps it is as simple as adding measures as George Kelling suggests:

CompStat is the most important administrative policing development of the past 100 years. CompStat appropriately focuses on crime, but I think the danger is that CompStat doesn't always balance that focus with the other values that policing is supposed to pursue. . . . I want CompStat to measure and discuss things like complaints against officers and whether police are reducing fear of crime in the community. The CompStat systems of the future must reflect all of the values the police should be pursuing.¹⁴

CompStat 2.0

Police departments are already experimenting with the next generation of CompStat. CompStat 2.0 for the NYPD is about sharing the data with the public and their officers. The NYPD announced a new digital version of CompStat on February 23, 2016. Anyone can go to the NYPD CompStat 2.0 website and see the data from their CompStat book.¹⁵ The NYPD is also providing officers with smart phones containing police apps like officer safety alerts, missing person alerts, mobile fingerprinting, and database searches. The goal of the NYPD's 2.0 version of CompStat is to deliver the same data to different audiences in different ways.

The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) began increasing the time frame captured by CompStat and taking a more strategic approach in its crime meetings. The PPD still looks at the last two weeks and the last 28 days of crime, but it also focuses on chronic crime areas. Each of the 23 police districts identified a chronic crime area based on crime analysis that officers focused on over a 12-month period. Reducing crime in these 23 hot spot areas helped drive down citywide crime levels. The intent was to stop chasing the dots on a crime map and start making a difference in selected neighborhoods. In addition, PPD leadership began bringing analysts, officers, sergeants, and lieutenants into their crime meetings to discuss their problem-solving efforts. District analysts shared their work and the rank and file shared how they worked with the community, organizations, and city agencies to address problems in their area. This reinforced the PPD's data-driven, collaborative approach to crime prevention.

12. Robert D. Behn, "Distinguishing CompStat's Impact," in *The PerformanceStat Potential: A Leadership Strategy for Producing Results* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014).

13. David Weisburd et al., "Reforming to Preserve: CompStat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing," *Criminology and Public Policy* 2, no. 3 (2002): 421–456, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2003.tb00006.x/pdf>.

14. Police Executive Research Forum, *CompStat* (see note 7), 1.

15. "NYPD CompStat 2.0," New York City Police Department, accessed September 29, 2016, <https://CompStat.nypdonline.org/2e5c3f4b-85c1-4635-83c6-22b27fe7c75c/view/89>.

These modifications to traditional CompStat—using technology to increase information sharing and expanding the focus to include strategic problem solving—still use only crime and activity data. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) includes non-crime measures on its CompStat sheet like the number of community member complaints, overtime usage, sick leave usage, and field activities. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) is working to revamp its CompStat to eventually include measures for use of force and vehicle pursuits, audit and review scorecard measures, and community policing measures. Most interesting is that the NOPD wants to develop measures that will help monitor progress toward meeting its consent decree requirements. These are examples of adding measures and counts to help monitor key activities and outcomes in addition to crime reduction.

There are at least three major challenges that must be met in order to integrate community policing into the CompStat process. These challenges include developing new measurements, including non-law enforcement participants in the meetings, and creating supportive technology. Each of these challenges is discussed in the sections that follow, and suggestions are offered on how each might be overcome.

The measurement problem

In some cases, the problem is one of measurement. Counts of crime, arrests, and stops are part of the life of a police officer that is captured through administrative data. This reliance on administrative activity data creates unintended consequences. First is the temptation to adopt a “lazy” supervision model. Unengaged first-line and mid-level supervisors simply view their role as counting beans. The result is they do not necessarily know who is doing a good or bad job; they know only how many citations an officer is writing, what crimes are being reported, and maybe what crimes are being solved.

Second, the reliance on administrative data and the lack of input from rank-and-file officers into what gets measured result in counting only a fraction of the work officers do during their shift. For instance, most departments do not track non-enforcement activity like settling neighbor disputes, directing traffic, responding to calls for assistance, assisting stranded motorists, responding to medical emergencies, saving lives, or even responding to fires (first responders to most fire scenes are the police). None of that activity is counted or tracked, and all of it has significant impact and import on the community. Rank-and-file officers, first-line supervisors, and management ranks need to be involved in identifying and developing new CompStat measures.

Traditional CompStat does not measure community members’ feelings of safety or level of trust in the police department. It is difficult to continuously measure changes in community trust or perceptions of safety or procedural justice. George Kelling suggests that CompStat systems must reflect all of the values the police should be pursuing. This demands that we clearly understand these values, operationalize them, and develop measurement processes. Relying solely on data that police departments already collect is weak analysis and evaluation.

Timely, accurate measures of problem solving, community engagement, satisfaction, and perceptions of trust have to be created, captured, and maintained in databases. These measures have to be captured at the police district or neighborhood level to be useful in assessing accountability and change. Some would even argue that these data are needed at a shift level to understand fluctuations. Here then is the crux of the problem in aligning CompStat with community policing and 21st century policing. What should be measured, how, and with what frequency to push departments into the changes required for this century?

Possible approaches. New measures for policing must be developed jointly with all ranks of a police department, city government, non-government organizations, and residents. Jerry Ratcliffe offers one possibility to our measurement problem.¹⁶ He suggests that police departments should think in terms of harm reduction, which is much broader than crime reduction. A harm index could weigh the harm a crime creates in a community and also the harm a police tactic may cause. Such an index would acknowledge that a high frequency of less serious crimes may produce a similar level of harm to a moderate frequency of serious crimes, something that just a raw count of Part I and Part II crimes (violent and property crimes) misses. Including a weight for street stops would acknowledge that there is some cost to this tactic. Harm indicators can also include non-crime measures. Community representatives, police, and city representatives can work together to develop and test harm measures for their city.

Another example of capturing and using timely non-crime data is described by McCarthy and Rosenbaum¹⁷ as RespectStat. Survey data are collected from individuals in Chicago who had a recent contact with a police officer as a result of a traffic stop or crime report. The survey focuses on the procedural justice aspects of the encounter and police legitimacy. The data are collected and managed by the University of Illinois at Chicago; comparisons can be drawn across police districts, geographical areas, or periods of time. Users could also examine data within a district over time. The same data could be mapped. One can imagine an overlay of crime hot spots with hot spots of dissatisfaction with police service.

One inhibitor to using such measures is the cost associated with the collection of the data. Community surveys can be costly. There is also the bias associated with self-reporting by respondents. The methodological and statistical basis for these data collection protocols must be made available to other police departments so that they can adopt and implement them in a cost-effective manner.

Including other participants in CompStat meetings

Innovative measures like those already discussed along with measures of community wellness can help the police, the community, and city politicians begin to focus on more than just crime as a measure of success. As measures expand beyond those directly controlled by the police, responsibility and accountability for improving outcomes should also expand to include community residents, city employees, and representatives from non-government agencies.

So measures are only part of moving to CompStat 2.0. Another aspect is identifying who participates in the CompStat meetings and shares accountability. There must be political will and the courage to open the doors of the CompStat room and invite others to participate in co-producing public safety. Some departments allow the media into their CompStat sessions. However, at least one executive command-level law enforcement leader has noted that this dampens the free and candid exchange of ideas and often results in a “dog and pony” show that provides little benefit to the department.

It is not just policing, but government in general, that is reluctant to invite non-government people and entities into the decision-making process. Expanding participation in CompStat meetings requires being honest in terms of what can and cannot be done, relinquishing some decision-making power, defining roles and responsibilities for all participants, and losing some control. This is a fundamental cultural shift for police and government leadership.

16. Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “Harm-Focused Policing, Ideas in American Policing,” *Ideas in American Policing* 19 (2015), 1–12, <https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/harm-focused-policing/>.

17. Garry F. McCarthy and Dennis P. Rosenbaum, “From CompStat to RespectStat: Accountability for Respectful Policing,” *The Police Chief* 8 (August 2015), 76–78, <http://www.policchiefmagazine.org/from-compstat-to-respectstat-accountability-for-respectful-policing/>.

Possible approaches. Examples of integrating community concerns, community participation, and community perceptions into the CompStat process are hard to find. Joint community, police, and city agency problem solving is one way to make that entry. Such efforts must occur at the lowest and most local levels—in the neighborhoods. As people sit down together to address a shared problem, the barriers lessen and respect and trust increases. Issues that extend beyond the ability of the local district commander and residents are brought to a citywide meeting. At such a meeting, police and city leaders, representatives from community and organizations, and others will work together to help provide the resources and support needed by the local neighborhood. The goal is not only to address crime and disorder problems but also to jointly revise key policies like use of force and making resource allocations. CompStat 2.0 meetings become problem-solving meetings occurring in various geographical areas addressing problems of a local neighborhood, issues of departmental policy, and even reallocating city resources. This begins to move the model from community policing to community government.

Joint community and police problem-solving groups are not new. We need to revisit these efforts, learn from them, and adopt successful models to today's environment. This model building work must involve all potential participants—police, city agencies, community-based organizations, and community residents—to be successful.

Developing supportive technology

A final key element of the traditional CompStat was using technology to advance the organizational change. This element encompasses more than just new means of delivering information. Today our informational exchange assumes a fairly passive recipient. Police departments present data and then perhaps facilitate a conversation around those data. That is the format for CompStat meetings, bulletins to officers, and alerts to community members. Even the open data movement is one of presenting raw data hoping someone will do something with it. We must move from a “need to share” to a “need to act” orientation. Technology can help foster this change in orientation by reducing bureaucracy, identifying alternative solutions, and encouraging feedback.

Possible approaches. We must use our data and technology not just to inform but also to engage our partners in collaboration. This requires that the technology collect the data that is meaningful to all participants in ways that are cost effective. We need to understand how to mine the data that already exist in a variety of systems—911 and CAD, 311 requests, surveys, and social media—to broaden our understanding, to expand our actions, and to hold ourselves and others accountable. In today's global world, a problem-solving group can be developed around a community of interest instead of a geographical community. Likewise, it may be possible for people from other communities—or even countries—to become involved by offering strategy recommendations to a neighborhood in Philadelphia, for example.

We must explore how to use existing technology like social media and body camera videos to bring more insight into police and community interactions. We need to experiment with apps that allow residents and police officers to instantly rate the quality of a police contact. We must encourage the exploration of how “big data” and algorithms can use crime, 311, school attendance, public health, and other data to produce indicators of community wellness that are sensitive enough to monitor changes over time.

Conclusion

CompStat changed policing. It did so through measurement, accountability meetings, and technology. CompStat 2.0 can use these same building blocks but adapt them for the challenges of the 21st century. These challenges to policing and government are reflective of the emerging values of co-production and co-governing, transparency and accountability, fairness, and ensuring constitutional rights. Our measurement and accountability systems and use of technology must be based on these values.

Today it is difficult to imagine how policing will look in 2090. Hopefully, we can agree on what we do not want. We can work together to lay the stepping stones to a future we want for all of our children's children.

Robert F. Kennedy said, "Every society gets the kind of criminal it deserves. What is equally true is that every community gets the kind of law enforcement it insists on."¹⁸ Our communities are insisting on policing that is accountable, collaborative, fair, and trustworthy. We must work with them to figure out ways to measure and hold each other accountable for achieving those goals.

18. Robert F. Kennedy, *Statement by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Government Operations Committee* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 1963), <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/09-25-1963.pdf>.

Improving CompStat Structures and Processes for Application to Community Policing

Stephen D. Mastrofski and James J. Willis

The marriage of CompStat to community policing may be a powerful way to increase the effectiveness of implementing the latter. Yet research suggests that the two popular reforms tend to be stovepiped in most American police organizations, each operating largely independent of the other.¹⁹ Following are a few recommendations on steps that could be taken to make CompStat and community policing more effective when they are integrated.

Striking a balance between accountability and inventiveness

CompStat has proven most effective at promoting performance accountability among police middle managers, but that has come at the cost of inventiveness. CompStat has stimulated police commanders to stay informed about problems that emerge on their beats. They are motivated to identify those problems early and to act quickly to do something about them. However, the accountability mechanisms have discouraged the more time-intensive efforts to understand the nature of these problems and to develop and experiment with novel and potentially more effective ways of dealing with them. That is to say, CompStat's focus on accountability has reduced police organizations' capacity and inclination to engage in true problem-oriented policing.

Sometimes the short leash of accountability is helpful—when problems are readily identified and an effective response has been well established. Routinized responses can be applied with the typically high level of accountability for implementation that has been the trademark of CompStat in the past. However, sometimes a more creative, trial-and-error approach will have greater success. An adaptive organization must find ways to incorporate both capabilities into its structures and processes. The value of a less structured, more creative approach was demonstrated in the British military's creation of a special unit at Bletchley Park during World War II to crack the German cypher used by the Enigma machines. An example of a similar experience in policing was the creation of an entirely new way of framing and responding to drug trafficking and violence through Boston's Operation Ceasefire.

That is to say, police organizations need to find ways to incorporate the “skunk works” concept into their problem-solving and accountability systems. (A “skunk works” is a small part of the organization that is protected from many of the bureaucratic features that govern the rest of the organization to facilitate creative exploration and problem solving.). This is especially so to advance police organization performance according to criteria embedded in community policing, problem solving, and evidence-based policing. Because community policing is a nebulous concept—and because defining what matters rests heavily on the beliefs, values, and perceptions of the public—a much higher degree of flexibility must be established in the accountability and problem-response structure. It is not reasonable to simply transplant a few new statistical outcomes to CompStat (e.g., community satisfaction, fear of crime, confidence and trust in police) and expect the system to facilitate community policing.

19. Willis, Mastrofski, and Kochel, “The Co-Implementation of CompStat” (see note 1).

One of the key elements of CompStat that must change to accommodate truly effective community policing is greater flexibility with regard to the scope of the problem and the time frame for responding. CompStat has traditionally stimulated a rather limited scope for identifying problems (organizing them according to the organization chart—by borough, precinct, and patrol zone) rather than looking for problems that may extend across such zones. Similarly, CompStat has done little to overcome the limitations of “rapid-response” policing. It encourages a “whack-a-mole” response to police problems, which constrains the thoughtfulness and creativity of responses. It also tends to focus commanders’ attention on short-term problems and short-term solutions. Short-term fixes have their place, but effective community policing and problem solving requires a long-term approach as well.

One way to accomplish this is to develop an organizational framework that accommodates the skunk works approach. When a complex problem worthy of intensive problem solving is identified and “certified” by top management, the organization needs to be able to create a special team or task force that is well-suited to studying the problem, developing strategies for solving it, monitoring its implementation, evaluating its impact, and making recommendations for implementation. Such a task force might include persons with a wide range of skills and responsibilities from across the organization—whoever seems best suited to contribute to the problem-solving process. Regular participation by entities from outside the organization is possible (local university researchers, community stakeholders, personnel from other government organizations). This special team or task force needs to be held accountable too, but according to different criteria than are commonly used for police commanders in CompStat. Persons outside the organization may also be asked to play an important role in evaluating the efforts of the special team. The police organization must be committed to rewarding high quality performance by persons serving on these teams. Of course, one of the benefits of a skunk works structure is that it is temporary and is dissolved once its purpose has been served. There is a substantial literature on what and what not to do with skunk works that can be drawn upon to incorporate this structure into CompStat.²⁰

Coping with measurement matters

One of the great strengths of CompStat is also its Achilles heel. Strong accountability structures are linked to consequences for individuals and units in the organization. The more performance affects outcomes for individuals and units, the greater the pressure to perform. Strong organizational pressures to perform increase the risks of gaming or even abusing the system. Organizational behavior and management scholars call this “goal displacement.” For example, the goal of reducing crime gets displaced by the goal of making crime statistics go down, but that is accomplished by reclassifying events, misreporting them, or under-reporting them. Several evaluations of CompStat have suggested that such goal displacement has occurred under the pressures generated by CompStat. So how can CompStat 2.0 reduce the risk of this organizational pathology when applied to community policing?

