Nonlinearity in the Relationship between Impression Management Tactics and Interview Performance

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Abstract

This study examined the linear and nonlinear relationships between applicant impression management (IM) behaviors during the interview and subsequent interview performance. We proposed that honest IM would have a nonlinear effect on interview performance, whereas deceptive IM would demonstrate a linear effect. Hypotheses were examined using a sample of 693 high-fidelity interviews. Results indicated that honest IM has a nonlinear relationship with interview performance, such that honest IM appears to only be effective up to a particular point, after which it becomes detrimental. Conversely, the relationship between deceptive IM and interview performance was more linear and negative. This study contributes to our understanding of IM by demonstrating that the effects of IM on performance are more complex than previously identified.

Nonlinearity in the Relationship between Impression Management Tactics and Interview Performance Ratings

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The study of applicant impression management (IM) tactic use in interviews has surged over the past several decades. This research has examined applicant IM behaviors as a primary means through which applicants can attempt to influence the outcome of the interview (Bolino, et al., 2016; Levashina et al., 2014). Although there are a number of tactics applicants may use, at a broad level, researchers have distinguished between two forms of IM tactics in interviews—honest and deceptive IM tactics (cf. Bourdage et al., 2018; Levashina & Campion, 2006; 2007). Honest IM tactics are used when applicants try to create an impression of competence and fit by emphasizing truthful positive past experiences and value similarities with the organization; whereas deceptive IM tactics are used when applicants try to make this positive impression by exaggerating or pretending to have qualifications, experiences, or fit that they do not possess.

Ratings of interview performance have often been used as criteria against which to judge the effect of IM tactics. Research has found that the relationship between honest IM tactics and interview ratings is generally positive; whereas the relationship between deceptive IM tactics tends to be lower (Amaral et al., 2019; Bourdage et al., 2018; Kristof-Brown et al., 2002; Melchers et al., 2020). It is likely that deceptive IM tactics are less related to interview performance ratings because they are difficult for interviewers to identify (Roulin et al., 2015), or that applicants use them less effectively. The underlying assumption behind this research is that the relationship between IM tactics and interview performance is linear.

While the presumption has been that the relationship between IM and interview performance is linear, management researchers are becoming more sensitive to the fact that relationships between organizational phenomena and outcomes of interest can often be nonlinear. Pierce and Aguinis (2013) have labelled this as the too-much-of-a-good-thing effect. Applied to interview IM tactics, we predict that the relationship between honest IM and interview performance may be nonlinear. When using IM, Jones and Pittman (1982) and Turnley and Bolino (2001) argue that theoretically, IM can create a desired image (e.g., competent, likable), but also can lead to undesirable images (e.g., conceited, sycophantic). Here, we propose that one factor contributing to the success of IM is using the appropriate amount of IM, with the possibility that applicants may be punished or experience diminishing returns for overuse of honest IM.

On the one hand, because interviewers (a) expect honest IM (Jansen et al., 2012), and (b) are better at detecting honest IM (Roulin et al., 2015), a certain degree of the use of IM tactics is useful, conforms to interviewer expectations, and helps to highlight the applicant's skill and fit. However, it is also possible that at a certain point, interviewers may see those over-using honest IM as overly gratuitous and self-serving. Indeed, although interviewers seem to expect honest IM, evidence also indicates that some modesty can elicit positive reactions (Diekmann, Blickle, Hafner, & Peters, 2015). Conversely, interviewees judged as sycophantic and conceited are evaluated more negatively overall (Wingate & Bourdage, 2019). As such, the immodesty associated with very high levels of IM may be off-putting to interviewers. Moreover, certain IM behaviors have been shown to "backfire when used under the wrong conditions or in the wrong way" (Diekmann et al., 2015, p. 127), and that effective use of IM is knowing when IM is

appropriate and when it is not (Turnley & Bolino, 2001). Indiscriminate use of IM may be one of these inappropriate cases.