First, any given element of performance should be measured, as much as possible, using more than one indicator. Ideally, these indicators will be sufficiently diverse that it would be difficult

20. Gu Jing, “The Success Factors for Successful Skunk Works,” master’s thesis, Halmstad University, Halmstad, Sweden, 2013, <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:718988/FULLTEXT01.pdf>; Matthew E. May, “The Rules of Successful Skunk Works Projects,” Fast Company, last modified October 9, 2012, <https://www.fastcompany.com/3001702/rules-successful-skunk-works-projects>; “Kelly’s 14 Rules & Practices,” Lockheed Martin, accessed September 29, 2016, <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/aeronautics/skunkworks/14rules.html>.

for a small number of people to pervert the reliability of the data. For example, department data on crime classifications (e.g., distinguishing between different levels of theft according to the amount taken or distinguishing between different levels of seriousness of assault) require the judgment of individuals whose units are being judged. Consequently, it is also advantageous to use data in which those evaluated do not have a hand in constructing (e.g., victimization surveys). The same goes for complaints against police officers. The police department's system of recording, classifying, and assessing community complaints may—even unintentionally—bias estimates of police misbehavior, so it is useful to have another means of measuring this (e.g., follow-up surveys of a sample of individuals who have had recent contact with the police).

Second, the entire CompStat system should be subjected to annual auditing by a qualified outside organization. Just as private sector companies are routinely audited to protect investors and taxpayers, so police departments' statistical accountability systems should be audited for integrity and accuracy.²¹

Mobilizing the entire organization

One of the limitations of CompStat noted in prior research is the truncated scope of its impact down the organizational hierarchy. CompStat displayed a profound effect on those whose performance was regularly held to account through the periodic CompStat meetings (typically middle and upper management), but it virtually evaporated at lower levels of the organization, the very levels where the work must get executed. First-line supervisors and the rank and file were largely ignorant of what went on at CompStat meetings, and although CompStat might have a big effect on the strategies and tactics that their division commanders might direct them to employ, the opportunity for helping the rank and file understand and appreciate why they were being required to do as directed was overlooked. CompStat can and should do more than merely offer a way to help bureaucracies select better strategies and execute command and control more effectively. CompStat needs to inspire the rank and file or at least play an important role in winning the hearts and minds of those who exercise the greatest discretion in determining how policing is done.

One way to do this is to promote a departmental culture that makes better use of social media (websites, Facebook, Twitter) to communicate to the rank and file. But the communication needs to be two-way. A few departments have created district-level CompStat meetings as a way to do this.²² A truly effective CompStat will support and monitor the efforts of the division commanders to solicit input from those subordinates most likely to be familiar with street-level problems and mobilize them to implement the tactics and strategies that are selected. This is especially relevant for effective implementation of community policing.

21. Stephen D. Mastrofski, "Policing for People," *Ideas in American Policing* (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1999), 8, <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Mastrofski-1999-Policing-For-People.pdf>.

22. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Tammy Rinehart Kochel, "Recommendations for Integrating CompStat and Community Policing," *Policing* 4, no. 2 (2010), 182–193, <http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/content/4/2/182.full.pdf+html>.

Bring the community into CompStat

CompStat in most departments has concentrated most of its effort on establishing greater internal control of the police organization, strengthening top management's capacity to get the rest of the organization to do things that produce desirable results. But the central value of community policing is to bring the community into the picture. Over time some departments have made the CompStat meetings open for the public to observe, and many departments are now also making the statistical results reported at CompStat meetings available to the public. This is appropriate, but a true commitment to integrating CompStat and community policing will go beyond the community serving in essentially passive roles.

CompStat 2.0 could do much more to give different community groups a role in nominating and debating the issues and performance measures that will command the attention of the CompStat enterprise. CompStat 2.0 could find ways to incorporate neighborhood-level input into what problems should be monitored in a given area of the city, and this could and would vary by area. Community groups could play an important role in nominating problems for the special teams to deal with as well as participating on those teams in devising and implementing solutions to the problems identified (as suggested earlier). Finally, police could benefit from community input on what aspects of police performance are measured. For example, CompStat programs of the past have focused heavily on law enforcement and crime control indicators, whereas the community tends to be at least as interested in police responsiveness to a wide range of problems, procedural justice, and equitable service delivery.

Make scientific research more accessible within the organization

Problem-oriented policing relies upon access to scientific knowledge of the benefits and downsides of different strategies and tactics. Many police organizations claim to be committed to evidence-based policing, but it is not at all obvious that this commitment has been integrated into CompStat. Indeed, most evaluations of CompStat show that problem solutions chosen tend to focus on what staff members think has worked in the past in their organization, what they hear from other police organizations, or whatever strategy enjoys current popularity. A search and consideration of scientific evidence rarely occurs. There is a growing number of proposals about how to get organizations to more effectively integrate science into the decision-making structures and processes of police organizations (see also research by Cody Telep, Cynthia Lum, and colleagues).²³ Further, some have suggested ways to team the best that craft has to offer with this evidence-based approach.²⁴

23. Cynthia Lum et al., "Receptivity to Research in Policing," *Justice Research and Policy* 14, no. 1 (2012), 61–95, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3818/JRP.14.1.2012.61?journalCode=jrxa>; Lawrence W. Sherman, "A Tipping Point for 'Totally Evidenced Policing': Ten Ideas for Building an Evidence-Based Police Agency," *International Criminal Justice Review* 25, no. 1 (2015), 11–29, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1057567715574372>.

24. James J. Willis and Stephen D. Mastrofski, "Pulling Together: Integrating Craft and Science," *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 8, no. 4 (2014), 321–329, <http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/4/321.full.pdf+html>.

Reflections on CompStat in the Community Era of Policing

Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean

Introduction

CompStat is an administrative innovation designed to hold mid-level police commanders accountable for achieving crime-reduction results. Introduced as part of the “reengineering” of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in the mid-1990s, CompStat has been widely emulated by police agencies across the United States and around the world.²⁵ CompStat has also been adopted by other types of public agencies and by city mayors and even state governors; Robert Behn calls it, more generically, “PerformanceStat.”²⁶ In theory, CompStat can be an organizational mechanism that serves first to direct attention to important police outcomes and second to stimulate the formulation and implementation of tactical and strategic operations that are directed toward those outcomes.²⁷ It appears to have been successful in the NYPD in terms of crime reduction, though no rigorous evaluation has been conducted.

No agency is like the NYPD, however, and in order to reap the benefits of CompStat, care must be taken to adapt the structure and process of CompStat to the distinct settings of individual police agencies while remaining true to the fundamental tenets of CompStat. But research shows that as popular as CompStat has become in police circles, it is one thing to have an administrative structure that resembles CompStat and quite another to have a structure that stimulates innovative, data-driven problem solving by operational commanders.²⁸ Realizing the potential of CompStat in different agency settings is a challenge. Moreover, the further evolution of CompStat in the community era of policing confronts challenges both in harnessing its organizational power to the range of outcomes for which the public holds police responsible and in applying CompStat-like principles and mechanisms to the implementation of community policing.²⁹

We consider these challenges in this paper. We draw on the literature and also our observations and interviews in several police departments in the course of conducting research or providing technical assistance. We have, in the course of our work as research partners, observed CompStat meetings in several agencies ranging in size from about 500 to 1,500 sworn officers in addition to the NYPD. We have also assisted two smaller agencies (with about 150 sworn officers) in upstate New York in establishing CompStat mechanisms and evaluating their processes through their first year of operation, and we conducted a process evaluation of a third agency’s CompStat mechanism.

25. William Bratton, “Chapter 14,” *Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic* (New York: Random House, 1998); David Weisburd et al., “Reforming to Preserve: CompStat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing,” *Criminology and Public Policy* 2, no. 3 (2002), 421–456, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2003.tb00006.x/pdf>.

26. Robert D. Behn, *The Seven Big Errors of PerformanceStat* (Cambridge, MA: Kennedy School of Government, 2008), <http://ksghauser.harvard.edu/index.php/content/download/68608/1247242/version/1/file/performancestat.pdf>.

27. Mark Moore, *Recognizing Value in Policing: The Challenge of Measuring Police Performance* (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2002).

28. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastroski, and David Weisburd, *CompStat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities* (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2003), <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Willis-et-al.-2004-CompStat-in-Practice.pdf>; Eli B. Silverman, “CompStat’s Innovation,” in *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, ed. David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Behn, *Seven Big Errors* (see note 27).

29. George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore, “From Political to Reform to Community: The Evolving Strategy of Police,” in *Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality*, ed. Jack R. Greene and Stephen D. Mastroski (New York: Praeger, 1988).

Transplanting CompStat from the NYPD

Perhaps the most widely recognized features of the NYPD's CompStat are (1) twice-weekly meetings with a precinct commander at a podium fielding pointed questions about patterns of crime and the precinct's efforts to address them and (2) the maps projected on a large screen that depict those crime patterns in spatial terms. But in fact CompStat is much more, a system of performance measurement that undergirds the CompStat meetings and enables police managers to track important outcomes and a distribution of managerial responsibility and authority. As a system of performance measurement, CompStat focuses attention on valued outcomes and provides a means of both formulating data-driven plans to improve outcomes and assessing the success with which police units have produced valuable results. In this respect, CompStat may be an antidote to the common police malady—the means over ends syndrome—that was diagnosed many years ago by Herman Goldstein, who observed that police administrators who “have succeeded in developing a high level of operating efficiency have not gone on to concern themselves with the end results of their efforts—with the actual impacts that their streamlined organizations have on the problems the police are called upon to handle.”³⁰ The success of CompStat turns on what is measured, how it is measured, and the uses to which that information is put—not only during CompStat meetings but also and especially during the days and weeks between CompStat meetings. In a nutshell, the essential components of CompStat are (1) a specification of who is accountable for what, (2) the development of an information system that enables both parties—those who are being held accountable and those to whom they are accountable—to measure performance in terms of the outcomes for which the former are accountable and which supports analysis that can drive operational decision making, and (3) a mechanism for enforcing accountability.

The NYPD's CompStat was guided by four principles:

1. Timely, accurate data
2. Selection of effective tactics
3. Rapid, focused deployment of resources
4. Relentless follow-up and assessment³¹

Patrol—often hailed as the backbone of police departments—was at the center of this process, as precinct commanders bore the primary responsibility for selecting tactics and deploying resources. Information about crime was made available to them with the expectation that they would use it to become aware of conditions in their precincts that demanded attention and to gain some insight into the dynamics of crime problems. Precinct commanders were empowered to use their resources to address identified problems, thereby enhancing the department's agility, and they were expected to follow through to the resolution of those problems. Either other more specialized functions were subject to patrol commanders' authority or the specialized units that performed these functions were strongly expected to cooperate as needed.

30. Herman Goldstein, “Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach,” *Crime and Delinquency* 25 (1979), 239, <http://cad.sagepub.com/content/25/2/236.full.pdf+html>.

31. Bratton, *Turnaround*, 224 (see note 26).

But some research on CompStat, and our own experience with it, shows that the replication of CompStat in other agencies has not always adhered to the same principles and has encountered several problems. In contrast with the NYPD, a bureaucracy of gargantuan proportions, and New York City, a city of more than eight million people, the more typical American police agency—even if we consider only those that serve communities with a population of at least 30,000—is a small enough organization that its employees can all be acquainted with one another, serving a city that is no larger in population than one or two of the NYPD’s precincts. In many of these agencies, unit commanders cannot be readily replaced based on their failures to meet the department’s expectations, whereas in the NYPD, two-thirds of the precinct commanders were replaced in the first year of then Commissioner William Bratton’s administration in the mid-1990s. These agencies’ information systems may not rival that of the NYPD—their analytical staff may be disproportionately smaller (or nonexistent)—and so they may not support so robust a CompStat infrastructure as well as the NYPD can. Geographic organization of command (i.e., placing around-the-clock responsibility for a specified area in a single police manager) is not feasible in smaller agencies.³² In view of these and other differences, we would not expect that the details of CompStat operation would be the same in these agencies as in the NYPD but rather that CompStat would be adapted to each agency’s organizational structure and environment. CompStat, however, does not come with a user’s guide, complete with directions on how it can be adjusted while remaining faithful to the principles that made it successful in the NYPD.

Previous research in agencies other than the NYPD has found that CompStat is loosely coupled with practice. In police and other “institutionalized” organizations we sometimes find structures that are not tightly (or at all) connected to day-to-day practices—practices with which the structures may not even be compatible in principle—and that are only loosely coupled with (or decoupled from) the technical core of the organization in which the main work gets done. In their study of three agencies’ CompStat mechanisms, James Willis and his colleagues report that accountability extended down past the precinct or district commanders in none of the departments, with no “efforts to get the rank and file to respond to the direction of middle managers,” and consequently CompStat “did not strengthen control over lower-ranking officers who continued to exercise the same high level of discretion long recognized as a characteristic of police work.”³³ Commanders succeeded in the context of the CompStat meetings by being prepared with facts and figures to respond to the chief’s questions and not by devising and implementing effective crime reduction strategies. Willis and colleagues opine that tighter coupling would have lowered morale, required changes in civil service laws to make it possible to remove underperforming commanders, and required additional resources for analysis (and thus fewer resources for other more traditional and well-established police functions). From our observations, the loose coupling of CompStat to street-level performance stemmed from unclear expectations for commanders, too little follow-up, and too few consequences for managers.

32. Weisburd et al., “Reforming to Preserve” (see note 26).

33. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd, “Making Sense of CompStat: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police Departments,” *Law & Society Review* 41 (2007), 147–188, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5893.2007.00294.x/full>.

Expectations

Among the “seven big errors” committed in the implementation of PerformanceStat, Behn lists one as a failure to convert “clear purposes into specific responsibilities.” Responsibilities, he goes on to explain, could take the form of reaching output targets, reaching outcome targets, or developing new strategies. In our experience, the assignment of responsibilities—and, with them, the specification of expectations for commanders—has often been implicit and hence not well understood.

In one agency with which we worked, some of the commanders understood their CompStat-related responsibilities to revolve around the commander profiles and the counts therein—either personnel matters (staffing, sick leave) or outputs (arrests, tickets). In another agency, many commanders told us that the expectations for their participation in the CompStat meetings were unclear. They presumed that their role was to be ready to talk about important cases or incidents and to be prepared to tell the group what had occurred and how they were addressing the incident or case. Several commanders believed they were expected to come to meetings to “report out” statistics.

As we began our study of injecting measures of procedural justice into two agencies’ CompStat mechanisms, we found among platoon commanders the following perception:

The assessment of police performance was nearly exclusively numbers-driven (e.g., number of tickets, number of drug buys, number of field contacts, number of arrests, number of crimes). They described expectations for their role as it relates to Compstat in terms of “being on top of the numbers,” “identifying patterns,” and being prepared to explain during the meeting what they had done to address the patterns or numbers.³⁴

With respect to expectations for follow-up between meetings, some commanders felt that their roles and responsibilities were clear but others were uncertain. Those who could clearly describe expectations generally described their role between meetings as one of regularly reviewing reports and cases to stay on top of them and, based on that review, drawing their subordinates’ attention to spikes or problems and deploying resources accordingly.

Commanders could draw inferences from the outputs and outcomes tracked for and discussed at CompStat meetings, but these counts do not speak for themselves. Outputs—arrests, tickets, field contacts—are important mainly as the manifestations or byproducts of effective operations. But simple counts of outputs by platoon or unit, which would be informative as measures of raw “productivity,” do not capture the connections between outputs and outcomes. Spatial or temporal analysis that allows for an assessment of the connections between the outputs and the crime patterns would be more useful but was rarely performed.

Accountability

Research on CompStat raises but does not answer the question of how—that is, with what rewards and sanctions—commanders should be held accountable. In the early days of CompStat in the NYPD, the stakes for precinct commanders were high: Those who performed well could expect to be praised during CompStat meetings and to advance in the NYPD hierarchy, and those who performed unsatisfactorily could expect to be berated and humiliated during

34. Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean, *Mirage of Police Reform: Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 154.