In short, the use of some honest IM may lead to a perception of the applicant as competent and likable, whereas too much of such behavior could lead to being seen as sycophantic or conceited, with resulting diminishing returns. Although it has been suggested that engaging in excessive IM can be "overdone" (Waung et al., 2017) or can "backfire" (Moore et al., 2017), this proposition has never been empirically tested, and so we aim to contribute to the literature by testing this.

Finally, we should note that we also test for a nonlinear effect of deceptive IM on interview performance. However, we believe that it is less likely that a nonlinear effect will be found with deceptive IM tactics as they are likely generally not accurately recognized and interpreted by interviewers (Roulin et al., 2015).

H1a: The relationship between honest IM tactics and interview performance will be nonlinear such that at it will be positive up to a point, but at higher levels of honest IM effects on interview performance will decrease.

H1b: The relationship between deceptive IM tactics and interview performance will be negative and essentially linear.

2. METHOD

2.1 Participants and procedure

Two samples of participants were combined and used in this study.[1] Sample 1 (n = 523) was composed of mostly female (58.3%) and non-White (Asian 43.2%, South Asian 22.8%,

[1] The correlation between honest IM tactics and interview performance was nonsignificant across subsamples (z = 0.23, p = .82) as was the correlation between deceptive IM tactics and interview performance across subsamples (z = 1.35, p = .18). Additionally, the interactive effect 95% confidence intervals between subsamples overlapped for both honest and deceptive IM tactics (see Tables A3.1 and A3.2 in the Appendix). Full subsample results can be found in

White 24.5%, all other 9.5%) participants who were on average 22.3 years of age (*SD* = 3.8). Sample 2 (*n* = 170) was composed of mostly female (81.1%) and White (White 60.1%, 22.3% Asian, 4.8% Middle Eastern, 4.7% Black, and 8.1% all other) participants who were on average 20.8 years of age (*SD* = 2.6). Both samples were composed of undergraduate students at two major Canadian universities. Sample 1 participants were engaged in mock interviews for a range of jobs and Sample 2 participants were engaged in real interviews for the position of Research Assistant. Both samples provided self-report ratings of IM tactics and had their performance rated by professional interviewers upon completion of the interview.

2.2 Measures

2.2.1 IM tactics

Seven different IM tactics were measured. The participants Sample 1 were given the long form version of the scales; whereas, participants in Sample 2 were given the short form version of the scales. Number of items and associated scale reliabilities are in parentheses for each sample. Three scales measured honest IM tactics: (1) honest self-promotion (pointing out one's actual past experiences or accomplishments and describing one's actual job-related abilities or skills in an attractive way) (14/4 items | .92/.75 alphas); (2) honest ingratiation (highlighting values that one shares with the interviewer or organization, or genuinely praising the interviewer or organization) (8/4 items | .88/.69 alphas); and (3) honest defensive IM (using excuses, apologies, or justifications to repair one's image when threatened by negative questions of concerns from the interviewer) (10/4 items | .85/.60 alphas). Four scales measured deceptive IM tactics: (1) slight image creation (embellishing, overstating, tailoring, or enhancing one's

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the Appendix. We therefore aggregated the samples. We focus on the aggregated results because statistical power estimates for the honest IM tactics were low in the subsamples (.59 and .42 for Sample 1 and Sample 2, respectively) in comparison to .80 for the aggregated results.

qualifications or experiences to appear more qualified for the position or a better fit with the organization) (7/4 items | .86/.59 alphas); (2) extensive image creation (inventing, constructing, or borrowing qualifications or experiences to appear more qualified for the position or a better fit with the organization) (9/4 items | .91/.59 alphas); (3) deceptive ingratiation (expressing false beliefs, values, or attitudes to appear similar to the interviewer or organization, or insincerely praising or complimenting the interviewer or the organization) (9/4 items | .88/.68 alphas); and (4) image protection (omitting, hiding, or distancing oneself from negative events in one's past to defend one's image of a good candidate) (8/4 items | .84/.56 alphas).

Details on the scale development for the short and long form versions used to measure honest IM tactic scales can be found in Bourdage et al. (2018). Details on the scale development for the long form version used to measure deceptive IM tactics can be found in Levashina and Campion (2007) and for the short form version used to measure deceptive IM tactics see Bourdage et al. (2018). Responses were made on a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (to no extent) to 5 (to a great extent).