CompStat meetings and to lose their commands. Whether such serious consequences are necessary in order to motivate commanders to work conscientiously to meet the expectations that CompStat imposes on them is not clear. In the context of many smaller agencies, the question is to a degree academic, inasmuch as the opportunities for advancement are limited, and the risk of losing one's command is small.

Mark Moore and Anthony Braga describe how a system of performance measurement can be analogized to a generator:

An important part of the design of a performance measurement system . . . is to get the amount of current right. If too much voltage runs through the system, the organization may become paralyzed or lose its capacity to be imaginative and resourceful in responding to new situations. If too little voltage is generated, the organization may well grow slack and inattentive.³⁵

The voltage is shaped in part by the extent to which it is “tied to real consequences for the managers, affecting their salaries, status, or prospects for advancement.”³⁶ Behn echoes these observations on the need to strike a “balance between the brutal and the bland.” He explains that “in an overreaction to the NYPD's and Baltimore's reputation [as ‘brutal and punitive’], some jurisdictions and agencies have consciously tried to make their meetings as harmonious as possible. As a result, their meetings have become mostly show-and-tell.”³⁷

This is a very delicate balance to strike—especially in smaller agencies, where the prospects for the reassignment of an underperforming commander are quite limited, as there are few degrees of administrative freedom at that level. In one agency whose CompStat process we examined, commanders' assignments are determined by seniority bidding, such that reassignment was a practical impossibility. In another agency whose commanders we interviewed, we found a high level of uncertainty regarding the consequences for a commander's failure to meet expectations. The commanders took one of three views on this matter: (1) that there would be no consequences, (2) that there might be consequences but of an unknown nature (e.g., “I guess it would go in your personnel file” or “maybe it would be reflected in your performance appraisal”), or (3) that the consequences would be shame or humiliation in front of one's peers.

Furthermore, in no agency whose CompStat meetings we have observed was the treatment of commanders brutal. To the contrary, if commanders' professional pride and reputation were their principal stakes in meeting CompStat demands and expectations, they were not at risk. We cannot be sure, but one reason for that may be that in smaller agencies the command staff are well-acquainted with one another, and so in some—perhaps many—instances, social pressure inhibits even the kind of follow-up that might prove to be embarrassing for a commander who has not fulfilled his or her CompStat responsibilities. Under these circumstances, the voltage running through the performance measurement system is quite low—too low to establish tight coupling between CompStat and practice.

35. Mark H. Moore and Anthony A. Braga, “Measuring and Improving Police Performance: The Lessons of CompStat and its Progeny,” *Policing* 26 (2003): 442, <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/13639510310489485>.

36. *Ibid.*, 443.

37. Behn, *Seven Big Errors* (see note 27).

Engaging multiple levels

Decisions about tactics and deployment are ultimately the responsibility of unit commanders, and we would expect that this work would be done on a day-to-day and week-to-week basis by commanders and their subordinates throughout the chain of command. Commissioner Bratton described “four levels of CompStat,” including the empowerment (and “interrogation”) not only of precinct commanders but also of platoon commanders, field supervisors (sergeants), and officers, in turn down the chain of command.³⁸ All of the pertinent levels—in smaller agencies, some of these levels may not exist—should be incorporated into structures that would support tactical decision making and problem solving. A structure by which district or precinct commanders can engage platoon commanders in the CompStat process and platoon commanders can engage field supervisors is necessary to engage all levels of the organization. This need not involve attendance at CompStat meetings. It would involve a statement of responsibilities in the process, regular consultation concerning crime and disorder conditions, and the formulation of operational plans to address those conditions.

Problem-oriented policing

Some accounts of CompStat hold that it is intended to facilitate problem-oriented policing. “Problems” are understood as constellations of related incidents whose common features—when they occur, where they occur, what kinds of people are involved as victims or perpetrators—may afford the police some leverage, allowing for responses that alter the conditions that give rise to the incidents. Problem-oriented policing requires not only a recognition that incidents are related to one another but also analysis of the conditions that contribute to the problem and that are within the power of police (or their partners or both) to alter. Moreover, problem-oriented policing is thought to be most effective when the search for responses that might alter the identified conditions is not limited to the enforcement of the penal law. Problem-oriented policing is a demonstrably effective approach that is more strategic in nature than traditional “incident-driven” policing.

Like problem-oriented policing, CompStat is data-driven and outcome-oriented, yet CompStat as it is commonly implemented is decidedly tactical in its applications. That it is should be no mystery, as the original principles of CompStat are predicated on tactical operations, and several features of CompStat tilt heavily toward tactical applications: Commanders attend to short-term crime spikes or crime series through equally short-term redeployment of personnel resources or targeted investigation. In one agency, the primary sources of information on which most commanders rely include daily review of incident (crime) reports, the weekly CompStat report, informal communication within and between units, and follow-up with the crime analysis unit where necessary. Based on the advice of a retired NYPD officer turned consultant, commanders read every incident report that their officers prepare. The CompStat report focuses on the current week, the preceding week, and the previous 28 days. The 28-day CompStat time horizon, over which crime patterns are most intensively analyzed, may not be optimal for all purposes in any agency, however, and fortunately, the short-term crime spikes in many smaller cities are not normally so frequent or so pronounced that the monthly incidence of crime forms patterns that commanders can address. Generally there is little emphasis on and support for problem solving and a more strategic focus. Analysis is better suited to addressing short-term crime spikes and not well suited to supporting efforts to address longer-term problems, for which an analysis of longer time horizons would be essential.

38. Bratton, *Turnaround*, 239 (see note 26).

Meeting function and format

In 2005 and 2006, the Lowell (Massachusetts) Police Department (LPD) undertook an experimental test of the effect of problem-oriented policing at crime and disorder hot spots, and for this purpose, the LPD convened monthly problem-solving meetings in addition to its biweekly CompStat meetings, which had been held since 1995 (the LPD is one of the three departments in which Willis and his colleagues found a loosely-coupled CompStat). Brenda Bond and Anthony Braga not only evaluated the impacts of the intervention but also analyzed the two types of meetings, finding differences in meeting inputs, processes, and outputs.³⁹ They found the greatest differences in three domains: (1) communication and information sharing, (2) collaborative planning, and (3) the use of the skill sets of the actors. In the problem-solving meetings, communication was more likely to be multilateral and to engage lower-ranking participants, resulting in more collaboration, better understandings of problems, and more numerous and diverse responses.

The LPD's problem-solving meetings served a different purpose than CompStat meetings. Bond and Braga describe the problem-solving meetings as "an ongoing scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA) process." The meetings were occasions on which collective efforts were brought to bear in defining the problems, identifying conditions that contributed to the problems, and strategizing about how to address those conditions. We can imagine that meetings of this kind could be organized at subdepartment levels to engage lower levels of the organization, as we described earlier.

CompStat meetings are not primarily the settings in which analysis is performed and responses—of a tactical or strategic nature—are fashioned. One now retired member of the NYPD described CompStat meetings to us as "public audits," that is, occasions on which stock is taken of the ongoing work of identifying crime patterns and formulating tactical interventions. But if the meetings are little more than "show and tell," then they do not serve this purpose. If the meetings are more than merely show and tell and the voltage running through the performance measurement system is sufficient to command managers' attention, then commanders might reasonably gravitate toward conventional police tactics, which more reliably produce evidence of their efforts in addressing crime or disorder problems and away from more innovative approaches whose elements may not be documented in customary police records. One department in which we have done research recently scaled its biweekly CompStat meetings back to monthly, instead holding weekly "operations" meetings that resemble the LPD's problem-solving meetings.

Meeting frequency

The operational focus of CompStat is related to the frequency with which meetings are convened, but once again, a balance must be struck. Willis and colleagues point out the following:

Meeting every two weeks means that district commanders often feel pressured to do *something* quickly in the hope that a hot spot will turn cold by the next reporting period. Such a CompStat system merely moves "fire-brigade" or incident-driven reactive policing to the middle management level as district commanders rush from crime spike to crime spike.⁴⁰

39. Brenda J. Bond and Anthony A. Braga, "Rethinking the CompStat Process to Enhance Problem-Solving Responses: Insights from a Randomized Field Experiment," *Police Practice & Research* 16, no. 1 (2015), 22–35; Anthony Braga and Brenda J. Bond, "Policing Crime and Disorder Hotspots: A Randomized, Controlled Trial" *Criminology* 46, no. 3 (2008): 577–607, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2008.00124.x/epdf>.

40. Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd, "Making Sense of CompStat," 188 (see note 34).

It would be better, in their view, to allow time for more completely analyzed problems and more fully developed responses.

However, meetings must be held frequently enough to get and keep commanders' attention, to keep them focused on the achievement of valued outcomes, to keep chiefs informed about operational targets and tactics, and to provide feedback on the effectiveness of operational decisions. No standard exists, to our knowledge. Some agencies meet weekly, some biweekly, and some monthly. The frequency with which meetings are held depends to some extent on the pace at which new and meaningful performance information takes shape. In smaller agencies with lower volumes of crime, calls for service, and other police-community contacts, monthly meetings would probably suffice. In larger agencies with higher volumes, more frequent meetings may be desirable. As Behn points out, "if performance data are available only monthly, it makes little sense to hold biweekly meetings."⁴¹

The periodicity of the CompStat meetings need not define the time frame across which commanders and chiefs scan for, analyze, and address crime and disorder problems. Commanders—and CompStat meetings—can and should address problems that are comprised of incidents occurring over a much longer duration. Regular (e.g., monthly) CompStat meetings would serve to provide the "relentless follow-up" that is so often missing when police agencies practice problem-oriented policing.

Analysis

Problem-oriented policing calls for a use of data and analysis that tends to be resisted in many organizational settings and which we might expect to be resisted especially strongly in police settings. In their review of the book *Moneyball*, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein point out the sources of resistance to using numerical data and analysis, rather than the wisdom based on experience ("professional intuitions"), even in organizations—professional baseball teams—in which the pressure of market competition is intense, the performance of organizational members is public, success (and failure) is unambiguous, and the stakes are very high.⁴² In 1999, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics, Billy Beane, espoused the use of data on performance in making judgments about players' talents, and he privileged the use of analytic results ("Sabermetrics") over conventional wisdom in game tactics. Scouts and field managers resisted. The resistance was fundamentally human, inasmuch as human decision making is only boundedly rational, relying on heuristics that simplify and accelerate decisions even though they also yield errors.⁴³ The resistance was also organizational, rooted in organizational norms whose prescriptions were incompatible with Beane's approach.

The A's proved quite successful, and in time baseball executives and others have come to better appreciate the utility of data and analysis. But if data and analysis confronted resistance in the highly visible, market-driven, easily evaluated baseball environment, what would we expect in police organizations, where the performance of organizational members is of low visibility (though that is changing), there is no market pressure, and success is hard to judge? We have

41. Behn, *Seven Big Errors*, 5 (see note 27).

42. Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, "Market Efficiency and Rationality: The Peculiar Case of Baseball," *Michigan Law Review* 102 (2004): 1390–1403, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4141950?seq=1 - page_scan_tab_contents.

43. Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1947); James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958); Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Judgments Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," *Science* 185 (1974): 1124–1131, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8; Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).

seen what we should have expected to see: Police engaged in problem-oriented policing tend to focus on narrowly defined problems, skip over or give short shrift to the analysis that supports the formulation of multifaceted responses, and rely on conventional, enforcement-based responses, with the likes of which they are already familiar.⁴⁴ Even if CompStat was redesigned to render it more structurally compatible with problem-oriented policing, we should anticipate a gradual and halting adaptation to the practice of problem solving.

Thaler and Sunstein also caution that poor measures of performance—measures that poorly represent important dimensions of performance—can distort decision making that is based on them. Performance measures that are based on data that happen to be available may not be valid measures of any dimension of performance or, even if they form valid measures of some aspect of performance, may not be measures of important dimensions of performance. Thaler and Sunstein point to the save statistic in baseball as a “dumb statistic” (though it retains a lot of currency in professional baseball). We might point to response time in policing, which in most instances is unrelated to desirable outcomes. Some performance measures are incomplete. Thaler and Sunstein explain why batting average—which neglects walks—is deficient. In policing, counts of stops or field interviews—which neglect their location and time—do not suffice to indicate the potential crime control value of these preventive activities.

These difficulties in conducting sound analysis are compounded by the limitations of police information systems. Even with well-trained crime analysts responsible for analyzing crime, the what, when, where, and who analysis that is feasible with the data in record management systems supports mainly traditional tactics. More innovative responses call for more and better information on the “how” and especially the “why” of crime.

Beyond crime reduction

One serious shortcoming of CompStat is that the focus is normally restricted to crime reduction, and thus the measurement of outcomes is normally confined to crime. In many agencies, CompStat neglects important outcomes that ought to be the objects of police attention, including quality-of-life issues, community satisfaction with police service, the compliance of police with law and policy, and the procedural justice with which police exercise their authority.

To some extent this shortcoming is a function of the expense or difficulty (or both) of measuring non-crime outcomes. Police agencies do pretty well in collecting and storing information about crime, especially if they have adopted incident-based reporting. Crime as an outcome can be tracked in aggregate and spatially disaggregated form (i.e., citywide and by precinct or even by beat). Moreover, patterns of crime can be analyzed in ways that support tactical and, to some degree, strategic decision making. Insofar as the records that are kept as a matter of administrative routine can be used to measure outcomes other than crime, they can

44. George E. Capowich, Janice A. Roehl, and C. Andrews, *Evaluating Problem-Oriented Policing: Assessing Process and Outcomes in Tulsa and San Diego* (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Analysis, 1994); Gary Cordner and Elizabeth P. Biebel, “Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice,” *Criminology & Public Policy* 4, no. 2 (2005), 155–180, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2005.00013.x/pdf>; Police Executive Research Forum, National Evaluation of the Problem-Solving Partnerships (PSP) Project for the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2000); Rana Sampson and Michael S. Scott, *Tackling Crime and Other Public Safety Problems* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000), <http://www.popcenter.org/library/reading/pdfs/1Tackling.pdf>.

be tapped without the cost of additional data collection. Calls-for-service records, for example, can to some degree serve as indicators of quality-of-life conditions. Community complaints have been used as a measure of the procedural propriety of police actions.⁴⁵

But compared with police records of crimes and arrests, other police records are normally less complete and less detailed, and thus the measurement and analysis of other outcomes based on police records is more questionable and less informative. Community complaints, for example, have serious shortcomings as an indicator of the quality of police service delivery. Among the individuals who have police contacts and believe that the police acted improperly, only 5 to 10 percent file complaints, and we can infer from the proportions of complaints that are disposed as unfounded or exonerated that many filed complaints are based on misunderstandings or deceit.⁴⁶ Call-for-service records include the when, where, and what of some kinds of disorder (though the “what” may contain considerable error), but often too little information to form reliable indicators in terms of police performance can be assessed or to informative analysis.

Some outcomes, such as community members’ satisfaction with police and assessments of procedural justice, can be measured reliably only through surveys, and surveys can also provide data on social and physical disorders or “incivilities.” Some agencies with which we are familiar perform customer service surveys, contacting people who reported crimes or requested other police assistance to solicit their feedback, though they are often performed by supervisors on unsystematic samples and may be subject to only case-by-case follow-up when potential misconduct is uncovered rather than systematic tabulation as a measure of performance. Some agencies contract for annual or biannual surveys of their communities, drawing representative samples of residents. The drawback of such community surveys for management accountability is that measures of public perceptions and attitudes that are made only once a year do not hold managers’ attention or provide opportunities to show improvements.