The base rate of IM behaviors in an interview setting did not appear to be very high. In both samples, the average scale scores were below the midpoint of the scales. To ensure that we had adequate coverage of honest and deceptive behaviors at the high end of the distribution (necessary to examine nonlinearity), we conducted an exploratory factor analysis within each sample at the scale level using principal axis factor extraction and promax rotation with a kappa = 4. In each sample, two factors were extracted with eigenvalues greater than one with a scree plot that suggested no necessary additional factoring. Simple structure was obtained in each sample for six of the seven scales. Deceptive ingratiation cross-loaded and a decision was taken

to drop this scale from analysis.[2] Stratified alpha (Feldt & Brennan, 1989) for the three scales that formed the honest IM tactics composite was .95 for Sample 1 and .80 for Sample 2, and for the three scales that formed the deceptive IM tactics composite was .94 for Sample 1 and .77 for Sample 2.

The samples were combined to increase statistical power and simplify analyses. Scales were summed to form a composite and z-scores were computed within each sample (to maintain each sample's unique distributional properties). The use of z-scores allowed us to more easily derive starting values for some of the analyses. The two sets of data were then combined for subsequent nonlinearity analyses for a total $N = 693$ for all analyses (see below).

2.2.2 Interview performance ratings

2.2.2.1 *Sample 1*. Interviewers rated each interviewee on three questions designed to tap into interview performance. The items were "Overall, based on the interview, I would evaluate this candidate positively,", "Based on the interview, I would invite this student for another interview/on site visit", and "Based on the interview, I would recommend extending a job offer to this interviewee". Single ratings were provided either as an individual interviewer or as a panel of interviewers. All answers were provided on a 5-point Likert scale. The internal consistency estimate for this scale was .92.

2.2.2.2 *Sample 2*. Four behaviorally anchored rating scales were used. For 79 of the participants, only one interviewer was used and therefore the internal consistency estimate was .57. For the remaining participants, two interviewers provided ratings with an ICC = .57. An example item was "Can you tell me about a time when you had to work on a large independent project at either work or school?" Answers were scored along three behavioural levels—low (e.g., "Does not

[2] Please contact the first author for details on the exploratory factor analysis.

complete the assigned task within the required time frame"), medium (e.g., "Adheres to all required deadlines for the task on schedule"), and high ("Meets all required deadlines ahead of schedule").

3. ANALYSES AND RESULTS

3.1 Analyses

Similar analytic methodology for examining nonlinearity to that detailed by Rigotti (2009) was used in the present study. Three different regression models were fit to the data for both honest and deceptive IM tactics: linear, quadratic, and segmented with IM tactic as the predictor and interview performance rating as the outcome. The linear regression model was a simple linear regression model. The quadratic regression model adds a squared term to the linear regression term and tests for a U or inverted-U shape in the data. Quadratic regression models thus test for a gradual change in the direction of the regression line where effects are most likely to be detected when a reversal occurs toward the center of the predictor distribution. Squared terms that evidence statistically significant increases in variance over the linear term indicate a quadratic effect. The segmented regression model is rarely used in the social sciences but tests nonlinearity using a threshold approach—that is, it tests for an abrupt change in the direction of the regression line (Seber & Wild, 2003). Four parameters are estimated in a segmented regression model (ba0 = intercept, ba1 = direct effect, bb1 = interactive effect, and knot = break point). The two primary parameters of interest are the knot (indicating where in the distribution the break point occurs) and bb1 (indicating an abrupt change in the direction of the regression line where there is a difference in the slopes below and above the break point). Graphing the nonlinearity effects for both the quadratic and segmented models are preferred for interpreting the form of the nonlinearity. Partial *F*-tests were then employed to examine whether the

segmented regression model provided statistically significant increases in variance over the linear and quadratic regression models.