Procedural justice

Surveys have been better done as a source of data that form regular indicators of performance from residents’ perspectives. For example, the NYPD contracted with the Vera Institute in 2001–2002 to conduct monthly surveys of “consumers”—people who had reported crimes—in each of its 76 precincts; the surveys captured information on the “speed, professionalism, courtesy, and expertise with which police officers handled respondents’ matters or concerns and their level of satisfaction with the service they received.”⁴⁷ For another more recent example, the Chicago Police Department made plans for “RespectStat,” which uses “data on the quality of police-community interactions to provide constructive feedback to command-level personnel about performance in specific geographic areas.”⁴⁸ Similarly, we worked with the Schenectady and Syracuse (New York) Police Departments in 2011–2013 to incorporate survey-based

45. Robert C. Davis and Pedro Mateu-Gelabert, *Respectful and Effective Policing: Two Examples in the South Bronx* (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1999), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/respectful_policing.pdf; Malcolm K. Sparrow, “Complaints Against the Police and Department Management: Making the Connection,” *The Police Chief* 59, no. 8 (August 1992), 65–73.

46. Robert E. Worden and Kelly J. Becker, “Tip of an Iceberg: Citizen Complaints and Citizen Dissatisfaction with the Police,” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Washington, DC, November 18–21, 2015).

47. Joel Miller et al., *Public Opinions of the Police: The Influence of Friends, Family, and News Media* (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2003), 1, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205619.pdf>.

48. Garry F. McCarthy and Dennis P. Rosenbaum, “From CompStat to RespectStat: Accountability for Respectful Policing,” *The Police Chief* 82, no. 8 (August 2015), 76–78, <https://chicagopatf.org/2016/03/04/new-from-compstat-to-respectstat-accountability-for-respectful-policing-2015/>.

measures of community members' judgments about their contacts with police—especially procedural justice—into those agencies' CompStat processes. Over the course of 18 months, we drew semimonthly samples from three populations of contacts—calls for service, stops, and arrests—in each city, summarizing community members' assessments of police performance in their contacts at CompStat meetings each month. So it is clearly feasible—but not inexpensive—to use surveys to form measures of presumptively important police outcomes and incorporate them into CompStat.

In doing so, however, we should be careful not to presume too much about what surveys measure. In conjunction with our surveys in Schenectady, we obtained the video and audio recordings captured by the police department's in-car cameras, and for a sample of the surveyed contacts, we coded features of the police-community interactions using well-established protocols for systematic social observation. We thereupon formed measures of officers' procedural justice that were independent of community members' assessments of procedural justice. A comparison of the survey-based measures of procedural justice with the observation-based measures of officers' behavior revealed only weak correlations.⁴⁹ We infer from these results that the measures of police performance that can be derived from surveys probably do not bear a close relationship to what officers actually do, and this is quite consistent with the findings of panel surveys, which show that community members' subjective assessments of their contacts with the police are strongly shaped by their prior attitudes toward the police. It appears, then, that the utility of survey-based performance measures for managing the quality of police service is quite limited. Surveys of the individuals with whom police have contacts inform us about community members' perceptions and their subjective experiences with police; as indicators of officers' actions, however, they form measures about the likes of which Thaler and Sunstein caution us.

Disorder

Research has also raised questions about survey-based measures of disorder. Disorder is central to broken windows policing, of course, and inasmuch as disorder has been linked to fear of crime, it is central to community policing more generally. But residents' responses to survey items that inquire about the levels of physical and especially social disorder may be shaped more strongly by the varying criteria that individual respondents apply in making their judgments about disorder than the "objective" conditions of the neighborhoods in which they reside. Danielle Wallace and her colleagues found that even people who reside within a block or two of one another often do not agree about the presence of disorder and that "the likelihood of reporting various disorder cues is associated with individuals' characteristics, their routine activities, and how attached they are to their neighborhood."⁵⁰ Furthermore, residents' reports of disorder in surveys do not correspond with measures of social and physical disorder that are based on independent observations of disorder.⁵¹

49. Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean, *Assessing Police Performance in Citizen Encounters* (Albany, NY: The John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety), 145–164, <http://finninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Assessing-Police-Performance-in-Citizen-Encounters.pdf>.

50. Danielle Wallace, Brooks Louton, and Robert Fornango, "Do You See What I See? Perceptual Variation in Reporting the Presence of Disorder Cues," *Social Science Research* 51 (2015), 247–261, 258, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X14001847>.

51. Joshua Hinkle and Sue-Ming Yang, "A New Look into Broken Windows: What Shapes Individuals' Perceptions of Social Disorder?," *Journal of Criminal Justice* 42, no. 1 (2014), 26–35, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235213001128>.

Problem officers

Many police agencies operate early intervention (EI) systems, which are based on performance indicators for individual officers, assessed with a view toward identifying and intervening with officers who exhibit performance problems—“problem officers.” In many EI systems, much of the responsibility for intervention and for post-intervention monitoring of officers’ performance falls to field supervisors.⁵² But in a few agencies, district commanders are held accountable for their subordinates’ conduct in a CompStat-like setting. For example, the Pittsburgh Police Bureau’s (PPB) EI system, the Performance Assessment Review System (PARS), includes numerous indicators of potentially problematic performance, and with officers who exceed thresholds on an indicator supervisors can intervene in a variety of ways from informal counseling to referrals for retraining. But in addition, officers who are “flagged” by PARS are the subjects of discussion at the PPB’s COMPSTAR meetings:

Quarterly command staff meetings that focus on personnel management. Each zone commander makes a presentation of aggregate performance data for the zone, explaining any significant increase or decrease in activity since the previous meeting. Then the group turns to individual officer performance, discussing those who have been flagged by PARS in detail. Zone commanders present PARS data for each officer flagged in the current quarter and attempt to offer a more complete picture of that officer’s performance. . . . The meeting then turns to officers flagged in a previous quarter who are still undergoing intervention and monitoring. After describing the type of intervention and the officer’s response, the commander makes a recommendation either to continue or to end the monitoring.⁵³

Davis and colleagues conclude that the effectiveness of Pittsburgh’s EI system was “cemented” by the COMPSTAR meetings.⁵⁴

Discussion

Among the respondents to the 2007 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey, one can find nearly 500 agencies with 100 to 500 sworn, full-time employees but only 89 agencies with more than 500 sworn personnel, about half of which have more than 1,000 sworn. Most agencies, then, may not be sufficiently large to be able to generate the kind of “voltage” in their performance measurement systems that they can achieve effective management accountability. CompStat in such agencies tends to be loosely coupled to day-to-day practice, and the meetings may be largely “show-and-tell.” Thus one question about CompStat is whether, in most agencies, it can serve a function other than legitimating the agency in the eyes of external stakeholders (i.e., satisfying external constituencies that the agency looks like a professional police agency). Because the impediments to more tightly coupling CompStat to practice are mainly structural and not easily overcome, we are not optimistic about the answer to that question.

52. Robert E. Worden et al., “Features of Contemporary Early Intervention Systems” (poster presented at the Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Chicago, October 24–27, 2015).

53. Robert C. Davis et al., *Federal Intervention in Local Policing: Pittsburgh’s Experience with a Consent Decree* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2005), 12, <http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p092-pub.pdf>.

54. *Ibid.*, 36.

These impediments arise with respect to the practice of community policing as well. James Willis and his colleagues report that CompStat is decoupled from community policing: In their seven case studies of the co-implementation of CompStat and community policing, they found that these two innovations “function simultaneously but independently.”⁵⁵ Can the theoretical virtues of CompStat be adapted and applied to community policing? Might some version of CompStat stimulate greater attention to community concerns, more and better analysis of problems, and the formulation of more and more diverse responses to problems?

We think meetings devoted to community and problem-oriented policing might optimally serve such purposes. The meetings would signify the priority that agency leadership accords to community policing. No pretense would be made that the techniques and outcomes of community policing can be numerically measured. Meetings could be held no more frequently than monthly. They would neither resemble nor supplant meetings like Lowell’s problem-solving meetings, which would serve to push the work of problem solving forward. Instead, police commanders would be expected to be aware of and prepared to report on community concerns and police efforts to address them. One key would be the assessment phase of the SARA problem-solving process; wherever quantifiable data (e.g., calls for service) are available or could be economically collected, they should be used for assessment, and when quantifiable data are not available, simple assessments through direct observation of conditions might suffice.

We are skeptical of the value of integrating CompStat and community policing if by integration we are contemplating CompStat meetings that encompass both the conventional crime focus and attention to “softer” and less readily measured outputs and outcomes.⁵⁶ We fear that under these circumstances, executives and operational commanders would be prone to gravitate toward more concrete, less abstract tasks and problems on which to work and to attend to the functions with the firmer, numerical measures of performance. Thus we envision a specialized meeting that concentrates on community policing, just as Pittsburgh’s COMPSTAR meetings dwell on managing problem officers.

55. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Tammy R. Kochel, “The Co-Implementation of CompStat and Community Policing,” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 38, no. 5 (2010), 969–980, 978, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235210001479>.

56. Willis, Mastrofski, and Kochel, “Recommendations for Integrating CompStat” (see note 23).

Moving Toward Community-Oriented CompStat

Julia Ryan, Suzanne Bergeron, and Cy Richardson

The Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) and the National Urban League (NUL) understand CompStat to be a performance management system for police agencies that emphasizes use of timely and accurate data about crime problems to inform rapid deployment of police resources and “relentless follow-up.”⁵⁷ Cited by some law enforcement leaders as “perhaps the single most important organizational innovation in policing during the latter half of the 20th century,” CompStat can be a powerful tool for improving police accountability and effectiveness in reducing crime.⁵⁸

Can it also be a tool that encourages police managers to pursue real collaboration with the communities they serve to enhance neighborhood safety and quality of life, improving mutual trust in the process? The following paper discusses our ideas for evolving CompStat in that direction based on our perspective as national nonprofit organizations committed to economic empowerment in historically underserved communities. Our observations draw on the experience of our local partners and affiliates across the country, many of which work on a daily basis with local law enforcement agencies to address community problems.

CompStat context and goals

Two topics factored prominently in our thinking as we considered the opportunity for CompStat to evolve to better align with community policing principles and practices.

First is the persistence of crime and interconnected problems of unemployment, minimal access to capital, poor quality housing, and struggling schools in some neighborhoods. Though overall crime levels are at a 30-year low nationwide,⁵⁹ some high-poverty “neighborhoods in distress”⁶⁰ have not experienced these dramatic reductions in crime. It is now widely accepted that we cannot arrest our way out of crime in these communities or elsewhere and in fact that aggressive enforcement leading to justice involvement or incarceration for a substantial proportion of residents can have a destabilizing effect.⁶¹ More effective and sustainable change requires investment across a variety of sectors to create jobs, improve access to quality education, spur production and preservation of quality affordable housing, build collective efficacy, and otherwise create opportunity. The more integrated and mutually reinforcing those investments are, the greater their likelihood of success.

57. Police Executive Research Forum, *CompStat* (see note 7).

58. George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, Jr., *Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms* (New York: Manhattan Institute, 2011), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf.

59. Alan Neuhauser, “U.S. Crime Rate Rises Slightly, Remains Near 20-Year Low,” *U.S. News and World Report*, September 26, 2016, <https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-26/us-crime-rate-rises-slightly-remains-near-20-year-low>.

60. White House Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative, *Building Neighborhoods of Opportunity* (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/nri_report.pdf.

61. Todd R. Clear, *Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods Worse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Policing is a critical component of this kind of comprehensive community change, and the partnerships and collaborative problem solving that community policing philosophies champion are fundamental to successful multisector action. If CompStat operates in isolation from this comprehensive work, there is greater risk that a police manager motivated to act quickly to quell crime problems could pursue aggressive suppression tactics at the expense of more measured but strategic enforcement activities or other interventions that strike at root crime drivers. There is also risk that these consistently troubled places might get insufficient attention in CompStat. If crime in a given place is high and remains that way, there are fewer variations over time in calls or incident data that stand out for special attention. CompStat's focus on variations from the norm could then fuel a sense of hopelessness that we have heard voiced by some officers and community members—that certain neighborhoods will always have high crime and efforts to turn the tide are futile. On the other hand, if police managers recognize the powerful and positive role that a police department can play in long-term and multisector responses to crime and related problems, CompStat could be among the systems and tools that support effective, comprehensive change. It could also advance proactive, preventive measures that reduce demand for police service in the long run.

The second issue we considered is CompStat's relevance to the national crisis in police legitimacy, particularly among African Americans. While mutual distrust between communities of color and police has existed throughout the history of this country, it has been in the national spotlight in a new way since unrest in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. As highlighted in the report of the Task Force on 21st Century Policing published in May 2015, trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is essential to our democracy and the integrity of our justice system.⁶² In addition, as the work of Tom Tyler and other scholars has demonstrated, distrust has direct implications for community and officer safety given that people's choices to comply with the law or cooperate with police are affected by their perception of the legitimacy of those officers and the criminal justice system.⁶³ As such, there is growing recognition that building public confidence in police and the justice system is critical to the most basic crime control mission of police agencies. Many police agencies also see community-police collaboration and trust as fundamental to their broader mission to help create safe neighborhoods that afford people opportunities for good quality of life.

CompStat could be a powerful piece of a complex puzzle to enhance police legitimacy. To the extent that the values of a police department are reflected in the data that are examined in CompStat and the nature of the discussion that occurs in CompStat meetings about the people and places tied up in crime issues, CompStat could help establish or reinforce a culture of fairness and respect that is at the foundation of procedural justice and legitimacy issues. CompStat could also overtly encourage police practices that reflect these positive values and discourage aggressive tactics that aggravate tensions with communities and fuel distrust and trauma for certain individuals—particularly young boys and men of color—without necessarily yielding solutions to crime.

62. President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* (Washington, DC: Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, 2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

63. Tom R. Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan, "Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?" *Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law* 6, no.1 (fall 2008), 231–275, <http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/osjcl6&div=11&id=&page=>.

It is important to note that CompStat is one system within myriad others that shape how policing happens and that gains in community-police collaboration and police legitimacy may require a much bigger shift in culture, policy, and practice in some departments. In addition, policing is just one part of the criminal justice system and is in fact further along in the process of community-oriented reform than many other pieces of the system. We believe that the time is ripe for examination of how CompStat can contribute to positive change within police agencies and as a signal for other parts of the system overall.

Opportunities for CompStat 2.0

The following are several specific ideas and recommendations building on the foregoing discussion:

“What gets measured is what matters”

Ensure data used in CompStat capture indicators related to procedural justice and community confidence. Including examination of community complaints, police satisfaction surveys, or other data related to community perceptions of police in CompStat could send a signal about departmental values while also providing a mechanism for holding police managers accountable for employing tactics that reflect procedural justice. This inclusion needs to be tied to positive recognition of officers and commanders (see discussion of incentives that follows) and disciplinary action as appropriate to be meaningful. Examining traditional data in new ways could also be valuable. In one LISC-supported neighborhood, police commanders went to great lengths to understand why residents’ reports of gunfire were low compared to data from gunshot detection technology, uncovering useful information about perceptions of police and fear of retaliation in the process.

We also encourage consideration of data points related to the frequency of turnover in police positions for which community interaction is an important function. Regular turnover in precinct command staff, for example, can have a deleterious effect on police-community relations. While we understand the need to move key personnel around and up in the department—both for operational and management reasons and for the career development of key people—using CompStat as a vehicle to reflect on the timing and frequency of those choices could help mitigate negative effects.

Include consideration of non-police data related to crime drivers such as information about foreclosures, vacant properties, liquor violations, illegal dumping, building code violations, emergency room admissions, infant mortality rates, 311 calls, or availability of mental health services. While police should certainly not be held accountable for changes in these data points, providing room in CompStat for their consideration could encourage more thorough analysis of crime drivers. It could also open the door for discussion of key partnerships capable of reducing both the burden on police agencies and the likelihood that heavy enforcement tactics will be used in response to problems that might be more effectively addressed by non-police entities.

Identify appropriate ways for researchers to contribute to CompStat to encourage more robust and nuanced use of data and evidence to drive police decision making. As more police agencies embrace research partnerships to inform their work, there is room to explore how researchers can enhance the real-time analysis that occurs in CompStat, perhaps most notably for evaluating unintended consequences of police actions that may not be obvious in analysis of arrest- or incident-related data alone and a greater emphasis on long-term trends.

Transparency and collaboration

Provide appropriate avenues for community leaders and other municipal officials to contribute to CompStat. Their contributions could include helping police to select problems for CompStat attention, participating in discussion of potential responses, and helping with implementation of selected strategies. Non-police parties could also assist in highlighting the value of effective police responses or raising concerns about negative results. In several cities receiving support from the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation Program,⁶⁴ cross-sector teams have presented their analysis of crime drivers for specific places and their multifaceted response strategies as part of police CompStat meetings. This practice extended CompStat's accountability framework to other entities such as community development organizations, service providers, neighborhood associations, and other city agencies. These CompStat presentations also highlighted the broader context in which police actions were taking place, which enhanced future decision making by police commanders and other leaders about resource deployment in persistently high crime communities.

Communicate about CompStat to encourage community collaboration with police. In many communities in which we work, residents are clamoring for greater police presence because of fear of crime. Without divulging sensitive information that would jeopardize the success of enforcement actions, there are many ways that police can educate community members about how CompStat works, helping them understand how their collaboration contributes to effective police responses. As evaluations of citizen police academies suggest, this can have the added benefit of enhancing legitimacy as residents gain a more nuanced understanding of the policing profession.⁶⁵ A former police chief and affiliate partner of the NUL also noted that this kind of transparency enhances public confidence in ways that improves the ability of police agencies to respond to crises.⁶⁶

Support the development of a community-driven problem-solving system that mirrors CompStat and has a regular feedback loop to the police system. As discussed previously, not all problems that drive crime are appropriate for police response. Also, resource deployment by many non-police entities—including other public agencies, nonprofit organizations, and businesses—would do well to be informed by analysis of crime data along with other metrics. Led by municipal or community leaders, a community-driven version of CompStat could encourage multisector accountability for interconnected problems including those that are prioritized by community members more than by police. It could also pave the way for more effective collaborative problem solving if there is an adequate feedback loop between the police and community systems. This collaboration builds on the use of CompStat-like performance management systems that are already underway in some school districts and city agencies. The onus is not on police agencies to start this kind of system, but police leaders could be valuable advisors in addition to supplying crime data.

64. "Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation (BCJI) Program" Bureau of Justice Statistics, accessed September 29, 2016, https://www.bja.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=70.

65. Jacqueline Pope et al., "Citizen's Police Academies: Beliefs and Perceptions Regarding the Program," *Applied Psychology in Criminal Justice* 3, no. 1 (2007), 42–53, http://dev.cjcenter.org/_files/apcj/3_1_PoliceAcademies.pdf.

66. Thomas H. Warren, Sr., President and CEO, Urban League of Nebraska and former Chief of Police of the Omaha (Nebraska) Police Department.

Incentives

Connect strong CompStat performance—including on metrics related to community-police collaboration and legitimacy—to officer recognition and advancement. Some departments have sought to set a positive tone for CompStat by beginning meetings with recognition of officers who have served admirably. This is a step in the right direction. Supporting the career development of those officers and commanders whose performance in CompStat reflects community policing values is another way to encourage evolution of police culture in this arena.

Establish benchmarks for CompStat aligned with community policing practices as part of agency accreditation processes. We encourage collaboration with the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA®), Inc., to ensure that indicators of community-oriented CompStat are part of the professional standards required for accreditation and encouraged for ongoing executive monitoring.⁶⁷ For example, CALEA's articulation of standards for the law enforcement agency's role, planning and goals, and crime prevention and community involvement could reflect key indicators relevant to using CompStat as a management system that promotes community-police collaboration.

The time is ripe for consideration of how CompStat and community policing can be better aligned. Shaped by police department values that support procedural justice and collaborative problem solving, CompStat's rigor could greatly enhance efforts to address crime, promote accountability for public safety among entities outside of law enforcement, and build mutual trust with community members willing to work with police to create safe neighborhoods.

67. "Law Enforcement Program: The Standards," Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., accessed May 9, 2017, <http://www.calea.org/content/law-enforcement-program-standards>.

CompStat 2.0: A Community-Centered Performance Management System

Brenda J. Bond and George L. Kelling

Revisiting “measuring what matters”

Policing in the United States has seen dramatic change since the 1980s. These changes include new forms of community policing, a movement toward evidence-based practice, and an emphasis on measuring performance to ensure accountability. Notwithstanding the positive impact of these changes on police practice and administration, significant gaps remain in police-community relations, especially in police relations with poor and minority communities. In the climate of community protests, federal reform mandates, and calls for accountability, police are called upon to justify their performance in new ways. This requires a new way of thinking about how we define and measure success and how these measures are institutionalized.

Policing must evolve to become a community-centered, responsive institution where policy and practice respect and support community needs, which requires that the police change what is consistently measured to guide departmental practices. We explore the idea of “CompStat 2.0,” in which community priorities are central to CompStat implementation. We first summarize what is known about community policing and CompStat. We discuss the benefits and challenges of integrating community policing measures into CompStat, and we offer concrete ways in which police agencies of all sizes can undertake CompStat 2.0. Last, we argue that a community-centered CompStat model will facilitate the constant adaptation needed in an ever-changing community safety context.

Community policing

Community policing represents a paradigm shift in American policing. First conceptualized during the 1980s, community policing stands in contrast to reform (or professional) policing that dominated policing for most of the 20th century. It emphasizes crime prevention over after-the-fact response; organizational and geographic decentralization; and close working relationship to the community, problem solving, and improved quality of neighborhood life. Cordner suggests that community policing has philosophical, strategic, tactical, and organizational dimensions. We briefly discuss these dimensions here.⁶⁸

Police agencies that have adopted community policing believe that community members should have input into police priorities, policies, and practice. Examples of an embedded philosophy of community policing include meaningful citizen advisory boards, systematic administration, use of community surveys or social media for feedback and input, and other active ways to engage the community in how the police operate. The strategic dimension of community policing includes the reorientation of operations with a particular emphasis on personal, face-to-face engagement with the community, refocusing on prevention, and approaching operations and deployment through a geographic lens. The tactical dimension operationalizes these ideas and concepts into programs, activities, and action on the street. The common denominators

68. Gary Cordner, “Community Policing,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, eds. Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 148–196.

across this dimension are positive interaction with constituents, partnering with a variety of stakeholders, and problem solving crime and disorder. The organizational dimension focuses on what the organization supports relative to these other dimensions. There are structural adjustments or arrangements that allow community policing to succeed. For example, models such as team-based policing, decentralized operations, and civilianization of specialty positions represent the types of structural factors that support community policing.

Community policing has broadened the goals of the police, having a powerful impact on what American police do and why. In some respects, the ideals put forth by the creator of Anglo-Saxon policing, Sir Robert Peel, are even more evident in today's climate of police reform and accountability. Not only must the police increasingly adopt prevention and a community-centered approach as their guiding philosophy but the public also has to endorse and have trust in the police. Community stakeholders have come to believe in and value face-to-face interaction with the police, increased visibility, and accountability for improved crime and safety. The challenge, however, in this current period of American policing, is systematically integrating community policing measures into the organization for the purposes of consistently monitoring the quality and outcomes associated with their activities.⁶⁹ Without an institutionalized mechanism for measuring community policing activities, there is no systematic way for ensuring these types of police efforts are resourced and valued, and there are no structures to hold themselves accountable for community-centered policing efforts.

CompStat

CompStat is an interactive control mechanism.⁷⁰ Launched in 1994 by then Commissioner William Bratton and his colleagues in the New York City Police Department (NYPD), CompStat was introduced as a tool to monitor and measure police performance in dealing with crime across geographic locations and time. On taking over the NYPD, Bratton was confronted with the problem of ensuring that his vision of policing would be carried out in New York in each of the 75 precincts. Earlier, both as chief in the then New York Transit Police and as commissioner of the Boston Police Department, Bratton was able to meet regularly with district commanders to ensure that his priorities were understood and implemented. Given the size of the NYPD, this was not possible in New York. Out of these concerns, Bratton, Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple, and others designed CompStat to prompt police commanders in open meetings with their peers and superior officers to identify and address critical crime problems. Fundamental to CompStat in the beginning were a number of noted principles including access of information to all levels of the agency, the identification of effective tactics and strategies to tackle crime problems, rapid and tailored responses to crime problems, and relentless follow-up and assessment to monitor what was working to address crime problems.⁷¹

Aside from New York, where few doubt CompStat has been a central factor in its remarkable crime declines that persist to the present, research regarding the impact of CompStat on crime across cities is varied and inconclusive. Nonetheless, we do know that CompStat is widely used in American police departments (not to mention other public and private sector

69. Stephen D. Mastrofski, "Community Policing: A Skeptical View," in *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, eds. David Weisburd and Anthony A Braga (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 44–76.

70. Robert Simons, *Levers of Control: How Managers Use Innovative Control Systems to Drive Strategic Renewal* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1995).

71. Phyllis P. McDonald, *Managing Police Operations: Implementing the New York Crime Control Model CompStat* (Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2002).

organizations).⁷² A recent survey of police agencies found that agencies implement CompStat for a number of reasons, including identifying emerging problems, coordinating the deployment of departmental resources, increasing accountability, and facilitating communication and information sharing within the department.⁷³ Some, however, have noted that CompStat processes can reinforce hierarchical communication and do not facilitate meaningful collaboration and problem solving.⁷⁴

The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) remain key sources of data in CompStat meetings, although many agencies use 911 calls or offender release data, for example, in CompStat discussions. Through crime analysis techniques and tools, CompStat facilitates the visualization and discussion of crime data with an emphasis on patterns and incidents, clearances, arrest rates, and other traditional police measures.⁷⁵ While there is value to using these standard measures of performance, there are also downsides. Narrow crime measures do not capture community fear, satisfaction, and justice. Revisiting what we measure and how those measures relate to community priorities is a growing imperative in today's policing climate as community policing and community-police relationships take center stage.

Scholars have suggested that police performance should be reflective of community needs, values, and priorities not solely based on traditional measures of crime reduction.⁷⁶ CompStat for the most part centers on traditional measures of policing that emphasize crime patterns as the primary measure of public safety. From what we know of CompStat, we can surmise that the only dimensions noted by Moore that are typically included in CompStat are the reduction of crime and perhaps victimization, though the latter is not directly measured by standard UCR or NIBRS data. We are not capturing other dimensions of police performance, and those may be more important and valued by the community. In the sections that follow we discuss the adoption and current manifestation of community, offering a rationale for why we should integrate community policing into CompStat.

The marriage of community policing and CompStat: The challenge becomes an opportunity

In a time of reform, mounting demands for positive police-community interactions, and accountability for tackling community priorities, police organizations must effectively align their efforts with community values and measure the impact of their efforts.⁷⁷ CompStat in its

72. David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga, "Introduction: Understanding Police Innovation," in *Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives*, eds. David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–27; David Weisburd et al., "Reforming to Preserve" (see note 26).

73. Police Executive Research Forum, *CompStat*, 8 (see note 7).

74. Brenda J. Bond and Anthony A. Braga, "Rethinking the CompStat Process to Enhance Problem-Solving Responses: Insights from a Randomized Field Experiment," *Police Practice & Research* 16, no. 1 (2015), 22–35; James J. Willis et al., *CompStat and Organizational Change in the Lowell Police Department: Challenges and Opportunities* (Washington, DC: The Police Foundation, 2004), <http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/lowellCompStat.pdf>.

75. George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, *Keeping Americans Safe: Best Practices to Improve Community Policing and to Protect the Public* (Phoenix, AZ: Goldwater Institute, 2011), 242, https://www.freedomsphoenix.com/Uploads/023/Media/Policy_Report_FINAL.pdf.

76. *Ibid.*; Mark H. Moore et al., *Recognizing Value in Policing: The Challenge of Measuring Police Performance* (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2002).

77. Kelling and Coles, *Keeping Americans Safe* (see note 75).

current form serves as the main performance management mechanism in American policing, but we know that CompStat relies mainly on traditional crime and rapid response measures.⁷⁸ These are important measures, but police agencies have expanded their mission to serve as guardians of the community, partnering in and leading a whole host of efforts that extend beyond narrow crime incidents. They serve as agents of change and key partners in many public and social policy endeavors. Given this new mission and role, we must move towards the systematic measurement of how safe residents feel, the nature and quality of police-community interactions, and whether the outcomes of resource allocation align with community values. We believe that the integration of community policing measures into CompStat will create a community-centered, higher performing police organization.⁷⁹

Through a community-centered performance measurement approach police will measure and understand whether and how they are meeting expressed community needs and expectations. To do so, we must overcome the challenges of measuring police effectiveness in a community policing context.⁸⁰ We see this as an opportunity rather than a problem. The opportunity includes aligning police practice with community priorities, facilitating partnerships to more formally integrate community voice into police practice and management, and building organizational legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Alignment between community values and expectations and police policy and practice means that the police should measure and be “held accountable for demonstrating an understanding of local crime problems and concerns, knowledge of best practices in policing for addressing particular crime problems, and determination of their appropriate use in the local context.”⁸¹

What would CompStat 2.0 look like?

The police must create the right structures and processes to support a community-centered measurement and accountability system. Kelling and Coles offer a framework that could serve as a foundation for CompStat 2.0. They suggest a focus on “four arenas: ensuring policing is consistent with community values and priorities; making a commitment to the ultimate objectives of policing; promoting excellence in policing performance; and producing improvement in measurable policing outcomes.”⁸²

To operationalize this framework, Kelling and Coles advocate for the use of a balanced scorecard and the systematic use of benchmarks. The balanced scorecard is a tool and process through which managers use and monitor metrics of interest to achieve short- and long-term goals.⁸³ Its application to policing has been suggested before.⁸⁴ The approach includes rendering a vision; communicating and connecting the vision to actions across the whole organization; deliberately linking goal-based planning, activities, and budgeting; and supporting systematic learning that considers how well the organization did in terms of meeting stated goals.

78. Bond and Braga, “Rethinking the CompStat Process” (see note 74); Stephen D. Mastrofski and James J. Willis, *Improving CompStat Structures and Processes for Application to Community Policing* (see page 23).

79. Kelling and Coles, *Keeping Americans Safe* (see note 75).

80. James J. Willis, “A Recent History of Policing,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Police and Policing*, eds. Michael D. Reisig and Robert J. Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3–33.

81. Kelling and Coles, *Keeping Americans Safe*, (see note 75), 3.

82. *Ibid.*, 13.

83. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).

84. Mark H. Moore et al., *Recognizing Value in Policing* (see note 76).

Benchmarking compares individual officer and organizational achievements with other officers, organizations, and known best practices.

For our purposes, the seven dimensions of police performance put forth by Moore and colleagues serve as the outcomes of interest in a balanced scorecard approach:⁸⁵

1. Reduce crime and victimization.
2. Effectively initiate justice processes.
3. Reduce fear and enhance personal security.
4. Ensure safety in public places.
5. Use financial resources fairly, effectively, and efficiently.
6. Use force and authority fairly, effectively, and efficiently.
7. Satisfy customer demands and achieve legitimacy with those policed.

We suggest expanding on traditional crime pattern reviews to review other measures of police performance and community well-being such as community disorder (e.g., graffiti, abandoned buildings), community and stakeholder experiences and perceptions (e.g., fear, safety, and interactions with police), internal data such as investigation data (e.g., clearance rates, case outcome data), and administrative data (e.g., expenditures, complaints filed, patrol and specialized unit activities), as well as indicators of community well-being that are empirically demonstrated as highly predictive of crime (e.g., employment, housing, public health, or educational patterns). These data provide a holistic perspective on how the police are doing relative to community needs and challenges.