3.2 Results

The linear relationship between honest and deceptive tactics was moderate ($r = .38$, $p < .001$). The linear relationship between honest IM tactics and interview performance ratings was small and positive ($r = .11$, $p < .01$); whereas the linear relationship between deceptive IM tactics was small and negative ($r = -.07$, $p < .10$). The estimation of the linear and quadratic models can be found in Table 1. For honest IM tactics: (a) the linear model was statistically significant in the positive direction ($\beta = .11$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .011$); and (b) the quadratic model accounted for a statistically significant increase in variance over the linear model ($\beta = -.09$, $p < .05$, $\Delta R^2 = .006$). For deceptive IM tactics: (a) the linear model was marginally statistically significant in the negative direction ($\beta = -.07$, $p < .10$, $R^2 = .005$); and (b) the quadratic model did not account for a statistically significant increase in variance over the linear model ($\beta = -.01$, $p > .05$, $\Delta R^2 = .000$).

The results for the segmented regression model can be found in Table 2. For honest IM tactics: (a) the overall model was statistically significant $F(4, 689) = 3.70$, $p < .01$) with an $R^2 = .021$; (b) the direct effect (ba1) was not significantly different from zero; (c) the interactive effect (bb1) was negative and significantly different from zero; and (d) the breakpoint occurred near the mean of the distribution. For deceptive IM tactics, the overall model was not statistically significant $F(4, 689) = 0.87$, $p > .05$ and none of the parameters were statistically different from zero.

Comparison of segmented regression models with the linear and quadratic models can be found in Table 3. For honest IM tactics: (a) the segmented regression model accounted for a significantly greater percentage of variance in interview performance ratings compared to the

linear model F(3, 688) = 2.34, $p < .10$, $\Delta R^2 = .010$; and (b) the segmented regression model accounted for a significantly greater percentage of variance in interview performance ratings compared to the quadratic model F(3, 688) = 2.46, $p < .10$, $\Delta R^2 = .007$. Segmented models did not outperform the linear and quadratic models for deceptive IM tactics. Our results thus support both study hypotheses.

Figure 1 shows the forms of the predicted relationships between honest IM tactics and interview performance ratings based on the segmented, linear, and quadratic models. The segmented and quadratic models look quite similar with the exception that the slightly better fitting segmented model shows an abrupt change in the direction of the regression line versus the gradual change exemplified by the quadratic model. Of particular note in this figure is the degree to which individuals' interview performance scores would be overpredicted at both the low and high ends of the distribution should one use a linear model in comparison to a segmented or quadratic model.

4. DISCUSSION

Our data demonstrate an inflection point in the effectiveness of honest IM, which occurred near the mean of the distribution. These findings suggest that, although honest IM may indeed be associated with higher interview scores to a point, there seems to be a maximum, after which these tactics are no longer effective, or may even be a detriment to performance. These results extend our understanding of honest IM tactics, as much of the previous research investigating the effect of IM on interview performance has assumed a linear model. For example, there have been several meta-analyses reporting positive relationship between IM use in the interview and interview outcomes (e.g., Barrick et al., 2009; Levashina et al., 2014: Peck & Levashina, 2017), which have assumed a linear relationship.

These findings support Pierce and Aguinis's (2013) too-much-of-a-good-thing (TMGT) effect – that is, "ordinarily beneficial antecedents causing harm when taken too far." (p. 314). Pierce and Aguinis illustrated their meta-theory with a number of examples from Human Resource Management; our findings provide support for their theory and provide an additional example of an inflection point – more honest IM does not lead to even higher interview performance scores after that point. This is consistent with the (so far untested) notion that IM can be successful, but in some circumstances may also result in negative attributions (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Moore et al., 2017; Turnley & Bolino, 2001; Waung et al., 2017).

Interestingly, we did not find the same pattern of results for Deceptive IM. The previously cited meta-analyses of the IM-Interview Performance literature (e.g., Barrick et al., 2009; Levashina et al., 2014: Peck & Levashina, 2017) did not differentiate between honest and deceptive tactics; in many cases the measures used in the primary studies were a mix of both honest and deceptive tactics. When studies have reported on the relations between specifically deceptive IM and interview outcomes (such as interview performance or hiring outcomes) the correlations have ranged from small and negative to moderate and positive (see Melchers et al., 2020 for a review). In the present study, the linear model we tested was marginally statistically significant in the negative direction. It appears that deceptive IM is not a "beneficial antecedent" that fits within the TMGT model – at least not for this sample. This implies that there may be additional moderators of the deceptive IM to interview outcome relationship, such as that deceptive IM is only effective for some individuals (Buehl & Melchers, 2017).

Limitations and Future Directions

The samples in this study were relatively young and inexperienced job seekers. It is difficult to know if these same patterns would generalize to older and more experienced workers,

and this is a question for future research. Pierce and Aguinis (2013) noted in their paper on TMGT theory that specific inflection points would be context specific—what might be considered too much in one context might be not enough in a different context. We recommend that this model be tested in other contexts, with different jobs and more experienced interviewees.

A limitation of the current study is that we relied on self-reports of IM. However, this approach is necessary when trying to make distinctions between honest and deceptive IM. As Melchers et al. (2020) point it, observers are rarely able to detect whether a specific IM tactic used during an interview is honest or deceptive – it is really only the interviewee who knows. Thus, although it is a limitation to rely solely on self-report IM data, it is the best approach when it is important to distinguish honest from deceptive IM.

A final set of limitations surround the aggregation of the data sets. The reliabilities of the measures were lower in the smaller subsample. This limitation was mitigated by the lower weighting given to this sample when aggregating. However, future research should endeavour to use measures with higher reliabilities. Also, the interview performance constructs were different which could have introduced construct validity error. Again, future research should examine whether these nonlinearities hold in larger samples with the same constructs.

Conclusion

Some IM is expected in the employment interview context, (Jansen et al., 2012), and engaging in honest IM is associated with higher interview scores--to a point. Although tactics like honest self-promotion and honest ingratiation may be helpful during the interview, it appears there is a point at which it can be too much. In contrast, deceptive IM was not associated with higher interview scores in our data. Perhaps IM that is actually honest starts to appear less

genuine to interviewers if used too frequently—thus the relationship between excessive use of honest IM starts to look like the relationship between deceptive IM and interview performance. Melchers et al. (2020) suggested that IM might behave as a continuum, with honest tactics at one end, and deceptive at other. Perhaps excessive honest IM moves the candidate up the continuum such that the tactics start to exceed what the interviewer expects, and thus excessive honest IM starts to have the same small negative effects on interview performance as deceptive IM. Practically, while initial findings of a linear effect for honest IM would imply that we should advise applicants to use as much honest IM as possible, the findings of the present study suggest that applicants should use some IM but be careful to avoid using too much of this behavior. Employment interviews are a complex social interaction, where candidates much strike the right balance between promoting why they are the best candidate for the job, while also not tipping the balance and engaging in ‘too much of a good thing.’

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Table 1

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations (Aggregated)

Variable	M	SD	SK	$SK_{(se)}$	KT	$KT_{(se)}$	K-S	HIM	DIM	IP
HIM	0.00	1.00	-0.32	.09	-.12	.19	.05**	--		
DIM	0.00	1.00	1.06	.09	.62	.19	.11***	.38***	--	
IP	0.00	1.00	-0.76	.09	.12	.19	.13***	.11**	-.07	--

Note. N = 693. **p < .01. ***p < .001. SK = skewness. $SK_{(se)}$ = skewness standard error. KT = kurtosis. $KT_{(se)}$ = kurtosis standard error. K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. HIM = honest impression management tactics. DIM = deceptive interview tactics. IP = interview performance.

Table 2

Results of Regression Analyses of IM Tactics on Interview Performance Rating (Aggregated)

	Honest IM Tactics			Deceptive IM Tactics		
	β	ΔR^2	F	β	ΔR^2	F
Step 1		.011	7.65**		.005	3.36†
IM Tactic	.11**			-.07		
Step 2		.006	4.25*		.000	0.07
IM Tactic^2	-.08*			-.01		
Adj. R^2		.014			.002	
F			5.97**			1.71

Note. N = 693. Standardized regression coefficients are reported for the step indicated. † p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. IM = impression management.