In the two tables that follow we identify police desired outcomes, examples of police outputs, and measurement criteria. Table 2 on page 38 presents Moore's seven police outcomes and the kinds of activities and best practices (outputs) available to police.

85. Ibid.

Table 2. A balanced scorecard of best practices for policing

Objectives	Best practices
<p>1. Reduce crime and victimization.</p>	<p>Establish the presence of police through patrols and participation in community activities.</p> <p>Maintain order through the broken windows approach.</p> <p>Deter crime with “pulling levers,” hot spot approaches, and law enforcement.</p> <p>Solve problems with a focus on identifying clusters of related activities rather than individual incidents.</p>
<p>2. Effectively initiate justice processes.</p>	<p>Measure and benchmark the number and quality of arrests.</p> <p>Measure and benchmark quality clearances.</p> <p>Measure and benchmark the percentage of cases resolved either by plea bargaining or conviction.</p> <p>For detectives, identify crime patterns and share information with patrol officers, special unit officers, and community interests and groups.</p>
<p>3. Reduce fear and enhance personal security.</p>	<p>Increase the perceived presence of police by community members through foot and bicycle patrol and increased police-community interaction.</p> <p>Maintain order through the broken windows approach.</p> <p>Target resources to specific neighborhood problems.</p> <p>Organize the self-defense capacity of neighborhoods and communities.</p>
<p>4. Ensure safety in public spaces.</p>	<p>Implement vehicular, foot, and bike patrols in parks and other public places.</p> <p>Partner with private security and businesses.</p> <p>Study public spaces and craft specific programs to solve disorder problems.</p> <p>Enforce traffic laws; establish community ownership of public spaces (e.g., parks).</p>
<p>5. Use financial resources fairly, efficiently, and effectively.</p>	<p>Maintain budget controls and set goals for the cost each resident pays for police protection.</p> <p>Establish benchmarks for deployment and scheduling efficiency.</p> <p>Target overtime to problem areas.</p> <p>Implement public policing alternatives: outsourcing, privatization, civilianization, or regionalization.</p>
<p>6. Use force and authority fairly, efficiently, and effectively.</p>	<p>Establish value-based guidelines for the use of force.</p> <p>Train officers to defuse conflicts and use a wide array of nonlethal devices.</p> <p>Require debriefing after use of force incidents.</p> <p>Develop easily accessible community complaint system as well as mechanism for speedy resolution of complaints; monitor problem officers.</p>
<p>7. Satisfy consumer demands and achieve legitimacy with those policed.</p>	<p>Establish a value statement that guides officers to deal with community members in a patient and helpful manner.</p> <p>Establish a call management system to respond to service requests efficiently.</p> <p>Shape service demand by using community input and educating residents about services and alternatives.</p> <p>Establish and maintain maximum transparency in operations and performance data.</p>

We emphasize that the adoption of best practices must be tailored to neighborhoods, their problems, and their potential solutions. Not all best practices necessarily apply to all neighborhoods. Moreover, additional best practices are discussed in the following sections, and others will be devised as knowledge and skills advance.

Creating CompStat 2.0

Continuing based on the work of Moore et al as a framework, table 3 presents a number of measures to gauge public safety and police performance.⁸⁶

Table 3. Measures of police performance*

Objectives	Measurement criteria	√
1. Reduce crime and victimization.	Crime statistics (UCR/NIBRS)	
	Crime victimization surveys	
2. Effectively initiate justice processes.	Quality arrest and clearance statistics	
	Conviction and guilty plea statistics	
3. Reduce fear and enhance personal security.	Residential sales and purchase statistics	
	Average business closing hours	
4. Enhance safety in public spaces.	Counts of public usage	
	Property values and rental costs	
5. Use financial resources fairly, efficiently, and effectively.	Cost of policing per resident	
	Overtime expenditures	
6. Use force fairly, efficiently, and effectively.	Complaints filed against officers	
	Liability suit settlement amounts	
7. Satisfy consumer demands and achieve legitimacy with those policed.	Attitudinal survey statistics	
	Response times	

* Kelling and Coles, *Keeping Americans Safe* (see note 75).

These measures are not all-inclusive and in fact should change as communities and police evolve. In concert with the community, the police must identify and prioritize metrics based on the characteristics and needs of various groups or neighborhoods within the community.

1. Reduce crime and victimization

The police should move from UCR to NIBRS, which captures data about the nature and characteristics of incidents. Other measures of this police objective include calls for service, repeat locations, traffic accidents, and victimization data. Data are collected from police reports, calls for service, and feedback tools such as surveys, focus groups, and interviews.

86. Kelling and Coles, *Keeping Americans Safe* (see note 75).

2. Effectively initiate justice processes

Data to measure this objective include arrest and clearance rates and investigative and chronic offender data as well as offender incarceration and reentry data. The police must gather data from those who interact with the police to assess perceptions and experiences in the justice initiation process. Victim, offender, and witness data are valuable in capturing perceptions of procedural justice.

3. Reduce fear and enhance personal safety

CompStat 2.0 would include indicators of disorder, such as cases and prevalence of graffiti, abandoned buildings, trash on streets, unkempt lots, and other signs of disorder that contribute to community anxieties and concerns. These indicators can be measured through observations, surveys, and calls for service. It is important to remember that collecting data directly from stakeholders is essential in a community-centered approach. Data include information about community satisfaction and interactions with police, experiences of victims and offenders, and feedback from the business community or other stakeholder groups about their perceptions and interactions relative to fear and safety.

4. Ensure safety in public spaces

In CompStat 2.0, the police should marry the outputs of police actions (e.g., number of park and walks, number of community meetings) with feedback from the community about police work. Measuring how safe people feel is paramount to managing police performance. We describe an example from Lowell, Massachusetts, that illustrates the importance of a more holistic view. In Lowell, the police department's community liaison participates in CompStat conversations. At CompStat, the community liaison adds to crime and disorder conversations by bringing in community voice. For example, when a commander reports on a series of warrant sweeps in a crime hot spot, he or she may report on the number of sweeps and emphasize how successful the sweeps were via-a-vis arrests. The community liaison offers another perspective, adding that while these activities may have resulted in arrests, the fact that the immediate neighbors were unaware that the sweeps were occurring actually increased their sense of fear. How the police approach this work in the future should change as a result.

5. Use financial resources fairly, efficiently, and effectively

In CompStat 2.0, leaders should monitor human and financial resources and their outputs and outcomes. By employing professional management practices, agencies monitor budget activity to ensure efficient and effective deployment of personnel as well as identify cost saving measures to ensure quality service. Calculating the costs for public safety outputs and outcomes should be a goal.

In addition to financial resources, the police should integrate administrative data into CompStat 2.0. Most agencies review community complaints or sick time abuses as part of early warning systems or to monitor budgets but rarely combine this review with analysis of crime and safety outcomes. Police in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, have recently integrated this type of data into CompStat, as have a few other agencies, including Los Angeles.

6. Use force fairly, efficiently, and effectively:

CompStat 2.0 should include complaint data regarding use of force as well as supervisor observations and reports where officers may be acting unlawfully. These data come from community members or supervisors as well as body-worn or in-car cameras. These and other measures are fundamental to understanding if and how officers are adequately trained, supervised, and held accountable for their work in the community.

7. Satisfy consumer demands and achieve legitimacy with those policed

We advocate for the systematic collection of community stakeholder data to assess community concerns and priorities, interactions with and perceptions of police behavior and effectiveness, and experiences of victims and offenders. The police can also assess patterns in calls for service as a way to understand whether and how the community seeks the assistance of the police.

Beyond these measures, we suggest the police monitor broader community well-being data. For example, data on the rise or fall of home prices, unemployment or other indicators of a thriving or diving economy, and existing or emerging substance abuse all provide a comprehensive picture of community well-being and broaden our understanding of the challenges facing the community, police, and local government.

We reiterate that moving towards a community-centered approach and measuring the performance of the 21st century police organization requires thoughtful and ongoing engagement with the community. Measures of police performance and community well-being will vary by community and neighborhood and will change over time. As we move into implementation, we suggest a number of ways in which agencies can implement CompStat 2.0.

Reframing CompStat

Police agencies must reframe CompStat and our assumptions about CompStat to accommodate a community-centered performance management system. The concept of reframing calls upon us to break away from our current understanding of how organizations and their processes work to change those models for the better.⁸⁷ There are four frames or lenses through which we can grasp and direct a change in CompStat. They are the (1) structural, (2) human resource, (3) political, and (4) symbolic (or cultural) frames.

Structure provides clarity in the organization relative to member roles, the structure through which roles and work are organized and understood, and the processes and policies for communicating and coordinating work.⁸⁸ Police agencies must have the organizational capacity and wherewithal to implement CompStat 2.0. The most logical place for this work is in a research and development (R&D) unit. R&D (or planning) units are designed for planning and

87. Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. Deal, *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2013).

88. Ibid.

performance monitoring and improvement and therefore are best suited structurally to manage CompStat 2.0.⁸⁹ These units or staff dedicated to this work exist in many police agencies and have the potential to influence and support the adoption of new and promising practices.⁹⁰

An R&D unit should use empirical and analytical methodologies to identify and promote best practices in line with the benchmarking approach we propose. Well-trained professionals (sworn or civilian or both) would bring specialized training and expertise to the tasks. This type of unit should work across the agency and externally to promote and learn from experimentation, implementation, and systematic feedback on police performance. A successful R&D unit was created by former Lowell (Massachusetts) Police Superintendent Ed Davis in 1998 when police R&D units were scarce. R&D staff acted as liaisons internally and externally, seeking out best and evidence-based practices and the funding to support innovation. The unit has been institutionalized, continuing under current Superintendent William Taylor, and has secured more than \$20 million dollars in grants for police staff, training, equipment, and community partnerships.

The structure and nature of CompStat 2.0 must change to accommodate a scorecard and benchmarking discussion. CompStat 2.0 must emphasize participatory problem solving to best understand community challenges as well as offer and review solutions based on experience, evidence, and new ideas. This type of model has been shown to increase problem solving and have a positive impact on crime and disorder outcomes.⁹¹

The human resource frame focuses on staffing, skills, and relational capabilities required to achieve organizational goals.⁹² It requires that we empower people to perform at their best and supports the development of leadership at all levels. These ideals are aligned with core principles of community policing that support decentralized decision making at all levels of the agency. CompStat 2.0 allows individuals at all levels to develop and step into decision making and leadership experiences. In CompStat 2.0, communication across and between ranks for the purposes of participatory problem solving is necessary; therefore, front-line supervisors (e.g., sergeants) must fully understand and participate in achieving CompStat goals.

CompStat 2.0 requires staff training to effectively engage stakeholders for problem identification and problem solving. Moreover, the identification and measurement of outcomes is another competency required to implement CompStat 2.0. Systematic and consistent exposure to and training on evidence-based and promising practices is also needed. Last, skills such as effective collaboration, public speaking, and presentation will give participants the knowledge and abilities to be successful in their work.

The political dimensions of change are complex.⁹³ Power, conflict, and competition are dynamics that can inhibit experimentation, innovation, and risk taking, as has been observed in past CompStat research.⁹⁴ These dynamics could be an obstacle to a successful CompStat 2.0.

89. Albert J. Reiss, "Police Organization in the Twentieth Century," *Crime and Justice* 15 (1992), 51–97, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147617?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

90. Brenda J. Bond and Kathryn R. Gabriele, "Research and Planning Units: An Innovation Instrument in the 21st-Century Police Organization," *Criminal Justice Policy Review* (2016), 1–22, <http://cjp.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/01/20/0887403415624947.abstract>.

91. Bond and Braga, "Rethinking the CompStat Process" (see note 74).

92. Bolman and Deal, *Reframing Organizations* (see note 87).

93. Ibid.

94. Bond and Braga, "Rethinking the CompStat Process" (see note 74); Willis et al., *CompStat in the Lowell Police Department* (see note 74).

There are two dimensions to this idea that pertain to CompStat 2.0. First, police leaders and managers must commit to recalibrating performance measures in a way that aligns with community concerns and priorities. By creating genuine communication channels for the purposes of setting and meeting community expectations, police agencies are more likely to be viewed as legitimate and perhaps see benefits in crime and disorder because of their new work with the community.

Second, police leaders and commanders must be willing to decentralize decision making, allowing front-line personnel to serve as active participants and leaders in community policing, problem solving, and performance measurement. We suggest that front-line supervisors and officers are a missing link in the current implementation of CompStat.

Organizational culture is a collection of concepts that can be understood by observing behavior, group norms, espoused values, habits of thinking or mental models, and formal rituals.⁹⁵ CompStat 2.0 requires a shift in values and beliefs and in behavior to recognize the community as experts. In a community-centered performance management and accountability system, the community informs and clarifies outcomes and outputs of interest and associated performance measures. Moreover, a new CompStat that values a community-centered approach, and one that supports more cross-rank participation requires a new appreciation for what different participants have to offer. To leverage the knowledge, experience, and ideas of diverse organizational actors, leadership must recognize the value that each brings to the conversation. This was observed in at least one CompStat study where appreciation and participation led to increased activity levels and outcomes associated with problem solving.⁹⁶

Challenges to implementing CompStat 2.0

There are many benefits to the creation of CompStat 2.0. It will serve as a new form of performance measurement and management in a community-centered policing model. CompStat 2.0 will serve as the mechanism through which community needs and satisfaction are addressed. We advocate for the adoption of a balanced scorecard and benchmarking as a model practice. As we offer concrete steps to get there, we recognize the challenges of such change.

CompStat 2.0 requires a repositioning of financial and human resources. Staffing a research and development unit requires resources. There are many ways in which a unit can be constructed if doing so is a priority. There may be in-house expertise. Grant funds can help establish or enhance a unit and support training and technologies. Partnerships to obtain interns or research assistants are practical approaches. Sharing positions across police agencies may be a novel way to obtain resources. Beyond the best practice in Lowell, there are ample models of successful R&D units across the country.

95. Bolman and Deal, *Reframing Organizations* (see note 87); Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2010).

96. Bond and Braga, "Rethinking the CompStat Process" (see note 74).

Training is needed in data analysis and application, the use of a balanced scorecard, identification and assessment of evidence-based and best practices, and other abilities such as public speaking and presentations. In-house or partnerships with academic institutions or community partners (e.g., think tanks, community foundations) are ways to overcome challenges.

Reimagining the role of the community in police performance systems may be a significant challenge. Not only will the task of meeting with and facilitating the identification of priorities and measures be a complicated undertaking but the conceptual and emotional changes required on the part of the police and the community must also be cared for. Fortunately, we can apply many of the valuable lessons learned from the implementation of community policing to this task. We see this as another opportunity to partner with academic institutions as well as key community leaders on the facilitation of productive dialogue.

Many police agencies ask community partners or other criminal justice agency representatives to participate in or observe CompStat. Many invite residents. The question in moving toward CompStat 2.0 is whether and how residents or other members of the community participate in CompStat 2.0 meetings. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, has on occasion actually conducted CompStat in the community. Actively integrating the community into CompStat 2.0 calls for careful and thoughtful processes to increase awareness on behalf of the police and community but may also require arrangements vis-a-vis confidentiality and information sharing. We see great value in this exploration and want to learn as much as possible from those who adopt this approach as part of the modernization of CompStat.

Last, we expect an additional challenge of changing the tone and feel of CompStat to be less hierarchical and more participatory. This does not suggest that CompStat 2.0 abandon its accountability principles but rather that to successfully implement CompStat 2.0, agencies will need to accept new ways of talking about and addressing community safety priorities.

Conclusion

The time is right to revisit and reframe CompStat to reflect a more community-centered model of policing. A scorecard and benchmarking approach provide the structure and framework through which the police can implement CompStat 2.0. CompStat was designed as a police performance management tool focused on changes in crime and holding commanders accountable for crime and disorder reduction. CompStat 2.0 does not lose these benefits but rather expands the goals and measures of police performance to align with contemporary policing.

CompStat 2.0 Development Symposium: What Did We Learn?

James J. Willis and Stephen D. Mastrofski

The CompStat 2.0 Development Symposium brought together a diverse array of perspectives from law enforcement, community engagement, and police scholars on what form a new CompStat model might take—one that better integrates the values, principles, structures, and practices of community policing.

While opinions differed among participants, there did appear to be a consensus that CompStat was an important feature of current policing efforts and needs to be reformed in order to better meet the challenges and complexities of 21st century policing.

What follows is a summary of the large group discussion and the reporting back of the smaller break-out groups based on what we heard and observed. We acknowledge at the outset that this is necessarily a partial account of all that transpired, but we hope it can provide some useful insights for others to consider when envisioning a new CompStat model. We begin with some takeaway points for each of the six elements that were used to structure the symposium. We then provide some implications based on these points for what a CompStat 2.0 might look like.

1. How to measure community policing

All participants seemed to feel that the measures used to drive CompStat needed to be broadened beyond traditional Part I (violent) crimes. This was made especially clear by patrol officers from Austin, Texas, whose analysis showed that 93 percent of their agency's calls for service had nothing to do with serious crime. Thus, serious crime was regarded as too narrow a set of indicators to capture what matters most to the police organization and to the community. One of the papers by Worden and McLean expressed some skepticism about the capacity of scholars and police departments to measure concepts such as procedural justice because of the differences in people's perceptions of the amount of procedural justice they received in comparison to the amount of procedural justice actually delivered (based on ratings by trained observers).

While acknowledging the challenges of producing valid and reliable measures, others felt that these challenges were not insurmountable and that measures of department (and community) performance were fundamentally important to assessing what a department was doing and how it was doing it and to strengthening accountability for results. Several participants mentioned variants on the theme of "what is measured matters"—the implication being that if something is not measured, it is viewed as unimportant. Many measures were raised as possibilities for a revamped CompStat 2.0, including serious crime, a harm index, procedural justice, use of force, community satisfaction, disorder, fear of crime, and community problems (disturbances, traffic, etc.). Participants also noted the different ways that data could be collected—not just official crime reports but also surveys of a city's entire population and people living in smaller geographic areas (neighborhoods, communities, etc.), photographs, informal discussions with community members about what had changed, and direct observations.

Some suggested the value in capturing data on community health (such as foreclosures or changes in house prices), while another talked about "ResidenceStat," an approach for the collection of data on how many young people are using community centers in public housing. However, these measures did not seem as essential to others as those related to safety and

legitimacy. The latter did more to reflect the fundamental values of the police organization. Also, some participants felt it was important that the police should be held accountable for those things they had some capacity to change. Others noted the value in capturing measures of police activity that could be used as indicators of harm to the community (such as field interviews or stop, question, and frisk).

An additional issue with regard to measurement was the need for indicators collected by agencies that operate independently of the police. Participants noted the unavoidable pressure on police to “cook the books” when so much emphasis is placed on performance indicators that have consequences for officers’ reputations and promotions. Not only might independent measures of police performance help prevent data manipulation, but having such measures in place could also contribute to perceptions of police legitimacy—the importance of which was mentioned often throughout the symposium in light of tensions between law enforcement and the community, especially communities of color. Another benefit of multiple measures was to give a more nuanced and more complete picture of a department’s performance.

In the small break-out group discussion on measures of community policing, it seemed there was disagreement among the participants regarding what constituted community policing and what should be measured. Should police departments be focusing on outputs (such as the number of community meetings offered, number of people attending a community meeting, or the number of knock-and-talks conducted by police officers), or should the focus be on outcomes (such as community satisfaction)? This disagreement might presage some of the difficulties that departments will have in selecting community policing measures for CompStat 2.0.

2. How to motivate and incentivize performance

In the larger group discussion, one participant urged the group to consider carefully what the key purpose of CompStat should be (it could not be all things to all people and do all things). Another talked about the virtue of having police share performance measures with “Communities of Trust,” who could then disseminate these among the wider community in support of a police department (rather than acting in opposition to it).

In the small group, the focus was on both extrinsic motivation (providing rewards and punishments) to elicit desirable behavior and intrinsic motivation (winning over the hearts of minds of police officers). Regarding the latter, both patrol officers and other members of the small group raised the importance of delegating responsibility to patrol officers to engage in problem solving to make their work meaningful rather than simply telling them what to do. Giving patrol officers the opportunity to exercise their own initiative and creativity in devising problem-solving strategies helps strengthen intrinsic motivation by making the problem-solving process and the opportunity to serve the community its own reward. The former chief of the Sacramento (California) Police Department, Samuel Somers, Jr., noted that his department tries to tie the goals of the organization to the promotional process. This is an attempt to institutionalize problem solving into the culture—command staff has to write papers to get promoted and first-line supervisors have to explain their strategies for dealing with a problem as part of the promotional process.

3. What is the role of CompStat in facilitating problem solving

In the larger group discussion, some attention was paid to the virtues of having two meetings—a separate internal CompStat meeting and another meeting focused on providing the community with department updates and soliciting feedback. In Baltimore, Maryland, the department has a Community Stat where the district commander must invite a community leader, a leader in the faith community, and other community representatives to talk about what is going on in his or her district. At these meetings, the district also rewards an officer for being a “guardian”—an attempt to recognize the important role of the police in helping and serving others (rather than just making arrests and enforcing the law). The Sacramento Police Department has also recently undergone a large change toward a problem-solving model. The chief has created 18 small segments in the city, and lieutenants are made responsible for identifying crime, quality-of-life, and other problems in these areas. The expectation is that they will engage in long-term problem solving and building police-community relations. Some participants expressed concern that a meeting devoted to problem solving or to community collaboration would be considered less important by members of the department than a meeting devoted to crime fighting (just as community policing officers can be regarded as second class by those focused on traditional law enforcement tasks). Here people mentioned the need to include other city agencies in the CompStat process and to push problem solving to the lowest levels of the organization (to those most familiar with the problems in a given area). This push would mean having sergeants attend department-level CompStats; perhaps a more appropriate approach would be to have sergeants attend district-level CompStats to discuss their team’s problem-solving efforts.

The breakout group had one overarching observation about CompStat’s relationship to problem solving and then five main points to share. The overall point was that CompStat was not particularly effective at measuring and promoting problem solving.

1. CompStat needs to incorporate a broader array of problems into CompStat meetings (not just Part I—violent—and Part II—property—crimes). These problems might include how the police treat the community (and how the community treats the police). CompStat needs to concern itself with community priorities and ways to monitor them.
2. Problem solving in police agencies typically occurs at the lowest levels of the organization rather than at CompStat meetings. The group was comfortable with this arrangement. The purpose of CompStat meetings should be to monitor and assess the problem-solving efforts of those responsible and to hold them accountable. In terms of who should be responsible for daily problem solving, the group mentioned the Senior Lead Officer model in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) as an example.
3. There needs to be an adequate level of support for problem solving—high quality data collection, management, and analysis. Police agencies should make use of academics and other experts, and the CompStat process should also monitor the quality of support for problem solving in order to make an overall assessment of problem-solving performance.
4. CompStat meetings should monitor and track problem-solving projects and should hold people accountable for results. Again, the LAPD was mentioned as a possible model. It was noted that in the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) model, the analysis and assessment components are often neglected compared to scanning and response, and so particular attention needs to be paid to these. The group also seemed to suggest that the whole organization had a role to play in the CompStat monitoring process.

5. The CompStat process needs to pay attention to the identification and correction of problems within the police department, especially “problem” police officers who abuse their authority or fail to perform to an adequate skill level. Discussion of such problem officers needs to occur in a separate CompStat process that has restricted access to a limited number of people because of legal constraints on privacy regarding personnel matters. Such a process, however, should not only evaluate individual officers but also look to identify patterns in the sources of creating problem officers, which might have implications for department policy and practice in supervision, performance evaluation, training, and discipline.

4. How should participation be broadened beyond police?

This item did not receive quite as much explicit attention as some of the other points, but it was clear that CompStat needs to be a mechanism that is used to foster participation by community members in the identification and resolution of problems and to solicit feedback on department performance. The small group mentioned participation in terms of fostering widespread and meaningful participation in the CompStat process among members of the department—not just command staff—and also participation between the police department and its external stakeholders and community members. As can be seen from the other points, many participants seemed to see the value in holding separate CompStat meetings from community meetings—as long as community meetings still allowed for meaningful, open, and honest dialogue between the police and the community. Some remarked that traditional CompStat meetings might be open to the public, but outsiders are largely passive observers rather than active participants in these meetings. Community members need a real voice to express their concerns and engage in a two-way dialogue with the agency—a vision of the police and community as co-producers of public safety rather than police just asking the community to do their bidding. The words “empowerment” and “collaboration” were mentioned by a community activist in the sense that community members should not merely be passive observers of CompStat meetings but should have the opportunity to provide meaningful input and to collaborate in possible problem-solving strategies.

5. How to increase transparency of policing activities and outcomes

The discussion on transparency was wide-ranging and raised a number of issues broadly related to how open an agency should be about what it was doing to reduce problems of crime and social disorder, the role of leadership, and what outcomes should be used as measures of success. Some attendees expressed concerns that ongoing investigations could not be discussed at a CompStat meeting attended by members of the public, while others reiterated the need for meaningful outcome measures (rather than outputs or simple measures of police activity). The point was also raised that CompStat could be a vehicle for promoting transparency with members of the public by soliciting community input on appropriate performance measures and building two-way communication. The small group report raised more questions than answers as to what degree of transparency was desirable.

6. What data best measure police performance

The theme of identifying measures of police performance came up throughout the meeting. The larger group noted the difference between outputs and outcomes and underscored the importance of outcomes. Others mentioned how the measures currently used to assess patrol officer performance were largely meaningless (number of arrests, citations, traffic stops) to what really matters in terms of judging high quality police work.

The small group focused on the need to identify measures that embody the fundamental values of the organization—the real business of the business. This was part of the power of the original CompStat idea. Then Commissioner William Bratton identified serious crime as essential to the New York City Police Department's performance and promised to reduce it by 10 percent in his first year—a bold proclamation that clearly demonstrated to members of his own department and people in New York what his organization was going to be all about. Thus the challenge was not to include every possible measure of performance at CompStat but to select those that told people what the department's mission was going to be. Chiefs need to use CompStat to establish their vision for their departments in collaboration with their communities.

The small group identified serious crime, procedural justice and community satisfaction, and community problems (including those actually identified by the community and not just the police) as the three areas to focus on in CompStat. Other measures should be collected that could inform these (such as use of force; community complaints; and stop, question, and frisk), but they need to be presented at CompStat only if they are relevant to the major problems identified by the district commander. If these need to be the focus of a longer or larger discussion, they can be part of an Administrative Stat meeting (such as some departments currently hold). Thus the purpose of CompStat is strategic, where the focus is on the “big picture” and major problems (based on evidence) in a given district (not simply reporting crime numbers, which could easily be shared and discussed at weekly meetings between the chief and his or her command staff). There is flexibility here—different communities are likely to identify different problems, and so we would expect variation in what is the focus at CompStat. The danger of too much information is that it is difficult to know what matters (as T.S. Eliot wrote, “Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?”).⁹⁷ The crime analyst in the group noted how new technologies (such as Twitter and Facebook) can be used by departments to monitor and measure police-community relations but also noted how it is challenging to get access to these data.

In this context leadership plays an important role in establishing clear expectations for performance. Rather than “whack-a-mole” policing, the emphasis should be on long-term problem-solving efforts. This shift in emphasis can set a higher bar for accountability than short-term fixes because it is more challenging to find long-term solutions to difficult, long-standing problems. The purpose is to shift attention to creative and innovative solutions to complex problems rather than traditional law enforcement strategies that provide short-term fixes. This does not mean that the agency ignores crime spikes and problems as they arise (the organization should be constantly monitoring its environment in order to be responsive), but it does mean more attention to addressing chronic and recurring problems so that they can be prevented from reoccurring in the future.

97. T.S. Eliot, *The Rock: A Pageant Play* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1934).

This would seem to imply longer periods between CompStat meetings when a district commander must present his or her progress to top leadership, but there was disagreement among the group on this point. Some argued for regular monthly meetings in order to maintain focus and accountability; others felt quarterly CompStat meetings would suffice. Perhaps this is something that different CompStat 2.0 models could test: Do different intervals result in trade-offs between accountability and innovation or creativity?

The group envisioned internal CompStat meetings and separate meetings with members of the community where district commanders could present on what they are doing, share CompStat data, and solicit input and discussion from the community.

Constructing a CompStat 2.0 prototype

Here we offer our opinions about the implications of the meeting for major issues in how to construct a CompStat 2.0 prototype—that is, what it should look like. We recognize that there will need to be adjustments to the prototype when it is actually implemented. Agencies will need or want to change some aspects of the model, but here we outline what the theoretically ideal model would include.

Measuring community policing

Include both outcome and output measures. Outcome measures reveal whether the ultimate goal was achieved. Output measures reveal how well community policing was implemented. Physicians track both treatment and the health outcomes, and so should CompStat. Output measures need to be constructed in a thoughtful manner. For example, simply counting the frequency of neighborhood group meetings (e.g., 12 held in the last year) does not show anything about the degree and quality of community engagement (attendance and participation during the meeting).

Incorporating a wide variety of indicators of community policing outputs and outcomes is recommended, but considerable thought needs to go into which ones to select and why. Here are some obvious possibilities:

- Procedural justice in police-community contacts
- Use of police authority (arrest, citations, informal enforcement such as threats, cautions, warnings, and advice)
- Assistance rendered
- Community satisfaction and police legitimacy
- Fear of crime
- Level of observed disorder
- Level of perceived disorder

Measuring the degree of procedural justice that police provide will be important, but it must be done with a sound scientific basis. The most popular way to measure procedural justice is by surveying the public (or certain segments of the public, such as those with recent police contact). However, it is important to note that relying on public perceptions of police procedural

justice may not accurately reflect what the police actually did,⁹⁸ so it might be desirable to incorporate some occasional observational audits of police practice. This observation could be done efficiently where departments routinely generate video recordings of police officer interactions (through dashboard or body-worn cameras). Using these videos to assess actual police practice would be a major step forward in learning to what extent police are practicing procedural justice. Such videos will permit access to a more credible account of what officers did and will allow the department to learn more about how to go about improving procedural justice performance, not to mention other aspects of police performance (such as minimizing the use of force to only that degree needed). Being able to take advantage of this technological advance might well be an appropriate prerequisite for testing of the CompStat 2.0 prototype. To date far more attention has been paid to using these videos to address community complaints and conduct use of force investigations than to advancing good police work.

CompStat measures of community policing need to reflect the full range of services and efforts undertaken by the police, because a community-oriented police organization is committed to quality delivery of the full range of services the community expects from it. Thus, the construction of a set of performance measures needs to take into account not only how well the police are doing with serious (Part I) crimes, but how they are doing with the much more numerous less serious offenses, disturbances, and array of requests for non-crime assistance. Just as traditional CompStat seeks to record reductions in serious crime, a community-oriented CompStat should seek to record reductions in these “less-serious,” but far more numerous events.

Measuring the impact of community policing should include measures that rely upon community input about perceptions and judgments of police performance. This may (and should) be done a number of ways:

- Surveys of the general population of residents
- Surveys of special populations (school children, homeless persons, arrestees, people who have had recent contact with the police)
- Complaints or commendations regarding police practice

Motivating performance

Care must be taken to activate motivational systems that affect actors throughout the organization, not just the middle managers who routinely appear at CompStat meetings. Lower-level personnel (e.g., police-rank officers) are frequently not included. However, the costs of tracking individual-level performance using CompStat data will be very challenging, and such tracking is likely to face resistance from collective bargaining units. Realistically, it will not be feasible to routinely gather many data elements on individual officers (e.g., follow-up surveys of community satisfaction with their contact with a police officer), but it may be feasible to track an entire unit’s performance.