Table 3

Estimated Parameters for Segmented Regression Models with Interview Performance Rating as Dependent Variable (Aggregated)

Honest IM Tactics			
Parameter	Estimate	95% lower bound	95% upper bound
ba0	.12	0.00	0.23
ba1	.25	0.11	0.40
bb1	-.34	-0.69	-0.09
Knot	.10	-0.12	0.82
Deceptive IM Tactics			
Parameter	Estimate	95% lower bound	95% upper bound
ba0	.00	0.00	0.02
ba1	-.09	-0.20	0.06
bb1	.03	-1.34	0.19
Knot	.07	-1.41	2.30

Note. N = 693. ba0 = intercept. ba1 = direct effect. bb1 = interaction effect. knot = break point. IM = impression management. Confidence intervals calculated using percentile bootstrapping (1,000 resamples). Honest IM tactics R^2 = .021, p < .01. Deceptive IM tactics R^2 = .005, p > .10.

Table 4

Comparison of Segmented Regression Models with the Linear and Quadratic Model with the Partial F-Test (Aggregated)

Comparison of Regression Models	*Honest IM Tactics*	*Deceptive IM Tactics*
Segmented regression vs. linear regression		
ΔR^2	.010	.000
F ($df1$, $df2$)	2.34 (3, 688)	0.00 (3, 688)
p	.072	1.00
Segmented regression vs. quadratic regression		
ΔR^2	.007	.003
F ($df1$, $df2$)	2.46 (2, 688)	1.04 (2, 688)
p	.086	0.36

Note. N = 693. $F = \frac{(R_1^2 - R_2^2)/(df_1 - df_2)}{(1 - R_1^2)/(n - df_1 - 1)}$

Figure 1

Predicted Relationships Between Honest IM Tactics and Interview Performance Ratings Based on Segmented, Linear, and Quadratic Regression Models (Aggregated)



APPENDIX (Sample 1 and Sample 2 Results)

Table A1.1

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations (Sample 1)

Variable	M	SD	SK	$SK_{(se)}$	KT	$KT_{(se)}$	K-S	HIM	DIM	IP
HIM	0.00	1.00	-0.44	.11	-.11	.21	.06**	--		
DIM	0.00	1.00	1.14	.11	.83	.21	.11***	.42***	--	
IP	0.00	1.00	-0.76	.11	-.06	.21	.13***	.11*	-.10*	--

Note. N = 523. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. SK = skewness. $SK_{(se)}$ = skewness standard error. KT = kurtosis. $KT_{(se)}$ = kurtosis standard error. K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. HIM = honest impression management tactics. DIM = deceptive interview tactics. IP = interview performance.

Table A1.2

Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations (Sample 2)

Variable	M	SD	SK	$SK_{(se)}$	KT	$KT_{(se)}$	K-S	HIM	DIM	IP
HIM	0.00	1.00	.05	.19	-.11	.37	.06	--		
DIM	0.00	1.00	.82	.19	.04	.37	.14***	.25**	--	
IP	0.00	1.00	-.78	.19	.72	.37	.15***	.08	.02	--

Note. N = 170. **p < .01. ***p < .001. SK = skewness. $SK_{(se)}$ = skewness standard error. KT = kurtosis. $KT_{(se)}$ = kurtosis standard error. K-S = Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. HIM = honest impression management tactics. DIM = deceptive interview tactics. IP = interview performance.

Table A2.1

Results of Regression Analyses of IM Tactics on Interview Performance Rating (Sample 1)

	Honest IM Tactics			Deceptive IM Tactics		
	β	ΔR^2	F	β	ΔR^2	F
Step 1		.012	6.54*		.010	5.04*
IM Tactic	.11*			-.10		
Step 2		.002	1.16		.000	0.11
IM Tactic^2	-.05			.02		
Adj. R^2		.011			.006	
F			3.85*			2.57†

Note. N = 523. Standardized regression coefficients are reported for the step indicated. † p < .10. * p < .05. IM = impression management.