There are two types of motivational systems, both of which should be used.

1. Extrinsic motivation systems rely upon providing external consequences that police care about for performing well. Providing these consequences requires making clear what constitutes good performance; giving police the capability, opportunity, and resources to perform well;

98. Robert E. Worden and Sarah J. McLean, “Reflections on CompStat in the Community Era of Policing” (see page 28).

and creating a sense in officers that good performance will be rewarded in ways that matter to officers (and lower levels of performance will not receive rewards). Developing this extrinsic reward system requires attention to articulating expectations (policies and standards), providing training and resources needed for performance, a reliable system of performance tracking, and providing material rewards for performance on a routine basis (e.g., recognition, career advancement). The sort of leadership style that this requires is sometimes called “transactional.”

2. The second system relies upon intrinsic rewards—employees striving to perform well because they have internalized a value system in which performing well is the right thing to do. That is, officers embrace the values, goals, and priorities embedded in the CompStat system as their own. Officers need to be convinced that the values and priorities that CompStat is intended to promote are the right ones for them and for the organization. This requires hiring and promoting people who embrace those values or who are open to persuasion. It also requires training and supervision that do not simply dictate department policy but show convincingly why those policies and expectations are worth promoting. Leaders up and down the chain of command need to constantly reinforce the importance of those values. Finally, the CompStat system must clearly be shown to reflect those values.

One of the best ways to build effective motivational systems is to let employees participate in its construction.

Integrating the values of CompStat 2.0 into the existing systems outlined here will be a complex and time-consuming process, probably requiring more time and effort than will be available for the testing of a prototype system. One way to deal with this problem is to select agencies that have systems that are already fairly compatible with the values and expectations of CompStat 2.0.

One of the most efficient ways to stimulate both motivational systems is to focus on involving first-line supervisors in the CompStat process. This involvement might be accomplished by holding periodic district-level CompStat meetings at which district commanders hold first-line supervisors accountable for reporting on the challenges and progress on priorities within their domains. When the topics of these district-level CompStat meetings are linked to the department-level CompStat meeting, it is easier for these key linchpins of implementation to get the bigger picture and feel involved in the process.

Measuring police performance in general

The use of a crime harm index⁹⁹ should be undertaken with care. A crime harm index is different from the common method of summing the number of crimes that have occurred, as the Uniform Crime Reports does for broad categories of crime (violent crime, property crime). A harm index weights the crimes according to the severity of harm that each specific type of crime offense has caused. Presumably an assault that causes injury severe enough to send the victim to the hospital is more severe than one that does not. One non-index way to deal with this is to provide separate counts of all types of crimes, but this may prove cumbersome given the large numbers of offenses that exist in criminal codes, making it difficult to readily interpret

99. Lawrence Sherman, Peter W. Neyroud, and Eleanor Neyroud, “The Cambridge Crime Harm Index: Measuring Total Harm from Crime Based on Sentencing Guidelines,” *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 10, no. 3 (2016), 171–183, <https://academic.oup.com/policing/article/10/3/171/1753592/The-Cambridge-Crime-Harm-Index-Measuring-Total>; Tim Hegarty, Brad Ingalls, and Jeremy Riley, *6 things you need to know about Sherman’s Crime Harm Index* (Manhattan, KS: Riley County Police, 2016), http://www.rileycountypolice.org/sites/default/files/iacp_2015_handout_website_version.pdf.

what is happening to a given area in a given time span. The harm index creates a single overall value that comes from summing the severity of each individual crime event into a single score, thus weighting the occurrence of a crime by its severity. A variety of methods have been proposed for weighting offenses: court records of sentences handed down, victim assessments of crime seriousness (from victimization surveys), and sentencing gravity scores promulgated by sentencing commissions. The value of a crime harm index is similar to that of a consumer price index, which generates a single value for the cost of consumable goods across many different categories, taking into account what portion of the typical family's budget is taken up by each type of expense.

Caution in the use of such indices is required for a number of reasons, but perhaps the most obvious is that crimes at the most severe end of the scale have much higher scores than those that occur far more frequently. Hence, unusual high-severity events in a given area may skew harm index scores in ways that are easily misinterpreted if users are unaware of the dynamic (e.g., a homicide in a neighborhood that rarely experiences violent crime of any sort). Further, such an index, while potentially useful as an overall assessment of the cost of crime in a given area during a given time period, can obscure essential disaggregated crime information and make it difficult to conduct a problem-solving assessment of what is going on and what to do about it.

Good measurement of police performance (however defined) requires drawing on multiple data sources whenever possible. For example, the most common way of measuring crime is to use crimes reported to or by the police and recorded in police data archives. However, victimization surveys allow evaluators to learn about the "dark figure" of unreported crime as well. So using both forms is useful. Victimization surveys are costly, so they may not be conducted as frequently (perhaps only annually), but they can nonetheless be very helpful for interpreting crime figures based on police records. Such audits should be alert to changes in data recording procedures and practices that might account for statistical trends. For example, downgrading offenses from felony to misdemeanor has been one way in which crime trends have led consumers of the data to misinterpret declining rates of crime.

The more that CompStat 2.0 ties departmental consequences to police statistical performance (e.g., crime rate trends), the greater will be the pressure to distort the data in a positive way. The validity and legitimacy of the entire enterprise rests upon the integrity of the data, so extra care is needed to ensure that the data are as accurate as possible. Hence, it is important to conduct both routine audits of the data as well as unannounced spot audits. Ideally these audits would be performed by an independent organization, not by the police department—just as businesses are required to submit to financial audits.

CompStat 2.0 must be sensitive to the possibility that different segments of the community systematically receive different levels of police performance. Some examples are racial or ethnic groupings, religious groups, age groups, neighborhoods, wealth levels, and mental health status. Hence, data collection systems used by CompStat 2.0 should be able to distinguish police performance according to community segment. This will require careful advance thought, discussion, and debate about how to define community segments for the purpose of tracking police performance. This segmentation has political as well as technical implications, but the bottom line is that where there is a reasonable expectation that differences exist (especially those that may be unwarranted), there is an obligation to examine them.

The role of CompStat in problem solving

A repeated theme throughout the conference—coming especially from community organization representatives—was the desire for CompStat to draw in a much broader array of public and private organizations to deal with broader social, economic, and cultural problems than are typically thought of as policing responsibilities. Dealing with health, education, welfare, sanitation, and a host of other needs was presented as doing something much broader to get at what may be the most powerful forces that present challenges that police end up handling. While the goal may be worthy, we caution against using this as a major feature of the new, improved CompStat. The capacity of police—in terms of both their expertise and the scope of their power—is simply insufficient. Such broad efforts require the mobilization of a much broader range of actors, at the level of both the bureaucracy and the politicians to whom the bureaucracies are responsible. While it is valuable to establish links and partnerships with other service agencies and organizations, attempting to create a highly integrated system to coordinate all of these links and giving the system adequate resources and motivation will almost certainly overwhelm nascent attempts to build a more community-oriented CompStat. Thus, if a candidate agency for a protocol trial already has something like CityStat, and it functions well, it would be a potentially promising solution. But trying to build CityStat from scratch seems like too much.

The selection of problems to receive priority attention needs to be informed by what the community or communities want. CompStat needs to ensure that the organization devises ways to gather indicators of community priorities.

For most problems selected for police attention, the problem-solving process will be conducted outside of the CompStat meeting, but the CompStat meeting will be used to monitor problem-solving projects. There needs to be clear accountability for who is responsible (e.g., LAPD's Senior Lead Officer), and each problem-solving project needs to have specific goals and performance measures established so that CompStat can properly monitor progress. Under the LAPD's Basic Car Plan, small beats are given one patrol car that is assigned to several officers, including a Senior Lead Officer responsible for coordinating officers' activities across different shifts. One of the advantages of Senior Lead Officers is that this structure decentralizes geographic accountability down to the beat level rather than the much larger geographic unit of a district. Research on hot spots suggests that problems occur in very small geographic areas (such as street segments).

It is appropriate for CompStat to monitor not only the progress of problem-solving projects in solving problems, but also the problem-solving process. Is the process meeting expectations about the quality of the analysis and assessment components of the SARA process—which are typically the weakest? Is supervision of the problem-solving process adequate? When results do not meet expectations, is there an analysis of what went wrong (e.g., did stakeholders do their part)? Is the department's support for the problem-solving process (such as quality of data from department records, data management, and data analysis) adequate? CompStat should ensure that problem-solving projects have available outside research expertise when the department is unable to provide what is needed.

A CompStat-like approach needs to be applied to the identification and correction of problem police officers. Problem police may be defined as officers who either abuse their authority or show insufficient skill in ways that significantly undermine the department's quality of service and legitimacy with the public. The CompStat process applied to this sort of problem should be run separately from the regular CompStat because of issues of privacy and confidentiality that will be raised in personnel matters. The process should include not only the identification of problem officers but also the monitoring of interventions to change officer performance (training, supervision, etc.).

Broadening participation beyond police

Other government and private sector organizations should be invited to participate in CompStat meetings when their participation is relevant to problems being considered.

Community representatives should be invited to participate in CompStat meetings. Some may be invited to participate routinely at all meetings, while others may be invited to participate when topics of discussion are relevant to them. Participation should go beyond mere observation. Community attendees should be allowed to ask questions and should be expected to contribute to the presentation of information about progress in solving problems.

A balance must be struck between too many and too few community participants. Participants should be contributors to the CompStat process and not merely bystanders.

Transparency issues

Should the meetings be open to the general public or broadcast on television or other social media? Perhaps some meetings would be appropriate for this degree of transparency, but when such visibility threatens the candor of participants or changes their behavior to "showboating," then access should be restricted.

Transparency can be accomplished by routinely reporting an overview of CompStat meetings while excluding sensitive and confidential information. Reports can be disseminated online at the department's web site or by other social media. On some occasions it may be useful to hold special meetings for the public.

About the Authors

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Nola M. Joyce is the former Deputy Commissioner and Chief Administrative Officer for the Philadelphia Police Department, where she helped manage and direct the change in policy, process, and procedures for Commissioner Charles H. Ramsey. From 1998 to 2007, she served as the Chief Administrative Officer for the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. In this capacity, she guided the expansion of the community policing model, the alignment of the budget with strategic initiatives, and the implementation of significant changes in the department's organizational structure. She also restructured the department's budget into

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George L. Kelling, PhD, is Professor Emeritus in the School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers Newark University, and senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Formerly he was a professor in criminal justice at Northeastern University and a fellow in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has practiced social work as a child care worker and a probation officer and has administered residential care programs for aggressive and disturbed youths. In 1972, Dr. Kelling began work at the Police Foundation and conducted several large-scale experiments, most notably the *Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment* and the *Newark Foot Patrol Experiment*. The latter was the source of his contribution to his most familiar publication in the *Atlantic*, "Broken Windows," with James Q. Wilson. During the late 1980s, Dr. Kelling developed the order maintenance policies in the New York City subway that ultimately led to radical crime reductions. Later, he consulted with the New York City and Los Angeles Police Departments under William Bratton. His most notable major publication is *Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities*, which he has published with his wife, Catherine M. Coles. Dr. Kelling has lectured, consulted, and conducted research in cities throughout the United States as well as in South and Central America, Europe, Japan, and Australia. Dr. Kelling recently published a book, *Policing in Milwaukee*, and is currently working on another, *The Rediscovery of Policing*, with William Bratton and Catherine Coles. Dr. Kelling received his BA from St. Olaf College, his MSW from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and his PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Stephen D. Mastrofski, PhD, is a University Professor in the Department of Criminology, Law, and Society and Director of the Center for Justice Leadership and Management at George Mason University. His research interests include police discretion, police organizations and their reform, and systematic field observation methods in criminology. His recent publications have focused on application of systematic observation methods to police procedural justice, the reform of police organizations, and establishing and validating the quality of police performance. For several years Dr. Mastrofski led a large team of researchers supporting and evaluating the transformation of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service and before that the Project on Policing Neighborhoods. He was a co-principal investigator on the NIJ-funded National Police Research Platform project. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the NIJ and the

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Sarah J. McLean, PhD, is the Associate Director of the John F. Finn Institute for Public Safety, Inc., and its Director of Research and Technical Assistance. She received her PhD in criminal justice from the University at Albany, State University of New York. Dr. McLean's primary research interests lie in the areas of organizational change and development, management accountability, and decision making, focused especially on policing. Prior to co-founding the John F. Finn Institute with Robert Worden in 2007, she worked on several policing research projects at the University at Albany, State University of New York's Hindelang Research Center. Dr. McLean's most recent work includes the NIJ-funded multiagency examination of early intervention systems. She is also serves as the co-principal investigator on a study to understand the police response to "dual role victims." Dr. McLean was co-principal investigator on a recently completed NIJ-funded examination of police legitimacy and procedural justice that placed an emphasis on understanding the impact of incorporating measures of police performance in these terms into two departments' management accountability systems (i.e., Compstat). Her past research focused on domestic violence and judicial decision making. She previously worked as a research associate at the Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center of the University at Albany and prior to that as a research associate at the National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice.

Cy Richardson is the Senior Vice President for Economics and Housing Programs at the NUL. Prior to being appointed in 2013 to co-lead the NUL's Programs Department, he previously served as Vice President for Housing and Community Development, where he promoted asset building and wealth creation for people of color in the urban United States. A member of the NUL's senior leadership team, he also conducts basic and applied research around the guiding principles and practices of equitable development and is a frequent commentator and blogger on the boosts and blocks to building sustainable wealth in communities of color. Prior to joining the NUL in 2002, Mr. Richardson, a certified City Planner and Economic Development Finance Professional, worked in various positions in New York City municipal government including as a researcher and policy analyst with the New York City Council, with the New York State Legislature on economic policy issues, and as a land use planner for the Brooklyn Borough President. He also serves as a lecturer in Hunter College's Urban Affairs Graduate Program. Mr. Richardson earned a BA with honors in political science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he was a four-year starter and captain of the nationally ranked baseball team. After graduating he played professionally in the Toronto Blue Jays organization for three years. He holds graduate degrees in City and Regional Planning from Pratt Institute and Urban Politics from the City University of New York's Graduate Center. In 2001 Mr. Richardson received an Advanced Certificate in Urban Policy Analysis from Humboldt University (Berlin) and in 2013 earned an Executive Certificate in Nonprofit Management from Georgetown University.

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About Vera

The **Vera Institute of Justice** (Vera) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit center for justice policy and practice with offices in New York City; Washington, D.C.; New Orleans; and Los Angeles. Vera's research, projects, and reform initiatives, typically conducted in partnership with local, state, or national officials, are located across the United States. For additional information, visit www.vera.org.

About the Police Foundation

The **Police Foundation** is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing innovation and science in policing. As the country's oldest police research organization, the Police Foundation has learned that police practices should be based on scientific evidence about what works best, the paradigm of evidence-based policing.

Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure and works to transfer to local agencies the best new information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of the foundation's efforts is the goal of efficient, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.

To learn more, visit the Police Foundation online at www.policefoundation.org.

A performance management system based on crime incident data, CompStat has proven to be a valuable measurement and decision-making tool for law enforcement since its development in 1994. However, many believe that its effectiveness would be greatly enhanced by the inclusion of community engagement measures. This report contains recommendations for integrating community policing values, inputs, and outcomes into CompStat. The result would be CompStat 2.0, which would be a more accurate tool for measuring police effectiveness and public safety. The recommendations are in the form of white papers submitted by a diverse group of stakeholders who attended a symposium on integrating community indicators into CompStat, a meeting convened by the Vera Institute of Justice and the Police Foundation with a grant from the COPS Office. In providing ideas for the development and implementation of a CompStat 2.0, these papers offer valuable guidance for evidence and community-based policing.



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