Table A2.2

Results of Regression Analyses of IM Tactics on Interview Performance Rating (Sample 2)

	Honest IM Tactics			Deceptive IM Tactics		
	β	ΔR^2	F	β	ΔR^2	F
Step 1		.007	1.19		.000	0.06
IM Tactic	.08			.02		
Step 2		.027	4.72*		.004	0.72
IM Tactic^2	-.17*			-.08		
Adj. R^2		.023			.000	
F			2.97†			0.39

Note. N = 170. Standardized regression coefficients are reported for the step indicated. † p < .10. * p < .05. IM = impression management.

Table A3.1

Estimated Parameters for Segmented Regression Models with Interview Performance Rating as Dependent Variable (Sample 1)

Honest IM Tactics			
Parameter	Estimate	95% lower bound	95% upper bound
ba0	.00	-0.04	0.23
ba1	.16	0.06	0.39
bb1	-.17	-0.71	-0.01
Knot	.38	-0.11	0.97
Deceptive IM Tactics			
Parameter	Estimate	95% lower bound	95% upper bound
ba0	.00	-0.14	0.14
ba1	-.13	-0.36	0.15
bb1	.07	-1.25	0.50
Knot	.64	-0.86	2.44

Note. N = 523. ba0 = intercept. ba1 = direct effect. bb1 = interaction effect. knot = break point. IM = impression management. Confidence intervals calculated using percentile bootstrapping (1,000 resamples). Honest IM tactics R^2 = .016, p < .10. Deceptive IM tactics R^2 = .010, p > .10.

Table A3.2

Estimated Parameters for Segmented Regression Models with Interview Performance Rating as Dependent Variable (Sample 2)

Honest IM Tactics			
Parameter	Estimate	95% lower bound	95% upper bound
ba0	.00	0.00	0.00
ba1	.20	-0.03	0.49
bb1	-.26	-3.03	0.27
Knot	.19	-1.44	2.21
Deceptive IM Tactics			
Parameter	Estimate	95% lower bound	95% upper bound
ba0	.00	0.00	0.00
ba1	.00	-0.24	0.30
bb1	.03	-6.82	0.34
Knot	-.47	-1.75	2.30

Note. N = 170. ba0 = intercept. ba1 = direct effect. bb1 = interaction effect. knot = break point. IM = impression management. Confidence intervals calculated using percentile bootstrapping (1,000 resamples). Honest IM tactics R^2 = .020, p < .10. Deceptive IM tactics R^2 = .001, p > .10.

Table A4.1

Comparison of Segmented Regression Models with the Linear and Quadratic Model with the Partial F-Test (Sample 1)

Comparison of Regression Models	*Honest IM Tactics*	*Deceptive IM Tactics*
Segmented regression vs. linear regression		
ΔR^2	.004	.000
F (*df*1, *df*2)	0.70 (3, 518)	0.00 (3, 518)
p	.551	1.00
Segmented regression vs. quadratic regression		
ΔR^2	.005	.004
F (*df*1, *df*2)	1.32 (2, 518)	1.05 (2, 518)
p	.269	.352

Note. $N = 523$. $F = \frac{(R_1^2 - R_2^2)/(df_1 - df_2)}{(1 - R_1^2)/(n - df_1 - 1)}$

Table A4.2

Comparison of Segmented Regression Models with the Linear and Quadratic Model with the Partial F-Test (Sample 2)

Comparison of Regression Models	*Honest IM Tactics*	*Deceptive IM Tactics*
Segmented regression vs. linear regression		
ΔR^2	.013	.001
F (*df*1, *df*2)	0.73 (3, 165)	0.06 (3, 165)
p	.536	.983
Segmented regression vs. quadratic regression		
ΔR^2	.000	.001
F (*df*1, *df*2)	0.00 (2, 165)	0.08 (2, 165)
p	1.00	.921

Note. $N = 170$. $F = \frac{(R_1^2 - R_2^2)/(df_1 - df_2)}{(1 - R_1^2)/(n - df_1 - 1)}$